1. G.R. No.

160689 March 26, 2014

RAUL H. SESBREÑO, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN I. COROMINA (SUBSTITUTED BY ANITA COROMINA,
ELIZABETH COROMINA and ROSIEMARIE COROMINA), VICENTE E. GARCIA (SUBSTITUTED BY
EDGAR JOHN GARCIA), FELIPE CONSTANTINO, RONALD ARCILLA, NORBETO ABELLANA,
DEMETRIO BALICHA, ANGELITA LHUILLIER, JOSE E. GARCIA, AND VISA YAN ELECTRIC
COMPANY (VECO), Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H. Sesbreño founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreño accused the
violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric
meter with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential premises. But the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13,
in Cebu City rendered judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim;1 and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
dismissal on March 10, 2003.2
Hence, this appeal by Sesbreño.
Antecedents
At the time material to the petition, VECO was a public utility corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño was one of
VECO’s customers under the metered service contract they had entered into on March 2, 1982.3 Respondent Vicente E.
Garcia was VECO’s President, General Manager and Chairman of its Board of Directors. Respondent Jose E. Garcia was
VECO’s Vice-President, Treasurer and a Member of its Board of Directors. Respondent Angelita Lhuillier was another
Member of VECO’s Board of Directors. Respondent Juan Coromina was VECO’s Assistant Treasurer, while respondent
Norberto Abellana was the Head of VECO’s Billing Section whose main function was to compute back billings of
customers found to have violated their contracts.
To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning, and that none of it meters had been tampered with, VECO
employed respondents Engr. Felipe Constantino and Ronald Arcilla as violation of contract (VOC)
inspectors.4 Respondent Sgt. Demetrio Balicha, who belonged to the 341st Constabulary Company, Cebu Metropolitan
Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors during their inspection of
the households of its customers on May 11, 1989 pursuant to a mission order issued to him.5
The CA summarized the antecedent facts as follows:
x x x. Reduced to its essentials, however, the facts of this case are actually simple enough, although the voluminous
records might indicate otherwise. It all has to do with an incident that occurred at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
May 11, 1989. On that day, the Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and
their PC escort, Balicha, conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City,
including that of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers,
wiring connections, and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate,
they inspected the electric meter and found that it had been turned upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took
photographs of the upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they
removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño was in his office and no one
called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter
the house itself to examine the kind and number of appliances and light fixtures in the household and determine its
electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition of the

1
electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected it, with notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory
test. She also signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at all with what the VOC Team did on
May 11, 1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding premises was effected without his permission and
over the objections of his maids. They threatened, forced or coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the electric
meter, turned it upside down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new electric meter. They
searched the house and its rooms without his permission or a search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two documents,
making her appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that some of his personal effects were missing,
apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the house.6
Judgment of the RTC
On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.7 It did not accord credence to the testimonies
of Sesbreño’s witnesses, Bebe Baledio, his housemaid, and Roberto Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to inconsistencies
on material points in their respective testimonies. It observed that Baledio could not make up her mind as to whether
Sesbreño’s children were in the house when the VOC inspection team detached and replaced the electric meter. Likewise,
it considered unbelievable that Lopez should hear the exchanges between Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha, on one hand,
and Baledio, on the other, considering that Lopez could not even hear the conversation between two persons six feet away
from where he was seated during the simulation done in court, the same distance he supposedly had from the gate of
Sesbreño’s house during the incident. It pointed out that Lopez’s presence at the gate during the incident was even
contradicted by his own testimony indicating that an elderly woman had opened the gate for the VECO personnel, because
it was Baledio, a lady in her 20s, who had repeatedly stated on her direct and cross examinations that she had let the
VECO personnel in. It concluded that for Lopez to do nothing at all upon seeing a person being threatened by another in
the manner he described was simply contrary to human experience.
In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the respondents showing that the VOC inspection team had found the
electric meter in Sesbreño’s residence turned upside down to prevent the accurate registering of the electricity
consumption of the household, causing them to detach and replace the meter. It held as unbelievable that the team forcibly
entered the house through threats and intimidation; that they themselves turned the electric meter upside down in order to
incriminate him for theft of electricity, because the fact that the team and Sesbreño had not known each other before then
rendered it unlikely for the team to fabricate charges against him; and that Sesbreño’s non-presentation of Chuchie Garcia
left her allegation of her being forced to sign the two documents by the team unsubstantiated.
Decision of the CA
Sesbreño appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC on March 10, 2003,8 holding thusly:
x x x. plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s account is simply too implausible or far-fetched to be believed. For one thing, the
inspection on his household was just one of many others that the VOC Team had conducted in that subdivision. Yet, none
but plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño complained of the alleged acts of the VOC Team. Considering that there is no proof that
they also perpetrated the same illegal acts on other customers in the guise of conducting a Violation of Contracts
inspection, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño likewise failed to show why he alone was singled out. It is also difficult to believe
that the VOC Team would be brazen enough to want to antagonize a person such as plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño. There is
no evidence that the VOC Team harbored any evil motive or grudge against plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, who is a total
stranger to them. Until he came along, they did not have any prior criminal records to speak of, or at least, no evidence
thereof was presented. It is equally difficult to believe that their superiors would authorize or condone their alleged illegal
acts. Especially so since there is no indication that prior to the incident on May 11, 1989, there was already bad blood or
animosity between plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño and defendant appellees to warrant such a malevolent response. In fact,
since availing of defendant-appellee VECO’s power services, the relationship between them appears to have been
uneventful.
It becomes all the more apparent that the charges stemming from the May 11, 1989 incident were fabricated when taken
together with the lower court’s evaluation of the alleged theft of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s personal effects. It stated
2
that on August 8, 1989, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño wrote the barangay captain of Punta Princesa and accused Chuchie
Garcia and Victoria Villarta alias Victoria Rocamora of theft of some of his things that earlier he claimed had been stolen
by members of the VOC Team. When he was confronted with these facts, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño further claimed that
the items allegedly stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part of the loot taken by defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla.
Yet not once did plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño or any of his witnesses mention that a conspiracy existed between these
people. Clearly, much like his other allegations, it is nothing more than an afterthought by plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
All in all, the allegations against defendants-appellees appear to be nothing more than a put-on to save face. For the
simple truth is that the inspection exposed plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño as a likely cheat and thief.
xxxx
Neither is this Court swayed by the testimonies of Baledio and Lopez.1âwphi1 The lower court rightly described their
testimonies as fraught by discrepancies and inconsistencies on material points and even called Lopez a perjured witness.
On the other hand, it is odd that plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño chose not to present the witness whose testimony was very
crucial. But even though Chuchie Garcia never testified, her absence speaks volumes. Whereas plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño claimed that the VOC Team forced her to sign two documents that made her appear to be his authorized agent or
representative, the latter claimed otherwise and that she also gave them permission to enter and search the house. The
person most qualified to refute the VOC Team’s claim is Chuchie Garcia herself. It is axiomatic that he who asserts a fact
or claim must prove it. He cannot transfer that burden to the person against whom he asserts such fact or claim. When
certain evidence is suppressed, the presumption is that it will adversely affect the cause of the party suppressing it, should
it come to light. x x x9
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Sesbreño appealed.
Issue
Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Sesbreño’s main contention is that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was an unreasonable search for being
carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly done with malice or bad faith.
Before dealing with the contention, we have to note that two distinct portions of Sesbreño’s residence were inspected by
the VOS team – the garage where the electric meter was installed, and the main premises where the four bedrooms, living
rooms, dining room and kitchen were located.
Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was installed, the respondents assert that the VOC team had the
continuing authority from Sesbreño as the consumer to enter his premises at all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection
of the meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling. The authority emanated from paragraph 9 of the metered service
contract entered into between VECO and each of its consumers, which provided as follows:
9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorized employees or representatives of the COMPANY to enter his
premises at all reasonable hours without being liable to trespass to dwelling for the purpose of inspecting, installing,
reading, removing, testing, replacing or otherwise disposing of its property, and/or removing the COMPANY’S property
in the event of the termination of the contract for any cause.11
Sesbreño contends, however, that paragraph 9 did not give Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha the blanket authority to enter
at will because the only property VECO owned in his premises was the meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla should
enter only the garage. He denies that they had the right to enter the main portion of the house and inspect the various
rooms and the appliances therein because those were not the properties of VECO. He posits that Balicha, who was not an
employee of VECO, had no authority whatsoever to enter his house and conduct a search. He concludes that their search

3
was unreasonable, and entitled him to damages in light of their admission that they had entered and inspected his premises
without a search warrant.12
We do not accept Sesbreño’s conclusion.1avvphi1 Paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC team with unquestioned authority
to enter the garage to inspect the meter. The members of the team obviously met the conditions imposed by paragraph 9
for an authorized entry. Firstly, their entry had the objective of conducting the routine inspection of the meter.13Secondly,
the entry and inspection were confined to the garage where the meter was installed.14 Thirdly, the entry was effected at
around 4 o’clock p.m., a reasonable hour.15 And, fourthly, the persons who inspected the meter were duly authorized for
the purpose by VECO.
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO,16 his participation was to render police assistance to ensure the
personal security of Constantino and Arcilla during the inspection, rendering him a necessary part of the team as an
authorized representative. Under the circumstances, he was authorized to enter considering that paragraph 9 expressly
extended such authority to "properly authorized employees or representatives" of VECO.
It is true, as Sesbreño urges, that paragraph 9 did not cover the entry into the main premises of the residence. Did this
necessarily mean that any entry by the VOS team into the main premises required a search warrant to be first secured?
Sesbreño insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the right of every
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
He states that a violation of this constitutional guaranty rendered VECO and its VOS team liable to him for damages by
virtue of Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code, which pertinently provides:
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter
for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secured in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
x x x x.
Sesbreño’s insistence has no legal and factual basis.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint against the Government and
its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of State power. The Court has made this clear in its pronouncements, including that made in People v.
Marti,17 viz:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for
its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. 18
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreño
turned upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to determine the unbilled
4
electricity consumed by his household. The circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the main
premises was a continuation of the authorized entry. There was no question then that their ability to determine the unbilled
electricity called for them to see for themselves the usage of electricity inside. Not being agents of the State, they did not
have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.
Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did not make the inspection a search by an agent of the State within the ambit
of the guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part of the team by virtue of his mission order authorizing him to
assist and escort the team during its routine inspection.19 Consequently, the entry into the main premises of the house by
the VOC team did not constitute a violation of the guaranty.
Our holding could be different had Sesbreño persuasively demonstrated the intervention of malice or bad faith on the part
of Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection of the main premises, or any excessiveness committed by them in the
course of the inspection. But Sesbreño did not. On the other hand, the CA correctly observed that the inspection did not
zero in on Sesbreño’s residence because the other houses within the area were similarly subjected to the routine
inspection.20 This, we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress,
the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may
be liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale for the concept is to present some basic principles to be followed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social order.21Moreover, according to a
commentator,22 "the exercise of right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the
prejudice of others[;] [i]t cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another." Article
19 of the Civil Code23 sets the standards to be observed in the exercise of one’s rights and in the performance of one’s
duties, namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty and good faith. The law
thereby recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights – that in the exercise of the rights, the standards under Article 19
must be observed.24
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is
performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the
following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith,
and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.25 There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to
ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on the
circumstances of each case.
Sesbreño asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or Chuchie Garcia to let anyone enter his residence in his absence; and
that Baledio herself confirmed that the members of the VOC team had intimidated her into letting them in.
The assertion of Sesbreño is improper for consideration in this appeal.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA unanimously found
the testimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies on material points; and even declared that
the non-presentation of Garcia as a witness was odd if not suspect. Considering that such findings related to the credibility
of the witnesses and their testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them now because it is not a trier of facts, and is
not also tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.26 Verily, a review that may tend to supplant the findings of the
trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses themselves should be undertaken
by the Court with prudent hesitation. Only when Sesbreño could make a clear showing of abuse in their appreciation of
the evidence and records by the trial and the appellate courts should the Court do the unusual review of the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts.27 Alas, that showing was not made here.
Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreño was denied due process by the refusal of the trial judge to inhibit from the case.
Although the trial judge had issued an order for his voluntary inhibition, he still rendered the judgment in the end in
compliance with the instruction of the Executive Judge, whose exercise of her administrative authority on the matter of
the inhibition should be respected.28 In this connection, we find to be apt the following observation of the CA, to wit:
x x x. Both Judge Paredes and Judge Priscila Agana serve the Regional Trial Court and are therefore of co-equal rank. The
latter has no authority to reverse or modify the orders of Judge Paredes. But in ordering Judge Paredes to continue hearing
5
the case, Judge Agana did not violate their co-equal status or unilaterally increased her jurisdiction. It is merely part of her
administrative responsibilities as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, of which Judge Paredes is
also a member.29
Lastly, the Court finds nothing wrong if the writer of the decision in the CA refused to inhibit from participating in the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed by Sesbrefio. The motion for her inhibition was grounded on suspicion
of her bias and prejudice,30 but suspicion of bias and prejudice were not enough grounds for inhibition.31
Suffice it to say that the records are bereft of any indication that even suggested that the Associate Justices of the CA who
participated in the promulgation of the decision were tainted with bias against him.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pet1t1on for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March
10, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

