Assign No.

7 Case Digest Persons

1. Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan
Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a
criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and
await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal
case for concubinage.

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody
of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree
of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount
of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce
the same.

SHORTER VERSION FOR WRITTEN CASE DIGESTS:

Cang v. CA
GR 105308
Sept. 25, 1998
FACTS:
 Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Clavano married and begot 3 children.
 Upon learning that petitioner had an alleged extramarital affair with another woman,
Anna filed a petition for legal separation.
 The court approved the joint manifestation of the spouses providing that they agreed to
live separately and apart or from bed and board.
 They further agreed:
o That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of P1,000
effective from the date of the filing of the complaint
o That the plaintiff (Anna) shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement
with any persons without the written consent of the husband.
 Petitioner left for the US where she sought a divorce from Anna.
 A divorce decree was issued which also granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to
Anna.
 While in the US, petitioner remitted to the Philippines a portion of his monthly salary to
the Philippines for his children’s expenses and deposited another portion of his monthly
salary in a bank in the name of his children.
 Private respondents Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano, respectively the brother
and sister-in-law of Anna, filed a special proceeding for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang
children.
 The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption.
 Anna likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging facts of abandonment by petitioner.
 Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents
were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager
compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children.
 The RTC issued a decree of adoption and concluded that petitioner has abandoned his
children.

ISSUES:
1. Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of the natural parent
on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
2. Whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary

RULING:
1. Yes. Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides that there shall be filed with the petition a
written consent to the adoption signed x x x by each of its known living parents who is
not insane, or hopelessly intemperate, or has not abandoned the child x x x. In the instant
case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for
 adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition
sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors by the natural father. However,
in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto
was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper
issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the
oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon
his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
2. No. Records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims. Petitioner’s testimony on the matter is
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the handwritten letters to him of both
his wife and children. Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required
consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.

LONGER VERSION:

2.Cang v. CA
GR 105308
Sept. 25, 1998

CASE DOCTRINES:
1. The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which
our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
2. However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure
of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
3. The act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It
means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support
which parents owe their children.
 4. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Clavano married in 1973.
 They begot 3 children, namely: Keith (born in 1973), Charmaine (born in 1977) and Joseph
(born in 1981).
 Anna learned of her husband’s alleged extramarital affair.
 Anna then filed a petition for legal separation.
 The court approved the joint manifestation of the spouses providing that they agreed to
live separately and apart or from bed and board.
 They further agreed:
o That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of P1,000
effective from the date of the filing of the complaint
o That the plaintiff (Anna) shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement
with any persons without the written consent of the husband.
 Petitioner left for the US where she sought a divorce from Anna.
 A divorce decree was issued which also granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to
Anna.
 While in the US, petitioner remitted to the Philippines a portion of his monthly salary to
the Philippines for his children’s expenses and deposited another portion of his monthly
salary in a bank in the name of his children.
 In 1987, private respondents Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano, respectively the
brother and sister-in-law of Anna, filed a special proceeding for the adoption of the 3
minor Cang children.
 The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption.
 Anna likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging:
o that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children;
o that her brothers & sisters, including Ronald Clavano, had been helping her in
taking care of the children;
o that because she would be going to the US to attend a family business, leaving the
children would be a problem and would naturally hamper her job-seeking venture
abroad; and
o that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children for the ff.
reasons:
 The decision in the legal separation case allowed her to enter into any
contract without the written consent of her husband;
 Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the US and had
been transferring from one place to another to avoid detection by
Immigration authorities; and
 Her husband divorced her.
 Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents
were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager
compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children.
o Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire
custody over his children alleging that Anna had transferred to the US thereby
leaving custody of their children to private respondents.
o The RTC issued an order finding that Anna had, in effect, relinquished custody over
the children and therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father.
o The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
petitioner.
 In 1990, the RTC issued a decree of adoption.
o The lower court was impelled by these reasons:
1. The Cang children had, since birth, developed close filial ties with the Clavano
family especially their maternal uncle, Ronald Clavano
2. Ronald Clavano and Maria Clavano were childless and with their printing press,
real estate business, export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in
California, USA, had substantial assets and income
3. Anna, the natural mother of the children, approved of the adoption b/c of her
heart ailment and the fact that she could not provide them a secure and happy
future as she travels a lot
4. The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual directions as they
would go to church together and had sent them to Catholic schools
5. The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by the
Clavanos. Keith had testified and expressed the wish to be adopted by the
Clavanos while the 2 younger ones were observed by the court to have
snuggled close to Ronald even though their natural mother was around.
 The lower court concluded that oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children.
Abandonment of a child by its parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for
dispensing with his consent to its adoption. In such case, adoption will be allowed not
only without the consent of the parent, but even against his opposition.
 Before the CA, petitioner contended that it would not be in the best interest of the 3
children if they were adopted by the private respondents. He asserted that the petition
for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because
he did not have a written consent to the adoption; he never abandoned his children; Keith
and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and the petitioners for
adoption did not present as witness the representative of the DSWD who made the case
study report required by law.
 CA – affirmed the decree of adoption issued by the RTC stating that Art. 199 of the Family
Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted.
However, the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is NOT necessary. The
question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered as having abandoned
the children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the
 parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, OR the
neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their
children (Santos v. Ananzanso), OR the withholding of the parents’ presence, his care and
the opportunity to display voluntary affection.
 Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and has in
fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide support comes
from two judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges
him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce
decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of
US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show compliance
with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs.
24 to 45) drawn in the children’s names totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance was on
October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support commenced under the
divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made
53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to
have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was woefully in
arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was totally in default of the
judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really been
performing his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations.
 The 3 bank accounts he opened were in his name as trustee for each of his 3 children. In
other words, the accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by the oppositor
himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the minors.
 Petitioner is now before the SC alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Art. 31(2) of PD
No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Art. 188(2) of the Family Code.

