Political Law Reviewer Bar 2019 Part 1 V 20 by Atty. Alexis Medina PUP LAW REVIEW PDF

2019 BAR REVIEW NOTES
POLITICAL LAW
PART I.
Selected Recent Jurisprudence (2010-June 2018)1

By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Innocent passage in Philippine internal waters: Philippine internal waters

under the Constitution or archipelagic waters under the UNCLOS are subject to the
international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, granting innocent passage
rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters: Petitioners contend that RA 9522
unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these
waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to
nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. Whether referred to as
Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters" under
UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III affirms this. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of
municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation.
Thus, domestically, the Philippine government may pass legislation designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. (G.R No. 187167, August
16, 2011)
The right of innocent passage is a customary international law: In the absence

of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s
limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine
law. (G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
CITIZENSHIP
Those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship: It is incorrect to intimate that complying with
Republic Act No. 9225 (who take the Oath of Allegiance to reacquire Philippine citizenship)
shows that the person is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to
postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to
perfect citizenship. Those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way
things were." Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose
1 This collection of summaries or capsules of recent jurisprudence is a work in progress (v 20), subject to continuing
revision and updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.
2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of Law;
Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland, 2014); Litigation lawyer; formerly
with the Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manlastas Law Offices (Pecabar); Teaches Constitutional Law at San Sebastian College-Recoletos,
Manila, College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; Taught Constitutional Law at
New Ear University, College of Law; Bar Review Lecturer, Recoletos Review Center, Manila; Transaction adviser on Public Private
Partnerships (PPPs); Partner, Libra Law
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part I) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 1
citizenship commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements. Repatriation
involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's original nationality.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Thus,
he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving
forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth. (David v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
Natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign

country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship must (1) take
the oath of allegiance under RA 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates
in Philippine elections: R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject
to certain conditions. Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
198742, August 10, 2012)
The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign
citizenship are separate requirements: A candidate for public office cannot claim that he
has renounced his foreign citizenship by taking the Oath of Allegiance under RA 9225. The oath
of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate
requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to run for public office.
(Chua v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016)
The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship: The petitioner’s act of running for public
office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While
the Supreme Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling
was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003
which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 for those who have lost
the same by naturalization before the effectivity of RA 9225 -- has no retroactive
effect. A former natural-born Filipino citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015)
Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of

Representatives, may be questioned at any time: Citizenship, being a continuing
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, may be questioned at any time.
Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she would run
again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition. (Vilando v. HRET, G.R.
Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011)
Foundlings as natural-born citizens
(Note: The 2019 Bar Chairperson dissented in the Poe cases)
As a matter of law, foundlings are natural-born citizens. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec,

G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
The framers of the 1935 Constitution intended foundlings to be covered by
the enumeration on natural-born Filipino citizens: The deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration on natural-born Filipino citizens. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973
and 1987 Constitution. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
The Constitution does not permit discrimination against foundlings: The

constitutional provisions on equal protection, social justice, human rights, and the rights of
children contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings: (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
Foundlings are citizens under international law. International treaties obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. Moreover, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law" as part of the law of
the land. Generally accepted principles of international law are based not only on international
custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Under customary
international law, a child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth, which is presumed to be where it was found. Also, under customary
international law, a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where it is found.
(Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is

substantial evidence to the contrary. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
221538, September 20, 2016)
To establish that a foundling is a natural-born citizen, sufficient evidence can

be presented to sustain a reasonable inference that at least one or both of his or her
parents is Filipino: When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered
despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference
that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her
parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born
citizen. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
SUFFRAGE
Biometrics validation is not a qualification to vote but merely regulates the
exercise of the right to vote: It is a procedural, not a substantive requirement:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such
right. Biometrics validation as part of the registration process is not a "qualification" to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the
State has the right to reasonably regulate. Registration is a mere procedural requirement which
does not fall under the limitation that "no literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage." (Kabataan Party List v. Comelec, G.R. No.
221318, December 16, 2015) (Emphases supplied)
STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Requisites for Judicial Review: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. (Samahan Ng Mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon
City, August 8, 2017, G.R. No. 225442; Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
Actual case: A conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution, ripe for
determination, and not conjectural: There must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or
issue. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
Movements, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)
Actual case requirement: The Court cannot render an advisory opinion:

Pleadings before the court must show a violation of an existing legal right or a controversy that
is ripe for judicial determination. The Court cannot render an advisory opinion. A policy that
reduces the Court to an adviser for official acts by the other departments that have not yet
been done would unnecessarily tax its resources. It is inconsistent with the Court’s role as final
arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. (In The Matter Of:
Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements, UDK-15143,
January 21, 2015)
The courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions,
bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. If there is a lack of a
specific factual milieu from which a petition originates, any pronouncement from the Court will
be a purely advisory opinion and not a decision binding on identified and definite parties and on
a known set of facts. The Court is barred from rendering a decision based on assumptions,
speculations, conjectures and hypothetical or fictional illustrations. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No.
207246, November 22, 2016)
Actual case requirement: The case must be ripe for adjudication, such as
when the law is already being implemented: The case must be ripe for adjudication,
which means the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. The petition challenging the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances is ripe for
adjudication, considering that these ordinances were being implemented. Samahan Ng Mga
Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, August 8, 2017, G.R. No. 225442)
No actual case – A petition to declare an SEC circular void based on a

hypothetical case of a fictional corporation: Petitioners' hypothetical illustration as to how
SEC-MC No. 8 "practically encourages circumvention of the 60-40 ownership rule" is evidently
speculative and fraught with conjectures and assumptions. There is clearly wanting specific
facts against which the veracity of the conclusions purportedly following from ·the speculations
and assumptions can be validated. The lack of a specific factual milieu from which the petitions
originated renders any pronouncement from the Court as a purely advisory opinion and not a
decision binding on identified and definite parties and on a known set of facts. Petitioners fail to
allege or show how their hypothetical illustration will directly and adversely affect them. From
the foregoing, it is evident that the Court can only surmise or speculate on the situation or
controversy that the petitioners contemplate to present for judicial determination. Thus, the
petitions must fail because the Court is barred from rendering a decision based on assumptions,
speculations, conjectures and hypothetical or fictional illustrations, more so in the present case
which is not even ripe for decision. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
No actual case - A petition challenging the constitutionality of a law on the