6
2. G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991

VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991
JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A. BAGALIHOG, MAYOR NESTOR
C. LIM and MAYOR ANTONIO KHO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE, respondents.
Francisco R. Llamas for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57.
Jolly T. Fernandez, Elenito Bagalihog, Orlando M. Danao and Hechanova, Ballicid & Associates for petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 94266-69.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the certification
or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic
Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security
escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the
PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos.
9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor
Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection
with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that:
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary
examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon
Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime
Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
xxx xxx xxx
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as bail for
the provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which was granted by the court
and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each. Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the
accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.
7
On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261) pages were transmitted to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the
petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be
charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four
victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H",
Comment of Fiscal Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by petitioners
Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim was denied.
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of
murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue.
(Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)
On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from the Regional Trial Court
of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice, to wit:
Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 5811, 5812, 5813, and 5814 from the
Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to any of the Regional Trial Courts at Quezon City or Makati, the Court Resolved
to (a) GRANT the aforesaid petition for transfer of venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article VIII, Section
5(4) of the Philippine Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to transmit
the records of the aforesaid cases to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Makati, for raffling among the other
branches of the court; and (c) ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate to desist from further taking
cognizance of the said cases until such time that the petition is finally resolved.
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in
substance prayed for the following:
1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted
by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of
guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall
have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a matter of right; and
3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause, to be allowed to file a motion
for reduction of bail or for admission of bail. (p. 17, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists aprima
facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary
investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by the prosecution.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued
warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which
found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are
probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the
Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom
such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and

8
substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's
certification in each information which reads: (pp. 19-20, Rollo, G.R Nos. 94054-57; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990 Order.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly
authorized representatives or agents to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without
bail issued against the petitioners in his Order dated July 5, 1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.
In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION, ordering and directing the respondent judge
to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal effects of the warrants of arrest without bail issued against and served upon herein
petitioners Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release them from confinement at
PC-CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City; and (2) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized
representatives or agents, to CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrants of arrest without bail
issued against petitioners Mayors Nestor C. Lim and Antonio T. Kho.
The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without
bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled that a judge may rely
upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest.
However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the
"search and seizure" provision of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce . . .
We ruled:
. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of
the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the
investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of
arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and
require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause. This has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this evidently is
the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982.
Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had
been attached to the information filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the
determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required
affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where he was satisfied that probable
cause existed.

9
The case of Soliven v. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. We
stated:
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently convinced
petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in
his determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990), reiterated the above
interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:
We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for
the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the
Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic
notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the
Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should
be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the
Judge. The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [19891):
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court

10
of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran, Comments on the
Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on
January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges.
We had occasion to point tills out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic
propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but) part of the
prosecution's job, a function of the executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors to conduct
preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them," and the fact "that
a certain power is granted does not necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988
Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges
of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct
preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make a preliminary
examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or
search warrant). Such a power –– indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power –– has been and remains vested in every
judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or
Statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary
investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he
retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale
of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be
judicial in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It
is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . .
Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990) there is a statement that
the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the
certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
We, however, also reiterated that ". . . the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted
to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest." (Section 2, Article
III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of
either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution
because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges are still bound by the inertia
of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and are sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also
interested in a clear cut ruling. We will, therefore, restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms.
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is no duplication of
work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly
urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's
investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his
desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions.

11
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . . probable cause to
be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in
Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners'
motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent
Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However,
there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before
the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each
case.1âwphi1 We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge
has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can
be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's
certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to
answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent Judge documents of
recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. Although, the general
rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial (Tan
Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298
[1972]) the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the
records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned
witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General recognized the
significance of the recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:
It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are affidavits of recantation
subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano and an affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano, father of
the complainant's witnesses, Renato and Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these earlier written
statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found the existence of a prima facie case against
petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal Information. Evidently, the same written statements
were also the very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification", since the attached affidavits of recantation were not yet then
available. Since the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is now assailed and put in issue and, since the petitioners have
not yet been arraigned, it would be to the broader interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation of this case be had to
secure the petitioners against hasty prosecution and to protect them from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive trials (Salonga v.
Paño G.R. No. 59524, February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is
subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him,
he issues a warrant of arrest.

12
Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination
of the existence of a probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix
of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.

13
3. G.R. No. 188133 July 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO y EBDANE, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this appeal the challenge to the October 16, 2008 Decision1 and the December 23, 2008 resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142. The challenged CA decision affirmed the April 22, 2004 joint
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103, Quezon City, finding appellant Oliver Renato Edafio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), and imposing on him the penalty of life imprisonment. The assailed resolution, on the
other hand, denied the appellant's motion for reconsideration.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
under two separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-111200 and Q-02-112104.
The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits followed.
The prosecution presented, as itswitnesses, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin Casignia and Police Officer (PO) 3 Elmer
Corbe. The appellant, Siochi and Ruben Forteza took the witness stand for the defense.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drugs
Enforcement Group, composed of PO3 Corbe, PO3 Nelson Javier, PO3 Dennis Padpad, PO3 Marcelo Alcancia, Jr.,
together with a female informant, went to the parking area of McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an entrapment
operation against a certain alias "Nato."4
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi.5 The informant approached the
appellant and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe.6 When PO3 Corbe was
approaching the appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and ran away. PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad and PO3 Alcancia
chased the appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab the appellant, causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe
recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in
the appellant’s waist. The other members of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi
and the seized items to the police station for investigation.7
P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the Western Police District Crime Laboratory, examinedthe seized
items and found them positive for the presence of shabu.8
The appellant, for his part, testified that at around 4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he called Siochi on the phone, and
informed him that the motorbike starter the latter needed was already available.9 On the same day, Vanessa Paduada
called the appellant, and asked for the directions to McDonalds, West Avenue.10 At around 6:00 p.m., Siochi and Ruben
arrived at the gate of Philam Homes on board a space wagon. The appellant met them at the subdivision gate, and showed
the starter to Siochi. Thereafter, Vanessa called on the appellant’s cellular phone. The appellant then boarded the vehicle,
and told Siochi that he would just talk to a person at McDonalds.11 When the space wagon arrived at McDonalds, the
appellant alighted from the vehicle and proceeded towards the restaurant’s entrance. Afterwards, Vanessa called him from
inside a parked car. The appellant approached Vanessa who, for her part, alighted from the car. Vanessa told the appellant
to get inside the car’s rear. The appellant did as instructed; Vanessa went to the front passenger seat, beside a male
driver.12 Immediately after, the male driver alighted from the vehicle and entered the car’s rear. The appellant went out of
the car, but the male driver followed him and grabbed his hand. The appellant resisted, and wrestled with the driver along
West Avenue. During this commotion, the appellant heard a gunfire; four (4) persons approached him, and then tied his

14
hands with a masking tape.13 The police placed him on board a pick-up truck, and then brought him to Bicutan. In
Bicutan, the police brought him to the interrogation room, where they punched him and placed a plastic on his head.14
In its joint decision dated April 22, 2004, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of shabu under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. It also ordered him to pay a ₱500,000.00 fine.
The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable doubt.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA found PO3 Corbe to be a credible witness. The CA also
found the appellant’s warrantless arrest to be valid; it explained that the appellant’s act of running when PO3 Corbe was
approaching him reinforced the latter’s suspicion that "something was amiss."15
The CA added that strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not required as long asthe integrity
of the seized item had been ensured. It further held that the police officers were presumed to have regularly performed
their official duties.
Finally, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of illegal possession of shabu.
The appellant moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated December 23, 2008.
In his brief16 and supplemental brief,17 the appellant essentially alleged that PO3 Corbe’s testimony was "vague and
equivocal;"18 it lacked details on how the appellant was lured to sell shabu to the informant, and how the entrapment
operation had been planned. The appellant also argued that his warrantless arrest was illegal since he was not committing
any crime when the police arrested him. He alsoclaimed that the police did not mark and photograph the seized items, and
that there was a broken chain of custody over the confiscated drugs.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the testimony of PO3 Corbe was clear and
convincing; the inconsistencies in his court testimony pertained only to minor details. It also claimed that the appellant’s
arrest was valid, and the seized shabu was admissible in evidence. Finally, the OSG maintained that there was no break in
the chain of custody over the seized plastic bag containing shabu.19
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUITthe appellant.
Warrantless arrest invalid; seized
items inadmissible
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto.20
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 21
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the
appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or
was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with
each otherwhen he approached them. For clarity and certainty, we reproduce PO3 Corbe’s court testimony dated February
21, 2003, thus:
ATTY. RENATO SARMIENTO:
Q: You and the informant were not able to approach Nato because he sense[d] that you are (sic) a policeman?