ISSUES:
1. Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of the natural parent
on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? YES
2. Whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary. NO

HELD:
1.

Despite the amendments to the law [Art. 31(2) of PD 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code as
amended by EO 91 was the applicable law at the time when the private respondents filed the
petition for adoption in 1987. During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on Aug. 3, 1988,
Art. 188(2) of the Family Code amended PD 603], the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court which provides that: “There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed x x x by each of its known living parents who is not insane, OR
hopelessly intemperate, OR has not abandoned the child x x x.” As clearly inferred from the
foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural child is indispensable for the
validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with IF PARENT HAS ABANDONED THE CHILD or that such parent is INSANE or
HOPELESSLY INTEMPERATE. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the
written consent of the parents or one of the parents PROVIDED that the petition for adoption
ALLEGES FACTS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT EXEMPTION FROM COMPLIANCE THEREWITH.

In the instant case, only affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition
for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED THE FACT OF ABANDONMENT OF THE MINORS FOR ADOPTION BY THE
NATURAL FATHER as follows:

3. That the children’s mother, sister of petitioner Ronald Clavano, has given her express consent
to this adoption, as shown by the Affidavit of Consent. Likewise, the written consent of Keith
Cang, now 14 years of age appears on this petition; However, the father of the children, Herbert
Cang, had already left his wife and children and had already divorced the former, as evidenced
by the copy of the Decree of Divorce issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, USA which
was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his family to live in the US as
an illegal immigrant.

The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child
by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence
dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor children.

However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto
was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for
determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue
that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.

2.

In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly.
The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The emphasis is on the
finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In
reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any conduct
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioner’s testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children.

Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing
that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit
of his children. Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985
to 1989.

These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts below
simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the emotional
exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below emphasized
the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards the bank
deposits, these were withdrawable by him alone. Simply put, the courts below attached a high
premium to the prospective adopters’ financial status but totally brushed aside the possible
repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.

In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person
simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural
parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child
to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his affluent father who
was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his mother. The Court said:
“Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises
if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is
able to support her children according to her means.”

In Celis v. Cafuir where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award custody of
a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said: “We should not take away
from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice
due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride
and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams
of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother
and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its
foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have
done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they
committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real
natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her
associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. x x x.”
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that in ascertaining the welfare and best interests
of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the Court said: “A scrutiny
of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on
emphasizing the `torture and agony of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation
she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings
and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother and
her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer
agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than
that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent
but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.

Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his
children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical,
emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. The conclusion of the
courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than
his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could
provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children
would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he
received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie
between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their
whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems
and triumphs.

Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by
law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.

2.Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They
had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about
1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond
the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen
abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency
of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

4.Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in
March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings
were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even
before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on
April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued
in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with
petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior
marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly
contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and
of her children.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:

SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who
sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from
the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She
is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages
would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common
funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do
not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach
of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and
subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support
to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.

5.Version 2- HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY

10 Augusy 1918 | Fisher, J.
Plaintiff: Mrs. Henry E. Harding and husband
Defendant: Commercial Union Assurance Company

DOCTRINE (Void Donations)

BRIEF
Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance with Commercial Union Assurance Company.
When the car was destroyed by fire, Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but the
Commercial Union denied it. One of the reasons was that the car does not belong to her
since a gift from her husband is void under the Civil Code. The Court ruled that the transfer
did not interfere with their rights and interests.

FACTS
1. In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as
a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly
authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in
the Philippines.
 2. The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server). The
car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs
done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00.
3. This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She
also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as
an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
4. In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker.
5. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the
representations and averments made as to the cost of the car were false; and that said
statement was a warranty.
6. Commercial Union stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift
from her husband is void under the Civil Code.

Supreme Court: ISSUES of the CASE

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim. (YES)
RATIO
1. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by
Mr. Harding to his wife.
2. Although certain transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in
article 1334, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a
relation to the parties making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer
interferes with their rights or interests.
3. Even assuming they had the legal standing, we cannot say that the gift of an automobile
by a husband to his wife is not a moderate one. It depends on the circumstances of the
parties, which was not disclosed.
4. The subject property was part of the conjugal property of the Spouses. It was acquired
during the existence of a valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and Epifania. There was no
decree of dissolution of marriage, nor of their conjugal partnership

RULING: Appeal DENIED.