Part 4 Latin Rules - Full Text

9/9/2019 G.R. No.
109005
Today is Monday, September 09, 2019
Custom Search
Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuances Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109005 January 10, 1994
JUAN D. VICTORIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JESUS JAMES CALISIN, respondents.
Juan D. Victoria for himself and in his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to section 2, Article IX of the
Constitution, to set aside (a) the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated January 22, 1993,
which certified respondent James Calisin as the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Albay and (b) its Resolution dated February 22, 1993, which denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner.
The issue in the case at bench is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Albay for purposes of succession.
In the May 11, 1992 Elections, the following candidates from the first, second and third districts of the Province of
Albay were elected and proclaimed as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, to wit:
FIRST DISTRICT
Name No. of Votes Garnered
1. Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes

2. Vicente Go, Sr. 17,937 votes
3. Clenio Cabredo 16,705 votes
SECOND DISTRICT
1. Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes

2. Jesus Marcellana 26,030 votes
3. Lorenzo Reyeg 23,887 votes
THIRD DISTRICT
1. Ramon Fernandez, Jr. 19,315 votes

2. Masikap Fontanilla 19,241 votes
3. Arturo Osia 17,778 votes
4. Nemesio Baclao 17,545 votes
(Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana
automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under
the law, Azana's position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sangguniang member, a post
being contested by petitioner and private respondent.
In answer to private respondent's petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for the Province of
Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in the order of ranking with
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jan1994/gr_109005_1994.html 1/3
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 109005
petitioner herein as second ranking member. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained
by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district.
Thus, on February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of the Department of Interior and Local Government
designated private respondent as acting Vice-Governor of the province.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution which was denied on February 22, 1993.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes
obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who
actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of registered voters but only a few
actually voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes
obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but may have a big voters' turn-out,
in which case the winning candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, petitioner
would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.
Petitioner gives the following illustration:
1. for private respondent.
107,216 (actually voted)

—————————— x 28,335 (votes obtained) = 23.40%
129,793 (registered voters)
(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30)
2. for petitioner
121,423 (actually voted)

—————————— x 32,918 (votes obtained) = 25.84%
154,665 (registered voters)
(Rollo, p. 9).
We are not persuaded.
The Local Government provides:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.
— (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case
of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall become the governor,
vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall
be filled automatically by the other Sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined
on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. (Emphasis ours)
The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top three Sanggunian members:
——————————————————————————————
NAME District Registered Votes Percent Rank
of Elected Voters Obtained Dist'n
Candidates
——————————————————————————————
ALBAY
CALISIN,
JESUS JAMES B. 1st 130,085 28,335 21.78 1st
VICTORIA,
JUAN D. 2nd 155.318 32,918 21.19 2nd
MARCELLANA
JESUS, M. 2nd 155.318 26,030 16.76 3rd
——————————————————————————————
(Rollo, p. 14)
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes
obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of registered voters who actually voted. In such a case, the
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 109005
Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words (Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 [1992]).
In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 710
(1992), we held that:
. . . Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given it literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or
verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on
the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent
or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure. . .
Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves no room for
other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no
power to change the law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
Resolution dated January 22, 1993.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno and
Vitug, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
9/9/2019 G.R. NO. 177333
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented by ATTY. CARLOS R.

BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONE AUTHORITY, et al., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the Zamboanga
City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the
law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz:
Section 7.
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities;
xxxx
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent
Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance.
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as such licensor/regulator to the
international business and gaming community, drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) to file the present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not give power or authority to the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three (3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise
created economic zones and provided for the powers and functions of their respective governing and administrative
authorities, PAGCOR posits that the grant therein of authority to operate games of chance is clearly expressed, but
it is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903.
Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent provisions:
Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act" enacted on March 13, 1992:
Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –
xxxx
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. – The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, otherwise
known as the Subic Authority, shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to priorities and standards set by the
Subic Authority including games and amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall
continue to be licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation of
the Conversion Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas as a national park;
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_177333_2009.html 1/4
9/9/2019 G.R. NO. 177333
xxxx
Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted on February 24, 1995:
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority – The Cagayan Economic Zone
Authority shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements, recreational and sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling,
casinos, golf courses, and others, under priorities and standards set by the CEZA;
xxxx
And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995," enacted on February 24, 1995 authorizing
other economic zones established under the defunct Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and its successor
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance under the license of
PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto clause, viz:
SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions granted to special economic
zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be accorded to special economic zones already created or to be
created under this Act. The free port status shall not be vested upon the new special economic zones.
PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the ecozone-related statutes, Section 7(f)
of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize
entities to operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement" employed therein do not
include "games of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes, ZAMBOECOZONE Authority’s grant of license to private
respondent PEJI encroached on its (PAGCOR’s) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-
stated special laws to centralize and regulate all games of chance.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no personality to file the present petition
as it failed to cite a superior law which proves its claim of having been granted exclusive right and authority to
license and regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to PAGCOR’s assertion, the
words "games" and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 include "games of chance" as was the intention
of the lawmakers when they enacted the law.
In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR cites the November 27, 2006 Opinion3 rendered by the Office of
the President through Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the pertinent portions of which
read:
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related activities
including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE
is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws
specifically allowing the same. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or
license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own, either directly or
through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.4
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.5
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly different
from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an
"amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment.6 On the other hand, a "game of
chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as
"making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value." 7
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar provisions in the three cited statutes
creating ECOZONES shows that while the three statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan
9/9/2019 G.R. NO. 177333
Economic Zone Authority to directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos within its jurisdiction, categorically
stated that such power was being vested in their respective administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in the
case at bar, however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of chance" and
"gambling" does not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators.
The lawmakers could have easily employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they
had intended to grant the power to operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A.
No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not.
The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the President which, after differentiating the
grant of powers between the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that
while the former is authorized to, among other things, operate gambling casinos and internet gaming, as well as
enter into licensing agreements, the latter is not. The relevant portions of said Opinion read:
The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the former, the
grant of powers is not only explicit, but amplified, while to the latter the grant of power is merely what the law (RA
7903) states. Not only are the differences in language telling, it will be noted that both charters of CEZA and
ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e., February 23, 1995 in the case
of ZAMBOECOZONE and February 24, 1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in
the light of what Congress intended them to be, and the distinction that the lawmakers made when they enacted the
two laws.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related activities
including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and
gambling casinos.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE
is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws
specifically allowing the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the President, the latter’s
interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative
or practical construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as
bases thereof – factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as
independent rules in themselves. These factors include the respect due the governmental agencies charged
with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that
they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature
must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute.8
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate and/or license games of
chance/gambling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the
operation of any games of chance. And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is
DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from operating any games of chance pursuant to the license granted to it by
public respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO* ARTURO D. BRION

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
9/9/2019 G.R. NO. 177333
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Additional member in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 75-85.
2 Id. at 99-109.
3 Annex "A" of Reply, id. at 111-113.
4 Vide National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 163448, March 8, 2005, 453
SCRA 70, 79; Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 141246, September 9, 2002, 388 SCRA 485,
487, 491.
5 Id.
6 Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A., 1990, pp. 679 and
84.
7 Id. at 679.
8 Asturias v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617, 623.
9/9/2019 CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES
148 Phil. 295
[ G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971 ]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PETRONILA

CERVANTES, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called
upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage
[1]
applies to a common-law relationship. The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia
Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made
while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court,
after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latter's stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in
character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954
[2]
decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, by the then Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the
appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a
donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and
[3]
void as contrary to public policy." Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this
Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff's
complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she
specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to
defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the
Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely
because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not
take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19,
1965, there was a stipulation of facts which it quoted.[4] Thus: "The plaintiff and the
defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: 1. That
the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; 2. That said Felix
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c583c 1/4
Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila

Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same
donation was accepted by defendant; 3. That the donation of the land to the
defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common-law
relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-donee and the now deceased
donor and later said donor and donee were married on March 28, 1962; 4. That the
deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; 5. That the plaintiff
claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of
the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and
had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon."
[5]
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It
reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void
if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by
Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes
and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They
became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of
[6]
donation had been executed."
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the
most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision,
[7] [8]
Buenaventura v. Bautista, interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code
speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; 'porque no se
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,' [according to] the
Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore
invicem spoliarentur' of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem);
then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted
that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32
ad Sabinum, fr. 1), 'it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the
condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.' So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage."[9]
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement,
any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the
framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in
its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the
policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is
right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with
disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as
what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal
provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence
to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la
ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacion de sus
[10]
disposiciones."
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and
the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore
his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.[11]
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the
complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the
rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question
recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Barredo, Villamor,
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
[1] Art. 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes
effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing."
[2]
50 O.G. 3679 (1954).
[3] Ibid, p. 3686.
[4]
Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.
[5] Ibid, pp. 19-20.
[6]
Ibid, p. 21.
[7] 50 O.G. 3679.
[8]
Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded: "All donations between
the spouses made during the marriage shall be void."
[9] Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).
[10]
The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers Union v. Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co., 80 Phil. 833, 838 (1948) reads in full: "Esta interpretacion de la ley es
insostenible. El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los
tribunales en la aplicacion de sus disposiciones. No deben atenerse a la letra de la ley
cuando la interpretacion literal se separa de la intencion de la legislatura y
especialmente cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con el objeto manifesto de la
ley. Cuando hay conflicto entre la interpretacion literal y la interpretacion fundada en
el proposito de la ley, la ultima debe prevalecer." Cf. Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051
(1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105; Casela v. Court
of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279.
[11] According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: "Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. (953,
837a)."
9/9/2019 REPUBLIC v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
DIVISION
[ GR NO. 154380, Oct 05, 2005 ]
REPUBLIC v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
DECISION
509 Phil. 108
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law'
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
[1]
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its
[2]
Resolution dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of
the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/ca370 1/9
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE

FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5]
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent's situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition-Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between

two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse,
as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The
issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent' Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators
in its enactment'
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented
by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are

Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not
be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry.
We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization'
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.
[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can
thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving

parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would
still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife.
It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14]
Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15]
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former
wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 20-22.
[2] Id. at 27-29.
[3] Id. at 21-22.
[4] Id. at 105.
[5] Id. at 106-110.
[6] Id. at 110.
[7] Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
[8] Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA
281, 286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA
729, 737.
[9] Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
[10] No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[11] G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
[12] Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100
Phil. 850, 855.
[13] Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
[14] Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
[15] Id. at 451.
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 112170
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation
of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan,
Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to
conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint
was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the
involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the
area.2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City
requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua
to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to
attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar
Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents
before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he
would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to
register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after
which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the
letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy
of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez."4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in
the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced
himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline
station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without
leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed
alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no
document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him
was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum
as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided
for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an
indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not
violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his
alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/apr1996/gr_112170_1996.html 1/4
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 112170
also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one
occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement
for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution
failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further
argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong
law.5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.6 The court may consider the
spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner,
and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its
amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and
before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the
one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings
like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall
be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for
the use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on
which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the
proper civil register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No.
142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment
purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no
person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of
the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which
he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within
which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to
secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the
person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias,
the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry,
and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or
are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use
in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which
was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.8 The
pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow —
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including
receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any
written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection
with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the
place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm
name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or
business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other
person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business transaction,
or business . . . .
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the
field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons
could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.9
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 112170
10
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of
an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled —
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real
name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager
of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all,
petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad,
Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had
encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to
explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said
difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a
petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant
of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his
further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one
name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he
believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the
Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu
Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory
proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and
the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized
the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds
by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is
known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends
to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the
name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of
petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is
no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real
name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even
legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the
concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is
a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this
principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest
easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by
him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 24-37.
2 Id., p. 26.
3 Records, p. 7.
4 Rollo, p. 26.
5 Id., p. 12.
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 112170
6 People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, 28 November 1978, 86 SCRA 542.
7 Gregorio, Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1985 Ed., p. 9; People v. Manantan, No. L-
14129, 31 July 1962, 5 SCRA 684.
8 Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed., Vol. II, pp. 1008-1009.
9 Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1954 Ed., Vol. II, p. 331; Guevarra, Guillermo
B., Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 Ed., p. 359.
10 106 Phil. 762 (1959).
11 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. III, West Publishing Co., p. 139.
12 See Note 6.
13 People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957).
14 See Note 6.
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 192330

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192330 November 14, 2012
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering from
malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.
The Facts and the Case
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code.1
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a
Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with
which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the
beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita
Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction
materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in
charge of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had
already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval.
After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of
rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to
consult the accounting department regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk
of the Municipal Accountant’s Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency
situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries.
Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per auditing rules.
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint
against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP goods were
intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental
Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus,
Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP
beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor of the
municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims
good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore,
Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001
and found nothing irregular in its transactions.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/nov2012/gr_192330_2012.html 1/4
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 192330
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation.
But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of
the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than
that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s
motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
The Questions Presented
In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he committed technical malversation. He
particularly raises the following questions:
1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different from their
originally intended purpose;
2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that could be used to
augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality;
3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him; and
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
The Court’s Rulings
One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code4 has three
elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is
different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.5 Ysidoro claims that he
could not be held liable for the offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of
sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133
appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.6 This appropriation was based on the executive budget7 which
allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social
Services8 which covers the CSAP housing projects.9 The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention
to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP’s
needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target
clientele of the SFP according to its manual10 are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-school children
aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and
below.11 This rule provides assurance that the SFP would cater only to the malnourished among its people who are
in urgent need of the government’s limited resources.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing free labor for
the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the
construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither
could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that, therefore, the same
could already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People12 which states that funds
classified as savings are not considered appropriated by law or ordinance and can be used for other public
purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoro’s argument.
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran throughout the year.
Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project, leaving funds or goods
that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already distributed the food items needed by the SFP
beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom
constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of rice
or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods were no longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite
premature.
In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly apply funds,
already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available exclusively for the specific purpose
for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations
from one item to another. However, the local chief executive or the presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 192330
may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget for their respective offices
from savings in other items within the same expense class of their respective appropriations.
The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law gives the
Sanggunian the power to determine whether savings have accrued and to authorize the augmentation of other items
on the budget with those savings.
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of the subject goods,
such finding should be respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to present the municipal auditor
at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony would have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this
goes against the rule on the presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor testified, his testimony
would have been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditor’s view regarding the transaction is not conclusive to
the case and will not necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if it happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not,
therefore, be drawn into speculations regarding what the municipal auditor would have said had he appeared and
testified.
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP
beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting
department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he
cannot be convicted of the crime. 1âwphi1
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property
earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive
law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.13 It is the commission
of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.14
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of
technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere
fine.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
28228 dated February 8, 2010.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 192330
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated Acting Member, per Special Order 1299 dated August 28, 2012.
1
Records, p. 1.
2
Id. at 250.
3
Id. at 260-329.
4
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. — Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or
property under his administration to any public use other than for which such fund or property were
appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine
ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damages or
embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the
penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5 to
50 per cent of the sum misapplied.
5
Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, 274 Phil. 451, 460 (1991).
6
Records, pp. 258-259.
7
SEC. 318. Preparation of the Budget by the Local Chief Executive. – Upon receipt of the statements of
income and expenditures from the treasurer, the budget proposals of the heads of departments and offices,
and the estimates of income and budgetary ceilings from the local finance committee, the local chief
executive shall prepare the executive budget for the ensuing fiscal year in accordance with the provisions of
this Title. The local chief executive shall submit the said executive budget to the sanggunian concerned not
later than the sixteenth (16th) of October of the current fiscal year. Failure to submit such budget on the date
prescribed herein shall subject the local chief executive to such criminal and administrative penalties as
provided for under this Code and other applicable laws. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 319. Legislative Authorization of the Budget. – On or before the end of the current fiscal year, the
sanggunian concerned shall enact, through an ordinance, the annual budget of the local government
unit for the ensuing fiscal year on the basis of the estimates of income and expenditures submitted by
the local chief executive.
8
Records, p. 254.
9
TSN, May 23, 2006, p. 15 (rollo, pp. 127-128) and TSN, August 2, 2007, pp. 15-16 (rollo, p. 130).
10
Guidelines on the Management of CRS Supported Supplemental Feeding Program Implemented by the
Local Government Units; Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, pp. 260-329.
11
Id. at 263.
12
495 Phil. 70 (2005).
13
FLORENZ REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS (2003 rev. ed), citing People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich.,
563, N.W. 371, 35 ALR.
14
Luciano v. Estrella, 145 Phil. 454, 464-465 (1970).
9/9/2019 ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL PRESIDED OVER BY JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO
161 Phil. 397
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-30576, February 10, 1976 ]
ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN AND MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN,

PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BRANCH X)
PRESIDED OVER BY HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court, dated June 27,
1968, dismissing petitioners' petition to adopt the minor, Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan. It seeks to have the findings and conclusions of law contained in the decision
annulled and revoked and to declare the petition for adoption meritorious and the
child sought to be adopted, the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, declared the
child by adoption and heir of herein petitioners-appellants, Robin Francis Radley
[1]
Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen.
Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are husband
and wife, the former a British national residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years
and the latter an American citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines. Having no
children of their own but having previously adopted another child, said spouses filed a
petition with respondent court (Sp. Proc. No. 5457) for the adoption of a child
previously baptized and named by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. The
petition is filed and denominated as Sp. Proc. No. 5457.
In the decision rendered by respondent Court dated June 27, 1968, the petition for
adoption was dismissed.[2]
The principal reason given for the dismissal of the petition was that "* * * the consent
given in this petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express
[3]
requirement of the law".
Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c54b4 1/8
"Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of the following to
the adoption shall be necessary:
********
2. The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.
"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in
mandatory terms by the word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the
persons who will give the consent to the adoption in the order as follows:
parents, guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted.
"It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of the mother
who gave her the child. This being the case, the proper person who is supposed to
give the parental consent to the adoption should first be, in the order of
[4]
preference, the parent or the mother herself."
On the allegation of petitioners that their principal witness, Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez, under whose care the newlyborn child was entrusted by the unwedded
mother, could not reveal the identity of the mother because would violate the
privileged communications between the attorney and client, respondent Judge
explained: "The contention that for her (Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the witness
for the petitioners who gave the written consent to the adoption of the child in her
capacity as loco parentis to said child) to reveal the identity of the mother would be
violative of the client-attorney relationship existing between her and the mother
cannot hold water, because in the first place, there was no such relationship existing
between them in so far as this case is concerned and secondly, it is not only a question
of revealing the identity of the mother but rather, of giving consent to the adoption by
that alleged unwed mother."[5]
Taking exception to respondent Judge's decision and the ratio decidendi thereof,
[6]
appellants-petitioners alleged the following as errors committed by the trial court:
1) The inviolability of privileged communication between attorney and client is

only binding upon the attorney in the same case where such relationship of
attorney and client arose when the client imparted the privileged communication
and that elsewhere or in another case the attorney is not bound to the secrecy;
2) The infant that was given away by the natural mother, even without the latter
providing for the child's maintenance and support, could not be considered as
abandoned;
3) The stranger who received the baby or child, in this case, Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez, could not be considered as the guardian de facto and in loco
parentis of the child, and therefore, is not empowered by law to give written
consent to the adoption;
4) That whenever and as long as the natural mother is known to anybody, only
said natural mother can give the written consent to the adoption;
5) That the term "person in charge of the person to be adopted", one of those
who can give consent to the adoption under Article 340 of the Civil Code, means
or refers to institutions or orphanages established for the purpose of rearing
orphans, foundlings and destitute children.
The facts of this case are few and simple.

[7]
a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3 days old) was given
to petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for
them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as
Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the aforementioned espouses appearing in the
[8]
records of said baptism as the parents of said child;
b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant from the
child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity
because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother
instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will
adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the maintenance and support of her
child;[9]
c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty. Corazon
de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the
[10]
adoption petition, gave the written consent required by law;
d) Learning from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez that the
natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the court then pressed
upon the witness to reveal the identity of said mother. The witness refused to divulge
the same on the ground that there existed an attorney and client relationship between
them. She had been instructed by her client not to reveal the latter's identity. She
could not now violate such privileged communication.[11]
On the other hand, the Rules of Court (Rule 99) has this to say on those who are
required to give consent in adoption:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and
not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known
living parents who is not an insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian,
or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan
asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or
officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is
illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption
shall not be required.
After examining the facts and the arguments presented, it appears to this Court that
there is only one principal issue involved, i.e., whether or not the person who gave the
consent for adoption, which in this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the
proper person required by law to give such consent.
The law applicable is Art. 340 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 340. The written consent of the following to adoption shall be

necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;

(2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be
adopted.
Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly described by
law may be considered here as legally capable of giving the required written consent.
They are:
Under Art. 340 of the Civil Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge of the
person to be adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in Section 3, Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court, describing it as each of the known living parents "who has not
abandoned such child." The father's consent here is out of the question as the child is
illegitimate and unrecognized.
Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez) is assailed by the trial court as being unauthorized and had consequently
caused the rejection of the petition, this Tribunal will now look into her alleged
authority or lack thereof to give the controverted consent.
Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition, undisputedly
declared as only three days old then, was turned over by its mother to witness Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The natural and unwedded mother, from that date on to
the time of the adoption proceedings in court which started in mid-year of said 1967,
and up to the present, has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child,
much less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In short,
this parent is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is
not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child." We are
convinced that in fact said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her
child. This Court has previously declared that abandonment imports any conduct on
the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to
[12]
the child. Applying this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in
this case can be declared, as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child
with all legal consequences attached thereto.
Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent, there
appears to be no more legal need to require the written consent of such parent of the
child to the adoption. As had been said by this Court in the aforecited case of Santos
vs. Aranzanso, the parental consent required by the law in adoption proceedings
refers to parents who have not abandoned their child.[13] The question now is
whether or not Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed custodian of the
abandoned waif, may be considered as the guardian under Art. 340 or the person
standing in loco parentis of said infant contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code.
It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of
Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of someone who
could give it protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was
under no legal compulsion to accept the child and to extend to it the protection and
care it badly needed. Since there had been no showing that the identity of the natural
mother was made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said
mother seen fit to present herself before the court despite the public notice given to
the proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one person who could
be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child.
Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in
the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there
could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could,
with reason, be called the guardian of said infant. It was she who had actual physical
custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the
mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which otherwise could have
suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into some garbage heap as had often
happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies. The least this Court could do to
recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to extend, as it hereby
extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian exercising patria
potestas over the abandoned child.
The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal maxim
"Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered.
While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in
adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less
severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for
the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for
those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide
homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow
from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious social
problems, should be given the widest latitude of sympathy, encouragement and
assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument to impede the
achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully possible,
their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances for
human life to exist with a modicum promise of a useful and constructive existence.
The herein petitioners, the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy
Christensen, appear to be qualified to adopt the child. There is no showing that they
suffer from any of the disqualifications under the law. Above all, they have the means
to provide the child with the proper support, care, education and love that a growing
child needs, even if they have previously adopted another child as theirs. The fact that
even before they have applied for legal custody and adoption of the infant they have
already showered it with love and care and had it baptized, with them appearing in the
records of the baptism as the parents of the child, speaks well of the genuine desire of
petitioners to have the child as their very own. The child was born in May, 1967, and
he will be at this time, 1976, about 9 years of age. In all the years, from the time he was
turned over to the herein petitioners when he was only about a week old, (there is no
showing that the said child was ever placed at any time in the care and custody of
some other persons) he had been cared for and loved by the spouses Robin Francis
Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. He must have known no other parents
than these persons. If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this
Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses,
and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other
children who might be similarly situated. We consider it to be justifiable and more
humane to formalize a factual relation, that of parents and son, existing between the
herein petitioning spouses and the minor child baptized by them as Colin Berry
Christensen Duncan, than to sustain the hard, harsh and cruel interpretation of the
law that was done by the respondent court and Judge. It is Our view that it is in
consonance with the true spirit and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the
State, to uphold, encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of family
relations.
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing, the decision of the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in Sp. Proc. No. 5457, dated June 27, 1968,
is hereby annulled, and We declare that the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan is
the adopted child and the heir of petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria
Lucy Christensen. No Costs. So ordered.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Munoz Palma, and Martin, JJ., concur.
[1] Brief for Petitioners, p. 23; Rollo, p. 66.

[2]
Decision, Annex "A", Petition for Certiorari; Rollo, p. 24.
[3] Ibid, p. 8; Rollo, p. 31.
[4]
[4] Ibid, pp. 6-7.
[5]
Ibid, p. 7.
[6] Brief for Petitioners, Rollo, p. 66.
[7]
Petition for certiorari, p. 3; Rollo, p. 12.
[8] Ibid, p. 6.
[9]
Ibid, p. 7.
[10] Ibid, p. 7.
[11]
Ibid, p. 7; Petition for Certiorari, p. 3; Rollo, p. 12.
[12] Santos vs. Aranzanso, L-23828, Feb. 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 344.
[13]
Ibid.
9/9/2019 CARLOS ALONZO v. IAC
EN BANC
[ GR No. 72873, May 28, 1987 ]
CARLOS ALONZO v. IAC
DECISION
234 Phil. 267
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether
we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do
we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The
answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We
apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our
Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry
of Deeds of Tarlac.[1]
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share to
[2]
the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. One year
later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same
vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of
[3]
P440.00.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two?fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent,
their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the
enclosed area.[4]
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the
area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared
[5]
that he was an American citizen. On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c6d45 1/7
co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her
brother.[6]
The trial court* also dismisses this complaint, now on the ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963
and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of
[7]
the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied.
The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of
only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners.[8] Eustaquia
herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla,
who later claimed redemption.[9] Moreover, the petitioners and the private
respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together.
[10]
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they
thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was
impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection
thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was
done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and
application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the
petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code,
providing as follows:
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by the vendor."
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court* declared that the notice required by
the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
[11]
substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals applied by the
trial court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in
Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was
required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing
the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption
would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e.,
the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he
declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running."
In the earlier decision of Butte v. Uy,[12] the Court, speaking through the same
learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and
not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as
follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co?owners excludes that of the adjoining owners."
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately
selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed
exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would
not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard
cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that
there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly
applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in
view of such deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had not begun to run, much
less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the
word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."[13] While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have
the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature.
While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have
the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the
letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's will.
"The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence,
a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the
spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that
which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated
differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers."[14]
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is
properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is
really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin,
to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was
invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint
was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years
after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a
decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the
period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written,
would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice
although it was not in writing, would there be any question that the 30-day period for
redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense
that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964.
By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the
law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers
and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963
and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in
1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the
sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired.
This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of
the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words,
when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been ex-
tinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
"While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an
alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which
he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced
inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon
inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the
[15]
same as if he had known the facts."
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo,
who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build
thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet,
given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire,
to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before
one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict
letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to
reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this
should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and
Butte doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general
rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began
and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
[16]
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we
have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.
[1]
[1] Rollo, p. 5.
[2]
Ibid., p. 6.
[3] Id., p. 64.
[4]
id.
[5] id., p. 21.
[6]
id., p. 21.
* Presided by Judge Cezar D. Francisco
[7]
id., p. 65.
[8] id., p. 5.
[9]
id., p. 64
[10] id., p. 26.
* Gaviola, Jr., P.J., ponente, Caguioa, Quetulio-Losa & Luciano, JJ.