15
PO3 CORBE:
A: Our informant first approached Renato Edano[,] and they talked but when he (sic) called me, Renato run (sic), sir.
Q: You said tinawag ka[,] who was that that call (sic) you?
A: Team informant, sir.
xxxx
Q: How did she call you?
A: She waived (sic) her had (sic), sir.
Q: What was she doing?
A: She was talking to Alias Nato[,] sir.
Q: Did you hear what they are talking? (sic)
A: I was still in the car[.] I was not able to hear[,] sir.
Q: How would you know that they are talking, Mr. Witness? (sic)
A: I could see them, sir.
Q: What did you see?
A: They were talking, sir.
Q: They were not exchanging stuff and money, Mr. witness?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: While talking[,] the female informant call[ed] you, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.22 (emphases ours)
As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other; there was no
exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. Notably,while it is true that the informant waved at PO3
Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been consummated.
PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug
and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed
as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:23
Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against him.
Flight per seis not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.It is not a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for
flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses,and fear of being
wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of
various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.24
In other words, trying to run awaywhen no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of
guilt.

16
Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise
illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence,
having comefrom an invalid search and seizure.
Corpus delicti not proved with moral
certainty
Even granting, for the sake ofargument, that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid, the latter’s acquittal is still in
order due to the prosecution’s failure to establish the evidence of the corpus delictiwith moral certainty.
We stress that "[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua nonfor conviction for the illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs, it being the verycorpus delictiof the crimes."25 Thus, the evidence of the corpus delictimust
be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the various lapses – enumerated and discussed below – committed by the police in the handling,
safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.
First, we find it highly unusual and irregular that the police officers would let the appellant mark the drugs seized from
him, instead of doing the marking themselves. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. SARMIENTO:
Q: This item was not marked at the place allegedly where you apprehended the suspect at McDonald’s, West Avenue,
Quezon City, am I correct to say that?
PO3 CORBE:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You are also required not only tomark it but to put your initial to it, my question did you place your initial in this
evidence? (sic)
A: No, sir.
Q: You did not, Mr. Witness?
A: No, sir.
Q: You were also required to put the date of apprehension, being the arresting officer, did you put the date in this
evidence, Mr. Witness?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why did you not do that, Mr. Witness?
A: What I remembered there is an initial of the accused, sir.
Q: Who put the initial, Mr. Witness?
A: He was the one, sir.
Q: At your station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not put your initial?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why did you not put your initial?
17
A: I was not able to put sir.26 (emphases ours)
Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyerof his/her initials and
signature on the item/s seized. "Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized
items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence -
should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation."27The Court clarified in
People v. Resurreccion28 that marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. Thus, while marking of the seized drugs at the police station is permitted, the
marking should be done by the police, and not by the accused. The appellant’s participation inthe marking procedure
should only be as a witness. Why the police failed to do a basic police procedure truly baffles us.
We also point out that per the testimony of P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer, the police forwarded two (2)
plastic bags containing white crystalline substances to the crime laboratory for examination – one marked with the initials
"OR" and the other marked with "GS." Both plastic bags were used asevidence against the appellant. The records,
however, did not indicate who marked the plastic bag with "GS," who witnessed this marking, and whenthis marking had
been made. As with the bag that had been marked "OR," we express doubts on whether the plastic bag containing white
crystalline substances marked as "GS" was the same plastic bag taken from the appellant’s co-accused, Siochi.
Second, the police did not inventory or photographthe seized drugs, whether at the place of confiscation or at the police
station.1avvphi1 These omissions were admitted by the prosecution during pre-trial.29
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1,Article II of R.A. No.
9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventoryand photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof[.] [emphases ours]
This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of theImplementing Rules and Regulations(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165,
which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventoryand photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall berequired to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] [emphasis
ours]
To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]"This saving clause,
however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable
grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved.30
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for its
failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling and safekeeping of the seized items. "We stress that it is the
18
prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under Section 21[a] of R.A. No. 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so."31 The Court
cannot simply presume what these justifications are.
Although the Court has recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. No. 9165 would not
automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared that when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards
prescribed inthe substantive law (R.A. No. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items
that the prosecution presented in evidence. This doubt cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural
safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.32
In sum, we hold that the appellant’s acquittal is in order since theshabupurportedly seized from him is inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the prosecution's failure to comply with Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the
item seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delictiof the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSEand SET ASIDEthe October 16, 2008 decision and the December 23,
2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142. Appellant Oliver Renato Edaño y Ebdane is
hereby ACQUITTEDfor failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately
RELEASEDfrom detention unless heis otherwise legally confined for another cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation.1âwphi1 The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

19
4. G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no
time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses — like "stop-and-frisk"
— which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect
and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA
G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,1 Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal
E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows: 2
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and
knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.3 With the agreement of the public
prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.4 After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision5convicting
appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: 6
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of
Marijuana residue), and hereby sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant remained on provisional liberty.7 Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal8dated
May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court9 promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the appeal and affirming
the trial court:10
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against
appellant.
Respondent Court11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

20
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:12
At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was
driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being
made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male
person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be
walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands.
The male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his
hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet
and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned
over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated
wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a
white sheet of paper on which he wrote "Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The white sheet of paper was marked as
Exhibit "E-3". The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit "E-4").
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a chemical
analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
apprehending policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit "D") to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat.
Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit "D".
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40
o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit "D".
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the specimen which she
identified. (Exhibit
"E")13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana leaves" in her Certification dated April 11,
1988 (Exhibit "F").14 These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she also found that the
"crushed marijuana leaves" gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her examinations
(Exhibit "G").
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit
"E"). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl.
Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City.
(Exhibit "C")
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery when
he was apprehended.15
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:16

21
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A.
Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the driver of
the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The
policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The
policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why he
was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found on
the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused
to the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signalled the latter to follow him. The neighbor
thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked to
remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned over the pants of the
accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and
dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused. The
accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and was led to the Ford
Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to "settle" the case. The policemen who led the
accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who
told the accused to call his parents. The accused did not call his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not
have any telephone.
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an inquest Fiscal. There,
the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say anything.
The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were stopped by
policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on his
person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City Police Headquarters
on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to take off his pants at the police
headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing that tricycles were
allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.17
The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting
officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were "neutral and disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on what
transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially they asserted that the appellant was found to be in
possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely "trumped up," because the appellant neither
took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of
Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations, surmises or
conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled
that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the narration. It further found petitioner's
contention — that he could not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue — to be without merit, because the
forensic chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.
Issues
22
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of the accused had
been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
material and substantial and not minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for the purpose of extorting
money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is consistent with both innocence
and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the credibility of
prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized
During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were products of an
illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for
respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner never raised this issue
in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that
there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case
of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a

23
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against
the person from whom they were taken.19
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention and
detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This
was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner
and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time,
while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third
person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to have failed to investigate this
behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what justified the
limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.20 Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of the
poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute.21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the
rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable
search and seizure."22 In People vs. Encinada,23 the Court further explained that "[i]n these cases, the search and seizure
may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable
cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched."
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the
Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found
inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun
and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search

24
the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes
and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular
hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to
stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in
petitioner's possession:25
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around at A. Mabini Street in front of
the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez, what
happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we called his attention, he tried
to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in his hands.

25
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of
any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a
right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following
requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof;
and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.26 Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this
elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its
violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases
where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not
raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.27
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained "polluted, irreconcilable and unexplained"
contradictions which did not support petitioner's conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect the
result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule.28
We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People vs. Avila,
it was held that — "As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the
details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full credence
on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas' contradictory testimony,
that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit29 signed by both arresting policemen. The question of whether the
marijuana was found inside petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny
possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in
petitioner's possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor and does not destroy Espiritu's credibility.30
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.31
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed
marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His awareness thereof was
undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when asked

26
to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding
marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to believe the extortion
angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or present any
evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and unbelievable, considering that he
was released on bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988.32 Since then, he could have made the charge in
relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this
Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.33
The Proper Penalty
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by sentencing
petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand
pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished
by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
(As amended by Act No. 4225.)
Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to
those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted
of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to
those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those
whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the
time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal possession of
marijuana:
Sec. 8. . . . .
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment
ranging from six years and one day to twelve years.34
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to
PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

27
5. G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 which
affirmed in toto the December 11, 2007 Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC), convicting appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati
(appellant) of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (RA 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a
fine of ₱300,000.00.
The Factual Antecedents
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving his
motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and
scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special
Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he
recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.4
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver.
Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate
the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station
to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic
sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and appellant’s initials and the date of the arrest.5
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the investigator, PO2
Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment receipt6 and prepared a letter request7 for
the laboratory examination of the seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated item
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police Senior Inspector Albert Arturo
(PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.8
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, tested positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu)
weighing 0.03 gram which, when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result of METHYLAMPHETAMIME
HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.11
In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead claimed that on the date and time of the incident,
he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th

28
Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant approached the person, who
turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and took his wallet which contained ₱1,000.00.12
Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled by eight other detainees under
the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to the Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police
officers, whose names he recalled were "Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters’ firing range. There,
"Michelle" and "Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right beside his ear each
time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he continued to deny knowledge about the cellphone.13 Thus,
appellant sustained head injuries for which he was brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment.14
The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who informed him that he was being
charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11."15 The first charge was eventually dismissed.
The RTC Ruling
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the elements of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established, to wit: (1) the appellant is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused
freely and consciously possesses said drug. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3 de Leon to testify falsely against
appellant, coupled with the fact that the former had previously arrested the latter for illegal possession of drugs under
Republic Act No. 642516 (RA 6425), the RTC gave full faith and credit to PO3 de Leon’s testimony. Moreover, the RTC
found the plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de Leon at the place and
time of the arrest.
On the other hand, the RTC gave scant consideration to the defenses of denial and frame-up proffered by the appellant,
being uncorroborated, and in the light of the positive assertions of PO3 de Leon. It refused to give credence to appellant’s
claim that PO3 de Leon robbed him of his money, since he failed to bring the incident to the attention of PO3 de Leon’s
superiors or to institute any action against the latter.
Consequently, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest"17 as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held that appellant
"exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion,"18aggravated by the existence of his
past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him.
Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise ruled that the prosecution had adequately shown the continuous and
unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, from the time it was confiscated from appellant by PO3 de Leon, marked at
the police station, turned over to PO2 Hipolito and delivered to the crime laboratory, where it was received by PSI Arturo,
the forensic chemist, up to the time it was presented in court for proper identification.
The Issue
The sole issue advanced before the Court for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTC’s Decision
convicting appellant of the offense charged.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests,
either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
29
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 19 On the other
hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.20
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required.
Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed.
In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an "in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as above-quoted.
The Court disagrees.
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have been no lawful warrantless
arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leon’s testimony on direct examination in court is revelatory:
FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th
Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?
PO3 DE LEON: Yes Ma’am.
Q: What was this incident?
A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking at the shabu in his hand, Ma’am.
Q: And exactly what time was this?
A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Ma’am.
Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying something in his hand?
A: Eight to ten meters, Ma’am.
Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was holding, Ma’am.
Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?
A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Ma’am.
Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and holding in his hand was a shabu?
A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu, Ma’am.21 (Underscoring supplied)

30
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably
perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while
simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the
plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is
insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to
appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands
cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at
the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful
warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been
complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled
to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge22 for the same offense. The CA stressed this point when
it said:
It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view.1âwphi1 PO3 Renato de Leon saw appellant
holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a white powderly substance. PO3 Renato de Leon was quite
familiar with appellant, having arrested him twice before for the same illegal possession of drug. It was not just a hollow
suspicion. The third time around, PO3 de Leon had reasonably assumed that the piece of plastic wrapper appellant was
holding and scrutinizing also contained shabu as he had personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past
criminal record. He would have been irresponsible to just ‘wait and see’ and give appellant a chance to scamper away. For
his part, appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from an equally familiar face of authority,
ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with him through the aid of a tricycle driver. Appellant’s act of
running away, indeed, validated PO3 de Leon’s reasonable suspicion that appellant was actually in possession of illegal
drug. x x x23
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of
the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as
referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch
the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous
criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.
It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on "personal knowledge of
facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is unquestionably not what "personal knowledge"
under the law contemplates, which must be strictly construed.24
Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against him.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.25It is not a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances,26 for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for
flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being
wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.27 Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of
various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.

