Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Discussion Note
Carlo Natali
A note on Metaphysics Θ.6, 1048b18–36¹
Carlo Natali: Università “Ca’ Foscari” Venezia, Dipartimento di Filosofia e Beni Culturali, Palazzo
Marcorà Malcanton, Dorsoduro 3484/D, I-30123, Venice, Italy, E-Mail: natali@unive.it
1 Burnyeat’s article.
This passage has been widely studied since Ryle (1966), but a few years ago Myles
Burnyeat (2008) made an excellent survey of all the problems connected to it, and
proposed a new and stimulating interpretation. He tackled the question at all the
possible levels, and criticised a sort of overvaluation of the passage made in the
last decades.
Among the main results of Burnyeat’s article are the following: (1) the passage
is present only in the branch β of the transmission of the Metaphysics, in Ab (Lau-
rentianus 87.12, 12th century) and some of the connected manuscripts. This is, I
think, in favour of not reducing the readings of Metaphysics to only the branch α
(that includes the most ancient mss., E = Parisinus gr. 1853, 10th century, and J =
Vindobonensis phil. gr. 100, 10th century), and of not considering the branch β as
an editorial revision of α, as some of the contemporary scholars tend to do. (2) The
passage was never discussed in antiquity, and in the Middle Ages only by Geor-
gios Pachymeres (13th century). (3) The terminology is unique: in particular we
have here a usage of energeia much more restricted than in other apparently par-
allel passages; we have also, at the beginning, an unusually wide usage of praxis
if we compare it to the classical usage in the Ethics. In my opinion the passage
is really something unique, as far as vocabulary is concerned. Elsewhere, when
Aristotle proposes a restricted usage of praxis as praxis teleia indicates a different
relationship between praxis and kinêsis. In EE II.2 he says that every praxis is a
1 This note has been written during a Visiting Fellowship in the splendid surroundings of All
Souls College, Oxford. It is in part a fruit of a seminar and a workshop on Θ.6 held in Oxford in
April–June 2010 and directed by D. Charles and T. Irwin, with J. Beere, Ch. Shields, M. Peramatzis,
C. Trifogli, and others. I profited very much from the common discussion, but responsibility for
what I say here is only mine. Also, I am very grateful to Justin Vlasits for the corrections which
improved my rather unidiomatic English.
kinêsis (1222b29) and in Metaphysics B.2 he says that every praxis is accompanied
by a kinêsis (996a27), whereas he says in the present passage that no teleia praxis
is a kinêsis and no kinêsis is a teleia praxis. (4) The original context of the passage
is an ethical one because of the presence of the term praxis, and it was adapted to
the place where it is by some subsequent editor. (5) The passage is not connected
with the rest of Θ.6, and is “a freak performance” (p. 276).
I think points 1–3 are completely acceptable, but I have doubts and reserva-
tions about points 4 and 5. In what follows I will try to propose a different under-
standing of the meaning of the text.
2 An attempt to do that was already made by Schwegler (1847–8), II p. 155, with different pro-
posals.
3 τὸ … ἢ Bywater; [ἡ ἰσχνασία] deleted by Jaeger
4 [αὐτό] deleted by Christ
5 ἐκείνη <ᾗ> Bonitz
6 ὁρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ ἑώρακε,> καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε> Bonitz ex Soph. el. 278a9 ff.
(1) Since, among actions, (a) none of those that have a limit is an end, but all are things
conducing to an end (e.g. in the process of making (someone) thin the process of thinning
is exactly that, and the things themselves, when one makes them thin, are in movement in
such a way that it is not present what the movement tends to), these are not to be counted
as an action, or at least not as (b) a complete one, for none is an end.