ground that the law’s implementation may be abused: The possibility of abuse in the
implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of
any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real
events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. (Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 2010)
For an actual case or controversy requirement to exist, the case must be ripe
for adjudication: Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed
by either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
(Philconsa v. Philippine Government, G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016)
No actual case that is ripe for adjudication – A petition to declare as

unconstitutional peace agreements that can only be implemented through the
passage of a law and/or amendment of the Constitution: The Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)
mandates the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in order for such peace agreements to
be implemented. The government gives no commitment, express or implied, that the
Constitution will be amended or that a law will be passed comprising all the provisions indicated
in the CAB and the FAB. The CAB and the FAB require the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic
Law for their implementation. Congress has full discretion to enact the kind of Bangsamoro
Basic Law that Congress, in its wisdom, deems necessary and proper to promote peace and
development in Muslim areas in Mindanao. The Executive branch cannot compel Congress to
adopt the CAB and the FAB. The CAB and the FAB cannot be implemented without the passage
of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The CAB and the FAB remain peace agreements whose
provisions cannot be enforced and given any legal effect unless the Bangsamoro Basic Law is
duly passed by Congress and subsequently ratified in accordance with the Constitution. It is not
the CAB or the FAB that will establish the Bangsamoro but the Bangsamoro Basic Law enacted
by Congress and ratified in a plebiscite in accordance with the Constitution. Clearly, any
question on the constitutionality of the CAB and the FAB, without the implementing
Bangsamoro Basic Law, is premature and not ripe for adjudication. Until a Bangsamoro Basic
Law is passed by Congress, it is clear that there is no actual case or controversy that requires
the Court to exercise its power of judicial review. (Philconsa v. Philippine Government, G.R.
No. 218406, November 29, 2016)
No actual case – A petition to declare a proposed bill unconstitutional: A

proposed bill does not present an actual justiciable controversy. The filing of bills is within the
legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. Also, the judiciary cannot
speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not
pass. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
Movements, DK-15143, January 21, 2015)
No actual case – a case that has become moot and academic: As a rule, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Atienza, 24 February 2010, G.R. No. 175241)
Moot case – nothing for the court to resolve: An action is considered "moot" when
it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is
not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been
overtaken by subsequent events. (International Service for The Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia, July 26, 2016 G.R. No. 209271)
Moot case – a decision would be of no practical value: A case becomes moot

when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No.
206004, February 24, 2015; Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Exceptions to the moot and academic principle: A case is moot and academic if it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This
court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases when: (1) there was a grave violation
of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles
to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet
evading review. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)
Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if: (1) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of
Justice, G.R. No. 232413, July 25, 2017)
Exceptions to the Moot and Academic Principle: Recent examples of petitions

decided by the Supreme Court even though the cases have become moot
The petition questioning the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System: It

alleges a grave violation of the Constitution; presents a situation of exceptional character as
well as a matter of paramount public interest; involves a compelling need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public on how public funds should be
utilized; and is an issue capable of repetition yet evading review. Thus, even on the assumption
that the petition is moot, the Court can still decide the case. (Belgica v. Honorable Executive
Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The petition questioning the validity a hold departure order of the DOJ that
has already been lifted: The petitioners impute the respondents of violating their
constitutional right to travel through the enforcement of DOJ Circular No. 41. They claim that
the issuance unnecessarily places a restraint on the right to travel even in the absence of the
grounds provided in the Constitution. There is also no question that the instant petitions
involved a matter of public interest as the petitioners are not alone in this predicament and
there can be several more in the future who may be similarly situated. It is not farfetched that a
similar challenge to the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41 will recur considering the
thousands of names listed in the watch list of the DOJ, who may brave to question the
supposed illegality of the issuance. Thus, it is in the interest of the public, as well as for the
education of the members of the bench and the bar, that the Supreme Court must resolve the
question on the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41. (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930,
April 17, 2018)
A petition questioning the validity of holding of dual Cabinet positions, even

after the situation ceased to exist: While the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of
the two positions in the Cabinet (concurrent designations as the Acting Secretary of Justice and
Acting Solicitor General) has become moot and academic (with the appointment of a new
Solicitor General), the Supreme Court may still resolve the issue because all recognized
exceptions obtain. (Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
A petition questioning the validity of the expenditures under the Development

Acceleration Program (DAP) which has already been discontinued: Even if the DAP
program has already been terminated, the Court can still rule on its constitutionality because all
the exceptions to the moot and academic principle are present. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)
A petition to be included in the Comelec’s list of candidates even the elections

are over and winners have been proclaimed: We may no longer act on petitioner’s prayer
that his name be included in the certified list of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a
candidate for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his
Petition for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after Comelec began printing the ballots on
February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners
already proclaimed. That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from
setting forth "controlling and authoritative doctrines" to be observed by respondent in motu
proprio denying due course to or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance
candidates. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)
THE STANDING REQUIREMENT
Definition: "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,
April 8, 2014)
Locus standi or legal standing: It is defined as a personal and substantial interest in
a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. (Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, July 25, 2017, G.R. No.
228628)
Locus Standi: The requirements of Injury, Causation and Redressability: The

party must show that (1) he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. If the
asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, an
excursion into constitutional adjudication by the courts is not warranted. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R.
No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Legal standing as a citizen: The Direct Injury Requirement: When suing as a

citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid,
but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. (Umali v.
Judicial and Bar Council, July 25, 2017, G.R. No. 228628)
Legal standing as a tax payer: There must be a showing of illegal

disbursement of public funds: In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is
a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. (Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, July 25, 2017, G.R. No.
228628)
Legal standing as a tax payer: The case must involve illegal disbursement of
public funds or the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress: A taxpayer's
suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct correlation of the act
complained of and the disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution,
or has shown that the case involves the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress.
(Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Legal standing as a legislator: There must be an invasion of the powers,

prerogatives and privileges of Congress: Each member of Congress has a legal standing to
sue even without an enabling resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade
the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect
the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may validly bring
an action to challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the sanctity thereof. (Umali v.
Judicial and Bar Council, July 25, 2017, G.R. No. 228628)
Locus standi: Mere membership in the Bar is not sufficient: The requisite is not
met by the expedient invocation of one's citizenship or membership in the bar who has an
interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government. The general and
equivocal allegations of petitioners on their legal standing do not justify the relaxation of the
locus standi rule. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Locus standi: If the petition is anchored on a public right, such as the people’s
right to information, any citizen can be the real party in interest: If the petition is
anchored on a public right, such as the people’s right to information on matters of public
concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general
public which possesses the right. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment [IDEAL] v.
Power Sector Liabilities and Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088, October 9,
2012)
Locus standi in a facial challenge on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness:

