(Livia Sz. Oláh, Ewa Frątczak (Eds.) ) Childbeari

Work and Welfare in Europe
Series Editors: Denis Bouget, University of Nantes, France, Jochen Clasen,

University of Edinburgh, UK, Ana Guillén Rodriguez, University of Oviedo,
Spain, Jane Lewis, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and
Bruno Palier, Sciences-Po Paris, France
Titles include:
Sigrid Betzelt and Silke Bothfeld

ACTIVATION AND LABOUR MARKET REFORMS IN EUROPE
Challenges to Social Citizenship
Sonja Drobnic and Ana Guillén Rodriguez
WORK-LIFE BALANCE IN EUROPE
The Role of Job Quality
Colette Fagan, Maria Gonzalez Menendez and Silvia Gomez Anson
WOMEN IN MANAGEMENT
European Employment Policy
Neil Fraser, Rodolfo Gutierrez and Ramon Pena-Cassas
WORKING POVERTY IN EUROPE
Patricia Frericks and Robert Maier
THE LIFE COURSE AND THE ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY OF THE
WELFARE STATE
Paolo Graziano, Sophie Jacquot and Bruno Palier
THE EU AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF WELFARE STATE REFORMS
Europa, Europae
Karl Hinrichs and Matteo Jessoula
LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND PENSION REFORMS
Flexible Today, Secure Tomorrow?
Trudie Knijn
WORK, FAMILY POLICIES AND TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD IN
EUROPE
Colin Lindsay and Donald Houston
DISABILITY BENEFITS, WELFARE REFORM AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY
Ive Marx and Kenneth Nelson
MINIMUM INCOME PROTECTION IN FLUX
Livia Sz. Oláh and Ewa Fratczak
˛
CHILDBEARING, WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT AND WORK–LIFE BALANCE
POLICIES IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE
Birgit Pfau-Effinger and Tine Rostgaard
CARE, WORK AND WELFARE IN EUROPE
Martin Schröder
INTEGRATING VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM AND WELFARE STATE RESEARCH
A Unified Typology of Capitalisms
Rik van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf and Tomáš Sirovátka
THE GOVERNANCE OF ACTIVE WELFARE STATES IN EUROPE
Work and Welfare in Europe

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Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Childbearing, Women’s
Employment and
Work–Life Balance Policies
in Contemporary Europe
Edited by
Livia Sz. Oláh

Stockholm University, Sweden
and
Ewa Fratczak
˛
Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
Selection and editorial matter © Livia Sz. Oláh and Ewa Fratczak
˛ 2013
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2013
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Contents
List of Figures vii
List of Tables ix
Notes on Contributors xii
Funding xvi
1 Introduction: Aspirations and Uncertainties. Childbearing

Choices and Work–Life Realities in Europe 1
Livia Sz. Oláh and Susanne Fahlén
2 Work and Childbearing Intentions from a Capability

Perspective: Young Adult Women in Sweden 28
Susanne Fahlén and Livia Sz. Oláh
3 Employment Instability and Childbearing Plans

in a Child-Oriented Country: Evidence
from France 65
Ariane Pailhé and Anne Solaz
4 Female Employment, Reconciliation Policies

and Childbearing Intentions in East and
West Germany 97
Katharina Lutz, Mandy Boehnke, Johannes Huinink
and Silke Tophoven
5 The Interplay of Fertility Intentions, Female Employment

and Work–Life Balance Policies in Contemporary Poland:
Can Gender Equity, Preference and Social Capital Theories
Provide a Better Insight? 135
Ewa Fratczak
˛ and Aneta Ptak-Chmielewska
6 Unattainable Desires? Childbearing Capabilities

in Early 21st-Century Hungary 179
Judit Takács
v
vi Contents
7 Concluding Thoughts on Childbearing, Women’s Work and

Work–Life Balance Policy Nexus in Europe in the Dawn of
the 21st Century 207
Index 218
Figures
1.1 Total fertility rates in five European countries,

1960–2010 9
1.2 Ideal family size (women aged 20–49 years), total
fertility rate in 2006 and adjusted total fertility rate
2005–07 in five European countries 11
1.3 Female labour force participation rates in five European
countries, 1975–2010 (women aged 25–54 years) 11
1.4 Women’s usual work hours a week (h/w) in five
European countries in 2007 12
1.5 Part-time employment (% of total employment) in five
European countries, 1997–2010 (women aged 25–49
years) 13
1.6 Maternal and female employment rates in five European
countries in 2007 14
1.7 Attitudes towards working mothers in five European
countries. Proportion who disagree/strongly disagree
with the statement ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer
if his or her mother works’ (age 18–65 years) 15
1.8 Unemployment rates in five European countries,
1997–2010 (women aged 25–49 years) 16
1.9 Temporary employment (% of total number of
employees) in five European countries, 1997–2010
(women aged 25–49 years) 16
2.1 Theoretical model: capability set and childbearing
intentions 33
2.2 Actual weekly work hours for women and men aged
20–24 years and 25–49 years, Sweden 35
2.3 Childbearing intention probabilities to have the first
child, and to have it within five years, by labour force
attachment, education and income: Sweden
(26-year-old women in co-residential partnership) 47
2.4 Childbearing intention probabilities to have the first
child within five years by weekly work hours, education,
income and partner’s labour force attachment: Sweden
(26-year-old women in co-residential partnership) 53
vii
viii List of Figures
3.1 Fertility plans in France by number of children 77

3.2 Fertility plans in France by age, all parity together 78
3.3 Fertility plans in France by employment status 80
4.1 Total period fertility rate in East and West Germany,
1960–2008 100
4.2 Attendance in childcare according to age, Germany,
2007 111
4.3 Intentions to have a first child in Germany 120
4.4 Intentions to have a second child in Germany 121
5.1a Fertility patterns in Poland, 1990–2009, selected years 140
5.1b Fertility patterns, Poland – EU 27, 2008 141
5.1c Fertility patterns, Poland, cohorts, 1970–79 142
5.2a Unemployment rate in Poland, total, males and females
aged 15–34 years, 2003–09 145
5.2b Activity rate in Poland, total, males and females aged
15–34 years, 2003–09 146
5.2c Family model and labour division in Poland, 2005,
2007, 2009 147
5.3 Number of nurseries and places in nurseries in Poland,
1990–2008 151
5.4 Late fertility diagnosis – panel survey scheme, Poland 156
6.1 Total fertility rates in nine Central and Eastern European
capitals (2003) 180
7.1 Proportion of men and women aged 20–60 years, in five
European countries, who find it important/very
important to be able to combine work and family life
when choosing a job 208
Tables
2.1 Logistic regression results. Labour force attachment and

childbearing intentions among women in Sweden (odds
ratios) 42
2.2 Logistic regression results. Labour force attachment and
short-term childbearing intentions (that is planning to
have a child within five years) among women in
Sweden (odds ratios) 46
2.3 Logistic regression results. Work hours and childbearing
intentions among women in paid work, living with a
partner in Sweden (odds ratios) 49
2.4 Logistic regression results. Work hours and short-term
childbearing intentions (that is planning to have a child
within five years) among women in paid work, living
with a partner in Sweden (odds ratios) 52
2.A.1 Descriptive statistics by parity (%). Sample for analysis
on labour force attachment and childbearing intentions
among women in Sweden (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2) 57
2.A.2 Descriptive statistics by parity, selected variables (%).
Sample for analysis on work hours; women in Sweden
(see Tables 2.3 and 2.4) 58
3.1 Proportion (%) declaring their timing linked to their
professional situation in France 81
3.2 Timing and partners’ professional situation (%) in
France 82
3.3 Determinants of fertility plans in France (logistic
regression models). Relative odds of intention to have
a(nother) child within three years 83
3.A.1 Distribution of independent variables (%): France 92
4.1 Labour force participation of women, aged 25–40 years,
in Germany, 2001 (%) 103
4.2 Logistic regression model on women’s intentions to
have a first and second child within the next two years
in Germany (odds ratios) 122
ix
x List of Tables
4.3 Logistic regression model on the intentions to have a

first and second child within the next two years among
women in partnerships in Germany (odds ratios) 124
4.4 Logistic regression model on the intentions to have a
first and second child within the next two years in
Germany, including interaction effects (odds ratios) 125
4.A.1 Distribution of independent variables: Germany 128
5.1 Lifestyle/family model preferences among young Polish
women in the early 2000s (classification in line with the
preference theory) 158
5.2 Logistic regression results for lifestyle preferences.
Intentions to have a first child and intentions to have a
subsequent child in Poland (odds ratios) 160
5.3 Logistic regression results for gender equity. Intentions
to have a first child and intentions to have a subsequent
child in Poland (odds ratios) 162
5.4 Logistic regression results for social capital. Intentions
to have a first child and intentions to have a subsequent
child in Poland (odds ratios) 164
5.5 Summary conclusion, Poland: gender equality model for
fertility intentions – testing H1 and social capital model
for fertility intentions – testing H2 (variables with
significant impact on fertility intentions are marked
by ‘+’) 167
5.A.1 Distributions of answers to these questions:
a) Questions summing up woman’s satisfaction with her
current situation
b) How do you evaluate your and your
husband’s/partner’s time commitment to household
duties?
c) How do you evaluate your and your
husband’s/partner’s time commitment to taking care of
your children?
d) Questions concerning housing support, regular
monetary support and regular non-monetary support
according to intentions to have a child (%) 170
5.A.2 Size of a network – summary statistics: Poland 172
6.1 Mean actual, ideal and latest age at the birth of the first
child in Hungary (2006) 186
6.2 Mean general and personal ideal number of children in
Hungary (2006) 191
List of Tables xi
6.3 Ideal and real(ised) number of children by gender:

Hungary 193
6.4 Ideal and real(ised) number of children by educational
level: Hungary 194
Contributors
Editors
Livia Sz. Oláh is Associate Professor of Demography at the Department

of Sociology, Stockholm University. Her main research fields include
family demography in comparative perspective, the impact of public
policies on fertility and on partnership dissolution, and the interplay
of family patterns and societal and familial gender relations. She has
published in international journals such as Demographic Research, Popu-
lation Research and Policy Review, International Journal of Law, Policy and
the Family, in addition to authoring a number of book chapters. She has
been a member of the Network of Excellence RECWOWE (Reconciling
Work and Welfare in Europe) and co-leader of the project on fertility,
female work and reconciliation policies there. She has been the initiator
and coordinator of the research network Gendering European Family
Dynamics, and a member of the editorial advisory board of The Open
Demography Journal and of an international advisory panel to the Father-
hood Institute in the UK, as well as a member of reference groups for
Swedish government reports on family issues.
Ewa Fratczak
˛ is Professor and Head of the Event History Analysis and
Multilevel Analysis Unit at the Institute of Statistics and Demography,
Warsaw School of Economics. She was also Head of the Demographic
Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences (2006–11), and a for-
mer member of the UN Commission on Population and Development,
of the European Population Committee and of the European Popula-
tion Network at the Council of Europe. She was Vice-President of the
Polish Demographic Society (1992–2007); Vice-Editor-in-Chief of the
Polish Population Review (1996–2007); and Secretary of the Governmen-
tal Population Council in Poland (2001–07). She has been a country
representative of the Network of Excellence RECWOWE, a member of
the Executive Committee and the Governing Committee, and co-leader
of the project on fertility, female work and reconciliation policies. She
has written numerous articles as well as books on family and individual
xii
Notes on Contributors xiii
life course, population policy, population structure and ageing, applied

and advanced statistics, and event history and multilevel analyses.
Contributors
Mandy Boehnke is Director of Studies at the Bremen International

Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS) at the University of Bremen
and Jacobs University Bremen. She received her PhD in 2010 from the
University of Bremen where she has worked as Research Associate and
Lecturer at the Institute of Empirical and Applied Sociology (EMPAS)
and the Institute of Sociology. Her main research interests include fam-
ily sociology in a cross-cultural and interdisciplinary perspective, social
inequality and political sociology. She has been a member of the Net-
work of Excellence RECWOWE in the project on fertility, female work
and reconciliation policies since 2008. Her most recent work on this
topic in English includes ‘Gender Role Attitudes around the Globe:
Egalitarian vs. Traditional Views’ (Asian Journal of Social Science, 2011).
Susanne Fahlén is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Soci-

ology, Stockholm University. She has a multidisciplinary background in
cultural anthropology, demography and political science. Her doctoral
project concerned gender and social politics in a European perspec-
tive with a special focus on parental work–life balance, childbearing
intentions and realised fertility. She has been a member of the Net-
work of Excellence RECWOWE, has published articles in Social Politics
and The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
and has co-authored a chapter in Regulating Family Responsibilities (eds
J. Bridgeman, H. Keating and C. Lind) and in Family, Ties and Care (eds
H. Bertram and N. Ehlert) with Professor Barbara Hobson.
Johannes Huinink is Full Professor for Sociology at the University

of Bremen. His main research interests lie in the research fields of
social structure analysis, sociology of the life course (especially fam-
ily and migration) as well as research methods. He is co-initiator of
the ‘Panel Analysis of Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics’
(pairfam) sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (German
Research Foundation). The panel is a representative, multidisciplinary,
longitudinal study for researching partner and family dynamics in
Germany. He has published several monographs, edited volumes and
xiv Notes on Contributors
articles in leading German and international journals, such as Kölner

Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Zeitschrift für Soziologie,
American Journal of Sociology, Social Science Research and International
Sociology.
Katharina Lutz is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Social

Sciences, University of Frankfurt. The chapter in this book was devel-
oped during her time at the University of Bremen, where she received
her PhD in 2011 and where she was part of the Priority Programme
‘Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics’ funded by the German
Research Foundation. She has been a member of the Network of Excel-
lence RECWOWE, taking part in the project on fertility, female work
and reconciliation policies since 2008. Her doctoral thesis examined
the influence of occupational characteristics on fertility decisions. Her
research interests lie in the fields of the sociology of the life course, social
structure and the family.
Ariane Pailhé is a senior researcher at the French National Demo-

graphic Institute (INED), Paris, and a lecturer in demography at the Paris
School of Economics. Her main research fields are work–family conflict,
gender and ethnic discrimination within the labour market, working
conditions and time allocation between spouses. She co-designed and
co-coordinated the French national representative survey on ‘Families
and Employers’ (2004–05). She has been involved in the project on
fertility, female work and reconciliation policies for the Network of
Excellence RECWOWE and is a member of the management committee
of the European research group ‘Labour Market and Gender in Europe’.
She has published in high-quality international journals, such as Demo-
graphic Research, Feminist Economics, Population, Annales d’économie et de
statistique, Review of Economics of the Household and European Journal of
Population.
Aneta Ptak-Chmielewska is Associate Professor at the Institute of Statis-

tics and Demography, Warsaw School of Economics. Her main research
fields include demography and applied demography, study of com-
petitive careers with event history methods and models, multivariate
statistics and advanced statistics application in economy and life sci-
ences. She has been a member of the Network of Excellence RECWOWE.
She is co-author of recent books (2011) on cohort fertility in Poland:
Fertility in Poland – Cohort Analysis: Birth Cohorts 1911–86 and Fertility
and Nuptiality in Poland: Birth Cohorts 1911–86. She was Secretary of the
Notes on Contributors xv
Demographic Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences between

2007 and 2011.
Anne Solaz is a researcher at the French National Demographic Research

Institute (INED), where she is leader of the demographic economic team.
Her main fields of interest are fertility, divorce and stepfamily, work–
family balance, time allocation between spouses and gender inequalities
in the labour market. She co-designed and co-coordinated the French
national representative survey on ‘Families and Employers’ (2004–05).
She has been involved in the project on fertility, female work and rec-
onciliation policies for the Network of Excellence RECWOWE. She has
published in leading international journals, such as Journal of Popula-
tion Economics, Feminist Economics, Population, Review of Economics of the
Household and European Journal of Population.
Judit Takács currently works as Head of Department of Research on

Theory and Methodology at the Institute of Sociology, Centre for Social
Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. She has been a country
representative of the Network of Excellence RECWOWE. Her research
has been focused on gender issues and family practices, social exclu-
sion/inclusion of LGBT people, AIDS prevention, anti-discrimination
and equal treatment policies. She has authored and co-authored sev-
eral books and journal articles, including the book How to Put Equality
into Practice? (2007), the book chapter ‘Differential Modernization in
Hungary’ (in Families and Family Policies in Europe, eds L. Appleton and
L. Hantrais, 2003) and the article ‘Agency and Capabilities to Achieve
Work–Life Balance’ (with B. Hobson and S. Fahlén, Social Politics, 2011).
Silke Tophoven is a researcher at the Institute for Employment Research

(IAB) in the project ‘lidA – German Cohort Study on Work, Age and
Health’. Her main research interests include labour force participation
over the life course, the relationship between work and health, and
gender inequalities. She received her BA in social sciences from the
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf in 2006 and her MA in sociology
and social research from the University of Bremen in 2009. As a student
research assistant in Bremen she was involved in the project on fertility,
female work and reconciliation policies of the Network of Excellence
RECWOWE.
Funding
This book has been published thanks to the European research project
RECWOWE (Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe), 2006–11,
co-funded by the European Commission, under the 6th Framework
Programme for Research – Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities
(contract nr 028339–2) in the Directorate-General for Research.
The information and views set out in this book are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the
European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies
nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the
use which may be made of the information contained therein.
xvi
1
Introduction: Aspirations
and Uncertainties. Childbearing
Choices and Work–Life Realities
in Europe
1. Background
Europe is facing a demographic challenge based on the conjuncture

of population ageing and a shrinking labour force that in the long
run jeopardises economic growth and sustainable development. The
current situation is the outcome of three trends: (i) long-term below-
replacement level period fertility (that is less than 2.05 children per
woman on average); (ii) increasing longevity; and (iii) a growing pro-
portion of people in their late 50s and above in the labour force.
While the latter two trends nearly equally apply to every society in
Europe, cross-country variations in fertility levels are quite substantial,
accelerating population ageing in societies where fertility rates have
remained below the critical level of 1.5 children per woman for longer
periods (McDonald, 2006; Myrskylä et al., 2009). In addressing coun-
try differences in fertility, the importance of the childbearing, female
employment and work–life balance policy interplay has been increas-
ingly recognised in contemporary scholarships of the welfare state,
economics, gender and demography (see e.g. Castles, 2003; Gornick and
Meyers, 2003; Engelhardt et al., 2004; Frejka et al., 2008a; Thévenon and
Gauthier, 2011).
Economists have since long pointed out that there is a link between
high and/or greatly increasing rates of female employment and the
simultaneous decline of fertility from the late 1960s onwards. While the
cost of the time that mothers, who were not engaged in paid work, spent
raising children was negligible, having little impact on fertility rates
L.S. Oláh (eds.), Childbearing, Women’s Employment and Work-Life Balance Policies in
Contemporary Europe © Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Nature America Inc. 2013
2 Childbearing Choices & Work–Life Realities: Europe
under the primacy of the male-breadwinner family model, the opportu-

nity cost of childbearing has become substantial as women increasingly
remained in the labour market after entering marriage and even moth-
erhood (Becker, 1991; Joshi, 1998). As a result, couples’ desire to have
more than one or two children has greatly diminished. Highly efficient
and easily available contraceptives have provided women with nearly
total control over their fertility over the past decades, while a range
of new opportunities beyond the family sphere have become available
to them on a par with men, so that childbearing has more and more
become a choice (Morgan and Berkowitz King, 2001). At the same time,
relationships have grown less stable as seen in increasing divorce rates
even among couples with children and a growing prevalence of less
committed partnership forms, such as non-marital cohabitation and
living-apart-together relationships, which are inherently more fragile
than marriages. Hence, being able to support oneself economically has
nearly become an imperative in contemporary Europe independent of
one’s gender (Oláh, 2011). Consequently, young women increasingly
prepare themselves for a long employment career, carefully planning
childbearing, both number and timing, while considering how best
to combine the dual responsibilities of work and family under given
structures of social support (Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000).
During the mid-/late 1980s, the negative macro-level correlation
between birth rates and female employment rates shifted to a positive
one, known as ‘the positive turn’, capturing the attention of welfare
state and gender scholars alike (Ahn and Mira, 2002; Castles, 2003;
Gornick and Meyers, 2003). Later studies have shown that the rever-
sal of sign in cross-country correlation has been related to substantial
differences across countries in the magnitude of the negative time-series
association between fertility and female work, as well as to unmeasured
country-specific factors (Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 2004; Engelhardt
et al., 2004; Kögel, 2004). In any case, since the late 1980s, coun-
tries with low female employment rates are the ones with very low
fertility levels, whereas societies that have embraced the dual-earner
family model display reasonably high fertility rates (Bernhardt, 1993;
Hobson and Oláh, 2006a; OECD, 2011a). Hence, the role of work–life
balance policies in this relationship has become increasingly important
to address (Rindfuss et al., 2003; Neyer, 2006; Hoem, 2008). Indeed, fer-
tility has remained at very low levels (below 1.5 children per woman),
at least since the early 1990s, in German-speaking countries, Southern
European and most Central-East European countries, where policy sup-
port for women to combine paid work and family responsibilities has
Livia Sz. Oláh & Susanne Fahlén 3
been less consistent and/or comprehensive, while the Nordic states,

France and other West-European societies with (usually) more devel-
oped reconciliation policies displayed fertility rates quite close to the
replacement level (that is 2.05 children per woman).
At the same time, the picture at the micro level has become much
more complex. As high levels of youth unemployment over an extended
period of time in a number of European countries, combined with high
economic aspirations and a reluctance to accept, if only temporarily,
a lower living standard than in one’s parental home, have strength-
ened the sense of being able to support oneself among young people,
labour force participation irrespective of gender may have become a pre-
condition of childbearing in many societies across Europe (McDonald,
2002; Hobson and Oláh, 2006b). The substantial cross-country varia-
tions in fertility rates, which have long intrigued demographers (for a
brief overview of that research see e.g. Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003;
Billari et al., 2004; Frejka et al., 2008b), have been accompanied lately
by a decrease in ideal family size among young adults in some societies
with very low fertility (Goldstein et al., 2003). Therefore, the so-called
low fertility trap hypothesis (Lutz and Skirbekk, 2005; Lutz et al., 2006)
has called for close attention to childbearing intentions, seen as an influ-
ential predictor of future fertility in a country (see also Schoen et al.,
1999). According to this approach, decreasing intentions in conjunction
with specific demographic and economic forces, especially the nega-
tive population momentum seen in the declining number of women in
childbearing ages who thus produce fewer and fewer births in Europe,
and the not negligible mismatch between high personal consumption
aspirations of young people and a negative, or at best stable, expected
income development due to high (youth) unemployment rates and/or
a high prevalence of precarious labour market positions are likely to
inhibit a rise in fertility to above the critical level. The long-term risks
are obvious in terms of future labour supply, economic competitiveness
(as young workers are more willing and able to adapt to new technology,
labour market restructuring or other changes in economic production)
and the sustainability of welfare states that assume that the productive
workforce will provide the resources to shoulder the costs of care for the
aged and the disabled (McDonald and Kippen, 2001; Lutz et al., 2003;
Bongaarts, 2004).
The importance of demographic sustainability has been increasingly
recognised also in European policymaking. The discrepancy between
the number of children desired and achieved fertility (much lower)
was a point of departure of the European Commission’s Green Paper
‘Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the gen-

erations’ (European Commission, 2005), as the first comprehensive
EU-level document openly concerned with demographic sustainability,
acknowledging the need for the European Union to address the child-
bearing, employment, public policy nexus. In the Renewed Sustainable
Development Strategy (European Council, 2006), demographic sustain-
ability has been discussed as one of the key challenges that Europe is
facing, given the distortion in the age structure of the population and
the labour force due to long-term low fertility. In the same year, a com-
munication on ‘The demographic future of Europe – from challenge to
opportunity’ (European Commission, 2006) has called for a constructive
response to the demographic changes, especially in terms of reducing
uncertainties for young adults entering the labour market and via effec-
tive gender equality policies facilitating choices about childbearing. The
progress of such work has been monitored in the bi-annual Demography
Reports since then. Concerns about low birth rates are clearly articulated
in the first two demography reports, to be addressed mainly by facilitat-
ing the reconciliation of paid work and care (European Commission,
2007, 2008), but little attention has been paid to fertility in the 2010
report (European Commission, 2011) that instead emphasised that the
era of extremely low (so-called lowest-low, that is less than 1.3 children
per woman) fertility levels (seems to have) ended (see also Goldstein
et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, we may need to be cautious and maintain concern about
fertility trends in Europe for at least three reasons. First, as pointed
out in a recent article by Sobotka and Lutz (2010), much of the recent
increase in period total fertility rates is the result of the slowing down
or end of the postponement of childbearing, particularly of entering
parenthood. Consequently, the tempo distortion of fertility diminished
greatly, but this does not mean a real increase of fertility. Second, in a
number of European countries even the tempo-adjusted total fertility
rates (see Vienna Institute of Demography, 2008, 2010, 2012) indicate
(much) lower fertility levels than what the simple replacement of the
population with relatively stable age structure would require. Third, in
line with previous studies on cohort fertility (see e.g. Frejka and Sardon,
2004; Sardon and Robertson, 2004) a recent forecast indicates that com-
pleted cohort fertility rates for women born in the mid-/late 1970s will
remain at or even below the critical level of fertility in Italy, Spain and
Portugal, and be only slightly above that level in Germany, Austria,
Poland, Hungary, Romania and Greece (Myrskylä et al., 2012); that is
one-third of EU Member States. As completed family size declined in
these countries over the cohorts of women born in the 1950s and 1960s,
the forecast results may call for close attention to the factors influencing
childbearing choices and behaviour, even if the gap between personal
ideal family size and completed cohort fertility may seem modest, as is
often the case due to a downward adjustment of childbearing desires
given the constraints of childbearing (see McDonald, 2000, 2007).
Indeed, at the individual and couple level, the link between child-
bearing decisions and one’s labour market position is likely to have
strengthened in the past decades due to increased economic uncertain-
ties related to substantial business cycle fluctuations and relatively high
unemployment rates, rendering the male-breadwinner family model
unviable. At the same time, as childbearing is increasingly perceived as
risk and individuals and couples seek to minimise uncertainties in their
lives (Beck, 1999), fertility choices, intentions as well as behaviour are
likely to be affected by policies perceived as facilitating, or rather, con-
straining labour force participation and the balance between paid work
and family life for (prospective) parents (McDonald, 2006). Hence, cross-
country differences in fertility levels are linked to women’s agency and
capabilities in specific institutional settings given the possibilities and/or
constraints to combine employment and childrearing. A better under-
standing of the interplay between paid work, welfare regimes/policy
configurations and fertility choices may be thus essential for construct-
ing policies that would increase the capabilities of families to have
the number of children they wish to have (Hobson and Oláh, 2006b;
Hobson and Fahlén, 2009) and thereby promote sustainable develop-
ment. We focus on heterosexual individuals, not addressing processes
around childbearing decisions in same-sex relationships, which are a
topic per se. With this book, we seek to contribute to the knowledge
base of policymaking as we shed more light on the role of increased
labour market flexibility and of work–life balance policies for combining
family and employment in relation to childbearing choices (intentions,
desires) in different fertility regimes across Europe in the early 21st cen-
tury. To our knowledge, no other comprehensive work (book or special
journal issue) has taken on such a challenge during the past two decades
or so, which makes this volume especially important.
2. Conceptual issues
2.1 Two key concepts

Based on the comprehensive literature of fertility decision-making, we
have identified two key concepts that are particularly relevant to address
the childbearing, female employment and work–life balance policy

nexus. These are (i) uncertainty and risk, and (ii) incoherence. Although
a variety of theories has been applied to build the theoretical frame-
works of the different country chapters in this book, they all relate to
these key concepts, providing a common platform to study the tensions
young women and couples face while making choices about childbear-
ing and paid work in specific institutional contexts. Here, we explain
the main features of these concepts and their importance for our topic.
The concept of uncertainty and risk is highly relevant to under-
stand decisions on employment and family formation in contemporary
Europe, which are increasingly linked. In the past decades, national
labour markets have become more and more deregulated due to increas-
ing globalisation and the spread of social liberalism (Blossfeld et al.,
2006; McDonald, 2006); wage inequalities have increased along with
substantial variations in the gender earning gap within and across
countries (see Brainerd, 2000; Machin, 2008); and eligibility to social
benefits and services has become increasingly dependent on own labour
force participation, strengthening the impact of economic uncertain-
ties on childbearing decisions. High youth unemployment rates and a
growing prevalence of temporary positions (e.g. fixed-term contracts,
project employment) in a number of European countries, increases
in women’s earning power but declines in men’s earnings as well as
growing job insecurity have strengthened the awareness among young
people to seek to minimise the risk of economic uncertainty. Childbear-
ing is seen to greatly increase uncertainty and the risk of economic
hardship for a family, making the single-earner model a less feasible
(and/or desirable) alternative for (prospective) parents. Hence, an impor-
tant strategy for risk-averse individuals is to postpone parenthood and
reduce the number of children they (plan to) have, and invest instead
in the strengthening of their labour market positions, independently
of gender (Beck, 1999; McDonald, 2007). Aspirations to acquire higher
educational attainment and/or further employment experiences will in
turn reduce the space for other engagements, including family commit-
ments. In this volume we assess whether and how women’s employment
and (lack of) policy support for the combination of labour market roles
and family responsibilities for young people shape their childbearing
choices in different national contexts, considering the concept of uncer-
tainty and risk as a cornerstone of a comparative framework in which
our country case studies are embedded.
The other major component shaping childbearing decisions in
modern societies is the incoherence of levels of gender equity
in individual-oriented versus family-oriented institutions (McDonald,

2000). Women and men have, for the most part, equal access to educa-
tion at all levels and work for pay; that is they are assessed as individuals
in the educational system and the labour market, where they benefit
from relatively high levels of gender equality. In the family, however,
the unequal division of domestic tasks prevails, with women contin-
uing to perform the lion’s share, especially as they become mothers.
Indeed, gender equality has remained low in the family (and in some
cases the tax system and social welfare system), jeopardising women’s
equal position with that of men in other spheres when the domestic bur-
den greatly increases due to, for example, childbirth. As young women
tend to have a similar or even higher level of education as young men
in modern Europe, their aspirations are no longer limited to the family.
When childbearing is seen as severely constraining women’s opportu-
nities beyond the family sphere as domestic responsibilities multiply,
fertility aspirations are likely to diminish, perhaps quite substantially,
depending on the institutional context. Work–life balance policies can
greatly mitigate the negative impact of childbearing and childrearing on
economic and other roles women aspire to beyond family life (Hobson
and Oláh, 2006b), preventing a downward adjustment of fertility plans.
Hence, the degree of incoherence is part of our comparative framework,
being another key aspect that shapes the interplay between childbearing
choices, paid work and policy context.
2.2 Childbearing choices (intentions and desires)

Our rationale to study childbearing choices instead of achieved fertil-
ity (births) is the interest in longer-term fertility development, of which
childbearing intentions and desires can be seen as feasible indicators
(Schoen et al., 1999; but see Hagewen and Morgan, 2005 for an exten-
sive review of their shortcomings). Also, given a time window between
plans/wishes and their realisation, if societal constraints can be iden-
tified already in relation to childbearing choices, there may be room
for policy measures implemented and/or modified to enhance individ-
ual agency to be able to combine parenting and labour force activities,
thereby promoting demographic sustainability in the longer run. The
concepts of childbearing intentions and desires might appear similar
and are sometimes used interchangeably (see e.g. Tazi-Preve et al., 2004;
Sobotka, 2009). Most often, however, researchers distinguish between
these concepts given their different implications (e.g. Engelhardt, 2004;
Philipov et al., 2006; Billari et al., 2009). Childbearing desires or pref-
erences are commonly operationalised through questions concerning
ideal family size. They relate to what a person would like to do or be

if there are no constraints at hand. They are about ideals irrespective of
whether they can be achieved or not. Preferences and desires also reflect
social norms and stereotypes (Livi-Bacci, 2001; Hagewen and Morgan,
2005). Childbearing intentions or plans in contrast relate to questions
on whether a person intends, plans or expects to have a first or subse-
quent child, ever or within a certain time span. They reflect potential
constraints in a person’s life. When asked about intentions, current sit-
uation is taken into account as individuals consider whether certain
preferences can be achieved and how (Fahlén, 2012). Hence, inten-
tions may differ quite substantially from preferences (Heiland et al.,
2005). Intended family size reflects a person’s general fertility plans to
be achieved during one’s life, while intentions to have a first or an
additional child within a certain time span are more influenced by
constraints of the current situation which might be overcome in the
long run.
3. Research design
Based on the concepts of uncertainty and risk and of incoherence,

we address the tensions in the interplay between childbearing choices,
female employment and work–life balance policies via five country case
studies. We focus on two high-fertility and three low-fertility societies
from different welfare regime/policy configuration types (see Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 2000; Hobson and Oláh, 2006b). First, we study
Sweden, a high-fertility society, which also is also the prime case of
the Social Democratic welfare regime and the Dual-Earner policy con-
figuration type with extensive policy support to families to achieve
a work–life balance (Oláh and Bernhardt, 2008). Thereafter, we turn
to two Conservative Welfare-Regime-type/General Family Support pol-
icy configuration countries; one with high fertility, France (Toulemon
et al., 2008), and another, Germany, with low fertility (Dorbritz, 2008).
Female labour force participation rates in these countries for 15–64-
year-olds have not differed greatly since the 1970s, although French
women were somewhat more likely to be in paid work throughout
the period as policies in Germany were less supportive of the recon-
ciliation of work and family life than in France (Köppen, 2006). Also,
there have been noticeable differences between East and West Germany
with respect to women’s employment patterns and the institutional
contexts, most importantly public childcare provision facilitating the
combination of paid work and childrearing in the Eastern part of the
country (Kreyenfeld, 2004). In recent years, higher employment rates

were seen for German women than for their counterparts in France.
Yet, when looking at full-time equivalent employment rates as well
as maternal employment we get a different picture, given low female
work hours and low labour market activity rates among women with
children in Germany (Salles, 2012). Finally, we study two Post-Socialist
welfare regime/Transition Post-Socialist policy configuration type soci-
eties, Poland and Hungary, with very low fertility and much reduced
female employment rates as compared with the state-socialist period
(Aassve et al., 2006; Kotowska et al., 2008; Spéder and Kamarás, 2008).
Current fertility regimes may, however, be the results of relatively
recent developments in several of the countries we have studied. Indeed,
looking at the trends over a longer period from the 1960s onwards,
we notice variations between past and current fertility regimes (see
Figure 1.1). France and Poland have had the highest fertility levels
among our group of countries up until the mid-/later 1980s. Fertil-
ity rates in France were among the highest in Northern and Western
Europe, and the Polish rates were among the highest in Southern and
Central Eastern Europe. During this period, Sweden displayed nearly
3.0
2.8
2.6
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
19 0
19 2
19 4
19 6
19 8
19 0
19 2
19 4
19 6
19 8
19 0
19 2
19 4
19 6
1988
19 0
19 2
19 4
19 6
20 8
20 0
2002
20 4
20 6
20 8
10
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
0
0
0
0
19
Sweden France Germany Poland Hungary
Figure 1.1 Total fertility rates in five European countries, 1960–2010

Source: Eurostat (2012a) (years 2000–10); INED (2012) (years 1960–99).
the lowest fertility rates among the five societies, which changed rad-
ically by the late 1980s when Swedish fertility skyrocketed (linked to
the so-called speed-premium that promoted a much closer spacing of
children). Although this has been followed by a rapid decline in fertility
in the late 1990s, Sweden has had the second-highest fertility level in
our group of countries since then. Hence, Swedish society experienced
a change from a previous low-fertility regime to a high-fertility regime
in the past three decades. For Poland we have seen a different change,
from a high-fertility regime up until the late 1980s to a very-low-fertility
regime since the mid-1990s. In contrast, France can be considered a
high-fertility country throughout the period, even though some of the
other countries showed higher fertility rates at some points in time.
Germany has never showed especially high fertility levels, and had the
lowest fertility rates among the five countries over the 1970s, 1980s and
up until the late 1990s, when Hungary and Poland became very-low-
fertility regime countries. Hungary has had the lowest fertility in Europe
also in the mid-1960s, but thereafter generous reconciliation policies
ensured reasonably high fertility rates until the early 1990s, when fer-
tility declined rapidly to very low levels and where they have remained
for more than a decade.
In our two high-fertility regime countries, Sweden and France, women
in the main childbearing and childrearing ages also have especially
high family size ideals, around 2.6 children per woman or more (see
Figure 1.2). Childbearing ideals in the three low-fertility societies vary at
or slightly above the replacement level of 2.05 children per woman, with
Germany displaying the lowest level. Period fertility rates and tempo-
adjusted fertility rates are much below the ideal family sizes in all five
countries. However, while the latter rates vary around the replacement
level in the high-fertility societies, even the tempo-adjusted rates are
at or only slightly above the critical level of low fertility in Germany,
Hungary and Poland. Their much lower family size ideals compared
with those in France and Sweden may even be considered as providing
some support to the low-fertility trap hypothesis, and their fertility rates,
even the adjusted rates, indicating reasons for concern about future
fertility and sustainable development in these societies.
In addition to childbearing trends, women’s labour market activity
is of special importance for our topic of interest. In Figure 1.3, we
focus on women in the main childrearing ages (25–54 years), map-
ping cross-country differences since the mid-1970s, when such data
are available by age groups. Sweden has displayed the highest rates
throughout the period, with the next highest rates seen for France.
11
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Sweden France Germany Hungary Poland
Personal ideal family size TFR 2006 Adjusted TFR 2005–07
Figure 1.2 Ideal family size (women aged 20–49 years), total fertility rate in 2006
and adjusted total fertility rate 2005–07 in five European countries
Source: Eurobarometer 65.1 (2006) (authors’ own calculations); OECD (2006); Vienna Insti-
tute of Demography (2010).
%
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
05
07
09
75
77
79
81
83
85
87
89
91
93
95
97
99
01
03
20
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
Figure 1.3 Female labour force participation rates in five European countries,
1975–2010 (women aged 25–54 years)
Note: Data for Hungary and Poland are available from 1992 onwards.
Source: OECD (2011b) (data for France 1975–82); OECD (2012).
Although the gap between them was quite considerable in the 1970s and
1980s, it diminished greatly, especially in the past ten years, as female
employment rates increased in France. Labour market activity for this
age group of women was very modest in Germany in the 1970s and
1980s, increasing substantially at the German unification given high
employment rates for East-German women. In the first decade of the
21st century, the German female labour force participation rates for the
age group of interest approached but did not reach the rates seen for
France, notwithstanding a much lower fertility level in Germany. In the
1990s (unfortunately we do not have comparable data for these coun-
tries before then), women’s labour market activity declined greatly in
the former state-socialist countries, but more modestly in Poland than
in Hungary. These countries had the lowest labour force participation of
women in the main childrearing ages among the countries studied here,
accompanied by very low fertility in the past 15 years. All in all, this
brief overview suggests that high levels of female labour force participa-
tion are not an impediment to childbearing, while low activity rates of
women are hardly accompanied by high fertility, rather the opposite, as
discussed earlier in this chapter.
However, women’s labour force participation per se may not pro-
vide sufficient information for possible implications on fertility, but if
combined with work-time patterns obstacles or difficulties to achieve
work–life balance can be revealed. As indicated by Figure 1.4, the over-
whelming majority of women work full-time or even overtime in the
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Sweden
France
Germany
Poland
Hungary
<20 h/w 20–34 h/w 35–39 h/w 40–44 h/w 45+ h/w
Figure 1.4 Women’s usual work hours a week (h/w) in five European countries
in 2007
Source: OECD (2009).
very-low-fertility regime societies where female activity rates have been

quite modest in the past decade, so reconciling childrearing and paid
work may indeed be a challenge there. In contrast in Germany, despite
reasonably high female employment rates about one-fifth of women
have marginal labour force attachment, working less than 20 hours a
week, and nearly half of women work at most short part-time. This
is also likely to indicate difficulties to combine motherhood and paid
work, thus suppressing fertility, as seen in the low level of childbear-
ing in Germany. Our high-fertility societies on the other hand display
a small share of women with marginal labour force attachment (less
than 8 per cent) while at least 60 per cent work long part-time or more,
without this pattern having any negative implications for fertility. This,
again, confirms our earlier discussion.
In line with these patterns, we see in Figure 1.5 that among women
aged 25–49 years part-time employment is extremely rare in Poland
and Hungary, but is very common in Germany, with all three coun-
tries displaying fertility rates below the critical level. In contrast, in
the high-fertility regime societies of Sweden and France we find 30–40
per cent of women in this age group working part-time. Hence, both
rigid labour market structures with almost none other but full-time
%
50
40
30
20
10
0
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Figure 1.5 Part-time employment (% of total employment) in five European

countries, 1997–2010 (women aged 25–49 years)
Source: Eurostat (2012b).
%
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Mothers of a <3-year-old child Mothers of a 3–5-year-old child

All women 25–49 years
Figure 1.6 Maternal and female employment rates in five European countries in
2007
Source: OECD (2010a); Eurostat (2011).
positions and a large share of women having weak labour market attach-
ment may be equally suppressive for fertility levels in a country, while
flexible structures and the majority having reasonably strong labour
force attachment seem to facilitate work–life balance, enhancing the
possibilities of childbearing.
Moreover, we find strong cross-country variations in maternal
employment rates displayed by the age of the youngest child (see
Figure 1.6). Among mothers with very young children, Swedish women
have the highest activity levels, which can be at least partly explained
by extensive provision of high-quality public childcare even for chil-
dren below age three. The German rates are not much lower than the
French, and even Polish mothers with small children have an employ-
ment rate of around 50 per cent. In contrast, in Hungary only a small
fraction of mothers with very young children return to the labour
market given rather generous childcare leave policies (ensuring long,
paid leaves) there. For the two high-fertility regime countries, Sweden
and France, there is little difference between the employment rates of
mothers with children aged three and above and of women in the
main childbearing and childrearing ages (25–49 years), unlike in the
%
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
ISSP 1994 ISSP 2002 EVS 2008
Figure 1.7 Attitudes towards working mothers in five European countries.