31
In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be
dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-
quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.28 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to
whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent
purpose of suspending his liberty,30 it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a
citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the case of People v. Tudtud:31
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most
basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a
basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense charged and ordered
immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.

32
6. [G.R. No. 93239. March 18, 1991.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDISON SUCRO, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Fidencio S. Raz Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT; WHEN LAWFUL. — Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered
lawful. The rules states: "Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN THE PRESENCE OR WITHIN THE VIEW OF AN OFFICER,
CONSTRUED. — An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v.
Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910]).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL COMMISSION OF CRIME. — The court earlier indicated in
the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.

4. ID.; ID.; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, AS A GENERAL RULE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A VALID
WARRANT; EXCEPTION. — That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule
(Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)

5. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY ENTITLED TO GREAT
WEIGHT. — Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it
being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to
evaluate their testimonies (People v. Umali, Et Al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163
SCRA 745 [1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970]).

6. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION THAT POLICE OFFICERS PERFORM
THEIR DUTIES REGULARLY; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
police officers were compelled by any motive than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution
of the crime, the presumption being that police officers perform their duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Castiller, supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145
33
SCRA 483 [1986]).

7. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; ALIBI; UNAVAILING IN THE FACE OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. — In contrast to
the evidence presented by the prosecution, Accused-appellant’s defense is alibi which is unavailing considering that he
was positively identified by Macabante to be the person from whom he bought marijuana.

8. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; MERE DENIALS CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION. — It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the
appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170
SCRA 681 [1989]).

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act, under an
Information which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of
Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting
as a pusher or broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to another and - or distributing
prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law have in his
possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves
which were confiscated from him by the police authorities of Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried
marijuana leaves to a customer." (Rollo, p. 9)

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. Trial
ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, the pertinent portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug under
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his sentence with
the period for which he has undergone preventive imprisonment to the date of promulgation of this judgment. All the
items of marijuana confiscated in this case are declared forfeited in favor of the State." (Rollo, p. 41)

From the foregoing judgment of conviction, Accused-appellant interposes this appeal, assigning the following as errors
allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E" - "E-4",
TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA, TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI; FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SAME

34
WERE TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE ACCUSED
WAS NOT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.
II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO GUILTY OF THE SALE OF
PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P20,000.00.
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 1)

The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi,
Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2, 1989).

As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado
at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio
saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart
found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while
appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-
18, ibid). It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi
instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up
Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant. (pp. 18-19, ibid)

At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at
Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up
with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police,
Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp 6-8, TSN, June 19, 1989)
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the
chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo
and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another
teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado,
Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all found positive of
marijuana. (pp. 4-7, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-6)

As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is
lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

We rule in the affirmative.

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under Section 2, Artilce
III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and
arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days
before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

This contention is without merit.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is

35
considered lawful. The rule states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;" (Emphasis supplied).

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil.
516 [1910]).

The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the activities of the
accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado’s house.

Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some persons,
go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he
was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.

Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the
marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates
that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the
police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro’s nefarious
activity.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that police officers have
personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the
accused. Thus, it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would take place and while positioned at a
street corner, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters
away from them (the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter handed a wrapped
object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants infront of his abdomen while Bati, on his part,
placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. (p. 2)
x x x

. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their testimonies were based on their actual and
personal knowledge of the events that took place leading to appellant’s arrest. They may not have been within hearing
distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on hushed tones, but they were certainly near enough
to observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law enforcers and
are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Bati,
supra citing People v. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, October 12, 1987)

The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio himself knew of

36
Sucro’s activities even prior to the former s joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro’s activities only three days
before the incident.

As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years and that after Fulgencio
joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is possible that because of
this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in such activity.
However, because of reliable information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday, he was
constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.

On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired
from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is
that probable cause existed. Thus, it has been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 88017, January
21, 1991):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable
ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was
based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was
touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused
from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which
must still be present in such a case."cralaw virtua1aw library

As the Solicitor General has pointed out:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at
checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring
of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana
and to seize the contraband."cralaw virtua1aw library

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule
126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (People v.
Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)

The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it follows that the evidence obtained
therefrom is inadmissible.

As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.chanrobles law library : red

Edison Sucro assails the trial court’s reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for testifying could be merely
to escape prosecution.

We quote the trial court’s finding as to the testimony of Macabante:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have been the reason of (sic) his willingness
to testify in court against the accused. But this does not necessarily taint the evidence that proceeds from his lips. As

37
explained by Lt. Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers are usually their customers, especially if as
in this case, there is no other direct evidence of the selling except the testimony of the buyer. We accept this observation
as a realistic appraisal of a situation in which drug users are, and should be employed by law enforcement authorities to
bolster the drive against pushers who are the real felons in our society. We have observed the demeanor of the witness in
court, and found him to be straightforward, unhesitating, and spontaneous in his declarations, so that we are satisfied as to
his intention and disposition to tell the truth" (Rollo, p. 40)

Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being
acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate
their testimonies (People v. Umali, Et Al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745
[1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970])

Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by public officers Fulgencio and Seraspi.

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive than to accomplish their
mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime, the presumption being that police officers perform their
duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People
v. Castiller, supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986])

The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic Chemist that the items seized were all
positive for marijuana.

In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, Accused-appellant’s defense is alibi which is unavailing
considering that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the person from whom he bought marijuana.

Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his uncle and cousin distributing handbills for
his Auntie’s candidacy. The fact, however, remains that it does not preclude the possibility that he was present in the
vicinity as established by his admission that he moved a lot and even had the occasion to meet Macabante on the street.

It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the appellant as the seller of the
prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])

Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense charged. The
trial court’s decision must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

38
7. G.R. No. 129296 September 25, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No.
7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about September 25, 1996, at
Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante delicto and without authority
of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or
derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured shall be
confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on
the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about
the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya.3 The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao,
Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The
team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G.
Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants
and arrest the cultivator of same."4
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site
where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the
police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut.
They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.5 PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.6 The police uprooted the seven marijuana
plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.7 The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants.8 Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.9 Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime
Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs
containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.10 She next conducted a chemical examination, the
results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a white sack
with markings.

39
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for
Marijuana, a prohibited drug."11
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the land
cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland Block B, which
formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.12 This lot was part of the public domain.
Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been
issued in his favor.13
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996,
he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He
was asked to go with the latter to "see something."14 This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the
marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut.15 Five armed policemen were present and
they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing
there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the
plants.16 Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.17
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot five of
the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of
uprooted marijuana plants.18 The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain
Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge
against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning
the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation."19 At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he
knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.20
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest
house being 100 meters away.21 The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace
officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found was located between his house and
Carlito Pascua's.22
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's claim that the
marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating.23 Tipay presented a sketch he made,24 which showed the
location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the closest neighbor.
According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant
from the hut of Carlito Pascua.25 Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied him when he made
the measurements.26 He further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter of the seized
plants was the information given him by the police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said
plants.27
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership of
marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants punishable under
section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs
against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."28
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I

40
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS
DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON
APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE
MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED
APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.29
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample
time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove
appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection against
unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no search made by
the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot
and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police
officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The
instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely to make a
verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view of the
remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they
stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any search warrant.
Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which evinced
the occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search warrant was
required."30
The Constitution31 lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial
warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded.32 Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.33
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable
cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a
41
warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants
were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the
accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the
protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants.34 The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine
to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.35
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested
without a warrant.36 Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note
further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora.
The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.37 Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the
area" before they could spot the illegal plants.38 Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and
a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and
hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot,
appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his
papers, and other possessions.39 The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security"40 of the individual. As appellant
correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. 41 To
conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a
person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or
a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his
bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal
search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the
prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against
appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a
quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove
appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now
address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that appellant
admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in the
absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under
42
custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional fiat that
admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without any counsel."42
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against him for
being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have relied
upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers was not a general
inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the
investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police
sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of
regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the
marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and independent
counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellant’s failure to impute any false motive for the police officers
to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by police officers
was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.43 An investigation
begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.44 The
moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of having
committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the
presence of counsel.45
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the location of
appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly
meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a
suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.46
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so we just
asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking him..." 47 In
trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he
was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial
investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."48 As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated appellant.
Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed policemen.49 All had been dispatched to arrest
him.50 From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a
significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly
pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be
admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.51 The records show that the
admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the
investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not
only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.52 Even if the
confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of
such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given.53
43
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof.54 The
evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,55 it must likewise be credible and
competent.56 Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.57 Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such
a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial." 58
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense
charged.1âwphi1 These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership
of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link appellant
with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these proofs
against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted without
the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police had sufficient time to
obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure
of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt
without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the inadmissibility of evidence procured
pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the police during
investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession was made without the
assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to
convict appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must
have the services of competent and independent counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the
prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved..."59 To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused.60 Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he
is entitled to an acquittal.61 In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably
tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 62 Nor can the
confession obtained during the uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence
against him."63 Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining evidence did not
even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of
innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his
innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic
law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then
his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."64
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from
confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

44
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

45
8. People v. Chua Ho San 308 SCRA 432 (1999) G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999
Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, CID began patrolling the Bacnotan
coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area he intercepted a radio call from ALMOITE requesting police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this
time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious
of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA,
however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police
officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seem not
to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed
“sign language;” he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and
acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances. which was later found out that it was Shabu. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As
CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence,
CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. CHUA was initially
charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of the RTC.
Issue: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause impelling the police officers from
effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by
informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest exists in this case. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant,
arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts or as recent case law
adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person
arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and
which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or
evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned
in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.

