G.R. No.

101837 February 11, 1992 investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner
vs. also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he
Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
PHILIPPINES, respondents. P100,000.00.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to
1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of
towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and
started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.
Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted
from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's conduct preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the
car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial
retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation,
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to
Elsa Ang Go. recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a
copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the
suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary
Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the
card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person
who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying
police launched a manhunt for petitioner. the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was
given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and
news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23
police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the July 1991.
police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was
avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings
such waiver. in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was,
however, denied by respondent Judge.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
wound(s).
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari,
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment
recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
of petitioner on 23 August 1991.
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his
arraignment.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the
Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October
Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the
same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court.
court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for
continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or
14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11 not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition
for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case,
detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus. petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the
gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station.
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the
corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals. seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with
to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic. which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the
provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
its first witness. the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even without
preliminary investigation.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing
the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds: On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant
because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time
and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an
investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been an existing eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge"
manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful
positively identified petitioner as the culprit. warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest.
He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the
under the Rules. circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court
sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because
days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses
the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them
constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an
conformable to law and justice.
outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and
order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal
petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
for habeas corpus could not be granted.
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with Procedure which provides as follows:
petitioner's conformity.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San
or is attempting to commit an offense; Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the
disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he
was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
investigation.
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a
committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the
had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial
the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have
turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's
constitute "personal knowledge." 18 statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The
preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within
Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for
the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which
murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record
provides:
whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed
19
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, this Court held:
arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without
whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of
offended party or arresting office or person
said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of
for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.While it is true that the
the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
its inception. consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due process of law.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the xxx xxx xxx
information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
do with the case before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of
investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re- the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for
investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to
that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the
clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17
information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring
five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly
Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence
preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail
reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially as a matter of right.
complied with.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented
While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and,
been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a
right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a remain entitled to be released on bail?
mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is
inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains
the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial
criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process. forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the
evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on
investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is
1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due
27
to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, process. Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without
petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that
arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and
Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on
investigation before being forced to stand trial. 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment,
counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic and determined
had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and
appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de
after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through
did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary
asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner
omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his
ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's
preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de
oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his
right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record
concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the
Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be
up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to
grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into
the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the
Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute
important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to
require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at
this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not
compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idleceremony; rather, it would be
a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of
its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a
preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete
such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement
thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be
SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail
bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without
prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106087. April 7, 1993.
ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, PASIG, METRO
MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NATURE OF BAIL
PROCEEDINGS. — Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail
proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court. By 'summary hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method
of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for the
purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses
and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details
that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN GRANT OF BAIL IS SIMILAR TO PROCEDURE IN
CANCELLATION OF BAIL. — Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge
were not for an application for bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the
principles and procedure governing hearings on an application for bail were correctly
applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued
by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court
may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail. The grant
of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this
case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence
of guilt. In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with
the same issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as
to convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the
nature and procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the
same.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; ESSENCE
OF RULE ON DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES. — The Constitution commands that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a speedy, impartial, and
public trial." This right is a derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due
process of law. The rule on the disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the
requirements of due process.
4. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY ON PART OF JUDGE.
— "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that
degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair
and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would prosecution. Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence
be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites." for the prosecution. This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although required primarily for the benefit of overruled petitioner's objection to the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not
the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Peñaranda, it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between
fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a
when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and
justice" is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public manifest partiality." If petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he may still question the
business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction is
proper dispensation of justice. rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection raised
by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only
5. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, DENIAL OF MOTION FOR baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature
INHIBITION, AND PETITION CHALLENGING DENIAL OF MOTION FOR because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the
INHIBITION. — Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on particular piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility.
Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, he shall proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either Petitioner's conclusion that "the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness'
the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the statement suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" is, if not suggestive of
trial court or a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
an order of the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive the judge of
authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or 9. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF
petition, although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial. CONSIDERING THE CANCELLATION OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS RIPE FOR
RESOLUTION AND REFUSING TO ALLOW PETITIONER'S COUNSEL TO
6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE; BIAS AND PRESENT ANYMORE WITNESSES, NOT MOTIVATED BY BIAS; REASON. — The
PREJUDICE NOT PRESUMED. — While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred during one
petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge of the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's bail.
under Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, the established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution
partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail
Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore
presumed especially if weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the proceeding in
to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the
court need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses from both the prosecution and
7. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF NOT the defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to two (2)
SUSPENDING HEARING OF CASE AFTER DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION witnesses as borne out by the record of the case . . . Having determined that respondent
FOR RECUSATION AND DURING PENDENCY OF PETITION CHALLENGING HIS judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail proceedings before him, we
ORDERS DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND THE MOTION TO likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of witnesses for
SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSFER VENUE OUTSIDE METRO MANILA petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to
NOT PROOF OF PARTIALITY. — In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion."
accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial If the trial judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the
after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact bail issue, after giving both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his
that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case during the pendency of this petition authority to consider the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge
as proof of his claim that the judge is partial. acceded to petitioner's request and allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail
proceedings. In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on September 28,
8. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF 1992 considering the prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the
OVERRULING PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE basis of the evidence already presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.
EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS WHO DID NOT
TESTIFY THEREON, NOT PROOF OF BIAS; REASON. — The first of these allegedly 10. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ORDER ALLOWING
"palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by respondent judge on August 14, PETITIONER'S ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, NOT NECESSARILY PROOF OF PARTIALITY.
Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge should not — Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition that
have admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 which in
witness stand to affirm the statements contained in the document presented by the effect allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary
investigation. It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar is
1992, a divided Court nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
preliminary investigation be conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial system, so necessary for
necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, we held that erroneous rulings do not the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying
always constitute evidence of bias. In Luciano v. Mariano, we made the pronouncement that degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or
"[t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with
more occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part of the various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues
judge against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence on our courts . . ." involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful,
Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge can be remedied and was convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."
actually corrected, as in this case, militates against the disqualification of the judge on the
ground of bias or partiality. 14. ID.; ID.; AN INSTANCE OF HIGHLY DEROGATORY, OFFENSIVE AND
CONTEMPTUOUS LANGUAGE TOWARD A JUDGE. — Indeed, in the Motion for
11. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, MOTION FOR RECUSATION IS ANOTHER Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer malevolence"
DILATORY MOVE. — In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further stated:
must be viewed in the light of his lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge's baseless, nay
the respondent judge. Before the trial court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense. . ." The trial judge's actions
merely to reset the scheduled hearings, but to suspend the trial of the case itself. The were also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." In the Urgent
following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed either to suspend Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have: (a)
the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a particular "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced
issue . . . Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to
orders of respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. hear before he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty
Apart from the present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has only after a full trial of the facts." . . . In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as
previously filed two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all well as the inherent power and authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in
three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the language used by petitioner's
proceedings before the trial court held in abeyance. The murder case involving only one lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.
accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and the proceedings before
the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between the filing of the RESOLUTION
information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the records of
the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have ROMERO, J p:
reached a total of one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are
still being conducted. When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated September 23, 1992
proceedings in the murder case suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the denying petitioner's Petition and affirming the Decision and Resolution promulgated on
needless protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another March 9, 1992 and June 26, 1992, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings. 26305. 1 The CA Decision and Resolution upheld the following: (1) respondent Judge
Benjamin V. Pelayo's Order dated September 4, 1991 which denied petitioner's Motion for
12. ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A LAWYER BEFORE COURTS AND JUDICIAL Recusation; and (2) respondent judge's Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's
OFFICERS. — The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila.
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." Reinforcing this rule
of conduct is the Code of Professional Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the A review of the antecedent facts of this case, particularly those wherein respondent Judge
following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial participated, is in order to arrive at a just and correct assessment of his acts vis-a-vis the
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further petitioner.
states: "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson Street, San Juan,
behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall
Metro Manila. After conducting an investigation of the shooting incident, the police
not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having materiality to the
identified petitioner Rolito Go as the prime suspect in the commission of the crime. On July
case."
8, 1991, petitioner, accompanied by two lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan
13. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT. — To be sure, the adversarial nature Police Station. He was arrested and booked for the shooting of Maguan. The police filed a
of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the complaint for frustrated homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a license to malign
On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was filed against petitioner before the An Order 11 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1, 1991 setting for hearing the issue
Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died on July 9, concerning the proper venue of petitioner's detention.
1991.
After the hearing on petitioner's custody, the trial court issued an Order 12 dated August 2,
On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus 1991 ordering the CAPCOM to bring the person of petitioner to the court not later than
motion praying for petitioner's immediate release and for a preliminary investigation. August 5, 1991 so that a commitment order for his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro interposed no objection to petitioner's being granted could be issued. The Commitment Order 13 ordering the Provincial Warden of the
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00. Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody of petitioner was issued on August 5, 1991.