Proportion who disagree/strongly disagree with the statement ‘A pre-school child
is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’ (age 18–65 years)
Note: France was not included in ISSP (1994).
Source: ISSP (1994, 2002); EVS (2008) (authors’ own calculations).
three low-fertility countries, where the presence of a preschooler reduces

women’s labour force engagement noticeably. This indicates obstacles in
the institutional context and/or limited normative support for mothers
to reconcile paid work and childrearing in the latter group of countries.
As indicated by Figure 1.7, maternal employment has become more
and more accepted (or less and less questioned) across Europe over the
past decades. Among the countries studied here, it is viewed most pos-
itively by women and men in Sweden and by French women, while
Polish as well as Hungarian women and men, and men in Germany
remain the most sceptical. Women in Germany have similar attitudes as
men in France in this question. This cross-country pattern observed here
provides indications with respect to the concept of incoherence in the
country chapters, which has turned out to be highly relevant for four
out of the five countries studied. The exception is Sweden, with appar-
ent limited levels of incoherence, as the high acceptance of mothers
working suggests.
Next, we look briefly at two aspects related to economic uncer-
tainty, our other main concept, namely unemployment and temporary
employment, among women in the main childbearing and childrearing
ages (25–49 years). As seen in Figure 1.8, for the past 15 years unem-
ployment reached relatively high levels for this age group in Poland,
%
25
20
15
10
0
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Figure 1.8 Unemployment rates in five European countries, 1997–2010 (women

aged 25–49 years)
Source: Eurostat (2012c).
%
30
25
20
15
10
0
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Figure 1.9 Temporary employment (% of total number of employees) in five

European countries, 1997–2010 (women aged 25–49 years)
Source: Eurostat (2012d).
and has been less negligible even in France, except for the last few years.
Also, temporary employment (see Figure 1.9) was less of an exception in
France, and in Sweden in the late 1990s. From being nearly non-existent
in Poland, it increased strongly over the 2000s, surpassing the French
and Swedish levels, and plateaued at the level of 25 per cent over the
past three to four years. The trends are increasing also in Germany and
Hungary, but much more slowly. All in all, there are clear indications of
economic uncertainty in the countries studied here, even at ages well
beyond the (early) years of labour market establishment, enhancing the
importance of a deeper insight into the employment, fertility choice
and public policy nexus.
The policy settings are discussed in detail in each country chapter, so
we address here only two measures essential to ensure work–life balance
for families with children. These are the maternity/paternity/parental
leave programmes and public childcare services. There are large vari-
ations across the five countries we study, even in these aspects. For
the sake of comparability notwithstanding differences in duration and
replacements levels, as well as eligibility to leave in order to care for
a child, we refer here to a full-rate equivalent of paid leaves, for the
year 2006 (see Moss and Korintus, 2008; OECD, 2010b). We find the
longest maternity leave for Poland (18 weeks), somewhat shorter leave
for Hungary and France (16 weeks), followed by Germany (14 weeks)
and finally Sweden with only about half as long maternity leave as for
Poland (9.6 weeks). The order changes for the paternity leave as Sweden
offers the longest leave (9.3 weeks) there, Polish leave is half as long as
the Swedish leave (four weeks), France (two weeks) and Hungary (one
week) even less, and Germany none. As for parental leave, Hungary pro-
vides the longest leave (about 73 weeks), followed by Sweden (about
53 weeks), Germany (nearly 35 weeks), France (31 weeks) and finally
Poland (16 weeks). Taking all three leaves offered to parents together,
Hungary ranks first (89.6 weeks), followed by Sweden (62.4 weeks),
Germany (48.8 weeks), France (47.1 weeks) and finally Poland (34.1
weeks). Hence, the very-low-fertility regime countries are placed at the
two ends of this scale with the most and the least generous leave
programmes. Sweden is the next generous, while we find little differ-
ence between France and Germany despite them representing different
fertility regimes.
As for public childcare enrolment rates, clear targets have been formu-
lated for Member States at the Barcelona summit in 2002 to be achieved
by 2010 (European Council, 2002). Accordingly, public childcare should
be provided for 33 per cent of children below three years of age
and 90 per cent of children between age three and the mandatory
school age. In order to get a comparable picture, we rely on informa-
tion about childcare attendance presented as the full-time equivalent
enrolment rates with respect to the proportion of children receiving
formal childcare for at least 30 hours a week (OECD, 2011c). Only our
high-fertility regime countries, Sweden and France, have achieved the
targets for the youngest children (with 44 and 43 per cent enrolment
rates respectively), while enrolment rates remained modest in the three
low-fertility societies, Germany, Hungary and Poland (10 per cent in
each). For children aged three and above, that is the preschoolers, we
find 100 per cent enrolment rate for France as this is already part
of the school curriculum, Germany displays 89.3 per cent enrolment
rate, Hungary 86.8 per cent, Sweden 85.6 per cent, while Poland has a
very low enrolment rate, even for this age group of children, of 40.7
per cent. Hence, in line with the literature (for an overview see OECD,
2011a) also for our group of countries we see that fertility levels are
most strongly influenced by childcare availability for children below
age three, while leave programmes to care for children as well as public
childcare enrolment of preschoolers have rather limited impact.
Before turning to specific details of the chapters, it is important to
highlight their linkages which make this volume a consistent and coher-
ent research product. In the book, case studies of this carefully selected
group of countries are joined via a comparative framework based on
the key concepts, especially on uncertainty and risks, with more sub-
tle links to incoherence. Our research team has sought to identify and
provide a better understanding of the multiple tensions between work
life, family life and welfare systems/policy configurations, to facilitate
the efforts of policymakers on developing strategies to manage and
resolve them. All chapters address the tensions between fertility choices
(intentions/desires), female labour force participation and work–life bal-
ance policies, while also focusing on specific problems that are most
prominent for the country concerned, a clear advantage of this research
design. The structures of the chapters are harmonised beyond the main
research questions in terms of the aspects studied at each national con-
text, the analytical design including the methods used as well as the
variables included in the models, and the ways the findings are discussed
with respect to the tensions. There is a dialogue between the chapters;
they ‘speak’ to each other. Four of the country chapters focus on child-
bearing intentions based on quantitative analyses of recent survey data
from the early 2000s. In addition, the chapter on Hungary provides fur-
ther insights addressing fertility desires by relying on a rich qualitative
data set of 100 working parents (fathers and mothers) with young chil-
dren. In the first three country chapters, data extracted from nationally
representative surveys are analysed, while the chapters on Poland and
Hungary rely on data material collected in large cities. Our research
design enables us to identify the more general processes that shape

the relationship between childbearing choices, women’s employment
and work–life balance policies beyond the national contexts analysed,
and highlights cross-country variations in addition to matters specific
for a country, allowing for a modest contribution to the conceptual
development of further research on this complex relationship.
4. Structure of the book
Below we present the main research questions along with the spe-
cific theoretical frameworks, data and methods applied in the different
chapters.
Fahlén and Oláh in Chapter 2 examine the interrelation between
institutional context, employment situation and childbearing inten-
tions among young women in Sweden, a country with extensive policy
support for women and men combining work and family responsibili-
ties and widespread egalitarian gender norms; hence, this chapter does
not address the issue of incoherence. Relying on a multilayered the-
oretical framework based on the Capability Approach, developed by
Amartya Sen (1992, 1993), the authors focus on both general and short-
term childbearing intentions, the former without any time limitation
and the latter defined as intending to have a first or additional child
within the next five years, considering birth intentions as indicators of
a person’s capability to have and care for children. Fahlén and Oláh
argue that childbearing-related capabilities derive from multiple dimen-
sions, more specifically individual resources, work-related factors and
institutional factors, the latter including work–life balance policies and
services. These factors together influence people’s sense of risk and secu-
rity, which in turn shapes their childbearing plans. The chapter explores
to what extent women’s labour force attachment and working hours
impact on their childbearing intentions in contemporary Sweden, also
controlling for the partner’s employment status and/or work hours in
some of the models. The data analysed are extracted from the Swedish
panel survey Family and Working Life among Young Adults in the 21st Cen-
tury (YAPS), based on a nationally representative sample of women and
men born in Sweden in 1968, 1972, 1976 and 1980, conducted in 1999
and 2003. Logistic regression is the tool of analysis.
In Chapter 3, Pailhé and Solaz study the parity-specific impact of
employment uncertainty on women’s and men’s short-term childbear-
ing intentions, that is to have a first, second or third child within three
years in France, a country with strong social norms regarding fertility
and a rather generous welfare state. The aim is to gain a deeper insight
into how economic factors influence people’s childbearing decisions.
The issues addressed are whether comprehensive family and employ-
ment policies in France constitute a framework of stability that dimin-
ishes the negative impacts of economic uncertainty on fertility choices,
and whether the pro-natalist social norms can counterbalance economic
constraints. The authors examine, for women and men respectively,
whether and how individual level unemployment and having a non-
permanent job themselves and/or for their partner affect the intention
to have a(nother) child in the next three years. The impact of eco-
nomic uncertainty is addressed taking neoclassical economic reasoning
of opportunity cost versus income effect as the point of departure, also
relating to the concept of incoherence. Logistic regression is the tool
of analysis. Separate models are estimated by the number of children
one already has. The empirical analysis is based on data extracted from
the Familles et employeurs survey (Families and Employers Survey) con-
ducted by the French National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED)
and the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) on a represen-
tative sample of the French population between November 2004 and
March 2005.
In Chapter 4, Lutz, Boehnke, Huinink and Tophoven explore the
tensions between female employment and fertility intentions and their
links to work–life balance policies in Germany, a country with a pol-
icy setting that promotes traditional family arrangements such as the
male-breadwinner model. The authors focus on women’s intentions to
have a first or additional child within two years, arguing that such short-
term fertility intentions are particularly suitable to observe first tensions
regarding economic insecurity and problems of incoherence (prospec-
tive) parents perceive. The authors examine East and West Germany
separately as the female occupational behaviour and attitudes towards
mothers’ engagement in paid work and care differ considerably between
these regions. The chapter relies on a theoretical framework consisting
of the Theory of Social Production Function complemented by the Life
Course Approach and the New Home Economics Theory. Lutz and oth-
ers argue that procreation and becoming a parent is one of the goals
embedded in individual well-being, but the ability to pursue this goal
depends on individual resources. The empirical analysis is based on data
extracted from the first wave of the German Family Panel (Pairfam), con-
ducted in 2008–09. This is a nationwide representative survey designed
as a cohort study for three cohorts who were at very different stages of
their family and labour market careers at the time of the data collection.
Logistic regression is the tool of analysis. The effect of the male partner’s
employment status is controlled for in some of the models.
Fratczak
˛ and Ptak-Chmielewska in Chapter 5 argue that social capi-
tal, lifestyle preferences and gender equality in the family and society
are likely to be important for fertility-related decision-making and
behaviour in societies facing economic uncertainty along with a trans-
formation of values and norms, like Poland, a Transition Post-Socialist
country. The authors focus on fertility intentions in general, without
time limitations, relying on a theoretical framework consisting of the
Preference Theory, Gender Equity Theory and Social Capital Theory. The
empirical analysis is based on data extracted from the Late Fertility Diag-
nosis Survey, conducted in 2007 on a representative sample of women
aged 19, 23, 27 and 31 years in two large cities in Poland. Descriptive
and logistic regression methods are used as analytical tools. Fratczak
˛ and
Ptak-Chmielewska argue that changes in fertility and female employ-
ment can be linked to cultural factors such as lifestyle preferences
and values. With regard to gender equity, there are no formal barri-
ers against women acquiring higher education and participating in the
labour market to the same extent as men in Poland, but the division
of household labour is still highly gendered, indicating incoherence in
the levels of gender equity in the family and in the public sphere. The
authors emphasise that during the transition period, the costs of hav-
ing children increased significantly due to reductions in state transfer
payments and social benefits, and due to greatly increased labour mar-
ket uncertainties. In such a context, social networks (family members,
relatives, friends, neighbours and colleagues) can help to reduce inse-
curity and influence childbearing intentions in a positive way. Fratczak˛
and Ptak-Chmielewska argue that the three theories together promote
a better understanding of the processes shaping childbearing intentions
in contemporary Poland than the economic approach.
In Chapter 6, Takács addresses the issue of weak capabilities for hav-
ing and caring for children in Hungary as reflected by the views of
100 working parents in Budapest on their fertility-related desires. The
analysis is based on the Hungarian part of the Tensions between Rising
Expectations of Parenthood and Capabilities to Achieve a Work Family Bal-
ance survey, conducted in Budapest in 2008. In the chapter, desired and
realised fertility as well as perceived obstacles are interpreted in a frame-
work based on the Capability Approach. Capabilities are understood as
the freedom to achieve valued functionings, that is the parents’ notions
on the real opportunities they have to be a working parent with as many
children as they would like to have. Takács argues that fertility desires
reflect people’s assessment of their personal, interpersonal and social

conditions, as well as internalised norms, and that desired fertility is
influenced by how people see their freedom to achieve various lifestyles
in their specific social settings, where work–family policies can act as
capability expansions or limitations. She emphasises that capabilities are
especially important to address in relation to childbearing decisions in
the context of economic uncertainties and risks. The chapter highlights
the multiple ways in which Hungarian parents’ fertility-related capabil-
ities are constrained, which can be detected in their achieved fertility as
well as the level of their desired family size.
Finally, in Chapter 7 Oláh and Fahlén summarise and synthesise the
findings of the five country studies, illuminating more general processes
linked to uncertainty and risk and to incoherence, and the ways these
shape the tensions between childbearing choices, women’s paid work
and work–life balance policies in contemporary Europe. The insights
highlighted are this volume’s contribution to a conceptual development
of research on the relationship of the fertility, paid work and public
policy nexus, and to the knowledge base of policymaking aiming to
promote sustainable societal development.
Acknowledgement
Financial support for Livia Sz. Oláh via the Swedish Research Council
grant to the Linnaeus Center on Social Policy and Family Dynamics in
Europe, SPaDE (grant number 349–2007–8701) is gratefully acknowl-
edged. The authors are grateful to Barbara Hobson for invaluable
suggestions regarding the chapter.
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2
Work and Childbearing Intentions
from a Capability Perspective:
Young Adult Women in Sweden
Susanne Fahlén and Livia Sz. Oláh
1. Introduction
Since the late 1960s, female labour force participation increased

substantially nearly everywhere in Europe. For women aged 20–44 years,
the participation rate increased from an average of 50 per cent in 1970
to nearly 80 per cent in 2000, large cross-country differences notwith-
standing (Ferrarini, 2006). High or increasing female employment rates
have been seen, in turn, as the main reason for low fertility (Becker,
1991), based on the incompatibility of motherhood, that is childrearing
and paid work, in industrialised societies (Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000).
Indeed, the aggregate-level relationship between women’s labour force
participation and fertility was negative until the mid- or late 1980s,
although the causality is unclear (Bernhardt, 1993; Engelhardt et al.,
2004). Then the relationship turned into a positive one (Castles, 2003;
see also Hobson and Oláh, 2006a, 2006b for an overview of relevant
studies).
The link between employment and childbearing at the individual
level has also been seen as being of special importance for fertility
trends. For example, most factors identified by Hobcraft and Kiernan
(1995) as preconditions for parenthood in Europe, beyond having a
partner, relate at least indirectly to labour force participation, such as
having completed education; to have secure employment, sufficient
income and suitable housing; and to have a sense of a secure future.
If the future is perceived as uncertain given an unstable labour market
situation, especially unemployment and a high prevalence of tempo-
rary jobs, people will seek to reduce uncertainty through investing in
28
Susanne Fahlén & Livia Sz. Oláh 29
further education and extended labour market experiences, instead of

having a(nother) child, as pointed out by McDonald (2002). Delayed
childbearing, in turn, is likely to result in smaller family sizes as well as
an increasing prevalence of childlessness (Morgan, 2003).
Indeed, total fertility rates (TFRs) are well below the replacement level
of 2.1 children per woman in most European countries and elsewhere
in the developed world, paralleled with the consistently high preva-
lence of ideal family size of two children on average (Testa, 2006).1 This
indicates a substantial gap between ideal family size and achieved fer-
tility, which may be related to constraints regarding individuals’ (and
couples’) capabilities to have as many children as preferred under the
current circumstances, given rather low proportions in the prime child-
bearing ages expressing a preference for no or one child (see also Fahey
and Spéder, 2004). Studying childbearing intentions can provide us with
a better understanding of this gap, as intentions are likely to influence
childbearing behaviour (Thomson, 1997; Schoen et al., 1999). Unlike
preferences that mainly capture social norms and ideals, intentions
incorporate individuals’ life situations as a whole. Hence, in this chapter
we focus on childbearing intentions as they reflect women’s ability, or
lack of ability, to be both earners and carers in contemporary Sweden,
where such role combination has been the agreed upon norm for sev-
eral decades, contraceptives are widely used (Oláh and Bernhardt, 2008),
and one-child families and childlessness are seen as appealing alterna-
tives by only a small proportion of young adults (Testa, 2006; Engwall
and Peterson, 2010). Yet, nearly 15 per cent of women have no offspring
and about the same proportion have only one at the end of their repro-
ductive career, projected to remain so even for those born in the 1960s
and 1970s (SCB, 2009), which may indicate constraints with respect to
capabilities to start and/or extend a family.
In the context of substantial labour market uncertainties and the risk
of economic hardship at least in the early stages of an employment
career, characteristic of most countries in Europe including Sweden, we
aim to shed more light on the relationship between work situations and
fertility intentions, relying on the Capability Approach, developed by
Amartya Sen (1992, 1993), which addresses people’s real freedom to
choose to live the life they value and differences between individuals
regarding their capabilities to convert resources into valuable activities.
We argue that having children is considered a value even in mod-
ern societies (Nauck, 2007) but that people’s preferences about their
ideal family size may not entirely translate into childbearing inten-
tions and, hence, into actual childbearing. Intention is regarded as an
30 Capability Perspective – Young Adult Women: Sweden
intermediate factor between preferences and behaviour that captures a

range of possibilities and constraints related to institutional context,
individual resources and work-related factors (labour market attachment
and work hours). The Capability Approach provides a multilayered lens
to study the interplay between family-building intentions and individ-
ual and institutional resources. Based on that, we seek to illuminate
in the Swedish context: (i) the relationship, if any, between women’s
childbearing intentions and labour force attachment, also taking into
account possible differences by the number of children one already has
(that is by parity); and (ii) the possible association between women’s
childbearing intentions and their work hours, and its parity-specific
pattern, if any.
2. Theoretical considerations
In the literature on childbearing decisions, the concepts of intentions,

desires and preferences are sometimes used interchangeably (see e.g.
Bracher and Santow, 1991; Tazi-Preve et al., 2004), but most often there
is a clear distinction, especially between intentions (plans) and prefer-
ences (desires) (Thomson, 1997; Hagewen and Morgan, 2005; Philipov
et al., 2006).2 Preferences and/or desires are usually operationalised
based on questions concerning ideal family size and number of children
one would like to have, while intentions and/or plans are defined based on
questions on whether a person intends, plans or expects to have a(nother)
child. According to Heiland et al. (2005), the conceptual difference
between intentions and desire is that the latter measures the preferred
family size while intentions capture a person’s more concrete childbear-
ing plans and, therefore, intention is considered a better measure of
future fertility behaviour.
Although these concepts are closely related, it is important to distin-
guish them, especially from a capability perspective as their implications
are quite different. Preferences and desires reveal what a person envi-
sions to do; they are about ideals, irrespective of whether they can be
achieved. The concept of ideal family size, in addition, reflects social
norms (Livi-Bacci, 2001; Hagewen and Morgan, 2005). Intentions, in
contrast, show the evaluation of own situation when considering the
feasibility to realise a desire in question. Childbearing intentions reflect
a person’s ranking potential family sizes and considerations of the
constraints to achieve the highest-ranked family size (Heiland et al.,
2005). This can explain possible differences between one’s childbearing
intentions and preferences, especially when socio-economic and/or

biological constraints are taken into account.
The rationale for studying childbearing intentions is their link to
actual fertility behaviour (see Schoen et al., 1999), the latter often seen as
based on rational choice, calculating costs and benefits. As argued, peo-
ple refrain from childbearing (as most probably also being less inclined
to start or extend a family) if the socio-economic costs are perceived
as higher than the socio-psychological benefits (Bulatao, 1981; Becker,
1991; Joshi, 1998). Yet, information on the projected costs and benefits
are often imperfect, whereas having a child is an irreversible, life-long
commitment. Hence, when the future seems especially uncertain due
to insecure employment prospects, people are likely instead of fam-
ily building to opt for strengthening their labour market position and
reduce the risk of economic hardship, thus postponing or perhaps even
foregoing childbearing altogether (McDonald, 2002).
Along with the rational choice framework, the theory of Reasoned
Action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and built on that, the theory of
Planned Behaviour, in short TPB (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen and Fishbein,
2005), the latter two developed in the field of social psychology, have
been increasingly utilised in demographic studies on family building
in recent decades (Philipov, 2009; also see Billari et al., 2009 for an
overview of earlier studies), addressing the role of intentions as a key
issue in the behavioural decision-making process. Indeed, these theo-
ries (and studies) have enhanced our understanding in general of the
relationship between attitudes, norms, intentions and behaviour, that
is, about the processes of how attitudes and norms about childbearing
influence the intentions to become a parent or whether to have fur-
ther children. The TPB called for attention also to perceived behavioural
control, which implies taking into account, beside resources and means
available to a person, the subjective ability to act based on perceived
obstacles or the ease of achieving a certain behaviour. As pointed out,
resources and opportunities, but also perceived constraints, shape the
ability to act and thereby individual agency (Ajzen, 1991).
However, neither the rational choice perspective nor the TPB pay
sufficient attention to the impact of the institutional context, most
importantly the particular policy setting which also affects the costs and
benefits of fertility decisions as well as people’s perceived behavioural
control. Even if having the means and resources, the institutional con-
text may constrain a person’s capabilities and, hence, her behaviour.
For example, in a number of societies with very low fertility, those not
having children are often the highly educated who are most likely to
have resources that would economically enable them to build a fam-
ily. As the proportions who desire a life without children are still very
small across Europe (Testa, 2006), this suggests an agency gap for peo-
ple desiring but not having children for other than economic reasons,
most likely due to lack of policies that would enable them to reconcile
their family and career aspirations (Hobson and Oláh, 2006b). There-
fore, we argue that the Capability Approach (see Sen, 1992, 1993, 2006)
can provide a better insight into fertility decision-making measured as
the intention to have a(nother) child or not, considering childbearing as
planned behaviour in a specific social and policy setting. Relying on this
framework enables us to address the linkage between the individual level
and the institutional context, of what people aspire to be or do in terms
of what they value in life (that is functionings, valuable achievements)3
and their possibilities for actualising them (that is capabilities), the lat-
ter shaping their freedom to make genuine choices for their well-being
(Robeyns, 2003, 2005; Anand et al., 2005, 2009; Hobson, 2011).
As pointed out, people still seem to consider having children as a
valuable functioning. We suggest that their capabilities to achieve this
functioning are reflected in their fertility intentions, that is we con-
sider childbearing intentions as indicators of a person’s capabilities with
respect to family building, also taking into account that intentional
childlessness as well as one-child family size were shown to appeal to a
very limited proportion of people of childbearing ages in Sweden (Testa,
2006; Engwall and Peterson, 2010). As paid work along with parenting
is the norm in contemporary Sweden (and increasingly so in a num-
ber of European societies), it is important to address the tensions, if
any, between employment situations and childbearing decisions, and
their interplay with work–life balance policies. Based on the Capabil-
ity Approach, we argue that a person’s capabilities derive from who she
is and what means she has, and to what extent she is able to make
use of the means, resources and opportunities to eventually achieve a
valued functioning, such as starting or extending a family. In our anal-
ysis, we consider individual factors (especially educational attainment
and other resources), institutional factors (most importantly work–life
balance policies and services) and work-related factors (such as labour
market attachment and work hours) constituting a person’s capability
set, which in turn influences her sense of risk and security, based on
which childbearing intentions are formed and, in a longer run, birth will
be realised or postponed (perhaps foregone). Relying on this theoretical
model (see Figure 2.1), we will study differences in women’s capabilities
Individual factors: Institutional factors:

Characteristics Legislation, rights
and resources and regulations
Work related factors:

Labour force attachment
Allocation of work hours
Sense of risks
and security
CHILDBEARING
INTENTIONS
Realised fertility
Figure 2.1 Theoretical model: capability set and childbearing intentions
to have and care for children in contemporary Sweden, as reflected in

their childbearing intentions, with respect to the tensions they face if
they try to combine their family and labour market aspirations.
3. The Swedish context
3.1 Gender equality, labour force participation

and fertility trends
A basic principle of the Swedish welfare state, seen as representative of
the Dual-Earner policy configuration type (Korpi, 2000; Hobson and
Oláh, 2006b), is gender equality. Given extensive policy support for
women and men combining work and family responsibilities from the
1970s onwards, Sweden is widely considered as highly women- and
family-friendly (Montanari, 2003; Hoem, 2005). At the same time, egal-
itarian gender role attitudes regarding work and care are widespread
in the society (Hobson and Fahlén, 2009). As data from the European
Social Survey in 2004–05 showed, about 95 per cent of respondents,
independently of gender, agreed on women’s and men’s equal respon-
sibility for the home and children in Sweden compared with 75–85
per cent in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, whereas less than
15 per cent of Swedish men and women think that a woman should
reduce her working hours for the sake of the children compared with
more than 40 per cent in Germany, the UK, Spain, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland (Hobson and Fahlén, 2011).4 However, the division
of domestic tasks in practice does not entirely coincide with the high
share of gender egalitarian ideals of Swedish society. Although the gap
between men’s and women’s share of housework diminished in the last
decade of the 20th century, time-use studies reveal that this can be
attributed to women having reduced their time spent on housework
rather than men substantially increasing their involvement, which is
still about half of the time women spend on housework5 (SCB, 2003),
and that childless couples share housework more equally compared with
parents (Ahrne and Roman, 1997; Anxo et al., 2007).
Yet, in the public sphere, a high level of gender equality characterises
Swedish society also in practice. The proportion of tertiary educated has
greatly increased among women, from 6.8 per cent in the 20–24-year
age group in 1985 to 29 per cent in 2009, whereas for men the corre-
sponding proportions were 10.8 per cent and 20.1 per cent respectively.
In the age group 25–49 years, a higher share of women than men had
higher education in 1985, and the gender gap has increased from 2.2
percentage points then to 10 percentage points in 2009 (SCB, 2010a).
To some extent, women’s higher human capital investment is moti-
vated by a rather gender-segregated labour market in which a woman’s
employability increases more if highly educated compared with having
only secondary schooling, than is the case for men (Oliveira Martins
et al., 2007).
The level of female labour force participation in Sweden has been
among the highest in Europe6 since the late 1970s (OECD, 2011),
approaching that of men by the last two decades with about 70 per cent
of women in employment, well above the EU average of below
60 per cent even in 2009, and a gender gap of around 5 percentage
points for the 15–64-year age group. Below age 25, employment rates
have varied around 40 per cent for both sexes in Sweden, some-
what above the EU average, especially for women (Eurostat, 2011).7
Labour force participation has been very common also among moth-
ers in Sweden. 76.5 per cent of mothers with a child aged one to
two years, and 81.7 per cent of those with a child aged three to six
years were in paid work in 2009, compared with around 90 per cent
of fathers (SCB, 2010b). The high levels of maternal employment have
been paralleled by a high prevalence of part-time employment, above
the EU average, both at young ages and for all working ages (that is
15–64 years). Even among men, a larger proportion works part-time
in Sweden than in the EU in general. In the past decade in Sweden,
about 40 per cent of women and somewhat more than 10 per cent of
men of working age have been employed part-time. For those below age
25, the proportions varied at 55–60 per cent among women and 27–35
per cent among men in this period (Eurostat, 2011). However, part-
time employment in Sweden, unlike in several European countries does
not necessarily mean a marginalised labour market position, often not
covered by social benefit systems (Fagan, 2004). Distinguishing by cate-
gories of working less than 17 hours a week, 17–29 hours (that is short
or medium part-time), 30–37 hours (that is long part-time), 38–40 hours
(that is full-time) and 41+ hours, we find a diverse picture of labour
market attachment of people in the main childbearing and childrearing
ages in Sweden (see Figure 2.2).
As we can see, long full-time work (41+ h/w) is more frequent among
men, especially in ages 25–49 years where nearly 50 per cent work more
than full-time. Very short part-time work (less than 17 hours) charac-
terises mainly the younger age group, and women more so than men,
while long part-time work (30–37 h/w) is most frequent among women
aged 25–49 years in Sweden. Working very short part-time means limi-
ted income and career prospects, as well as the risk of losing social rights
linked to employment, such as unemployment and sickness benefits,
and pension (Montanari, 2009). In Sweden, the eligibility conditions
to unemployment benefit include an at least one-year-long member-
ship to an unemployment insurance fund (A-kassa) and having been
employed for 480 or more hours for at least six continuous months
(Arbetsförmedlingen, 2011), which equals at least 17 hours of work a
week (OECD, 2007).
Women 25–49
years
Women 20–24
years
Men 25–49
years
Men 20–24
years
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
<17 h/week 17–29 h/week 30–37 h/week

38–40 h/week 41+ h/week
Figure 2.2 Actual weekly work hours for women and men aged 20–24 years and
25–49 years, Sweden
Source: European Social Survey (2004), own calculations.
In addition to short part-time work, temporary employment is much

more common at young ages. In Sweden in the past 15 years, the pro-
portions with fixed-term work contracts increased from about 30 to
50 per cent among young men and from around 50 to 65 per cent
among young women, compared with an increase from about 33 to
42 per cent for both sexes in the EU (Eurostat, 2011). For the same
period, unemployment rates at working ages in Sweden have been close
to or below the EU average for both sexes, with especially low rates in
the first years of the 2000s, but below 10 per cent even at the end of the
decade. For ages below 25 years, however, the Swedish rates exceeded
the EU average from 2004 onwards, and have reached nearly 27 per cent
among men and 24 per cent among women by 2009 compared with
about 20 per cent in the EU in general.
Hence, young women and men in contemporary Sweden seem to face
rather high labour market uncertainties, both in terms of high unem-
ployment rates and of a very high prevalence of temporary employment.
In addition, although the permanently employed have quite strong legal
protection in Sweden even from a European perspective, this is not the
case for those with fixed-term contracts. In fact, the protection for the
temporarily employed has decreased rapidly since the 1990s (from index
score 4.08 to 0.88), while the protection for the permanently employed
has remained about the same (index score 2.9) (OECD, 2010).8 Thus,
the labour market has become more flexible, but less secure for those
holding fixed-term positions, which indicates constraints with respect
to their capabilities for family building.
Alongside high female employment rates, fertility remained rela-
tively high in Sweden compared with other European countries, that
is around two children on average for cohorts born before the 1970s,
notwithstanding large fluctuations of the period TFR from the mid-
1960s onwards, reaching 2.13 children per woman in 1990, but only
1.51 at the end of the decade, and rising again thereafter to 1.94 in 2009
(SCB, 2010c). As pointed out, these fluctuations seem to correlate with
the business cycles (Andersson, 2000). The economic crisis in the mid-
1990s made it quite difficult, especially for young people, to establish
themselves in the labour market, changing the premises of childbear-
ing and reducing period fertility rates for several years. The mean age
at first childbearing also increased during the past decades, from 24 to
29.9 years for women and from 26.7 to 31.4 years for men in 1970 and
2009 respectively (SCB, 2010d). The level and the age patterns of fertil-
ity and their link to business cycles, in turn, are likely to be connected
to Swedish family policy measures (Hoem and Hoem, 1996; Oláh and
Bernhardt, 2008).
3.2 Policy measures promoting work–life balance

A programme of major importance that enables (prospective) parents
in Sweden to combine work and family responsibilities is the parental
leave scheme. Since 1962, mothers were entitled to a paid leave for six
months at the birth of a child. In 1974 the leave became gender neutral;
mothers and fathers could share six months to care for their children
at home while receiving a generous benefit at the level of 90 per cent
of their previous wage, and thereafter return to their previous job or its
equivalent. The length of the leave has been extended gradually over
time, to 9 months in 1978, to 12 months in 1980, to 15 months in 1989
and to 16 months in 2002 (Duvander, 2008; Oláh and Bernhardt, 2008).
Currently, of the total 480 leave days, 390 days are covered with a bene-
fit equalling 80 per cent of previous earnings9 and with a ceiling of 910
SEK per day (around 100 euros).10 The parental leave scheme enables
all working parents or legal custodians to take time off from work to
care for their children at home. State employees receive 90 per cent of
their previous earnings, and many large private companies top up their
employees’ leave benefit to similar levels (Hobson et al., 2006). In addi-
tion to the income-related leave days, parents are entitled to 90 days
with minimum-level benefit, which is 180 SEK per day for children born
on 1 July 2006 or later.
To be eligible for the income-related benefit, one must have worked
a minimum of eight months prior to the birth of a child or receive
a basic-level benefit, a flat-rate payment of 180 SEK (about 20 euros)
per day (Försäkringskassan, 2008).11 The leave benefit is based on the
SGI (Sjukpenninggrundande inkomst, that is sickness benefit-qualifying
annual income), calculated on the basis of a person’s annual income
(Försäkringskassan, 2011). In general, the SGI expires if a person stops
working, except for education and unemployment when one can keep
her/his former SGI under certain conditions. Thus, if a previously
employed person (re-)enters university and receives study grants, or con-
ducts studies within his/her field of work, he/she is entitled to keep
the SGI, and the parental leave benefit will be based on the previous
work income. Full-time parental benefit will only be paid though if
she/he takes a break from studies. Students without previous employ-
ment receive a flat-rate benefit. Unemployed individuals, previously in
paid work, who are registered at the Swedish Public Employment Service
as a jobseeker or attend a so-called labour market programme receiving

an activity grant, are also entitled to the income-related parental benefit.
Nowadays, the Swedish parental leave programme provides nearly the
longest paid leave to parents with young children in Europe, weighted
by the level of payment (Plantenga and Remery, 2005). Moreover, the
programme promotes closer birth intervals. Since 1980, a parent, with-
out returning to work between births, has been entitled to the same
level of parental benefit for a child as for the previous one if the inter-
val between the two births does not exceed 24 months, or 30 months
since 1986 (Hoem, 1993). This ‘speed-premium’ has contributed to the
Swedish baby boom of the late 1980s to early 1990s, and has influenced
the timing of childbearing in Sweden ever since (Andersson et al., 2006).
The principle of gender equality has been influential for both
the introduction and the further development of the parental leave
programme, strengthening fathers’ roles as care-providers over time.
In 1980, ten ‘daddy days’ with income-related benefit were added to
the parental leave scheme. In 1995, a father’s quota was introduced,
with one month from the total leave with income-related benefit
reserved for the father, not transferable to the mother (another month
was reserved for the mother). Since 2002, when another month with
income-replacement was added to the total leave, the father’s quota (and
also that of the mother) equals two months (Oláh and Bernhardt, 2008).
Given such consequent policy efforts, fathers in Sweden have increas-
ingly engaged in active parenting, as seen in the proportion of men of all
parents using some parental leave increasing from 2.8 per cent in 1974
to 43 per cent in the early 2000s (Duvander and Andersson, 2006). Yet,
women still take most of the parental leave, notwithstanding fathers’
increasing take up from 0.5 per cent in 1974, to 10 per cent in the early
1990s and 23.1 per cent of all leave days in 2010 (Försäkringskassan,
2005, 2010).
The parental leave as well as the benefit can be taken on a full-time
basis or part-time (half days, quarter days or one-eighth days) until the
eighth birthday of a child. Moreover, a parent is entitled to a full-time
leave until the child is 18 months old, even if she/he chooses not to
use any parental benefit. Parents (legal custodians) are also entitled to
reduce their regular working hours up to 25 per cent12 until the child
is eight years old or until the first year in school is completed (partial
leave without parental benefit) (Parental Leave Act, 1995: 584). The enti-
tlement is mainly used by mothers, seen in the proportions of parents
with a child below age seven working part-time (that is 45 per cent of
mothers and 8 per cent of fathers in 2009). In the event that a child
is ill, parents can take a shorter leave with temporary parental benefit,
which is 60 days per year per child until the age of 12 (Parental Leave
Act, 1995:584).
As the amount of parental leave benefit depends on previous employ-
ment and the level of earnings, this provides incentives for prospective
parents to establish themselves in the labour market before having a
child, promoting a delay in first childbearing. Greatly increasing labour
market uncertainties, seen in high youth unemployment rates and a
substantial share of young adults having temporary employment with
weak legal protection that further increases the risk of unemployment
for them, are likely to constrain capabilities to realise labour market and
family aspirations, which may appear already at the level of childbear-
ing intentions. The same applies to weak labour force attachment in
terms of very short part-time work, implying limited social protection
with respect to unemployment benefit, and a low parental benefit when
on leave with a child given low previous earnings.
The combination of employment and family responsibilities for both
mothers and fathers is greatly facilitated by the extensive provision of
high-quality public childcare in Sweden, in addition to the parental
leave scheme. Children whose parents study or are gainfully employed
for at least 20 hours a week are eligible. Since 2002, even the children
of unemployed parents and of parents who are at home on parental
leave are guaranteed three hours a day at a day-care centre (Oláh and
Bernhardt, 2008). Regular pre-school, family day-care home and open
pre-school are provided to children aged one to six years, with spe-
cial classes offered for the six-year-olds to prepare for the first grade in
school, starting at age seven. Pre-schools are open all year round and
daily opening hours are adjusted to parents’ working hours or studies
and the needs of the children (Skolverket, 2011). For older children up
to age 12 there are leisure-time centres available after the school hours,
and lunch is provided in school.
Public childcare provision is a municipal obligation from when a child
turns one year (Skolverket, 2000). Mainly, the municipalities themselves
provide this service,13 financed partly by government subsidies and to
a minor extent by parents’ fees. Since the early 2000s, the fee paid
by parents for pre-school and/or leisure-time centre activities is max-
imised (the so-called maxtaxa)14 at 3 per cent of the family income for
one child with a ceiling of around 140 euros for one child, 2 per cent
(ceiling circa 94 euros) for the second child and 1 per cent (ceiling 47
euros) for the third child and free for further children (Skolverket, 2011).
Enrolment rates in formal day care up to school age have been rather
high in Sweden since the 1980s, and have even increased in the last ten
years from 73 per cent to 86 per cent, facilitating the combination of
paid work and family tasks for parents, especially mothers (Skolverket,
2009a).
Summarising the main features of the Swedish welfare state, we can
conclude that the institutional setting provides conditions that are sup-
portive for having children while also pursuing other aspirations, such
as paid work. Indeed, employment seems hardly an obstacle to fam-
ily building in the Swedish context, unlike elsewhere. It may be rather
a precondition of parenthood, providing entitlement to a reasonable
parental leave benefit as well as to public childcare when one’s chil-
dren reach pre-school age. This is our rationale for studying the tensions
between fertility intentions and employment situations in Sweden, the
latter with respect to labour force attachment and work hours implying
differences in individual capabilities to be both earner and carer.
4. Data and method
The empirical analysis is based on data extracted from a Swedish panel

survey, Family and Working Life among Young Adults in the 21st Century
(that is the Young Adult Panel Study, or YAPS),15 based on a nation-
ally representative sample of women and men born in Sweden in 1968,
1972, 1976 and 1980. The YAPS is a mail questionnaire survey, designed
by Professor Eva Bernhardt at Stockholm University, Sweden, with the
Survey Unit of Statistics Sweden in charge of the fieldwork. A first wave
was carried out in 1999, including the three eldest cohorts only and pro-
viding information on 2,820 respondents (with a response rate of 65 per
cent). In 2003, a second wave was conducted, in which 78 per cent of
respondents from the first wave participated and a new sample of those
born in 1980 was added. Hence, we have information on a total of 2,816
respondents there. In addition, the YAPS is augmented with register data
on vital events, both partnerships and births.
In our study, we focus on a subsample of women aged 22–34 years.
We rely mainly on information from the second wave, except for those
who participated only in 1999. Our working sample contains a total
of 1,678 women, who were not pregnant, nor were on parental leave
at the time of the survey.16 A majority of them, that is 64.7 per cent,
were childless, 14.2 per cent had one child, 16.3 per cent had two chil-
dren and 4.8 per cent had three or more children. Not surprisingly,
among the childless the two youngest cohorts constituted the majority
(77.8 per cent).
4.1 Variables
We use two specifications of childbearing intentions as our dependent
variables. The first specification measures childbearing intentions with-
out time limit, based on the question ‘Do you think you will have (more)
children in the future?’ Response alternatives were yes (coded as 1), no
and perhaps (the latter two coded as 0). The second specification of the
dependent variable addresses short-term childbearing intentions, based
on the question ‘When do you think you will have your first (your next)
child?’ For that, responses within the next two years and within two to
five years were coded as 1, while other alternatives (that is more than five
years from now, I don’t think I will have (more) children and I don’t know
were coded as 0).
Our main explanatory variables are: labour force attachment and weekly
work hours. As for the former, we distinguish between the following
statuses: permanent employment (the reference category), temporary
employment (that is fixed-term contracts), self-employment (that is own
business or freelance), unemployment, studies, other (that is full-time
homemaking and other unspecified activities). For work hours, we have
four categories: working less than 17 hours a week, 17–30 hours a week,
31–37 hours a week and 38 or more hours a week (the reference cate-
gory). In the models, we control for the effects of a respondent’s age,
number of children also taking into account the age of the youngest child, if
any, whether in a co-residential partnership,17 educational attainment (dis-
tinguishing between low-medium level and post-secondary level) and
relative income (not relative to a partner but based on quartiles in the
income distribution of respondents’ income before taxes and transfers,
with categories of up to 25, up to 75 percentiles and above). In the ana-
lyses of work hours we also control for the effect of partner’s work hours
(as reported by the respondent, distinguishing between full-time, less
than full-time and not in paid work). For descriptive statistics regarding
the variables in the models, see Appendix Table 3.A.1.
4.2 Method
Logistic regression is our tool of analysis. As our research questions
address different aspects of labour market situations, we conduct sep-
arate analyses. First, we study the relationship between women’s inten-
tion to have a(nother) child and their labour force attachment, pooling
data of all women in our working sample. We also look at possible differ-
ences in the effects of factors for childless women versus mothers. In our
second set of analysis, we examine the association between childbearing
intentions and women’s work hours. Here, we include only employed
women with a co-resident partner in the model, analysing first all parity
together, thereafter the childless and the mothers separately.
5. Regression analysis
5.1 Labour force attachment and childbearing intentions

As a first step, we study the association between employment status and
childbearing intentions without time specification (Table 2.1).18 In mod-
els 1:1:1–1:1:3 we rely on a step-wise model fitting, analysing all women
together. First, only labour force attachment is included in the model;
thereafter, we add factors of individual characteristics and resources. As a
final step, we also control for the effect of the number of children a
woman has, also taking into account the age of her youngest child,
if any, to reveal possible parity differences. Accounting for potential
interactions between parity and our variables, we also compute separate
analyses for non-mothers and mothers (models 1:2–1:3).
Table 2.1 Logistic regression results. Labour force attachment and childbearing
intentions among women in Sweden (odds ratios)
All women Non-mothers Mothers
Model Model Model Model 1:2 Model 1:3

1:1:1 1:1:2 1:1:3
Labour force
attachment
Permanent 1 1 1 1 1
employment
Temporary 1.36∗ 0.82 0.88 0.72 1.37
employment
Self- 0.89 1.29 0.87 1.01 0.72
employment
Unemployment 0.82 0.66∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.62∗ 0.57
Studies 1.95∗∗∗ 0.83 0.88 0.83 0.83
Other 0.68 0.56∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.99
Age
22 years 0.59∗∗∗ 0.76 1.32 0.95
26 years 1 1 1 1
30 years 0.12∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
34 years 0.02∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
Educational
attainment
Primary/Secondary 1 1 1 1
level
Post-secondary 2.34∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 2.18∗∗∗
level
Relative income
Low 1 1 1 1
Medium 1.23 1.41∗∗ 1.39∗ 1.74
High 2.19∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗ 1.27 2.80∗∗
Co-residential
partnership
Yes 1 1 1 1
No 0.73∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.49∗
No. of children/
age of
youngest child
No child 0.86
One child/0–2 1 1
years
One child/3–6 0.69 0.73
years
One child/7 years 0.21∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
or older
Two or more 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
children/0–2
years
Two or more 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
children/3–6
years
Two or more 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗
children/7
years or older
Nagelkerke R 0.03 0.34 0.45 0.16 0.52
Square
-2LLR 40.81∗∗∗ 492.16∗∗∗ 683.94∗∗∗ 122.08∗∗∗ 275.36∗∗∗
Df 5 12 18 12 17
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10; ∗∗ p < 0. 05; ∗∗∗ p < 0. 01.

Source: YAPS, own calculations.
The first step of the pooled analysis (model 1:1:1) including all
women (1,678 respondents) suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that the
temporarily employed and students are more likely to intend to have
a(nother) child than the permanently employed. However, the fit of
the model improves greatly as we control for the effects of individual-
specific factors and resources (age, partnership, education and income)
in the next step (model 1:1:2). For labour force attachment, we now
find significant effects only for unemployed women and those with
an unspecified employment situation (that is the other category), who
both are less likely to intend to have a(nother) child than the per-
manently employed. As in this model we control for the effect of
age, the impact of temporary employment and of studies has changed
and ceased to be significant, because mostly the younger women

hold fixed-term contracts or engage in studies, who are also more
likely to intend to start a family. As expected, compared with the
26-year-olds, women in their thirties have weaker childbearing inten-
tions, and so do the 22-year-olds who may feel too young to think
of motherhood or if already a mother, to extend the family further.
Those with high education or high relative income are more likely
to intend to have a(nother) child than women with low education
or income. Also, having a co-resident partner strengthens childbear-
ing intentions. As we add to the model information of the number
of children born also taking into account the age of the youngest child
(model 1:1:3), the effect for unemployment and unspecified employ-
ment status becomes more strongly negative. No substantial changes
are seen for the effects of the other variables, except for having medium
income also significantly strengthens childbearing intentions and the
effect of partnership becomes stronger. We see that mothers with one
child aged zero to two years are the most likely to intend to have
a (next) child, more so than childless women, although the differ-
ence is not significant. The intention to have another child decreases
with the age of the first child, probably due to the close birth-spacing
patterns in Swedish society. Women with two or more children are lit-
tle inclined to intend to have further children regardless of the age
of their youngest child, in line with the strong two-child norm in
Sweden.
To detect parity differences, we conduct separate analyses for non-
mothers and mothers (models 1:2 and 1:3). We find that it is mainly
the magnitude of the odds ratios that differ, rather than their direc-
tions. For non-mothers, unemployment and other unspecified activities
reduce the intention to have a first child quite substantially, given the
high level of uncertainty attached to these statuses. For mothers, we
find no significant effect for labour force attachment, having estab-
lished eligibility to extensive social rights probably prior to the birth,
although the impact of unemployment resembles that in the model
for non-mothers. Age has a similar effect among childless women and
mothers, with intentions decreasing by age. Also, partnership and edu-
cational attainment matter alike for non-mothers and mothers; we find
stronger childbearing intentions among those with a co-resident partner
and among the more highly educated, respectively. Income seems to
be more important for mothers, as those with high income are sub-
stantially more likely to intend to have an additional child than are
low-income mothers, whereas the difference is quite small and not sig-
nificant for childless women. Childbearing intentions decrease among
mothers by the number of children already born and age of the youngest
child (model 1:3).
Next, we examine short-term childbearing intentions, that is the
intention to have a(nother) child within five years, based on the same
models as in Table 2.1, conducting separate analyses for the childless
and for mothers (Table 2.2).
The importance of labour force attachment is even more evident for
childless women when short-term childbearing intentions are consid-
ered. The temporarily employed, unemployed, students and those with
unspecified activity status are less likely to intend to become a mother
within five years than the permanently employed, given the higher
level of labour market uncertainty they face compared with those in
a stable position. In addition, women in these statuses are often not eli-
gible to get income-related parental benefit, and therefore face a risk of
their living standard diminishing substantially if having a child under
such conditions. For mothers, we find the opposite effect for temporary
employment, with higher intentions to have a next child in the near
future compared with the permanently employed, which may indicate a
selection effect. These women may have chosen to have a fixed-term but
perhaps well-paid position, not being able to find a permanent job, so
they can build up their eligibility for a reasonably high income-related
parental benefit for a next child. As their employment is temporary,
they are likely to be motivated to plan to extend their family while
still qualified for the income-related benefit, after having built up the
eligibility for it. None of the other categories show a significant influ-
ence, except for mothers with an unspecified activity status, which is
a rather uncertain situation, displaying quite low short-term intentions
to extend their family, as they may not qualify for the income-related
parental benefit, and need to earn the SGI before even planning a next
child.
Women in their early twenties are much less likely to intend to have
a first child shortly than the 26-year-olds, unlike in the analysis of
intentions without a specified time limit (model 1:2 in Table 2.1). This
indicates a confidence among young women that they will become
mothers eventually, but preferably at more mature ages. Short-term
intentions to become a mother are also rather low for women in
their mid-thirties as they may have become accustomed to a childless
lifestyle and motherhood may feel less appealing to them. Similarly,
Table 2.2 Logistic regression results. Labour force attachment and short-term
childbearing intentions (that is planning to have a child within five years) among
women in Sweden (odds ratios)
Non-mothers Mothers
Labour force attachment

Permanent employment 1 1
Temporary employment 0.63∗∗ 1.74∗
Self-employment 1.05 0.84
Unemployment 0.64∗ 1.10
Studies 0.64∗∗∗ 1.60
Other 0.42∗∗ 0.39∗
Age
22 years 0.37∗∗∗ 0.79
26 years 1 1
30 years 0.76 0.58∗
34 years 0.47∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
Educational attainment
Primary/Secondary level 1 1
Post-secondary level 1.14 1.31
Relative income
Low 1 1
Medium 1.48∗∗ 0.71
High 1.75∗∗ 1.04
Co-residential partnership
Yes 1 1
No 0.32∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
No. of children/age of youngest child
One child/0–2 years 1
One child/3–6 years 0.48∗
One child/7 years or older 0.12∗∗∗
Two or more children/0–2 years 0.09∗∗∗
Two or more children/7 years or older 0.07∗∗∗
Nagelkerke R Square 0.22 0.39
-2LLR 195.43∗∗∗ 206.29∗∗∗
Df 12 17
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10; ∗∗ p < 0. 05; ∗∗∗ p < 0. 01.

for mothers, short-term intentions to extend a family are lower among

those in their thirties, as they have perhaps already reached the family
size they prefer to have, unlike the younger mothers. We find no sig-
nificant impact of educational attainment on short-term childbearing
intentions of either childless women or mothers, unlike on inten-

tions in general (that is without time specification), with the highly
educated being much more confident about becoming a mother even-
tually or having another child. With respect to short-term plans, the
more educated are also more likely to have other aspirations and may
prefer to enter into motherhood or extend their family later, with lit-
tle difference between the strength of their short-term childbearing
intentions and that of the less educated. Not living with a partner
reduces both short-term intentions and intentions in general among
the childless as well as the mothers. As for income, the impact is
stronger for non-mothers’ short-term intentions than on their gen-
eral intentions, as the immediate economic situation matters more
strongly when planning for the next few years than for a long-term
future.
Finally, we explore how the interplay of labour force attachment and
resources is reflected in the probability of childbearing intentions19 in
general and in the short-term. We focus on childless women aged 26,
living with a partner, who are the most likely to intend to become a
mother, also within a short time (Figure 2.3). Compared with those in
permanent employment, being in an uncertain labour market situation
seems to suppress short-term first childbearing intention probabilities
100 90.9 87.8 86.2 89.1

90 81.0 83.7 83.8
80.3
80 75.5 72.7 71.9 72.2
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Permanent Temporary Unemployed Permanent Temporary Unemployed
employed employed employed employed
Intentions without time specification Short-term child bearing intentions
Low education/low income High education/high income
Figure 2.3 Childbearing intention probabilities to have the first child, and to
have it within five years, by labour force attachment, education and income:
Sweden (26-year-old women in co-residential partnership)
somewhat more than intention probabilities in general, independently

of the woman’s resources (education and income). Yet, the reduction
in intention probabilities is more limited for those with more resources
in terms of high education and income than for the least advantaged.
Those in the latter category are equally strongly affected with respect
to their short-term intention probabilities if temporarily employed or
unemployed, with unemployment having similar influence even on
their childbearing intention probabilities in general.
These findings indicate that capabilities to start a family are linked to
a combination of labour market certainty/uncertainty and the woman’s
own resources. Short-term intentions are especially influenced. This is
seen in uncertain labour force situations reducing short-term mother-
hood intention probabilities even among those with better resources
more than with respect to intentions in general. Highly educated
women with high income may be confident to be able to improve their
position in the long run and also more likely to be positive to the idea to
have a first child at a more mature age. Hence, an uncertain labour force
position has a more limited effect on their intentions to start a family
eventually, than to become a mother within a short time. The low edu-
cated with low income feel equally constrained in the short-term and
in general when unemployed, whereas temporary employment reduces
mostly their short-term intention probabilities compared with that of
the permanently employed with similar resources, as they may be more
confident to be able to build up eligibility for more generous benefits
in the long-term, even if not being able to secure a stable employment
position.
5.2 Work hours and intentions

Next, we study the impact of weekly work hours on the intention to
have a(nother) child among women aged 22–34 years who were in paid
work at the time of the survey and lived with a partner, also exploring
differences by parity, if any (Table 2.3).20 In models 3:1:1–3:1:3, we ana-
lyse all working women (N = 740), while model 3:2 includes childless
women only (N = 384) and model 3:3 mothers only (N = 356).
Model 3:1:1 suggests that working less than full-time is associated
with lower childbearing intentions than those of full-time workers.
Introducing individual-specific factors and resources in the analysis (age,
education, income and partner’s work hours), we find a more pro-
nounced difference between full-time and very short part-time workers’
(less than 17 hours a week) childbearing intentions, whereas the dif-
ference diminishes for short part-timers (17–30 hours) and ceases to be
Table 2.3 Logistic regression results. Work hours and childbearing intentions among women in paid work, living with a partner in
Sweden (odds ratios)
Model 3:1:1 Model 3:1:2 Model 3:1:3 Model 3:2 Model 3:3
Work hours
<17 h/week 0.71 0.54∗ 0.61 0.40∗ 1.16
17–30 h/week 0.43∗∗∗ 0.67∗ 1.04 1.01 1.07
31–37 h/week 0.37∗∗∗ 0.66 1.18 1.83 0.98
38+ h/week 1 1 1 1 1
Age
22 years 0.44∗∗∗ 0.60∗ 0.63 1.64
26 years 1 1 1 1
30 years 0.11∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.62
34 years 0.02∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
Primary/Secondary level 1 1 1 1
Post-secondary level 2.62∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗ 2.22∗∗
Relative income
Low 1 1 1 1
Medium 1.34 1.33 1.83∗ 0.62
High 2.84∗∗∗ 1.56 1.38 1.11
49
50
Table 2.3 (Continued)
Model 3:1:1 Model 3:1:2 Model 3:1:3 Model 3:2 Model 3:3
Partner’s work hours

Full-time 1 1 1 1
Less than full-time 1.27 1.14 0.94 1.24
Not in paid work 0.69 0.64 0.56 0.86
No child 0.78
One child/0–2 years 1 1
One child/3–6 years 0.59 0.73
One child/7 years or older 0.20∗∗ 0.23∗∗
Two or more children/0–2 years 0.09∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Two or more children/3–6 years 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
Two or more children/7 years or older 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
Nagelkerke R Square 0.06 0.43 0.54 0.17 0.54
-2LLR 33.08∗∗∗ 287.35∗∗∗ 382.09∗∗∗ 41.90∗∗∗ 173.59∗∗∗
Df 3 11 17 11 16
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10; ∗∗ p < 0. 05; ∗∗∗ p < 0. 01.