46
9. G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO,
knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have his
possession, control and custody one (1) bag of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to
transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City, without authority of law to do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is narrated by the trial
court as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio
Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan,
were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said
place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by
informers; that it was around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G)
who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan
to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves;
that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or
less; that the person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel
Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused
was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo
submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report (Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo
asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who has had special training on
narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to have the remaining portion examined by
the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the
marijuana leaves and found positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana
leaves were taken to the PCCL at Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A and
A-1) and when examined, the same were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1). (At pp. 9-10, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:

47
The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot a child on June 10, 1982; that he was
formerly employed in the poultry farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is engaged in the
business of selling poultry medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used to conduct his business at Taytay, Rizal; that he
goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one
Nena Ballon and dispose the same in Manila; that he never left his residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on
March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to collect a balance of P100.00 from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that he was
able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because he had a
drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo City but he failed and
was able to take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening that it was a Victory Liner Bus that he rode and because he was
tipsy, he did not notice that the bus was only bound for San Fernando, Pampanga; that upon alighting at the Victory Liner
Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the street to wait for a bus going to Manila; that while thus waiting for
a bus, a man whom he came to know later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has any residence
certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet and took all the money inside the wallet
amounting to P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the municipal building for verification as he may
be an NPA member; that at the municipal building, he saw a policeman, identified by him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo,
sleeping but was awakened when he arrived that Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out everything from
his pocket saying that the prisoners inside the jail may get the same from him; that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill
and Pat. Quevedo took the same, telling him that it shall be returned to him but that it was never returned to him; that he
was thereafter placed under detention and somebody told him that he is being charged with possession of marijuana and if
he would like to be bailed out, somebody is willing to help him; and, that when he was visited by his wife, he told his wife
that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his wife not to complain anymore as it would be
useless. (Rollo, pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in his appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan died. Thereafter, this
court appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of
the Clerk of Court, required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter complied and, in her brief, raised the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A
WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA
LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER
AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a
warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

48
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section
12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls
squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with the same issue, held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the
latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
(Nolasco V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case the PC
officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and
was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the
gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that
the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally. The records show, however, that there were
certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had
at react two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to
Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority
that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN,
pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to
secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants
during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of
contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was never
authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana
package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag
bearing the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana
package together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that
she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-request bore the name of the accused, then the
requirements of proper authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by
the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.

49
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly authenticated, still, we
cannot discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive results for
marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and doubtful and that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been presented before the lower
court. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This Court has ruled in several cases
that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16,
1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court.
Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had first hand opportunity to
watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their
testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no reason to
disturb the following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan are positive and sufficiently
clean to show the commission by the accused of the offense herein chatted. These prosecution witnesses have no motive
to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against the accused. The knowledge on what these witnesses
testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the official performance of their duties and then, (sic) being no showing that
they are prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the possession of the accused were marijuana
leaves were corroborated by the examination findings conducted by Pat. October to Salangad of the PCCL, with station at
camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). (Rollo, p. 11)
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat. Punzalan got all the money from his wallet
when he was accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will be "salvaged" why
will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal Building for interrogation and/or verification? Would not Pat.
Punzalan be exposing his identity to the accused? This is unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony to the accused
that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill arid never returned the same to him. If the policemen really got any
money from the accused and that the marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused, why will the two policemen still
produce in Court as evidence that expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and which
contained the marijuana in question if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the prosecution in this case were all based on
personal knowledge acquired by the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties and there is
nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they have any prejudice against the herein accused.
Between the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the
accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo, p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed himself through
compulsory court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was presented nor
was any justification for the non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. It
cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly observed by the lower court, is an added
circumstance tending to establish his guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:

50
The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one (1) kilo, more or less. The intent to
transport the same is clear from the testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other things, that when he
confronted the accused that night, the latter told him that he (accused) is bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City.
Moreover, considering the quantity of the marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused and the place he was
arrested which is at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place where the accused is not residing, it can be said that the intent to
transport the marijuana leaves has been clearly established. (Rollo, pp. 13-14)
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically denied in court, that he is
transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial
confession cannot be admitted because it does not appear in the records that the accused, during custodial investigation,
was apprised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People v. Duero 104 SCRA
379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged
oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated
in People v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:
In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts relative to admissibility of
statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of
the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to
questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights.
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this finding extracted a clear intent
to transport the marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that although the information stated the weight to be
approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only
600 grams Such amount is not a considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to transport the
marijuana leaves.
Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused was arrested at San
Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe penalty must be
based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in this case.
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but his actual
session.
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine
of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.

51
10. [G.R. No. 138881. December 18, 2000.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, finding
accused-appellant Leila Johnson y Reyes guilty of violation of §16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of;2500,000.00 and the
costs of the suit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The information against accused-appellant alleged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess three plastic bags of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, each bag weighing:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;

#2 ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and

#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, respectively,

or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding license or prescription to possess or use said regulated
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Upon being arraigned, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, 3 whereupon trial was held.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George de Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, duty
frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense presented accused appellant who testified in her own
behalf.

The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean
Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had
since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer’s disease, in
convalescent homes in the United States. 4

On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son’s family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to
52
the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998. 5

At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her
duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband
goods, and explosives. 6

When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United Sates via Continental
Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed
to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. 7

Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi
po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." ("Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.") She was directed to take accused-
appellant to the nearest women’s room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied by
SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. 8

Inside the women’s room, Accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and
accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under
her girdle." Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the
women’s room. 9

The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was
fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." 10

Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the
arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellant’s passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were
taken and her personal belongings were itemized. 11

In her defense, Accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached
by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the women’s room. There, she was
asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was fount on her person. She was later
taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change
were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of
a certain Col. Castillo. 12

After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards carne in and threw two white packages on the table.
They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the packages. She was
detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal for inquest. 13 She
claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed to talk
to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines. 14

On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: 15

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended and hereby imposes on her
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment. in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibits "G", "C-2" and "C-3")

53
are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to cause the
transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.

The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail of Pasay City during the pendency of
this case provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) "despite failure of the prosecution in proving the
negative allegation in the information;" (2) "despite failure of the prosecution in proving the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride;" (3) "despite violation of her constitutional rights;" and (4) "when guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt." 16

First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. She
argues that the "shabu" confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature on
the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been
informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu," should have
been excluded from the evidence. 17

The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and used in
evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellant’s invocation of Art. III, §12(1) and (3). On the
other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person.

The trial court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace. officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed. and person to be arrested has committed it; and (Emphasis supplied)
x x x

A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as "the questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant
way. This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit
information or [a] confession from him."cralaw virtua1aw library

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited,
hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. 18

The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

54
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 19 Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking
and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. 20 Indeed, travelers are often
notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.

The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.

Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had been obtained while she
was in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General correctly points out
that nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to affix her signature to the packs. In fact,
only the signatures of Embile and Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect, were presented by the
prosecution in proving its case.

There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellant’s passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other
personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her
signature thereon. Rule 126, §2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.

Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by RA. No. 7659, states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 20 Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or Instrument Of The Crime — The
penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this
Act, shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

55
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;

6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, or

8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements as determined and
promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings conducted for the purpose.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional
to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

Under this provision, Accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for her
possession of 580.2 grams of shabu.

Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a qualitative examination of the substance contained
in Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the examination conducted by the NBI forensic chemist was a qualitative
one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu, but failed to establish its purity; hence, its exact quantity remains
indeterminate and unproved.

This contention is likewise without merit.

The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted would have indicated the presence of impurities if
there were any. He testified

PROS. VELASCO

By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants or impurities, it will be discovered by just mixing it?

WITNESS

If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a thin layer chromatographic examination.

PROS. VELASCO

Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr. Witness?

WITNESS

In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears one spot which resembles or the same as the Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride sample
x x x
56
PROS. VELASCO

So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals you have examined, in chemical examination, what
color it will register, if any?

WITNESS

In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it will not react with the reagent, therefore it will not dissolve. In
my examination, all the specimens reacted on the re-agents, sir.

PROS. VELASCO

And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in layman’s term.?

WITNESS

It is only a tawas.
x x x

COURT

In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the specimen.?

WITNESS

None, your Honor.

x x x

ATTY. AGOOT

I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed with 200 grams of tawas, you
will submit that to qualitative examination, what will be your findings, negative or positive, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS

It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.

ATTY. AGOOT

That is qualitative examination.

WITNESS

And also positive for aluminum sulfate. 21

57
A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a quantitative analysis requires the
determination of the percentage combination of the components of a mixture. Hence, a qualitative identification of a
powder may reveal the presence of heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a quantitative analysis may conclude the
presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent quinine. 22

De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3.
Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a mixture. It is particularly useful
for analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently received in a crime lab. For example, illicit drugs sold on
the street may be diluted with practically any material that is at the disposal of the drug dealer to increase the quantity of
the product that is made available to prospective customers. Hence, the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation
would be an arduous one without the aid of chromatographic methods to first separate the mixture into its components. 23

The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough, but also that the scientifically correct method
of obtaining an accurate representative sample had been obtained. 24 At any rate, as the Solicitor-General has pointed out,
if accused-appellant was not satisfied with the results, it would have been a simple matter for her to ask for an
independent examination of the substance by another chemist. This she did not do.

Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation in the information that she did
not have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."cralaw virtua1aw library

Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated
drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," a regulated drug, is not
unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the required license or prescription. She points out that since the
prosecution failed to present any certification that she is not authorized to possess or use regulated drugs, it therefore falls
short of the quantum of proof needed to sustain a conviction.

The contention has no merit.

The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. Chan Toco. 25 The accused in that case was
charged with smoking opium without being duly registered. He demurred to the information on the ground that it failed to
allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician.

This Court denied the motion and said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize generally the smoking of opium in these
Islands. But the legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited class of smokers who smoked
under the advice and by prescription of a licensed and practicing physician . . . Hence where one is charged with a
violation of the general provisions of the Opium Law, it is more logical as well as more practical and convenient, if he did
in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician, that he should set up this fact by way of defense, than that the
prosecution should be called upon to prove that every smoker, charged with a violation of the law, does so without such
advice or prescription. Indeed, when it is considered tit under the law any person may, in case of need and at any time,
procure the advice of a physician to use opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the nature of things no public record
of prescriptions of this kind is or can be required to be kept, it is manifest that it would be wholly impracticable and

58
absurd to impose on the prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium does so without the
advice of a physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in a particular case, that one using opium does so without the
advice or prescription of a physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility without the aid of the defendant
himself, while a defendant charged with the illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in establishing the fact that he
used it under the advice and on the prescription of a physician, if in fact he did so. 26

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not
always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it
is an easy thing for him to do, he has no one but himself to blame.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, which requires the prosecution to present a certification that accused-appellant has no license or permit
to possess shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon accused-
appellant to show that she has a license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug.