(2) On the contrary, in the other case⁹ (b) both the end and the action are present [together] –
(3) e.g. one sees, but also one thinks;¹⁰ and (4) one understands and at the same time has
understood, but (a) it is not the case that someone learns and at the same time has learned,
neither is one being healed and has already been healed. (5) One lives well and has achie-
ved good life but also is happy and has reached happiness, (6) and if that were not so, (a)
one would have to stop at some time, just as when one is making (someone) thin. But in the
present case (b) it is not necessary: one both lives and has stayed alive. (7) Then, (we must)
call the first ones ‘movements’ and the second ones ‘activities’.
ad line 22: ἐκείνῃ could refer either to the opposite case, i.e. to the second
kind of the praxeis distinguished in line 18 (Brague 1988, p. 459), or to what has
been said before, in line 1048b9, ὡς οὐσία πρός τινα ὕλην, if we consider the entire
passage ἄλλως δὲ καὶ … χωρίζεσθαι οὔ (b9–17) as an aside. Parallel case: in NE
VII we must connect τούτων at line 1149a12 to ἕξεις at line 1148b19, considering
section 1149a5–12 as a parenthesis.¹² I will return to this point.
ad line 22–3: πρᾶξις and τέλος are the subject of ἐνυπάρχει. Aristotle means
that both acting, and what acting is for, in that case are present together, cf. NE
X.4, 1174a14–9, Burnyeat (2008), p. 256 and Brague (1988), p. 459.
ad lines 23 and 25: ἀλλὰ καί is used in a ‘progressive’ way (Denniston 1934,
p. 21) and loses nearly all adversative force. In Aristotle alla kai is used often in
connection with ou monon, but is used also by itself, and in that case sometimes it
has a progressive sense: cf. as examples Metaph. 994b25 “but the whole line must
also be apprehended” (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὅλην … νοεῖν ἀνάγκη), 1023b1–2 “the compos-
ite substance comes from the sensible matter, but also the form comes from the
matter of the form” (ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητῆς γὰρ ὕλης ἡ συνθετὴ οὐσία, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος
ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἴδους ὕλης), and 1071a5. In other cases it keeps its adversative force,
as in 1048a37. But there it is opposed to οὐ δεῖ, on contrary in the present passage
it is connected to οἷον. This is hardly a “nonsense making ἀλλὰ καί”, as Burnyeat
says (2008, p. 276, cf. p. 258).
ad line 28: λέγειν, according to Brague (1988, p. 456), it could have an impera-
tive force, and seems an indication Aristotle gives to himself. But the usage is to be
found, as far as he says, only in Marcus Aurelius, (Farquharson 1920, pp. 135–6),
so the explanation is doubtful. Schwegler considers the infinitive contrary to the
grammar (1847–8, IV, p. 175). Alternatively, add <δεῖ>, as Bonitz does.
There are two main moves necessary to make intelligible the manuscripts’
text as edited by Bekker. They are (I) to interpret ἡ ἰσχνασία as an example of
processes that have a limit and are conductive to an end, and not as an example
of the end itself (contra Bonitz, Schwegler, Ross and Jaeger) and (II) to interpret
ἀλλὰ καί as progressive and not adversative.
12 With regard to the passage from neuter to feminine (τὰ δέ … ἐκείνῃ), this is not a problem,
cf. Burnyeat (2008), pp. 254–6: ad 1074b3 a masculine, οὗτοι, picks up a neuter plural θείων
σωμάτων, 1074a30–1.
3 The argument.
Let us now examine the steps of the argument:
In (1) Aristotle introduces the distinction between two kinds of praxeis, (a)
and (b);
in (2) he says why praxeis of type (b) are complete: because the end and the
action are present together;
in (3), line 23, he explains what he means by the examples of seeing and
thinking, which are not means to something else, because they are activities that
have their end in themselves;
in (4), in lines 23–4, repeats the opposition between type a praxeis and type
b praxeis introducing the verbal forms, what is called a “tense test”: it is possible
to understand and having understood, but it is not possible to learn and to have
learned the same subject, or to heal a body already in good health. We don’t know
yet why, it will become clear later;
in (5) he adds more examples of type b praxeis, where we can use present and
perfect at the same time;
in (6) he explains the reason why, going back to the beginning of the passage:
the difference in the way of speaking happens, because in type a praxeis one has
to stop when the end is reached; whereas in type b praxeis there is no internal
necessity to stop, since the end is already present from the beginning of the
praxis, so its presence does not entail that action is stopped. This makes it pos-
sible to describe the praxis using both present and perfect tense;
in (7), finally, Aristotle concludes that it is appropriate to apply the term
kinêsis to type a praxeis and the term energeia to type b praxeis.