Petitioner need to claim violation of his own rights: A facial challenge on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness is an exception to the prohibition on third-party standing. A petitioner
may mount a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation
of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. This is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected
speech. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
In a facial challenge, the party need not claim that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him: In overbreadth analysis, challenges to a statute are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for." A particular litigant need not claim that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her. This is to remove the "chilling" or deterrent effect of
the overbroad statute on third parties. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
Locus standi in environmental cases: Any Filipino citizen, as a steward of

nature, can file an action before the courts for violations of our environmental laws:
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws; this collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)
Locus standi in environmental cases: Writ of Kalikasan v. Writ of Continuing

Mandamus: There is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced
by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the
unlawful act or omission. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7,
2017)
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
Political questions – to be decided by the people, the executive or legislative

branch: Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. (Belgica
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013; Vinuya v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010)
A question is political, and not judicial, if it is a matter which is to be exercised by the

people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. (The
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
Political questions -- dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a

particular measure: Political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013; Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230)
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of a law. It may do
so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. (Imbong v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial
review. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by Section 1 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the power to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Ocampo v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016)
Grave abuse of discretion - the issue to be resolved in political questions:

When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the official whose action is being questioned. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
Examples in recent jurisprudence of political questions
The conduct of foreign relations is a political question: The conduct of the

foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative departments.
The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
Filipino citizens’ claims against Japan. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28
April 2010)
The sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is a

political question: The determination of whether a narration of facts in an impeachment
complaint constitutes an impeachable offense is purely a political question. (Gutierrez v. House
of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
Who to appoint is a political question: Who to appoint is "a political question

involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." For the
betterment of government service, the appointing authority may consider other "abstract
criteria," aside from the minimum qualifications set by law in making appointments. (Abad v.
Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)
Whether or not the House observed its own internal rules of procedure, such
as in the election of its Minority Leader, is a political question: Under the Constitution,
the House has sole control over method and manner of choosing its officers other than the
Speaker. The method of choosing its officers must be prescribed by the House, not the courts.
Moreover, the House has sole authority to determine the rules of its proceedings. Mere matters
of procedure of the House are of no concern to the courts. The Supreme Court has no authority
to interfere and intrude into that exclusive realm. Thus, the Supreme Court cannot pry into the
internal workings of the House. Thus, the petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat
should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the
House where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for
Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending
Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position -- must be dismissed. (Baguilat v.
Alvarez, July 25, 2017, G.R. No. 227757)
President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the

LNMB involves a political question: President Duterte's decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national
military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. The President's
decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence. There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to
interpose its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another
branch. (Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016)
Examples of issues that are NOT political questions
The legality of the pork barrel system: The validity of the Pork Barrel System is not
a political question because it is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19,
2013)
The sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law: The third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing. Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to
the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017,
G.R. No. 231658)
DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT
Under the doctrine of operative fact, in the interest of fair play, the actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized, because
the existence of a law or executive act prior to its invalidation is an operative fact:
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to
the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play. The doctrine of operative fact nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
Under the doctrine of operative fact, notwithstanding the finding of

unconstitutionality in the composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are
nonetheless valid: The doctrine of operative fact is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law. Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds
that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all
its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
202242, July 17, 2012)
Under the doctrine of operative fact, DAP-funded projects should not be

nullified: As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the
illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity
and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of
nullifying P 144.378 Billion worth of projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts
under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the
operative fact doctrine. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Why PDAF/Pork Barrel System is void

Violation of separation of powers: The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the
principle of separation of powers, as it authorizes legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation, such as project identification, fund release and
fund realignment, thus allowing legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013)
Violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power: The

PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the principle of non-delegation of legislative power
considering that an individual legislator is given the authority to dictate (a) how much fund
would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that he himself also determines, two (2) acts
that comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. (Belgica
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
Undermining the system of checks and balance: The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System”
undermines the system of checks and balance by impairing the President’s item veto power. For
the President to exercise his item-veto power, there must be a proper "item" which may be the
object of the veto. Because PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. The legislator’s identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. (Belgica v.
Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
Undermining public accountability: The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines

public accountability by impairing Congress’ oversight functions considering that legislators
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. It also violates
the constitutional prohibition on legislators’ intervention on matters where he may be called
upon to act. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
Violation of local autonomy: The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the
constitutional principles on local autonomy as it allows district representatives who are national
officers to substitute the judgement of local officials on use of public funds for local
development. A Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19,
2013)
Martial law and the Role of Congress
It is not obligatory for Congress to convene in joint session following the

President's proclamation of martial law, except for the specific purpose of
revocation of the President's declaration: Under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, in the event that the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part thereof, Congress is not
constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session, except to vote jointly to revoke the
President's declaration or suspension. The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is specifically for the
purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus, when the Senate and House of Representatives
already separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation
No. 216, and given their already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, there is no
obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint session. (Padilla v. Congress of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017)
There is no violation of the right to public information if public joint sessions

are not held, as each house may adopt its own rules and hold executive sessions in
case of confidential matters: The Congress did not violate the right of the public to
information when it did not convene in joint session where public viewing is allowed. Based on
their internal rules, each House has the discretion over the manner by which Congressional
proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are generally open to the public, but each
House may decide to hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of the subject
matter to be discussed and deliberated upon. (Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No.
231671, July 25, 2017)
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Only the President can exercise the powers of the Commander-in-Chief,