significant for those working long part-time (31–37 hours) (model 3:1:2).
These results indicate weaker capabilities with respect to family-building
intentions among those working only a few hours a week or short part-
time compared with full-time workers, even if the effect of education
and income are controlled for. The effects of age, education and income
are in line with the findings presented at Table 2.1, while there is no
significant difference by partner’s work hours. Including information
in the model on the number of children born taking into account the
age of the youngest child (model 3:1:3), the effect of the woman’s work
hours is no longer statistically significant, indicating a strong impact
of children on the female work pattern. We find no significant differ-
ences in childbearing intentions of the childless and of mothers with
one child below age seven, whereas women with an older child or with
two or more children are substantially less likely to intend to have an
additional child than are one-child mothers with a 0–2-year-old.
As the interaction between number of children/age of youngest child
and our independent variables appear to be interesting and significant,
we also analyse childless women and mothers separately. Model 3:2 indi-
cates that non-mothers who work less than 17 hours a week, and thus
do not qualify for income-related parental benefit, are substantially less
likely to intend to have a first child than are full-time workers, con-
trolling for the effect of individual characteristics and resources and
partner’s work hours. Among the childless, those with high education
and medium income are significantly more likely to intend to have a
child than are women with low education and low income. Focusing on
mothers (model 3:3), we find no significant differences by work hours on
further childbearing intentions, due to the strong influence of children
(their age and number) on mothers’ work patterns. As for the childless,
the highly educated are more likely to intend to have another child also
among the mothers.
We also study the association between work hours and short-term
childbearing intentions, using the same models as in Table 2.3, con-
ducting separate analyses for the childless and for mothers (Table 2.4).
Similar to the results of childbearing intentions in general (that is
without a time limit), we find that non-mothers who work less than
17 hours a week are much less likely to intend to have a first
child within five years than are full-time working women, control-
ling for the effect of age, educational attainment, relative income
and partner’s work hours. Non-mothers with medium and high rel-
ative income are substantially more likely to intend to have a first
child within five years than are women with low income, whereas
Table 2.4 Logistic regression results. Work hours and short-term childbearing
intentions (that is planning to have a child within five years) among women in
paid work, living with a partner in Sweden (odds ratios)
Non-mothers Mothers
Work hours
<17 h/week 0.41∗∗ 1.57
17–30 h/week 0.88 1.18
31–37 h/week 2.36 1.44
38+ h/week 1 1
Age
22 years 0.40∗∗∗ 0.63
26 years 1 1
30 years 0.96 0.62
34 years 0.12∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
Primary/Secondary level 1 1
Post-secondary level 0.72 1.42
Relative income
Low 1 1
Medium 2.59∗∗∗ 0.72
High 2.77∗∗ 1.08
Partner’s work hours
Full-time 1 1
Less than full-time 0.61 3.01∗∗
Not in paid work 0.72 1.03
One child/0–2 years 1
One child/3–6 years 0.35∗
One child/7 years or older 0.08∗∗∗
Two or more children/7 years or older 0.05∗∗∗
Nagelkerke R Square 371.74 340.14
-2LLR 51.12∗∗∗ 152.47∗∗∗
Df 11 16
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10; ∗∗ p < 0. 05; ∗∗∗ p < 0. 01.

we do not find significant differences in childbearing intentions by

education or partner’s work hours. Work hours have no statistically
significant effect on mothers’ short-term intentions to extend their fam-
ily, neither has educational attainment or income. However, mothers
whose partners work less than full-time are substantially more likely
to intend to have another child within five years than are those
with a full-time working partner. This may be the result of this cat-
egory including men on part-time parental leave as father’s leave
taking has shown to increase the propensity of childbearing in such
couples (Oláh, 2003; for an overview of further relevant studies see
Goldscheider et al., 2010) and also probably strengthens childbearing
intentions.
Finally, we explore the interplay of work hours and resources also
with respect to the partner’s labour force position on short-term
first childbearing intentions, displaying such intention probabilities of
26-year-olds, gainfully employed childless women, living with a partner
who works full-time or is not in paid work at all (Figure 2.4). We find
that women whose partner is not in paid work have lower intention
probabilities to become a mother within five years independently of
own weekly work hours than are women with a partner engaged in
the labour force full-time. In addition to the negative impact of lower
household income when the partner is not gainfully employed, this
finding may also reflect women’s expectations of their partner to engage
100
90 87.3 83.1
77.6
80 73.7 71.3
70 66.9
58.7
60 50.5
50
40
30
20
10
0
Full-time Short part-time Full-time Short part-time
(+38 h/week) (<17 h/week) (+38 h/week) (<17 h/week)
Having a partner in full-time paid Having a partner not in paid work

work
Low education/low income High education/high income
Figure 2.4 Childbearing intention probabilities to have the first child within
five years by weekly work hours, education, income and partner’s labour force
attachment: Sweden (26-year-old women in co-residential partnership)
in active parenting when they have a child. However, he being eligi-

ble to a reasonably high income-related parental benefit, while on leave
with the child, depends on his labour market participation before the
birth. As for the woman’s own resources, we find a larger difference in
intention probabilities of the low educated with low income compared
with the highly educated with high income among women working
less than 17 hours a week, who face high labour market uncertainty
and are not eligible for the income-related parental benefit themselves,
than among full-time workers independently of the partner’s work
hours.
Hence, our findings suggest that women’s capabilities regarding start-
ing a family are constrained if they are only marginally attached to
the labour market working less than 17 hours a week, which does not
provide eligibility for the generous social benefits otherwise available
to parents. Capabilities are also reduced to some extent if having a
partner not in paid work, who thus does not qualify for the income-
related parental benefit although expected to take leave when the
couple has a child, given the father’s quota in the parental leave
scheme.
6. Conclusions and discussion
In contemporary Europe, labour force participation independently of

gender seems increasingly to have become a precondition of parent-
hood. In the context of prevalent labour market uncertainties, a com-
mon characteristic of modern societies along with below-replacement
level fertility rates, people are likely to seek to reduce the risk of a
substantial decline in their living standard by investing in labour mar-
ket skills and delaying (or even foregoing) irreversible decisions such
as childbearing. The ability to combine employment aspirations and
family responsibilities is increasingly affected, in addition to individ-
ual resources, by institutional settings that can mitigate the negative
impact of economic uncertainties on family-building decisions. Rely-
ing on the Capability Approach, developed by Sen, we have consid-
ered childbearing intentions, known to influence fertility behaviour,
as an indicator of a person’s capabilities to start or extend her fam-
ily. Focusing on such intentions, in this chapter we have addressed the
tensions between women’s childbearing aspirations and labour force sit-
uation, and their interplay with work–life balance policies in modern
Sweden, where being both earner and carer has been an agreed-upon
norm for several decades. Using logistic regression as our tool of

analysis, we have studied childbearing intentions without any time
horizon specified as well as short-term intentions, that is to start or
extend a family within five years, and their relationship with women’s
labour force attachment and with work hours respectively. We have
detected differences in the effects of our main variables of interest
on childless women’s and on mothers’ childbearing intentions, which
may be linked to differences in eligibility for various forms of social
benefits.
With respect to the impact of labour force attachment on child-
bearing intentions in general, controlling for differences in individual
characteristics and resources we have found that unemployment and
unspecified activities reduce childless women’s intentions to become
mothers, as uncertainty and the risk of economic hardship may be felt
most strongly by them. Focusing on short-term intentions, the impact of
labour force uncertainty has become even more pronounced. Compared
with the permanently employed, we have seen much reduced first-birth
intentions in addition to the unemployed and those in unspecified
activities also for the temporarily employed and for students, all of
whom may see little hope to be able to qualify for income-related
benefits within the short run, which constrains their capabilities to
start a family soon. In contrast, mother’s fertility intentions are lit-
tle influenced by their employment status, as most of them probably
established eligibility for generous social benefits prior to the birth
of their (youngest) child, and can more easily keep such eligibility
(e.g. due to the speed-premium rules in the parental leave scheme).
For short-term intentions though, even mothers with an unspecified
employment status have shown reduced intentions to extend their
families, whereas those with temporary contracts have seemed to
plan having another child relatively soon, probably after they built
up (new) eligibility for the income-related parental benefit. Having
access to high-quality public childcare, even if having a temporary
work position, they may be less concerned about labour market uncer-
tainties and more confident to be able to combine work and care
responsibilities.
Studying the effect of work hours, we have seen for both childbearing
intentions without a time horizon and in the short-term that child-
less women have much reduced intentions to become mothers if they
work less than 17 hours a week, that is very short part-time. Such
marginal labour market engagement does not provide reasonably high
income-related parental benefit or eligibility to other generous social

provisions. Hence, it is linked to substantial uncertainty and the risk
of economic hardship, which may explain the strongly reduced inten-
tions among these women to start a family. For mothers, we have not
found significant differences by work hours regarding the intention to
have another child, either in general or in the short-term, probably due
to the strong influence of children on mothers’ work patterns. How-
ever, we have seen a significant impact of partner’s work hours on
mothers’ short-term childbearing plans, with the partner working less
than full-time strongly increasing mothers’ intentions to extend the
family in the short run. As men on part-time parental leave are also
included in this category, this result may reflect previous findings on
father’s leave use increasing the propensity among mothers to have
another child, suggesting that it can strengthen childbearing intentions
as well.
Summarising our results, it seems that even in the context of compre-
hensive Swedish work–life balance policies, labour market uncertainties
and the risk of economic hardship constrain capabilities to start a fam-
ily among certain groups of women. Those with weak labour force
attachment (that is temporarily employed, unemployed, students and
those in unspecified activities) and/or working very short part-time
(less than 17 hours a week) are not eligible for generous social bene-
fits and, hence, have limited capabilities to be both earner and carer,
which reduces their first-childbearing intentions. Among mothers, most
of whom are likely to have qualified for income-related benefits and
other social provisions, reconciliation policies in Sweden seem to have
successfully reduced the tensions between labour force engagement
and family responsibilities. Thus, their childbearing intentions do not
indicate constraints of capabilities to extend their family, linked to
labour market participation or work hours, unlike for childless women.
To increase capabilities to start a family among non-mothers with
marginal labour force engagement may, in turn, be a challenge for future
policymaking.
Acknowledgement
grant to the Linnaeus Center on Social Policy and Family Dynamics
in Europe, SPaDE (grant number 349–2007–8701) is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
Appendix
Table 2.A.1 Descriptive statistics by parity (%). Sample for analysis on labour
force attachment and childbearing intentions among women in Sweden (see
Tables 2.1 and 2.2)
No children One child Two or more

(n = 1,086) (n = 238) children
(n = 354)
Childbearing Do not intend to 25.0 37.0 88.7

intentions have a(nother)
specification child
I (without time Intend to have 75.0 63.0 11.3
limit) a(nother) child
Childbearing Do not intend to 42.4 27.3 72.3
intentions have a(nother)
specification child within 5
II (with time years
limit) Intend to have 57.6 72.7 27.7
a(nother) child
within 5 years
Age 22 years 41.8 13.9 1.4
26 years 35.9 27.7 10.5
30 years 16.9 35.7 37.9
34 years 5.4 22.7 50.3
Age of youngest Youngest child 52.1 36.7
child 0–2 years
Youngest child 32.4 41.2
3–6 years
Youngest child 7 15.5 22.0
years or older
Educational Primary/secondary 50.1 69.7 64.1
attainment level
Post-secondary 49.9 30.3 35.9
level
Co-residential No co-resident 53.8 17.6 9.9
partnership partner
Co-resident 46.2 82.4 90.1
partner
Relative income Low 29.7 9.2 5.1
Medium 50.8 50.8 70.3
High 19.5 39.9 24.6
Labour force Permanent 38.9 60.5 61.3
attachment employment
Temporary 12.4 11.3 11.6
employment
Self-employment 2.9 5.5 3.1
Unemployment 7.6 7.6 7.6
Studies 35.0 9.2 13.0
Other 3.2 5.9 3.4

Table 2.A.2 Descriptive statistics by parity, selected variables (%). Sample for
analysis on work hours; women in Sweden (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4)
No children One child Two or

(n = 384) (n = 142) more
children
(n = 214)
Work hours <17 7.6 9.2 5.6

17–30 10.9 33.1 35.5
31–37 9.4 13.4 27.6
38+ 72.1 44.4 31.3
Partner’s work Full-time 76.8 74.6 86.4
hours Less than full-time 8.9 14.1 6.5
Not in paid work 15.1 12.7 9.3
Note: Sample includes women aged 22–34 years in paid work, living with a partner.
Notes
1. See Eurobarometer N. 253, wave 65.1 and 65.3. The first wave, conducted in
February–March 2006, included the 25 Member States of the EU. The second
wave, conducted in May–June covered the candidate countries. The follow-
ing question was asked: ‘For you personally, what would be the ideal number
of children you would like to have or would have liked to have had?’ (Testa,
2006).
2. See also Rovi, 1994; Thomson and Hoem, 1998; Engelhardt, 2004.
3. Sen (1992) argues that functionings are activities or states of beings, on a
scale from rather elementary things (such as being well-nourished, being in
good health, avoiding premature mortality) to more complex achievements
(e.g. being happy, having self-respect and taking part in social and commu-
nity life).
4. The analysis is based on a sub-sample of men and women aged 20–57
years in ten European countries: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany,
the Netherlands, the UK, Spain, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
(Hobson and Fahlén, 2011).
5. Preliminary results from the most recent Swedish time-use study, conducted
in 2010–11, indicate a further decrease of the gender gap in time spent on
housework (SCB, 2011).
6. The introduction of individual taxation of married couples in 1971 was seen
as a key measure promoting such development, as it provided incentives for
labour force participation to women independently of civil status (Baude,
1992).
7. The rates of employment, part-time employment, temporary employ-
ment and unemployment, reported here and in the next para-
graphs, are available at Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, annual data, at
the relevant tables (see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/
employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database).
8. Scale range from zero (least restriction) to six (most restriction). For more
information about the construction of the indices, see OECD (2009).
9. In 2008, the income replacement was efficiently reduced to a payment level
of 77.6 per cent (Moss, 2009).
10. Based on an exchange rate in January 2011.
11. For children born earlier than July 2006, parents receive a lower level of 60
SEK per day (5.7 euros).
12. A reduction of 25 per cent is equivalent to a working week of 30 hours if the
regular working week is 40 hours.
13. The share of childcare provided by the private market, mainly by parental
cooperatives and other non-profit organisations has increased in the 1990s
to around 15 per cent as non-municipal childcare centres became eligible for
public subsidies (Bergqvist and Nyberg, 2002).
14. The maximum fee was voluntary for municipalities to apply, and those
who implemented the system were entitled to a central government
grant. By 2003 all 289 municipalities had implemented the maximum fee
(Skolverket, 2009b).
15. For more information about the survey and the data, see www.suda.su.se/
yaps/Index_en.html or http://snd.gu.se/en/catalogue/study/SND0786.
16. The rationale for excluding women on parental leave as main activity is that
this status is of relatively short-term and we do not have information on
the women’s main activity prior to birth. Women, who specified employ-
ment or other activities (e.g. studies) as their main activity, even if they were
temporarily on parental leave, are included in the analysis.
17. In Sweden, the mean age at first birth has been below that of first mar-
riage since the early 1970s. In the early 2000s, more than 60 per cent of
all children are born out of marriage, with most of these children born in
cohabiting relationships (Oláh and Bernhardt, 2008). Hence, we only con-
trol for whether having a co-resident partner, which is more important for
childbearing than being married.
18. See Appendix Table 2.A.1 for descriptive statistics.
19. Probabilities are calculated as follows: Probability = exp (logit)/(1+ exp (logit)).
20. See Appendix Table 2.A.2 for descriptive statistics.
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3
Employment Instability and
Childbearing Plans in a
Child-Oriented Country:
Evidence from France
Ariane Pailhé and Anne Solaz
1. Introduction
The link between female employment and childbearing has attracted

much research attention over the past decades, as fertility rates in Europe
and elsewhere in the industrialised world have declined and remained
below the level necessary for population replacement. Studies address-
ing the relationship have typically focused on the impact of female
employment on fertility. Despite much research on this issue, causal-
ity remains unclear (Mira and Ahn, 2002; Engelhardt and Prskawetz,
2004; Kögel, 2004). Lately, the focus of the debate has moved from the
effect of women’s employment on fertility to the effect of job insecurity
on fertility for several reasons. First, the spread of dual-earner couples
in high-income countries has made women’s employment less of an
option but rather a fact. It is no longer female employment that has to
adapt to fertility but the reverse, and fertility is guided by the possibil-
ity of mothers of being able to work and the conditions of work–family
balance (Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000). Second, women’s employment is
often an economic necessity for the family. Since the 1980s, the growing
insecurity on the labour market with the high frequency of short-term
jobs and high rates of unemployment has changed the context of child-
bearing decisions. Thus, the issue is no longer participating in the labour
market so much as getting and keeping a job, for both men and women.
Third, the recent economic crisis has also reinforced the interest in the
impact of economic uncertainty on fertility. Fertility usually has a pro-
cyclical relationship with economic growth, and recessions often lead,
65
66 A Child-Oriented Country: Evidence from France
one or two years later, to a temporary decline in fertility (Sobotka et al.,

2011). It is too early to answer whether the recent economic crisis will
lead to a decline or a delay with a later catch-up in birth rates, but we
can examine how worsened economic conditions may affect fertility
intentions at the micro level.
The increasing feeling of uncertainty, especially for people at child-
bearing ages is, however, not a new development. It is linked to the
labour market restructuring of the last decades with unemployment as
one of the key features (Hobson and Oláh, 2006). Unemployment is a
particular and complex event. Unplanned and often an external shock,
it may impose economic constraints on couples. It may also influence
the usual work division between partners and familial gender relations,
for instance if unemployed men stay at home whereas their partners
go to work (Solaz, 2005). The impact of unemployment, or an inse-
cure job position and their interactions with other socio-demographic
characteristics, on fertility is of interest to several research fields.
For demographers, job security holds among the five preconditions for
transition to parenthood, that is being in a partnership, having com-
pleted full-time education and training, having a home of one’s own,
being in employment with adequate income and having a sense of a
secure future (Hobcraft and Kiernan, 1995). Economic uncertainty has
also been identified by sociologists as one of the main explanations for
postponement of childbearing in Europe (Blossfeld et al., 2005), since
starting a family requires a stable economic situation within the house-
hold. Yet, in a context of longer-term economic uncertainty, people may
centre life on the private sphere and invest in having children, since the
private sphere is less uncertain than the public and having a child may
be a tool to gain social approval. This explanation may apply especially
in a context where children are highly valued (Friedman et al., 1994).
Economists also distinguish two opposite effects of economic uncer-
tainty on fertility. On the one hand, for unemployed people, the cost
of having children may be perceived as higher due to decreasing (actual
and expected) income (Becker, 1981). Thus, young people are expected
to wait until they hold a permanent job before entering into parenthood
(Adsera, 2004, 2011; Kohler et al., 2005). On the other hand, unem-
ployment lowers the opportunity cost of children, that is the income
or career opportunities that a parent must give up to care for the child.
Thus, a period of unemployment may be the best time to have chil-
dren, especially for women who, in any case, stop working and take
maternity leave in the immediate months after a birth. One cannot
theoretically determine whether the income effect or the substitution
Ariane Pailhé & Anne Solaz 67
effect dominates with respect to the impact of unemployment on fer-

tility, since the relative importance of these two opposite effects varies
among individuals and genders.
This individual-level variation of fertility response to economic uncer-
tainty may be explained by the heterogeneity of lifestyle preferences
(Hakim, 1998), in particular the preferences regarding the trade-off
between work and family. According to this, the more family-oriented
women have a higher number of children, while the work-oriented
women are the least fertile (Vitali et al., 2009). However, the link
between lifestyle preferences and fertility is country-specific as it is
mediated through welfare regime type and the societal norms regarding
fertility, family and gender relations.
In this chapter we address the relationship between employment
uncertainty and fertility in a country that has both strong social norms
regarding fertility and a quite generous welfare state: France. This is
an interesting case to examine whether childbearing decisions are sen-
sitive to economic factors since France holds a high level of fertility
in spite of a high level of youth unemployment and a high share of
non-permanent employment. Hence, we seek answers to the questions:
Do the generous public policies (family and employment policies) cre-
ate a framework of stability that erases some of the negative aspects of
economic uncertainty? Are the pro-natalist social norms strong enough
to counterbalance economic constraints? More specifically, we study at
the micro level how unemployment and having a non-permanent job
affect fertility intentions, for men and women respectively, and by par-
ity, that is the number of children one already has, thanks to recent
data that allow the opportunity to measure the relative importance of
each partner’s professional situation on fertility intentions. We focus on
intentions in a specific time interval since individuals are likely to take
into account the economic constraints of the time being when express-
ing their desire for a child. In the next section, we describe previous
research and the originality of our approach. Thereafter, we present the
specific French framework, then our data and methods. It is followed by
the discussion of the results, ending with a concluding section.
2. Research framework
Studies on fertility usually address childbearing behaviour, mainly the

timing of fertility rather than intentions. Focusing only on realised
events, however, cannot reveal the complexity of processes around
childbearing decisions. There is often a discrepancy between couples’
childbearing plans and births as some couples may desire a child but
do not have one for fecundity or other reasons. Fertility intentions are
an indicator that captures the desire for children. They are also used by
demographers to predict fertility trends (Schoen et al., 1999; Bongaarts,
2001). Indeed, demographers consider childbearing intentions as deter-
mining factors (Berrington, 2004) or at least mediating factors (Testa and
Toulemon, 2006) of fertility behaviours. By analysing the determinants
of short-term fertility intentions, one can understand how individuals
take into account current constraints, such as employment uncertainty,
regarding childbearing decisions. Such short-term intentions describe
the child as desire of the moment and are more likely to integrate the
current constraints of economic conditions. In other words, they may
help us to understand how economic factors impact on childbearing
decisions. Moreover, temporarily restricted fertility intentions also allow
us to distinguish between potential postponers and abandoners (Spéder
and Kapitány, 2009). Lastly, when asked about short-term intentions
the answers are less likely to mirror societal norms and/or expectations,
unlike in the case of people’s ideal number of children (Fahlén and Oláh,
2009). Thus, a true diversity of people’s planned behaviours is captured
through these intentions.
A number of studies in different countries addressed the impact of
work uncertainty on fertility. They usually focus on the sole effect of
unemployment on fertility, and find that unemployment delays the
formation of a family (Adsera, 2011). But the results are contrasting
depending on the countries covered. Meron and Widmer (2002) and
Impens (1989) find that women’s unemployment delays first birth in
France and in Flanders respectively. Kreyenfeld (2005) finds the same
effect but only for highly educated women in Germany. Rindfuss et al.
(1996), using US data, find no significant effect, whereas an accel-
eration is usually found in Nordic countries (Kravdal, 1994, 2002;
Andersson, 2000; Hoem, 2000; Vikat, 2004), Germany and the UK
(Schmitt, 2008). The impact of other insecure labour market situa-
tions is rarely addressed, except in some studies on Southern European
countries, where these types of employment are particularly common
(Ahn and Mira, 2001; de la Rica and Iza, 2005). They have shown that
childbearing is postponed when employment is unstable, as people are
uncertain about their future employment status and income, and there-
fore delay irreversible decisions such as having a child. As this type of
occupational instability and atypical employment has sharply increased
during the last 20 years in European countries, this chapter not only
analyses the effect of unemployment on childbearing intentions, but

also that of having an unstable employment position.
Indeed, unemployment is a major source of uncertainty in the life
course. It disrupts plans regarding the future and may lead to postpone-
ment of key life events. As said previously, unemployment can impact
on fertility in two different ways. Since the household income is lower
for unemployed people, in a context of high living-standard aspira-
tions, unemployment reduces the demand for children. In a context
of increased economic uncertainties, childbearing may be perceived as
being risky, as expected future incomes are likely to decrease. Postponing
childbearing may also be a way to save resources otherwise spent on the
child, providing a means to offset the financial losses arising from unem-
ployment. Conversely, the opportunity cost of children is lower for the
unemployed: it may be relatively less expensive to have a child when
being unemployed than when working as one does not need to spend on
childcare. Such reasoning may apply also to persons at risk of unemploy-
ment, particularly those in unstable employment. However, the income
effect is probably attenuated for people in non-permanent jobs com-
pared with unemployed people since their current income is likely to be
higher than that of unemployed people. The income effect will depend
on their expected future incomes, that is on the chances they anticipate
of getting a permanent job. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of
being a parent is higher for people in non-permanent employment com-
pared with unemployed people given the substantial foregone income
while out of employment due to childrearing. Indeed, their opportunity
cost may be even larger than that of people in permanent employment
since continuing to work may prove one’s commitment to work, and
thus increase the chances of getting a permanent contract. Hence, if
people anticipate greater difficulties in finding a job after becoming a
parent, they will postpone childbearing. In addition, though women
and men have increasingly similar levels of human capital and access to
the labour market, women still bear most of the costs of childbearing,
which reflects an incoherence in gender equality levels in the public
sphere and in the family and may influence childbearing decisions (see
McDonald, 2000). As long as taking care of a child is considered primar-
ily women’s business, mothers face higher barriers to re-entering the
labour force than fathers; hence, the magnitude of the opportunity cost
of childbearing strongly depends on gender.
Up to now, research has mainly focused on women while the impact
of male unemployment has received little attention (for exceptions
see Kravdal, 2002 for Norway; Tölke and Diewald, 2003 for Germany;
Blossfeld et al., 2005 for 14 industrialised countries; Lundström, 2009
for Sweden). The underlying assumption was that women are the main
drivers of fertility. Yet, it may also be important to study men as
the impact of economic uncertainty may be different for men’s and
women’s childbearing decisions. In a context where men provide most
of the financial resources of the household, the negative impact of
unemployment should be stronger for men than for women. On the
other hand, since women are still the main childcare providers, the
opportunity cost of childbearing is higher for them. This opportunity
cost is particularly high for women with non-permanent job contracts.
Indeed, having a child interferes much more with the chances of obtain-
ing stable employment for women than for men given men’s limited
engagement in childrearing, and if having a child is interpreted by
the employer as a weakening of commitment to work and if childcare
provisions are deficient.
Therefore, it is important to analyse the impact of unemployment and
non-permanent employment for both men and women. It is even more
relevant to jointly analyse the impact of both partners’ professional sit-
uation on fertility intentions since the economic situation of the couple
depends on both partners’ employment statuses. Taking into account
both of their professional situations is a way to ensure that the results
are not misinterpreted. The sign of the association between the part-
ners’ professional statuses and their fertility decisions is undetermined.
Indeed, a negative impact of female unemployment may be the indirect
effect of the homogamy of couples, that is unemployed women are more
likely to have a spouse/partner with a precarious job position himself.
Cumulating unstable employment positions may strongly affect fertil-
ity intentions. Conversely, the unstable employment situation of one
spouse may be compensated by the stable employment status of the
other. Thus, in this study, we analyse the impact of own professional
situation while controlling for the partner’s activity status.
Childbearing decision may be seen as a sequential process, with each
birth causing a re-evaluation of further fertility plans. Therefore, price
and income effects may differ by birth parity (Rosenzweig, 1976). Sep-
arate analyses of different parities indicate that the effects of income
on fertility vary over successive parities. The impact of unemployment
and non-permanent employment is likely to be stronger for first births.
In such cases, postponement may be an obvious choice for childless
couples, who are on average younger, as their remaining fecund period is
longer, whereas the risk of infecundity due to increased age may prevent
parents from delaying subsequent births. Moreover, parents’ preferences

regarding birth spacing may alleviate the effect of economic constraints.
Thus, we conduct separate analyses by parity and we devote special
attention to the intention to have a third child as French family policy
is mainly targeted to promote third births.
3. The French context
France holds a rather particular position with one of the highest fertil-
ity levels in Europe over several decades. Since 2006, the total fertility
rate has reached two children per woman – very close to the ‘replace-
ment level’. Apart from this aspect, other demographic characteristics
are not very different from those of other Western European countries:
like elsewhere in Europe, the number of marriages has dramatically
declined, while unmarried cohabitation is rising and entry into parent-
hood is being delayed. As in many countries where the state plays a key
role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-
being of citizens, female labour force participation is quite high, even for
mothers. According to census data, the labour force participation rate of
mothers aged 25–49 is 89.8 per cent with one child, 85.3 per cent with
two children and 67 per cent with three children in 2004–07 (Chardon
and Daguet, 2008).
During the last decades, economic uncertainty has significantly
increased due to high unemployment rates, particularly of young peo-
ple, and an increasing frequency of short-term jobs. Indeed, the unem-
ployment rate is fairly high in France compared with other European
countries. In 2008, it reached 7.8 per cent, it was the fourth highest
in Europe, behind Spain (11.3 per cent), Slovakia (9.5 per cent) and
Hungary (7.8 per cent), above the EU-27 average (7.0 per cent). More-
over, the youth unemployment rate (under age 25) is also one of the
highest in Europe: it increased from 7.1 per cent in 1975 to 19.0 per cent
in 2008. Young people with lower levels of educational attainment are
particularly hard-hit (Fondeur and Minni, 2004). The female unemploy-
ment rate is higher than the male rate, indicating some discrimination
of women to get a job (Duguet and Petit, 2005). However, the gender
gap narrowed between 2000 and 2008 from 2.8 per cent to 1.0 per cent
(Insee, 2011). Another specific feature of unemployment in France is its
long duration. The average length is more than one year (14 months in
2006): 40 per cent of unemployed people have been out of work for at
least one year, 21 per cent for at least two years. Flows from unemploy-
ment to employment are rather low: according to Labour Force Survey
data, the likelihood of finding employment in 2007 if unemployed in

2006 was 34 per cent. Long-term unemployment mainly concerns per-
sons aged 50 and over (61.2 per cent of unemployed people were aged 50
and over in 2006). However, also a significant share of young people are
at risk of long-term unemployment, with 25.8 per cent of unemployed
youth remaining out of work for a year or more in 2006 (26.8 per cent
of men, 24.6 per cent of women).
Labour market uncertainty is particularly common at labour mar-
ket entry: flexible forms of employment and employment instabil-
ity affect primarily young people. Half of jobs held by people aged
20–24 in France are non-standard work in 2006 compared with less
than 20 per cent at the beginning of the 1980s (see Eurostat, Labour
Force Surveys). The share of insecure jobs among employees has grown
despite strict regulations on temporary forms of employment. Since
the late 1970s, a succession of formal regulations on fixed-term con-
tracts has been introduced to restrict fixed-term contracts to contracts
of short-term duration, to limit the allowable grounds for their use and
to ensure equal treatment of employees hired under such contracts and
other employees. The Labour Code guarantees them the same rights
and benefits, particularly regarding wages.1 The use of such contracts
is restricted to ‘objective’ situations (replacement, seasonal work, tem-
porary increases in company activity, training purposes, public work
programmes). Moreover, the number of successive fixed-term contracts
for the same person within the same company is limited. Such con-
tracts also have a fixed duration of 3 to 18 months, and can be renewed
only twice within the same company. The maximum cumulated dura-
tion of successive contracts is 18 months (in some exceptional cases it
may be 24 months; in the public sector this duration may be six years
at the same workplace for highly qualified people). Indeed, employ-
ment protection for people on temporary contracts is quite strong in
France compared with other European countries (Venn, 2009). Despite
this restrictive regulation, the use of this type of contract has regu-
larly increased. In 2005, 12.5 per cent of men and 14.2 per cent of
women aged 15 and more in employment held a fixed-term contract,
such as short-term and temporary contracts, government-sponsored
jobs and apprenticeships (Labour Force Survey, Insee, 2011a). The pro-
portion involuntarily in fixed-term jobs was 9.2 per cent for women
employees and 6.7 per cent for men. Labour market uncertainty in terms
of non-permanent jobs is even more pronounced among young people
in France: about one-third of workers under the age of 30 have a fixed-
term contract according to Labour Force Survey data (Eurostat, 2011). This
frequency decreases with age. All in all, these profound changes on the
labour market progressively led to an increasing feeling of uncertainty,
especially for people of childbearing ages.
At the same time, the state provides extensive social support for young
adults in France. Forty-two per cent of students’ income came from state
support in 2005 (housing allowances, student grants, family benefits,
etc.). Also, the state covers the health insurance of unemployed per-
sons who have worked at least four months in the last 22 months.
The duration of unemployment benefit and the amount depend on
one’s work record.2 When entitlement to unemployment benefit ends
it is replaced by a fixed amount from the social assistance. Although
uncertainty is particularly high for young people, social protection is
quite limited for them, especially for school leavers (drop-outs as well as
graduates) without a work record. They are not covered by the unem-
ployment insurance scheme, and if they are under 25, they are not
entitled to the minimum welfare benefit either and thus get no social
support.
French family policy, though, is rather generous and comprehensive.
Including fiscal support for families, the state contribution to families
is estimated to be 3.6 per cent of GDP. Hence, France may be seen as
the country with the most substantial family support in Europe (Adema
and Ladaique, 2005). While usually considered a representative of the
General Family Support policy configuration type, France also displays
characteristics of the Dual-Earner type (Korpi, 2000; Hobson and Oláh,
2006). It combines allowances designed to reduce the cost of children for
families, parental leave and subsidised day care (crèches, subsidised reg-
istered childminders, nursery schools). With at least one child under the
age of three, families can get a basic allowance (a one-off payment per
birth of 890 euros and 178 euros per month for three years), of which,
although means-tested, more than 80 per cent of parents benefit. Uni-
versal family benefits are also available, but only from the second child
onwards (124 euros per month for two children, 283 euros for three
children). The French parental leave system allows one of the parents
to devote him- or herself entirely to childrearing until the third birth-
day of the child. The employer cannot object or constrain the use of
this right; the beneficiary is guaranteed to return to the same or a sim-
ilar job after the break, with at least the same income. In addition, an
allowance for parents with three or more children, at least one of whom
is under the age of three, was created in 1985, benefiting parents who
partially or entirely left the labour market to look after their children.
It was extended in 1994 to families of two children. Since 1 January
2004, it can be granted from the birth of the first child for a maximum
of six months. This allowance is conditional on past employment.3 Its
amount is fixed (not proportional to the income gained before birth)
and very low, that is half the minimum wage.
As for formal childcare, it is attended by a high share of children.
According to the OECD Family database, 43 per cent of French chil-
dren under three years were enrolled in formal care in 2006. From the
age of three, all children attend nursery school. Due to high enrolment
rates in formal childcare, also for very young children, female labour
market participation is high, even for mothers. Eighty-eight per cent
of one-child mothers aged 20–45 were working or looking for a job
in 2003 and 81 per cent of those with two children (Labour Force Sur-
vey, Insee, 2011b). The societal acceptance of mothers working, even
those with young children, is high, both by individuals and by firms.
The dominant family model is the two full-time earners one, but as in
many other countries, the household division of labour remains fairly
unequal: women bear around two-thirds of parental and household
duties (Ponthieux and Schreiber, 2006). There are no explicit policy
measures favouring gender equality, apart from the ten days’ statu-
tory paternity leave introduced in 2002. In any case, French family
policy seems to have created positive attitudes towards two- and espe-
cially three-child or larger families (Toulemon et al., 2008). Indeed, one
particularity of the French policy support is to target large families rather
than families with one or two children, by providing them with larger
allowances and larger income tax breaks. Another important feature is
that provisions do not depend on employment status. Like those in
permanent jobs, also unemployed people and those holding short-term
contracts are entitled to universal and means-tested family benefits, and
to the parental leave allowance (on condition that they have at least two
years of previous employment). As for entitlement to childcare services,
unemployed parents can also benefit from day-care centres but they do
not have priority.
In sum, the share of short-term jobs has increased greatly in the last
decades, and unemployment rates have reached high levels in France
but those with precarious work and the unemployed are nevertheless
ensured some financial guarantees and rights. Furthermore, the diversi-
fied family policy provides help to parents whatever their professional
position. Given such an institutional context, we expect that the neg-
ative effects of unemployment and job insecurity on fertility decisions
should be limited in France unlike in countries where job protection
is weaker and/or support for families with children depends on the
parents’ employment status. If unemployment and insecure jobs in

France are shown to impact on fertility intentions, they certainly affect
childbearing plans elsewhere and probably to a greater extent.
4. Data and method
4.1 Data
The data set used here comes from the Familles et employeurs survey (Fam-
ilies and Employers Survey) conducted by the French National Institute
of Demographic Studies (INED) and the French National Institute of
Statistics (INSEE) on a representative sample of the French population
between November 2004 and March 2005. A total of 9,547 individuals
aged 20–49 years, and at most two persons per household in that age
range were interviewed.
The data contains standard socio-demographic information (educa-
tion, household type, number of children, region of residence, health
status, immigrant status, etc.) and detailed information on current
employment status at the time of interview of both partners. This survey
also includes retrospective individual biographical data concerning fam-
ily, residential and employment history from the age of 18. In addition,
people living in partnerships were asked about their fertility plans, and
the timing of these plans. They were asked: Would you like to have or to
adopt a(nother) child(ren), now or later? Respondents could choose any
of the following five response alternatives: I am pregnant or my partner
is pregnant; yes; no; maybe; and don’t know. Those who declared intend-
ing to have a child were also asked: In how many years? Answers varied
between 0 (next year) and 20 years. If declaring at least one-year delay
or being uncertain (that is responses: maybe, don’t know), respondents
were asked whether the timing or the uncertainty was linked to their
own as well as to the partner’s professional situation. Yes, no, maybe or
do not know were the response alternatives.
Our sample comprises 1,571 men and 1,877 women aged 20–40 with
a partner (co-resident or not), not pregnant at the time of the interview.
The majority (63 per cent of women and 85 per cent of men), hold
a stable job, with a long-term labour contract. Around 20 per cent of
the respondents face an unstable employment situation: 9 per cent of
women and 7 per cent of men hold a fixed-term contract (that is short-
term or temporary job, seasonal contracts, government-sponsored jobs,
apprenticeships); 8 per cent of women and 6 per cent of men declare
they are unemployed. About 2 per cent of men and 3 per cent of women
are still in education. See the Appendix for details.
4.2 Method
We estimate multivariate regressions using logistic regression on the
probability of wanting a(nother) child within the next three years.
We control for socio-economic variables such as age (age squared),
number of children, religiosity, educational attainment (four levels:
tertiary/secondary/primary education and no completed education),
duration of partnership, number of siblings, immigrant status and
household income (three categories: high/medium/low). The variable of
interest is the current professional situation of each partner. Five statuses
are distinguished: being in a permanent job, in a fixed-term job, being
unemployed, in education or housewife.4 The same categories apply for
the partner’s employment status. Separate regressions are conducted for
men and women on the entire population, and on the childless and
on parents, separately. For the latter group, an indicator of whether the
youngest child is under three years is introduced as a control variable.
5. Results
5.1 Fertility plans in France – descriptive results

In France, the two-child family is the norm and very few people wish to
remain, and effectively remain, childless. Fertility intentions of couples
according to birth parity are a good tool to estimate how strong this
two-child norm is.
In our sample, whether they are parents or not, about 35 per cent
of men and women aged 20–40 declare they want to have a(nother)
child during the next three years and about 7 per cent want a child
later (Figure 3.1). Overall, fertility plans vary little by gender except
that women less frequently declare not wanting a(nother) child at all
(36 per cent of women and 41 per cent of men). Nearly 1 out of 5
individuals are unsure about childbearing decisions. But fertility plans
strongly depend on the number of children one already has. Only about
9 per cent of childless women and 6 per cent of childless men do not
want a child at all. 24 per cent of childless women and 17 per cent
of men are hesitant. The remaining part, that is 77 per cent of child-
less men and 67 per cent of women, declare they want a child now
or later. Fifty-two per cent of childless women and 63 per cent of men
want a child within the next three years, and around 15 per cent of
people want a child later. Thus childless men’s childbearing plans seem
more certain than those of childless women. Fertility plans of one-child
parents are close to those of childless people, except that the share of
%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Total 0 1 2 3 4+ Total 0 1 2 3 4+
Number of children, WOMEN Number of children, MEN
No Maybe Yes later Yes within 3 years
Figure 3.1 Fertility plans in France by number of children

Source: Familles et employeurs survey, women and men, aged 20–40, own estimations.
those who want a child later is very small, while that of those who
do not want another child is higher (about 20 per cent). This suggests
that there is a preference for shorter spacing between first and second
births. Once families have two children, fertility plans drop dramati-
cally: about 15 per cent of parents of two children want another child
within the next three years, and about 10 per cent of parents of three or
more children. This shows the strong two-child family norm, character-
istic of French fertility, as an implicit contract for couples to reach. After
having reached this goal, the third child and those following appear
more optional. Around more than 1 out of 3 two-child parents still want
another child, but only 38 per cent of them want this birth to arrive in
a short-term period. Most of them hesitate or want to wait longer.
Of course, fertility plans fluctuate a great deal with age (Figure 3.2).
The age range during which fertility plans are the strongest is 23–28
years for women, and 24–30 years for men. Individuals in their early
twenties are either hesitant regarding their fertility plans or want to
postpone childbearing. One noteworthy point is that the non-desire for
children (or additional children) is null at 20 and remains very small,
that is under 5 per cent, until the age of 27 for both sexes, showing a very
strong desire of all French couples to become parents during their lives.
The proportion of people who do not want (more) children increases
Women
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Men
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Figure 3.2 Fertility plans in France by age, all parity together

with age. Many of them may have already reached their desired fam-
ily size. But there is also a decrease of fertility desires among childless
people observed for women only, from age 30 onwards, as Regnier-
Loilier and Solaz (2010) showed. This may come from a discouragement:
afraid of not managing to become mothers for biological or other rea-
sons (a disagreement with their partner about fertility intentions, for
instance), these women might be more cautious in declaring that they
want a child. Or this may be a selection effect: the more child-oriented

women being mothers already, those remaining childless at later ages
are more likely to be childless by choice. Moreover, childless women at
these ages are probably more often highly educated. They may decide
to postpone or give up their fertility plans, because they wish to enjoy
the returns from their human capital investment first, since having chil-
dren involves a higher cost for them. Indeed, as economic theories have
pointed out, the opportunity cost of childbearing is higher for highly
educated women who may also be more work-oriented and have a lower
preference for children, as suggested by Hakim (1998) with respect to
women’s preferences regarding work and children.
The desire to have a(nother) child is concentrated over a period of
three years and this timing is very similar for men and women. Among
childless people, 53 per cent of men and 60 per cent of women want
to become a parent during the next three years, respectively 64 per cent
and 71 per cent during the next five years. Women who desire a child
are a bit more in a hurry to have it soon than their male counterparts.
One reason may be that their fecundity fails sooner than men’s. Very
few declare they want a child in more than five years. The timing is
more concentrated around the next two years for parents, showing a
preference for having children of close ages. There is no visible gendered
effect in the delay.
Plans vary also by professional status (Figure 3.3). Women in stable
jobs have stronger fertility intentions: 67 per cent want a child within
the next three years, compared with 57 per cent of women holding a
short-term job or being unemployed, and 37 per cent of women in
education.5 Moreover, few women in stable jobs intend to postpone
childbearing, contrary to those in fixed-term jobs or those who are
unemployed, in line with the concept of uncertainty. Compared with
men in stable jobs, unemployed men intend to delay fertility much
more often. They are also more hesitant about the timing. More sur-
prisingly, 60 per cent of men holding a short-term contract desire a
child within the next three years. This may be linked to the life cycle
as men holding a short-term contract are more likely to be young and
childless, whereas men having a long-term job are more likely to have
already reached their desired number of children. Thus, multivariate
regression analyses can provide a better understanding of these results.
Compared with their female counterparts, unemployed men are also
more likely to postpone having children: 28 per cent of unemployed
men and 19 per cent of unemployed women want a child, but not
within three years. There are not many differences between men and
%
100
80
60
40
20
0
Long-term job
Short-term job
Short-term job
Unemployed
Unemployed
In education
Long-term job
In education
Women Men
Figure 3.3 Fertility plans in France by employment status

women holding a fixed-term contract: men want an earlier child a little

more often (61 per cent against 58 per cent). However, women having
a stable job position clearly have a stronger desire to have a child soon
than men. Women seem more certain of their fertility intentions than
men when they can be confident about their professional situation.
The analysis of the links between fertility intentions and the individ-
ual’s and the partner’s employment situation tends to confirm this last
observation, as 38 per cent of women and 27 per cent of men declare
that their professional situation matters for their timing of childbearing
(Table 3.1). Whatever the fertility intentions, women’s intentions are
declared to be more dependent on their own professional situation than
those of men are. The professional position seems to be a crucial deter-
minant of the delay in childbearing in general. Economic constraints
affect the desire, but also the timing in which the desire is expected to
be realised. More than half of the postponers declare that the delay in
having a child is connected to their professional situation.
The link between fertility plans and the individual’s and the partner’s
employment situation is also sensitive to the degree of job insecurity.
People, again women more often than men, declare more frequently
that their timing plans are connected to their professional situation
when they hold a fixed-term contract or are unemployed than when
they have a permanent contract. This is particularly the case when
they intend to postpone fertility. Seventy per cent of women holding
Table 3.1 Proportion (%) declaring their timing linked to their professional
situation in France
Permanent Short-term Unemployed In education Total

contract job
All people
desiring a
child
Men 19.8 51.3 49.3 71.8 27.2
Women 31.1 56.2 48.2 77.3 37.6
Yes within
3 years
Men 16.4 50.3 35.1 61.3 22.5
Women 30.6 52.6 43.2 79.6 34.7
Yes later
(postponers)
Men 39.1 56.7 82.3 84.8 50
Women 35.8 69.8 66.8 74.4 54
a fixed-term contract and 67 per cent of the unemployed, who intend

to postpone childbearing more than three years, declare that this timing
is linked with their professional situation. This figure is only 36 per cent
for women in stable employment. Thus, it seems that having a sta-
ble job is a precondition for women to have a child. Similarly, among
postponers, unemployed men and men holding a short-term job declare
more often that their timing is linked to their professional situation
compared with those in permanent jobs.
Besides the individual’s employment situation, that of the partner is
also a determining factor. Comparing both partners’ answers, one can
distinguish four cases: timing plans depend on (i) the respondent’s pro-
fessional situation (ii) his/her partner’s professional situation (iii) both
partners’ professional situation, or (iv) neither partner’s professional sit-
uation (Table 3.2). Nine per cent of men and 20 per cent of women think
their fertility plans depend only on their own professional situation.
Men declare more often that it depends on their partner’s professional
situation (13 per cent), as opposed to women (6 per cent). Again, the
woman’s professional situation matters more than the man’s for fertility
intentions, even from the partner’s point of view.
Postponers are more likely to declare that their own professional situ-
ation matters more than their partner’s professional situation, compared
with those who want a child within the next three years. Similarly, men
and women who intend to have a child within three years declare less
Table 3.2 Timing and partners’ professional situation (%) in France
Men Women
Yes within Yes Total Yes within Yes Total

3 years later 3 years later
Own professional 8.4 12.8 9.1 18.4 31.7 20.4

situation matters
Partner’s professional 12.4 13.4 12.5 5.9 4.1 5.6
situation matters
Both partners’ 14.1 37.2 18.0 16.3 22.3 17.2
professional situation
matters
Not linked with 65.1 36.6 60.3 59.5 41.9 56.8
professional situation
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
often that their timing is related to both partners’ professional situation

than those who want a child later. Thus, those who have concrete fer-
tility plans seem less constrained by their professional situation than
postponers. Women seem to pay more attention to their own profes-
sional situation than to their partner’s in their fertility plans, while men
declare more often that both situations matter or that only their part-
ner’s situation matters. This result tends to confirm that both partners
have concluded that having a child would be more costly for the woman
than the man.
As for the link to the partner’s professional situation, its uncertainty
also matters (results not presented here): the less stable the partner’s pro-
fessional situation, the more it affects own fertility plans. Women whose
partner is unemployed declare more frequently that their intended tim-
ing of childbearing is linked with his professional situation. This is also
the case for women whose partner holds a fixed-term contract. Men
seem to be more worried when their partner holds a fixed-term contract
than when she is unemployed.
5.2 Results of the multivariate analyses