[11] 16 SCRA 775.
[12]
4 SCRA 527.
[13] Dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438.
[14]
Statutory Construction, Ruben E. Agpalo, pp. 64-65, 1986, citing Manila Race
Horse Trainers' Assn. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60; Go Chi v. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622;
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315;
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 26 SCRA 578; People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542; US v. Go
Chico, 14 Phil. 128.
[15] Ater v. Smith, 245 III. 57, 19 Am. Cases 105.
[16]
Institutes 1, 1, pr. as cited in Handbook for Roman Law, Miravite, Lorenzo F., p.
39, 1981.
9/9/2019 EULOGIO R. LERUM v. ROMAN A. CRUZ
[ GR No. L-2783, Nov 29, 1950 ]
EULOGIO R. LERUM v. ROMAN A. CRUZ
DECISION
87 Phil. 652
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City)
dismissing the petition for declaratory relief filed by attorneys Eulogio R. Lerum and
G. Viola Fernando as private prosecutors in behalf of the People of the Philippines for
the purpose of testing the sufficiency and probative value of the testimony of former
Judge Roman A. Cruz to prove a decree of divorce issued by him while a judge of First
Instance of Manila sometime in 1944.
It appears that a case for bigamy was filed against Nello Y. Roa in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Case No. 962). In the course of the trial held in June 16 and 30,
1948, former Judge Roman A. Cruz was placed on the witness stand by the defendant
to prove that his wife Elena Muñoz has already secured a decree of divorce against
him in July 1944. The prosecution objected to this move of the defendant, but the
objection was overruled, and so the prosecution filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition with this Court praying that the respondent judge be enjoined from
allowing the defendant to prove the alleged decree of divorce by oral evidence (G. R.
No. L-2340). The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Judge Roman Cruz then
was allowed to testify, and his testimony reads as follows:
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c3976 1/6
"Sr. Guanlao:
"P Conoce Ud. personalmente a Elena Munoz? R Si, señor.

"P Conoce Ud. personalmente a Nello Roa?
* * * * * * *
"P Porque dice Ud. que conoce a Elena Munoz? R La conozco porque fue
demandante en una causa de divorcio que se habia ventilado en una de las
salas que yo presidia entonces en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Manila durante mi incumbencla en 1944.
"Sr. Viola Fernando:
"Pido Su Señoria el descarte de esta parte del testimonio del- testigo por ser
incompetente y, ademas, es una conclusion.
"Juzgado:
"El testigo esta declarando sobre hechos de su conocimiento propio.
"Sr. Viola Fernando:
"Es una conclusion.
"Juzgado:
"El testimonio del Juez Cruz no puede considerarse como una prueba
secundaria, sino mas bien que vendria a ser como una prueba primaria o
principal, cuyo expediente surgio a rais de sus actuaciones oficiales como
Juez. (Steno. Notes, Transcript, pp. 4-7).
* * * * * * *
"Sr. Guanlao:
"P De su propio eonocimiento y segun su mejor recuerdo, se tramito ante

Ud. la causa de referenda?
* * * * * * *
"Juzgado:
"Se le pregunta si recuerda. * * *
"Juzgado:
"Eso incumbe al Juzgado. Puede contestar.

"R Si, señor. (Steno. Transcript Notes, p. 6.)
* * * * * * *
"Juzgado:
"Puede contestar.
"Testigo:
"Si, señor, Se ha tramitado ese asunto de divorcio durante mi incumbencia

en 1944, cuando presidia entonces una de las salas de Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila.
"P. Y cual fue el resultado de ese asunto de divorcio si Ud. recuerda? R Se
concedio el divorcio solicitado por la entonces demandante.
"P Sabe Ud. se el demandado apelo de esa decision? R No podia haber
apelado porque era un divorcio concedido mediante rebeldia.
"P Pero Ud. no esta seguro si el demandado apelo o no? R Que yo sepa, ni
sequiera peticion de reconsideracion se presento, ni que se hay dado cureo a
alguna apelacion. (Steno. Notes, Transcript, pp. 13-14, hereto attached as
Exhibit "A")." (Copied from G.R. No. L-2783, pp. 23-25, record on appeal).
The prosecution moved for the striking out of the above testimony of Judge Cruz, and
when the motion was denied, the prosecution again brought the case to this Court
through certiorari (G.R. No. L-2483), and again the petition was denied on the ground
that the respondent judge had power and authority to rule on the question raised
therein. After the steps taken by the prosecution to foil the attempt to prove the
alleged decree of divorce by oral evidence proved futile, the private prosecution filed
the present petition for declaratory relief.
It also appears that the petition was at first filed by City Attorney Jose P. Fernandez,
and by attorneys Eulogio R. Lerum and G. Viola Fernando as private prosecutors in
the bigamy case No. 9^2, but later, upon motion filed by City Attorney Fernandez, his
name was stricken out from the pleadings, and so an amended petition was filed
wherein attorneys Lerum and Viola Fernando appeared as the only petitioners
representing the People of the Philippines. It finally appears that attorneys Lerum and
Viola Fernando made an attempt to have the Solicitor General appear as counsel, but
this attempt was again ruled out on the ground that under the law the Solicitor
General can only be required to intervene when the validity of a statute is involved.
While the petitioners have assigned in their brief seven errors which are alleged to
have been committed by the lower court, we believe that the issues raised can be
boiled down into two, to wit, (1) whether petitioners have the necessary personality
and interest to file the petition under consideration; and (2) whether the subject
matter of the petition is among those that can be determined by way of declaratory
relief under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
1. The incident giving rise to the petition for declaratory relief arose in a criminal
case for bigamy instituted against one Nello Y. Roa. The information was filed by
City Attorney Jose P. Fernandez as required by the Rules of Court, and attorneys
Eulogio R. Lerum and G. Viola Fernando appeared as private prosecutors in
behalf of the offended party. The incident concerns the presentation of the oral
testimony of former Judge Roman A. Cruz to prove a decree of divorce issued by
him as Judge of First Instance of Manila in an effort to bring about the. acquittal
of the defendant. The interested party, therefore, in testing the sufficiency or
probative value of the aforesaid testimony is the People of the Philippines. In fact
it is the City Attorney who filed the two certiorari cases with this court in a vain
attempt to get a ruling on the matter. This being the case, the City Attorney
should be the one to ask for the declaratory relief if it is desired to have said
matter tested in court and if and when this step is feasible under the law. It
appears, however, that City Attorney Jose F. Fernandez has refused to join the
petitioners in filing the herein petition for declaratory relief as shown by his
attitude in asking that his name be stricken out from the pleadings. This attitude
is indicative that the government has no interest in prosecuting the petition, and
inasmuch as all criminal actions can only be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal and for that matter he is the only official who can represent
the People of the Philippines (sec. 4, Rule 106, of the Rules of Court; Herrero et
al. vs. Diaz, 42 Off. Oaz., 1166), it is evident that the petitioners herein, who as
private prosecutors can only intervene subject to the control of the City Attorney
(Herrero et al. vs. Diaz, id.), are not the proper parties to file the petition under
consideration.
2. Granting for the sake of argument that the petitioners herein can be considered
as parties in interest within the meaning of the statute, the next question to
determine is whether the subject matter which they want to be tested is among
those mentioned in section 1, rule 66, of the Rules of Court.
Under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring
an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." This
means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other
matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of
expressio unius est exclusslo alterius.
Now, does the subject matter under consideration come within the import of the rule?
The answer cannot but be in the "negative, for it does not refer to any written
instrument, statute or.ordinance. It merely refers to the sufficiency or probative value
of an oral evidence concerning a decree of divorce issued by a former judge, which the
court trying the bigamy case has ample power and authority to pass upon. This is not
the opportune moment to look into the correctness of the ruling of the court in said
bigamy case allowing the presentation of oral evidence to prove a decree of divorce
under the circumstances at present obtaining, for the bigamy case is still pending
determination. This will be determined in due time when properly presented before
this Court. For the purposes of this appeal, it suffices for this Court to declare that the
subject matter of the petition does not warrant the granting of declaratory relief
within the meaning of said Rule 66.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes,
and Jugo, JJ., concur.
9/9/2019 MARTIN CENTENO v. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS
DIVISION
[ GR No. 113092, Sep 01, 1994 ]
MARTIN CENTENO v. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS
DECISION
G.R. No. 113092
REGALADO, J.:
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their desire
to devote their remaining years to the service of their Creator by forming their own
civic organization for that purpose, should find themselves enmeshed in a criminal
case for making a solicitation from a community member allegedly without the
required permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of
a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay
launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together
with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and
solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was
made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
[1]
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was
filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente
Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law,
before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as
[2]
Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the
ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that
Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public
welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction
[3]
of a chapel. This was denied by the trial court, and petitioner's motion for
reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c7e8b [4] 1/9