which must be exercised by him in person: Executive power is granted only to the
President. It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as the calling-out
powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. There are certain acts which, by their very nature,
may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or
prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers. These powers must be exercised by
him in person. Thus, the provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as
the President. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)
Judicial Review of the President’s Declaration of Martial Law
The power of the Supreme Court – to determine the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus: The Constitution specifically grants authority to the Supreme Court to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but
precisely within the ambit of judicial review. Moreover, the Constitution also relaxed the rule on
standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis
of such proclamation or suspension. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658)
Supreme Court’s review can be simultaneous with and independent from
Congress power to revoke: The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by
Congress are totally different and independent from each other although concededly, they have
the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. The Court can
simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke
by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not
deprive or deny the Court of its power to review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No.
231658)
Presidential judgment call on military powers: The determination of which

power to exercise (calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the write,
proclamation of martial law) is the President’s judgment call and the Supreme
Court’s cannot calibrate the President’s decision: The power and prerogative to
determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether
the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it
calls for the declaration of martial law, lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to
choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions
is a judgment call on the part of the President. The power of judicial review does not extend to
calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set
of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain
of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with
the President. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658)
Facial review of the proclamation of martial law on the grounds of vagueness

is unwarranted because the proclamation does not regulate speech and judicial
review does not cover the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines issued after the proclamation: Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged
on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups" and in its
Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters
within the entire Mindanao region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation,
misinterpretation, or confusion. Facial review of the proclamation of martial law on the grounds
of vagueness is unwarranted. The proclamation does not regulate speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged. What it seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech. Judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information or data available
to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. There is
no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for
being irrelevant to its review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658)
Nullification of a proclamation of martial law declaration will not affect a

proclamation in the exercise of calling out powers because the President can
exercise one power independently of the other: The calling out power is in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Nullification of a proclamation of martial law declaration will not affect a
proclamation in the exercise of calling out powers. The President may exercise the power to call
out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible
future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R.
No. 231658)
Scope of judicial review: Sufficiency of the factual basis, not correctness of

the President’s decision: The phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's
power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the
President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's
decision had sufficient factual bases. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658)
Basis for determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis -- facts or

information known by or available to the President at the time he made the
declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the Proclamation
and the written Report to Congress: The determination of the Supreme Court as to
whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or
information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written
Report submitted by him to Congress. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658)
Review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the factual basis:
Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and
the written report are not enough reasons to invalidate the declaration and/or
suspension if there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that
support the conclusion. The Supreme Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not
accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events
do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. Falsities of and/or
inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not
enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there
are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that
there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or
suspension. The court’s review would be limited to whether the facts in his possession prior to
and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R.
No. 231658)
No need for the Supreme Court to conduct an independent investigation: The

determination by the Supreme Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to
the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Supreme Court
cannot "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." (Lagman v.
Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658)
What the Supreme Court must determine -- only sufficiency, not accuracy, of
the factual basis: The purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or
veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the
factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. The
allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report
are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. The Supreme Court is
not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so
would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation. (Lagman v.
The public safety requirement: The overriding and paramount concern of martial
law is the protection of the security of the nation and the good and safety of the public.
Rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be present. (Lagman v.
Parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law: 1) actual invasion or rebellion; 2) public safety requires
the exercise of such power; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. Section 18, Article VII itself sets the
parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion
or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power." Without the
concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down. In determining the existence
of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or
evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed.
To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency
powers. Probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by
which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for
a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of
proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and therefore unduly
restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler.
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur;
and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or
invasion. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658)
Territorial coverage: The discretion to determine the territorial scope of

martial law lies with the President. The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire
Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law. The discretion to determine the territorial
scope of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative
whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is no
constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the
armed public uprising actually transpired. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and
public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other
areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. Clearly, the power to
determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658)
DIPLOMATIC POWER
The President is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations: The
President is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. The presidential role in foreign
affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the
conduct of foreign affairs. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January
12, 2016)
A treaty is required for initial entry of foreign military bases, troops and
facilities: The constitutional restriction on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
Philippines refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations
provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25
requirement of validity through a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016)
When executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops and facilities

are valid: The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. The
EDCA can be in the form of an executive agreement, since it merely involves "adjustments in
detail" in the implementation of the MDT and the VFA. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa,
G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
As the sole organ of our foreign relations, the President may generally enter into
executive agreements subject to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in
furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary
Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
Executive agreements are international agreements embodying adjustments of

detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature. These can cover a wide array of subjects
that have various scopes and purposes. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016)
Treaties require Senate ratification, executive agreement do not: Treaties

are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426,
January 12, 2016)
An international agreement may take different forms: Treaty, act, protocol,

agreement, concordat, compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of
notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or
some other form. Under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international
agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining
international rights and (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)
Distinctions between executive agreements and treaties: Executive agreements

must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes,
or treaties. Treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements.
Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements,
which are solely executive actions. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426,
January 12, 2016)
Constitutional limitations on the President's prerogative in concluding
international agreements. There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the
President's prerogative in concluding international agreements, such as those that involve the
following:
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by a
majority of all the Members of Congress
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that

must be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate.
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of the Senate is
required, should the form of the government chosen be a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive
Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
The President has the choice to enter into an international agreement by way
of an executive agreement or a treaty. The Court does not look into whether an
international agreement should be in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, save in
cases in which the Constitution or a statute requires otherwise. In view of the vast
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the President in foreign affairs, the task of the Court
is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the applicable
limitations. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign military forces if it merely
involves detail adjustments. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January
12, 2016)
Basic requirements for the validity executive agreement
1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent requirements that
must be fulfilled by the international agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and
(b) it must be duly concurred in by the Senate.
2. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President may
choose the form of the agreement (i.e., either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided
that the agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal
agreement that first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines.
3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and
standards set by the law and/or treaty that the former purports to implement; and must not
unduly expand the international obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in the law
or treaty.
4. The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January
12, 2016)
POWER TO TRANSFER APPROPRIATIONS
Constitutional requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated funds: 1) law