Fourth. Lastly, Accused appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to support a
finding that she is guilty of the crime charged.

This contention must likewise be rejected.

Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police
officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case,
no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting Accused-
Appellant. This Court accords great respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses in
the absence of any palpable error or arbitrariness in its findings. 27

It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no other witness was presented in her behalf. Her denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 28 As has been held, denial as a rule is a weak
form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or
frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 29

The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be validly charged with and convicted
of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of RA. No. 6425, as amended, have been complied with by the
prosecution in this case. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it is been held that courts may fix any amount within the limits established
by law. 30 Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580.2) grams of shabu were confiscated from accused-
appellant, the fine imposed by the trial court may properly be reduced to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding accused-appellant guilty of
violation of §16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs
against Appellant.

The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet returned to the accused-appellant are hereby
ordered returned to her.

SO ORDERED.

59
11. G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663,
for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist.
He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day,
he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the
first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then
proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline
bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of
the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint
at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. 2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at
the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The
two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the
sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a
gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag
and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in
brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to
get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.

60
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the
teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only
after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative
of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his
personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two
(2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in
Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no
more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that
they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other Identification papers, he
handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his passport, return
ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus.
When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and
his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's
defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise such
defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the
Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after
said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as
having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.3 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds
him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La
Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the
search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs
which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances.6

61
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed
by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely
under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused,10 or where the accused
was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search
warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at
Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer
was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the
police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was
riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his
passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the
suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who
has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession,
plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances

62
arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In
other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags
containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his
identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion even by the king, has not only found its niche in
all our charters, from 1935 to the present; it has also received unvarying recognition and acceptance in our case law.1 The
present Constitution2 declares that —
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right, among others, "shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."3
The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other government authority to a search of his body, or his
personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a legitimate
arrest.4
An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant of arrest. Even without a warrant, an arrest may also be
lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person:5
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

63
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."6 And it has been held that the
search may extend to the area "within his immediate control," i.e., the area from which said person arrested might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.7
Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also been held to be proper in cases of "search of a
moving vehicle,8 and "seizure of evidence in plain view."9 This was the pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention to Moreno v. Ago Chi;10 Alvero v. Dizon,11 Papa v. Mago,12 and an American
precedent, Harris v. U.S.13
If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest
without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and
in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the
occasion thereof, as being "the fruit of the poisonous tree.14 In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the
initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."15 But the right against an unreasonable search and
seizure may be waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly decided not to invoke it.16
There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing validity of these established principles.
However, the Court is divided as regards the ultimate conclusions which may properly be derived from the proven facts
and consequently, the manner in which the principles just cited should apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at odds. What is certain, however, is that the
soldiers had no warrant of arrest when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's person and the things in his possession at
the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the soldiers could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or
arrest nor a search warrant everytime they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and) no judge would issue them one
considering that searching questions have to be asked before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to the
search, a warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in accordance with the norms of the law. For
Malmstedt had not committed, nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit a crime, in the soldiers' presence,
nor did said soldiers have personal and competent knowledge that Malmstedt had in fact just committed a crime. All they
had was a suspicion that Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags; all they had was, in the words
of the Trial Court, "the hope of intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the Office of the Solicitor
General asserts, "information that most of the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera) were transporting marijuana and
other prohibited drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6, 1988 also by the First Division.17 There,
Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was disembarking from an inter-island vessel. The
officers were waiting for him because he was, according to an informer's report, then transporting marijuana. The search
of Aminnudin's bag confirmed the informer's report; the bag indeed contained marijuana. The Court nevertheless held that
since the PC officers had failed to procure a search warrant although they had sufficient time (two days) to do so and
therefore, the case presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search of Aminnudin's person and bag,
the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal; and the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence in the
criminal action subsequently instituted against Aminnudin for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in which apparently different conclusions were
reached. It is needful to devote a few words to them so that the relevant constitutional and legal propositions are not
misunderstood.
In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988),18 the accused boarded a "Victory Liner" passenger bus
going to Olongapo from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was carrying at the back of the seat then occupied by
Obiña, an INP member "on Detached Service with the Anti-Narcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obiña's suspicion,
and at the first opportunity, and without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously looked into the plastic bag and noted that
it contained camote tops as well as a package, and that there emanated from the package the smell of marijuana with
which he had become familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at Sta. Rita, and Claudio alighted, Obiña

64
accosted her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a policeman, and announced his intention to search her bag which
he said contained marijuana because of the distinctive odor detected by him. Ignoring her plea — "Please go with me, let
us settle this at home" — he brought her to the police headquarters., where examination of the package in Claudio's bag
confirmed his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana. The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances
to be lawful, the search justified, and the evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence against the accused.
In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990),19 two police officers and a barangay tanod were
conducting a "surveillance mission" at the Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed not
only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there) but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic
of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers; . . . they noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag . .
who was acting suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag; the person did so only after they identified themselves as
peace officers; found in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing one kilogram, more or less; the person
was then taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, where he was investigated; and an information was
thereafter filed against that person, Tangliben, charging him with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA
6425), as amended. Upon these facts it was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a valid warrantless arrest and a
proper warrantless search incident thereto.
The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In contrast"
to Aminnudin where the Court perceived no urgency as to preclude the application for and obtention of a search warrant, it
was declared that the Tangliben case —
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as
carrying marijuana . . . Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not
enough time to secure a search warrant . . . To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers,
illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robber, etc. would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on hand to enable the PC officers to secure a
search warrant, had there been time. But because there was actually no time to get the warrant, and there were "on-the-
spot" indications that Tangliben was then actually committing a crime, the search of his person and his effects was
considered valid.
Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al., decided on August 2,
1990,20 and People v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990.21
In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two members of the INP, Davao Metrodiscom, and when
he was accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police officers, he suddenly fled. He was pursued, overtaken
and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody. The buri bag Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a
revolver, for which he could produce no license or authority to possess, four rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas
grenade. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and convicted after trial. This Court
affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a search without warrant, i.e., the
appellant was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he had with him at the time. The Court cited
with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio,22 a 1968 case, which the
Solicitor General had invoked to justify the search.
In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics
Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on the highway going towards Baguio
City. This was done because of a confidential report by informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would be
transporting a large quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the
checkpoint. As expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the
checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw that on it were loaded
2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks and cans were seen to contain what appeared
to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves

65
which, upon scientific examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus
conducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest,23 and declared that, as in Tangliben, supra, Maspil and
Bagking had been caught in flagrante delictotransporting prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. Again, the Court took
occasion to distinguish the case from Aminnudin24 in which, as aforestated, it appeared that the police officers were aware
of Aminnudin's identity, his projected criminal enterprise and the vessel on which he would be arriving, and, equally as
importantly, had sufficient time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the Court
found that the officers concerned had no exact description of the vehicle the former would be using to transport marijuana,
and no inkling of the definite time of the suspects' arrival, and pointed out that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a
passenger boat on the high seas whose route and time of arrival are more or less certain, and which ordinarily cannot
deviate from or otherwise alter its course, or select another destination.25
The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure appears to be People v. Lo Ho Wing; et al., G.R. No.
88017, decided on January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an undercover or "deep penetration" agent, Tia,
managed somehow to gain acceptance into a group of suspected drug smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim Ching
Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo to Guangzhou, China, where he saw him and other person empty the contents of six (6)
tins of tea and replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with the cans of substituted "tea," they were met
at the airport by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were intercepted by officers and
operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), who had earlier been tipped off by Tia, and placed under arrest. As
search of the luggage brought in by Tia and Peter Lo, loaded on the group's vehicles, quickly disclosed the six (6) tin cans
containing fifty-six (56) bags of white crystalline powder which, upon analysis, was identified as metamphetamine. Tia,
Lo and Lim were indicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was discharged as state witness. Lo and
Lim were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the questions raised by them in this Court
on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their vehicles and personal effects was legal. The Court, citing Manipon,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 (1986),26 held legal the search of the appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure
therefrom of the dangerous drug, considering that there was intelligence information, including clandestine reports by a
planted spy actually participating in the activity, that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; that
the requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity," and "it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.27
In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing, facts existed which were found by the Court as
justifying warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly ascertained that the woman he was arresting
was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had personally seen that her bag contained not only vegetables but also a
package emitting the odor of marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, and had
been positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused were about to board passenger buses,
making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and decisive action. In Posadas, the person arrested and
searched was acting suspiciously, too, and when accosted had attempted to flee from the police officers. And
in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was definite information of the precise identity of the persons engaged in transporting
prohibited drugs at a particular time and place.
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the case at bar make out a legitimate instance of a
warrantless search and seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable divergence of views among the members of
the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant should be absolved on reasonable doubt.
There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or
package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of
perpetrating the offense for which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch
and the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. It matters not that the search disclosed that the
bags contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and suspicion. The search was not made by
virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a
66
reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed, or adjust been committed. There was no intelligent
and intentional waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore illegal, since the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body and his belongings may licitly be
made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken, and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the
evidence yielded by the search. An arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident
of such an unlawful arrest, also unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic Command at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Malmstedt
had, it is said, willingly admitted that there were was hashish inside the "teddy bears" in the luggage found in his
possession — an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory examination — does not help the cause of the
prosecution one bit. Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Malmstedt was accorded the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to all persons under custodial investigation.28 He was not informed, prior to being interrogated, that he
had the "right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice," and that if
he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one; not does it appear at all that he waived those
rights "in writing and in the presence of counsel." The soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead with the
investigation of Malmstedt, without counsel. The admissions elicited from Malmstedt under these circumstances, as the
Constitution clearly states, are "inadmissible in evidence against him.29
The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having been taken in violation of the constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, are inadmissible against him "for any purpose in any proceeding." Also
pronounced as incompetent evidence against him are the admissions supposedly made by him without his first being
accorded the constitutional rights of persons under custodial investigation. Without such object evidence and admissions,
nothing remains of the case against Malmstedt.
It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence presented by Malmstedt in his defense is feeble,
unworthy of credence. This is beside the point; for conformably to the familiar axiom, the State must rely on the strength
of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The unfortunate fact is that although the existence of the hashish is
an objective physical reality that cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate with any degree of
persuasion, much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was engaged in a criminal activity. This is the paradox
created by the disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is that the hashish in question has
been correctly confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn from private use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a disparagement of the efforts of the police and
military authorities to deter and detect offenses, whether they be possession of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or some
other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and commendation of the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen.
But those efforts must take account of the basic rights granted by the Constitution and the law to persons who may fall
under suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be justified by the objective of ferreting
out and punishing crime, no matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective might be. Disregard of those
rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of the guilty, and all because the "constable has
blundered," rendering the evidence inadmissible even if truthful or otherwise credible.30
I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989 and to acquit the appellant on reasonable doubt.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe represents the correct application to the facts of this
case of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and seizures. It is consistent with
my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a
unanimous decision of the Court en banc, and my dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311,
Valmonte v. De Villa (on checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181
SCRA 623.
67
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made during the deliberation on this case that some
members of the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of extending its protection to society, which deserves our
higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong priorities, criminals are being imprudently let free, to violate
our laws again; and it is all our fault.
Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I do not consider a person a criminal, until
he is convicted by final judgment after a fair trial by a competent and impartial court. Until then, the Constitution bids us
to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak crudely or sport tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of
our own standards of propriety and decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he may look like a criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also so wrong.
On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal search and seizure as long as
the suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited article That fact will retroactively validate the violation
of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize, the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact of
illegal possession, not the fact of illegal search and seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1, which was discredited
in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejected by an express provision in the 1973
Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the present Constitution, again explicitly declares that any
evidence illegally obtained "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of criminal justice.1âwphi1 In the case at bar,
the search was made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that the route was being used by marijuana
dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at his waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that
probable cause? The ponencia notes that the military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the
Sagada with prohibited drugs in his possession. This is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless
search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily accept it.
The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was
carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal
possession that retroactively established the probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of
the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself.
In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years ago:
. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used.1avvphi1 It
is also desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which
the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well
pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly
accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am "coddling criminals," I welcome the accusation and
take pride in it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with outlawed evidence than exalt order at the
price of liberty.

