RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.

SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, Respondents.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with
a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-
General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law
and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of
the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis
supplied)

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not
only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting
for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the
Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess
the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior
to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority
of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." (Art IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that
he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounded duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active,
habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot
be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a
business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v. Villanueva: 2

"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared,

enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It
states:jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such
as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law
(U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public,
and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in
the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988
ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as
to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin,
supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected,
`all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term `practice of law’. (Martin supra).

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN
(10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded
that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so
HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
"practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of
acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People v. Villanueva: 4

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services."
cralaw vi rtua1aw lib rary

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior
to his appointment to such position.

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity
and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer,
he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice of legal services, he was the one receiving
that advice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice
of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work,
blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. chan robles lawlib rary : re dnad

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as
having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the
age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is
useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman,
farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly
assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?.

Facts:
respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled... an examination
for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before
the Philippines Patent
Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines
Patent Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring
members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given
by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before...
said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so...
that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled
not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent
Office... that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-
judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before such bodies,... requires more of an application of scientific and
technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law;... that the action taken
by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the
Patent Law of the Philippines,
Issues:
whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and prosecution of
patent applications. etc., constitutes or is included in the... practice of law.
Ruling:
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their... rights in
patent cases.
although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be
conducted... and all orders and decisions of the Director of Patents have to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with... law.
Not only this, but practice before', the Patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and... procedure.
to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and
competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent
cases,... which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the
Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point.
we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the...
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved
Principles:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation m court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the... management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety... of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs.
Ulep vs legal clinic

FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A'
and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The
advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before
quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and
Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.

Issue:

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law.
The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:Black
defines "practice of law" as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with
thelaw." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear
is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise
him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends
to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation
employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged
in the practice of law by virtueof the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within
the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn
the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of
the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and
the unwholesome result of propaganda.

UDGE LEAH DOMINGO-REGALA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 226, QUEZON

CITY, complainant,
vs.
MA. DONNA Y. SULTAN, LEGAL RESEARCHER, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 226,
QUEZON CIT

Judge Leah Domingo-Regala, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226, Quezon City, has charged
Ma. Donna Y. Sultan, Legal Researcher of the same court, with Inefficiency, Habitual Absenteeism,
Tardiness, Falsification of Daily Time Record, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Service.

In a referral letter dated 12 May 2000, Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada requested Judge
Regala to comment on the unauthorized leave of absence for the period 1-29 October 1999, 3-29
November 1999, and 1-3 and 06 December 1999, of Ma. Donna Y. Sultan. Said absences were the
subject of a letter by Ma. Donna Sultan addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
complaining the disapproval by Judge Regala of her applications for leave on the above-mentioned
dates.

In her comment dated 05 June 2000, Judge Regala alleges that Ma. Donna Sultan is guilty of
habitual absenteeism as defined by Administrative Circular No. 1-91 for having incurred
unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credits for at least three (3)
months in a semester:

In sum, respondent’s conduct falls short of the exacting standards of public office. Section 52, A (16,
17, 20), Rule IV, Resolution No. 991936, series of 1999 of the Civil Service Commission (Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service) classifies inefficiency, frequent unauthorized
absences and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as grave offenses. Each offense
carries an imposable penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Considering,
however, respondent’s poignant open admission of her "excesses and shortcomings" and her plea to
complainant for forgiveness and understanding, we are moved to temper our view of her actuations
with altruistic consideration and recommend the lightest penalty possible for all three offenses.8

Holding respondent liable for inefficiency, habitual absenteeism, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, the OCA recommended that respondent be suspended from the service for
six (6) months without pay.

We agree in the findings of the OCA.

As enunciated by the Court in several cases,9 no other office in the government service exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. The
conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.10 Public officers must be accountable to the
people at all times and serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility and efficiency. Any act
which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected
to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.11 It is the imperative and sacred
duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of
justice.12

When respondent incurred several absences during the months of October, November, and
December 1999, she was indeed confronted with a passionately difficult family problem due to the
discovery that her unwed, student daughter is pregnant.13 The fact that said daughter suffered
relapse after giving birth resulted in respondent’s need to absent herself from work to attend to her
sick daughter and the newborn baby. Furthermore, respondent has been unabashedly admitting her
excesses and shortcomings, and has been sincerely beseeching for complainant’s forgiveness and
understanding. Records also disclose that this is respondent’s first offense.

In the recent case of Monserate v. Adolfo,14 the Court, in imposing a penalty on a court employee
who has been previously found guilty of gross inefficiency, absenteeism and failure to serve
summons, declared that "[m]oral obligations, humanitarian consideration, [and] performance of
household chores are not reasons sufficient to warrant exemption. . . If at all, these facts may only
be considered in mitigating respondent’s liability." Thus, instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal
as prescribed for the second offense of frequent unauthorized absences, the Court, taking into
consideration mitigating circumstances present in the said case, imposed a fine of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000).

Considering, thus, the presence of mitigating circumstances in herein case, and the fact that this is
respondent’s first offense, the Court resolves to modify the penalty recommended. 1awphi1.nét

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator, but
hereby MODIFIES the penalty recommended. As modified, respondent MA. DONNA Y. SULTAN is
l^vvphi1.net

hereby SUSPENDED from the service for three (3) months without pay. She is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more severely.