authorizing the transfer; 2) savings; and 3) transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014)
Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid
Invalid authority: The GAAs of 2011 and 2012 authorized the transfers "to augment
any item in this Act", and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of
funds to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the
Executive, contravention of the Constitution. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Funds transferred were not necessarily savings: The transfer of funds under DAP
is invalid because DAP funds were not necessarily “savings.” Savings are realized only when the
purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such
funds had ceased to exist. Funds described as “unreleased or unallotted” are not necessarily
savings. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Transfers were made to non-existing items in the GAA: The transfer of funds
under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not transferred to augment existing items in the
GAA. There must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with
an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. The
power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent items in the GAA. (Araullo v. Aquino,
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
Cross-border transfers: The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid for because some
of the transfers of appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Cross-border
transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)
POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The ban on midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372,
June 16, 2015)
The concurrence of all procedural steps in the Presidential appointment

process is required for valid appointments outside the ban: 1) Presidential signing of
the appointment; 2) transmittal to the MRO; 3) receipt by the appointee; 4) and
acceptance by the appointee by taking oath or assumption of office: Any valid
appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, must consist of the following: 1) President signing an appointee's
appointment paper to a vacant office; 2) the official transmittal of the appointment paper
(preferably through the Malacañang Records Office (MRO); 3) receipt of the appointment paper
by the appointee; and 4) acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or
her oath of office or his or her assumption to office. The Constitution allows the President to
exercise the power of appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban, and
disallows (subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of appointment
during the period covered by the appointment ban. The concurrence of all steps in the
appointment process is required for appointments outside the appointment ban. (Velicaria-
Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
Elements for a valid appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of

the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence
of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt
of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment: There is no valid
appointment if the process lacks even one step: The following elements should always
concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective)
appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2)
transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at
the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of
when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.
There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of
the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper; there should
be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued: It is not
enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment
paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but
never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper
through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance. The
inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire appointment process
prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. Petitioners have failed to show
compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that
their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the
other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.
(Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
The constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to

presidential appointments; it does not apply to appointments made by local chief
executives: A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months
immediately prior to the next presidential election." Midnight appointments are prohibited under
Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution:
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to

presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.
(Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015)
POWER TO CREATE EXECUTIVE OFFICES

OR REORGANIZE THE GOVERNMENT
Presidential power to create investigating bodies: Pursuant to his duty to

faithfully execute the law, the President has the power to conduct investigations
and create an ad hoc investigating body: The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission
finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President
the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The President’s power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental
laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the
Chief Executive. As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)
Reorganization of the national government: The President does not have

continuing authority to reorganize the national government. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)
PARDONING POWER
The President’s pardoning power cannot be limited by Congress: The pardoning

power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. This doctrine of non-diminution
or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress was strongly adhered
to by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot
abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons
convicted of violating penal statutes. (Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015)
POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Presidential authority over LGUs is limited to general supervision: No

Presidential approval required for an LGU to grant additional benefits to LGU
officials and employees: Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of
the President, the President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws
are faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but
the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or
replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits by the LGU to its officials and employees does not need the approval of the
President to be valid. (Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners, Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010)
THE JUDICIARY
RULE-MAKING POWER
The Supreme Court’s rule making power is not shared with Congress or the
Executive: The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. The power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by the Supreme Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. (Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-
Cortes, G.R. No. 165922, February 26, 2010)
Congress cannot grant exemptions from payment of legal fees: First, payment
of legal fees is part of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is no longer shared
with Congress. Second, any grant by Congress of exemptions from payment of legal fees will
impair the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and erode its independence. (Re: in the Matter of
Clarification of Exemption from Payment of all Court and Sheriff's Fees of Cooperative etc.,
A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012)
POWER TO EXECUTE DECISIONS
The execution of a decision is an integral part of the adjudicative function:

The execution of a decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Supreme
Court. Thus, in the execution of its continuing mandamus against agencies of the Executive
Department, the Supreme Court may order such agencies to perform their assigned tasks within
specific time frames or completion periods. The imposition of such time frames or completion
periods is not an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch. (Metro
Manila Development Authority [MMDA] v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171947-48, February 15, 2011)
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
Function of JBC: It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees
recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three
qualified nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President,
who, in turn, shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino,
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016)
The President in the exercise of his discretionary power to appoint members

of the Judiciary can validly disregarded the clustering of nominees for a collegiate
court by the JBC. The JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for
the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and
21st Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice may be appointed as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for each of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th,
20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Petitioners insist that President Aquino could
only choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each
specific vacancy, and no other; and any appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a
violation of the Constitution. President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to
appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six
separate shortlists for the vacancies in the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. (Aguinaldo v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)
Why the President in choosing appointees to vacancies in a collegiate court
can disregard the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
Restriction on the President’s power to choose: The power to recommend of the

JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's
prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the
Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated
by the JBC, the appointment is valid. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21,
2017)
Restriction on the President’s power to determine the seniority of members of

a collegiate court: The President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as
the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such
newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members'
appointment or commission papers. By already designating the numerical order of the
vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointment by the President and, thus,
unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment. (Aguinaldo v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016)
Clustering as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee: The JBC should

give all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the
JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts can
actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
224302, February 21, 2017)
Clustering as arbitrary – no objective criteria or guidelines: Without objective

criteria, standards, or guidelines in determining which nominees are to be included in which
cluster, the clustering of nominees for specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least,
totally arbitrary. The lack of such criteria, standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to
manipulation to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302,
February 21, 2017)
Judicial and Bar Council: There should be only one (1) representative from Congress.
(Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
JBC can set standards or criteria for selection of nominees: JBC’s policy of
requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum
qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. (Villanueva v. Judicial
and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
MANDAMUS
Courts cannot check the exercise of discretion of executive officials in the