On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment[4] finding accused
Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing
them to each pay a fine of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that
the accused be pardoned on the basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus
the fact that it believed that the latter should not have been criminally liable were it
not for the existence of Presidential Decree No. 1564 which the court opined it had the
duty to apply in the instant case.
Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 10. However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence
the case proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno. On May 21, 1993,
respondent nudge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but
modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act committed which
caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno to
suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000.00,
[5]
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The motion for
[6]
reconsideration of the decision was denied by the court.
Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the
judicial heirarchy eventually reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole
issue of whether solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial sanction is a nominal
imposition but, on a question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is
gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final adjudication.
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations
for contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the
term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute,
hence what the law does not include, it excludes; (2) penal laws are to be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to
State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an
abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the
Solicitation Permit Law), provides as follows:
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c7e8b 2/9
"Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit

or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first
secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services
and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the
filing of a written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional
Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development, the Regional
Director or his duly authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a
permanent or temporary permit or disapprove the application. In the interest of
the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under Act
4075."
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should
be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the
negative.
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in
the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
[7]
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat
the words "charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other.
Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28
(3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that "charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages x x x, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two
terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26
(e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross
income) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the
organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and Section 234 (b)
(exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code.
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious"
in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or
public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question
never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in
nature, since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions.
[8]
However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression
"charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is not
also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a
[9]
"charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term.
Although the term "charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a
broader term and includes matters which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is
a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the
two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done
[10]
away with by statute. The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is
capable of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses
from taxation, it has a very wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564
which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it would be
prejudicial to petitioners.
To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against
the taxpayer. However, there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for
"religious purposes" have been liberally construed as covered in the law granting tax
exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the term "charitable purposes," within
the meaning of a statute providing that the succession of any property passing to or
for the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be subject to
succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes.[11] A gift for "religious
purposes" was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption from
inheritance tax.[12]
On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the
concept of "charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree No. 1564 requires a
prior permit from the Department of Social Services and Development; under pain of
penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly,
the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for
"religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying

virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would
favor the accused.
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by
implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be
strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or
multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to
subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its
provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent
and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal
expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within
[13]
the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment.
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape
punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden
acts.[14] The word "charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise
definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is charitable must be
decided on its own, particular facts and circumstances.[15] The law does not operate
in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.
Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above,
the enumerations therein given which include the words "charitable" and "religious"
make use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a
disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or
propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the various members of
[16]
the enumeration are to be taken separately. Accordingly, "charitable" and
"religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive "or"
should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling
consideration why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made
applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized
under the law for, otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free
exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people
and, consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public
welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the regulatory powers of the State may,
to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that
such an activity is within the cloak of the free exercise clause under the right to
freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve
into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise of
this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be imposed
thereon.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere
to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot
be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen
form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The
freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a
[17]
permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience,
in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may
protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the
community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to
establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to
represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.[18]
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of
[19]
religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said
that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as
one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally
[20]
has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the
general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any
religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is
not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious
purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the
free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.[21]
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations
are carried on by persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the
guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public.
It is in fact amazing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to people
who manipulate them. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power
to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous
persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of
contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused
is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good
faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the
[22]
power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. The
objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper
charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the
[23]
raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. Some regulation of public
[24]
solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest.
To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by
the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor.
As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the
penalty imposed by the trial court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioner's
act which thereby caused damage to the complainant. It must be here emphasized that
the trial court, in the dispositive portion of its decision, even recommended executive
clemency in favor of petitioner and the other accused after finding that the latter acted
in good faith in making the solicitation from the complainant, an observation with
which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and difficult question of law
can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.
There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate,
impliedly or otherwise, that petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or
malevolently. This could be reflective upon her objectivity, considering that the
complainant in this case is herself a judge of the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan
City. It bears stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave at all times as
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c7e8b [2 ] 7/9
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,[25]

should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence, and must resist
any pressure from whatever source.[26]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Puno, J., concur.

Padilla, J., joins J. Mendoza in his separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., see separate concurring opinion.
[1] Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 25.

[2]
Annex B, id.; ibid., 20.
[3] Annex D, id.; ibid., 34.
[4]
Annex G, id.; ibid., 40.
[5] Annex H, id.; ibid., 44.
[6]
Annex J, id.; ibid., 64.
[7] Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 48886-88,
July 21, 1993, 224 SCRA 665.
[8]
Scobey vs. Beckman, 41 N.E. 2d 84.
[9] See Adye vs. Smith, 26 Am. Rep. 424.
[10]
See Read vs. McLean, 200 So. 109.
[11] In re Seaman's Estate, 139 N.E. 2d 17.
[12]
In re Clark's Estate, 159 A. 500.
[13] Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., 183.
[14]
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et el., G.R. No. 69809, October 16,
1986, 145 SCRA 112.
[1 ]
[15] Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc. vs. Board, 402 P. ed 802.
[16]
Martin, op. cit., 81.
[17] Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 296 (1940).
[18]
Id., loc. cit.
[19] 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, 283.
[20]
Ibid., id., 282.
[21] Cantwell vs. Connecticut, supra.
[22]
Id., loc. cit.
[23] City of Seattle vs. Rogers, 106 P. 2d 598.
[24]
Commonwealth vs. Creighton, et al., 170 A. 720.
[25] Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[26]
Rule 1.03. id.
9/9/2019 LYDIA O. CHUA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
EN BANC
[ GR No. 88979, Feb 07, 1992 ]
LYDIA O. CHUA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
DECISION
G.R. No. 88979
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act
No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early
retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits
are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
"Sec. 2. Coverage. - This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of
the National Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service
as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this
Act."
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered
separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of
service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service
Commission yielded negative results.[1] Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April
1989 pleaded thus:
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c74fc 1/15
x x x
"With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of

RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law
merely requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary,
emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government service
in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons
who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget
needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will
shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government
corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects are entitled to
the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There
is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
[2]
x x x"
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
emphasized:
"x x x
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of
Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an
applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the
date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual
employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your

separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is
contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.
[3]
x x x"
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for
certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No.
6683. Her arguments:
"It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23
(sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of
R.A. No. 6683, provides that:
'2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific
activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force,
Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the
Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC--INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the
service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with
pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, as
amended, or vice-versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law
and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation
from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that
if such officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the
availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or
cleared of all charges and their application accepted and approved by the head of
office concerned.'
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of
them. Ms. Chua is as full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits
provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. x
x x If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with
more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous
service in the government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficent (sic)
[4]
purpose of the law."
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's
exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers
kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was
issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP),
Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as
of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included
in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807)
which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand,
retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career
personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance.
Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure
is available only for the term of office (i.e. duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or
retirement benefits but reorganization[5] to streamline government functions. The
application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was
enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it
will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only
for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no
necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary
separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing
the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span.[6]
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned

or controlled corporations with original charters and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties,
the Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public
sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended)
deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D. No. 807 (promulgated on 6
October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 - R.A. No. 2260) or in
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 Promulgated on 25 July
1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class
of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is
employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as
follows:
1. permanent - one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to
which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act
and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof;[7]
2. temporary - In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the
public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except
the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment
shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a
[8]
qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
"(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an

appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature;
these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities,
and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant

Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of
whom are appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are
appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the
Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall
maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether

performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the
non-career service; and
[9]
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled."
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
"x x x (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project
for which purpose employment was made."
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office
and their personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in

accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and
performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility
with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
[10]
5. emergency and seasonal personnel."
There is another type of non-career employee:
"Casual - where and when employment is not permanent but occasional,

unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70;
Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)"
Consider petitioner's record of service:
"Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a

laborer holding emergency status with the NIA - Upper Pampanga River Project,
[11]
R & R Division. From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research
aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31
December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III, R & R Division, then on 1 January
1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River
Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA-
W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the
status of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was
changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981, starting 9 July 1982, the
status became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December
[12]
1988. The appointment paper attached to the OSG's comment lists her status
as co-terminus with the Project."
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign - assisted projects is

considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of
the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
of government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987 provides:
"WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil
Service Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable
services for retiring officers and employees of the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all
previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved
appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services,
while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered on contractual,
emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some

contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or
appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual,

emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment
therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the
following conditions: (underscoring provided)
'1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or
other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary
proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the
effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and
fulfill the service requirement for retirement."'
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal,
project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no
[13]
fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial
characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA project
which in turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-
terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April
1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee -
"(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is
characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to
his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:
'a) co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to
the availability of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with
the tenure of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent - when appointment is co-existent with the

appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of
the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. 'co-terminous for a period of 3 years' the
appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is
deemed abolished.'
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classification (c) and (d), what is
termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further,
in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his
incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period."
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency

employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the
Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683
expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed
personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific
enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and
confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned[14] or casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est - A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally.[15] Yet adherence to these legal maxims can
result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
[16]
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., comes to mind where, workers
belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another
were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a
span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be
assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws."
"x x x In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
[17]
applies only to those who belong to the same class."
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the
equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits
of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly
situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary
implication which holds that:
"No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future.
So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may
be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser,
expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus."[18]
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law),
in response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university
employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or
[19]
three (3) years, he explained:
"This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and
voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the
appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered."
It will be noted that, presently pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a
proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the
submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil
servants, Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:
"Sec. 3. Coverage. - It will cover all employees of the national government,

including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel
of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply
to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
government service as of the date of separation. The term 'contractual
employees' as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by
agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with
definite expected output.
"Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of

the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act." (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the
bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary
retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the
petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and
separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is
considered expired, the office functus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual
personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years
of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that
co-terminous or project employment is inherently short?lived, temporary and
transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here,
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because
casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early
retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the
bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees
(casuals) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of

permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of
excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made
thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of
continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as
long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as
they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act
[20]
No. 6850, requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an
aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need not be
continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual,
emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous, including military and police
[21]
service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. A similar
regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-
terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the
coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-
[22]
being of public servants." After all, co-terminous personnel are also obligated to
the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the
general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and
CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683
is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give
allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the
assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be
granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years - the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioners
application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with
the pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Nocon, JJ.,concur.
[1] Letter of Commissioner Samilo Borlongay, 17 March 1989.

[2]
Annex "E", Rollo, p. 13
[3] Annex "F", Rollo, p. 14
[4]
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[5] AN ACT PROVIDING BENEFITS FOR EARLY RETIREMENT AND VOLUNTARY
SEPARATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AS WELL AS INVOLUNTARY
SEPARATION OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO
VARIOUS EXECUTIVE ORDERS AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[6]
See Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, 12 December 1988, Rollo, p. 61.
[7] Sec. 25, a and b, P.D. No. 807; see also CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, S. of
1991, 5 April 1991.
[8]
Ibid., also Perez v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-48196-R, 11 July 1978; Ata v.
Namocatcat, G.R. No. L-35703, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 320.
[9] Executive Order No. 292, Section 7, 83 O.G. No. 39, 75 (September 1987)
[10]
Ibid, Section 9, p. 77
[11] Per Service Record, Rollo, p. 7.
[12]
Rollo, p. 70.
[13] Page 3, this decision.
[14]
See Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 161.
[15] People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 664
[16]
G.R. No. 54083, 28 February 1983, 120 SCRA 910
[1 ]
[17] Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 17 February 1968
[18]
Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 118-119 citing In re Dick,
38 Phil. 41 (1918); City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No. L-37251, August 31, 1981, 107
SCRA 98; Escribano v. Ovila, G.R. No. L-30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245
(1978), also Go Chico v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923); Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. L-32560, October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 435 (1970); People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil.
679 (1957) and People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949).
[19] Deliberations House Bill No. 4942 - 8 March 1988, 6:30 p.m.
[20]
An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility Under Certain Conditions to Government
Employees Under Provisional or Temporary Status Who have rendered a Total of
Seven (7) Years of Efficient Service and for other Purposes.
[21] Rule 1, Sec. 2(c) as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 25, series of 1990, 21
May 1990
[22]
See Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.
9/9/2019 ENRIQUE D. MANABAT v. BERNABE DE AQUINO
[ GR No. L-5558, Apr 29, 1953 ]
ENRIQUE D. MANABAT v. BERNABE DE AQUINO
DECISION
92 Phil. 1025
BENGZON, J.:
The case: This is a petition for mandamus to require the respondent judge of first
instance to give due course to, and hear the petitioners' appeal from the decision of a
justice of the peace which he dismissed believing it had not been perfected in due
time.
The facts: Sued on a promissory note in the peace court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Enrique S.
Manabat and his wife, denied liability, alleging usury. Having failed to appear and
present evidence at the hearing, they were ordered to pay the amount of P1,261.74
plus interest, upon the proofs introduced by the plaintiffs, Alejandra L. de Roxas and
her husband Claudio Roxas.
Notified of the decision on September 7, 1951, the Manabats sent on September 22,
1951 their notice of appeal by registered mail together with a postal money order
payable to the justice of the peace for P16 as docket fees and a surety bond in the sum
of P30 as appeal bond. These papers were actually received at the peace court of
Tarlac, Tarlac, on September 24, 1951.
Forwarded to the court of first instance, the appeal was docketed as civil case No.
638. Subsequently, however, the Roxas couple submitted a motion to dismiss the
appeal of the Manabats on the grounds: (a) that the appeal documents had been
received by the inferior court of Tarlac, on September 24, i.e., two days after the
expiration of the time prescribed by law for appeals from that court and (b) because
the appeal was frivolous, interposed obviously for delay.
Noting that the 15-day period expired on September 22, and that the appeal papers
were actually received on September 24, the judge of first instance declared the appeal
was late and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. He expressly refused to apply
Section 1 Rule 27 of the Rules of Court on which the Manabats relied to sustain the
timeliness of their move. That section provides that "the date of the mailing" of the
court papers "as shown by the post-office registry receipt shall be considered as the
date of their filing" in court. His honor opined that his section does not regulate
inferior courts, since it is found only among rules governing courts of first instance,
and unlike other rules, it is not extended to inferior courts and therefore excluded by
section 19 Rule 4, which for convenience is quoted hereunder:
"Sec. 19. Application of certain rules. Rules 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 28, 29, 30, and 39
are applicable in inferior courts in cases falling within their jurisdictions and in
so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this rule."
Hence this petition for mandamus, appeal being inadequate, because the defendants
in the case, (petitioners herein) have not introduced evidence.
The question is whether the appeal had been perfected within fifteen days as required
by Section 2 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. If it was, this petition should be granted.
[1] Otherwise it will be denied. That question, in turn, depends upon the issue
whether the appeal papers are deemed filed in court on September 22 when they were
deposited in the mails by registered mail, or on September 24 when they were
actually received. If the first, the appeal was timely; otherwise it was belated.
Discussion: If section 1 Rule 27 is applied, the appeal papers would be deemed filed
on September 22, and therefore the appeal would have been seasonably perfected.
His Honor, however, and the other respondents, maintain that Rule 27 is not
applicable because it is not mentioned in Section 19 Rule 4 hereinbefore quoted, and
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, enumeration of certain rules, excludes others.
That legal maxim is well-known, and respondents' position seems at first blush
tenable. But the maxim is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be
ignored where other circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended to be
exclusive.
Now, if section 19, Rule 4 is exclusive, justices of the peace may disregard, (a) the
principles of evidence prescribed in Rule 123, (b) Rule 131 as to costs and (c) the
fundamental principles about splitting or joinder of causes of action in Rule 2, and the
theories about parties in interest, necessary parties, married women etc. in Rule 3.
These undesirable consequences could not have been overlooked by the farmers of the
Rules. They could not have intended, therefore, to make the enumeration in section
19 Rule 4 as all-inclusive and exclusive.
As a matter of fact this Court applied to litigations in inferior courts Rules other than
those enumerated in Rule 4, section 19. Thus in Viola Fernando vs. Aragon,[*] 43 Off.
Gaz., 145 we applied Rule 17 to a municipal court saying "Although Rule 17 has not
been make applicable to justice of the peace courts, such omission (from the
enumeration in section 19 Rule 4), can not be interpreted as a prohibition to apply it."
In Beltran vs. Cabrera (73 Phil., 666), Rule 124 was considered applicable to the
Manila municipal court.
In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil., 672), Rules 8, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, and the appendix of
forms after Rule 133 were deemed binding on inferior courts, over the objection that
they were excluded by section 19 Rule 4.
Consequently, there can be no legal obstacle to the application of Rule 27 section 1 to