Table 3.3 presents the logistic regression estimates on the desire to have a
child within the next three years relative to those who want a child later
or do not want a child.6 The first two columns describe the intentions
of men and women for the whole population studied, whereas further
Table 3.3 Determinants of fertility plans in France (logistic regression models). Relative odds of intention to have a(nother) child within
three years
Total Childless 1 child 2 children
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Respondent in 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
permanent job
Respondent in 1.400 1.408 0.667∗∗ 0.666∗∗ 1.959∗ 1.953∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.480∗∗ 0.771 0.768 0.798 0.800 1.600 1.638 0.684 0.660
short-term job
Respondent 0.612∗ 0.577∗∗ 0.751 0.747 0.431∗ 0.401∗∗ 0.666 0.670 0.755 0.629 0.719 0.694 0.604 0.623 0.486 0.458
unemployed
Respondent in 0.698 0.908 0.252∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.491 0.742 0.156∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
education
Respondent 0.971 0.976 1.376 1.399 0.681 0.648 1.193 1.204
housewife
Partner in 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
permanent job
Partner in 0.969 1.270 1.025 1.759 0.725 0.990 0.802 1.569
short-term job
Partner 0.860 0.901 1.064 1.123 0.577 0.599 0.748 1.502
unemployed
Partner in 0.442∗∗ 1.571 0.423∗ 1.038
education
Partner housewife 0.725 0.888 0.349∗∗∗ 1.176
Age 2.408∗∗∗ 2.375∗∗∗ 1.675∗∗∗ 1.680∗∗∗ 2.322∗∗∗ 2.272∗∗∗ 2.780∗∗∗ 2.815∗∗∗ 1.990∗∗ 2.076∗∗ 2.170∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗ 1.990 1.947 1.162 1.215
Age squared 0.985∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗ 0.987∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.988 0.988 0.996 0.995
Table 3.3 (Continued)
Total Childless 1 child 2 children
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Couple 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
duration= 0–4
years
Couple 1.184 1.143 1.030 1.035 1.457 1.379 1.543 1.557 1.530 1.452 1.174 1.142 0.763 0.774 0.522 0.513
duration=
5–9 years
Couple 0.716 0.688∗ 0.603∗∗ 0.608∗∗ 0.606 0.566 1.857 1.908 1.337 1.323 0.617 0.606 0.581 0.581 0.379∗∗ 0.373∗∗
duration
> 10 years
Tertiary 1.366∗∗ 1.395∗∗ 1.480∗∗ 1.482∗∗ 1.221 1.235 0.803 0.817 1.202 1.270 1.823∗∗ 1.848∗∗ 2.278∗∗ 2.286∗∗ 1.950∗∗ 1.936∗∗
education
Secondary 1.120 1.128 1.105 1.103 1.107 1.110 0.678 0.696 1.357 1.383 1.383 1.397 1.149 1.135 1.060 1.049
education
Lower than 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
secondary
education
No education 0.944 0.936 1.056 1.057 0.864 0.795 1.055 1.003 0.986 0.988 1.718 1.692 1.171 1.187 0.891 0.899
Childless 0.979 0.960 0.982 0.977
1 child 1 1 1 1
2 children 0.165∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
3 children 0.133∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
4+ children 0.164∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
No religious 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
feeling
Religious 1.322 1.351∗ 1.350∗∗ 1.355∗∗ 1.643 1.625 1.126 1.147 0.659 0.663 1.447 1.439 2.045∗∗ 2.022∗∗ 1.600∗ 1.612∗
feeling
Number of 1.253∗ 1.237 1.188 1.187 1.452∗ 1.389 1.300 1.299 1.323 1.453 0.893 0.903 1.426 1.410 1.809∗∗ 1.814∗∗
siblings
Low household 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
income
Medium 0.842 0.773 1.196 1.198 0.419∗∗ 0.379∗∗ 0.671 0.681 1.933 1.417 1.289 1.200 0.948 0.932 2.648∗ 3.021∗
household
income
High 1.229 1.020 1.477∗ 1.485∗ 0.904 0.748 1.055 1.097 2.181∗∗ 1.193 1.501 1.274 0.986 1.012 3.101∗∗ 3.644∗∗
household
income
Income 0.432 0.351∗ 0.665 0.672 0.355 0.379 0.838 0.502 0.624 0.539 0.769 0.836 2.759 3.282
(no answer)
Youngest child 2.521∗∗∗ 2.587∗∗∗ 2.457∗∗∗ 2.396∗∗∗ 1.627 1.558 1.175 1.158
<3
Observations 1571 1571 1877 1877 408 408 400 400 403 403 436 436 554 554 716 716
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10 ∗∗ p < 0. 05 ∗∗∗ p < 0. 01.

columns are distinguished by parity. We present two specifications with

and without the partner’s professional situation.
The first birth depends on professional status
Even after controlling for income, individual and partner’s professional

situation still influence fertility intentions. Employment status mat-
ters for fertility plans in different ways for men and women. Being
unemployed decreases fertility plans compared with those holding a
permanent job only for men. It shows that men would like to re-enter
the labour market before becoming fathers, to restore their social status
and perhaps also their breadwinner position. But if they are parents,
being unemployed has no effect on further childbearing intentions.
On the other hand, unemployment never has a significant impact on
women’s fertility plans. Unlike for men, being unemployed neither
weakens nor strengthens women’s fertility intentions, no matter what
their level of education might be.7 This gendered effect of unemploy-
ment reflects the persistence of quite traditional gender roles in France.
Men expect themselves and are expected by their female partners to
be the main breadwinner in the family, especially when entering into
parenthood.
For women, being in education has a very strong preventive effect
on planning to become a parent. Still being in education also dimin-
ishes the likelihood to desire a second child for those who are already
mothers.8 Thus, completing education, that is finishing investment in
human capital, is a precondition of childbearing for women. In con-
trast, male students’ fertility plans do not differ significantly from those
of men in permanent employment. This gender difference in the impact
of being enrolled in studies reflects the incoherence effect (McDonald,
2000), discussed earlier. Though women and men now have equal access
to education at all levels, women continue to bear, and anticipate that
they will bear, the main part of childrearing responsibilities. Indeed, the
cost of childbearing when in education is much lower for men than
for women. The period of interruption of studies because of having a
child is usually brief for men; they carry on with their studies while
being fathers. This gendered result for students may also reflect a selec-
tion effect. Student women and student men certainly have different
profiles. As men form partnerships generally later than women, they
are also less likely to be in a relationship while they are still studying.
Our respondents, however, are already living with a partner, even those
still in education; thus, they may be more confident about their family
life and also their job prospects. Male students in partnerships are, on
average, older than female students and may be closer to the end of
their studies. Interestingly, men seem to be aware of the higher cost of
childbearing for student women, as they are less likely to desire a child
within the next three years if their partner is currently in education,
whereas women students take into account only their own professional
situation, but not that of their partner.
Holding the status of housewife has no significant effect on fertility
plans when women are analysed together, but it diminishes the child
desire for one-child families in the men’s model. One possible expla-
nation is that women in these couples have not completely chosen
this position and thus want to go back to work before having another
child. Indeed, no parental leave was available for the first child in France
when the survey was conducted. This monetary constraint implies that
it is necessary to return to work before having an additional child,
all the more so since working and being a mother is quite easy and
widespread in France. Hence, it can be assumed that these housewives
are more likely to be discouraged unemployed. Errors in registering their
employment status are another possibility.9
Women holding a fixed-term contract have weaker fertility intentions
than those in permanent employment – this effect being significant
only for childless women. On the other hand, men working in inse-
cure jobs have the same childbearing intentions as men in stable jobs.
First-childbearing seems to be associated with a higher cost for women
in short-term jobs compared with men in the same position. Indeed,
being pregnant while holding a short-term job would reduce the oppor-
tunities for women to secure a long-term contract in the same firm. This
finding suggests that having a stable job is necessary for women before
getting pregnant. Women seem to anticipate the risk of losing their job
after childbearing when they hold a fixed contract, that is their con-
tract may not be renewed or made into a long-term contract. This risk is
lower for men since fatherhood has little effect on their employment
path. This gendered effect indicates that, as economic theory states,
the opportunity cost of having a child plays in the decision to have
a child, and both the opportunity cost and the direct cost of a child
seem to be higher for women. For men, however, what matters is to
get a job, whatever its quality or stability, before becoming a father.10
In other words, working status is much more important for them than
job stability.
Also, we find that individual employment status matters more than
that of the partner, particularly for women. When household income is
controlled for, the partner’s employment status has no impact at all on

women’s childbearing plans. For men, however, having a partner in edu-
cation has a negative effect on their intentions. They anticipate the huge
cost of a study break for women. One-child fathers with a housewife
spouse also have lower fertility intentions, consistent with the finding
that one-child housewives are less likely to plan to have another child
within three years. This reflects that men as well as women are aware
that women should return to the labour market before having additional
children.
An income effect for the third birth
Fertility intentions increase with educational level. Men and women

with university degrees are more likely to intend to have a child than
those with less schooling. The analyses by parity indicate that this effect
is only significant for parents who already have two children. In other
words, educational attainment matters mainly for the decision about
having a third child. Previous studies have also shown that French fer-
tility is weakly affected by socio-economic position or education level,
unlike in England for instance (Ekert-Jaffé et al., 2002), at least for the
first two births. This counter-intuitive finding of stronger intentions to
have a third child for the more educated is interesting. Of course, it
may reflect an income effect, but introducing the household income
covariate into the model does not cancel this effect. For women, we
also find that living in a high-income household strengthens their third-
child intentions. Thus, women’s intentions to have a third child during
the next three years are clearly driven by an income effect, directly
through the household income and indirectly through their level of
education. Having a high income and high level of education allows
them to retain their ties to the labour market, since they can afford
to pay for childcare for an additional child. Moreover, the gender divi-
sion of household tasks is less unequal in such families (Ponthieux and
Schreiber, 2006), which alleviates the cost of an additional child. Indeed,
there is strong heterogeneity of preferences among women regarding the
third child. But contrary to Hakim’s (1998) theory about preferences,
according to which highly educated women are supposedly less family-
than career-oriented, they are the ones who intend to have large fami-
lies in France. This result indicates that French family policy, that gives
more support to the third child than to previous children, has been
efficient in encouraging fertility in high-income families, more so than
among the less well-off, which is probably related to the special tax break
(called ‘quotient familial’), especially beneficial to wealthier families
rather than poorer ones. We do not find significant income effects for
men’s fertility intentions, except for aiming to start a family for child-
less men – stronger intentions for the extreme income levels: low and
high. There is also a positive effect on fertility intentions of one-child
fathers who live in a high-income household, but this effect is no longer
significant once their partner’s professional status is controlled for.
The strength of the two-child norm in France
Except for the effect of housewife status for one-child mothers, individ-
ual and partner’s professional situation matters only for childless men
and women. For parents, their professional status and that of their part-
ners matter little for childbearing plans, which mainly depend on the
life stage: that is age, relationship duration and age of the youngest
child. Intentions to have a third child are also driven by ‘inherited’ val-
ues: religiosity and the number of siblings which may indicate that the
respondent was raised in a family with strong family orientation, which
in turn strengthens their intentions to enlarge their family. Hence, the
results suggest that structural and economic explanations hold mainly
for entry into parenthood, whereas the desire to have a second child
seems to be a norm in itself. The positive and quite strong living-
standard effect on women’s intentions to have a third child, not visible
for the previous children, also indicates the dominance of the two-
child family norm in France – a kind of implicit contract for couples.
Second-child intentions are weakly affected by socio-demographic and
economic factors, whereas any additional birth is more of a choice, rest-
ing mainly on women’s shoulders who will bear most of the cost of this
‘optional’ child.
6. Conclusions and discussions
In this chapter we have addressed the effect of job uncertainty on fer-

tility intentions in France, a country where children are highly valued
at both the individual level and by the state, and families with children
enjoy extensive social support. Economic uncertainty, which is a result
of unemployment or of holding a non-permanent job, may weaken fer-
tility intentions leading to postponement in childbearing, if people feel
the need to have a secure professional situation before having children.
Alternatively, economic uncertainty may strengthen intentions to have

children if people choose to focus mostly on their private life.
Our analyses suggest parity-specific explanations for fertility deci-
sions. The results show that economic uncertainty constrains people
mainly in their wish to start a family. Intentions to have the first child
are driven by professional position and its stability. Unemployment
tends to reduce fertility intentions for men, but not for women. Get-
ting a job is thus a precondition of parenthood for men, who fear
further deterioration in their living standard if they become a father
while unemployed. In an uncertain economic situation, the cost of
having children is perceived as higher and young men delay plans to
have a child until they hold a job. For women, there is an additional
effect. Some women would like to take the opportunity to have a child
while being unemployed whereas others wait for better times, like men,
before thinking of having children. On average, these effects cancel each
other out. Our results also reflect the impact of gender norms on fer-
tility plans, at least for men, who seem to integrate the ‘breadwinner
norm’, that is they have to signal that they are the provider before
becoming fathers. For women, holding an unstable job, rather than
being unemployed, is what clearly weakens the intentions to have a
first child. It is important for women to get a permanent job before
becoming a mother, as they anticipate the higher opportunity cost of
childbearing they will have to bear, compared with men. Thus, neither
for women, nor for men do we find support for the assumption that eco-
nomic uncertainty could turn people’s attention mainly to the private
sphere.
For the second child, men’s and women’s fertility intentions depend
neither on their economic nor on the socio-demographic situation. Even
economic uncertainty seems not to matter. The two-child family norm
is so strong in France that it counterbalances economic constraints.
Indeed, there is no visible heterogeneity in the fertility intentions of
one-child parents. Their further childbearing plans depend only on the
age of the first child. Thus, the timing of fertility is the only aspect
that determines their fertility intentions, and by extension their future
behaviour.
As for the third child, we observe strong effects of both cultural
aspects, such as religiosity and family background, and of economic fac-
tors, such as education and living standard. Being religious and having
been raised in a family with strong family orientation have a positive
effect on fertility intentions. A high standard of living and high level of
education also increase third-child plans, being able to afford to have

a large family. In addition, the incoherence effect is smaller for the
more highly educated: as the household division of labour is less gen-
dered, highly educated women are more confident about their partner’s
active support in family tasks, and hence, about being able to continue
to combine their career with a large family. Indeed, these results show
that lifestyle preferences matter, although not in the way suggested by
Hakim, since the more career-oriented highly educated women are the
ones who intend to have larger families in France. The income effect is
not significant for men’s intentions, indicating that women are the main
driver of the third-child decision, as they will bear the professional cost.
All in all, unlike in most other European countries, we find a spe-
cific pattern with respect to childbearing intentions among women
in France. They do not benefit from unemployment to have chil-
dren, and wait until they are in a stable employment position before
becoming mothers. This reflects a very strong work attachment among
French women, supported by the rather extensive coverage of childcare
facilities that helps women to combine paid work and childrearing.
At the same time, these results, along with unemployed men being
less likely to intend to start a family in the near future, also indi-
cate the fertility-inhibiting effect of economic uncertainty. However,
no such influence is found for parents’ further childbearing inten-
tions. This suggests a framework of stability, created by the generous
French family and employment policies, that mitigates the negative
impact of economic uncertainty, at least when planning to have a sec-
ond or even a third child. Third-child intentions are strengthened by
specific policy measures, especially the tax system providing extensive
tax breaks for large families which benefits mostly those with high
incomes and then also the highly educated. Another possible reason
for highly educated women in France being most likely to intend to
have a third child is a more equal division of labour in such fam-
ilies, reducing the incoherence effect. Similar lines of reasoning are
followed in the current French public debate when suggesting to cut
the length of parental leave to also curb discrimination against moth-
ers in the labour market, increasing the parental leave allowance and
introducing a father’s quota, that is reserving some share of parental
leave for fathers in order to get them involved in childrearing. Such
measures may indeed lead to a more equal division of housework and
parental tasks, contributing to reasonable fertility levels also in the
long run.
Appendix
Table 3.A.1 Distribution of independent variables (%): France
Men Women
Respondent’s professional situation

Permanent job (ref) 85 63
Short-term job 7 8
Unemployed 6 8
In education 2 3
Housewife 18
Partner’s professional situation
Partner in permanent job (ref) 62 86
Partner in short-term job 9 7
Partner unemployed 8 6
Partner in education 3 1
Partner housewife 18
Age (mean) 32.68 32.01
Couple duration
< 5 years (ref) 31 26
5–9 years 29 27
10+ years 40 47
Education
Tertiary 32 40
Secondary 17 19
Lower than secondary (ref) 41 31
No education 10 10
Number of children
Childless 26 21
1 child (ref) 26 23
2 children 35 38
3 children 10 14
4+ children 3 4
Religious feeling (ref = no) 17 24
More than one sibling 61 64
Youngest child <3 33 31
Household income
Low (ref) 12 11
Medium 16 18
High 69 68
No answer 3 3
N (total) 1571 1877
Notes
1. Articles L1242–14 to L1242–16 and L1243–8 to L1243–1 of the Labour Code.
2. Unemployment benefits can be claimed for a period equal to the dura-
tion of former employment, with a maximum of 24 months. In 2010, the
amount of benefit equals 57.4 per cent of gross daily earnings if monthly
gross earnings were between 1,791.18 euros and 9,728 euros; 40.4 per cent
of gross daily earnings + 10.15 euros per day if monthly gross earnings were
between 1,791.18 euros and 9,728 euros and 1,791.18 euros; 24.76 euros
per day if monthly gross earnings were between 990.40 euros and 1,084.90
euros. If monthly gross earnings were under 990.40 euros, the benefit equals
75 per cent of the gross monthly wage.
3. For parents who worked or are unemployed at least eight quarters within
the two years preceding the birth for a first child, within the four years for a
second birth and five years for a third child.
4. Since very few men are out of the labour force, they are grouped with the
unemployed.
5. They are also older on average: their median age is 33 years compared with
30 for women holding a fixed-term contract, 31 for unemployed women
and 23 for students. Thus, a larger share of women in stable job has already
reached its final number of children.
6. Multinomial logistic models have also been performed to distinguish
postponers from people who do not want a child at all. These are available
from the authors but are not presented in this section.
7. Interaction effect between professional status and unemployment situa-
tion has been tested, but the results for unemployment situation have not
changed.
8. We could not estimate the effect for higher-order births given our sample
size as very few mothers with two or more children were studying.
9. Some mothers may have registered as housewives because they do not
receive unemployment allowances conditioned on having worked enough
time in the preceding years or because they are still on maternity leave.
10. An alternative explanation would be that the type of short-term contract dif-
fers by gender, for instance that men hold more secure short-term jobs (e.g.
in the public sector). But there is no such difference in the structure of short-
term jobs. For instance, in our sample 32 per cent of men and 35 per cent
of women holding a short-term contract respectively work in the public
sphere.
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4
Female Employment,
Reconciliation Policies
and Childbearing Intentions
in East and West Germany
Katharina Lutz, Mandy Boehnke, Johannes Huinink
and Silke Tophoven
1. Introduction
In many European societies a discrepancy between preferences towards

children and the realisation of births can be observed. It seems young
men and women have fewer children than they would wish. This fertil-
ity gap could be a chance for policy to increase birth rates. If hindrances
to the realisation of the preferred number of children were identified
and reduced, more children might be born (Philipov, 2009).
Two central reasons for low fertility can be detected in European soci-
eties: risk and incoherence. Economic risks in terms of labour market
uncertainties (temporary employment, unemployment) have become
very prevalent in recent decades characterised by New Capitalism and
Globalisation. Additionally, the risk of separation and divorce makes
the reliance on a single breadwinner problematic, leading to a higher
necessity for women to engage themselves in the labour market even
with young children (McDonald, 2006). The second reason is the prob-
lem of incoherence. Institutional settings in European countries differ
in the ways they facilitate the reconciliation of family life and employ-
ment, also affecting gender equity in the public sphere and in the family
(McDonald, 2000; Hobson and Oláh, 2006). Both reasons lead to severe
tensions young individuals face when deciding about childbearing.
This chapter addresses short-term fertility intentions, which are
the first step from ideals to the realisation of birth plans and thus
97
98 Childbearing Intentions in East & West Germany
particularly suitable to observe first tensions regarding economic

insecurity and problems of incoherence prospective parents perceive.
Focusing on Germany, we aim to explore the tensions, if any, between
female employment and fertility intentions and their links to work–
life balance policies. To do this, it is necessary to look at East and
West Germany separately. In the years since the collapse of the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) and the subsequent German unification,
Germany has undergone fairly dramatic changes. Although family pat-
terns in East and West have become more similar over time, in other
aspects, such as female occupational behaviour and attitudes towards
mothers’ engagement in work and care, the differences have remained.
We will argue that these differences do not only lead to objectively
different tensions regarding insecurity and incoherence but also to dif-
ferent perceptions of them. The present study moves beyond previous
research by postulating that it is not only institutional settings pro-
voking tensions between work engagement and family, but tensions
between work and private life can also be perceived differently due
to different norms and values. We will argue that different cultural
heritages, in terms of specific norms and values stemming from the pol-
icy context as well as people’s everyday experiences in the GDR and
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), exist in the two parts of the
country.
The chapter is organised as follows: first, we discuss the demographic,
economic, institutional and political circumstances in Germany
(Section 2). In order to link our analyses to previous studies we will
briefly outline the state of the art concerning fertility research in
Germany (Section 3, Subsection 3.1). Thereafter, we present our the-
oretical framework and the hypotheses. The data set analysed to test
our hypotheses is the first wave of the German Family Panel (pairfam),
which will be described in Section 4, followed by the descriptive and
multivariate results. Finally, the chapter gives an outlook on further
developments in German family policy.
2. The German context
In this section we give an overview of the context in which German cou-

ples plan and have their children. Germany, being a conservative welfare
state by Esping-Andersen’s classification (1990) and a representative of
the General Family Support policy configuration type (Korpi, 2000;
Hobson and Oláh, 2006), promotes traditional living arrangements,
K. Lutz, M. Boehnke, J. Huinink & S. Tophoven 99
like the male-breadwinner model. This characterisation will be veri-

fied as seen in the developments regarding fertility, female labour force
participation and reconciliation policies. Furthermore, the situation
regarding living standards and norms is described.
Like in almost all industrialised societies, fertility rates in Germany
have been below the reproduction level of 2.1 children per woman for
several decades now. Birth rates began to sink at the end of the 1960s
after the so-called baby boom. The FRG was among the first coun-
tries where decreasing fertility rates, mostly due to postponement of
childbearing, smaller family sizes and rising childlessness were observed
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007). Highly efficient contraceptives made
it possible to plan the timing of parenthood, also enabling women to
profit from the educational expansion that took place from the 1960s
onwards, and be more and longer engaged in the labour market, which
is the core reason for the rapid fertility decline in the beginning of
the 1970s given conditions for reconciliation in Germany (Brewster and
Rindfuss, 2000; Dorbritz, 2008). Since the late 1970s, the total fertility
rate1 in the West is quite constant at levels around 1.3. In contrast, fer-
tility trends in the GDR differed considerably from those in the FRG,
while most of the population had at least a basic occupational edu-
cation and women had been engaged in the labour market from the
formation of the state in 1949. Fertility rates declined also in the East
until the mid-1970s, when a range of family policy measures (such as
extended maternity and parental leave, reduced working hours, among
others) stopped this development and birth rates increased again, even
though they remained below the replacement level (Dorbritz, 2008).
After reunification, East Germany experienced a ‘demographic shock’.
Due to individuals deciding not to have more children or at least not to
have them at that time, the total period fertility rate sank to historically
unique levels of below one child per woman (Figure 4.1). Since the mid-
1990s, the rates have increased and by now fertility rates in East and
West have converged.
The fertility decline can also be seen in cohort fertility, that is the
final number of children women born in a certain year have. While
women born in 1930 had 2.2 children on average, younger cohorts had
smaller family sizes, reaching only 1.5 children per woman for the 1965
cohort in West Germany. In East Germany the decline was not as steep
and fertility remained higher, as even the birth cohorts of 1955–60 were
influenced by pro-natalist policies and had a completed fertility of about
1.8 children per woman (Engstler and Menning, 2003). Only for women
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
84
69
90
02
05
72
87
93
96
78
75
99
66
08
60
63
81
19
19
19
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
19
19
19
East West
Figure 4.1 Total period fertility rate in East and West Germany, 1960–2008
Source: INED (2011).
born after 1960 completed fertility began to fall. Here, as mentioned ear-
lier, the influence of the political turmoil began to show. The completed
fertility rates of women born in 1967 do not differ much between West
(1.44) and East (1.47) (Dorbritz, 2008).
The changes in period and cohort fertility went along with age at first
motherhood rising continuously since the 1970s in the West and since
1990 also in the East. While West German women born between 1942
and 1951 had their first child at age 24 on average, the mean age of
first birth is 27 for birth cohorts of 1962–71 (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2007). In contrast, women in the GDR had their children traditionally
early. Women born between 1942 and 1961 completed their childbear-
ing during the time of the GDR and had their first child on average at
age 22 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007). Even though women in the East
follow the Western trend and seem to adopt the pattern of later births,
the age of first motherhood is still lower there than in West Germany:
in 2008, East German women were 27.5 years old when giving birth to
their first child, while West German women were on average 28.7 years
(Goldstein et al., 2010).
Another indicator of changes in period and cohort fertility is
childlessness, which has become more and more prevalent during the
last decades, in particular in the FRG. While only 7 per cent of the
West German birth cohort of 1935 never had a child,2 this is true for
21 per cent of women born in 1960. Contrary to this, childlessness was
very low in the East, where only 7 per cent of women born in 1960 had
no children. Childlessness has increased though for younger cohorts, for
instance 13 per cent of women born in 1966 are expected not to become
mothers (Dorbritz, 2008).
Lower fertility rates in Germany are accompanied by decreasing
marriage rates. While in the times of the ‘Golden Age of Marriage’
almost the entire population entered into marriage, in 1980 it was only
84.1 per cent of women and 76.5 per cent of men who would marry at
least once in their lifetime. This was a continuing trend to the present
day with as few as 77 per cent of women and 67 per cent of men
who ever enter into a first marriage in 2004. In East Germany, there
was a higher inclination to marry, which lasted until the end of the
GDR, followed by a sharp decline thereafter, similarly to the fertility
rates. Since then rates of entering into first marriage are lower in East
Germany – for 2004 it was 69 per cent for women and 57 per cent for
men (Dorbritz, 2008). In addition to decreasing marriage rates we find
increasing divorce rates in Germany since the 1960s. Divorce rates have
been higher in East Germany until 1990, when they fell sharply after
reunification.
In summary, family patterns in the former GDR were shaped by early
marriages, early births, a high proportion of non-marital births and fre-
quent divorces unlike in West Germany. After reunification, most of
these indicators showed trends of convergence in East and West. Non-
marital births, however, are still much more frequent in the former GDR
(Neue Länder) although the trend is also increasing in the former FRG
(Alte Länder). In 2009, of all children born, 61 per cent were born out
of wedlock in the East, while only 26 per cent in the West. However,
some of these parents enter into marriage after they have had their
first child, and second and third children are more often born within
marriage (Goldstein et al., 2010). The different attitudes towards mar-
riage and children can also be observed when looking at the households
young East and West Germans live in. In 2003, 27.6 per cent of individ-
uals aged 18–35 in the West lived with children, and 28.8 per cent did
so in the East. Of those living in a household with children in the West
81.5 per cent were married, 9.1 per cent were cohabiting and 9.4 per
cent were single parents, while in the East only 50.7 per cent were mar-
ried, 30.2 per cent lived in non-marital partnerships and 15.6 per cent
raised their child(ren) alone (Huinink and Schröder, 2008).
2.1 Labour market structure and female employment

Due to the political division of Germany for 40 years and the fact that
the GDR and the FRG were based on two different economic regimes,
there are still distinct differences in the living standards of the popula-
tions in the two regions. While the economic system of the capitalistic
FRG was built on the free-market economy, the socialistic GDR was
dominated by principles of a centrally planned economy. After German
reunification, the GDR politically as well as economically adapted to
the West German system, which brought positive consequences, as well
as complications. On the negative side one could certainly highlight
the phenomenon of unemployment, unknown to East German citizens
who were used to full employment, and which developed rapidly in
the course of shutting down East German factories. Female unemploy-
ment rates in East Germany climbed from 11.9 in 1991 to 21.6 per cent
in 1997 and slowly declined again to 19.5 in 2004 (male unemploy-
ment rates rose from 8.7 in 1991 to 20.6 per cent in 2004). Figures
for West German men and women increased only slightly to a peak
of 11 and 10.5 per cent in 1997 and reached 10.3 and 8.4 per cent
respectively in 2004 (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen
und Jugend, 2005). Youth unemployment in general is a smaller prob-
lem compared with other European states, though it increased during
the last two decades. Ten per cent of all individuals aged 17–25 are
nowadays registered as unemployed. Since not all are entitled to unem-
ployment benefits, this figure rises to 12 per cent also taking account
of non-registered jobseekers. In the East, the employment situation for
the youth is worse than in the West. While in the new federal states
14 per cent of 17–25-year-olds are unemployed, it is only 11 per cent in
the old states (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006a).
The enrolment of women in the labour market has been rising in the
last decades. The development goes along with a higher participation
in the education system and a higher percentage of working moth-
ers (often working part-time). Since the 1960s, women increased their
engagement in higher education and by now reach similar educational
levels or have an even better educational background than their male
counterparts. In 2004, girls were over-represented in the Gymnasium3
(53.9 per cent of all pupils), while they were under-represented in the
Hauptschule (43.7 per cent of all pupils). Similar tendencies can be seen
in tertiary education. 49.4 per cent of all individuals starting university
in 2006 were women and 50.5 per cent of all graduating students in
the same year were women. However, things look differently if higher
positions in academia are considered. Only 40.9 per cent of all individ-
uals receiving a PhD and only 15.2 per cent of all professors in 2006
were female (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006b; Statistisches Bundesamt,
2008c).
As for labour force participation at ages 15–65 years, 71 per cent of
women and 82 per cent of men were employed in 2007 (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2008a). This gender difference can be explained by a differ-
ent effect of having children on employment, as women tend to take a
career break and reduce working hours to raise their children but men
do not. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the effect of children on female
employment is moderated by education of women and the region (East
and West Germany respectively). In all groups, women with children
under three years are less often employed than women without children
or mothers whose children are older. Women with university education
stay more often employed even with young children. Regarding region it
shows that, although there has been a rise of mother employment in the
West from 54 per cent in 1996 to 62 per cent in 2004, the percentage of
employed mothers is still higher among those living in the Neue Länder
(new German federal states) (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren,
Frauen und Jugend, 2005).
The different patterns of labour force participation of childless women
and mothers respectively can also be seen when analysing women’s
working hours. Most women with young children reduce their work-
ing hours. One-third of all employed and married women with young
children work less than ten hours a week (Statistisches Bundesamt,
Table 4.1 Labour force participation of women, aged 25–40 years, in Germany,
2001 (%)
Age of the youngest West Germany East Germany

child
No university With No university With
degree university degree university
degree degree
Without children 92 91 79 87
Youngest child under 3 33 42 45 58
Youngest child 3 to 68 72 70 82
under 10
Youngest child 10 and 81 84 81 91
older
Source: Huinink and Schröder (2008) on the basis of the micro census 2001.
2008a). With regard to the extent of working hours we find a difference

between East and West German women, the latter working part-time
to a higher percentage. The difference between the regions becomes
most apparent for mothers with two children. In the East, 68 per cent of
those mothers work full-time while only 27 per cent in the West does so
(Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2005).
Another crucial aspect for fertility decisions is having a secure posi-
tion in the labour market. Since the 1990s, economic insecurity in
the form of atypical types of employment (such as marginal, tem-
porary and fixed-term contract employment) has been rising (Keller
and Seifert, 2011). The so-called marginal employment (geringfügige
Beschäftigung) has a special status in social law as such earnings are
only partially subject to social security contributions. Employers pay a
lump sum for social insurance and tax, while employees are exempted
from taxes and social security contributions. Marginal employment is
restricted to a certain income (since 2003 the threshold is 400 euros
monthly), which leads to low weekly working hours, bringing lim-
ited pension rights (Freier and Steiner, 2007). Many of these jobs do
not require formal qualifications. They are mostly held by women to
have an additional income for their family. In December 2008, there
were 6.7 million people who had a part-time job with an income of
a maximum of 400 euros; 63 per cent of them were female (Deutsche
Rentenversicherung Knappschaft Bahn-See, 2008).
The German labour market traditionally promoted secure employ-
ment situations and, despite different deregulation measures during the
last years, fixed-term employment (with limited duration and automatic
end after expiration) increased only to about 10 per cent (Keller and
Seifert, 2011). Fixed-term contracts are only allowed if it is justified, that
is if, for example, the specific task is temporary, the employee has to
prove his or her abilities or if another employee has to be temporar-
ily replaced. Furthermore, the number of temporary contracts with the
same employer is restricted. A pregnancy does not affect the contract,
meaning the contract does not have to be extended because of a preg-
nancy (Bundesministerium für Justiz, 2000). Employers use this type of
contract to handle the number of staff flexibly. For permanent positions
there is comparatively strong job protection in Germany. This protec-
tion is even stronger in the public sector leading to a higher extent of
temporary workers there than in the private sector. Furthermore, tem-
porary employees can be needed if production demands fluctuate and it
becomes necessary to have additional workers. This is more common in
industry rather than in the service sector (Giesecke and Groß, 2006).
Compared with other European countries, temporary employment

is rather marginal in Germany. In 2004, of all employed individuals
(aged 15–65), 9.2 per cent had a fixed-term contract. Again, there are
differences by region with a higher insecurity in the East. There, the
percentage of temporary workers is 14.5 per cent, while in the West
it is 8 per cent (Fuchs, 2006). Women have non-permanent employ-
ment more often than men: 58.7 per cent of all temporarily employed
individuals are female. Young employees are more vulnerable and more
affected by temporary contracts. In 2004, of all fixed-term contract, 56.5
per cent were held by people younger than 30 (Fuchs, 2006). Giesecke
and Groß (2006) showed in their study about temporary employment
a risk of having individual sequences of insecure employment, mean-
ing that one temporary job is either followed by another or by a phase
of unemployment. However, two-thirds of all temporary workers had a
permanent position after three years.
2.2 Norms in East and West

East and West Germany live with different cultural heritages which have
led, for example, to differing family ideologies. The norm for mothers
to be employed has been very much promoted in the GDR, while in the
FRG not only the role as housewife was and is much more accepted, but
also the attitude that young children have to be cared for by the mother
at home and that they would suffer from institutional childcare was
and is more dominant. Differences in attitudes towards gender roles in
the two German regions are also reflected by figures of the Gender Data
Report (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend,
2005). While in the East 29 per cent agree with the opinion that young
children would suffer from mother’s employment, in the West more
than twice as many people agree with this statement in 2004. Nev-
ertheless, a remarkable development can be seen here, as in 1991 the
percentage of people supporting this view was 13 per cent higher than
in 2004 in the West and 29 per cent higher in the East. Similar differ-
ences between the regions can be gleaned from the fact that 66 per cent
of West German women and 59 per cent of West German men in 2002
do not agree with the statement that the male’s task is to earn money
and the female’s is to care for the children, while in the East both figures
are 10 per cent higher. Ideals of women aged 20–44 years on balanc-
ing work and family again show normative differences between East
and West Germany: while only 4.2 per cent of West German women
think that a mother should work full-time while having young chil-
dren, 11.9 per cent of their Eastern counterparts agree with this view
(Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2005).

Thus, the overall view of West Germans reveals rather strong traditional
attitudes putting the main responsibility of raising children on mothers.
This is in line with the findings of two qualitative studies, which
stress the scepticism towards public childcare for under-three-year-olds
in West Germany (Boehnke, 2010; Salles et al., 2010). Men and women
in the old federal states see childcare as their own parental – and mainly
maternal – duty and, thus, reject external childcare. If they have chil-
dren most women want to commit themselves entirely to the task of
childrearing. There seems to be the attitude of doing it well (mean-
ing entirely) or not having children at all. This leads to the pressure to
choose: job or family – at least for some time. This pressure is somewhat
weaker for women with higher education, though it does not van-
ish entirely. Salles et al. (2010) point out an interesting contradiction.
Even though most West German respondents reject formal childcare
for children younger than three years, they nevertheless demand bet-
ter childcare availability. Contrary to the Western ideal of maternal
childcare, women in the East see themselves as working mothers and do
not anticipate major problems of combining employment with mother-
hood. This does not mean they do not expect any problems, but they
are confident that they will be able to handle them. First and foremost,
East Germans are concerned with whether there are any reasonable job
options at all (Boehnke, 2010).
How do the different attitudes towards gender roles influence the
division of labour in the household? Interestingly, recent studies find
the division of household tasks being similar in East and West German
partnerships. In neither region can a true egalitarian division be found,
though many claim it to be their ideal. The tendency towards a more
egalitarian division is seen if the woman is engaged in the labour market
and it is highest if both partners are well educated (Wengler et al., 2008).
The birth of a first child is typically followed by the mother leaving
the labour market and an increase in her time spent on housework and
childcare (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend,
2006). Even though fathers increased the time spent with their children
during the last decade, the amount of time spent with children is highly
gendered (Wengler et al., 2008).
East and West Germany do not only have a different heritage concern-
ing gender roles but also a different development of religiosity. In the
communist system religion played a minor role, while the influence
of the church in the FRG was stronger although it has declined rather
steadily since the 1960s. In the united country this development can
be observed in the number of church memberships. Including Catholics

and Protestants, about three-quarters of West Germans were affiliated
to a church in 2006, compared with one-quarter in the East (most of
them being Protestants). However, only 20 per cent of church mem-
bers in both parts visit church services regularly, that is several times
a month (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008c). The Muslim population in
Germany4 is much more religious: 53.5 per cent consider themselves
as ‘rather religious’ and 33.8 per cent as ‘very religious’ (Brettfeld and
Wetzels, 2007). The influence of religion on fertility is much less anal-
ysed for Germany compared with other countries (see e.g. Frejka and
Westoff, 2006; Berghammer, 2009). We see, however, that religious indi-
viduals want and have more children both in the East and in the
West. The effects are lower for the Eastern parts though. Protestants and
Catholics do not differ in that regard (Blume et al., 2006; Philipov and
Berghammer, 2007).
2.3 Family and reconciliation policies

Until unification, family policies of the FRG and the GDR were fun-
damentally different. The West German model, characterised by a
gender-specific division of labour, has embodied the male-breadwinner
model, that is an institutional regime which encourages women to cease
work after childbirth and sees the father as the sole family provider.
The slow changes in gender roles from the 1960s have led to a what
Pfau-Effinger (2002) called a modernised male-breadwinner model, in
which children are expected to be taken care of by their mothers mainly
during the first years of their lives, with financial support from the
state. This modified version of the male-breadwinner model implies
limited engagement of mothers in the labour market, ideally part-time
(male-breadwinner/female part-time carer model). Family policies in the
former GDR, on the other hand, promoted a dual-breadwinner model.
After 1990, it was expected that with the change of the institutional
framework for family life in East Germany, there would be a conver-
gence of family models in the two parts of Germany (Pfau-Effinger and
Geissler, 2002). However, due to the different heritages there are still two
reconciliation models dominant at the same time: in West Germany, the
male-breadwinner/female part-time carer model; in East Germany, the
dual-breadwinner/dual-carer model.
Women’s employment pattern in Germany is greatly influenced by
financial disincentives to full-time employment of a second earner,
induced by the tax system in the West and after 1990 in the united coun-
try. Joint taxation of married couples reinforces the male-breadwinner
model as it reduces the labour force participation of married women

(Dingeldey, 2001). Spouses in Germany can choose between being
assessed separately or jointly. In the case of joint assessment, the income
of both spouses is summed (household income) and divided by two
(splitting of income between spouses). The standard rate of income tax
calculated for each half is doubled. The splitting effect emerges when
there are differences in income between the partners; taxation is par-
ticularly low if one spouse earns much less than the other or has no
earnings. Germany is among those countries that grant the highest tax
relief to sole earners.
Regarding payments for children, all parents are entitled to child
allowance paid by the state, independent of their own financial situa-
tion. It amounts to 184 euros monthly per child for the first and second.
For the third child, families receive 190 euros; for the fourth and subse-
quent children 215 euros per month. Child allowance is normally paid
until the age of 18. If children are unemployed, the benefit is paid until
the age of 21 and if they are enrolled in further education until the age
of 25. For disabled children there is no age limit. For families with higher
incomes and thus more taxes to be paid it is more beneficial to receive a
tax allowance instead of the monthly child allowance. If this is the case,
the tax authorities will automatically apply the tax allowance, meaning
that at the moment 5,800 euros of the annual income will not be taxed
(Bundeszentralamt für Steuern, 2010).
An important reconciliation measure facilitating women to combine
paid work and family life is defined by the maternity protection law
(Mutterschutzgesetz), providing pregnant women and nursing mothers
with legal protection against workplace hazards and dismissal, and
ensuring economic security before and after childbirth. Currently, preg-
nant and nursing women are not allowed to work from six weeks before
the expected date of birth until eight weeks after delivery. During this
period, employed women receive a payment (Mutterschaftsgeld), which
equals the net income and is jointly paid by national health insurance
and the employer (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen
und Jugend, 2008a).
Maternity protection leave is usually followed by parental leave. Since
1979, women in the FRG could take paid childcare leave (six months at
first), which has often been modified since then as the duration of pos-
sible leave was extended and the payment (childrearing allowance) was
increased. At first, only mothers were eligible to take such leave. Since
1986, fathers have also been able to take parental leave. Since 2001,
fathers and mothers can take leave together (and stay home together to
care for the child) or share the parental leave with each other (Elternzeit).
The childrearing allowance is a relatively low flat-rate benefit, paid only
for part of the leave (that is 307 euros per month for 24 months out
of a 36-month leave in 2001–06) (Bird, 2004; Kreyenfeld, 2004). Thus,
couples have to rely on the income of the breadwinner.
Family policies in the GDR were shaped by a very different regime.
A particular element of it was the strong attempt to integrate women
into the labour market and thus to promote a dual-earner model. Mater-
nity leave was shorter than in the FRG (up to 12 months) and payments
higher. The allowance during this Babyjahr (baby year) paid by the state
was high enough to replace the foregone income (Kreyenfeld, 2004).
Furthermore, there were cash benefits reducing the cost of children, such
as the monthly paid child benefit, a lump sum paid at the birth of the
child and the reduction of the ‘marriage loan’. Couples could receive a
loan when they married, which was partly paid off by having children
(Kreyenfeld, 2001, 2004).
With the unification in 1990, West German policies were imple-
mented in the new federal states, a radically different system of reg-
ulations for a population used to the dual-earner model. However, a
major policy reform was introduced in 2007 concerning financial sup-
port during parental leave with the so-called Elterngeld (parental benefit)
replacing the childrearing allowance. The Elterngeld equals 67 per cent
of the net income in the year before childbirth, is paid for 12 months,
or for 14 months if the father takes at least two months’ leave. A ceiling
applies, with a maximum benefit of 1,800 euros a month. The mini-
mum is 300 euros a month, which all mothers are entitled to even if
they were not employed before the birth. With this new measure the
Ministry of Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth intended on the
one hand to increase birth rates among highly educated women and
on the other hand to make women’s employment more continuous
by providing incentives for mothers to re-enter their former jobs ear-
lier (Spieß and Wrohlich, 2006). The first studies on the impact of the
new regulations show that most young parents consider the Elterngeld
helpful for their financial situation and that it does indeed stabilise
the household income after childbirth (Bundesministerium für Familie,
Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2008b). The other aim – relatively contin-
uous female employment – has been met as well, since women seem to
be re-entering the labour market earlier than before the introduction of
the parental benefit.
Availability of public childcare is another important precondition for
ensuring work–life balance. In 2007, there were 3,218,983 places in
childcare facilities offered in Germany. At the same time, 2,981,993

children were registered in a childcare facility. Thus, 93 per cent of all
places were taken. Though this figure indicates a supply which is greater
than the demand for places, there are wide differences by region and
age group. There is a considerable shortage of childcare for young chil-
dren (especially in the West and in rural areas), while the provision of
childcare exceeds the demand for children above the age of three in
some (mainly urban) regions (Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2008). In 2007,
78 per cent of the children enrolled were three to seven years old,
9 per cent were under the age of three, the rest were already attending
school (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008b).
According to the National Education Report 2008, there are sub-
stantial differences in childcare provision in East and West Germany
even today. Even though a great number of childcare institutions were
closed down, the new federal states still have more childcare establish-
ments with longer opening hours. Differences are most prominent in
the under-three age group: in the new states 37 per cent of children
below the age of three are registered in a childcare institution, com-
pared with only 8 per cent in the Western part (National Education
Report, 2008). In West Germany, 20 per cent of all two-year-olds use
childcare centres and much less of even younger children, unlike in
the East (Figure 4.2). To increase childcare availability the law to sup-
port children (Kinderförderungsgesetz) was enacted in December 2008,
aiming to extend the coverage of childcare facilities, child minders as
well as institutional care centres, and to increase the quality of institu-
tional care, and therewith of early childhood education. To achieve this,
federal government, federal states and municipalities agreed to increase
public childcare provision to include 35 per cent of children younger
than three years by 2013 (for the whole country). In order to reach this
goal, 70,000 places have to be created in the Alte Länder.
Another aspect of public childcare provision that greatly influences
work–life balance is the matter of opening hours not only in kinder-
gartens but also in schools. School lessons in elementary school are
usually held in the mornings and schools are open only half the day.
Thus, it is extremely difficult to combine work and family also for par-
ents with children of primary-school age. The half-day school assumes
a non-employed mother who prepares lunch and acts as an educator
supervising her children’s homework (Hagemann, 2006). Childcare for
school children of employed parents is therefore an important issue.
The percentage of schools offering all-day programmes differs between
federal states, from about 100 per cent in Berlin to only 2 per cent in
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Younger than 1 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
East West
Figure 4.2 Attendance in childcare according to age, Germany, 2007

Source: National Education Report (2008).
Baden-Wuerttemberg (National Education Report, 2008). Beside all-day

school, after-school day care (Hort) is another solution, offered mainly in
half-day schools. Similar to childcare for pre-school children, the atten-
dance of after-school day care in elementary school differs in East and
West Germany. About 65 per cent of children use after-school childcare
facilities in the new federal states, but only around 13 per cent in West
Germany. This is obviously linked to differences in maternal employ-
ment patterns, attitudes towards childcare outside the family as well
as availability of full-time programmes in early childhood and primary
education in the two parts of Germany (National Education Report,
2008).
All in all, taking together the labour market situation, the normative
setting and family policies, German society can be characterised with
individuals facing high tensions when deciding about childbearing.
However, the tensions differ between East and West. The reconciliation
of family and employment in the West is difficult because of the lack
of childcare for infants, and the rejection of the idea of out-of-family
care for them. As for older children, the time policies in the education
system create problems. Childcare and all-day programmes for children
are much more prevalent and accepted in the new federal states, which
reduce the tensions there somewhat.
3. Relationship between female employment,

work–family-reconciliation policies and childbearing
plans in the German context
3.1 State of the art

When analysing childbearing plans it is necessary to first consider the
demand for children. German studies come to different results regarding
childbearing desires. Some see a declining demand for children con-
sisting of a decrease in the number of children desired and a higher
percentage of those who do not want children at all (Dorbritz, 2005).
Others find a continuously strong desire to have children but a lower
propensity to realise this wish (Huinink et al., 2008). These conflicting
findings are likely to be linked to differences in the wording of ques-
tions measuring the demand for children. Our own research based on
the German Family Panel5 indicates that the vast majority of young
Germans want to have children, even though most of them will post-
pone this step and might not take it at all (Huinink et al., 2008). In any
case, both the German Family Panel as well as other studies show the
existence of a strong two-child norm in Germany (Fthenakis et al.,
2002; Huinink et al., 2008; Kunze and Sackmann, 2008). Childbear-
ing plans for men and women though, have been greatly influenced by
individuals’ educational and occupational attainment in the German
context, as empirical and theoretical research indicate (Blossfeld and
Huinink, 1991; Tölke and Diewald, 2003; Kreyenfeld, 2004; Kurz, 2005).
We provide an overview of such studies in this section, addressing the
Eastern and Western parts of Germany separately, given persistent dif-
ferences in attitudes towards maternal employment and the availability
of childcare. We also distinguish by the intention to have the first and
the second child as different factors are taken into account when family
enlargement is considered compared with the transition to parenthood.
3.1.1 Educational attainment