determination of the means to be taken by the executive in implementing legislative
or executive policy: Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. In the performance of an official duty or
act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but
not to act one way or the other. The Supreme Court cannot compel the Climate Change
Commission, the President, the DOTC, DPWH, or DENR to act one way to implement the Road
Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling,
and the other to Filipino-made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied
issuances that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. The
petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion with their own through this
petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus. There is nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of
roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to
compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of
implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. The continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not
the implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of
discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating
to the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by
the executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive policy relating to
the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of
"gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority," the general rule
applies that discretion cannot be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the
continuing mandamus cannot issue. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010,
March 7, 2017)
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Power to prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds: The COA is
endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. The Court has accorded not
only respect but also finality to COA findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)
Liquidated money claims against the government must be filed with COA: COA
has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities,
including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has primary jurisdiction to pass upon a
money claim against a local government unit. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction
and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)
COA’s authority over money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those determined or
readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting
officers. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos.
197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)
When money claims need not be filed first with COA: When there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction to the prejudice the complainant: Money claims
against the government need not be filed with COA first, and may be filed directly with the
courts directly, if the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, such as when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant, or where the question involved is purely legal.
Petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit
(COA) before going to the courts. The government project contracted out to respondent was
completed almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the
relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the
issues in the present case involve the validity and the enforceability of the "Contract of
Agreement" entered into by the parties. For almost two decades, the public and the
government benefitted from the work done by respondent. The contractor should be duly
compensated for services rendered, which were for the benefit of the general public. To deny
the payment to the contractor of the two buildings which are almost fully completed and
presently occupied by the university would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself
at the expense of another. Neither can petitioners escape the obligation to compensate
respondent for services rendered and work done by invoking the state’s immunity from suit.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. (Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011)
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The Supreme Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory

order or even a final resolution issued by a division of the COMELEC in the exercise
of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers: The decision subject to Supreme Court
review must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
division: Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to
review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, but limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. We have
interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be a final decision
or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a
division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 194139, January 24, 2012)
A decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the

Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January 24,
2012)
Contrary to the ruling in Poe, in a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel

COC on the ground of false material representation, a prior judgment by a
competent court that the candidate is guilty of an election offense is not required
before the said petition can be given due course by the COMELEC: The COMELEC is
fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to the
election contests before it: The COMELEC is fully-clothed with authority to make factual
determinations in relation to the election contests before it. The COMELEC, as an adjunct to its
adjudicatory power, may investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings.
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action. The sole
ground for Petitions to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC is false material representation
compounded by intent to deceive on the part of the candidate and that the intent to deceive or
mislead will be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain absent an established fact that the
candidate deviated from. Contrary to Poe, the COMELEC can be the proper body to make the
pronouncement against which the truth or falsity of a material representation in a COC can be
measured. (Francisco v. Comelec, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
CONDONATION DOCTRINE
Why the doctrine of condonation is bereft of legal bases
Inconsistent with the principles that a public office is a public trust and that
the people shall be accountable to the people at all times: The concept of public office is
a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, are plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be
wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post.
Election is not a mode of condoning administrative an offense.
There is no constitutional or statutory basis for the doctrine: (Carpio-Morales v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
If the administrative case was filed prior to the abandonment of the

condonation doctrine (on November 10, 2015), the condonation doctrine may still
be applied: In November 10, 2015, this Court, in Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar
Binay, Jr., extensively discussed the doctrine of condonation and ruled that such doctrine has
no legal authority in this jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be,
as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people’s reliance thereupon should be respected. Considering that the present case was
instituted prior to the ruling (the case was filed in June 2005), the doctrine of condonation may
still be applied. (Ombudsman v. Vergara, December 6, 2017, G.R. No. 216871)
The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-
elected to the same position: The application of the doctrine does not require that the
official must be re-elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. The
condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The most important
consideration in the doctrine of condonation is the fact that the misconduct was done on a prior
term and that the subject public official was eventually re-elected by the same body politic. It is
inconsequential whether the said re-election be on another public office or on an election year
that is not immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the public
official be the same. (Ombudsman v. Vergara, December 6, 2017, G.R. No. 216871)
THE OMBUDSMAN
The independence of the Ombudsman has the following aspects: 1) It is

created by the Constitution and cannot be abolished by Congress; 2) it has fiscal
autonomy; and 3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control: The concept
of Ombudsman’s independence covers three (3) things: First: creation by the Constitution,
which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made; Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office “may
not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to
[its] functions; hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political
branches of government so as to impair said functions; and Third: insulation from
executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office
can only be disciplined by an internal authority. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy.
They are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are
executive in nature. The framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies
be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would
result in the impairment of their core functions. (Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
196231, January 28, 2014)
Vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman

violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman: Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional. Subjecting the
Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority,
cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The
law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the
creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. (Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R.
No. 196231, January 28, 2014)
Concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases: The Ombudsman has

concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts or administrative agencies. In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of
two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts
to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. (Alejandrino v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013)
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission: In any