The argument makes a ring (Ringkomposition?) from (1) to (6) and arrives at a
conclusion in (7) (‘a lacet’, cf. Douglas 2007, p. 127).
The main change in the progression of the argument with respect to Bonitz’
text is that the argument using verbal forms begins at point (4) and is not already
present in point (3). There Aristotle only illustrates by some examples what he
means by τελεία πρᾶξις, i.e. a πρᾶξις in which the τέλος is present. There is a
parallelism between lines 19–21 and lines 23–5. The first passage begins with οἷον
τοῦ and afterwards gives an example of κίνησις = οὐ τελεία πρᾶξις. The second
passage begins with οἷον and then gives examples of ἐνεργεία = τελεία πρᾶξις.
There is not only a “tense test” in the passage, but more importantly a “stop
test”. The important point is that there is a necessary peras in type a praxeis and
there is not a necessary peras in type b praxeis. The differences of language derive
from this very fact. The language gives a hint to the fact that there is a distinction
between cases (a) and (b), but linguistic facts are simply a sêmeion of the real
difference. In other words, the usage of perfect and present is useful to clarify the
idea that some activities stop when they reach the telos and some not, because
the latter ones have, so to say, the telos embedded in themselves and reaching the
telos does not stop the functioning. But the linguistic fact has no value in itself,
what Aristotle wants to highlight is a difference in the way in which the end is
present and not the difference in the grammar of the verbs used to describe the
events.
On this reading, I think a minimalist interpretation of the opposition between
present and perfect tense is preferable. The mere compatibility between present
and perfect is sufficient to distinguish energeiai from movements, and there is no
need to look for a stricter condition, as the perfect following from present or the
two tenses following from each other.¹³
πᾶσα
γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδό-
30 μησις· αὗται δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα
βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ’ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ
γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται,¹⁴ ἀλλ’ ἕτε-
ρον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν¹⁵· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ
αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν
35 λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν.
13 The point was widely discussed in the Oxford seminar; I rely on this discussion and on
the excellent summary of it made by Terry Irwin. The choice between the different possibilities,
however, is my own.
14 E J Ab, Christ, Ross, Jaeger; Bekker, recc.: κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηκεν; Bonitz: κινεῖ τε καὶ
κεκίνηκεν; Schwegler: κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν.
15 E J Ab, Christ, Ross; secl. Jaeger; Bekker, recc.: κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται. If one follows the Bekker
edition the opposition between type a praxeis and type b praxeis becomes difficult: type a praxeis
would be described as mixing a passive and an active aspect (κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηκεν … κινεῖ καὶ
κινεῖται), lines 32–33 would be referred both to type a praxeis, and there would be no reference to
type b praxeis (Schwegler 1847–8, IV p. 175).
One could think that the text from line 23 to line 34 keeps repeating again and
again the same distinction. The so called “tense test”, based on a comparison
between present and perfect, appears at point (4), is repeated at points (5) and
(6) and again at points (9) and (10). One could suspect a double redaction: points
(2–6) are an argument to explain (1); another argument (8–10) to explain (1)
follows immediately and the two arguments arrive at the same conclusion, at (7)
and at (11):
τούτων δὴ τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ’ ἐνεργείας
“Then we should call the first ones ‘movements’ and the second ones ‘activities’”
(7),
and:
τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν
“Now, the latter type [of action] I call ‘activity’, the former ‘movement’” (11).
If we try to connect (1) to (8–11) we can make a perfectly understandable argu-
ment:
(1) Since, among actions, (a) none of those that have a limit is an end, but all are things
conducing to an end (e.g. in the process of making (someone) thin the process of thinning
is exactly that, and the things themselves, when one makes them thin, are in movement in
such a way that it is not present what the movement tends to), these are not to be counted
as an action, or at least not as (b) a complete one (teleia), for none is an end. […] (8) Because
every change is incomplete (atelês): slimming, learning, walking, building. Such things (a)
are changes, and therefore incomplete (ateleis). (9) In fact it is not at the same time that one
is walking and has completed the walk, nor one is building and has completed the building,
nor is becoming and has become, or is being changed and has been changed, but are differ-
ent things, and also is changing and has changed, (10) on contrary (b) one has already in
view and sees the same thing at the same time, and understands and has understood. (11)
Now, the latter type [of action] I call ‘activity’, the former ‘movement’.