There are two aspects to be addressed regarding educational attainment.
The first is related to differences in how long individuals stay in the
education system. Huinink (2000) names three reasons why it could
be problematic to have a child while enrolled in education, occupa-
tional training or university: (a) the difficulty to reconcile the duties
of parenting and education; (b) the lack of own financial resources;
and (c) the insecurity about the future career prospects of oneself and
the partner. Therefore, parenthood is usually postponed until education
is completed and a career is established. The higher the education the
later an occupational position can be held, which is widely regarded as

necessary before family formation is achieved (Maul, 2007).
The second aspect refers to differences in opportunity costs given
different levels of human capital. Higher education allows achieving a
higher income. Hence, the opportunity costs are greater for more highly
educated women, as the income they would have earned in the labour
market during the time spent on caring for their offspring is higher than
that of the less educated. The German welfare system does not make
it easy for women to combine work and motherhood (Huinink, 2001;
Hank et al., 2004), unlike in the former GDR, where a range of reconcili-
ation policies supported working mothers (see e.g. Huinink and Wagner,
1995). The consequence is a higher rate of childlessness for higher-
educated women. The incompatibility of motherhood and employment
can force them to choose one of the life spheres, since having children is
likely to lead to a career break or the end of a career. Those who decide to
have children reduce their engagement in the labour market and have a
second or even third child with their (usually also highly educated and
well-earning) partner who takes on the breadwinner role. As a conse-
quence, instead of a general trend towards one-child families we find a
polarisation pattern among well-educated women into a career-oriented
group with no children and a family-oriented group with at least two
children per woman (Huinink, 2002).
However, such an effect of higher education can only be observed
in the West. Childlessness among tertiary-educated women is lower in
East Germany. This can be explained by different attitudes, such as work
orientation versus the importance of children, different norms of what
being a good mother means as well as differences in the institutional
contexts, especially availability of childcare (Boehnke, 2007). It seems
that women in the new federal states do not feel the pressure to choose
between work and family, not only because of better availability of for-
mal childcare but also because the use of childcare institutions is widely
accepted, even for under-three-year-olds. Furthermore, children are seen
as more important for life satisfaction and are planned earlier in life.
For this reason we find lower overall percentages of childless women in
the East and no polarisation of fertility, unlike in the West. Rather, the
number of children is reduced instead of opting for a life without any
children at all (Huinink, 2002; Boehnke, 2007; Bernardi et al., 2008).
As highly educated mothers in the West are rather a select group,
opportunity costs for family enlargement might differ from those per-
ceived regarding family formation. Having a first child by itself often
means committing oneself almost entirely to the family in the Alte
Länder (old federal states). Career disadvantages have already been taken
into account and they increase only slightly with another child. This
selection also means that highly educated mothers in the West are more
likely to intend to and actually have another child, while no such effect
is seen in the East, where family and employment have remained more
compatible (Kreyenfeld, 2002; Ruckdeschel, 2004).
3.1.2 Characteristics of employment

Characteristics of employment are also often considered in studies con-
cerning fertility. A stable job of the potential father is still a necessity
before having a child for German couples, though more important in
the West. Only if the man can provide for the family would a couple
decide in favour of childbearing (Tölke and Diewald, 2003; Kühn, 2004;
Kurz, 2005; Tölke, 2005).
Despite the persistence of the male-provider model, female job trajec-
tories also influence childbearing decisions. Empirical evidence is mixed
in this regard: following the argument of opportunity costs, women
who are unemployed, not employed, work part-time or in marginal
jobs should be more likely to have a first child than full-time work-
ing women. However, no general effect of female unemployment was
found (Kurz et al., 2005). What matters is women’s educational level and
whether they were socialised in the new or old federal states of Germany.
Well-educated women in West Germany seem to avoid family formation
while being unemployed to preserve their chance to find a job, while
unemployment has rather a positive effect on childbirths of all parities
for East German women independent of their educational background –
at least for the 1961–70 cohort (Kreyenfeld, 2001). In West Germany,
longer and recurrent periods of unemployment of women were found
to hinder family formation even when the overall economic situation
(in the form of aggregate unemployment rates) was taken into account
(Brose, 2008). Substantial differences were seen between East and West
German men and women also with regard to job insecurity (part-time
positions, fixed-term jobs, subjective risk of unemployment) on child-
bearing intentions (Bernardi et al., 2008). While a secure job of at least
one partner is a necessity to start childbearing in the West, in the East
finding a stable position and starting a family are considered as parallel
processes for both partners.
With regard to family enlargement, previous studies have found a
high propensity for the transition to a second child for non-employed
women in the West (Kreyenfeld and Zabel, 2005; Brose, 2008). This fol-
lows the polarisation argument, which has been addressed earlier. These
results are due to the selection of family-oriented mothers not work-

ing because they intend to have another child. For these mothers, it is
the partner’s education and employment situation that predicts further
childbearing. Such an effect cannot be found in the East (Kreyenfeld,
2002; Kreyenfeld and Zabel, 2005; Köppen, 2006; Brose, 2008).
3.2 Theoretical framework

In our theoretical framework we rely on the theory of social production
function (TSPF) (Lindenberg and Frey, 1993) complemented by the life
course approach (Mayer, 2009) and the New Home Economics Theory
(Becker, 1991). Our point of departure is that individual agents pursue
‘instrumental’ goals that allow fulfilling their ultimate needs for indi-
vidual well-being as efficiently as possible (Lindenberg and Frey, 1993).6
Individual agency is embedded in a cultural, social, political and eco-
nomic context, which sets opportunities and impediments. The degree
to which individuals are able to pursue their goals and which goals they
strive for depends on their resources (time, money, education, etc.). Pro-
creation and becoming a parent is assumed to be one of those goals.
Nowadays, it primarily satisfies needs for mental well-being (e.g. stim-
ulation) and social well-being (e.g. affection) as people build up very
close relationships with their children in which they gain intimate per-
sonal confirmation and a kind of enjoyment one hardly finds in other
kinds of social relationships – except in the relationship with the partner
(Huinink, 1995).
The concept of social production function encompasses the ‘objective’
conditions of goal pursuit shaped by the ‘external’ opportunity structure
of an action and available resources. However, the personal character
(psychological dispositions) ‘frames’ the subjective perception of one’s
situation, influencing individuals’ evaluation of goal appropriateness
and the perceived probability to achieve them. Actors pursue goals
which promise highest and most certain benefits and postpone other
goals.
Family formation, a goal of main interest for our chapter, is embedded
in the individual life course, and is highly interrelated with education,
work and other activities. In their decisions, shaped by the external
opportunity structure and their subjective evaluations, individuals have
to consider both short-term benefits and long-term consequences of
their actions such as childbearing. Education and economic prospects of
the partners are especially important for the external opportunity struc-
ture, as pointed out in the theory of New Home Economics focusing
on the link between increasing opportunity cost of childbearing and
declining fertility (Becker, 1991). Subjective perceptions, in turn, are

influenced by long-lasting preferences on family and paid work, and
are part of the individual production function, prestructuring the life
course in regard to the allocation of time and resources on employment
and on family (Hakim, 2000).
Based on these theoretical considerations, we identify three major
premises for our analyses: first, the importance of childbearing for
personal well-being has diminished in modern societies, since there
are alternative options, for example work (Voland, 1992). In order to
achieve one’s goals time and resources are invested, both of which are
limited, leading to a ‘competition’ between different goals. Incoherence
of gender-equity levels in public-sphere institutions versus the family
reinforces the competition (McDonald, 2000), constraining childbearing
decisions in particular. Second, a shift from positive to negative material
returns of children has taken place in the industrialised world (Caldwell,
1982), and the direct and indirect costs of children have increased sub-
stantially, partly due to rising levels of aspirations regarding the ‘quality’
of children (Becker, 1991). Third, as long as the availability of resources
needed for successful parenting and gainful employment is not guaran-
teed over a sufficiently long period in the future, family formation is
postponed if not given up entirely (Hobson and Oláh, 2006; Kreyenfeld,
2009).
3.3 Hypotheses
Relying on the theoretical framework outlined above, we address the
interdependency between female labour force participation and fertility
intentions, that is to start and to enlarge a family in the German con-
text. Previous studies suggest an effect of women’s employment status
on childbearing decisions – an effect which is different for the regions of
East and West Germany and different by parity as well. Such differences
are likely to be related to two types of constraints women face when
taking work–life decisions: structural and normative (McRae, 2003). For
example, a permanent and full-time position ensures economic stability,
encouraging childbearing, but its importance may vary across regions.
Or, a child is more likely to be seen as part of women’s identity and a
natural part of life in East Germany than in the West. Hence, in our
analysis we will test the following hypothesis:
Having a stable employment situation such as a permanent and full-

time position will increase the probability of intending to have a first
child for women in West Germany, while employment position in
general is less important for the intention of family formation for

women in East Germany (H1).
As discussed previously, mothers are more likely to be a family-oriented

group in the West. Thus, the decision to have a second child is probably
less influenced by their labour market attachment. In the East, women’s
employment will matter more for considering family enlargement, since
sufficient financial resources might play a more important role there.
Thus, our second hypothesis reads:
Full-time employment will decrease the intention for a second child

in West Germany. In East Germany, intentions to have a second child
are likely to be reduced among women not working full-time (H2).
Previous studies suggest distinguishing between two aspects of educa-

tion in its influence on childbearing decisions: enrolment and attain-
ment. Educational enrolment can affect childbearing plans via a number
of aspects that hinder young women in having a child while still in edu-
cation, such as lack of time, lack of money and lack of a secure future.
This should apply to both parts of Germany. We therefore assume that:
Being in education will decrease the intention to have a child in both

East and West Germany (H3a).
Educational attainment can also influence childbearing decisions as it

serves as an indicator of the individual’s labour market opportunities.
The more highly educated have higher wages and better labour market
chances in general. Yet, children and employment are nearly incom-
patible in the Western part of Germany, increasing substantially the
opportunity cost of children there, whereas in the East better childcare
availability eases work–life-balance issues. However, the processes at
stake are somewhat different with respect to intending to have another
child for mothers, given the polarisation of fertility among highly edu-
cated women in West Germany, with only the family-oriented becoming
mothers. No such pattern has yet emerged in the East. Hence, we
hypothesise that:
High educational attainment of women reduces family formation

intentions and increases intentions for family enlargement in West
Germany but not in East Germany (H3b).
Even though the link between one’s labour market position, educational
background and childbearing decisions might have strengthened in the
last years due to labour market uncertainties, one’s personal situation
remains crucial. For example, the existence of a partnership is a pre-
requisite of family formation, and as shown in previous research, the
partner’s employment characteristics influence the intention to have
a first and second child in addition to the woman’s labour market
position. As the male-breadwinner/female part-time carer model is still
dominant in West Germany, whereas the dual-breadwinner/dual-carer
model characterises the East, we assume that:
Full-time employment of the partner strengthens women’s willing-

ness to start a family and also the intention to have a second child in
West Germany, whereas it matters little in East Germany (H4).
In our analysis, we control for a number of other aspects relevant to

family decisions, for example the respondent’s age, which is assumed to
have a non-linear effect. We expect a negative effect for young women
feeling that it is too early for them to become a mother, a positive one
at ages of mid-20s to early 30s and again a negative effect for women
approaching the end of their reproductive years, when those still child-
less are probably a select group lacking a strong desire to have children.
Family orientation indicated by attendance of religious ceremonies and
number of siblings, is also likely to influence childbearing decisions,
as do household income and partnership status. Hence, their influence
should be controlled for.
4. Analysis
4.1 Method and variables

In our analyses we use data from the first wave of the German Fam-
ily Panel (pairfam),7 which was conducted in 2008/09 (Huinink et al.,
2011). This panel survey includes multiple modules on families and rela-
tionships, with one of them focusing on the decision for parenthood,
including the intention to have (further) children. It is a nationwide rep-
resentative survey, designed as a cohort study for three cohorts who are
at different stages in their fertility and partnership biography. The old-
est cohort (aged 35–37 years) has already experienced many important
transitions, is integrated in the labour market, has established long-term
partnerships and might have founded a family. The middle cohort (aged
25–27) is observed while being in the process of family building, while
the 15–17-year-olds begin to experience the labour market and partner-

ships for the first time. We focus on the two older cohorts in our analysis
and only on childless women or mothers with one child. Respondents,
who are infertile or have an infertile partner, who live in a homosexual
relationship or are pregnant, are not included in our analyses as their
family formation processes are rather specific and therefore not suitable
for our study addressing the tensions between female employment and
fertility plans more generally.
An important advantage of the German Family Panel is its multi-actor
design and its detailed collection of data concerning the respondent’s
partner, as many studies have pointed out the particular influence
of partnership status and partner characteristics for fertility decisions
(Corijn et al., 1996; Klein, 2003; Kurz, 2005; Pavetic, 2009). Thus,
we will include partner data in some of our models where we anal-
yse women in partnerships only. We will run separate models for East
and West Germany. Respondents born in the former GDR and still liv-
ing in the new federal states are categorised as East Germans, while
West Germans were born in the West and also living there at the
time of the interview. Those who migrated between the two parts of
Germany as well as international migrants are not included. Thus, in
our working sample we have 1,678 women in total and 1,243 women in
partnerships.
The dependent variable in our analysis has been based on the ques-
tion, ‘Do you intend to become a mother (again) in the next two years?’
The response alternatives were: yes, definitely; yes, perhaps; no, probably
not; no, definitely not and I haven’t thought about that yet. The latter was
treated as a missing value. The answers were dichotomised into Intention
(1) including the two ‘yes’-alternatives and No Intention (0) including the
two ‘no’-alternatives. Respondents who do not want any (more) chil-
dren are also included in the analysis, coded No Intention (even though
they did not receive this question).
Our first main explanatory variable is the respondent’s employment
situation. We differentiate between Full-time stable, Full-time unstable,
Part-time, In education, Unemployment, No employment. Respondents with
a fixed-term contract are included in the category of unstable employ-
ment, while self-employment is considered to be stable. As for the
partner’s labour force position, we have no information about the
employment contract, and there are rather few cases for many of the cat-
egories specified for respondents. Thus, the partner’s employment status
is used as a dichotomous variable; Full-time employed versus Not full-time
employed. Respondent’s educational level is another core explanatory
variable with three categories (high, middle and low) reflecting the
German education system.8 No degree or a degree in Hauptschule is
coded as low, a degree in Realschule means middle level of education
and an Abitur is coded as the highest level of schooling.
In the models we control for the effect of income, age (that is cohort),
partnership status, number of siblings and religiosity on childbearing
decisions. The household income is divided into low (lowest quartile),
middle and high (highest quartile). In models with all respondents, the
partnership status indicates whether the woman is single, living-apart-
together, cohabiting or married. In models including only respondents in
partnerships, we use a variable indicating the marital status: married
or not married. The number of siblings is included as a metric vari-
able with the last category indicating three or more siblings. Religiosity
is measured based on the frequency of attending religious ceremonies
(in churches, mosques, synagogues, etc.), distinguishing between atten-
dance at least once a month and that more rarely or never. See
Table 4.A.1 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics on the independent
variables.
4.2 Results
First, we present some descriptive results concerning the activity status
of the respondents. As Figure 4.3 shows, childless women who intend
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
East West East West
Intention No intention
In education Unemployed Not employed

Part-time Full-time unstable Full-time stable
Figure 4.3 Intentions to have a first child in Germany

Source: Pairfam wave 1, women, aged 25–27 and 35–37 years, without children, own
estimations, weighted data.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
East West East West
Intention No intention
In education Unemployed Not employed

Part-time Full-time unstable Full-time stable
Figure 4.4 Intentions to have a second child in Germany

Source: Pairfam wave 1, women aged 25–27 and 35–37 years, with one child, own estimations,
weighted data.
a first child in the next two years work most often full-time and under
stable conditions. However, in the Eastern part of Germany the share
of women in part-time employment and in education intending to
have a child is about twice as large as in the West. This is probably
to some extent due to different labour market conditions in the two
regions but could also indicate differences regarding the preconditions
of motherhood.
Figure 4.4 reveals differences in mothers’ employment patterns in East
and West Germany. Most one-child mothers are either not employed or
work part-time in the West, unlike mothers in the East who are more
often employed in a full-time position. Yet, in both regions a relatively
large proportion of women who intend to have a second child in the
near future is not employed.
Using logistic regression models we estimate the probability of intend-
ing to have a first or second child within the next two years. Table 4.2
displays the first results of the multivariate analyses. We see that not
working full-time reduces the probability of intending to have a first
child in general, even though only few effects show as significant.
As hypothesised, being in education appears to be a strong hindrance to
motherhood intentions. In East and West alike, those who participate in
Table 4.2 Logistic regression model on women’s intentions to have a first and
second child within the next two years in Germany (odds ratios)
Region East West

Number of children
0 1 0 1
Employment status
Full-time stable 1 1 1 1
Full-time unstable 5.01∗ 0.64 1.38 0.25
Part-time 0.46 0.60 0.57∗∗∗ 1.12
In education 0.33∗ 1.26 0.34∗∗∗ 0.98
Unemployed 0.68 0.21∗∗ 0.97 2.04
Not employed −1 0.87 0.09∗∗ 1.47
Educational level
Low 1 1 1 1
Middle 1.12 0.78 1.06 1.03
High 2.58 0.56 1.07 2.31∗∗
Age (cohort)
25–27 1 1 1 1
35–37 1.87 0.10∗∗∗ 1.30 0.51∗∗
Household income
Lowest 25% 0.80 1.24 0.84 1.00
Middle 1 1 1 1
Highest 25% 0.69 1.53 0.79 1.31
Partnership status
Single 1 1 1 1
Living-apart-together 4.04∗∗ 2.02 2.08∗∗∗ 2.41∗
Cohabiting 3.45∗∗ 1.07 3.47∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗
Marriage 1.00 1.42 7.45∗∗∗ 2.27∗
Number of siblings
0 1 1 1 1
1 0.65 2.15 2.00∗∗ 1.42
2 0.59 1.73 2.14∗∗ 2.48∗∗
3+ 0.85 1.81 2.61∗∗∗ 1.41
Church attendance
At least once a month −1 −1 1.19 1.42
Less than once a month −1 −1 1 1
McFadden R2 0.1457 0.1864 0.1319 0.0825
N 163 197 827 424
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10; ∗∗ p < 0. 05; ∗∗∗ p < 0. 01.

1 Not enough cases to include this category.
Source: Pairfam wave 1, weighted data, own estimations.
education or training are about 70 per cent less likely to intend to have
a first child than women working full-time and in stable employment.
Part-time employment also substantially decreases the intention to start
a family (by about 50 per cent). However, this effect is only significant
in the model for the West, where also not being employed reduces
first-birth intentions greatly. In East Germany, very few non-employed

women were not considering themselves unemployed, so this category
could not be included in that model. As for fixed-term contracts, we find
different effects for East and West German women. While such contracts
seem to strengthen the intention to have a first child for Eastern women,
the type of work contract does not seem to matter in the West. Educa-
tional attainment does not have a significant impact, but the patterns
indicated are quite different in the two regions.
The control variables show no surprising results. There is no addi-
tional effect of income, while having a stable partner strengthens
parenthood intentions as expected and the institutionalisation of the
partnership increases the effect. The strong impacts of being married
and having siblings for West Germany reveal the importance of tradi-
tional values and family orientation there, unlike in the East. Neither
age, nor church attendance seem to matter for first-birth intentions in
either region.
Regarding the intention to have a second child, women’s employment
status seems to play a less important role. We find no significant effect,
except for unemployment with different patterns for the East and West.
Eastern women are 80 per cent less likely to intend to have another
child if they are unemployed, while in the West, the effect of unem-
ployment is positive but insignificant. As for education, we find clear
indications of polarisation of fertility among highly educated women in
the West, that is that those who enter motherhood are a select, more
family-oriented group and are also more likely to intend to have larger
families. No similar pattern is seen for Eastern women. Control variables
again hold no surprises. Neither income, nor church attendance seem to
matter in either regions, nor do partnership status or number of siblings
in the East. Being older (35–37) reduces the probability to intend to have
another child in both regions, as expected.
Next, we focus on women in partnership to study the influence of
partner’s employment status on fertility intentions (Table 4.3). In all
models we find that the effect of the partner working in a full-time posi-
tion is positive but insignificant. The effects of women’s employment
on family formation have become less pronounced, in the East espe-
cially, compared with those in Table 4.2, as the employment status of
the partner is controlled for. For family enlargement we find that unem-
ployment strongly increases women’s intentions in the model for West
Germany, suggesting that these women consider themselves relocated to
the family sector and not looking for a re-entry into the labour market.
If the spouse can provide sufficient resources, they stay at home and
have another child, unlike women in East Germany.
124
Table 4.3 Logistic regression model on the intentions to have a first and second
child within the next two years among women in partnerships in Germany (odds
ratios)
Region East West

Number of children
0 1 0 1
Woman’s employment status

Full-time stable 1 1 1 1
Full-time unstable 3.61 0.57 1.51 0.27
Part-time 0.78 0.59 0.70 1.21
In education 1.70 1.35 0.32∗∗∗ 1.75
Unemployed 0.34 0.16∗ 1.60 4.33∗∗
Not employed −1 0.64 0.12∗ 1.42
Partner’s employment status
Full-time 3.08 1.06 1.48 1.49
Not full-time 1 1 1 1
Educational level
Low 1 1 1 1
Middle 1.86 0.63 1.02 1.26
High 2.16 0.43 0.87 2.91∗∗∗
Age (cohort)
25–27 1 1 1 1
35–37 0.64 0.10∗∗∗ 0.81 0.47∗∗∗
Household income
Lowest 25% 0.65 1.58 1.12 1.19
Middle 1 1 1 1
Highest 25% 0.47 1.37 0.90 1.17
Partnership status
Living-apart-together 1 1 1 1
Cohabiting 1.49 0.53 1.86∗∗ 1.50
Married 0.29 0.71 4.25∗∗∗ 1.22
Number of siblings
0 1 1 1 1
1 0.65 1.32 1.48 1.32
2 0.16∗∗ 1.12 1.82 2.12∗
3+ 2.19 1.08 1.86 1.37
Church attendance
At least once a month −1 −1 1.14 1.46
Less than once a month −1 −1 1 1
McFadden R2 0.1990 0.1893 0.1005 0.0820
N 113 165 561 363
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10; ∗∗ p < 0. 05; ∗∗∗ p < 0. 01.


Table 4.4 Logistic regression model on the intentions to have a

first and second child within the next two years in Germany,
including interaction effects (odds ratios)
Model 11 Model 22
Number of children 0 1
Employment status
Full-time stable 1 1
Full-time unstable 1.29 0.28
Part-time 0.58∗∗ 1.22
In education 0.32∗∗ 1.56
Unemployed 1.00 3.83∗
Not employed 0.11∗∗ 1.36
Employment status∗ Region
Full-time stable 1 1
Full-time unstable 4.41 3.96
Part-time 1.09 0.80
In education 1.36 1.23
Unemployed 0.61 0.12∗∗
Not employed −3 0.84
Region
East 2.00∗∗ 0.76
West 1 1
McFadden R2 0.1249 0.0883
N 990 528
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10; ∗∗ p < 0. 05; ∗∗∗ p < 0. 01.

1 All women, controlled for cohort, education, household income, number of
siblings, partnership status.

2 Women in partnership, controlled for cohort, education, household income,
number of siblings, partnership status, employment status of partner.

The results of the logistic regressions support our hypotheses outlined

above, partly. Labour market integration is indeed a necessity for intend-
ing to have a first child. A stable full-time employment position seems
more important for women in West than in East Germany. However,
differences for the two regions are less pronounced than expected. Also,
the different impacts of a fixed-term contract become non-significant
when interaction effects are included in the model (Table 4.4).
In general, a woman’s employment position is more important for
considering becoming a parent than for family enlargement, perhaps
due to a strong two-child norm. The significant effects for unemploy-
ment (Table 4.4) might reflect differences with respect to difficulties
to reconcile work and family as well as economic uncertainty in the

two regions of Germany. In West Germany, women are more likely to
opt for either continuous employment or a longer family break and
thus the non-employed are more likely to intend to extend their fam-
ily. In contrast, not being employed means lower resources and higher
uncertainty for women in the East, reducing their intentions on further
childbearing.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from our analyses about the
interdependencies of female labour force participation, childbearing
intentions and reconciliation policies in Germany nowadays. First, there
are still some differences between East and West Germany 20 years after
unification and, second, different labour force positions influence child-
bearing intentions differently. Our results reflect the tensions, resulting
from uncertainty and incoherence, between female employment and
fertility plans and their link to family policies, the latter clearly dis-
similar in the Eastern and Western parts of the country before the
unification. The different policy settings seem to have led to different
norms and expectations regarding women’s roles as mothers and labour
force participants and divergent subjective views on life satisfaction in
East and West Germany, present even today.
Our multivariate analysis revealed similarities as well as differences in
the interplay between women’s work and childbearing decisions in the
two parts of Germany. As for similarities, we have found in both regions
greatly reduced intentions to start a family among students but also
among women in precarious labour market positions which increase
uncertainties regarding the future. Not working full-time reduces the
probability of intending to have a first child as women feel the need to
integrate in the labour market before becoming a mother. The impact
of the woman’s employment situation on her fertility intentions is
weaker though when the employment status of the partner is taken
into account, especially in West Germany where men’s integration in
the work force is a precondition of childbearing due to the persistent
male-breadwinner/female part-time carer model.
There are also clear differences in the tensions in the two regions.
First, as pointed out earlier, labour market integration with a secure job
is more difficult to achieve in the East given higher unemployment rates
and higher rates of non-permanent employment, which might explain
the different impacts on childbearing intentions of having a fixed-term
contract. While such contracts seem to strengthen the intention to have

a first child for women in the new federal states, probably regarded as
acceptable labour market integration, the type of employment contract
matters little in the old federal states. The positive impact of such con-
tracts in the East might be explained by pragmatism due to the higher
prevalence of fixed-term jobs there. Thus, for them a fixed-term job
mainly means having the financial conditions for becoming a parent
fulfilled. Second, a mother’s employment status matters little for her
intention to have another child, except if she is unemployed, which has
different effects in the East and in the West. Women in the new federal
states are much less likely to intend to have a second child if they are
unemployed, while in the old federal states unemployment strengthens
mothers’ intentions of family enlargement if the father is employed full-
time. In the East, unemployment means higher uncertainty about not
being integrated in the labour market, and thus not having fulfilled a
precondition of childbearing. In the West, unemployment is an indica-
tor of the mother’s family orientation and reduced ambitions to re-enter
the labour force. If the partner can provide for the family, the woman’s
non-employment increases her intentions about further childbearing.
Not only the remarkably different availability of childcare (in sheer
numbers and in hours) leads to these diverse impacts of unemployment
across regions, but also different attitudes towards childcare outside the
family. Mothers in the West perceive a greater wish (and probably higher
social pressure) to care for their young (under-three-year-old) children
themselves and, therefore, to cease employment. As family and career
are difficult to reconcile in the West, (well-educated) women are increas-
ingly selected into a family- and a work-oriented group with either a
long family break and several children or no break and no children,
respectively. In contrast, women in the new federal states perceive them-
selves as working mothers and due to the availability of childcare can
manage to live that way.
Taking the results of the multivariate analysis as well as the politi-
cal and cultural context of East and West Germany into consideration,
we can conclude that even though German reunification took place 20
years ago, the institutional and normative contexts for childbearing are
not entirely the same. Childcare institutions are much more prevalent
in the former GDR, leading to lower tensions regarding reconciliation of
family responsibilities and employment. Furthermore, cultural norms in
East and West are different with regard to maternal employment, accep-
tance of non-family childcare and importance of own children for one’s
well-being. Norms about maternal employment and formal childcare
lead to strong tensions in the West, forcing some women to forgo child-
bearing altogether and pursue other goals in life to gain welfare, even if
they originally envisioned having a family.
Lately, new political instruments are implemented in Germany to
stabilise economic security and facilitate work–life balance of parents
with young children, an aim which becomes increasingly important as
the proportion of the more highly educated increases among women.
The relatively recently introduced Elterngeld (parental benefit) reduces
the costs for caring for a child at home for a year after the birth.
In addition, formal childcare provision for under-three-year-olds is
planned to be extended substantially by 2013 and there are political
programmes promoting family-friendly measures in companies (see e.g.
Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2010).
The future will show whether these developments can change the
institutional and normative settings of family formation, including
the rejection of non-family childcare in large parts of society, which
at present reinforces the incoherence effect on women’s childbearing
decisions, at least in West Germany.
Appendix
Table 4.A.1 Distribution of independent variables: Germany
Variable Categories Percentages
Region West 81.29

East 18.71
Employment status Full-time stable 43.76
Full-time unstable 7.52
In education 13.46
Unemployed 6.27
Not employed 9.08
Part-time 19.91
Educational level Low 11.83
Middle 35.26
High 52.91
Household income Lowest 25% 34.85
Middle 33.94
Highest 25% 31.21
Partnership status Single 27.48
Living-apart-together 19.03
Cohabiting 27.41
Married 26.07
Number of siblings 0 12.95
1 42.21
2 25.73
3+ 19.11
Church attendance At least once a month 7.07
Less than once a month 92.93
Partner’s employment status Full-time 58.00
Not full-time 42.00
Source: Pairfam wave 1, weighted data, own calculations.
Notes
1. The total fertility rate (TFR) or total period fertility rate (TPFR) gives the esti-
mated average number of children that a woman gives birth to in her lifetime,
assuming that prevailing rates at a given time remain unchanged. The TFR is
affected by changes in tempo of childbearing (e.g. postponement of births).
2. This cohort was historically rather an exeption and typical for the ‘Golden Age
of Marriage’. Childlessness is not a historically new phenomenon, for exam-
ple 26 per cent of women born in 1901–05 remained childless. However, this
degree of childlessness was result of difficult social and political circumstances
(Konietzka and Kreyenfeld, 2007).
3. The German education system consists of three types of secondary schools.
Hauptschule leads to the lowest certificate after nine years, Realschule to a mid-
dle certificate after ten. A Gymnasium leads to the highest certificate (Abitur)
which entitles the student to go to university. Pupils attend Gymnasium until
grade 12 or 13. The achieved educational level leads to different labour market
positions, income, risk of unemployment and so on. (Hradil, 2005).
4. About 5 per cent of the population in Germany is Muslim. Muslims with
migration background differ regarding the region they stem from. Most of the
Muslim migrants have Turkish roots (63 per cent) (Bundesamt für Migration
und Flüchtlinge, 2009).
5. For more information, see http://www.pairfam.de.
6. Applying the concept of the social production function from the modified
VOC-approach of Nauck we differentiate different sources of subjective well-
being (Kanazawa, 2001; Nauck, 2001; Ormel, 2002). A physical-material dimen-
sion of well-being contains physical wellness (e.g. health, sexuality, avoidance
of pain) and economic welfare (e.g. material security, comfort). A primarily
psychological dimension of well-being deals with issues like emotional gratifica-
tion, autonomy, competence and stimulation. A social dimension of well-being
is achieved by social approval (e.g. social status), affect and behavioural
confirmation through others (Ormel, 2002, p. 355). This latter dimension
of well-being is rooted in different kinds of social relationships and social
structures, among them kin.
7. This paper uses data of the pairfam project, which has been conducted
by Johannes Huinink, Josef Brüderl, Bernhard Nauck and Sabine Walper.
The pairfam project has been funded by the German Research Foundation
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG).
8. See endnote iii.
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Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Statistical Office] (2008a) Fachserie 1 Reihe
4.1.1. Mikrozensus. Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Stand und Entwicklung der
Erwerbstätigkeit. Mikrozensus 2007. Band 2 (Wiesbaden: Destatis).
Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Statistical Office] (2008b) Statistiken der Kinder-
und Jugendhilfe. Kinder und tätige Personen in Tageseinrichtungen am 15.03.2007.
Revidierte Ergebnisse (Wiesbaden: Destatis).
Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Statistical Office] (2008c) Datenreport 2008
(Bonn: Destatis).
Tölke, A. (2005) ‘Die Bedeutung von Herkunftsfamilie, Berufsbiographie und
Partnerschaften für den Übergang zur Ehe und Vaterschaft’, in A. Tölke and
K. Hank (eds) Männer – Das vernachlässigte Geschlecht in der Familienforschung,
Zeitschrift für Familienforschung. Sonderheft 4 (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag).
Tölke, A. and M. Diewald (2003) ‘Insecurities in Employment and Occupa-
tional Careers and their Impact on the Transition to Fatherhood in Western
Germany’, Demographic Research, 9(3), 41–68.
Voland, E. (1992) Fortpflanzung: Natur und Kultur im Wechselspiel (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp).
Wengler, A., H. Trappe and C. Schmitt (2008) Partnerschaftliche Arbeitsteilung
und Elternschaft – Analysen zur Aufteilung von Hausarbeit und Elternaufgaben
auf Basis des Generations and Gender Survey (Wiesbaden: Bundesinstitut für
Bevölkerungsforschung).
5
The Interplay of Fertility
Intentions, Female Employment
and Work–Life Balance Policies
in Contemporary Poland: Can
Gender Equity, Preference and
Social Capital Theories Provide
a Better Insight?
Ewa Fratczak
˛ and Aneta Ptak-Chmielewska
1. Introduction
In the discussion on the main causes of recent fertility decline in

Europe, especially with regard to the very low and lowest low-fertility
levels in the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe, much
attention has been given to economic factors. At the same time, in
demographic research the effects of social capital, lifestyle preferences
and gender equality in the family and society have received relatively
limited attention. These factors are likely to be particularly important for
fertility-related decision-making and behaviour in societies facing eco-
nomic uncertainty along with a transformation of values and norms,
such as Poland, which is considered a representative of the Transition
Post-Socialist policy configuration type (Hobson and Oláh, 2006). Thus,
in our study, we focus on fertility intentions in the context of three the-
ories, namely (i) preference theory (Hakim, 2000, 2003a, 2003b; Vitali
et al., 2009) (ii) gender equity theory (McDonald, 2000b; Mills et al.,
2008; Mills, 2010) and (iii) social capital theory (Coleman, 1990; Bühler
and Fratczak,
˛ 2007, pp. 359–382).
Preference theory explains changes in fertility and female employ-
ment based on lifestyle preferences and values, that is cultural factors, as
135
136 Fertility, Employment & Work–Life Balance: Poland
principal determinants of fertility. The theory distinguishes three groups

of women: home-oriented, adaptive and career-oriented. In the UK and
Spain, the first and the last groups comprise about 20 per cent of women
each, and the adaptive group about 60 per cent (Hakim, 2000, p. 6). The
sizes of these groups may, however, vary in different societies as pub-
lic policies might trigger the distribution of preferences towards giving
more weight to a specific group in some countries, according to Hakim
(2000).
In line with this reasoning, a study in 11 West European countries
indicates asymmetric distributions of the three groups of women (Vitali
et al., 2009). The countries have been divided into four welfare regime
clusters in accordance with the well-known classification by Esping-
Andersen (1990, 2002). For countries with Social Democratic regimes,
the share of career-oriented women has been shown to vary between
26 and 38 per cent and the share of family-oriented women is at a very
low level between 2 and 4 per cent, as policies in these countries targeted
at facilitating women’s entry into the labour market, gender equality
and combining childbearing with labour market participation are uni-
versally accepted. In the Southern European regime cluster, the share
of family-oriented women varied between 21 and 28 per cent, whereas
the size of the work-oriented group does not differ significantly from
that in countries of the Liberal and the Conservative welfare clusters,
although the share of the adaptive group of women is reduced. Accord-
ing to Hakim (2000), the changes in norms and values in the southern
countries are very slow and there are ‘informal barriers’ which hinder
participation of women in the labour market on a larger scale. Thus, the
results for the old EU countries indicate that women’s work–family pref-
erences differ depending on the welfare regime (Vitali et al., 2009). There
are only a few examples of testing this theory in the East European tran-
sition countries, with the exception of the Czech Republic. The Czech
typological distribution is more or less similar to those seen in the UK
and Spain (Rabušic and Chromková Manea, 2007, p. 48).
As suggested by the preference theory, women with different lifestyle
preferences may respond differently to family and reconciliation poli-
cies. Hence, family policy measures are less likely to affect the career-
oriented group, whereas employment policies are of limited importance
for family-oriented women. The adaptive group reacts to both types
of policies. Therefore, the heterogeneity of women’s preferences needs
to be taken into account when assessing policy impacts. According to
Hakim (2000, p. 17) ‘preference theory does two things: it reinstates
(heterogeneous) personal preferences as an important determinant of
Ewa Fratczak
˛ & Aneta Ptak-Chmielewska 137
women’s behaviour, and it states that attitudes, values, and preferences

are becoming increasingly important in the lifestyle choices of peo-
ple in rich modern societies’. Currently, Poland is not a rich modern
society. Nevertheless, during the past 20 years it has passed a lot of
political and economic reforms inducing cultural changes, which have
diminished the distance to West European countries in many dimen-
sions (economic, cultural, ideational, etc.). However, the reforms and
labour market regulations that were introduced offer many possibili-
ties, but also created obstacles leading to fertility declining over many
years of transformation to a very low fertility level. The obstacles to
childbearing are connected with the uncertainty and risk of losing a
job, accompanied by a relatively high unemployment rate among the
youth and insufficient policy measures to reduce the tensions in recon-
ciling paid work with family life. Therefore, bearing in mind obtaining
a good and secure position in the labour market, young women (and
young people in general) in Poland invest in their education and post-
pone childbirth, which results in very low fertility levels. Thus, the
survey on fertility intentions by applying preference theory seems jus-
tified in the case of Poland, with the application (the stress on) the
changes in values and attitudes. A number of empirical studies indicate
that the preference theory was quite successful in predicting fertil-
ity patterns as well as women’s employment patterns (Hakim, 2003a;
Economic and Social Research Council Research Report ESRC, 2011).
Our research will allow us to confront Hakim’s theory with empirical
evidence on the constraints in making choices, and explain fertility
intentions based on lifestyle preferences in the context of the current
stage of the reconciliation policies in Poland as a country in transition.
In addition to preferences, the gender system is another crucial aspect
in fertility studies, taking into consideration both macro and micro lev-
els (McDonald, 2000a, 2000b, 2006). Focusing on this aspect, the gender
equity theory points to the incoherence in gender equality levels in
individual-oriented societal institutions, such as the educational sys-
tem and the labour market, and in families. The literature underlines
that the research within this area requires thorough studies (Mills, 2010,
p. 447): ‘there are institutions beyond education and the labour market
that remain highly powerful yet continue to evade equalisation, such as
household division of labour, the tax systems and societal and political
empowerment’. Regarding the latter, it is worth mentioning that a lot
of social initiatives have been developed and many non-governmental
organisations targeted at increasing women’s participation in social and
political spheres in Poland over the last several years. One such example
is a social movement called the Congress of Women (2012) (established

in 2010), which consists of 200 prominent and active women, includ-
ing politicians, entrepreneurs, civil activists, ministers, culture activists,
feminists and women from the left and right of the political spec-
trum. Their main objectives are: introduction of gender quotas into the
electoral rolls; appointment of an independent ombudsman for gender
equality; preparation of an annual report in Parliament on the situa-
tion of women; effective pro-family policy, and so on. Indeed, gender
equality has been promoted in Poland through various channels, but
it is an ongoing process. As pointed out by McDonald (2000b), insti-
tutional support and a gender system where equality in the family is
emphasised can reduce the constraints that shape women’s childbear-
ing plans. In Poland, many institutions securing or supporting gender
equality at the macro level related to education, the labour market, the
tax system and political empowerment are still at an early phase of
development. Similarly to the Western countries where high levels of
gender equality characterise education and labour market participation,
even though the division of household labour at the family level has
remained gendered (Hook, 2010), in Poland there are no formal barriers
to women acquiring access to higher education and participating in the
labour market on an equal footing with men. Hence, there is an inco-
herence between the near absence of gender equality in the family and
a relatively gender-equal public sphere, which makes the gender equity
theory applicable to test on childbearing decisions in the Polish context.
A further important aspect to address is the role of social networks
in relation to fertility intentions. Here, we will rely on the social capi-
tal theory (Coleman, 1990; Bühler and Fratczak, 2007). As mentioned,
during the transition period, Poland experienced a dramatic decline in
fertility level. At the same time, the costs of having children increased
significantly because of reductions and reorganisations in state transfer
payments and social benefits (lower levels of benefits, limited groups of
receivers), and due to rising unemployment and an unstable labour mar-
ket. In the context of insufficient state support, social networks based on
family members, relatives, friends, neighbours and colleagues can help
reduce uncertainty and thereby affect childbearing intentions in a pos-
itive way. With our analysis we aim to shed more light on this process.
We measure the number of supportive relationships in an individual’s
personal network and explore the extent of influence of the availabil-
ity of social capital on fertility intentions. In line with the theory, we
assume that the larger the social networks (both family and non-family),
the stronger is the positive influence on fertility intentions.
Ewa Fratczak
In the following we present first the Polish context, discussing

changes in fertility and nuptiality patterns, the expansion of tertiary
education and related changes in norms and values, labour market
trends for the population of active ages and the youth, and changes
in family policies and institutional provisions. Thereafter, we briefly
present the theoretical framework and outline our hypotheses. The data
and methods are discussed in Section 3, followed by the presentation
of the results of model estimation (Section 4) for preference theory, the
gender equity theory and for social capital theory. The chapter ends with
a concluding discussion.
2. The Polish context
2.1 Fertility changes

Poland, similarly to the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
has been experiencing substantial changes in fertility, mortality and
migration for over 20 years, which have accelerated the ageing of the
population. These changes appeared alongside the socio-political transi-
tion in this region of Europe, starting in Poland with the first democratic
election in 1989. The second important moment was Poland’s accession
to the EU in 2004, opening much greater opportunities for economic
migration, although not all ‘old member states’ opened their labour
markets to people from the new member states. According to the Central
Statistical Office in Poland, at the end of 2006 about 1,950,000 people
were temporarily staying abroad. As young people are the most likely to
migrate, a great increase in emigration contributed to declining fertil-
ity in Poland, while young Polish women willingly have children when
staying abroad.
The changes in the fertility level in Poland started at the beginning
of the 1950s. The average number of children per woman declined from
about 3.7 to around 2.3 by the late 1960s with a slight increase there-
after due to higher fertility among women from the first post-war baby
boom cohorts. Until the late 1980s, fertility in Poland stayed above
the level of simple generation replacement, that is 2.1 children per
woman. The years of socio-political transition were accompanied by a
decline of childbearing, and by the late 1990s Poland had joined the
group of countries with a fertility level below 1.31 children per woman,
the so-called lowest low fertility, and has stayed there ever since. The
changes in the fertility level are mainly connected to the changes in
the procreative behaviours and the changes in partnership formation
and dissolution. Marriage and childbearing have been strongly linked in
Poland. Along with the decline in first marriages, the mean age of first
marriage and that of the first and successive child births have increased.
Between 1995 and 2007, the mean age at the birth of the first child in
Poland increased by 2.3 years. An important factor influencing fertility
level is the form of relationships in which the procreation process is
being realised. The data for Poland indicate that the fundamental and
dominant form of relationship is marriage, particularly for younger age
groups and first births. However, there are indications of the deinstitu-
tionalisation of the family, that is the traditional family model is being
abandoned. The process manifests itself in decreasing percentages of per-
sons in marriage and an increasing share of extramarital births. While
about 94 per cent of children were born in marriage in the early 1990s,
this proportion declined to about 80 per cent in more recent years.
The declining total fertility rate (TFR) is caused mainly by the changes
in the fertility pattern that is illustrated by Figure 5.1a for the period
1990–2009. The range of the changes is shocking. At the beginning of
transition, the highest fertility characterised the group of 23-year-olds,
in 2009 – it was the group of 28-year-olds with the highest fertility, but
the level was about half of that in 1990. The impact of changes related
to the tempo effect, and the ones related to the quantum effect may be
0.20
0.18
0.16
0.14
Fertility rate
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Age in years
2009 2005 2000 1995 1990
Figure 5.1a Fertility patterns in Poland, 1990–2009, selected years

Source: Own elaboration based on the data of the Polish Central Statistical Office.
Ewa Fratczak
0.12
0.10
0.08
Fertility rate
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Age in years
Poland EU27
Figure 5.1b Fertility patterns, Poland – EU 27, 2008

Source: Own elaboration based on the data of the Eurostat.
distinguished within the changes in the fertility pattern (Bongaarts and

Feeney, 1998).1 The detailed analyses concerning fertility in Poland and
Estonia with the application of the Bongaarts-Feeney formula (see Katus
et al., 2007) concluded that the tempo effect related to the postpone-
ment of births, which influenced the decline of the TFR, was stronger
and lasted longer in Poland than in Estonia. The other characteristic
feature of fertility changes in Poland is its close relation with nuptiality,
confirmed by a high rate of marital births (in 2008 it reached the level of
80 per cent). The fertility pattern in Poland differs from that of the EU 27
(see Figure 5.1b), given its slightly higher intensity of births in younger
age groups (up to 27–28 years of age) and a much lower intensity of
births at older ages (particularly for ages 30–40 years).
Beside new patterns in cross-sectional fertility in Poland, significant
changes can be observed in cohort fertility, as shown by Figure 5.1c.
Detailed studies on cohort fertility carried out by Fratczak˛ and Ptak-
Chmielewska (2011) showed that the change in the cohort fertility
pattern concerns mainly women who were born in the 1970s and 1980s.
As seen in Figure 5.1c (gross maternity function is the number of births per
10,000 women by age group), the first symptoms of changes in the fertil-
ity pattern appeared already for the generations of the late 1960s, while
1400
Gross maternity function per 10,000
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
15 20 25 30 35 40 45
1950, 1960, 1970, 1975–79
1950 1960 1970 1975 1976
1977 1978 1979
Figure 5.1c Fertility patterns, Poland, cohorts, 1970–79

Source: Fratczak,
˛ Ptak-Chmielewska (2011), Figure 9, p. 47.
the rapid changes can be observed for the generations of the 1970s. Not
shown in the figure, but the changes continued throughout the gener-
ations of the 1980s. Figure 5.1c clearly displays for the generations of
the 1970s the pronounced changes at the early stages of the main pro-
creation ages. The change in the pattern concerns mainly the change in
the fertility intensity, its significant decline from the level of 1,200 births
per 10,000 women to the level of 600–700 births per 10,000 women.
2.2 Investment in education and changes in values and norms

Women’s educational attainment has since long influenced both the
number of children one has and their timing. More educated women
decide to have a child less often in older age when compared with
women with primary education. The studies of cohort fertility by edu-
cation in Poland for the cohorts 1951–75 indicated that for all birth
cohorts the TFR for women with higher education was about 1 child
less compared with women with only primary education (Fratczak˛ and
Ptak-Chmielewska, 2011, vol. II, pp. 35–36).
The growth in popularity of tertiary education among the young gen-
eration in transition countries is a fact. In Poland, the scope of these
Ewa Fratczak
changes should be assessed as a very intensive process considering the

short duration of its development. During the period of transformation
in Poland, the number of tertiary students tripled. The gross enrolment
rate increased from 12.9 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s to
48.9 per cent in 2006 (a growth of 280 per cent). The data concern-
ing the tertiary-education system in Poland indicate that women, more
often than men, study in tertiary schools. The share of women with
completed tertiary education in Poland in 2008 in the population of
women aged 25–34 years was at the level of 39 per cent, while the
corresponding share for men was 26 per cent. The increase in female
educational attainment level has contributed to changing female aspi-
rations regarding labour market participation in many OECD countries
even among married mothers (OECD, 2011, pp. 31–32). In Poland,
women with higher education are as likely to have a job as men;
moreover, they also have more stable employment prospects than
low-educated women. The emphasis on education among the young
generation of women increases their chances in the labour market and
provides them with the prospect of a better financial situation and
economic independence; on the other hand, it translates into the deci-
sion of postponing marriage and parenthood. For women in Poland,
one possible strategy related to the labour market and the popularity
of tertiary education is: employment first, then childbearing. As sug-
gested by Kotowska and others (2008), women who fear jeopardising
their employment prospects postpone births until they have established
a position in the labour market. In line with this, Matysiak (2009,
p. 254) showed that Polish women facing new conditions of labour
force participation postpone childbearing, until they have found a job.
This means that there had been a selection into employment before
childbirth (both among childless women and mothers). Education facili-
tates realisation of women’s aspirations regarding employment and their
position in the labour market, but it is not a tool for liquidation of
the conflict between family and professional career, as the results of
Matysiak (2009, p. 265) reveal. The conflict is reflected in markedly
negative impacts of children on women’s work. There are many rea-
sons for the conflict, but the main ones are: weak public support for
working parents, high instability of employment contracts (in terms
of a high frequency of fixed-term contracts and a high risk of getting
fired) and a relatively high unemployment rate among young people.
The employment-first strategy implies that education and occupational
activity as well as the situation in the labour market generally, may be
considered as significant determinants of fertility intentions.
A growth in the proportion and the number of people with tertiary

education, particularly among the young generation, will undoubtedly
contribute to more people being susceptible to changes in the system of
values, which facilitate changes in attitudes and behaviours related to
marriage and family, to the use of contraceptives including modern con-
traception. In Poland, religion experienced a significant transformation
along with the overall ideational shift. Recent decades have witnessed
the emergence of notions like ‘postmodern’ religion, and ‘believing
without belonging’, used to denote new trends in the development of
religiosity. The importance of religion in the study of contemporary fer-
tility and family changes in Europe was pointed out by Lesthaeghe and
Surkyn (1988). Indeed, in the case of Poland, the importance of religion
in the study of contraceptive use and fertility cannot be ignored. Sec-
ularisation may take place on many levels, of which the institutional
and the individual levels are the most important. During the secularisa-
tion process, institutions – economic, political and social – are removed
from the control of religion. At times, this control might have been
direct, with ecclesiastical authorities also having authority over the oper-
ation of these institutions (cf. Cline, 2011). The changes taking place in
religiosity and morality of the Poles during the transition period cer-
tainly influence the changes in reproductive attitudes and behaviours
of the young and middle-aged generations of both female and male
Poles (cf. Mariański, 2001, p. 27). The changes in lifestyle, opening
up to new ideas, concerns the younger section of society to a greater
extent. This results in pluralisation of society, including the processes
of de-secularisation and individualisation. Similar changes are observed
not only in Poland but also in other transition countries, for example
Bulgaria (cf. Koytcheva and Philipov, 2008). The younger section of soci-
ety in Poland that decidedly invests in education is more susceptible to
change in the system of values.
2.3 Situation in the labour market

Economic reforms in Poland in the early 1990s changed the structure of
labour demand. From the beginning of transition, until the end of 2006,
a visible decline in economic activity was observed, due to among other
factors, the ageing of society and the exercise of early retirement rights,
postponed entering into the labour market given the extended course of
education (tertiary school) and periods of low prosperity (crises). During
1990–93, the total unemployment rate increased to about 16 per cent in
the first quarter of 1994, which was caused by the liquidation of hidden
unemployment in the restructured public enterprises, as well as a drop
Ewa Fratczak
in GNP in 1990–91 following a decline in domestic and foreign demand.