vacancy for the positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, the successor shall
always be appointed for a full term of seven years: The Office of the Ombudsman is not
a constitutional commission. It is only as to the rank and salary that the Ombudsman and the
deputies shall be the same with the chairman and members, respectively, of the constitutional
commissions. In any vacancy for the positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a
result of the expiration of the term or death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of
the predecessor, the successor shall always be appointed for a full term of seven years. Unlike
the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year term of office
of the first appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned from 2 February 1987,
but shall be reckoned from their date of appointment. Accordingly, the present Ombudsman
and deputies shall serve a full term of seven years from their date of appointment unless their
term is cut short by death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability. (Ifurung v. Carpio-
Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local ordinances must be inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
Local governments cannot regulate conduct already covered by a statute involving
the same subject matter: The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was not
intended to create an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions
independent of the sovereign state. Local ordinances must be inconsistent with the laws or
policy of the State. Local governments are precluded from regulating conduct already covered
by a statute involving the same subject matter. Thus, an ordinance that seeks to control and
regulate the use of ground water within a City, a power that pertains solely to the NWRB under
the Water Code – is ultra vires and void. (City of Batangas v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 195003,
June 7, 2017)
The criteria under the Local Government Code (LGC) for the creation of a City
may be amended, not by repeal, but by way of exemption clauses in cityhood laws:
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009 (which expressly amended the LGC and imposed
the requirement of income of P 100 Million for 2 consecutive years for the creation of a city).
The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately
incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent
to exempt the subject municipalities, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the Local Government Code (provisions on the
criteria for establishment of a city) were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express
exemptions embodied in the exemption clauses in the Cityhood laws. (League of Cities v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011)
Local autonomy does not preclude the national government from taking a
direct hand in implementing national social welfare programs that are implemented
locally and in coordination with LGUs: The concept of local autonomy does not imply the
conversion of local government units into "mini-states." The national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments. Only administrative powers over
local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. Policy-setting for the entire country still lies
in the President and Congress. The national government is not precluded from taking a direct
hand in the formulation and implementation of national social welfare programs, such as the
Conditional Cash Transfer Program, especially where it is implemented locally in coordination
with the LGUs concerned. Thus, the P21 Billion CCTP Budget need not be directly allocated to
the LGUs. (Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012)
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Requirements for a service contract with a foreign-owned corporation: 1) in
accordance with a general law; 2) signed by the President; and 3) reported to
Congress: Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or
paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-
owned. Service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Agreements involving
Technical or Financial Assistance are service contracts with safeguards. Such service contracts
with foreign corporations may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that
will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements; (2) The President shall be the
signatory for the government because; (3) Within 30 days of the executed agreement, the
President shall report it to Congress. The President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the
same was not submitted to Congress, thus it is null and void for being violative of the 1987
Constitution. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary
Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)
National economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos: The Constitution declares
as State policy the development of a national economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos.
Under the 1987 Constitution, to own and operate a public utility a corporation’s capital must at
least be 60 percent owned by Philippine nationals. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October
9, 2012)
For effective control of a public utility, at least 60 percent of the capital must
belong to Filipino citizens: “Capital” refers to shares with voting rights and full
beneficial ownership: “The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development
of an economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the
Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine
nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to
Filipinos. The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares
with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579,
October 9, 2012)
The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation: The intent of the
framers of the Constitution is to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full
beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. The legal and
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of
Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent
of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally
required for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public utility. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No.
176579, October 9, 2012)
The 60 percent Filipino ownership must apply to voting control and beneficial
ownership of the corporation: The 60 percent Filipino ownership required by the
Constitution to engage in certain economic activities applies not only to voting control of the
corporation, but also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation. To repeat, we held:
Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in
the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of
60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in
accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-
Philippine national[s]." (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012)
SEC Requirement: The 60 percent Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH

(a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not
entitled to vote in the election of directors: Under the SEC-MC No. 8, for purposes of
determining compliance with constitutional or statutory ownership requirement, the required
percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors. SEC-MC
No. 8 simply implemented, and is fully in accordance with, the Gamboa Decision and
Resolution. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Excluded in the determination of Filipino ownership - shares with voting

rights assigned or transferred to an alien and shares with dividends that do not
accrue to a Filipino citizen: For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens
or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full
beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. If the
voting right of a share held in the name of a Filipino citizen or national is assigned or
transferred to an alien, that share is not to be counted in the determination of the required
Filipino equity. In the same vein, if the dividends and other fruits and accessions of the share
do not accrue to a Filipino citizen or national, then that share is also to be excluded or not
counted. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Voting power or investment power must be present for beneficial ownership

to exist: If the Filipino has the "specific stock's" voting power (he can vote the stock or direct
another to vote for him), or the Filipino has the investment power over the "specific stock" (he
can dispose of the stock or direct another to dispose it for him), or he has both, then such
Filipino is the "beneficial owner" of that "specific stock" and that "specific stock" is considered
(or counted) as part of the 60% Filipino ownership of the corporation. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R.
No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Meaning of “beneficial ownership”: The Filipino can vote the stock or direct
another to vote for him or he can dispose of the stock or direct another to dispose it
for him: If the Filipino has the "specific stock's" voting power (he can vote the stock or direct
another to vote for him), or the Filipino has the investment power over the "specific stock" (he
can dispose of the stock or direct another to dispose it for him), or he has both (he can vote
and dispose of the "specific stock" or direct another to vote or dispose it for him), then such
Filipino is the "beneficial owner" of that "specific stock" and that "specific stock" is considered
(or counted) as part of the 60% Filipino ownership of the corporation. In the end, all those
"specific stocks" that are determined to be Filipino (per definition of "beneficial owner" or
"beneficial ownership") will be added together and their sum must be equivalent to at least
60% of the total outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors and at
least 60% of the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in
the election of directors. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Where the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt, the

Grandfather Rule will apply: The ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first
be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation: Where the 60-40 Filipino-foreign
equity ownership is in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will apply. Thus, the combined totals in the
Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to
determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership. The ultimate Filipino ownership of the
shares must first be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation and added to the shares
directly owned in the Investee Corporation. (Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v.
Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014)
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS – HEALTH
Precautionary principle in environmental cases: Where there is lack of full

scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect, the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either
judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment: Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation: The oft-cited Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (1992 Rio Agenda), first embodied this principle, as follows:
Principle 15 - In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. In this jurisdiction, the principle
of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event,
the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the
goal of preserving and protecting the environment. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Elements required for the application of the precautionary principle:

uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm: It is
notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence
of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or
irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal link
between an action and environmental damage can be established, or the probability of
occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken.
Neither will the precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat of
environmental harm; or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible. (Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for the precautionary principle:

The Davao City ban on aerial spraying cannot be justified under the precautionary
principle due to lack of empirical studies: To begin with, there has been no scientific
study. Although the precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing
a connection between the serious or irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is
still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective policy
choices under the precautionary principle. Precaution is a risk management principle invoked
after scientific inquiry takes place. This scientific stage is often considered synonymous with risk
assessment. As such, resort to the principle shall not be based on anxiety or emotion, but from
a rational decision rule, based in ethics. As much as possible, a complete and objective scientific
evaluation of the risk to the environment or health should be conducted and made available to
decision-makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of action. The only study
conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be the Summary Report on the
Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations,
which was not a scientific study that could justify the resort to the precautionary principle. In
fact, the Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the fact-finding team that
recommended only a regulation, not a ban, against aerial spraying. We should not apply the
precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing is known
of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the residents
within and near the plantations and to the integrity and balance of the environment.
Accordingly, for lack of scientific data supporting a ban on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-
07 should be struck down for being unreasonable. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS,