The case was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Recusation 14 praying that respondent
July 12, 1991, approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release. judge inhibit himself from hearing the case. The motion was denied by respondent judge in
his Order dated September 4, 1991. 15
On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order granting leave for the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal to conduct a preliminary investigation. On August 22, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue
Outside Metro Manila which was denied by respondent judge on September 17, 1991. 16
However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio issued an Order 2 which: (a)
recalled the July 12, 1991 Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender within 48 Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his refusal to enter a plea, a plea of
hours from notice; (c) cancelled the July 16, 1991 Order granting leave for the Provincial "Not Guilty" was entered for him by the trial court. 17
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; (d) treated petitioner's omnibus motion
for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated July 11, 1991 as a petition for In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24, 1991, remanded to the Court of
bail. Appeals the petition filed by petitioner assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial court.

On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of
questioning the July 17, 1991 Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner filed Appeals.
before the trial court a motion to suspend all the proceedings pending the resolution of the
petition filed before the Supreme Court. 3 This motion was denied by respondent judge. 4 On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing
the two petitions. However, upon petition by petitioner, this Court by an 8-6 vote in G.R.
On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM. Upon motion 5 by No. 101837 issued a decision reversing the, CA decision and ordering (a) the Provincial
petitioner, the respondent judge issued an Order 6 directing "the accused's continued Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; and (b) the release of petitioner without
detention at the CAPCOM until such time as the Court shall have properly determined the prejudice to any order that the trial court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move
place where accused should be detained." for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation wrote a letter 7 to the trial court After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to this Court's decision in G.R. No.
requesting that custody of petitioner be transferred to the Bureau in view of an investigation 101837, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated February 27, 1992
for illegal possession of firearms involving petitioner. finding probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of murder. The Resolution was
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who filed with the trial court a motion to cancel the
On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an Order 8 granting the NBI bail of petitioner and a motion to set the criminal case for resumption of the trial on the
temporary custody of petitioner subject to the following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to merits.
be accorded his constitutional rights during the investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is to
be conducted only during office hours and petitioner is to be returned to the custody of the Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the Prosecutor reversed by appealing to the
CAPCOM at the end of each day; and (c) the NBI should report to the trial court the status Department of Justice, and filing petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA, G.R. SP No.
of the investigation. 27738) and finally to this Court (G.R. No. 105424), but his efforts did not meet with
success.
On July 30, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 9 before the trial court praying that the Order
dated July 29, 1991 be nullified and recalled. On October 1, 1991, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before this Court seeking to annul: (1) the Order of the trial court dated
The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI filed a motion 10 praying that it be granted full September 4, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2) the Order dated
custody of petitioner pending the investigation of the case involving illegal possession of September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer
firearms. Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 101772, was remanded to
the Court of Appeals.
On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division) rendered a decision dismissing the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision having been denied, 20 a
petition. As to the denial of petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Court of Appeals held in petition under Rule 45 was filed before this Court on July 29, 1992 assailing the decision of
part: the Court of Appeals. On September 9, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing respondent People of the Philippines, filed a Comment on the Petition.
"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is not inclined to strike down the
denial of petitioner's motion for recusation as a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the allegations contained, issues raised
respondent judge absent any clear showing of such grave abuse of his discretion. The and the arguments adduced in the Petition, as well as the Comment filed by the OSG, issued
allegation of petitioner in support of his motion for recusation are conclusions based on his a Resolution denying the Petition on the ground that the respondent Court of Appeals
own fears and are therefore speculations than anything else. committed no reversible error in its assailed decision.

In order to warrant a finding of 'prejudicial' publicity as urged by the petitioner, there must On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for Reconsideration 21 was filed in which
be allegation and proof that the judge has been unduly influenced, not simply that he might petitioner reiterates his position that respondent judge should inhibit himself from the case.
be, by the "barrage" of publicity (Martelino vs. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106; emphasis
supplied). While there is such allegation in the petition, the Court has however found no On December 16, 1992, petitioner filed a pleading captioned "Urgent Motion (for
proof so far adduced sufficient to accept the petitioner's claim that the respondent judge has preliminary mandatory injunction)." In said Motion, petitioner questioned the Order of the
been unduly influenced by the alleged publicity. trial court dated December 9, 1992 denying petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the
cancellation of bail proceedings) and to Present Last Witness. It appears that after the
Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of presentation of eleven (11) witnesses by the prosecution and six (6) by the defense, the trial
Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 where, citing the case of Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 court considered the question concerning the cancellation of petitioner's bail ripe for
SCRA 160, it said: resolution. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen and Present Last Witness. 22 But
the trial court issued an Order 23 dated December 9, 1992 which, among other things,
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. denied the Motion. In the Urgent Motion filed with this Court on December 16, 1992,
But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative petitioner prayed "for the issuance forthwith and ex parte of a writ of preliminary
approval to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or mandatory injunction directing respondent judge to allow petitioner to complete his defense
prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. As evidence by presenting his last witness on the bail issue . . ." 24
applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and
impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 25 issuing a temporary restraining
would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent order (TRO) restraining respondent judge from resolving the bail issue and directing him to
judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. We have had allow petitioner to present his last witness. This Resolution was clarified and the TRO
occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party 'will not be confirmed in another Resolution issued by the Court on January 11, 1993. 26
given a fair, impartial and just hearing' is 'premature.' Prejudice is not to be presumed.
Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
without respect to person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.' To disqualify or not to
At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in this Motion for Reconsideration
disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience."
18 no longer raises the question of change of venue. Moreover, the Motion for Reconsideration
is predicated on what petitioner alleges are "the supervening events demonstrating partiality
The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's denial of petitioner's Motion to to the prosecution, on one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other." 27 Perforce,
Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following this Resolution shall only consider the allegations and issues raised in this Motion for
pronouncement: Reconsideration and in the Comment thereon filed by the OSG.

"On the question of the denial by the respondent court of petitioner's motion to suspend
proceedings and transfer venue outside of Metro Manila, suffice it to say that the respondent
court was correct in denying petitioner's motion. For indeed, the authority to order a change
of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice is vested in the Supreme Court by
Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 4 of the Constitution. Neither the respondent court nor
this Court has the authority to grant petitioner's motion for transfer of venue. The cases
cited by petitioner in support of this issue were all decided by the Supreme Court before the
advent of the 1973 Constitution where the provision on transfer of venue was first adopted,
hence not applicable to the instant case." 19
Petitioner's Motion for Recusation filed before the trial court is based on Rule 137, sec. 1,
par. 2 of the Rules of Court on disqualification of judges.
The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." 28 (Emphasis supplied) This right is a
derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. 29 The rule
on the disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due
process. "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that
degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair
and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would
be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites." "Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case by setting it for pre-
30 trial since it is within her sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her own
competency, to either proceed with the trial or refrain from acting on the case until
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 31 although required primarily for the benefit of determination of the issue of her disqualification by the appellate court [Section 2 of Rule
the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 76].
fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected 43
when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice" 32 is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, sec. 1,
business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the par. 2, he shall proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of
proper dispensation of justice. Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or
a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of
While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to
reasons for the voluntary inhibition 33 of the judge under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, 34 the proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or petition,
established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. 35 Bare allegations of partiality and
prejudgment will not suffice. 36 Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing
weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion for
without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 37 Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend
hearing the case during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that the judge is
In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court, petitioner, to prove his allegation partial. This Court has not, in connection with the petition, issued a temporary restraining
of bias on the part of respondent judge, takes the latter to task for continuing with the trial order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge from further hearing the case. The TRO which this
during the pendency of this petition stating that: Court issued on December 29, 1992 after the petition was denied and pending this Motion
for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from resolving the question on the
"Even as the instant petition for the trial judge's recusation pends, the latter did not see fit to cancellation of bail until the last witness of petitioner was heard. The TRO did not restrain
suspend the hearings. Indeed the trial judge has been conducting marathon hearings which, the judge from hearing the case. On the contrary, the judge was ordered to hear petitioner's
in the context of his questioned fairness and impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to last witness in the cancellation of bail proceedings. 44 Because it was his duty to continue
make official a pre-determined verdict of guilt." 38 trying the case and there was no order from this Court not to do so, respondent judge
committed no impropriety evincing partiality when he continued hearing the case during the
The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his counsels 39 to the procedure to be pendency of the petition before this Court.
followed by the judge before whom a motion for disqualification has been filed. Rule 137,
sec. 2 provides: Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that since the issuance of the Court
Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying his Petition, there have been "supervening
"If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution on one hand, and hostility against
objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the petitioner, on the other hand." 45 Petitioner alleges:
grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw
therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification . . ." "Pursuing his unconstitutional bent first evinced when, without benefit of preliminary
(Emphasis supplied) investigation, petitioner's arraignment and trial, then arrest and detention for almost a year
was peremptorily ordered — which this Court reversed and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837,
In People v. Moreno, 40 we stated that if a judge denies the motion for disqualification and promulgated 11 February 1992) — the unchastened trial judge let out yet with two palpably
rules favorably on his competency to try the case, it becomes a matter of official duty for biased and hostile orders, infra, clearly and unmistakably demonstrating an unconstitutional
him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility prejudgment of petitioner's culpability." 46
without the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction. Although this case was
decided prior to the introduction of par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1, there is no reason why the The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by
procedure laid down in Rule 137, sec. 2 and applied in People v. Moreno should not respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility
likewise apply to a motion for inhibition filed pursuant to Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2. 41 In of an affidavit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that
fact, in Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court applied the procedure prescribed in respondent judge should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because
Rule 137, sec. 2 when the trial judge denied a party's motion for inhibition under Rule 137, the latter did not take the witness stand to affirm the statements contained in the document
sec. 1, par. 2, thus: presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying to
bolster the evidence for the prosecution.