68
12. G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS
(ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same
or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the
protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region.1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased
when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned
down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at
Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off
inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these
checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or
seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a
citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not
sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that,
in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against
unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs.
Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated
are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose
rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and
69
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by
the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there
was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to
be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and
order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that
all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of
the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and
fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of
national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to
be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that
they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
70
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice,
hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he
resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of security
and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to
actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a
measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with
the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the existence
alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is
also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is
not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.)
To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day by virtue of
General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS,
UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING
PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance.
(See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures, the same measures
against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that
terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved
party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that
event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in
particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and
gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by
itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto
themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question,
exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No
search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother
watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve routine checks
compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men,

71
CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without
batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a warrantless search,
which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the
hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the
checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of democracy"
in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make
liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and
fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of
national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to
be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that
they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice,
hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he
resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of security
and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to
actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a
measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with
the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the existence
alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is
also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is
not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.)
To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day by virtue of
General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS,
UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
72
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING
PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance.
(See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures, the same measures
against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that
terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved
party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that
event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in
particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and
gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by
itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto
themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question,
exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No
search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother
watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve routine checks
compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men,
CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without
batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a warrantless search,
which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the
hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the
checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of democracy"
in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make
liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.

73
13. G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist
elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded
by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of
the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine
Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements of the
Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and
explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-
90-11756, respectively, which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several John Does whose true names and
identities have not as yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and
explosives in furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree No. 1866, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in their possession, custody and control, the following to wit:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from the proper authorities, and armed with
said dynamites, ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and
prompted by common designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of rebellion, by then and there
participating therein and publicly taking arms against the duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and removing from its allegiance
the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John
Does were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon City upon the person
of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted
homicide.

74
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not authorized to
possess any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the
period from November 30 up to December 9, 1989. 4
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National
Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario,
M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually
started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication
command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building
near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd
was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a
group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that
moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to
start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew
their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the
surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or
bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team
leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col.
delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five
bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a
certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the
Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping
through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col.
Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto
Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being
mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the
fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a
certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on November 30, 1989, he was in
Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 1,
1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he was
inside his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the office of
Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of the building. He denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col.
Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives in his possession. He testified that when the military
raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and made to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet"
and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know anything about the explosives and insists
that when they were asked to stand up, the explosives were already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police (PC-INP), and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the 1987coup d' etat. In
July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no job. Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in
the PC-INP stockade and do the marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant worked
for Matillano.

75
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because "bata raw ako ni Col.
Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin."
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide,
but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, it made a recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as
Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd
paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C., the court recommends that Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after
serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason that he did not
have either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the same; he is neither
the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely employed by Col.
Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual
possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to possess, which is necessary before one can be convicted under
Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to
the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which criminal acts
have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of the country. The series
of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the first few years of the transitional government under then President
Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip
in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public peace and order.
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and
ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law
requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and management. 6 This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder
of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of
firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since
the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, 8 in which case good faith
and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. 9

76
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the
offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to
perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did
intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the
crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done
freely and consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession,
without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there
was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. 11 Such intent to possess is, however, without
regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal
intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not
important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a
violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus,
although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense
committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having
intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor.
Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office
when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several
explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives.
Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not
constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was merely
employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and
cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior
and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of thought is often
disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the
Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the
dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his
possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of
these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of
explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor
one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily
prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the
business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and
ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that appellant De Gracia actually intended to
possess the articles confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. While the
matter has not been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of advertence thereto by the parties, to
delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by the raiding team, considering the gravity of the offense for
which herein appellant stands to be convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed.

77
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that
time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the
RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at
by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The
Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of
an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In
addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity
of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding
areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to
the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team
had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained in People vs.
Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration:
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused
was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search
warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at
Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer
was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the
police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was
riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his
passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the

78
suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who
has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession,
plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances
arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In
other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with
hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in
his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even
without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts
but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need
not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence
of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts
of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The
arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the
exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case
of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less
justified.
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to and until
December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms,
explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of
others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court below held that appellant
De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the
Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives
and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis in
determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that appellant
is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree
No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code. These are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats
rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that
might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a
specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court has
explained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is penalized under two

79
different statutes with different penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the
accused. 23 It follows that, subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion.
Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the second
is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant elements.
It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised Penal Code in this
prosecution for a crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for executive
clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with good behavior. In any
event, this is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated against
any tenuous importunity.
Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from appellant De Gracia were
illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. In the words of the court a
quo:
2. the nature and quantity of the items — 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of M-16 ammo and 100 bottles of
molotov bombs indicate that the reports received by the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the
rebels was not without basis. Those items are clearly not for one's personal defense. They are for offensive operations. De
Gracia admitted that per instruction of Col. Matillano he went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to stay
guard there.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that office is not credible for: (a) he was a
former military personnel; (b) at the birthday party of Col. Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-
soldiers were present which self-evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the company of his boss, was still very much at
home and constantly in touch with soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989 was
a military coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office,
which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano; and (d) as heretofore discussed, De Gracia was
earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car of the AFP intelligence agents. 25
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is
committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the governance of
that law, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could
only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court, albeit with
an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its recommendation therein for
executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

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14. G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by
any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x
The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug
testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
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In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject
to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they
are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby
promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public
office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of
those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who
failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC]
shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004
elections,1filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

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SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the
Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers
to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they
can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination,
and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and
Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a
violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which
involves the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may
refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite
standing to challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.6 There is no doubt that
Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since
he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS
and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the
paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:

83
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute
undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are
unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers
of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore
of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap. 10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules
and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not
be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore,
in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer
to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar
84
set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state
that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section
of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision
deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the
mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its
terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral
event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its
validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal
drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit
by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and
projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a
result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or
any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x
apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall
bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to
undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent under the
voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability
under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has
85
long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion
through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the
focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among
school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly
pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions
following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random
urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the
football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's
drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools
stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school
gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal
undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a
higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous
effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the
Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school
students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and
academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes
violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations
and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non - athletes on the
basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non -
athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of
safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug - testing policy,
the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and
their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well - being of
the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools
is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate
concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our
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Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of
drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not
just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided
under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The
Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"23 has failed to show how the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's
lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote
without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory
drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug
tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted
extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of
the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara
v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the
public and defers to the state's exercise of police power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the
promotion of some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause
to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter--
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal
disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of
drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question
form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the
employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be

87
tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by
trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard
against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be
[kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results." 35 Notably, RA
9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to
the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well - being
of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this
through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace
via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal
drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the
illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern -
day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and
deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other
modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision
and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard
of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly
commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give
unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure
shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way.
And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the
Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other
88
agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug
testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers
have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the
increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power
of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons'
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced
to incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in
G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g)of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

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15. G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011

BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner,

vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and
eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the government
employer as evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated
October 11, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge
of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the
CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San
Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the
CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which documents marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead
sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an employee
of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a
violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of the
Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the Csc. The justice
in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly because our perception of your
clean and good office is being tainted.
Concerned Govt employee3
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and
issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found

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in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."4 After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-
ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials
of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director
Unite) of Chairperson David’s directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed
by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00
p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time,
informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. The text
messages received by petitioner read:
"Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the Chairman.
If you can make it here now it would be better."
"All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair."
"CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about this.
"We can’t do anything about … it … it’s a directive from chair."
"Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint"; "ill send a copy of the memo via mms"5
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer.
Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the presence of the team from CSC main
office: "Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin."6 At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team
finished their task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving all
the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for
Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters 7 in
connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David
issued the Show-Cause Order8 dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to
submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioner’s personal files, Chairperson David made the following
observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected with administrative
cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or
other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for and on behalves of parties, who are facing
charges as respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was
knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the
central personnel agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service.
The number of pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice
but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly against common
human experience, to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without any consideration,
and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft pleadings
were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or
had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control and disposition. 9
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had no
attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused
CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his
computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He

91
asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated
January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of
his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and
printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless
search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer
issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership,
including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to
comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus
inadmissible as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree."10
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07038211 finding prima facie case against the petitioner and
charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of
R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner was directed to
submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he elects a formal investigation. Since the
charges fall under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days preventive suspension
effective immediately upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1,
2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as
without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people with pending cases at the CSC and
alleged that those files found in his computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted, at one
time or another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship. Attached to the motion were the
affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioner’s CPU and Atty. Eric N.
Estrellado, the latter being Atty. Solosa’s client who attested that petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or bill for
legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the case
should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal complaint he filed before the Ombudsman
against Director Buensalida, whom petitioner believes had instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the
lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution No. 07051912 dated March 19, 2007, the CSC
denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioner’s answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26, 2007 as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this,
however, petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida
(Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman,
and a separate complaint for disbarment against Director Buensalida.14
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal investigation of the case on
April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO and preliminary
injunction.15 Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the CSC reset the same to
May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing conference
shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal investigation ex-parte.16 Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the
pre-hearing conference, claiming that the investigation proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of
his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the pre-hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with
similar warning on the consequences of petitioner and/or his counsel’s non-appearance.17 This prompted petitioner to file
another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.18
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07113419 denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the denial of his
motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez. The hearing
officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.

