2.

Santiago v De Leon
CA-GR 16180-R March 21, 1960
By: Kate
Topic: DUTY TO RESCUE
Petitioners:
Respondents:
Ponente:

I cannot find the full text of this case online, wala rin sa library resources 
I just copied from the Aquino Book, p. 156

The liability to a rescuer was recognized in Santiago vs. De Leon (CA-G.R. No. 16180-R, March
21, 1960, 7 Velayo’s Digest 569) where it was held that one who was hurt while trying to
rescue another who was injured through negligence may recover damages. The case involved
the negligence of an electric company in not repairing or reconnecting a live wire that was
cut and was hanging. It appears that the owner of the house went to the office of the electric
company to request for reconnection. The delay of the company in coping with the
emergency reported to them was considered conclusive evidence of negligence. In the
meantime, a boy was electrocuted by the live wire. On the other hand, the plaintiff realizing
that the boy had been electrocuted, took off his wooden shoes and with it stuck the wire
away in his desire to save the boy. Unfortunately, when the wire was released from
underneath the boy’s body, the wire coiled around the plaintiff’s leg. The Court of Appeals
awarded damages in favor of the plaintiff and rejected that argument of the defendant that
the plaintiff tried to effect the rescue. The Court observed that to act immediately was the
pressing need of the moment and to be unduly cautious would have been fatal to the boy.
The Court applied the following observation in Corpus Juris Secundum (65 CJS 736-737):

“x x x conduct which might otherwise be considered contributory

negligence may not be so considered where a person is injured in
attempting to save others from imminent danger of personal injury or
death x x x. Persons are held justified in assuming greater risks in the
protection of human life where they would not be under other
circumstances. One is not guilty of contributory negligence in exposing
himself to the danger of injury or death, if, under the same
curcumstances, an ordinarily prudent person might so expose himself,
or, as often expressed, if the act of intervention is not performed under
such circumstances as would make it rash or reckless in the judgment
of ordinarily prudent persons. This is true even though the persons
attempting the rescue knows that it involves great hazard to himself
without certainty of accomplishing the attempting rescue and even
though in attempting such rescue he thereby imperils his own life.
In determining whether one making or attempting such rescue exercised ordinary
care, all the surrounding circumstances are to be considered including the
existing emergency, the alarm, excitement and confusion usually present, the
uncertainty as to the means to be employed, the necessity for immediate action,
and the liability to err in the choice of the best course of action to pursue.