CULTURE AND SPORTS
The view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property, such as the Rizal

Monument, is not covered by the protection of the existing heritage law: Section 15,
Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "the State shall conserve, promote and popularize
the nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources." Since this provision is not self-
executory, Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural
heritage. One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of
2009, which empowers the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural
agencies to issue a cease and desist order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural
treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or significant
alteration from its original state." This law declares that the State should protect the "physical
integrity" of the heritage property or building if there is "danger of destruction or significant
alteration from its original state." Physical integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong
and sound the structure is. The same law does not mention that another project, building, or
property, not itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of a cease and desist
order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property or
building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium
project in relation to the Rizal Monument. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, G.R. No. 213948,
April 18, 2017)
Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose

disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel students who
violate disciplinary rules: The power to discipline students is subsumed in the
academic freedom to determine what may be taught, how it shall be taught and
who may be admitted to study: Academic freedom is guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution. Academic freedom or the institutional autonomy of universities
and institutions of higher learning, covers "four essential freedoms" of a university: To
determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how
it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study. The schools' power to instill discipline
in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom. The right of schools to impose
disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate
disciplinary rules. The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the
third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching
the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By
instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is
the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the
freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension
and the withholding of graduation privileges. As the primary training and educational institution
of the AFP, the Philippine Military Academy certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom
in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the
Honor System in particular. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy,
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

An unincorporated agency enjoys immunity from suit and waives its non-
suability only when it enters into proprietary contracts: There is no waiver of
immunity when the DPWH enters into road construction contracts, which involve
exercise of government functions: An unincorporated agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit. The State will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability only if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. Contracts for the construction of public roads that the DPWH enter into are done in
the exercise of its governmental functions, hence, there is no implied waiver by the DPWH
simply by entering into such contract. (Mendoza v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014)
If the government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental

functions, it is not immune from suit: If the government agency performs proprietary,
private or non-governmental functions, it is not immune from suit. If an unincorporated
government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental functions, it is not
immune from suit. The ATO was involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan
Airport, which are primarily private or non-governmental functions. Hence, the ATO has no
claim to immunity from suit. (Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402,
February 23, 2011)
The doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for

perpetrating an injustice to a citizen: Even an unincorporated agency such as the
DOTC may be sued, even when performing sovereign functions, for taking of private
property without filing an expropriation case: The DOTC encroached on the respondents’
properties when it constructed the local telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte. The
exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone Program. We have no
doubt that when the DOTC constructed the encroaching structures and subsequently entered
into the FLA with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign function.
Therefore, we agree with the DOTC’s contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall within
the cloak of state immunity. However, the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. Whenever private property is taken for
public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate
expropriation proceedings. By necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is
a waiver of State immunity. If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular procedure upon
discovering that it had encroached on the respondents’ property, it would have initiated
expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on its immunity from suit. The Department’s entry
into and taking of possession of the respondents’ property amounted to an implied waiver of its
governmental immunity from suit. (Department of Transportation v. Spouses Abecina, June 29,
2016, G.R. No. 206484)
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be invoked to defeat a valid claim

for compensation arising from a taking without just compensation: The doctrine of
sovereign immunity is not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen:
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. Where private
property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of
immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the
owners. (Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011)

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2019 BAR REVIEW NOTES

Selected Recent Jurisprudence (2010-June 2018)1

Innocent passage in Philippine internal waters: Philippine internal waters

The right of innocent passage is a customary international law: In the absence

Natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of

Foundlings as natural-born citizens

(Note: The 2019 Bar Chairperson dissented in the Poe cases)

As a matter of law, foundlings are natural-born citizens. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec,

The Constitution does not permit discrimination against foundlings: The

The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is

To establish that a foundling is a natural-born citizen, sufficient evidence can

STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

Actual case requirement: The Court cannot render an advisory opinion:

No actual case – A petition to declare an SEC circular void based on a

No actual case - A petition challenging the constitutionality of a law on the

No actual case that is ripe for adjudication – A petition to declare as

No actual case – A petition to declare a proposed bill unconstitutional: A

Moot case – a decision would be of no practical value: A case becomes moot

Exceptions to the Moot and Academic Principle: Recent examples of petitions

The petition questioning the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System: It

A petition questioning the validity of holding of dual Cabinet positions, even

A petition questioning the validity of the expenditures under the Development

A petition to be included in the Comelec’s list of candidates even the elections

THE STANDING REQUIREMENT

Locus Standi: The requirements of Injury, Causation and Redressability: The

Legal standing as a citizen: The Direct Injury Requirement: When suing as a

Legal standing as a tax payer: There must be a showing of illegal

Legal standing as a legislator: There must be an invasion of the powers,

Locus standi in a facial challenge on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness:

Locus standi in environmental cases: Any Filipino citizen, as a steward of

Locus standi in environmental cases: Writ of Kalikasan v. Writ of Continuing

Political questions – to be decided by the people, the executive or legislative

A question is political, and not judicial, if it is a matter which is to be exercised by the

Political questions -- dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a

Grave abuse of discretion - the issue to be resolved in political questions:

Examples in recent jurisprudence of political questions

The conduct of foreign relations is a political question: The conduct of the

The sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is a

Who to appoint is a political question: Who to appoint is "a political question

President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the

Examples of issues that are NOT political questions

DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT

Under the doctrine of operative fact, notwithstanding the finding of

Under the doctrine of operative fact, DAP-funded projects should not be

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Why PDAF/Pork Barrel System is void

Violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power: The

Undermining public accountability: The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines

Martial law and the Role of Congress

It is not obligatory for Congress to convene in joint session following the

There is no violation of the right to public information if public joint sessions

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Only the President can exercise the powers of the Commander-in-Chief,

Judicial Review of the President’s Declaration of Martial Law

Presidential judgment call on military powers: The determination of which

Facial review of the proclamation of martial law on the grounds of vagueness

Nullification of a proclamation of martial law declaration will not affect a

Scope of judicial review: Sufficiency of the factual basis, not correctness of

Basis for determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis -- facts or

No need for the Supreme Court to conduct an independent investigation: The

Territorial coverage: The discretion to determine the territorial scope of