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In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to
have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,20 the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo
GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of
Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties,
namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibilities
and bar from taking future civil service examinations.21
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, the CSC noted the dearth of
jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as employer invades the private files of an
employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial investigation of possible
misconduct committed by said employee and without the latter’s consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant
rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of O’Connor v. Ortega22as authority for the view
that government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and
seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the "probable cause" or warrant requirement for search and
seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark L. Simons 23 which declared that
the federal agency’s computer use policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its
employees. Though the Court therein recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondent’s
legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of the
employee’s office was upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant
to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in view of the CSC computer use policy which
unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right to a computer assigned to him. Even
assuming that there was no such administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of petitioner’s computer
successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the aforecited
authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the search in its capacity as government employer and that it was undertaken
in connection with an investigation involving work-related misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant requirement
under the Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the
totality of evidence adequately supports the charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and violation of R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioner’s
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from the
service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise
prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 07180025 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not charged on the basis of the anonymous
letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a
prima facie case against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in petitioner’s computer and later
confiscating the same, Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy
declaring the computers as government property and that employee-users thereof have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous in
CSC’s act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that –
I

93
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY
AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE
CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION NO.
99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE
HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION,
BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM SIGNED
SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION
CONSIDERING THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY
AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE
EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE
DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL
HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS
ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS
PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED
THAT RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND
FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS,
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE
ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY
24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON THE
FOUR URGENT MOTION TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.26
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,27 which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches and
seizures.28 But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential
that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v.
Marti29 :

94
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935
Charter which, worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court
may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are
considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.30
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically
recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and
constituted a "search and seizure". Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed
booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-
fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).32
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US
Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to an office at union headquarters
that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their guests could enter the office. The Court thus
"recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v.
Ortega34 where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program,
sexual harassment of female hospital employees and other irregularities involving his private patients under the state
medical aid program, searched his office and seized personal items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the
Court categorically declared that "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the
government instead of a private employer."35 A plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two steps:
first, because "some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy
is reasonable", a court must consider "[t]he operational realities of the workplace" in order to determine whether an
employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation,
an employer’s intrusion on that expectation "for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances."36
On the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace, O’Connor teaches:
x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of
employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate
regulation. x x x The employee’s expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation. An
office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees.
Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others –
such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public – may have frequent access to an
individual’s office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by
the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its
capacity as employer," x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the
question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case
basis.37 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

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On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortega’s Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed "an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider as reasonable." Given the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his
desk or file cabinets with any other employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in his own office
while those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office, and there being no
evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees from storing
personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the absence of such a policy does not create any
expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable
expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets.38
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was reasonable, the O’Connor
plurality decision discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals simply
concluded without discussion that the "search…was not a reasonable search under the fourth amendment." x x x "[t]o hold
that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the
standards governing such searches…[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place. x x x
Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the
standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires "balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion." x x x In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of
the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the
efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee’s office, desk,
or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly
burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason
to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have required
warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal
laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances,
the imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict with the "common-sense realization that government offices could
not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper operation of
the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if
employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file
or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the
criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons.
Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for the
purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public
employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee
misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest substantially different from "the normal
need for law enforcement." x x x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective
and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence,
mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are
entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the agency
and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are not

96
enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of
the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for
searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting
the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated
into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the…probable-
cause requirement impracticable," x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as
investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of
government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions
upon the privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally
protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as
for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be
reasonable:
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the…action
was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’" x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed
file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of …the nature of the [misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the character of the
search and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that was undertaken, the case was remanded to
said court for the determination of the justification for the search and seizure, and evaluation of the reasonableness of both
the inception of the search and its scope.
In O’Connor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for
work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the
employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant
requirement, which are related to law enforcement.40
O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the workplace. One of these
cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons41where the
defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and
possessing materials containing child pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did not share with
anyone, and a computer with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use stating that employees
were to use the Internet for official government business only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically
prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or
monitor the user’s Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the management of the
agency’s computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited internet activity originating from Simons’ computer, to
conduct a remote monitoring and examination of Simons’ computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed
downloaded pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of Simon’s computer were copied
from a remote work station. Days later, the contractor’s representative finally entered Simon’s office, removed the
original hard drive on Simon’s computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency security officer.
Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched Simons’ office in the evening when Simons was not around. The

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search team copied the contents of Simons’ computer; computer diskettes found in Simons’ desk drawer; computer files
stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes; and various documents, including personal correspondence.
At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons’ computer and office did not
violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was valid. It held that the search remains valid under the
O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an
otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a
violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The
warrantless entry into Simons’ office was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in O’Connor
because at the inception of the search, the employer had "reasonable grounds for suspecting" that the hard drive would
yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to
download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of
the search, and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation of
privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’ computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because, in
light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet.
Additionally, we conclude that Simons’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by FBIS’ retrieval of Simons’ hard
drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his Internet use in
light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS would "audit, inspect, and/or monitor"
employees’ use of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages, "as deemed
appropriate." x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they could not reasonably expect that their Internet
activity would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred from
the Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing
his Internet use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS’ actions in remotely searching and seizing the computer files Simons
downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x x Here, Simons
has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted above, the operational realities of Simons’ workplace may
have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is no evidence in the record of any workplace
practices, procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed
a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employee’s supervisor entering the employee’s government office and
retrieving a piece of government equipment in which the employee had absolutely no expectation of privacy – equipment
that the employer knew contained evidence of crimes committed by the employee in the employee’s office. This situation
may be contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of a government employee were unrelated to his employment. Here,
there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the employer’s policy and the conduct that violated the criminal law.

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We consider that FBIS’ intrusion into Simons’ office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer
might engage. x x x42 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board43 which involved the constitutionality of a provision
in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
certain offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of
drug testing requirement. The employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the following
questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the
search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in
its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employee’s relationship to the item
seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the
employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item." These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objective
prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions together.44 Thus, where the employee used a
password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy and any search of that space and items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.45
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had
a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other
employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees
from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV,
he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to
use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown
people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is "personally assisting
incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna
Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone,
that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer."46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had
such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances,
that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the
presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be used only for legitimate
business purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the performance of their respective jobs.

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3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have an expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign Users to handle the
confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on
the computer through the Internet or any other computer network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or
automated means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property or for the exclusive use of a
User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or operated by other users. However, he
is accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their passwords for access to the computer
system. Individual passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or given to others. Users shall be responsible for all
transactions made using their passwords. No User may access the computer system with another User’s password or
account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the computer system or to encode particular files
or messages does not imply that Users have an expectation of privacy in the material they create or receive on the
computer system. The Civil Service Commission has global passwords that permit access to all materials stored on its
networked computer system regardless of whether those materials have been encoded with a particular User’s password.
Only members of the Commission shall authorize the application of the said global passwords.
x x x x47 (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in determining whether an employee’s expectation of privacy in
the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy.48 In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth
Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
computer files where the university’s computer policy, the computer user is informed not to expect privacy if the
university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is specifically told that computer files, including e-mail,
can be searched when the university is responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner employee
thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university officials conducted a warrantless search of his
computer for work-related materials.49
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, we answer in
the affirmative.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV

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where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with
pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from unknown sources adverting
to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in another
government agency, "selling" cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all done during office hours and involved the
use of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient to warrant an
investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions involved in the
alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its effect on the
integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office staff to back up the files in the computers of the
Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x50
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.51 Thus, in the 2004
case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a government agency’s computer use
policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not
have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and technology, the government
employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore
evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that
case, the defendant employee’s computer hard drive was first remotely examined by a computer information technician
after his supervisor received complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail
messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the
prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken
and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured by the police
department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless
searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so
long as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the
first place.52
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope. We
quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines
established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission
that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued
the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the
inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was
"lawyering" for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the
imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged
in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the
institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling
its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative

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tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any
trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were
subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence.
Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button,
necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause
requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent
manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe
the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the
search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any
way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an
employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its
employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.53
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the
privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable
considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government
workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not
relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the
search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein
would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of
such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless
requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila54 involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an
anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, using office
supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to
access Atty. Morales’ personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be two
pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales’
computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to the
MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that there was
no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would
give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel
also charged in the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct.
The Court En Banc held that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court
employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support the claim of OCA
that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed
an administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the validity of the
investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no
other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to
hold him administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of
evidence.

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The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which involved a personal computer
of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued
computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such
relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances under
American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy,
failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are admissible in the
administrative case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in finding the petitioner
guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect but
even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable
minds might conceivably opine otherwise.55
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and documents
stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses it presented during the
formal investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were confirmed to be similar or exactly the same content-
wise with those on the case records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission
Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with the CA and duly furnished the
Commission. Further, the CSC found the explanation given by petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his
computer hard drive actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the use of his
computer for drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We
hold that the CSC’s factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings and misuse of the office computer is
well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings responding to the orders, decisions
or resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such as a petition for certiorari or a motion for
reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof knowingly and willingly participated in the
promotion or advancement of the interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the appearance in
one of the retrieved documents the phrase, "Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," lends plausibility to an
inference that the preparation or drafting of the legal pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable motivation.
Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing the same for the money – a "legal mercenary" selling or
purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the
author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer. More significantly, one of the witnesses, Margarita
Reyes, categorically testified seeing a written copy of one of the pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of
the respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of Appeals. The said
circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the interest of the Commission, his very own
employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the documents were the personal
files of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally served as his counsel of record
during the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a sworn affidavit to this effect.
Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution witness, Reyes, who testified
that during her entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer assigned to the respondent. Reyes
more particularly stated that she worked in close proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she
personally knows, was using the computer in question. Further, Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the
formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that the same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of
weight and credence. The same is true with the other supporting affidavits, which Pollo submitted.

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At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact that he was unlawfully
authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him for official purpose, not only once but several times
gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the interests of the Commission. He was, in effect,
acting as a principal by indispensable cooperation…Or at the very least, he should be responsible for serious misconduct
for repeatedly allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than what
they were officially intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line appearing in one of the
documents, "Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," was a private joke between the person alluded to therein,
Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything more sinister. The same is too
preposterous to be believed. Why would such a statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the computer assigned to the
respondent, unless he had something to do with it?56
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous complaint since Section 8
of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:
Rule II – Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in
writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining
authority, the complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation therein or
supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person complained of may be required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have been initiated by the
CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the files stored in the hard drive of computers in
the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the disciplining authority’s own fact-finding
investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file his
comment. As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals57 --
Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the
appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the
disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As to petitioner’s challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant consideration. The
alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the Commission
as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already explained by
Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflor’s previous memo expressing his dissent to
the actions and disposition of the Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was
in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by her and
former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a
Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of the Commission, the practice had been to
issue a memorandum order.58 Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which regulates
only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity.59
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSC’s ruling that petitioner is
guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No.
6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its
accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations.

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WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and
Resolutiondated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

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