In 1994–98, a decline in unemployment caused by strong economic
growth was observed, although it did not evoke a significant increase in
employment. The Russian crisis in 1998 initiated a strong rise in unem-
ployment, exceeding 20 per cent in 2002–04. Between 2004 and 2008,
a rapid drop in unemployment was observed, and since 2009, a slight
increase, caused by a negative demand shock following the international
financial crisis.
As Figure 5.2a shows, unemployment rates have been higher among
women than among men, although the difference has decreased over
the years. This difference diminished despite greater difficulties in com-
bining work and family life associated with greater competitiveness in
the labour market, and a higher demand for flexibility and education
in the context of pressure for senior positions in the labour market
(Kotowska and Sztanderska, 2007). As we can see, the unemployment
rate for people aged 15–34 years is higher than the total unemployment
rate, because employers are less likely to hire the youth aged 15–25 years
as they tend to believe that people at such a young age do not have
any occupational experience. In 2003–08, a decrease was observed in
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Males 15–34 Females 15–34 Total 15–34

Total 15–60/64
Figure 5.2a Unemployment rate in Poland, total, males and females aged 15–34
years, 2003–09
Source: Own elaboration based on the data from the Polish Labour Force Survey database.
the unemployment rate for the young, but beginning in 2009, a strong
increase in this age group was observed.
Since 2007, the negative tendency in economic activity seems to have
reversed (that is activity rates have increased), as the ‘baby boom’ gener-
ation of the 1980s entered the labour market and due to lengthening
of the period of economic activity given government restrictions on
earlier retirement. As Figure 5.2b shows, the changes in the activity
level of people in the age group 15–34 are similar to changes observed
for the total population in the active age range (15–60/64 years). The
activity level in this group was stable until 2006, and since then it has
been slightly increasing. The level of activity in this group is lower by
about 10 percentage points than in the total population of active age, as
the young are more likely to engage in higher education, which delays
their entering the labour market. Similarly to the total population, the
activity rate for males in this age group is also higher than that of
females. A relative increase in female activity was explained by a greater
determination for women to keep their positions, despite problems
with combining work with family life and responsibilities (Sztanderska,
2005; Kotowska and Sztanderska, 2007; Matysiak, 2009). One of the
strategies implemented by women was limiting the number of births.
Another action commonly undertaken was increasing one’s educational
level, which results in higher qualifications and more competence in
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Males Females Total 15–34 Total 15–60/64
Figure 5.2b Activity rate in Poland, total, males and females aged 15–34 years,
2003–09
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Polish Labour Force Survey database.
Ewa Fratczak
3 children or more
2009
2 children
1 child
No children
3 children or more
2007
2 children
1 child
No children
3 children or more
2005
2 children
1 child
No children
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Both working full-time One working full-time, One working,
one part-time one not working
Figure 5.2c Family model and labour division in Poland, 2005, 2007, 2009
Source: Own elaboration based on the Labour Force Survey, Eurostat database.
the labour market (Sztanderska, 2005), effecting stabilisation and more

secure positions.
Another aspect of interest with respect to the situation in the labour
market is combining employment with family life. As Figure 5.2c shows,
the gender gap in employment increases with the number of children in
the family. Obviously, contemporary Polish families with many children
are a minority; however, the data clearly indicate that the employment-
gender gap increases following a growing number of children in the
family. At the same time, a gender gap decreases significantly when
the age of the youngest child increases. A high gender gap for fami-
lies with the youngest child below six years of age may be related to a
limited number of childcare institutions providing care for children at
the crèche and kindergarten age. This may cause women to withdraw
from economic activity and is a source of tension in combining family
with occupational life in Poland. Improvement of care services for the
youngest children poses a great challenge for family policy in Poland, as
will be further discussed in the next section. The important issues in the
context of fertility intentions, labour market and work–life balance com-
prise changes in the Polish family model and in the division of labour
within the family.
The Polish family model underwent great changes in the period
of transition, that is after 1989. The family status life tables model
application, including the family changes in the context of life cycle
(cf. Fratczak
˛ and Kozłowski, 2005), indicate that at the beginning of
transition, the dominant model of the nuclear family in Poland was

the model with two children, whereas the currently dominant model
is a nuclear family with one child. The data presented in Figure 5.2c
show that currently in Poland, in families with one or two children
the most popular family model is the model with both parents work-
ing. Moreover, the share of this category in the overall structure has
been increasing; in 2005–09 it increased from a level of 53 per cent to
about 60 per cent. In families with three and more children, which are
in a minority in Poland, a high share comprises those with both par-
ents working, as well as those with only one working parent. These two
categories of families in the group of multi-children families constitute
between 90 and 92 per cent of the total number of families. The model
most often observed in childless families in Poland is that where one of
the spouses/partners works. Regardless of the number of children in a
family, the current situation in Poland indicates that the popular model
is the model of the family with both parents working full-time. The
families where one parent is working full-time, while the other works
part-time constitute between 6 and 10 per cent of the overall struc-
ture, which suggests that part-time work – one of the labour market
options that allows combining paid work with family life – actively
facilitating work–life balance is not widespread enough in Poland. The
changes that could be observed during 2005–09 indicate that the process
of transformation facilitating work–life balance has started; however, it
is progressing at a very slow pace.
2.4 Institutional and family policy changes

For many reasons, family-friendly policies are expected to have a pos-
itive impact on fertility and fertility intentions. They can reduce the
cost of raising children and improve conditions for reconciling work
with family life. The institutional context of family policy may be
defined in a very broad way. Most often it covers several institutional
instruments regarding family functioning, labour market regulation,
particular laws and responsibilities, actions targeted at equal rights and
combating gender-related discrimination, and so on. Several institu-
tional changes comprising replacement of institutions respective to old
instruments with new ones have been carried out – particularly in the
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland.
Institutional instruments related to family policy include leave policies
(maternity, paternity, parental leave), care services, cash and tax bene-
fits, and legal regulations with respect to the labour market, including
actions for the implementation of equal rights regardless of gender
Ewa Fratczak
(McNicoll, 1994; Sleebos, 2003; Neyer, 2006; Gauthier, 2007; Thevenon,

2009; Blum and Rille-Pfeiffer, 2010). All these actions aim to reduce
the direct and potential costs of children and help parents to improve
work–life balance. Among the most important legal regulations were
the Amendments of the Labour Code on equal treatment in employ-
ment. Since the beginning of 2007, two amendments have been passed
regarding the implementation of equal rights policy and counteracting
gender-related discrimination: the Law of 21 November 20082 and the
Law of 6 December 2008.3 The first of these laws introduced changes in
the Labour Code concerning equal treatment in employment and the
legal status of employees returning to work after maternity leave.4 The
new regulation guarantees the employee whose maternity or equivalent
leave has expired a return to their previous or an equivalent position, or
some other position commensurate with the employee’s occupational
qualifications, with a remuneration equal to what they would have had,
had they not taken any leave. The second one introduced changes into
the Labour Code concerning: maternity leave, leave equivalent to mater-
nity leave, additional rights particular to parenthood (paternity leave),
employment protection of workers entitled to childcare leave and taking
advantage of shortened working time.
3. Maternity and paternity leave
Maternity leave is available to all women working part-time or full-time,

even if on a fixed-term contract but not for self-employed women. The
benefit for maternity leave is equivalent to 100 per cent of earnings, that
is average salary from the last 12 months. There are no other restrictions
for eligibility, like employment status or the length of the period of work
before birth. Since 1 January 2010, the duration of maternity leave has
increased. It now comprises 20 weeks in the case of the birth of one child
(it was 16 weeks before 2006; and 18 weeks in 2006–09)5 and 31 weeks
in the case of twins.6 A part of maternity leave may be taken by fathers,
albeit not before a child is 14 weeks old. In addition, legal regulations in
the Labour Code adopted on 1 January 2010 introduced paternity leave.
Its duration was one week in 2011, and two weeks from 2012. Taking
paternity leave by an employee – a father bringing up a child (both
biological and adoptive) – is possible until the child is 12 months old.
According to the law, paternity leave may be taken at any time, that
is also during the maternity leave taken by the child’s mother, during
additional maternity leave or during childcare leave. Since 1 January
2010, there has been a possibility of taking up supplemental maternity
leave, up to a period equal to standard maternity or paternity leave.

Since 2011, an additional maternity leave is available for the duration
of up to two weeks in the case of giving birth to one child, and up to
three weeks in the case of multiple births.7
The amendment to Art. 182 §3 and 4 of the Labour Code introduced
the possibility of combining additional maternity leave with work for
an employer (other than the one granting the leave) for no more than
half of the hours worked full-time. In such a case, additional maternity
leave is granted for the remainder of the daily working time. Taking up
work is preceded by a written application from the female employee,
within a period no shorter than seven days before starting the leave,
in which the female employee indicates the hours to be worked and
the period she intends to combine additional maternity leave with part-
time work. The employer is obliged to consent to the application in such
a case.
During additional maternity leave, the labour relationship of an
employee is subject to a particular protection against notice of termi-
nation and dissolution (Art. 182 §5 respective to Art. 177 of the Labour
Code). Directly after the expiry of additional maternity leave, a female
employee will be entitled to vacation; in such a case the employer is
obliged to grant such leave in the desired period indicated by the female
employee (Art. 163 §3 of the Labour Code).
Apart from maternity and paternity leaves, in Poland, like in many
other countries, parents are entitled to unpaid childcare leave lasting up
to 36 months that may be taken by the parents until the child’s fourth
birthday. Respective legal regulations introduced in 2002–03 and later
were targeted at ensuring greater flexibility for this form of aid. The main
advantages are: the possibility to take leave in parts, the possibility to
take up part-time work and the possibility to receive a childcare benefit
depending on the household’s financial situation. Another area of legal
regulations regards the parents’ entitlements to material support related
to raising children. This includes: various kinds of family benefits (most
often in the form of financial allowances, mainly of a selective charac-
ter, dependent on income threshold) and income tax relief for single
parents.
An important institutional aspect of family policy provision is the
availability of childcare institutions for small children, that is kinder-
gartens and nurseries. Their universal accessibility may reduce the
indirect costs of having a child, as they may, in a more or less satisfying
way, lessen the tensions between paid work and childcare. In the period
of transition, the sector of institutional childcare services in Poland
Ewa Fratczak
1,600 12,0000
1,400 10,0000
1,200
1,000 80,000
800 60,000
600 40,000
400
200 20,000
0 0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Nurseries Number of places
Figure 5.3 Number of nurseries and places in nurseries in Poland, 1990–2008

Source: Own elaboration based on data of Polish Central Statistical Office.
underwent some deep changes, particularly in the case of childcare for

children up to three years old. Nurseries comprise the main form of
childcare services for children aged three or less. The continued ten-
dency observed since the beginning of the transition in Poland is a
decreasing number of childcare facilities and a declining number of
children participating in these services. In 1990, there were 1,412 nurs-
eries, in 2000 – 428, and by 2008 – the number had dropped to 392 (see
Figure 5.3).
A drop in the number of nurseries translated into a decline in
the number of children participating in institutional childcare. While
in 1990 this form of childcare included 137,500 children, by 2008
their number had decreased by 60 per cent and amounted to 54,700
(Figure 5.3). The current situation in Poland regarding the institutional
childcare of small children is far from the goals for childcare provision
set by the European Council at the Barcelona Summit in 2002 (Report
from the commission, 2008), which state that by 2010, in EU coun-
tries, 33 per cent of children aged up to three years and 90 per cent
of children between three years and the compulsory school entrance
age should be included in institutional day care outside the family.
The gap between these so-called Barcelona targets and the actual situ-
ation in Poland is huge, as currently institutional childcare covers only
2 per cent of children aged up to two years. A slightly better situation
is observed in the case of institutional care for children aged three to
six years.8 As the governments of particular countries are responsible
for the state and development of institutional childcare, the Polish gov-
ernment prepared new legislation, passed on 4 February 2011 as the
‘Law on childcare for children aged up to three years’. It determines: the
principles of organisation and functioning of childcare for children up

to three years old; conditions of providing the services; qualifications
of people providing childcare; the principles of childcare financing; as
well as supervising the conditions and quality of the childcare. The Law
introduces nurseries, children’s clubs, day childminders and nannies
as forms of childcare for small children. The objective of the imple-
mented regulations is rationalisation of the principles of establishing
and functioning of the alternative forms of childcare for children below
three years of age. The new regulations are expected to offer families
wider access to more varied and better quality institutional childcare for
children up to three years old, to improve the access of the children
participating in childcare to early education, to increase female employ-
ment rates through enabling mothers’ earlier re-entry into the labour
market, and at the same time to facilitate gender-equality promotion in
the family and in occupational life.
4. Theoretical framework
The discussion on the main causes of the recent fertility decline in

Central and Eastern Europe, and in Poland, in the context of the
emergence of lowest low fertility focuses on the influence of two
groups of factors: economic and not economic (cultural and soci-
etal). Within demographic research, the economic approach primar-
ily addresses the impacts of monetary income and wealth, welfare
regimes and labour market changes. However, apart from economic
capital, social capital, gender equality at both the household and the
macro level and the variety of lifestyle preferences may also mat-
ter in fertility intentions and fertility-related decision-making and
behaviour, especially in societies that face economic uncertainty – like
Poland.
In the study of fertility intentions in Poland, our theoretical frame-
work is based on three theories, namely preference theory (Hakim, 2000,
2003a, 2003b; Vitali et al., 2009); gender equity theory (McDonald,
2000a, 2000b; Bernhardt et al., 2008; Mills et al., 2008) and social
capital theory (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Wellman, 1992; Schoen et al.,
1999; Kohler et al., 2001; Lin, 2001; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan, 2003;
Philipov et al., 2006; Bühler and Fratczak,
˛ 2007). All three theories
address cultural, social and institutional dimensions, and hence will
allow a better understanding of the mechanisms shaping fertility inten-
tions in a country such as Poland, which has been undergoing political
and economic transitions for the last 20 years and which, on the
Ewa Fratczak
other hand, is perceived as a traditional predominately Roman Catholic

society with a traditional system of norms and values related to fertil-
ity and family. Yet, the last years of transformation have shown that the
Polish family model has been evolving towards the Western one, as con-
firmed by the new Hajnal line (Philipov, 2001).9 Therefore, studying the
most important aspects connected with these three theories and possi-
ble interactions between them can promote a better understanding of
fertility intentions among women in large city environments in Poland.
Before specifying our research questions, we summarise once again the
key features of these theories.
Preference theory aims to explain changes that women have experi-
enced in society with respect to fertility and employment. This social
theory regards lifestyle preferences and values (cultural factors) as prin-
cipal determinants of fertility, indicating that in public policymaking
the heterogeneity of women’s behaviours should be considered as an
important factor. According to this theory, there are three main groups
of women: home-oriented, adaptive and career-oriented. The size of
these groups may vary in different countries depending on which group
is favoured by public policies. Also, different groups react to policies
in different ways. Career-oriented women are less likely to be influ-
enced by family policies and employment policies are less important
for family-oriented women. The adaptive group reacts to both types of
policies.
According to gender equity theory, the phenomenon of women acquir-
ing higher levels of education and, in turn, better opportunities in
the labour market should be accompanied by greater levels of equal-
ity between women and men in their households. Greater equality in
the division of household duties will then result in higher fertility. Gen-
der equity is not only relevant within the household, but also at the
institutional and national levels. The level of gender equity and institu-
tional support differs from country to country. The more traditional a
society is, with regard to the gender system, the greater is the incoher-
ence between the levels of gender equality in social institutions and the
lower is fertility. Even if opportunities for women in education and paid
work are equal to those of men, unless supported by policies, services
and in the home, women will restrict the number of children they have
because of the constraints of time and other resources.
Social capital theory can be considered in relation to fertility inten-
tions with respect to social networks and perceptions of utility, personal
relationships and social capital. Social capital is measured via individual
embeddings in networks of giving and receiving support. This influence
is, on the one hand, linked to the number of relatives, including parents,
in these networks, but on the other hand also to the number of support-
ive friends and colleagues. In the context of the social capital theory,
we aim to explore how much the availability of social capital, measured
by the number of supportive relationships in an individual’s personal
network, has an influence on the individual’s fertility intentions. This is
especially relevant in the background of the significant social, economic
and demographic changes in Poland, as similarly to other Central and
Eastern European countries it has faced a serious decline in fertility after
the breakdown of Communism.
In our empirical analyses, we will seek first to verify each theory sep-
arately, and then test for interactions between them to gain a better
understanding of fertility intentions in the Polish context. Regarding
interactions, first between women’s preferences and gender equality at
the household level, we aim to identify the groups of women (pref-
erence groups) for whom gender equality matters most: whether for
home-oriented, work-oriented or possibly adaptive ones. Similarly, in
respect to the interaction between preferences and network size, it may
be presumed that the network size is more important for the work-
oriented and adaptive women, as it may reduce tensions between family
and professional career, thus positively influencing fertility intentions.
Assessment of the interactions between the three theories will allow a
better understanding of the processes around procreative intentions in
the context of tensions regarding work–life balance in a country expe-
riencing transformation. Hence, the results of our analyses can reveal
the relationship between work–family lifestyle, social networks, gender
equality and fertility intentions, indicating the functioning mechanism
of fertility intentions formulation.
In our analysis we first seek to answer the following questions:
1. What are the main determinants that influence fertility intentions

in city environments in Poland among young women and how may
the impact of the determinants be explained by these theories in the
context of very low (lowest low) fertility?
2. What is the division of Polish women regarding their lifestyle prefer-
ences, how do the different groups of women respond to the different
social policy solutions and how do the preferences of different
lifestyles influence fertility intentions?
Considering social capital theory and gender equity theory, we formu-

lated the following hypotheses:
Ewa Fratczak
H1. With respect to gender equality both micro and macro levels
should be considered. At the macro level we focus on individual-
oriented institutions (educational system, labour market), while at
the micro level on the division of household and family tasks
between men and women. The greater the gender equality at both
levels, the stronger the positive influence on the fertility intentions.
H2. Social capital is a factor which influences fertility intentions in
a positive way and partly reduces uncertainty and tension regarding
reconciliation of work and family-life.
Finally, we will discuss whether gender equity, preference and social cap-
ital theories can provide a better insight into processes around fertility
intentions in contemporary Poland, shedding more light on the inter-
play between fertility intentions, female employment and institutional
solutions of work–life balance problems.
5. Data and methods
Our empirical analyses were based on data extracted from the Late Fer-
tility Diagnosis Survey conducted in 2007 on a representative sample of
1,200 women aged 19, 23, 27 and 31 years from two big cities in Poland
(in Warsaw and Poznan). The survey was planned as a prospective panel
survey (see Figure 5.4) measuring intentions and their realisations.
Fertility intentions were measured by asking the following questions:
Would you like to have children in the future (yet), now or

later (if you are pregnant – besides the one you are expecting)?
(67.2 per cent of women answered ‘Yes’, and 32.8 per cent answered
‘No’ or ‘I don’t know’).
When would you like to have a (next) child? The answer alternatives were
the following:
• As soon as possible (less than two years) – chosen by 14.4 per cent
• Between two and five years from now – chosen by 51.2 per cent
• More than five years from now – chosen by 19.6 per cent
• I don’t know – chosen by 14.8 per cent
In our model estimation we used logistic regression with Intentions as

our dependent variable, with value 1 if a woman plans to have a child in
the future (without distinguishing the time aspect of those plans). Two
I Wave 1200 women (4 cohorts)

II Wave 1200 + 300 women (5 cohorts) 37 years
III Wave 1500 + 300 women (6 cohorts)
34 years 33 years
31 years 30 years 29 years
Age

I wave II wave III wave

1976 1980 1984 1988 1991 1994 2007 2010 2013
Calendar years
Figure 5.4 Late fertility diagnosis – panel survey scheme, Poland

Source: Own elaboration.
types of models (logistic regression models) were estimated: for childless

women, intentions to have a first child and for women who already have
at least one child, intentions to have a next child (subsequent). We have
controlled for the effect of the following characteristics:
• Activity (‘working’, ‘unemployed’, ‘inactive’; reference category:

‘working’)
• Marital status (‘married/in partnership’, ‘single’; reference category:
‘single’)
• Household size (number of people in the household)
• Educational level (‘higher’, ‘secondary’ and ‘lower’; reference category
‘higher’)
• Income (household income)
• Religiosity (‘religious’, ‘non-religious’ and ‘neutral’, meaning how
important religion is in respondent’s life; reference category: ‘reli-
gious’)
• Age (grouped as follows: 19 (1988), 23 (1984), 27 (1980), 31 (1976);
reference category – women aged 31 born in 1976).
‘Partnership’ means both cohabitation and having a stable partner with-

out living together. For specific models, variables connected to theory
were also included.
Ewa Fratczak
6. Model estimation and results
6.1 Preference theory

In testing the preference theory, we have measured lifestyle preferences
via the following questions, similar to those used by Hakim (2003a) in
her classification:
• If you could have a satisfactory income without having to take paid

work, then would you still like to have a paid job or not?
• Who is the main breadwinner/provider in your household?
• There is a common opinion concerning the reversal of roles of hus-
band and wife in the family. Below we present three types of families.
In an ideal world where money would not pose a problem, which of
the following solutions would you choose for yourself:
1. Family, where only the husband has paid-work?

2. Family, where the wife has less demanding work than her hus-
band and participates to a larger extent in the housework and
bringing up their children?
3. Family, where both parents are responsible for paid work and
each of them performs half of the housework and equally shares
the responsibilities of bringing up their children?
4. None of the above?
• Do you think that you have already realised/probably will in the

future realise your preferred model?
Based on their answers, women who preferred families in which only

the husband has paid work were classified as home-oriented. They
comprised 12.8 per cent of our sample (see Table 5.1). Women who
wouldn’t give up their paid work even without economic necessity
and who were the main earnings provider in their household (or
together with their husband) were classified as work-oriented, making
up 31.8 per cent of the sample. This is a higher share than expected
based on the studies by Hakim (2000, 2003a, 2003b). The remaining
women in the rest of the sample were classified as belonging to the
adaptive group (55.4 per cent).
Indeed, the group of home-centred women seems to be smaller and
the group of work-centred women appears to be larger in Poland than
would be expected, according to the preference theory. Still, the sizes of
these groups are within the 10–30 per cent limits proposed by Hakim
(2000, see Table 1.1.A, p. 6), and the size of the adaptive group is within
the proposed 40–80 per cent. As seen in Table 5.1, more than 90 per cent
of work-oriented women are employed, but only about 60 per cent
of those in the home-centred and the adaptive groups. Home-centred
women have, on average, nearly twice as many children as work-centred
and adaptive women. Almost half of work-centred women are highly
educated, but only 20 per cent of the adaptive group and 14 per cent of
the home-centred group. However, intentions to have a child seem to be
less strongly associated with lifestyle preferences. Work-centred women
have fewer children but more frequently declare their desire to have a
child than women in the other two groups. Taking into consideration
only women in partnership (lower part of the Table 5.1), the group of
Table 5.1 Lifestyle/family model preferences among young Polish women in the
early 2000s (classification in line with the preference theory)
All women
Items Home-centred∗ Adaptive Work-centred∗
% employed 59.70 56.00 91.90

% married/cohabiting 65.60 53.01 51.60
Single-person household 7.79 6.48 32.46
% 19 years old (%31-year-old) 20.8 (26. 6) 34.8 (19. 3) 9.16 (35. 06)
Average number of children 0.57 0.38 0.31
% childless 59.74 71.08 76.18
% with higher educational level 13.64 20.48 48.43
Intentions to have a child 56.49 67.02 71.73
Base = 100% (1,200 women)
Proportion of the three groups 12.83 55.33 31.84
Only married or cohabiting women
Items Home-centred∗ Adaptive Work-centred∗
% employed 64.36 73.86 92.89

% married 87.13 80.68 74.11
% 19 years old (%31-year-old) 8.91 (36. 6) 10.5 (32. 71) 5.08 (42. 13)
Average number of children 0.82 0.70 0.47
% childless 42.57 47.73 63.45
% with higher educational level 14.85 30.68 50.76
Intentions to have a child 50.50 65.34 65.99
Base = 100% (518 women)
Proportions of the three groups 15.54 54.15 30.31
Note: ∗ 20 women were classified as belonging to both groups and they were included in
home-centred.
Source: Own elaboration based on database from Late Fertility Diagnosis Survey.
Ewa Fratczak
home-centred women was bigger than in the full sample (15.54 per cent
versus 12.83 per cent). Women in the home-centred group have similar
numbers of children to adaptive women, unlike in the overall sample,
where the adaptive group was more similar to the work-oriented group
with respect to the number of children.
Our descriptive results were confirmed by logistic regression analysis.
Results for logistic regression models are presented in Table 5.2, in which
the first column shows estimates for intentions to have a first child and
the second column shows the regression results for intentions to have
subsequent children. In the first model, our explanatory variable is work-
oriented (with value 1 versus any other orientation), while in the second
model it is home-centred (with value 1 versus any other orientation).
In both models, we have included a variable on social policy evaluation
(‘good’, ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’, the latter being the reference
category), but the effect was not significant and, therefore, it is not
displayed here. Yet, an interaction between social policy evaluation and
being home-centred was found to be significant for the intention to have
a first child, but not for intentions to have a subsequent child. In the
model of intending to have subsequent children, we have controlled for
the number of children one already has (numeric: 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ).
As we see in Table 5.2, work-oriented women are more likely to
intend to have a first child generally compared with women in all other
groups. Surprisingly, home-orientation seems to weaken intentions to
have subsequent children. Religiosity was found to be an important fac-
tor as well. Non-religious or ‘neutral’ women, compared with religious
women, have weaker intentions to have a first child and subsequent
children, respectively (‘neutral’ for first child intentions is not obvious
but insignificant). Importance of religiosity confirms that Poland is still
a traditional and Catholic country. Younger women are more likely to
intend to have a first child and subsequent children than women from
the oldest cohort (31 years old).
A very interesting connection was found between being home-centred
and social policy evaluation. Home-centred women, who assessed social
policy as good, in comparison with work-oriented or adaptive women,
as well as with those who evaluated social policy as unsatisfactory, are
much more likely to intend to become mothers. These results confirm
the hypothesis that home-centred women are more likely to react to
family policies than work-oriented women.
Women who do not work are more likely to decide to have a sub-
sequent child. Married women or women in partnerships, compared
with singles (including divorcees), are more likely to intend to have
Table 5.2 Logistic regression results for lifestyle preferences. Intentions to have
a first child and intentions to have a subsequent child in Poland (odds ratios)
Variables Intentions to subsequent

have: a first child child
Work-oriented 1.52∗
Home-centred 0.54∗
Religiosity ‘religious’ 1 1
Religiosity ‘non-religious’ 0.49∗ 0.37
Religiosity ‘neutral’ 1.05 0.60∗
Age 19 (1988) 1.10 1.47
Age 23 (1984) 1.85∗ 1.28
Age 27 (1980) 1.07 1.96∗
Age 31 (1976) 1 1
Home-centred∗ Social policy evaluation 3.22∗
‘satisfactory’
Activity ‘working’ 1
Activity ‘unemployed’ 4.40∗
Activity ‘inactive’ 1.27
Marital status ‘single’ 1
Marital status ‘married/partnership’ 2.77∗
Number of children∗∗ 0.26∗
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10.

∗∗ Included only in model of intentions to have a subsequent child as a controlling variable.
subsequent children (the variable was not significant for first-child

intentions). This correlation also confirms a strict relation between mar-
riage and fertility in Catholic countries, such as Poland. The more
children a given woman already has, the less likely she is to intend to
have subsequent children. Intentions to have a child are weaker with
increasing numbers of children already born.
6.2 Gender equity theory

In testing the gender equity theory, we measured gender equality by
questions defining household duties division between women and men.
We asked only women in partnerships in this respect. Evaluation was
based on the following questions: ‘Are you satisfied with your relation-
ship?’, ‘Are you satisfied with your household duties division?’ and ‘Are
you satisfied with the division of childcare duties?’ (the latter question
was asked only in the case of women with children). For all ques-
tions, the responses were measured on a scale of 1–11 where one means
completely unsatisfied and 11 means fully satisfied. The answers were
Ewa Fratczak
summed up for each respondent and the results were grouped into three
levels of satisfaction: ‘low’ for one to three points, ‘medium’ for four to
six, and ‘high’ for seven and more. For details see Table 5.A.1 and foot-
note A.1 in the Appendix; here we sum up the results. Women seem to
be generally satisfied with their household duties division and childcare
duties division. The biggest difference was between women who want
to have a child and women who do not intend to have a child, but only
regarding their satisfaction with their relationships. Women who intend
to have a child are more often highly satisfied with their relationships,
compared with women who do not intend to have a child.
We have also addressed the actual division of duties in the house-
hold, based on the question: ‘How do you evaluate your and your
husband’s/partner’s time commitment to household duties?’ The actual
division of taking care of children was addressed in the question:
‘How do you evaluate your and your husband’s/partner’s time com-
mitment to taking care of your children?’ For both the latter ques-
tions, answers (points) between ‘me mainly’ or ‘both’, were grouped
to ‘me mainly’, and answers between ‘both’ and ‘partner mainly’ were
grouped to ‘partner mainly’. For the detailed distributions of answers,
see Table 5.A.1 in the Appendix.
In the logistic regression models, for intentions to have a first child
and for intentions to have a subsequent child, presented in Table 5.3,
two variables were included related to the gender equity theory: (i) Gen-
der ideals (binary, where value one means that the preferred family
model is a model where both partners work and take care of home and
children together); and (ii) Gender reality (binary, where value one means
that preparing meals is mostly done by the partner or at least by both
partners at the same level). Preparing meals was selected as the most
‘kitchen oriented’, that is ‘female’ household duty.10
As Table 5.3 shows, religiosity, age and economic activity matter with
respect to intentions to have a first child or subsequent child also in
relation to gender equality, as they did with respect to lifestyle prefer-
ences (Table 5.2). Economic activity is important for intentions to have
a first child, but it is not significant for the intentions to have a sub-
sequent child. Religiosity is important only for intentions to have a
subsequent child. Age is significant for both intentions to have a first
child and intentions to have a subsequent child. Gender ideals influ-
ences the intentions to have a first child, and gender reality affects the
intentions to have a subsequent child significantly. Women who value
gender equality in their households are more likely to intend to have a
child and subsequent children. A greater level of gender equality in the
Table 5.3 Logistic regression results for gender equity. Intentions to have a first
child and intentions to have a subsequent child in Poland (odds ratios)
Variables Intentions to subsequent

have: first child child
Religiosity ‘religious’ 1
Religiosity ‘non-religious’ 0.48
Religiosity ‘neutral’ 0.65∗
Age 19 (1988) 1.10 2.62∗
Age 23 (1984) 1.74∗ 2.24∗
Age 27 (1980) 1.04 2.34∗
Age 31 (1976) 1 1
Activity ‘working’ 1
Activity ‘unemployed’ 1.42
Activity ‘inactive’ 0.73∗
Gender ideals 1.28∗
Gender reality 1.92∗
Gender ideals∗ Work-oriented (p = 0. 69) 1.09
Gender reality∗ Work-oriented (p = 0. 64) 0.83
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10.

family is associated with stronger intentions to have a child (first and

subsequent), which is concordant with gender equity theory. Intentions
to have a first child are based on gender ideals but only the gender real-
ity resulting from when these ideals have been tested in everyday life
matters in the decision to have a subsequent child. We also included
interactions between gender ideals respective gender reality and Orien-
tation (Home-centred, Work-oriented and Adaptive) according to Hakim’s
theory, but neither interaction was significant, as shown by the p-values
in parentheses.
6.3 Social capital theory

Two models were estimated also in testing social capital theory, namely
intentions to have a first child and intentions to have subsequent chil-
dren. Social capital was measured by social network (that is how many
people a given woman talked to over the last 12 months about differ-
ent aspects of life) and by support from members of respondent’s social
network (such as dwelling support, regular monetary support and regu-
lar non-monetary support). Detailed distributions of relative frequencies
are presented in Table 5.A.2 in the Appendix. The following numeric
characteristics were selected as variables describing social networks and
are possibly important for fertility intentions:
Ewa Fratczak
• Size of a discussion network about the advantages and disadvantages

of having children.
• Size of a discussion network about the advantages and disadvantages
of living independently from other people.
And three variables of character type describing support:
• Help in obtaining housing (‘Yes’, ‘No’).

• Material help (‘Yes’, ‘No, I didn’t need any’, ‘No, I didn’t know
anybody’).
• Non-material help (‘Yes’, ‘No, I didn’t need any’, ‘No, I didn’t know
anybody’) – results for the latter variable are not displayed here as
they were not significant.
As Table 5.4 shows, dwelling conditions play a significant role in the

intentions to have a first child. An unstable housing situation, that is
category ‘other’, compared with owning a house or flat, greatly decreases
intentions to become a mother. Women who did not receive any help
with their housing are more prone to have a first child than those who
had been helped; however, this may be because they did not need any
help to get a dwelling. Women who received material help are more
likely to intend to have a child, both for a first child and subsequent
children. Receiving material help from a social network strengthens
childbearing intentions, in line with social capital theory. Women who
can rely on others for support may have reduced tensions between fam-
ily life and their professional career, which positively influences their
fertility intentions. Size of a network influences intentions in both ways.
The larger the network to discuss the advantages of having children, the
greater are the intentions to have a first child. On the other hand, the
size of a discussion network about the advantages and disadvantages of
living independently from other people decreases intentions to become
a mother.
We also estimated interactions between Orientation (Work-oriented
group) according to Hakim’s theory and the characteristics of social capi-
tal, that is social networks and support. The interaction between material
help and being work-oriented was significant for intentions to have a first
child, with women receiving no material help because they did not need
any being least likely to intend to become mothers. For intentions to
have a subsequent child, an interaction between being work oriented and
the network of talks about living independently was important. For the pur-
pose of interaction, the size of a network was characterised as binary: 0
164
Table 5.4 Logistic regression results for social capital. Intentions to have a first
child and intentions to have a subsequent child in Poland (odds ratios)
Variables Intentions Subsequent

to have: child
First child
Dwelling ‘own’ 1
Dwelling ‘other’ 0.21∗
Dwelling ‘rented’ 0.88
Dwelling ‘commune’ 1.09
Activity ‘working’ 1 1
Activity ‘unemployed’ 1.01 4.29∗
Activity ‘inactive’ 0.64∗ 1.05
Religiosity ‘religious’ 1 1
Religiosity ‘non-religious’ 0.38∗ 0.57
Religiosity ‘neutral’ 0.96 0.54∗
Marital status ‘single’ 1
Marital status marriage/partners 2.07∗
Age 19 (1988) 3.22∗
Age 23 (1984) 2.54∗
Age 27 (1980) 2.47∗
Age 31 (1976) 1
Educational level ‘higher’ 1
Educational level ‘secondary’ 0.55∗
Educational level ‘lower’ 0.47∗
Size of a discussion network about the advantages 1.39∗
and disadvantages of having children
Size of a discussion network about the advantages 0.83∗
and disadvantages of living independently from
other people
Material help ‘Yes’ 1 1
Material help ‘No, I didn’t need any’ 0.43∗ 1.35
Material help ‘No, I didn’t know anybody’ 0.25∗ 0.49∗
Help in obtaining housing ‘Yes’ 1
Help in obtaining housing ‘No’ 1.41∗
Work-oriented∗ Material help ‘Yes’ 1
Work-oriented∗ Material help ‘No, I didn’t 0.65∗
need any’
Work-oriented∗ Material help ‘No, I didn’t know 0.92
anybody’
Work-oriented∗ Talks about living independently 1.75∗
Note: ∗ p < 0. 10.

Ewa Fratczak
means no talks and 1 means talks with at least one person. Hence, the
results suggest that talks about living independently do not reduce the
intentions to have a subsequent child for work-oriented women.
Fertility intentions can be regarded as a prerequisite for fertility

behaviour; therefore, studying them in the context of the selected
theories seems to be justified in the situation of Poland, which is char-
acterised by a very low TFR (1.4 children per woman), and a large gap
between fertility preferences and behaviour (Bühler and Philipov, 2005;
Bühler and Fratczak, 2007). In this chapter, we have focused on three
theories: Hakim’s preference theory, gender equity theory and social
capital theory, the application of which is connected with the national
and institutional context of the labour market and family policy sup-
porting work–life balance in Poland. The empirical analyses were based
on the data from the Late Fertility Diagnosis Survey conducted among
young women in big cities in Poland.
In applying the preference theory, we assumed that lifestyle prefer-
ences, especially in big city environments, have an impact on fertility
intentions. We obtained some evidence to support Hakim’s theory iden-
tifying three different categories of women with respect to their lifestyle
preferences towards family and work. The share of each of the speci-
fied groups: home-centred, adaptive and work-centred falls within the
range proposed by Hakim (2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d). How-
ever, in Poland, many more women were included in the work-centred
group (about 31.8 per cent of the total sample), as compared with about
15 per cent in most Western countries (Vitali et al., 2009). In the work-
oriented group, the percentage of women who are employed is very
high, while the share of those who are married or cohabiting is relatively
low. About one-third of women in this group were in one-person house-
holds, while this percentage for the other two groups was at the level
of 6–7 per cent. On average, work-oriented women have significantly
fewer children than home-centred ones. In this group, the percent-
age of women with a higher level of education is significantly higher
than in other groups. Surprisingly, the intentions to have a child are
also greater. Assuming that a direct link exists between preferences and
behaviour (cf. Vitali et al., 2009, p. 432) and that lifestyle preferences
affect intended fertility, work-oriented women may constitute the target
group, which will contribute to fertility growth in the future in Poland.
This group demonstrates the current situation of young, well-educated
women in Poland in the period of transition. These are the women who
decided to attain a good education, achieve a good position in the labour

market, who plan to have children in the future – therefore the work-
oriented group is characterised by the highest fertility intentions. In the
light of the institutional solutions targeted at improvement of work–life
balance introduced in Poland in the last few years (e.g. the new law of
2011 on childcare for children aged three years or less), women in this
group are likely to have good chances of realising their intentions. Our
descriptive results of the three groups of women, in line with the pref-
erence theory with a slightly different size of each group in comparison
with those in West European countries, indicate the existence of links
between lifestyle preferences, fertility intentions and the welfare system,
as suggested by the preference theory. The results obtained for Poland,
which belongs to the group of ‘Transition countries’, differ from those
for the Liberal, Social Democratic, Conservative and South European
regimes (cf. Vitali et al., 2009, p. 422).
The results of the model estimation confirmed the conclusions from
the descriptive analysis and indicate that specific lifestyle preferences,
in our case being work-oriented, positively influence fertility inten-
tions for both a first child and subsequent children. Labour market
uncertainties may be especially important for this group, but at the
same time they may be more confident to cope with them given
their higher level of education compared with that of adaptive and
home-centred women. Moreover, we found a statistically significant
interaction between lifestyle preferences and social policy evaluation.
Home-centred women, who assessed the social policy as good, are much
more likely to intend to have a child than women in the other groups.
These results confirm that home-centred women are more likely to react
to family policies than work-oriented women. Family policy matters
less to the latter group. Based on these results, the preference theory
appears to be useful for studies on fertility intentions regarding the
countries experiencing transition, like Poland.
Applying gender equity theory and social capital theory, we tested two
hypotheses in the analysis. According to Hypothesis 1: the greater the
gender equality, the stronger the positive influence on fertility inten-
tions. Hypothesis 2 assumed: social capital is a factor that influences
fertility intention in a positive way and partly reduces uncertainty and
tension regarding reconciliation of work and family-life. We summarise
our findings with respect to these hypotheses in Table 5.5.
We estimated two models: one for intentions to have a first child and
the second for intentions to have a subsequent child. Testing the first
hypothesis, we included a gender equality measure in both estimations.
As Table 5.5 shows, only gender ideals, age and economic activity matter
Ewa Fratczak
Table 5.5 Summary conclusion, Poland: gender equality model for fertility
intentions – testing H1 and social capital model for fertility intentions – testing
H2 (variables with significant impact on fertility intentions are marked by ‘+’)
Variable – supporting H1 Intentions to Intentions to have

have a 1st child 2nd child and
subsequent children
Gender reality +
Gender ideals +
Religiosity +
Age + +
Activity +
Variable supporting H2 Intentions to Intentions to have

have a 1st child 2nd child and
subsequent children
Social network size

Size of a discussion network
about:
– the advantages and disadvantages +
of having children
– the advantages and disadvantages +
of living independently from
other people
Social capital, type of support:
– Help in obtaining housing + +
– Material help +
Controlling variables:
Age + +
Education + +
Activity + +
Dwelling +
Religiosity +
Marital status
Source: Own elaboration.
for the intentions to have a first child, but for intentions to have a sec-
ond child and subsequent children the influential variables are gender
reality, religiosity and age. More religious women were more likely to
intend to have another child. Economic activity was important in inten-
tions to have a first child as inactive women were less likely to intend
to become mothers than working women. Education was not signifi-
cant in any model. The latter results indicate that gender equality has
been achieved at a macro level in Poland, in that individual institu-
tions are providing equal access to education and the labour market for
both women and men. Therefore, education was statistically not sig-
nificant, while not being economically active, that is attached to the
labour market, suppressed intentions to have a first child. In contrast,

the level of gender equality remained low at the micro level, indicated
by the significant impact of the variables related to gender equality in
the family, that is gender ideals with respect to the intentions of having
a first child, and gender reality with respect to the intentions to have
a subsequent child. That not much has changed at the family level can
also be seen even in the continued importance of religiosity in Poland,
both for attitudes and behaviours related to fertility. In a wider sense,
religiosity connects to traditional norms and values, which suppress
gender equality at the family and household level. As pointed out in
the gender equity theory (McDonald, 2000a, 2000b), very low fertility –
as in Poland – results from high or increasing gender equality in
individual-oriented institutions, accompanied by a low level of gender
equality in family-oriented institutions (most importantly the family or
household). During the period of transition in Poland, gender equality
has been promoted at the individual-oriented institutional level, result-
ing in growing equality among men and women in education and in
the labour market. However, traditional gender relations, that is gender
inequality, remained at the family and household level. This incoher-
ence, that women participate in education and economic activities
equally to men while also performing their traditional roles in the fam-
ily, results in very low fertility. Indeed, the situation in Poland is similar
to the situation in the South European countries, such as Italy or Spain
(cf. Billari, 2008). The lack of a significant effect for interactions between
work–family orientation (according to Hakim’s theory) and our gender
equality measures indicates that the incoherence effect equally applies
to fertility intentions of women regardless of their lifestyle preferences.
Procreative decisions are not only personal and individual choices but
are also very much dependent on a person’s or a couple’s social capi-
tal, especially social networks. As a number of empirical studies have
shown, material aspects matter greatly in decisions to have a first child
and a subsequent child, as the economic situation of a family wors-
ens with growing family size. Receiving material and non-material help
can stabilise the situation of a household, increasing the desire of the
household members to have children (Bühler and Fratczak, ˛ 2007). Social
capital matters even more when state provision to families declines,
which was the case during the transition in Poland, particularly in the
first years. Diminishing state provision to families and other – in general
unfavourable – changes in the area of social policy, was characteris-
tic not only for Poland, but also for many other countries of Central
and Eastern Europe (Macura and MacDonald, 2003). Regarding the
increasing uncertainty and risk connected with political and economic
Ewa Fratczak
reforms, the role of social capital, particularly social networks (both fam-
ily and non-family) in the transition countries, including Poland, was
and still is significant for both fertility intentions and behaviours. In our
analysis, we found that material help is important in decisions to have
a first child and a subsequent child for those who need such help, espe-
cially since the costs of childbearing and childrearing are increasing.
Young women who decide to have a child should be supported by rela-
tives, in addition to the state, in taking care of a child, especially since
the child is only six months old when the mother returns to work.
In our analysis, we have also taken into account that the availabil-
ity of information about different aspects of life-determining decisions
about having a child has increased in recent years. Size of a network
is measured by the number of people with whom the respondent has
talked about different aspects of life: advantages of having a child;
advantages of living independently. A larger network ensures access to
more resources provided by members of the network (parents, relatives,
friends). This is in line with our finding that women who most fre-
quently talked about the advantages and disadvantages of having a child
more often intended to have a first child. Combined with the influence
of material help that supports the decision to have a child, the results
confirm the hypothesis that social capital is a factor which influences
fertility intentions in a positive way.
In addition, we have tested for interaction effects between the vari-
ables of social capital and lifestyle preferences. Most of these interactions
were statistically insignificant. The significant interactions are presented
in Table 5.4. They show that women who are not work-oriented and
those who do not need material help were less likely to intend to
become mothers, as compared with women who are work-oriented and
receive material help from their social networks. In respect to the inten-
tions to have a subsequent child, the interaction within the scope of
discussion networks (‘Talks about living independently’) is statistically
significant for the work-oriented group. These results suggest that social
capital is especially important for work-oriented women in Poland, with
respect to material help and talking about ways of living. According to
other studies, social capital in the form of social networks (family and
non-family) and material and non-material help (Bühler and Philipov,
2005; Philipov et al., 2006; Bühler and Fratczak,
˛ 2007) influences fertil-
ity intentions by reducing uncertainty and the costs of having a child,
relieving the tensions between economic activity and family life. The
outcomes of our study are consistent with those results. In addition,
they indicate that there is no difference between home-oriented and
adaptive women with respect to the importance of social capital in
shaping their fertility intentions, while the size of discussion networks,

as well as support from social networks, matter mostly for work-oriented
women.
Our analyses verified the formulated research hypotheses and proved
the soundness of the application of the three theories to the analy-
sis on fertility intentions in Poland. The changes in family policy in
2007–11 in Poland are favourable for women combining family respon-
sibilities with professional careers. Maternity leave was extended to
up to 20 weeks, with the possibility of adding another six weeks and
combining the leave with part-time employment. Moreover, a father
could use part of the maternity leave. In addition, mothers were guaran-
teed the right to reclaim their jobs after returning from maternity leave,
which ensured greater job stability and security. New, important insti-
tutional solutions regarding childcare for children up to three years old
were introduced in 2011, which can facilitate a reduction of the indi-
rect costs of having a child. Such possibilities were rather limited until
then (cf. Matysiak and Wrona, 2010, p. 27). Indeed, Poland is in one of
the last ranked positions in the EU with respect to childcare provision,
especially for children below the age of three. We hope that the new law
that came into effect in 2011 will facilitate the development of insti-
tutions providing childcare for children up to three years, reducing the
indirect costs of having a child. Unfortunately, these regulations were
introduced relatively recently, that is only at a later stage in the trans-
formation period. The new policy measures are targeted at improving
work–life balance and we hope that they will facilitate an increase in
fertility in Poland and reduce the gap between the fertility intentions
and behaviours.
Appendix
Table 5.A.1 Distributions of answers to these questions:

a) Questions summing up woman’s satisfaction with her current situation
b) How do you evaluate your and your husband’s/partner’s time commitment to
household duties?
c) How do you evaluate your and your husband’s/partner’s time commitment to
taking care of your children?
d) Questions concerning housing support, regular monetary support and regular
non-monetary support according to intentions to have a child (%)
a) Questions summing up woman’s satisfaction with her current situation

Intentions to have a child Satisfaction
Low Medium High Don’t
know
Are you satisfied with your relationship?
No 2.93 4.60 89.96 2.51
Yes 0.97 2.19 95.62 1.22
171
Are you satisfied with the division of household duties?