Here atelês and ateleis, lines 29 and 30, pick up teleia, line 22. The examples of
type b praxeis arrive only at the end of the argument, with no repetition and a
clear argumentative structure. Aristotle first explains why there is no end in type
It seems to me that all the three examples are to be considered examples of the
new meaning, the one explained by Aristotle later as: ὡς οὐσία πρός τινα ὕλην,
1048b9. This certainly applies to the example of Hermes, and also to the half-line
example (cf. 1019a8), and, because of that, it seems to me difficult not to apply it
also to the example of the θεωροῦντα, a34, pace Burnyeat (2008) p. 221.
Later, in lines 1048a37–b4, Aristotle makes another series of examples to illus-
trate a new point: not only are there two meanings of the distinction potentiality/
actuality, but the four meanings can be considered as terms of an analogy: as
actuality (1) is to potentiality (1), actuality (2) is to potentiality (2), i.e. as move-
ment is to capacity, substance is to some matter.
The examples are the following:
d) someone building/someone capable of building (τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ
οἰκοδομικόν, a37–b1)
e) someone awake/someone sleeping (τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, b1–2)
f) someone seeing/someone capable of seeing but with eyes shut (τὸ ὁρῶν πρὸς
τὸ μῦον μὲν ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον, b2)
Now, it seems to me clear that example (d) is relative to the first meaning of the
distinction: actuality as movement and potentiality as capacity. Examples (g)
and (h) are very similar to example (a), so they count as relative to the second
meaning of the distinction: actuality as substance and potentiality as matter.
But what about examples (e) and (f)? Burnyeat (2008, pp. 221–2) considers them
to be examples of the first meaning (movement/capacity), but I think they are
examples of the second meaning (substance/matter), because they are similar to
example (c) that was used to illustrate the new meaning of the distinction. They
show what the new meaning amounts to, when applied to human doings and
not to material objects. It is a very important theory in Aristotle, the idea that the
second meaning of the distinction potentiality/actuality could be applied also to
human activities.
This is what I suggested in a preceding article (Natali 1991). In my opinion the
passage is something added by Aristotle après coup, to clarify a point still unclear
in his ἐπαγωγή (1048a36). In this I agree with Burnyeat. And I think this very fact
explains why, in chapter 8, Aristotle does not use again the restricted meaning
of energeia introduced here (as noted by Burnyeat 2008, p. 243), but continues
to use it in the broad sense, which it has before this passage, that is, as includ-
ing kinêsis and not as excluding it. But I do not consider the passage to address
something else, related to some different problem. The passage we are discuss-
ing explains exactly in which way type b praxeis can be understood as cases of
the second meaning: because in them the reaching of the telos coexists with the
functioning, as in the statue of Hermes the form subsists in time together with the
matter. The passage makes an extremely interesting observation, and should be
kept where it is.
Bibliography
Bekker, Immanuel (1831): Aristotelis opera. Berlin (Prussian Academy Edition).
Bonitz, Hermann (1848): Aristotelis Metaphysica. Bonn.
Brague, Remi (1988): Aristote et la question du monde. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Burnyeat, Myles F. (2008): “Kinesis vs. energeia: a much-read passage in (but not of) Aristotle’s
Metaphysics” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 25, pp. 219–92.
Christ, Wilhelm von (1886): Aristotelis Metaphysica. Leipzig: Teubner (2nd ed. 1895).
Denniston, J.D. (1934): The Greek Particles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Douglas, Mary (2007): Thinking in Circles: An Essay on Ring Composition. New Haven – London:
Yale University Press.
Farquharson, Arthur S.L. (1920): “Emendations of Marcus Aurelius’ Commentaries” Journal of
Philology 35, pp. 133–41.
Jaeger, Werner (1957): Aristotelis Metaphysica. Oxford: Clarendon Press.