This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's
objection to the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In
Jandionco v. Peñaranda, 47 it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge
hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a
sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and
manifest partiality." 48 If petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he may still question
the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction
is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection raised
by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only
baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature
because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the
particular piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility.
Petitioner's conclusion that "the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness'
statement suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" 49 is, if not suggestive
of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred during
one of the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's
bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the
prosecution and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of
bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present
anymore witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the
proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the hearing on the
merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses from both the
prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to
two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case. 50
Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he
hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court. By 'summary hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In
such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered is
admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and
reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that
are not essential to the purpose of the hearing." 51
Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for
bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure
governing hearings on an application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in
the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No.
101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court may issue in case the
Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail. 52 The grant of bail was made
without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this case, the prosecution In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the
must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of guilt. 53 In the light of his lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge.
Before the trial court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the
cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the same issue
as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to convince
the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the nature and
procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the same.
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the
bail proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the
number of witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of
judicial discretion." 54 If the trial judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient
for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving both parties their opportunity to present
evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In
any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and allowed him to present more
witnesses in the bail proceedings.
In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992
considering the prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis
of the evidence already presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.
Finally, petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition
that the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 55 which
in effect allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary
investigation.
It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a
divided Court nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a
preliminary investigation be conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not
necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, 56 we held that erroneous rulings do not
always constitute evidence of bias. 57 In Luciano v. Mariano, 58 we made the
pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled against the same
litigant on two or more occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice
on the part of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence in
our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge can be
remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates against the disqualification of
the judge on the ground of bias or partiality. 59
We have earlier underscored the importance of the rule of disqualification of judges, not
only in safeguarding the rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning for the
judiciary the people's confidence, an element so essential in the effective administration of
justice. The rule should, therefore, not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant's personal designs
or to defeat the ends of justice. "While We are exacting on the conduct of judges confronted
with motions for disqualification's, We cannot, however, tolerate acts of litigants who, for
any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge for their own purpose, under a plea of
bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment . . . [T]his Court does not approve the tactic of
some litigants of filing of baseless motion for disqualification of the judge as a means of
delaying the case and/or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge." 60
scheduled hearings, 61 but to suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled
filed by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings for sheer malevolence" 62 respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's
entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a particular issue: lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial
judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense . . ." 63
CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING The trial judge's actions were also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in .
1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991 . ." 64
2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991
3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991 In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged
4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings to have: (1) "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;"
and Transfer Venue Outside (2) "evinced contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath
Metro Manila August 22, 1991 and duty to hear before he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a
5. Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4, 1991 man's liberty only after a full trial of the facts." 65
6. Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992
7. Motion to Suspend Action on The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect
Formal Offer of Evidence and on due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." 66 Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the
Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21, 1992 Code of Professional Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer
8. Motion to Reopen Hearing and shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992 insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall
Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various orders of abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the courts."
respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives
from the present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."
filed two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3)
petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the proceedings before To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in
the trial court held in abeyance. pursuing their duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this
privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the
The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary
complicated and the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from incumbent of the judicial office, but more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for
the fact that between the filing of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year our judicial system, so necessary for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court has
or December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements,
transcript of stenographic notes have reached a total of one thousand five hundred and disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . .
twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being conducted. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling
the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
murder case suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction offensive." 67
of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the
present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings. In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and
authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we
In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the case, including the transcript of are of the opinion that the language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory,
stenographic notes, and considering the applicable law, the pertinent rules and prevailing offensive and contemptuous.
jurisprudence, we reiterate our holding in the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992
that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the respondent judge's WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with
Order which denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation. This extended Resolution should FINALITY. Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are
put an end to petitioner's obvious attempts at deferring the trial of his principal case by hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P500.00 each with a stern WARNING that a repetition of
dwelling on incidental matters. The motion for reconsideration must, perforce, be denied this or similar act and language will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
with finality. Resolution be attached to their records. SO ORDERED.

In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor General prays that
Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be disciplinarily
dealt with by this Court for allegedly using abusive and intemperate language against
respondent judge which betrays disrespect to the trial court.