No 7.39 11.30 79.13 2.17
Yes 3.44 13.51 80.84 2.21
Are you satisfied with the division of childcare duties?
(only women with children)
No 5.48 15.07 78.08 1.37
Yes 3.82 15.92 80.25 0.00
b) How do you evaluate your and your husband’s/partner’s time commitment to
household duties?
Duties: Intentions to Who is mainly doing . . .
Me mainly
have a child Both Partner
mainly
Preparing everyday meals No 56.05 37.67 6.28
Yes 38.32 54.59 7.09
Cleaning No 56.64 36.73 6.64
Yes 44.90 49.49 5.58
Washing No 68.78 25.34 5.88
Yes 67.61 28.02 4.37
Shopping No 37.00 54.63 8.37
Yes 28.09 60.05 11.86
Budget No 25.22 66.81 7.97
Yes 17.95 70.00 12.05
Payments No 39.82 45.13 15.05
Yes 26.25 50.66 23.09
Dishes No 52.68 39.29 8.03
Yes 47.40 42.71 9.89
c) How do you evaluate your and your husband’s/partner’s time commitment to
taking care of your children?
Duties: Intentions to Who is mainly doing . . .
have a child Me mainly Both Partner
mainly
Preparing meals for children No 63.7 32.9 3.4
Yes 65.6 29.9 5.1
Helping children with getting No 51.4 45.8 2.8
(un)dressed
Yes 54.9 40.5 4.6
Taking care of children No 50.3 46.2 3.5
while ill
Yes 54.1 42.0 3.9
Playing with children No 22.4 73.5 4.1
Yes 24.2 65.6 10.2
d) Questions concerning: housing support, regular monetary support and regular
non-monetary support
Intentions to have a child Receiving support
Yes No −
Did you get housing support?
No 34.26 65.74 −
Yes 34.24 65.76 −
Receiving regular monetary support
Yes No, didn’t need No, didn’t know
any anybody
No 30.00 58.65 11.35
Yes 38.17 55.56 6.27
Receiving regular non-monetary support
No 30.83 58.71 10.46
Yes 35.58 58.57 5.84
Table 5.A.2 Size of a network – summary statistics: Poland
Size of a network . . . Intentions Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum
Talking about the No 1.42 1.14 0 10

advantages and Yes 1.63 1.29 0 10
disadvantages of
having children
disadvantages
of staying in a
relationship
with another
person
disadvantages of
living independently
from other people
Talking about the use of No 0.93 0.97 0 7
contraceptives Yes 1.16 0.96 0 7
Housing support No 0.16 0.42 0 2
(gaining
ownership) Yes 0.19 0.52 0 4
Housing support No 0.15 0.40 0 2
(without
owner’s rights) Yes 0.12 0.37 0 3
Dwelling occupancy No 0.29 0.56 0 4
Yes 0.26 0.57 0 4
Monetary support No 0.34 0.59 0 3
Yes 0.47 0.71 0 5
Non-monetary support No 0.40 0.74 0 6
Yes 0.49 0.85 0 7
Note A.1
Variables construction based on the questions from Late

Fertility Diagnosis Gender ideals
Question: There is common opinion concerning the reversal of the roles

of husband and wife in the family. Below we present three types of
Ewa Fratczak
family. In an ideal world where money would not be a problem, which

of the following solutions would you choose for yourself:
• Family where only the husband has paid-work?

• Family where the wife has less demanding work than her husband
and participates to a greater extent in the housework and in bringing
up the children?
• Family where both parents have paid work and both parents per-
form half of the housework each and equally share responsibilities
concerning bringing up the children?
• None of the above?
Gender ideals = 1 if option 3 and gender ideals = 0 in others.
Gender reality
Questions: How do you evaluate your and your husband’s time commit-
ment to household duties: everyday meals preparation?
(1 – just you; 2 3 4 5 – both partners; 6 7 8 9 10 – completely partner;
11 other; 12 doesn’t apply)
Gender reality = 1, if answer for everyday meals preparation > = 5
(excluding 12) and gender reality = 0 in others.
Note A.2
In the framework of the Bongaarts-Feeney formulae, the construction of

the cross-sectional TFR comprises the following constituents:
1) quantum component, defined as a TFR which would be observed, if

no changes occurred in the distribution of childbearing timing over
the period for which the rate is measured;
2) tempo component, measuring distortion related to changes in the
distribution of childbearing timing. It is expressed through changes
in the mean age at a given birth order.
Notes
1. For more details about tempo and quantum components, see Notes A.2 in
the Appendix.
2. On the law amendment – the Labour Code (Journal of Laws, No. 223, item
1460).
3. On the law amendment – the Labour Code and on the amendment of some
other laws (Journal of Laws, No. 237, item 1154).
4. The changes followed the implementation of the following directives: Coun-
cil Directive No. 2000/43/WE of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle
of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic ori-
gin; Council Directive No. 2000/78/WE of 27 November 2000 establishing
a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation;
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council No. 2002/73/EC of
23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the imple-
mentation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working
conditions; and Council Directive No. 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and
health of workers at work.
5. Maternity leave of 20 weeks was granted for children born in 2000, and
26 weeks for children born in 2001; however, the changes were only
temporary.
6. In the case of multiple births, respective leaves were:
33 weeks in the case of triplets, 35 weeks in the case of quadruplets and
37 weeks in the case of quintuplets or more children born at the same
time.
7. The duration of an additional maternity leave will be gradually increasing in
2012, 2013 and 2014, and will amount to:
– up to four weeks – in the case of giving birth to one child at a particular

delivery;
– up to six weeks – in the case of multiple births in 2014 and in the
following years;
– up to six weeks – in the case of giving birth to one child at a particular
delivery;
– up to eight weeks – in the case of multiple births.
8. For more on the subject, see Lange, Fratczak,

˛ 2010.
9. John Hajnal (1965) defined a line from Trieste to Saint Petersburg, called
the Hajnal line, that refers to two patterns of European marriage model –
Western and Eastern. The Eastern model is characterised by a younger age
at marriage and the fact that nearly everyone enters into a marriage. The
Western model, on the other hand, is characterised by a later age at marriage
and the fact that a relatively high share of the population remains unmar-
ried. During an international conference organised by IUSSP Working Group
on Low Fertility in cooperation with the National Institute of Population
and Social Security Research (Japan) in 2001, Bulgarian demographer Dimiter
Philipov in his paper entitled ‘Low Fertility in Central and Eastern Europe’,
based on the changes in the European model of marriage, ‘corrected’ the
Hajnal line, moving it more to the East, that is to the line from Dubrovnik
to Saint Petersburg.
10. For more details about variables construction – gender ideals and gender
reality – see Note A.1 in the Appendix.
Ewa Fratczak
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6
Unattainable Desires?
Childbearing Capabilities
in Early 21st-Century Hungary
Judit Takács
1. Introduction
This chapter addresses the issue of weak capabilities for having and
caring for children in Budapest as being reflected by the views of 100
working parents on their fertility-related desires. Capabilities are under-
stood as the freedom to achieve valued functionings; in our case that
is the parents’ notions of the real opportunities they have regarding the
(family) life they may lead (Sen, 1987), more specifically, being a work-
ing parent with as many children as they would like to have. The aim
of my study is to highlight the many ways in which Hungarian par-
ents’ fertility-related capabilities are constrained, which can be detected
not only in their achieved fertility, but also already at the level of their
desired family size.
If fertility desires are interpreted as somewhat fluid cognitive con-
structions, much less tangible than achieved or completed fertility,
one can question why a researcher would devote time to study this
aspect. Fertility desires, I argue, reflect people’s assessment of their
personal, interpersonal and social conditions, as well as internalised
norms. Desired fertility is influenced by how people see their freedom
to achieve various lifestyles (Sen, 1999) in their specific social settings,
where public policies can act as capability expansions or limitations.
In the context of economic uncertainties and risks, unknown in the
former state-socialist countries until quite recently, capabilities are espe-
cially important to address in relation to childbearing decisions, also
taking into account the possible influence of normative expectations
woven into the policy environment, as well as discursive constructions
of media and everyday life.
179
180 Childbearing Capabilities in 21st-century Hungary
2. The Hungarian context
Fertility desires are usually measured as the ideal number of chil-

dren. In Hungarian demographic research, it is hard to find another
macro-level indicator that has changed as little and as slowly as the
mean value of this measure, being quite stable at around two children
per woman (or couple) for decades (S.Molnár, 2001). However, at the
beginning of the 21st century a slight decrease in the level of fertil-
ity intentions and desires seems to have occurred. Young people aged
18–20 reported planning to have fewer children than those belonging
to the same age group did five to ten years ago when, at least, the
childbearing plans of young couples averaged around two, even if the
realisation of these plans remained mostly unfulfilled (Kapitány, 2002).
Declining fertility and declining family size ideals are not specifically
Hungarian features though; similar tendencies can also be observed
in other Eastern European countries (Bradatan and Firebaugh, 2007).
A recent study on demographic trends in Central-East European capi-
tals revealed extremely low fertility levels (Figure 6.1), with the average
number of children per woman ranging from 0.97 in Warsaw to 1.23 in
Riga and to 1.41 in Vienna as the highest levels (Központi Statisztikai
Hivatal, 2005). These figures reflect a culture of low fertility that emerged
first in German-speaking countries at the end of the 20th century
1.5 1.410
1.230
1.130 1.145 1.161
1.100
1.011 1.057
1.0 0.970
0.5
0.0
a
w
ue
na
n
st
na
va
ig
rli
llin
sa
pe
la
ag
en
lja
R
Be
ar
Ta
is
da
ub
Pr
Vi
at
W
Bu
Lj
Br
Figure 6.1 Total fertility rates in nine Central and Eastern European capitals
(2003)
Source: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (2005).
Judit Takács 181
(Goldstein et al., 2003; Sobotka, 2009). Yet, the mean ideal number of
children is still around two, or slightly higher in most parts of Europe
(Testa, 2006).
Hungarian women generally wish to have almost twice as many chil-
dren as they actually have, as difficulties in combining work and family
life seem to interfere with the realisation of their childbearing plans
and desires (Testa, 2006; Pongrácz, 2008). Similarly to other former
state-socialist countries, there is a higher prevalence of child-oriented
attitudes than in Western Europe (Pongrácz, 2006), which, however,
does not appear in actual fertility rates. Indeed, women in Hungary
seem to be highly family-oriented and they put greater emphasis on
being a mother than having a job or making a career. For example, in
the European Social Survey in 2006, Hungarian respondents, especially
women, expressed the highest level of agreement with the statement
that a person’s family ought to be his or her priority in life – followed
by respondents from the Ukraine, Poland and Greece (Takács, 2008).
At the same time, Hungarian women seem to attach considerable
significance to their own job and economic activity as being benefi-
cial for safeguarding the livelihood of the family (Tóth, 1995; Blaskó,
2005).
The dominant family pattern in Hungary, similarly to a number
of other European countries, is still a married couple with two chil-
dren. However, significant changes have been observed in partnership
arrangements, characterised by the declining omnipresence of marriage
in general, and its gradual replacement by cohabitation as a first partner-
ship in particular (Spéder, 2006). The pattern of early marriages prevailed
in Hungary only until the 1980s (Kamarás, 2002), as the traditional dif-
ference in marriage and family formation patterns between the Eastern
and Western parts of Europe (Hajnal, 1965) diminished (Kulcsár, 2007).
At the beginning of the 21st century, Hungarian women tended to
marry for the first time in their late twenties, and men in their early
thirties. In 2008, the average age of marriage for women was 30.7 years,
and 33.7 years for men (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2009). As a conse-
quence of these changes, the percentage share of extramarital births of
all live births has increased greatly in the last decades, from 7 per cent
in 1980 to 25 per cent in 1997, and over 37 per cent by 2007 (Vukovich,
2002; Eurostat, 2010). The declining share of marriages in partner-
ships is often interpreted by Hungarian demographers as a bad omen
in connection with fertility (Spéder, 2006; Spéder and Kapitány, 2007),
notwithstanding that rising levels of non-marital childbearing seem to
be a general feature in Europe, including countries like Sweden, France
or even Ireland, characterised by relatively high fertility rates (Eurostat,

2010).
During the last 30 years, the married proportion significantly
decreased in the Hungarian population aged over 15, from nearly
70 per cent in 1980 to less than 50 per cent in 2007, while the pro-
portion divorced nearly doubled, reaching about 10 per cent. During
this period, the percentage share of single women and men also nearly
doubled reaching around 30 per cent (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal,
2009). However, being single is not necessarily an intentionally cho-
sen lifestyle: most people would like to live in a relationship but not all
succeed. Empirical findings indicate that nearly every fifth person aged
30–49 lives alone in Hungary, and there seems to be a gender-specific
pattern in their situation: single women in this age group are more likely
to be highly educated with more marketable skills and live in a more
urbanised environment, while single men at these ages are more likely
to have lower education, fewer marketable skills and live in smaller
settlements in the countryside (Utasi, 2004). Not being able to build
and/or maintain close relationships leading to longer-term partnerships
can have several causes, including the increasing lack of solidarity as a
norm both in society at large and at the interpersonal level, as well as the
pursuit of career-centred lifestyles, where private life is subordinated to
work goals, especially in terms of time management (that is work goals
enjoy priority).
Despite the early marriage pattern up until quite recently, Hungary
has never been characterised by very high fertility (Spéder and Kamarás,
2008). During the second half of the 20th century up to the early 1990s,
women had about two births on average except for a higher average
number of children in the ‘Ratkó era’1 of the early and mid-1950s when
abortion was prohibited, which has also led to a second peak in fertility
in the 1970s. Since then, fertility has been declining, and the demo-
graphic wave effect caused by the coercive fertility intervention of the
Ratkó era has gradually been erased by a trend of postponed childbear-
ing during the transition to market capitalism. Up to the early 1990s,
women aged 20–24 had the highest fertility, but between 1995 and 2006
the 25–29 age group displayed the highest rates, and in 2007, for the first
time 30–34 year old women had the highest fertility (Vukovich, 2002;
Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2009). In the 1990s, second childbearing
decreased the most, while the postponement effect was strongest for
first births (Husz, 2006). Between 1980 and 2009, the proportion child-
less in the female population aged 15–49 increased from 28 per cent
to 43 per cent (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2009), given fewer and
Judit Takács 183
later births to the reproductive age groups. In 1993, of women aged

18–41 years 54 per cent planned to have two children and only
1.5 per cent wanted to have no children at all. Ten years later, the
preferred number of children was still two, but about 10 per cent of
women and 15–20 per cent of men under age 25 stated that they did
not want to have children (Kamarás, 2002; Vukovich, 2002). Intentional
childlessness is a relatively new phenomenon in Hungary that may indi-
cate the strengthening of individualisation tendencies among younger
generations and their awareness of difficulties in achieving a satisfying
work–life balance when having children (Hobson et al., 2011).
Current trends in the Hungarian labour market, especially a growth
in insecure employment forms, also seem to contribute to work–life bal-
ance deficiencies even before deciding to have children. In Hungary, in
the 15–64-year-old population the proportion of those employed with a
fixed-term contract increased from 6 per cent in 2000 to 8.5 per cent in
2010, while part-time-employment increased from 3.7 per cent in 2000
to 5.5 per cent in 2010.2 Fixed-term contract employment is equally
characteristic for both genders, while part-time employment is some-
what more widespread among women: in 2010 only 3.6 per cent of
men and 7.6 per cent of women were employed part-time. In the young
age-groups, that is below age 25, the proportions temporarily employed
doubled from somewhat below 13 per cent in 2000 to 25.9 per cent
for women and 24 per cent for men in 2010, and the share of part-time
employed increased even more rapidly from 3.3 per cent to 12.3 per cent
among women and from 1.8 per cent to 6.3 per cent among men in the
same period (Eurostat, 2011). In other European countries, for exam-
ple in the Netherlands, part-time employment is often seen as a useful
means of reconciliation, especially for women (Plantenga and Remery,
2009), but in Hungary it is considered less optimal even for parents,
mainly because of the low level of earnings it provides, which is hard
to live on (Hobson et al., 2011). The awareness of economic uncer-
tainty and risks is increasing in society not only due to the rapid growth
of fixed-term contracts, especially among the young, but also because
unemployment rates increased from 6.9 to 11.2 per cent among the
15–64-year-old population, and among those below age 25 from 12.4
and 10.8 per cent for women and men in 2000 to 26.6 and 24.9 per cent
respectively in 2010 (Eurostat, 2011).
Work–life balance issues are problematic in present-day Hungary,
as paid work often hinders people spending time with their family.
At the same time, family members tend to become increasingly intol-
erant towards job-related pressure, while a growing number of people
experience difficulties in concentrating on work because of family

responsibilities (Takács, 2008). Yet, in many Hungarian families only
paid work is considered ‘real work’ and housework is appreciated only
when it is not done. At the beginning of relationships, couples usu-
ally share the housework as they wish to spend more time together
(Neményi and Takács, 2006). After the birth of children, however, the
situation often changes, and women end up doing the lion’s share of
the housework with little or no help from their spouses (Bukodi, 2006;
Pongrácz, 2006). This may partly explain why work–life balance issues
are rarely seen as of central importance in society, while being employed
is considered an asset in itself. Hence, parents – especially mothers –
are increasingly likely to experience a time squeeze, reinforced by struc-
tural characteristics of the Hungarian labour market, such as insecure
employment, long working-time regimes, limited opportunities to work
part-time and low wages forcing people to take a second or even third
job (Frey, 2009; Hobson et al., 2011).
The reconciliation of work and childrearing (for women) along
with promoting births has been, according to Hungarian family pol-
icy experts, one of the main goals of childcare allowance (GYES) and
childcare benefit (GYED), introduced in the late 1960s and the mid-
1980s respectively, while childrearing allowance (GYET) is, since 1993,
an acknowledgement of parenthood (mainly motherhood) as work that
should be paid for (Korintus, 2008). GYES is a flat-rate benefit that
equals the amount of the minimum old-age pension; it is not tied to
insured status gained by previous employment, thus it is available to
all citizens. GYED, in contrast, depends on employment for at least six
months during the two years prior to a birth, covering 70 per cent of
previous earnings up to a ceiling. It is paid from the National Health
Insurance Fund, financed by employers’ and employees’ contributions,
and is available until the second birthday of a child. GYET is con-
fined to large families only; it is a flat-rate benefit that either parent
of three or more children can receive while on leave during the period
between the third and eighth birthday of the youngest child. Along
with these paid leave schemes, utilised nearly exclusively by mothers,
public childcare provision has been the main tool promoting work–life
balance for parents in the past four to five decades in Hungary. How-
ever, the number of crèches, providing childcare services for children
younger than three years, decreased rapidly during the 1990s – their
capacity having been reduced by more than 50 per cent: today, the
participation rate in childcare services for children under three is esti-
mated at around 7–11 per cent, while for children aged three to five
Judit Takács 185
it is around 87 per cent (Blaskó, 2009). From the age of five it is com-
pulsory for children to attend kindergarten and take part in preschool
activities.
The current system of family policies can be criticised on the one hand
as financing absence from work for educated women for an unneces-
sarily prolonged period of time, being the most generous cash support
system in the developed world; and on the other hand, as failing to
offer appropriate assistance to women with weak ties to the labour mar-
ket (Bálint and Köllő, 2008). The negative labour supply effects derive
from the amortisation of human capital during the extended period of
leave; hence, the universal flat-rate benefit (GYES), the insurance-based
benefit (GYED) and the childrearing allowance for large families (GYET)
can be seen not simply as schemes providing parents with the possi-
bility to raise their children themselves instead of relying on public or
varying forms of private childcare, but also as probably the most signif-
icant form of public support to inactive women under the age of 40,
insulating them from the labour market. Furthermore, return to the
labour market after a long period of parental leave can be quite prob-
lematic, especially for people with less education and for those living in
smaller settlements: while more than 75 per cent of Hungarian parents,
mainly mothers, plan to continue working in their old jobs after their
leaves, their actual return rate is below 45 per cent (Központi Statisztikai
Hivatal, 2006). There are various reasons for the difficulties to return to
the labour market, such as the employer being dissolved, one’s old posi-
tion being terminated or a new position available being unsuitable for
the returning employee.
The substantial reduction in public childcare provision, especially for
children below age three, along with rigid labour market structures may
have contributed to the rapid decline of childbearing desires among
women with a medium-level socio-economic status, that is a voca-
tional or secondary education, since 1990, and they typically have only
one child on average, as a consequence of their uncertain labour mar-
ket position (Spéder, 2003; Spéder and Kapitány, 2007). At the same
time, a growing number of women with higher social status either
remain childless due to postponing motherhood for too long given
extended periods of enrolment in education and/or pursuing other life
choices than motherhood, or having at least two children. In fact,
the proportion of one-child mothers decreased among the highly edu-
cated from 28 per cent in 1990 to 24 per cent in 2005 (Spéder and
Kapitány, 2007). More highly educated women start their fertility careers
later than those who had fewer other career options, but if they enter
motherhood they have more children within a shorter time period. The
least educated women are the least likely to delay childbearing, still hav-
ing relatively high fertility. Their childbearing behaviour does not seem
to adjust to the changes in the labour market and in formal childcare
provisions, unlike the decreasing fertility of the more educated display-
ing not only tempo but also quantum effects, that is later and fewer
births, especially apparent among women with secondary-school cer-
tificates whose period fertility in 2000 was only about two-thirds of that
in the early 1990s (Husz, 2006).
According to the Eurobarometer findings (Testa, 2006), among the
younger generations, that is below age 40, the ideal age of becoming a
parent for both men and women is higher than the age of first childbear-
ing (Table 6.1). On average, young Hungarian men and women would
prefer to become parents about a year later than they actually do. At the
same time the upper limit of the age range suitable for becoming a par-
ent has been extended too. Comparing the views of older Hungarian
respondents (aged 40–65) with those of younger ones (aged 25–39) we
find a year difference, on average, between the latest acceptable ages of
having a first child, which is about age 41 to become a mother accord-
ing to younger women in contrast to age 40.3, the perception of older
women, and age 46.9 to become a father according to younger men as
opposed to age 45.9 suggested by older male respondents. The changing
perception of childbearing age norms does not only reflect greater toler-
ance towards various individual life strategies but as previous Hungarian
studies indicate it can also affect the actual childbearing age (Spéder and
Kapitány, 2007).
Table 6.1 Mean actual, ideal and latest age at the birth of the first child in
Hungary (2006)
Gender/Age Actual age when one Ideal age to Latest age to

became a mother become a mother become a mother
Females 25–39 22.9 24.6 41.0

Females 40–65 22.8 23.8 40.3
Actual age when one Ideal age to Latest age to

became a father become a father become a father
Males 25–39 25.5 26.7 46.9

Males 40–65 26.0 26.2 45.9
Source: Testa (2006).

Judit Takács 187
The deferment of family formation and childbearing decisions cannot

be separated from the broader changes in the structural conditions
affecting women’s education and employment opportunities, includ-
ing both the expansion of higher education and the diminishing
childcare provision in recent decades. During the state-socialist era,
when women’s emancipation basically meant that they had equal rights
with men to be gainfully employed, solutions to reconcile employ-
ment and family responsibilities for working mothers were provided by
the state (Oláh, 1998). The free and geographically widespread public
childcare provision was especially important for work–life balance. As a
long-lasting effect of the state-socialist welfare regime in people’s minds,
public services (most importantly childcare) and generous cash bene-
fits facilitating reconciliation, are still being taken for granted. While
the generous programmes supporting the bearing and rearing of chil-
dren, especially formal childcare at both preschool and school ages, were
either abolished or diminished, the legacy of state-controlled moderni-
sation is often coupled with renewed nostalgia for traditional gender
roles. The ideological messages of conservative social forces, includ-
ing political and religious groups, have been trying, in particular, to
strengthen the view that after so many years of state-socialist repression
women can and should resume their ‘natural’, that is traditional roles as
mothers and housewives, being clearly separated from paid work-related
roles (Kovács and Váradi, 2000).
Notwithstanding the possible impact on fertility of a retraditional-
isation of women’s gender role at least in the public discourse, the
absolute and relative deterioration of the financial situation of families
with children has also played an important role in the decline of fertil-
ity in Hungary (Medgyesi et al., 2000; Havasi, 2008). Between 1991 and
2001, the proportion of people living in poverty increased at a faster
pace among households with children, than in the general population,
and having three or more children has been associated with high risk of
poverty; indeed, seen as a poverty trap (Gábos and Szivós, 2002, 2008).
All the more surprising is, then, that in the Hungarian population pol-
icy and research agenda, fertility issues tend to appear mostly in the
context of some sort of crisis management induced by a static family
concept, notwithstanding the fact that family life is in transformation.
While the central question of family-policy measures in most EU coun-
tries is how to help child-raising working parents to reconcile paid work
and family lives, in Hungary, political messages and policies that target
women are based on a traditional concept of ‘home building instead
of paid work’, although apparently less successful in increasing fertility.
As indicated by demographic developments, women (as well as men) in

Hungary want both work and family – but many of them first want work
and then a family, and later perhaps work again, if possible.
3. Theoretical framework
In the context of value shifts towards increasing individualisation,

associated with the second demographic transition (Van de Kaa and
Lesthaeghe, 1986) and linked to that, a greater level of risk awareness
(Beck, 1992), having children might appear not only as a way to achieve
self-fulfilment but also as a risky avenue, given persistent labour mar-
ket uncertainties with relatively high unemployment rates and a high
or growing prevalence of fixed-term employment contracts, especially
among people in early phases of their family careers, in most Eastern
European countries, including Hungary. At the same time, material and
non-material aspirations have increased within and across societies, and
new possibilities to fulfil such demands compete with choices of start-
ing a family, having further children or even to build an enduring
relationship (Cliquet, 2003). The perception of family formation not
being compatible with other goals one may have in life has been rein-
forced by a delayed and, compared with the Western part of Europe,
more intensified post-socialist version of late modern commodification,
characterised by an increasing urge to possess as much as possible.
While citizens of the late 20th-century (post-)welfare societies in North-
western Europe started the still ongoing process of reinterpreting what
well-being can mean beyond an often taken-for-granted standard of
living in the context of post-materialist value orientation (Inglehart,
1997), people in post-socialist countries have so far focused on the new
economic capabilities brought along by capitalist modernisation, with
imaginary promises about a smooth conversion of being (relatively)
poor into being (relatively) rich (Sen, 1999).
Replacing the state-socialist regime with a market economy influ-
enced the context of childbearing decisions also in other ways. Features
of the state-socialist past, such as job security, free education, free health-
care, relatively well-functioning and broadly available childcare facili-
ties along with limited career opportunities and leisure activities were
replaced by conditions more restraining for childbearing. The transition
brought along employment insecurity, an increasing pressure to acquire
more education, less generous social provisions, decreasing availabil-
ity of non-family childcare and a boom in career and consumption
opportunities (Frejka, 2008). The new conditions have strengthened
Judit Takács 189
the importance of individuals’ labour market position and, related to

that, a normative imperative to try to reduce uncertainty and the risk
of economic hardship before having a (or another) child (McDonald,
2006). In addition, although such expectations are mainly directed
towards men at the level of rhetoric idealising traditional gender roles
in most East-European societies, also in Hungary (Gal and Kligman,
2000), women too are supposed to support themselves and their fam-
ily if the circumstances require it (e.g. as indicated by the Hungarian
Family Act granting spousal alimony only upon special conditions in
case of divorce). This, in turn, strengthens the impact of incoherence
between gender-equal educational and employment opportunities and
the unequal division of family tasks, hardly mitigated by the inadequate
provision of care services, forcing women to consider the number of
children they will have, if any, very carefully (McDonald, 2000; Hobson
and Oláh, 2006).
The very low fertility rate in Hungary, that is below 1.5 births per
woman from the mid-1990s onwards, projects a demographically unsus-
tainable population (McDonald, 2006, 2008). Such a low level of fertility
seems to be a reflection of constrained individual agency and weak
capabilities for having and caring for children, linked to economic
uncertainties and incoherence of public versus private sphere gender
equity. How such capability and agency deficiency has been articulated
at the level of fertility desires can also shed more light on limitations
not only at the level of the subjective states of efficacy, but also, as
we will see, at the level of (impractical) policies and (infeasible) social
expectations. As discussed in the introduction to this section, desired
and realised fertility as well as perceived obstacles to achieve them are
interpreted as quality-of-life issues to be assessed according to Amartya
Sen’s capabilities approach (1985, 1992, 1993). Patterns of institutional
barriers and personal constraints inhibiting the socially desired changes
in fertility practices, as perceived by our respondents, are explored to
identify different approaches to fertility-related well-being and agency
achievements reflected by personal accounts of working parents of
young children in Budapest.
4. Data and methods
The empirical basis of this chapter is the fertility-related Hungarian part

of the Tensions between Rising Expectations of Parenthood and Capabilities to
Achieve a Work Family Balance survey, which was conducted in Budapest
in 2008 with 100 respondents aged between 25 and 50. This was a
RECWOWE3 Pilot Survey originally developed and conducted by a team

at Stockholm University, led by Professor Barbara Hobson. However, the
original survey, carried out in Stockholm, had a slightly different design,
that is it did not include any questions on fertility desires, unlike the
Budapest study.
There were three main participant selection criteria to be included
in the survey: one had to be a parent of at least one child below
age six, living as a couple, and having regular work activity (Hobson
et al., 2009). According to Central Statistical Office data for Budapest,
regarding educational attainment the sample was relatively represen-
tative of the population, though the least educated were somewhat
under-represented (27.8 per cent in total in Budapest compared with
25 per cent in the Budapest sample), and there was a slight over-
representation of the highly educated (47.4 per cent in total in Budapest
compared with 50 per cent in the sample). The sample was also strati-
fied by firm-level and firm-sector characteristics. Sixty-eight per cent of
respondents worked in the private sector and 27 per cent in the public
sector, compared with 61 per cent working in the private sector in total
in Budapest, and 29 per cent in the public sector. Firms were divided into
three categories: small (1–19 employees), medium (20–249 employees)
and large (250 or more employees). In the Budapest sample, the major-
ity of respondents (52 per cent) worked in small firms, while 20 per cent
worked in medium-size companies and 28 per cent in large companies
(compared with 44 per cent working in small firms, 16 per cent work-
ing in medium-size organisations and 37 per cent in large companies in
total in Budapest).
The survey questionnaire was a semi-structured interview schedule
divided into five parts focusing on: (i) the household (including ques-
tions on childcare, the division of time on household and care work);
(ii) employment and working time (including questions on employ-
ment situation, working shifts and work flexibility); (iii) the division
of parental leave between the couple; (iv) work environment and
workplace culture (including questions on competitiveness, support
from workmates and colleagues, and on norms about work commit-
ment and work–life balance policies, that is, whether the workplace is
family-friendly or penalises those with parenting commitments). The
fifth part was a country-specific module: a short section with ques-
tions on country-specific policy issues connected to work–life balance.
In Hungary, this module included questions about the ideal number
of children, the desired versus the actual number of children and on
the perceived obstacles that inhibit people from attaining their desired
Judit Takács 191
family size. The following questions were asked of each respondent:

‘In your view what is the ideal number of children in a family?’ ‘How
many children do you (did you) want to have?’ ‘To what extent has this
desire been realised, and why/why not?’
When asking about the ideal number of children, one should be aware
of the collective nature of this concept, that is reflecting normative
expectations of a society as a collective (Hagewen and Morgan, 2005).
Thus, it must be taken into consideration that respondents intentionally
or unintentionally might voice some sort of vox populi, influenced by,
for example, popular media and/or political discourses when answering.
In an attempt to handle this problem, ‘the general’ and ‘the personal’
ideal numbers of children can be differentiated, as in the Eurobarometer
in 2006, by asking two separate questions, such as ‘Generally speaking,
what do you think is the ideal number of children for a family?’ and
‘And for you personally, what would be the ideal number of children
you would like to have or would have liked to have had?’ (Testa, 2006,
pp. 152–153). According to the findings, the mean general ideal number
of children tends to be higher everywhere than the mean personal ideal
number of children. In Hungary, this was true for each of the exam-
ined age groups for both genders (Testa, 2006). Although the difference
between the mean values of the general and personal ideals is quite
limited (Table 6.2), the general ideal being consistently higher than
personal ones indicates the normative content of the former concept.
Each semi-structured interview was conducted in Hungarian. Each
interviewee chose a pseudo name, which together with an indication
Table 6.2 Mean general and personal ideal number of children in

Hungary (2006)
Mean general ideal number of children (HU)
15–24 25–39 40–54 55+ All
Men 2.20 2.03 2.14 2.29 2.17

Women 2.19 2.23 2.21 2.27 2.23
Mean personal ideal number of children (HU)
15–24 25–39 40–54 55+ All
Men 2.13 2.00 2.11 2.09 2.08

Women 1.99 2.16 2.20 2.25 2.17
Source: Testa (2006).

of their age at the time of conducting the interview, we used for their
identification in the study. The interviews were tape-recorded with the
agreement that all audio material will be destroyed after transcribing.
The coding was done in SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences)
format. Although SPSS is most often used for work with quantitative
data, it has a feature that allowed handling the qualitative material
obtained from the semi-structured interviews. For example, the ques-
tion ‘In your view what is the ideal number of children in a family?’ had
a numeric as well as a linking string variable that elaborated the inter-
viewee’s response to the question, and thus allowed for more detailed
contextual analysis. This section is based on the contextualisation of
fertility-related issues raised by the Budapest respondents, and, in par-
ticular, on the qualitative analysis of the coded contents of the specific
fertility-related string variables in the collected data set.
5. Results
The 100 working parents of young children in our Budapest sample

were first asked a rather general question: ‘In your view what is the
ideal number of children in a family?’ Without further specification to
the question, whether the scope of the answers regarded personal or
general ideals had to be inferred from further explanations, provided
by the respondents spontaneously, that is without being encouraged
specifically to do so. Some respondents emphasised that it does not
make much sense to speak about ideals in general terms as there is ‘no
such thing as an ideal number of children [for everyone]: as the cap
fits, depending on how things turn out’ (43-year-old engineer, father of
one); or as a 36-year-old beautician, mother of one stated: ‘I think three
[children would be ideal], but not for everybody. We probably won’t
have any more.’ Others referred to the historically changing character
of these ideals: ‘In the old days, my grandmother’s family had eight or
ten members, which is a lot today. Three [children] would be needed [in
a family] if we look demographically but that doesn’t concern me . . . if
there would have been another child . . . that wouldn’t have been good
in my situation’ (41-year-old father of one, working as a janitor). It was
often made clear by respondents that they feel they are witnessing the
coexistence of different norms in society but they can also see the dif-
ference between the collective norm of ‘should’ as opposed to their own
reality of ‘is’, that is between normative expectations and their own
everyday life. For example, a 40-year-old film trader, father of one, stated
that, ‘For us even one child is a big challenge, but otherwise there should
Judit Takács 193
be at least three in a family’; and in the view of a 30-year-old dressmaker,

mother of one, ‘Others imagine three [as the ideal number], but they
rarely have the three. Two seems attractive to me’.
Numerically, 2.6 was the mean value (and two the median) specified
as the ideal number of children in a family; on average women scored
slightly higher (2.66) than men (2.54). Most respondents (49 per cent of
women and 46 per cent of men) said that having two children would be
ideal, while more than a third (36 per cent of women and 39 per cent
of men) referred to three as the ideal number. Having only one child
was seen to be ideal by none of the female but almost 7 per cent of the
male respondents, while having at least four children was referred to as
ideal by 15 per cent of women and 8 per cent of men. The highest ideal
number of children was five, mentioned by two men, both fathers of
two: one being a 35-year-old bicycle-courier and the other a 46-year-old
journalist editor. Comparing the ideal numbers of children with the
numbers of children already born, these latter seem to be lagging behind
(Table 6.3), which can be explained, at least partly, by the fact that most
of the respondents presumably had not yet completed their reproduc-
tive careers. In each age category, people thought that the ideal number
of children in a family should be higher than the number of children
they had, at the very least there should be more than one child. A slight
decrease in ideal family size across generations appeared though, as the
ideal number of children for most respondents over age 40 was three
or more, while for younger people it was two or more children. Divid-
ing the younger age group further, we find that for 50 per cent of those
younger than 31 and 53 per cent of those aged 31–40, two children rep-
resented the ideal family size; while it was three children for 46 per cent
of those younger than 31 and 27 per cent of those aged 31–40.
Table 6.3 Ideal and real(ised) number of children by gender: Hungary
Ideal and real(ised) Women Men All

number of children
Ideal Real Ideal Real N = 93 N = 100
Ideal Real
1 0% 50% 6.5% 52% 3.2% 51%

2 49% 28% 46% 34% 47.3% 31%
3 36% 20% 39% 14% 37.6% 17%
At least 4 15% 2% 8% 0% 11.9% 1%
Source: Tensions between Rising Expectations of Parenthood and Capabilities to Achieve a

Work–Family Balance RECWOWE Survey, 2008 – Hungarian data. Own calculations.
Table 6.4 Ideal and real(ised) number of children by educational level:

Hungary
Level of education Ideal number of Real(ised) number

children (Mean) of children (Mean)
Low (Primary) 2.67 1.96

Medium (Secondary) 2.62 1.58
Higher (Tertiary) 2.50 1.60
Total 2.60 1.68
Source: Tensions between Rising Expectations of Parenthood and Capabilities to Achieve a

Work Family Balance RECWOWE Survey, 2008 – Hungarian data. Own calculations.
According to the educational level of respondents, as a general ten-

dency, the highest mean values for both the ideal and the actual number
of children were seen for those with the least schooling (Table 6.4).
However, regarding the ideal number of children within educational
groups, gender-specific differences could be detected at the lower and
the higher ends of the educational scale: while there seems to be a gen-
eral consensus about two children per family being ideal, most female
respondents with tertiary education and male respondents with lower-
secondary or primary education regarded three as the ideal number.
The lowest mean value of children born was observed in the group
of respondents with medium-level education, followed by those with
higher education, while respondents with primary schooling had the
highest mean value of the actual number of children. These results are
in line with the post-transitional demographic trends emerging since
the last decade of the 20th century, also documented by Hungarian
demographers (Spéder, 2003, 2006; Spéder and Kamarás, 2008), accord-
ing to which fertility can vary to a great extent by women’s educational
level with the least-qualified group having the highest fertility rates,
and those with medium-level qualifications the lowest. The gap between
desired and achieved fertility suggests that many people are unable to
realise their fertility ideals – ideals that are hardly separable from those of
their social environment. However, on the basis of our interview mate-
rial, roots of preferences have been harder to identify than elements of
constraints. Socially desirable fertility ideals were more often presented
with a taken-for-granted character, while a number of respondents inter-
preted their inability to realise their own fertility ideals as a failure that
needed to be explained.
When answering the questions about the extent to which their fer-
tility ideals were or were not realised and the reasons behind that,
Judit Takács 195
most respondents referred to the uncertain outcome of their calcula-

tions about the future and the direct costs of maintaining their families.
For example, a 33-year-old waitress with two children emphasised that,
‘I could have imagined four, but perhaps I will not give birth any more.
Not because of my comfort, but because I wouldn’t be able to provide
what today’s world demands materially.’ Also a 35-year-old carpenter,
father of two pointed out that, ‘If we look at ourselves, then [having]
these two [children], that is very good. We wouldn’t really be able to
cope with a third one, not materially, nor in terms of time . . . mainly
materially. If the financial circumstances were better, then it would be
easier to arrange things.’ Inability to live up to one’s ideals was per-
ceived by most respondents as a saddening subjective consequence of
externally determined, mainly material constraints: ‘Ideally [one should
have] as many [children] as can grow up without stress in one family,
who can be raised with a roof over their heads and food on the table and
without fear. I would have liked three, but now I would be happy with
just one more [making two], but financially I feel the next little one
is impossible . . . [and] it breaks my heart’ (25-year-old mother of one,
freelancer with medium-level education). For these parents, economic
hardship and the fear of it form capability constraints, inhibiting the
realisation of their fertility desires and limiting the level of well-being
they hoped to achieve in their family life.
Indeed, the reflections of our respondents seem to be in line with pre-
vious Hungarian findings, according to which fears of declining living
standards, the accelerating costs of having children and worries about
the future of the children can be seen as significant constraints when
parents decide about having more children or not – even if they do not
yet have as many children as they want to have (Kapitány, 2002). Accep-
tance of material sacrifice and financial responsibility due to bringing up
children that puts off the satisfaction of the parents’ personal needs was
also shown to be more widespread among the older generations than
the younger ones (Neményi and Takács, 2006). At the same time, for
an increasing number of people, especially among the younger gener-
ations, the thought of accepting a lower living standard as a result of
having children seems to be not only non-appealing but even threaten-
ing, reflecting the increasing material aspirations strengthened by the
transition to the market economy.
Similar lines of reasoning were seen in our data. When asked to
choose the three most important priorities for achieving a better work–
life balance (WLB) from a list, including items such as length of work
days, flexibility of working hours, shorter distance to work, more relief
from housework or childcare, better access to childcare, flexible opening

hours in childcare facilities, better economy and more time for them-
selves,4 more than three-quarters of the Budapest respondents said that
a ‘better economy’ would be necessary for them to reach a better work–
life balance. As a comparison, in Stockholm less than 10 per cent of
respondents shared the same view. For them, time seemed to be the
main issue: almost every second Swedish parent (47 per cent) noted that
shorter working days would lead to a better work–life balance (Hobson
et al., 2009). Desire for more time was important also for the Hungarian
sample,5 with men more often prioritising shorter work days, while
women mostly wanted more relief from housework, the latter point-
ing to their increasing awareness of incoherence of public versus private
sphere gender inequity. However, ‘better economy’ was equally impor-
tant for both genders and seemed to be the dominant concern of parents
in the Budapest sample. These results, in addition to the answers con-
cerning the realisation of family size ideals, suggest that economic issues
are seen as a main constraint inhibiting people both from being able to
achieve an ideal balance between work and family and to realise their
fertility desires.
Although work–life balance has received much attention in the EU,
individual agency to achieve this increasingly recognised aspect of
well-being is rather constrained in Hungary, mainly because of the ten-
sions generated by competing norms of working versus stay-at-home
parents (especially mothers) and numerous tasks to be completed simul-
taneously. As a 25-year-old mother of one (part-time student, working
part-time in the private sector) explained: ‘I have to have achievements
in too many fields at the same time, and mainly by myself: housework,
care work, paid work, and studying.’ References to ‘individual limits’ of
childrearing capacity emphasised not only the limited material condi-
tions but also that parenting cannot be equated simply with just having
children. In this context, parenthood is not associated simply with a
role one automatically acquires but rather as an achievement: as one
respondent pointed out parents are expected to ‘take good care’ of their
children. Thus, the individual ‘level of energy’, in addition to material
circumstances, defines the number of children one ‘would be able to
take on with good heart’ (a 39-year-old mother of two children, project
coordinator).
In Hungary, as in other Eastern European countries, economic and
socio-political changes have brought about tendencies that I call the
gender yo-yo effect to describe the contradictory normative expectations
about women’s roles in post-socialist societies, and the way they move
Judit Takács 197
nervously around the strings of norms dragging them between work

and home: typically, feeling bad at work because really they should
have been a full-time homemaker and stay-at-home mother (like their
grandmother most probably was, before the Second World War), and
also feeling bad at home because really they should be at work and earn
money (like their mother most probably did, after the Second World
War). Nevertheless, after the collapse of state socialism, Hungarian
women were not forced to participate in paid work and in the main-
tenance of the dual-earner nuclear-family model in the same way as
previously. As a consequence of this, at the beginning of the 21st
century, women in general, and more educated women in particular,
are more likely to interpret their work not only as a functional neces-
sity to earn money but also as an opportunity for personal development
through professional career building. The rising share of professional
ambitions and educational achievement among women has become a
determining factor in broadening female career opportunities (Nagy,
2001; Koncz, 2005). While the proportion of women employees in the
labour market decreased compared with the state-socialist era, economi-
cally active Hungarian women are getting ever better qualified, resulting
in a growing number of women in leading positions whose earn-
ings are catching up with those of men (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal,
2009).6
Although it seems to be a relatively new phenomenon in Hungary, the
need to consider women’s careers along with that of men in family deci-
sions was expressed by several respondents in our Budapest sample. For
example, a 43-year-old physician, father of two, emphasised that ‘[hav-
ing] the present two [children] is good, but we might want one more.
It depends on the intentions of my wife regarding her career building
and self-realisation.’ For a 39-year-old mother of two, the wish to have
a third child was put in the context of a trade-off with a PhD degree:
‘If I finish my PhD now and something really takes off, then it is possible
that I won’t have another child.’ A 39-year-old tobacconist, the mother
of three, on the other hand, presented herself as perhaps being slightly
more attached to her job than to the idea of having another child: ‘we
are now thinking about a fourth child, as my partner would really like
that, but . . . for me it is another set-back: no work, [and another] three
years of my life tied down’. Some parents, like this 40-year-old father of
one (a financial director), interpret the ideal number of children issue
in the context of quality-of-life concerns, where finding the right work–
life balance is a concern for both parents, implying the re-evaluation of
priorities:
Two [children are ideal] for us . . . if there were to be three, then it

would probably take too much of a toll on my wife. You cannot have
three children without some kind of permanent help . . . My wife has
interests outside the family as well, which is a perfectly natural thing
and we have to provide the opportunity for that. This means that
time is of the essence – if there are three children then there is only
time if there is help, otherwise the three children will fill your whole
day. When they finish high school it’ll be different, but that is quite
a way yet. We cannot and do not want to do this, because we want to
be involved with the children: so it’s not that we want five children
because we have the money, the babysitter looks after them and they
stand there like so many organ pipes and very nice that they are
there, but we didn’t have any time for them. So we think that if you
want to be involved with your children and would also like to do
other things, then in the case of more than two children you won’t
have time for anything. Perhaps this is a selfish standpoint, but not
in the sense that we really want to be involved with them.
These accounts also indicate that increased female education and

employment opportunities can bring about greater awareness concern-
ing the indirect costs of having children for women, both financially,
in the form of foregone earnings and financial independence, and psy-
chologically, in the form of abandoned career prospects, reinforced by
the incoherence of public versus private sphere gender equity. Notably,
neither the mothers nor fathers interviewed mentioned that such costs
could be mitigated by the father increasing his input in family tasks,
for example, by taking half the parental leave with a next child, so
the mother can pursue her non-family goals. In addition, becoming
and being a parent was seen by many of the female and not so many
of the male respondents as being interwoven with work–life balance
issues – especially in the context of quality parenting. As was pointed
out already, when referring to the ideal number of children, some
of the Budapest parents stated that their goal was not just simply
being a parent but they wanted to become a good parent or, using
Bettelheim’s term (1987), a good enough parent. The element of raising
quality concerns about parenting in the context of work–life balance
can be interpreted as an indicator of individual agency, when achiev-
ing well-being would most probably entail a conscious rethinking of
priorities with a focus on allocating enough (quality) time for chil-
dren and other family members. Such a reprioritising process would
mainly involve time-management issues and consequently the practical
Judit Takács 199
rearrangement of a whole network of relationships, including interper-

sonal and in some cases even intra-personal, as well as institutional and
work-related ones. Thus, when Hungarian demographers interpret the
maintenance of respect for individual autonomy within a couple’s part-
nership or pursuing not-so-traditional gender roles by couples already
having children as factors potentially limiting childbearing (Spéder and
Kapitány, 2007), they risk overlooking the possibility that at least some
of these parents’ and would-be parents’ fertility desires are constrained
by their awareness of the subjectively experienced limits of capabilities
to become good enough parents. In short: one’s not fully realised fer-
tility as a functioning can very well correspond with quality parenting
being part of the same person’s capability set.
All in all, on the basis of the personal accounts of parents in the
Budapest sample, the combination of uncertainty concerning the future
and certainty concerning substantial child-raising costs, in addition
to increasing awareness of incoherence between public sphere gender
equity but inequity in the family, have been identified as part of the
main constraints limiting fertility desires in Hungary. The parents’ grow-
ing awareness of risks and aspirations to reduce economic uncertainties,
and of women having aspirations beyond family life, provide us with a
better understanding of the tendency of ever increasing numbers of fam-
ilies that do not reproduce themselves, to use a phrase by Nathan Keyfitz
(1986). This is a trend to be taken seriously and addressed properly if
to avoid far-reaching consequences. As pointed out in the demographic
literature, the actual childbearing behaviour of societies can serve as a
norm-forming reference point for future generations: the small family
size ideals becoming the norm can lead to a ‘low fertility trap’ (Lutz
et al., 2006), resulting in even fewer families that reproduce themselves.
This chapter addressed the issues of weak capabilities of having and

caring for children in Hungary, considered a representative of the Tran-
sition Post-Socialist policy configuration type (Hobson and Oláh, 2006),
as reflected in the views of 100 working parents on their fertility desires
and sought to interpret different approaches to fertility related well-
being and agency achievements emerging in the personal accounts of
working parents of young children in Budapest. According to our find-
ings, many people seem to be unable to realise their own fertility ideals.
Most respondents desired to have two children at least, while many of
them acknowledged that having more than two children would be the
ideal from a broader perspective, taking into consideration the expec-

tations and interests of society. Socially desirable fertility ideals were
presented with a taken-for-granted character, while a number of respon-
dents felt they needed to explain why they have smaller family size
ideals for themselves. Respondents seemed to ponder much less on
how many children one might or should have in an optimal situation
than on the real and sometimes the imagined factors inhibiting their
own fertility desires. Positive motivations for why they wish to have
a certain number of children have, thus, been harder to identify than
limiting factors, which seemed to dominate the examined qualitative
material. In our Budapest sample, parents’ fertility-related capabilities
were shown to be constrained in many ways: the combination of uncer-
tainty concerning the future and certainty of high child-raising costs,
as well as incoherence between putting public gender-equity principles
into private family practice being the most important.
Indeed, both the reality and the fear of economic hardship were
clearly shown to limit the level of well-being parents hoped to achieve in
their family life by having as many children as they would have wished
for in ideal circumstances. Economic issues were also seen to inhibit
people from being able to achieve an ideal balance between work and
family life: most respondents reported on how the necessity to earn
enough can hinder them spending time with their family. Such time
constraints also inhibit the parents’ capabilities with respect to their
parenting aspirations beyond having a certain number of children. The
interviews revealed that parenting is interpreted by many parents (and
probably also would-be parents) in present-day Hungary as not just hav-
ing children, but as quality parenting, that is to be a good enough parent,
which involves conscious time and skill (re)arrangements to allocate
sufficient ‘quality time’ for the family and specifically for the children.
Worries about the ability as to whether one can take good enough care
of their (present and future) children showed as important elements in
determining fertility desires.
Additionally, in Hungary, similarly to other post-socialist societies,
women are influenced by a historically determined gender yo-yo effect,
subjecting them to contradictory normative expectations about their
‘natural’ roles, while dragging them back and forth between work and
home. Competing norms of working versus stay-at-home parenting
(especially mothering) and numerous demands to be met in parallel
generate tensions that can endanger the achievement of an optimal
work–life balance, being recognised as an increasingly important seg-
ment of family well-being. At the beginning of the 21st century, women
Judit Takács 201
in general, and more educated women in particular, are more likely to

have aspirations beyond family life and interpret their work not only
as a functional necessity to earn money but also as a way for personal
development through professional career building. The examined data
also indicated that increased female education and employment oppor-
tunities can bring about greater awareness of the importance of women’s
career options to be taken into account in fertility decisions by both
members of a couple. This also implies careful consideration of the indi-
rect costs of having another child for women, both financially, that
is in the form of lost earnings and reduced financial independence,
and psychologically, in the form of abandoned career prospects. The
latter aspect is especially important in the Hungarian context, where
the opportunity cost of motherhood (Schneider, 2009) is considerably
higher than that of fatherhood.
Thus, fertility desires in early 21st-century Hungary seem to be
reduced due to a combination of: (i) the high level of risk awareness
along with strong aspirations to diminish economic uncertainties for
one’s family; (ii) the related time constraints increasing the doubts
about one’s possibilities to meet (partly self-imposed) demands of good
enough parenting; and (iii) the incoherence of rising awareness about
women having aspirations beyond the family sphere given more gender
equal opportunities there but little changes in the gendered division of
home responsibilities. Indeed, the presented findings indicate that fer-
tility desires in Hungary are constrained by the content of people’s own
fertility-related capability sets. However, the negative impact of capabil-
ity constraints may be mitigated by policies addressing these issues in
a broader context, reducing gender inequity within the family by, for
example, introducing parental leave schemes approximating (not fur-
ther distancing) the opportunity costs of motherhood and fatherhood
in Hungary. There is space for improvement in other policy fields, too,
including possibilities for a higher level of parent-friendly flexibility in
the Hungarian labour market and tackling some labour market-related
aspects of parental time squeeze. The scope of this section does not allow
an exhaustive list, but readers are encouraged to think ahead in various
directions, which can be helpful to convince potential future parents
that parenting constitutes a form of (quality) life worth living.
Notes
1. It is a reference to a period named after Minister of Welfare (1949–50)
and Minister of Health (1950–53) Anna Ratkó, when abortion was strictly
prohibited and a special tax was introduced for childless people.
2. Source: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal [Hungarian Central Statistical Office]

(2011) Labour Market Data 2000–10, http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/
thm/2/indi2_3_1.html (accessed 2 July 2011).
3. RECWOWE (www.recwowe.eu) is a Network of Excellence of the Sixth Frame-
work Programme (FP6) on ‘Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe’.
4. For more details on the items of this list, see the RECWOWE deliverable report
(Hobson et al., 2009).
5. Desire for shorter workdays was first priority for 24 per cent of respondents,
second for 22 per cent and third for 8 per cent, while ‘more time for myself’
was chosen as a first priority by 12 per cent of respondents, 16 per cent as a
second priority and 34 per cent as a third priority.
6. Nevertheless, the average income of women is still only 85–88 per cent of that
of men in Hungary.
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7
Concluding Thoughts on
Childbearing, Women’s Work and
Work–Life Balance Policy Nexus in
Europe in the Dawn of the 21st
Century
This book has addressed the interplay between childbearing and work
and welfare, more specifically female employment and work–life bal-
ance policies, in contemporary Europe. Along with increasing scholarly
interest in the topic, demographic and economic sustainability has been
high on the agenda in European policymaking given substantial cross-
country variations in fertility levels in the past decades, (well) below
what is necessary for the replacement of the population (that is 2.05
children per woman) and not speeding up societal ageing. Focusing on
childbearing choices (intentions mainly, but even desires), considered as
influential predictors of future fertility, our research team has examined
the importance of labour force participation on young women’s fertility
plans in the context of increasing labour market flexibility in various
work–life balance policy settings. We have studied five countries, two
high-fertility and three low-fertility societies representing different wel-
fare regime/policy configuration types. Our two high-fertility societies,
Sweden and France, belong to different policy regimes, the former being
the prime case of the Dual-Earner, and the latter belonging to the Gen-
eral Family Support policy configuration type to which even Germany, a
low-fertility regime country belongs. The other two low-fertility societies
we have studied, Poland and Hungary, represent the Transition Post-
Socialist cluster. While both countries have displayed very low rates of
childbearing in the early 21st century, previously they belonged to dif-
ferent fertility regimes given high fertility rates in Poland up until the
late 1990s, unlike in Hungary. Thus, these five case studies demonstrate
207
208 Concluding Thoughts
that there is no clear-cut association between fertility level in a coun-

try and which welfare regime/policy configuration cluster it belongs to,
but we need to look more carefully to understand the processes at stake.
What seems to apply generally to working-age adults, independently
of gender and country context, is that they have high aspirations to
combine paid work and family life, as seen in Figure 7.1.
Our overall theoretical framework in the book has been built upon
two key concepts: uncertainty and risk, and incoherence. As for the for-
mer, young people in modern societies have been shown to have high
economic aspirations while being rather reluctant to accept a decline
in their living standard due to family formation. Hence, childbearing
has increasingly become a choice in which a high level of uncertainty
and risk of economic hardship for a family is embedded. In the con-
text of growing job insecurity, which is an increasingly common feature
of modern economies, risk-averse individuals/couples are likely to post-
pone irreversible decisions such as having a first or additional child
and invest instead in improving their labour force positions. The risk
and uncertainty can, however, be mitigated by policies that facilitate
the reconciliation of work and family life. As for the second concept,
childbearing choices are influenced by incoherence with respect to a
high level of gender equity in the educational system and the labour
market but continuously low gender equity in the family, where women
continue to bear the lion’s share of care and household duties. As the
%
100
80
60
40
20
0
Women Men
Figure 7.1 Proportion of men and women aged 20–60 years, in five European
countries, who find it important/very important to be able to combine work and
family life when choosing a job
Source: European Social Survey 2010/11 (authors’ own calculations).
latter tasks multiply in the case of a birth constraining women’s oppor-

tunities beyond the family sphere, fertility aspirations may diminish
greatly unless such constraints are counterbalanced by the policy con-
text. Our findings have shed more light on the ways these concepts
matter in the decision-making about family formation and employment
within and across societies. The Swedish, French, German and Polish
chapters have focused on childbearing intentions, based on quantitative
analyses of recent survey data. In addition, the Hungarian chapter has
addressed fertility desires based on a comprehensive qualitative data set
of 100 working parents. All five case-studies have shown convincing evi-
dence of uncertainty and risk being taken into account in women’s (and
as the French chapter has shown, also in men’s) childbearing choices,
while we have found somewhat more subtle links to incoherence for
these countries. Below, we discuss the findings and their implications in
detail.
1. Tensions related to uncertainty and risk
Relying on the concept of uncertainty and risk, when addressing the fer-
tility, paid work and public policy nexus, has provided us with a better
understanding of the increasing importance of continuous labour mar-
ket participation among (prospective) parents, both women and men,
and its link to childbearing decisions. To have a stable job matters, espe-
cially for those who have not yet entered parenthood. Parents, on the
other hand, seem to have better social protection in most countries and
are thus less vulnerable to labour market uncertainties. Here, we present
the relevant results for each country-specific chapter.
1.1 Entering parenthood

In Sweden, unemployment and unspecified activities (the latter indicat-
ing a lack of, or at best weak labour force attachment) have been shown
to suppress childless women’s intentions in general as well as in the
short term (that is the next five years) to become mothers, as uncertainty
and the risk of economic hardship may be linked most strongly with
such a situation. Compared with the permanently employed we have
seen much reduced short-term first birth intentions also for women in
temporary employment, for students and for those working very short
part-time (less than 17 hours a week). As the qualifying condition for
income-related parental benefit is closely linked to labour force partic-
ipation prior to the birth which is more difficult for these women to
meet, a sense of risk and uncertainty is likely to apply to them reduc-
ing their motherhood aspirations in the short run. Those with marginal
labour force attachment are constrained by not being able to qualify for
a reasonably high benefit as the amount is based on previous earnings,
linking motherhood for them with the risk of economic hardship and
insecurity.
In France, the intention to have a first child within the short term
(that is three years) is driven by one’s professional position and its sta-
bility. In this chapter, both women’s and men’s intentions have been
analysed, taking into account the respondent’s own and her or his part-
ner’s labour force situation. Unemployment has been shown to reduce
fertility intentions for men, not having any clear impact on women
for whom having an unstable job, that is a position with a fixed-
term contract that clearly weakens intentions to have a first child. For
unemployed men, fertility intentions are constrained by the fear of dete-
rioration of their living standard along with a kind of ‘breadwinner
norm’ they seem to have integrated compelling them to signal being
a good provider before planning to become a father. For women who
do not have a permanent job, it is their anticipation of higher oppor-
tunity cost of childbearing that constrains their intentions, hence they
wait until they have stable employment before planning to enter moth-
erhood. Being a student also suppresses motherhood intentions, but not
that of fatherhood, which may be related to women with children fac-
ing greater difficulties to enter the labour market than fathers do and
thus experiencing a higher level of uncertainty than men.
In East and West Germany, childless women in precarious labour mar-
ket positions and students have greatly reduced intentions of starting a
family as uncertainty and risk of economic hardship apply most strongly
to them. Also part-time work seems to be considered as inadequate
labour market integration linked to greater uncertainty suppressing
motherhood intentions in the short run (that is two years). However, the
impact of own employment situation on women’s childbearing inten-
tions is weakened when the partner’s employment status is taken into
account, especially in West Germany where men’s integration in the
work force is a precondition of childbearing due to the persistent male-
breadwinner/female part-time carer model. There are also differences
with respect to tensions to combine work and family life in the two
regions. One such feature with respect to planning a first child is that
having a fixed-term contract greatly increases motherhood intentions
in the Eastern region where obtaining a permanent position is more dif-
ficult, while the type of employment contract matters little for women
in West Germany. As the financial conditions for becoming a parent
are fulfilled by having full-time employment, the sense of uncertainty
seems to diminish independently of the type of the job contract and

women feel more confident to consider having a first child.
The chapter on Poland has addressed childbearing intentions with-
out time limitations, and their linkages to labour force attachment and
reconciliation policies in the context of three theories: preference the-
ory, gender equity theory and social capital theory. It has revealed that
work-oriented women are more likely to intend to have a first child
than home-centred and adaptive women. As a much smaller propor-
tion of the latter groups are highly educated than of the work-oriented,
their reduced intentions are likely to reflect a higher level of uncertainty
and greater risk of economic hardship if having a birth compared with
work-oriented women. Although labour market uncertainties may mat-
ter more for them, the work-oriented group may also be more confident
to cope with these given their greater prospects at the labour market as
being more educated. Employed women have been shown to be more
likely to intend to have a first child than are ‘inactive’ women who may
fear the risk of economic hardship if entering motherhood. Also, women
who value gender equality in their household have been found to have
stronger intentions to become mothers, probably being more confident
to be able to combine work and family responsibilities given more equal
share of tasks with their partners, which in turn can reduce the prospects
of labour market uncertainties for them.
1.2 Having another child

The relationship between labour force attachment and the childbear-
ing choices of parents displays a different pattern across our case-study
countries than what we have seen for the childless. In the Swedish
and French contexts, mothers’ intentions to have an additional child
have been shown to be hardly affected by their labour force participa-
tion, except for reduced short-term intentions among Swedish mothers
with little links to the labour market but increased intentions if they
are in temporary employment. The vast majority of mothers in Sweden
have established their eligibility to generous social provisions prior to
the birth of their youngest child, and can more easily keep such eligi-
bility, for example via the speed-premium rules in the parental leave
scheme. For those who for some reason do not qualify for reasonably
high income-related parental benefit, it is important to earn eligibility
before further extending their family. Those in a fixed-term position are
likely to do just that, also planning to have another child. The mothers
with weak labour force links may face greater uncertainties and risk of
economic hardship if further extending their family. Hence, they refrain
from that at least in the short run. In France, no such exceptions have
been seen as the generous family and employment policies successfully
mitigate economic uncertainties for parents planning to have a second
or even a third child. Third-child intentions are even strengthened by
specific policy measures, especially the tax system providing extensive
tax relief for large families. These rules benefit mostly those with high
incomes who also tend to be highly educated.
In Germany, we have found clear differences with respect to the
impact of unemployment on mothers’ second-child intentions in the
new versus old federal states. In the East, unemployed mothers have
been shown to be less likely to intend to have another child. In contrast,
unemployment seems to strengthen intentions of family enlargement in
the West, at least if the father is employed full-time. Such diverse pat-
terns are likely to be related to different expectations regarding work
and family life in the Eastern and Western parts of the country. In the
East, unemployment is linked to substantial uncertainty and greater
risk of economic hardship not being integrated in the labour market,
and thus not being able to fulfil financial preconditions of childbear-
ing. In West Germany, unemployment is an indicator of the mother’s
family orientation and reduced ambitions to re-enter the labour force.
If her partner can provide a reasonable living standard for the family,
a mother not being employed does not automatically imply a greater
risk of uncertainty and economic hardship, but rather it signals her
intentions to have further children. Moreover, while women in the East
perceive themselves as working mothers and due to better availability
of public childcare can manage to live that way, in the West, family
and career are more difficult to reconcile given the limited provision of
non-family childcare as well as the traditional view that young children
should be cared for by their mothers. Thus, women in West Germany
are increasingly selected into a family- and a work-oriented group, hav-
ing either long break and several children or no break and no children,
respectively.
As for the Transition Post-Socialist countries, the chapter on Poland
has revealed findings similar to what we have seen for West Germany
with respect to unemployed mothers being most likely to intend to
have another child and in terms of the importance of social norms,
especially religiosity (both attitudes and behaviours) for childbearing
choices. Religious mothers have been shown to have stronger inten-
tions to further extend their families than non-believers, as the sense
of economic uncertainty may be counterbalanced for them by a greater
social pressure related to traditional norms and values to have more
than a single offspring. Stronger intentions about family enlargement

have been seen not being limited to traditional values. Also, mothers
who enjoyed greater gender equity in their home have been found to
be more likely to intend to have a second child in Poland, as they may
have felt more certain about being able to combine work and family
responsibilities, which reduces economic uncertainties, even if having
another child.
In addition, the chapter on Hungary has demonstrated, based on the
personal accounts of 100 working parents with young children, how
economic uncertainties inhibit parents from achieving an ideal balance
between work and family life, influencing their fertility desires. As the
necessity to earn enough hinders them spending enough time with their
family, it also constrains parents’ capabilities with respect to their par-
enting aspirations beyond having a certain number of children. Labour
market uncertainties and the fear of economic hardship suppress fertility
desires and prevent the parents to achieve their ideal family size.
2. Tensions related to incoherence
The other major component pointed out in the literature to be likely to

shape childbearing choices in modern societies is the incoherence of, for
the most part, equal access for women and men to education at all levels
and work for pay, but an unequal division of domestic tasks with women
continuing to perform the lion’s share, especially as they become moth-
ers. When childbearing is seen as severely constraining women’s oppor-
tunities beyond the family sphere due to greatly increased domestic
burdens, childbearing plans will be reduced, perhaps rather substan-
tially, depending on the institutional context. The country-specific
chapters have, indeed, provided evidence that incoherence influences
childbearing choices, as discussed below.
The chapter on Sweden has not specifically addressed the impact of
incoherence, as being both earner and carer independently of gender
has been an agreed-upon norm there for several decades, reflected in
gender-neutral policies regarding work and care, employment and par-
enting. Yet, one of the findings may indicate that increased domestic
gender equity strengthens childbearing intentions even in Sweden, as
mothers with partners who combine paid work and childcare leave have
been most likely to intend to have another child.
In France, the effect of incoherence has been found especially pro-
nounced for students. Women in education have been shown to have
strongly reduced intentions to become mothers and/or to have further
children. In contrast, male students’ intentions to have a first child have

not differed from those of permanently employed men. Yet, men with
a female partner still in education have shown reduced intentions to
become fathers independently of their own labour force position. They
have apparently expected the women to bear most of the childrearing
responsibilities, understanding though that this would delay them fin-
ishing their studies. Moreover, the concept of incoherence has appeared
to be relevant also with respect to highly educated women having the
strongest third-child intentions. As the gender division of domestic
tasks is much less unequal in their families, highly educated women,
although more likely to be career- than family-oriented, are the most
confident about being able to combine their work and fertility aspira-
tions and, thus, are the most likely to intend to have a third child.
In Germany, the concept of incoherence seems to apply especially to
the Western part of the country as the different policy settings before
the unification have led to different norms and expectations regard-
ing women’s roles as mothers and labour force participants, still present
in East and West Germany. While women in the East see themselves
as working mothers, supported by and relying on quite extensive pub-
lic childcare provision, West German women are constrained by strong
social norms compelling mothers to care for their children themselves
accompanied by an institutional setting effectively preventing the com-
bination of career and family aspirations, as seen for example in the
low prevalence of non-family daycare, the half-day school and the
lack of school lunch provision. Hence, West-German women may feel
compelled to choose between having children and participating in the
labour market.
Also, the Polish case study shows the relevance of incoherence for
childbearing choices. During the transition period, gender equality has
been promoted in both the educational system and labour market, while
traditional gender relations remained at the family and household level.
In line with the concept of incoherence, stronger intentions to have
a first child and subsequent child(ren) have been seen among women
experiencing higher gender equity in their partnership than other
women. The lack of a significant effect for interactions between work–
family orientation and the gender equality measures in the analysis has,
in turn, indicated that the incoherence effect equally applies to women
in their fertility intentions regardless of their lifestyle preferences.
The chapter on Hungary has identified the incoherence between a
rising awareness about women having aspirations beyond the family
sphere given more gender equal opportunities, yet little changes in the
gendered division of household and care work in the family, as one

of the main aspects reducing fertility desires among working parents.
It has also pointed at competing norms of working versus stay-at-home
mothering and the numerous demands to be met in parallel as gen-
erating tensions that can endanger the achievement of an optimal
work–life balance, hence suppressing women’s aspirations about further
childbearing.
Thus, the empirical findings presented in our five country-specific
studies have clearly shown that both uncertainty and risk, and incoher-
ence are taken into account in childbearing choices in modern Europe,
in relation to one’s labour market position and relevant work–life
balance policies.
3. Future research
A synthesis of our findings is presented below to provide useful sugges-

tions for further research and to contribute to the knowledge base of
informed policymaking aiming at demographic and economic sustain-
ability in Europe.
Our first conclusion is that weak labour market position constrains
plans to become a mother, as reconciliation policies are likely to provide
poor, if any, protection to women in such situations against the risk of
economic hardship, unlike those in a (more) stable employment situ-
ation. We have found convincing evidence for this conclusion across
our case-study countries. First of all, being in education reduced the
intentions to have a first child in Sweden (at least in the short term),
France, East and West Germany, as economic uncertainties are antici-
pated in light of the difficulties that women face entering the labour
force and acquiring a stable position if being a mother. Unemploy-
ment, not having significant impact in the other countries, has been
shown to clearly reduce motherhood intentions in general and in the
short run in Sweden where social provision is most strongly linked
to employment and earnings prior to a birth. Women in temporary
employment have been found much less inclined to plan to become
mothers than those in permanent positions in Sweden and France, at
least in the short term as they anticipate greater uncertainties related
to the difficulties that women face trying to re-enter the labour mar-
ket as mothers. Marginal labour force attachment in the form of short
part-time work or labour market inactivity has been shown to suppress
motherhood intentions in Sweden, Germany and Poland, being linked
with a pronounced risk of economic hardship and uncertainty. Indeed,
the country-specific chapters have illuminated processes of uncertainty

and risk, related to insecure labour force attachment taken into account
in childless women’s childbearing decisions.
In addition, we have found diverse patterns of the relationship
between mothers’ labour force attachment, economic uncertainty and
childbearing choices across our case-study countries. While women’s
employment situation has mattered little in France for second- and
third-birth intentions as generous family and employment policies
reduce uncertainty and the risk of economic hardship for families with
children there, Swedish mothers with weak labour force attachment
have been seen to be less inclined to extend their family, not qual-
ifying for the generous social provisions to working parents. Greater
uncertainties also suppress unemployed mothers’ intentions to have
another child in East Germany, unlike in West Germany and Poland
where mothers’ unemployment is linked to them planning to enlarge
their families. Stronger intentions have been found also for Swedish
mothers in temporary employment who seek this way to qualify for
reasonably high parental benefit (based on income prior to a birth).
Our second conclusion is, then, that policies matter, as we have seen
for both intentions to enter parenthood and also to have further
children.
Furthermore, social norms about parenting seem to have a strong
impact on plans about further childbearing, especially in low-fertility
countries. Such norms may mitigate the negative effect of economic
uncertainties on childbearing choices (like for unemployment in West
Germany and Poland), in other cases they even strengthen them (like
for unemployed mothers in East Germany, working parents in Hungary
or for unemployed men in France, the latter with respect to first-birth
intentions). Hence, our third conclusion is that social norms matter pro-
viding further nuance to the fertility, female work and public policy
nexus.
The empirical findings have also demonstrated that even though
childbearing choices are formed at the individual level, they are strongly
influenced by macro-level conditions of labour market structures and
opportunities, and the institutional and policy settings. Our fourth con-
clusion is, thus, that context matters, and we need to pay attention
to the interrelationship of micro- and macro-level processes to better
understand current fertility decisions and future childbearing trends. For
such ambitions, the concepts of uncertainty and risk, and incoherence
are likely to prove useful conceptual tools, which is our fifth but crucial
conclusion.
Acknowledgement
grant to the Linnaeus Center on Social Policy and Family Dynam-
ics in Europe, SPaDE (grant number 349–2007–8701) is gratefully
acknowledged.
Index
association between fertility employment situation impact on,

and female work, 2, 30, 210
41, 42 foregoing, 31, 71
attitudes, 15, 20, 31, 33, 74, 98, 101, intentions, 3, 7–8, 19, 21, 29, 30–3,
105, 106, 111–13, 127, 137, 144, 41–2, 44–8, 49, 51–6, 68–9,
168, 181, 212 86–7, 91, 98, 114, 126–7, 138,
163, 209, 215, 216
lower, 48; motherhood, 121, 210,
balance
215; short-term, vii, 7, 19, 41,
work–life, 5–6, 12, 14, 17, 19–22, 24,
45–8, 51–3, 55–6, 68, 97, 209,
34, 39, 56, 58, 111–12, 131,
211; to have a first child, 8, 11,
150–2, 184, 186–7, 190, 193,
122, 124, 156, 159, 161, 162–4,
198–9, 201, 203, 216, 218;
166–8, 210, 214–15
deficiencies, 183; (institutional)
non-marital, 181
solutions, 155, 166, 183; issues,
paid work and, 6, 97; short-term, 56
117, 129, 183, 198; policies, 2,
plans, 19, 68, 75–6, 88–9, 90, 112,
5, 7, 8, 19, 20, 22, 32, 54, 56,
117, 180–1, 213
98, 190, 215; programmes
postponed, 182
promoting family-friendly
postponement of, 4, 26, 66, 69, 70,
measures, 128; transformation,
89, 99, 129, 141
148, 154
postponing marriage and
business cycles, 36, 53
parenthood, 143
postponing motherhood, 185
childbearing, 2–7, 10, 12–14, 28–9, probabilities of, 47, 76, 116, 121,
36, 38, 54, 65, 69, 77, 80, 82, 123, 126
86–7, 91, 97, 100–11, 114–16, reproductive attitudes and
126–7, 129, 136–7, 139, 143, behaviours, 144
173, 182 shaping childbearing decisions, 6
age(s), 3, 32, 73, 186 trends, 10, 216
attitudes and behaviours, 212 childcare, xi, 14, 17–19, 39–40, 55, 59,
behaviour, 5, 29 69–70, 74, 88, 91, 105–6, 109–13,
choices, 5, 7–8, 19, 22, 29, 207–9, 117, 147, 150–2, 166, 170, 184,
213–16 186–8, 190, 196, 212, 213–14
close birth-spacing patterns, 61, 71 all-day programmes, 39, 110–11
costs of, 2, 69, 86–7, 169, 210; attitudes towards, 111, 127
opportunity, 20, 66, 69, 70, 79, enrolment rates/attendance, 11, 17,
87, 113–15, 117, 201 18, 26, 39, 111
decisions, 113, 116–18, 126, 128, establishments, 110
129, 138, 179, 187–8, 216 facilities, 110, 151, 188, 196
desires, 112, 181, 185 formal, 18, 74, 106, 127–8, 186–7
218
Index 219
for infants, 111 economic

institutional care, xvii, 14, 17, 39, activity, 144, 146–7, 161, 167, 169, 181
40, 55, 73, 105–6, 109–10, 148, insecurity, 20, 104
150–2, 166, 185, 187, 212–13 issues, 196, 200
institution(s), 110, 113, 127, 147, uncertainties and risks, 22, 179, see
150 also uncertainty(ies)
non-family, 127, 188, 212, 214 economy
outside family, 110–11, 120, 127 free-market, 102, 195–6
private, 185 educational attainment, 6, 32, 41,
provisions, 70, 74, 139, 186, 188 46–9, 51–2, 71, 76, 88, 112, 117,
reduction in public, 185, see also 142–3, 190
social benefits access to higher education, 138
women’s education, 114, 132, 142,
services, 17, 74, 150, 151, 184
187, 194
subsidised day care, 73
educational system, 7, 137, 155, 208,
traditional view on, 212
214
childcare leave, 149–50, 213
employment, i, iii, v, x, 17, 19, 31–2,
leave policies, 14 34–5, 37, 39–41, 48, 54, 65–9, 72,
paid, 108 74–5, 81, 86–7, 91, 93, 97, 102–7,
cohort study, 15, 20, 118 111, 113, 114–119, 121–129, 136–7,
combining 143, 145, 149, 153, 174, 183–4,
combine employment and 187–90, 198, 201, 209–13, 215–16
childrearing, 5, 8, 13, 15, 28, atypical, 68, 104
91, 109, 184 career, 2, 20, 29, 32, 35, 66, 103,
conditions for reconciliation, 101, 112–14, 127, 154, 163, 170, 181,
108 185, 188, 197–8, 201, 212, 214
incompatibility of motherhood and equal treatment in, 72, 149, 174, see
employment, 113 also gender
motherhood and paid work, 15, 93, insecurity, 6, 65, 74, 80, 98, 104,
108 112, 114, 188, 208, 210
work and family/responsibilities, 2, marginal, 104
7–8, 13, 19, 33, 37, 39, 40, 54–5, policies, 67, 91, 136, 153, 212, 216
91, 110, 136, 145–8, 170, 181, status in, 42, 44, 55, 68, 70, 74–5,
208, 210–11, 213–14 80, 86–8, 116, 119, 122, 124–5,
see also reconciliation 127–8, 149, 210; education, 76,
component/effect 80–1, 112, 117, 119, 120–2,
quantum, 173, 186 124–5, 128, 153, 214–15;
tempo, 173, 186 partner’s, 15, 19, 21, 53, 70, 76,
costs and benefits, 31, 109 80, 81, 82, 86, 88, 89, 92, 115,
costs of having (another) child(ren), 118–19, 123–4, 126, 129, 210;
21, 138, 150, 169–70, 195, 198, self-employment, 41, 46, 86, 119
201
certainty of high child-raising costs, family, 2–8, 10–11, 22, 29, 31–33, 37,
199–200 39, 40, 44–8, 46–8, 52, 54–5, 54–6,
65–7, 69, 73–4, 75–7, 85–6, 88–91,
cultural changes, 137
98, 100, 104–7, 111–18, 123,
see also norms and values
126–8, 135–6, 138, 143–157, 162,
165–6, 168, 173, 179, 183, 188–9,
demand for children, 69, 110, 112 195–6, 197–201, 208–14, 216
220 Index
family – continued 137, 138, 147, 153–5, 160, 161,

childless lifestyle, 45, see also 171, 189, 190, 201, 213–15
preferences family policy(ies), 147–8, 150, 165–6,
childlessness, 29, 99–101, 113, 129; 170, 184–5
intentional, 32, 183 family and employment, 67, 91,
cohabiting, 59, 101, 120, 122, 124, 212, 216
128, 158, 165 family-friendly, 33, 148
co-residential partnership, 41, 43, measures, 37, 99, 136, 187
46–7, 53, 57 parent-friendly flexibility, 201
dual-breadwinner/dual-carer model, pro-family policy, 138
74, 107, 118 promoting births, 184
dual-breadwinner model, 107, 197 real opportunities, 21, 179
formation, 6, 113–16, 118, 123, 128, female employment, 1, 2, 6, 8, 20–1,
187–8, 208; building, 31–2, 36, 36, 65, 94–5, 97, 98, 102, 109,
40, 51, 54, 118; intentions, 117; 112, 119, 126, 135, 152, 155, 207
postponed parenthood, 112, activity rates, 12–13, 146
116; process, 116–17, 119, 131, career opportunities, 66, 188, 197
181, 190–1, 209 education and employment
inequity in, 199, see also gender opportunities, 187, 201
living-apart-together, 2, 120, 122, full-time, 12, 51, 52, 53, 104–5, 111,
124, 128 116–19, 118, 122
male-breadwinner, 2, 5, 20, 99, 107 labour force participation, 3, 5, 8,
11–12, 18, 28, 33–4, 54, 58, 71,
male-breadwinner/female part-time
103, 108, 116, 126, 207, 209, 211
carer model, 107, 118, 126, 210
maternal employment, 9, 15, 34,
married, 120, 123–4, 128, 156, 158,
111–12
159, 160, 165, 181, 182
mother’s employment, 105, 127
model, 74, 107, 147–8, 153, 158
mothers’ employment patterns, 121
multi-children family, 148
opportunities, 187, 198, 201
non-marital partnerships, 101
part-time, 13, 34–5, 102, 114,
nuclear, 148, 197 121–50, 170, 183, 215
one-child, 29, 32, 87, 113 rates, 1, 2, 9, 13–14, 36
size, 191; declining, 180; decrease in temporary, 16, 36, 39, 44, 46, 48,
ideal, 193; desired, 22, 78, 179; 58, 209, 211, 216
highest-ranked, 30; ideal, 3, 5, weak labour market attachment, 14,
8, 10–11, 29–30, 193, 213; ideal 39, 56, 209, 211, 215, 216
and actual number of children, woman’s employment, 8, 107, 137,
190, 194; ideal number of 173
children, 180, 191, 192–194, woman’s non-employment, 110,
197, 198 114, 127
traditional, 140 fertility
traditional attitudes, 20, 74, 98 attitudes and behaviours related to,
traditional concept of, 187 168
traditional gender relations, 168, behaviour, 5, 31, 32, 54, 68, 90, 135,
214, see also gender 139, 165, 169–70, 186
traditional roles, 168, 187 choices, 5, 18, 20
traditional values, 213 cohort, 4–5, 99–100, 101, 139,
(unequal) division of household 141–2
labour in, 7, 66, 74, 91, 106–7, contemporary, 144
Index 221
costs and benefits of, 31 division of domestic tasks, 7, 21, 34,

decisions, 31, 70, 74, 90, 104, 119, 74, 88, 91, 106–7, 137, 147, 201,
132, 176, 201, 216 213–15, 217–18, see also family
decline of; rapid, 10, 185; recent, 152 equality, 4, 7, 21, 33–4, 38, 69, 74,
declining, 116, 139, 180 135–8, 152–5, 160–1, 166–8,
desired and realised, 3, 21–2, 78, 214, 211; policies, 4, 152, 213
179, 189, 194 equal opportunities, 189, 201, 214
desires, 18, 21, 78, 179–80, 189, equity, 6, 21, 97, 135, 138, 153, 155,
195–6, 199–201, 209, 213, 215 162, 198, 208, 213–14
future, 3, 30, 207 equity theory, 21, 153–4, 160–3,
165–6, 168, 211
ideals, 194, 199–200; socially
gap, 34, 58, 147
desirable, 194, 200
gender-related discrimination, 71,
intentions, 20–1, 29, 32, 40, 55,
91, 147, 148–9
67–8, 75–6, 78–80, 86–90, 97–8,
ideals and reality, 161–2, 166–8,
123, 126, 135, 137–8, 143,
172–4
147–8, 152–5, 162–3, 165–170,
inequality, 6, 168
210
inequity, 196, 199, 201
late fertility, 21, 155–6 role attitudes, 33, 105–6
level, 1, 2, 4–5, 9–10, 12, 14, 18, 91, traditional relations, 214
137–9, 180, 207–8; high, 10, traditional roles, 86, 168, 187–9, 199
182; low, 3–4, 8–10, 28, 97, 174,
199; reproduction, 101; high relative income, 44, 51
variations in, 1, 3, 9, 67, 207; human capital, 34, 69, 79, 86, 113
very low/ lowest low, 3, 9, 139, amortisation, 185
152, 189 human capital investment, 34, 79,
pattern of later births, 100 86, 142
patterns, 36, 141
period fertility, 1, 10, 36, 99, 129, incoherence, 6–8, 15, 18–22, 69, 86,
186 91, 97–8, 116, 126, 128, 138, 153,
polarisation of, 117, 123 168, 189, 196, 198, 199, 200–1,
rates, 1–4, 9–10, 13, 29, 36, 54, 65, 208–9, 213–16
99, 101, 180, 181–2, 194, 207; individual life strategies, 189
tempo-adjusted total, 4, 10, 11; individual-oriented versus
total, 4, 9, 11, 29, 129, 140, 180; family-oriented institutions, 7
very low, 189 individual-oriented societal
realised, 13, 21, 32–3, 67, 189, 199 institutions, 137
regimes, 5, 9, 17, 207; high fertility, institutional context, 6, 7, 15, 19,
10, 13–14, 18, 207; lowest low/ 31–2, 74, 148, 165, 213
very low fertility, 10, 13, 17; intentions, 3, 5, 7, 8, 18, 19, 20, 21,
low fertility, 8, 10, 18, 207 29, 31–3, 39–42, 44–9, 51–57,
trends, 4, 28, 33, 68, 99 66–70, 75–6, 78–9, 81–82,
fertility related string variables, 192 86–91, 97–8, 114, 116–17,
120–8, 135, 137–8, 143, 147–8,
152–6, 158–72, 180, 197, 207,
gender, 1, 3, 6, 19, 33–4, 37, 54, 60, 209, 210, 211–16
66–7, 69, 76, 78, 86, 88, 90–1, lower intention probabilities, 53
103, 106–7, 137–8, 153, 182–3, see also childbearing, fertility
189, 191, 193 interaction effects, viii, 125, 169
222 Index
interplay, 1, 5, 7, 8, 30, 32, 47, 53–4, macro and micro levels, 137
126, 135, 155, 207 marriage, 2, 59, 71, 101, 109, 122,
between childbearing, work 129, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 160,
and welfare regime/policy, 5, 164, 174, 181, 182
8, 207 declining share of, 181
early marriage pattern, 182
labour force, 1, 4, 7, 15, 48, 53–8, marriage and family formation
69–93, 119, 126–208, 210–12 pattern, 181
attachment, 19, 30, 33, 39, 40–7,
55–57, 209–11, 216; marginal, New Home Economics Theory, 20, 115
13, 215 non-material aspirations, 188
participation, 3, 5, 8, 11–2, 18, 28, norms and values, 21, 98, 135, 136,
33, 34, 54, 58, 71, 103, 126, 139, 153, 168, 212
207, 209, 211; married traditional, 168, 212–13
women’s, 108 traditional system of, 153
see also employment, female values, 21, 89, 123, 135, 137, 142,
employment, labour market 144, 191, 194
labour market, 2, 7, 9–10, 12–14, 17,
20–1, 28–9, 31–9, 41, 45, 47–8, parenthood, 4, 6, 21, 28, 40, 54,
54–6, 65–6, 68–9, 72–73, 86, 88, 89–90, 99, 112, 118, 123, 149,
91, 97, 99, 102, 104, 106, 107, 184, 189, 193–4, 196
109, 111, 113, 117, 118, 119, 121, entering in to, 2, 4, 66, 86, 103, 112,
123, 126–7, 129, 136–9, 143–8, 149, 209, 214, 216, 218
152–3, 155, 165–8, 183–6, 188–9, postponed, 6, 143
197, 201, 207, 209–12, perceived behavioural control, 31
214–216 policy(ies), 3, 8, 10, 32, 56, 97, 99,
extended experiences, 29 107–8, 112–13, 126, 136–7, 208,
inactivity, 218 211, 215
uncertainty(ies), 29, 36, 45, 54, family, 37, 71, 73, 74, 88, 98–9, 136,
55–6, 118, 209, 211 138, 147–8, 150, 165–6, 170,
unstable, 28, 138 184
leave, 14, 17–18, 37–40, 53–6, 59, 66, public, 4, 17, 153, 177, 209, 216
73–4, 87, 91, 93, 99, 108–9, see also family, balance, work-life,
148–50, 170, 174, 184–5, 190, policies, reconciliation
198, 201, 211, 213 population ageing, 1, 139, 144, 207
childcare, 14, 108, 149, 150, 213 post-socialist societies, 9, 21, 176, 188,
full-time, 38 196, 200, 212
maternity, 17, 66, 93, 99, 108–9, post-transitional demographic trends,
148–9, 150, 170, 174 194
paid leave schemes, 184 preferences, 7–8, 21, 29, 30, 31, 71,
parental, 17, 26, 37, 38, 39, 53–56, 97, 116, 137, 154, 165, 194
59–60, 63, 73–4, 87, 91, 99, attitudes towards maternal
108, 109, 148, 185, 198, employment, 112
201, 211 child-oriented attitudes, 181
paternity leave, 17, 74, 148–50 orientation, 114, 163; adaptive, 136,
programmes, 17–18 153, 154, 156–9, 162, 165–6,
logistic regression, 19–21, 41–2, 46–9, 169, 211; career-oriented, 90,
52–3, 55, 76, 82, 83, 121–5, 93, 115, 136, 153; family,
155–6, 159–62, 164 89–90, 113, 115, 117, 123, 127,
Index 223
136, 153, 168, 181, 214; childrearing, 108–9, 184–5;

home-oriented, 136, 153–4, parental leave, 74, 91; tax, 108;
156–9, 162, 165, 211; unemployment, 93
work–family, 129, 158, 168, flat-rate benefit, 37, 109, 184–5
217; work-oriented, 67, 79, 115, insurance-based, 185
127, 136, 154, 157–60, 162–6, old-age pension, 184
169–70, 211–12 parental, 37–9, 45, 109, 128
importance of children, 113, 127 parental income-related, 37–438,
lifestyle preferences, viii, 21, 67, 91, 45, 51, 54–6, 209, 211
135–7, 152–4, 157–8, 160–1, sickness, 35, 37
165–6, 168–9, 214 social benefit systems, 35
women’s preferences, 79, 88, 136–7, unemployment benefit, 35, 39, 73,
154 93
work–life decisions, 115 social capital, 21, 135, 138, 139, 152,
preference theory, 21, 135–7, 139, 154–5, 162–3, 164, 167–9
152–3, 157–8, 165–6, 211 social capital theory, 21, 138, 139,
153–5, 162–3, 166, 211
rational choice, 31 social networks, 21, 138, 153–4,
reconciliation 162–3, 168–9, 170, 172
family and employment, 111, 155, social policy evaluation, 159, 165
166 social production function, 20, 115,
paid work and childrearing, 8, 15, 129
91 sustainability, 3
policies, 3–4, 8, 10, 56, 97, 99, 107, demographic, 3–4, 7
112–13, 126, 136–7, 183, 208, demographic and economic, 3–4, 7,
215, 211, see also balance, 207, 215
work-life, policies
religion, 106–7, 144, 156 tension(s), 6, 8, 18, 20–2, 32–3, 40, 54,
importance of, 144, 156 56, 90, 97–8, 111, 119, 126–8,
religiosity, 76, 89–90, 106, 120, 144, 137, 140, 150, 154–5, 163, 166,
156, 159–62, 164, 167–8 196, 200, 209–10, 213, 215
secularisation process, 144 between economic activity and
replacing, 188 family, 169
state-socialist regime with market between family life and professional
economy, 191 career, 166
risk, 3, 5–6, 8, 18, 22, 29, 31, 32–3, 35, between fertility choices, female
39, 45, 54–6, 69, 70, 72, 87, 97, employment and work-life
105, 114, 129, 137, 143, 168, 179, balance policies, 18
183, 187–9, 199, 201, 208–12, multiple, 18
215–6 between work engagement and
economic hardship of, 31, 55, 56, family, 196
200, 208–13, 215
strategy for risk-averse individuals, uncertainty(ies), 4–6, 8, 17–23, 20–3,
6, 208 28–9, 28–9, 35, 36, 39, 44–5, 48,
see also uncertainty(ies) 54–6, 65–73, 79, 82, 89–91, 118,
126–7, 133, 137–8, 152, 155, 166,
social benefits, 21, 35, 54–6, 138 168–9, 179, 180–9, 183, 197,
allowances, 73, 150; child, 108; 199–201, 215–16, see also risk
childcare, 153, 184; on childbearing decisions, 6
224 Index
uncertainty(ies) – continued 121–3, 126, 137, 143, 145–50,

concerning labour; force position, 153, 157, 169, 173, 179, 181–5,
31, 126, 215; market, 21, 29, 36, 187–90, 195–7, 199–201, 207–16,
45, 47–8, 54–6, 65, 68, 72, 97, see also employment, female
126–7, 211 employment, labour force, labour
economic, 5–6, 15, 17, 20–2, 54, market
65–7, 69–71, 89–91, 126, 152, commitment, 190
179, 183, 199, 201, 212–13, contracts, fixed-term, 6, 36, 41,
215–16 44–5, 72, 75–6, 79–80, 87, 93,
minimise, 5–6 104–5, 114, 119, 123, 125–7,
unemployment, 3, 5, 15, 16, 20, 28, 143, 149, 183, 188, 210–11
35–7, 39, 41–2, 44, 46–8, 55, 57–8, environment, 190
65–75, 86, 89–91, 93, 97, 102, family-friendly, 190
105, 114, 119, 123, 125–7, 129, female, 15–16, 36, 42, 45–7, 55, 104,
137–8, 143–6, 183, 188, 209–10, 209, 211, 216
212, 215–16 job insecurity, 6, 65, 74, 80, 114,
female, 70–1, 95, 102, 114 190, 208
rates, 3, 5–6, 16, 36, 39, 71, 74, 114, labour relationship, 169
126, 137, 143–6, 183, 188 related factors, 33
unemployed women, 43, 70, 79, 93 temporary employment, 6, 15–16,
28, 36, 39, 41–8, 55–9, 72, 75,
welfare 97, 104–5, 209, 211, 216;
benefit, 73 female, 15–16, 36, 42, 45–7, 55,
regime, 8–9, 67, 136, 152, 187, 104, 209, 211, 216
207–8 time scheme; full-time, 12–13, 17,
state, 1–3, 5, 20, 33, 40, 67, 98, 188 35, 37, 41, 48, 50–4, 56, 58, 75,
system, 7, 18, 113, 166 104–5, 107, 114, 116–26, 128–9,
well-being, 20, 32, 115–16, 122, 129, 147–50, 197, 210, 212; full-time
188, 195–6, 200 stable, 119–22, 124–5, 128;
family, 200 full-time unstable, 119–22,
mental, 115 124–5, 128; part-time, 13, 34–6,
personal, 116 38–9, 48, 51, 53, 55–6, 58, 102,
social, 115 104, 107, 114, 118–22, 124–6,
work (paid), 1–9, 12–22, 28–41, 48–56, 128, 147–50, 170, 183–4, 196,
58, 65–74, 79, 87, 91, 93, 98–9, 209–10, 215; part-time female,
102–5, 107–8, 110, 114–17, 107, 118, 126, 210

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Work and Welfare in Europe

Series Editors: Denis Bouget, University of Nantes, France, Jochen Clasen,

Sigrid Betzelt and Silke Bothfeld

Work and Welfare in Europe

Livia Sz. Oláh

List of Figures vii

Notes on Contributors xii

1 Introduction: Aspirations and Uncertainties. Childbearing

2 Work and Childbearing Intentions from a Capability

3 Employment Instability and Childbearing Plans

4 Female Employment, Reconciliation Policies

5 The Interplay of Fertility Intentions, Female Employment

6 Unattainable Desires? Childbearing Capabilities

7 Concluding Thoughts on Childbearing, Women’s Work and

1.1 Total fertility rates in five European countries,

3.1 Fertility plans in France by number of children 77

2.1 Logistic regression results. Labour force attachment and

4.3 Logistic regression model on the intentions to have a

6.3 Ideal and real(ised) number of children by gender:

Livia Sz. Oláh is Associate Professor of Demography at the Department

life course, population policy, population structure and ageing, applied

Mandy Boehnke is Director of Studies at the Bremen International

Susanne Fahlén is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Soci-

Johannes Huinink is Full Professor for Sociology at the University

articles in leading German and international journals, such as Kölner

Katharina Lutz is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Social

Ariane Pailhé is a senior researcher at the French National Demo-

Aneta Ptak-Chmielewska is Associate Professor at the Institute of Statis-

Demographic Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences between

Anne Solaz is a researcher at the French National Demographic Research

Judit Takács currently works as Head of Department of Research on

Silke Tophoven is a researcher at the Institute for Employment Research

Europe is facing a demographic challenge based on the conjuncture

under the primacy of the male-breadwinner family model, the opportu-

been less consistent and/or comprehensive, while the Nordic states,

‘Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the gen-

2.1 Two key concepts

the childbearing, female employment and work–life balance policy

in individual-oriented versus family-oriented institutions (McDonald,

2.2 Childbearing choices (intentions and desires)

ideal family size. They relate to what a person would like to do or be

Based on the concepts of uncertainty and risk and of incoherence,

country (Kreyenfeld, 2004). In recent years, higher employment rates

Sweden France Germany Poland Hungary

Figure 1.1 Total fertility rates in five European countries, 1960–2010

Personal ideal family size TFR 2006 Adjusted TFR 2005–07

Sweden France Germany Poland Hungary

very-low-fertility regime societies where female activity rates have been

Sweden France Germany Poland Hungary

Figure 1.5 Part-time employment (% of total employment) in five European

Mothers of a <3-year-old child Mothers of a 3–5-year-old child

ISSP 1994 ISSP 2002 EVS 2008

Figure 1.7 Attitudes towards working mothers in five European countries.

three low-fertility countries, where the presence of a preschooler reduces

Figure 1.8 Unemployment rates in five European countries, 1997–2010 (women

Sweden France Germany Poland Hungary

Figure 1.9 Temporary employment (% of total number of employees) in five

design enables us to identify the more general processes that shape

4. Structure of the book

reflect people’s assessment of their personal, interpersonal and social

European Commission (2008) Demography Report 2008: Meeting Social Needs

Hagewen, K. J. and S. P. Morgan (2005) ‘Intended and Ideal Family Size

K. Hagemann, K. Jarausch and C. Allemann-Ghionda (eds) Children, Families,