the justice of the peace court of Tarlac. And it should be applied, to uphold the
uniform principle that "the date of deposit in the post-office by registered mail" of
court papers is "the date of filing" not only in the Supreme Court, the appellate court,
and the superior courts but also in inferior courts. Uniformity of rules is to be desired
to simplify procedure (Cf. Henning vs. Western Equipment, 62 Phil., 886).
Conclusion: Hence, this Court's opinion is that the Manabats appealed on time.
The Roxas spouses interpose here two other points: (a) instead of delivering a
certificate of the municipal treasurer showing deposit of the docket fees, the Manabats
sent only a postal money order payable to the justice of the peace; and (b) the appeal
was unmeritorious and merely for delay.
The first objection was not raised in the court of first instance, wherein the time of the
appeal-not the form-was discussed. Any way there was substantial compliance of the
deposit requirement.[²]
The second point was ignored by the respondent judge. Rightly, we believe, because
at this stage we are not prepared to deprive the Manabats of their day in court, usury
being contrary to the policies of our system of legislation.
Judgment: Wherefore, the writ will be issued for the respondent judge to hear and
thereafter decide the appeal interposed by herein petitioners. Costs against the
Roxases. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and
Labrador, JJ., concur.
[1] Go Kim Cham vs. Valdez, 42 Off. Gaz., 1515; 75 Phil., 113, 371.
[*] 76 Phil., 609.
[2] Cf. National Bank vs. National City Bank, 63 Phil., 715.
9/9/2019 JOSE ESCRIBANO v. DAVID P. AVILA
EN BANC
[ GR No. L-30375, Sep 12, 1978 ]
JOSE ESCRIBANO v. DAVID P. AVILA
DECISION
174 Phil. 490
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to conduct the
preliminary investigation of a complaint for written defamation.
On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect of
Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that province (now North
Cotabato) a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong, Cotabato
(now the province of Sultan Kudarat). The complaint was subscribed and sworn to
before respondent Judge David P. Avila. It was supported by the affidavit of Acting
Governor Simeon Datumanong.
In that complaint Escribano was charged with having said in a speech, which was
broadcasted on August 26, 1968 by a radio station at Cotabato City, that "Mr.
Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live (lived) in this province" (Criminal Case
No. 5283).
Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation
of the offense. Judge Avila in his orders of March 5, 20 and 27, 1969 ruled that he had
the power to conduct the preliminary investigation. He received complainant's
evidence.
On April 1, 1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the
instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, praying that the said orders
of Judge Avila be set aside. The respondents were required to answer the petition. No
restraining order was issued.
On April 18 Escribano filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila's order of
March 29, 1969. In that order he found that Pendatun's evidence had "established a
probable cause to believe that "libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c5d0d 1/14
"probably committed the same." Judge Avila ordered the arrest of Escribano, fixed the
bail at three thousand pesos, and referred the case to the city fiscal of Cotabato for the
filing of the corresponding information. A warrant of arrest was issued on March 31.
Sometime before April 16 the city fiscal filed an information for libel against
Escribano.
On August 10, 1970 this Court issued a resolution restraining Judge Avila from
proceeding with the arraignment of Escribano.
The issue is whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority
to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of
radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney
of that city.
Petitioner Escribano, in support of his contention that the city fiscal of Cotabato is the
only functionary empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation of the libel
charge, invokes the following provisions of the charter of Cotabato City, Republic Act
No. 2364, as amended by Republic Act No. 3332:
"SEC. 23. The city attorney His compensation, powers and duties.- The
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred nine to the contrary
notwithstanding, the city shall have an attorney who shall be the chief legal
adviser of the city. x x x. The city attorney shall have the following powers and
duties:
xxx xxx xxx
''(f) He shall investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of

laws and city ordinances and prepare the necessary informations or make the
necessary complaints against the persons accused. x x x.
"(g) He shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of laws and city ordinances triable in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, and the municipal court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in
respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals."
He cites the ruling in Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859; Montelibano vs. Ferrer
and Benares, 97 Phil. 228, and Guerrero vs. Ferrer, 106 Phil. 1163, that in chartered
cities the city fiscal has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
He also invokes the following provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
which were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, approved on June 19, 1965, and which
do not empower the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of
written defamations:
"Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as

provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of
the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the
province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions
of this article."
On the other hand, complainant Pendatun and respondent Judge rely on section 13,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court to support their view that the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato could conduct the preliminary investigation:
''SEC. 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court
of First Instance. - Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance,
without previous preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the
fiscal, the judge referred thereof shall either refer the complaint to the municipal
judge referred to in the second paragraph of section 2 hereof for preliminary
examination and investigation, or himself conduct both preliminary examination
and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding
sections, and should he find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has
committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and
thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding
information."
Was it intended by Republic Act No. 4363, in specifying that the preliminary
investigation of criminal actions for written defamations may be conducted by the
provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or the municipal court of the city or
capital of the province, where the criminal action may be filed, to exclude the Court of
First Instance from conducting such preliminary investigation and to entrust that
power exclusively to those fiscals and courts? (Libel by means of radio is a written
defamation under article 355 of the Revised Penal Code).
As admitted by the petitioner, the purpose of the amendment is to prevent the
complainants in written defamation cases from harassing the accused by means of
out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Time,
Inc. vs. Reyes, L-28882, May31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311; p. 11, Memorandum, p. 113,
Rollo).
The rule is that in construing a statute the mischief intended to be removed or
suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment of a law are important
factors to be considered in its construction (2 Sutherland on Statutory Construction,
885-886, cited in Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil.
131, 145).
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the enumeration in the amendatory law of the
public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of
complaints for written defamation was designed to divest the ordinary municipal
court of that power but not to deprive the proper Court of First Instance of that same
power.
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil
actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published,
displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or
composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that
may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be
instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed (People vs. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under
that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant
place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippines
Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with
libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec vs. De
Guzman, 93 Phil. 933). To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 laid
down the following rules on the venue of the criminal and civil actions in written
defamations:[*]
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense
was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue
is the province or the city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a
public officer or a private person, he has always the option to file the action in the
Court of First instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or
first published.
Congress did not confine the amendatory law to laying down the guidelines for the
venue of criminal and civil actions. Since, as already noted, its purpose is to minimize
the filing in municipal courts of out-of-town libel suits, the lawmaking body, in order
to attain that objective, deprived the ordinary municipal courts of the power to
conduct the preliminary investigation of a criminal action for written defamation.
In other words, the amendment contains not only the rules limiting the venue of the
criminal and civil actions to the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
the libelous matter is printed and first published, or where the offended party held
office or resided at the time the libel was committed, but it also specifies that the
preliminary investigation should be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the
province or city or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where
the action may be instituted. (See People and Navarro vs. Hechanova, L-26459,
November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 101).
It should be repeated that the amendment, in specifying those who may conduct the
preliminary investigation, deprived the ordinary municipal court of that power in
cases of written defamations. And it should be recalled that the power of the ordinary
municipal court to conduct such preliminary investigations under the old law
facilitated the filing of libel cases in remote municipal courts and the consequent
harassment of the accused.
That purpose of the amendment has nothing to do with the power of the Court of First
Instance to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases cognizable by it. To
retain that power of the Court of First Instance would in a way be an implementation
of the purpose of the amendment, which is to prevent complainants from harassing
and embarrassing the accused with libel suits in distant municipalities.
Therefore, it can be stated without fear of successful contradiction that the lawmaking
body, by means of that amendment, never intended to take away the jurisdiction of
the proper Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases.
The amendment merely sought to strip the ordinary municipal court (not the
municipal court of the provincial capital or the city court) of its power to hold a
preliminary investigation of written defamations.
The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in article 360 as a tribunal
that may conduct the preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest
that it cannot conduct such preliminary investigation, following the maxim inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or
the enumeration of particular things excludes the idea of something else not
mentioned, applied in Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18; De la Rosa vs. Revita Santos, 10
Phil. 148, 149; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Tavora vs. Gavina, 79 Phil. 421, 435; In
re Guzman, 73 Phil. 51; In re Estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil. 167; Weigall vs.
Shuster, 11 Phil. 340, 357; Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, 94 Phil. 949, 953;
Gomez vs. Ventura, 54 Phil. 726; Mendenilla vs. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534, 539; Canlas
and Manila Pencil Co. vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 712, 716; Lao Oh Kim vs. Reyes, 103
Phil. 1139).
Under that canon of legal hermeneutics, where a statute directs the performance of
certain acts by a particular person or class of persons, it implies that it shall not be
done otherwise or by a different person or class of persons (82 C.J.S. 667-668).
That maxim is not a rule of law. It is just a tool of statutory construction or a means of
ascertaining the legislative intent. It is not of universal application and is not
conclusive. It cannot be used to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the lawmaking
body (82 C.J.S. 668). The maxim is inapplicable if there is some special reason for
mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within the
statute, so that the absence of any mention of such other will not exclude it (82 C.J.S.
670).
The maxim does not apply in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the
operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but
no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been
included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them (Springer vs.
Philippine Islands, 72 Law. ed. 845, 227 U.S. 189; People vs. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657,
668).
"The maxim is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where
other circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive"
(Manabat vs. De Aquino, 92 Phil. 1025, 1027).
The maxim cannot be applied in this case because, as shown above, the fact that the
Court of First Instance is not mentioned in the amendment, as being empowered to
conduct a preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do
with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law, the
court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be
remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law a reasonable or
liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat
it (82 C.J.S. 593).
It is reasonable to surmise that the Court of First Instance was not mentioned due to
inadvertence. That oversight is not unusual since preliminary investigations are
usually conducted by municipal courts and fiscals. In practice, a preliminary
investigation by the Court of First Instance is the exception, not the general rule.
In this connection, it is pertinent to cite the recent ruling that the power of the Court
of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the
constitutional provision that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
[3]
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" (Sec. 1 , Art. III, now Sec. 3, Art.
IV, 1973 Constitution; Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz, L-34038, June 18, 1976 and
five other cases, 71 SCRA 356).
Implicit in that provision is the constitutional grant of power to the judge to hold a
preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. That
which is plainly implied in the language of a law is as much a part of it as that which is
expressed (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45, 90). The term "judge" embraces a
judge of the Court of First Instance. Its coverage is not restricted to judges of inferior
courts.
The silence of article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to
conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations does
not preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation.
However, the exercise of that power is tied up with the rules on the venue of a criminal
action for written defamation. That power is lodged in the Court of First Instance of
the city or province where the libelous article was printed or first published or where
the offended party actually resided, or where the offended public official held office, at
the time of the commission of the offense.
Escribano's contention that in chartered cities the city fiscal has the exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigations is not correct. While section 23(f) of
the Charter of Cotabato City (Republic Act No. 2364) empowers its city attorney to
"investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city
ordinances and prepare the necessary informations or make the necessary complaints
against the persons accused", that power is not exclusive.
Section 78 of the same charter provides that the municipal or city court of Cotabato
City "may also conduct preliminary investigations for any offense, without regard to
the limits of punishments", a provision which is found in section 87 of the Judiciary
Law and in section 2, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
That same power is found in the last sentence of section 41 of Republic Act No. 409,
the Revised Charter of Manila, which took effect on June 18, 1949 or after Sayo vs.
Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859 was decided.
But that provision is not found in Commonwealth Act No. 326, the charter of Bacolod
City, under which Montelibano vs. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228 and Guerrero vs. Ferrer, 106
Phil. 1163 were decided, nor is it found in the old Manila charter contained in the
Revised Administrative Code.
Hence, in the Sayo, Montelibano and Guerrero cases, it was held that the city court
could not conduct preliminary investigations. (See Callanta vs. Villanueva, L-24646
and L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377).
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, C.J., Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Fernando, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., dissents on the ground that it is his firm conviction that court of first
instance have no power to conduct preliminary investigations as he explained in his
separate opinion in Villaluz, 71 SCRA 412-425.
Makasiar, J., concur in so far as the opinion is connected with ruling in the Villaluz
case (71 SCRA 356)
Concepcion, Jr., J., no part.
[*]
ART. 360. Persons responsible.- x x x
xxx xxx xxx
"The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense:
"Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
published:
"Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the
criminal action is filed and vice versa:
"Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:
''And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written
defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the
time of the effectivity of this law."
-o-
EXPLANATORY NOTE
For the Bill Which Became Republic Act No. 4363.
"The accompanying measure proposes to amend Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1289.
"This Article provides that the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance
of the province or city where any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides
at the time of the commission of the offense; and that where the libel is published,
circulated, displayed, or exhibited in a province or city wherein neither the offender
nor the offended party resides, the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the
court of first instance thereof.
"Under the present law, an alleged offender can be easily subjected to hardships,
inconveniences and harassments because the criminal complaint may be filed in a
very remote place so long as there is proper venue. This provision is wholly
responsible for many out-of-town libel suits. The attached bill proposes to minimize
or limit the filing of out-of-town libel suits by providing that the complaint may be
filed only in the proper court of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
"Furthermore, this bill seeks to provide the venue for the complaint in cases of written
defamations where one of the offended parties is a public officer. This proposal is very
necessary in the interest of public service.
"While the present law provides that the criminal complaint for written defamations
may be filed with the proper court where the accused or the offended party resides at
the time of the commission of the offense, the term 'residence' is vague in the sense
that it may refer to 'legal residence' or the place where the person actually lives. This
term is clarified in the proposed bill as referring to physical or actual residence. The
law should be clear on this point to avoid delays in its enforcement or implementation
arising from certain technicalities.
"Consistent with the purpose of preventing out-of-town libel suits, this bill also
proposes to vest only certain officers, judicial or otherwise, with the power of
conducting preliminary investigations in complaints for defamation. Like venue, this
proposal will prevent the filing of criminal complaints for defamation in far-flung
municipalities which are practically inaccessible to the accused.
"Obscurities in the law should be removed, more particularly in penal laws where the
liberty of an individual is always involved. A defective law which may cause undue
hardships for persons against whom it is enforced should be corrected immediately.
This is the case of our libel law. It has been resorted to most often to harass certain
individuals and this harassment occurs because of the defects in the law.
"In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
"(Sgd.) INOCENCIO V. FERRER
Congressman, Second District
Negros Occidental"
(Congressional Record dated May 20, 1965, pp. 424-425).
CONCURRING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
I concur in the dismissal of the petition. The mere nonmention of judges of the Court
of First Instance as among those authorized to conduct preliminary investigations of
criminal actions for written defamation under R.A. 4363 (which amended Art. 360 of
the revised Penal Code so as to provide a more restricted venue for criminal and civil
actions for damages in cases of written defamation under said Code) cannot be
construed to mean a withdrawal of the constitutional and statutory power of the Court
of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations.
[1]
As the Court held in Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz , "the power of the city
prosecutors to conduct preliminary examination and investigation (minus the
authority to issue warrants of arrest or search warrant) is purely statutory. On the
other hand, the judge derives his authority not only from the Rules of Court, but also -
and originally - from the fundamental law to which all other laws are subordinate. If
an objection must be raised, it should be against the authority of the fiscal to exercise
such power of preliminary investigation, which, as has been stated, is merely
statutory. No less than the Constitution confers upon the judge the power to conduct
such examination and investigation."
Aside from the provisions of Rule 112, section 13 of the Rules of Court, the statutory
power of judges of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations is
recognized and re-affirmed in Republic Act 5180, "An Act prescribing a uniform
system of preliminary investigation by provincial and city fiscals and their assistants,
and by state attorneys or their assistants"….."except when an investigation has been
conducted by a judge of first instance, city or municipal judge or other officer in
accordance with law and the Rules of Court of the Philippines."
While the aforesaid amendatory R.A. 4363 was enacted to minimize the filing in
municipal courts of out-of-town libel suits expressly for the purpose of preventing
harassment of the alleged offenders in written defamation cases through the filing of
such suits in remote towns, the said Act did not in law remove the general power of
the judges of such ordinary municipal courts of their power derived from the
Constitution, as well as from the statute and Rules of Court, to conduct preliminary
investigations. Rather, what was effected was a withdrawal of the venue and
jurisdiction over such cases from the ordinary municipal courts which was a valid
exercise of the power of Congress to define and allocate the jurisdiction of the various
lower courts.
The main opinion mentions in passing that "in the Sayo,[2] Montelibano[3] and
Guerrero[4] cases it was held that the city court could not conduct preliminary
investigations,"[5] thus giving the impression that the ruling in said cases that under
the charters of the cities of Manila and Bacolod the power to conduct preliminary
investigations is exclusively lodged in the city fiscal is still in force. I hold the view that
the city charter provisions of Manila and Bacolod (as well as of Quezon City[6] and
Cebu[7] for that matter) do not grant the city fiscal and his assistants sole authority to
conduct preliminary investigations for offenses committed within their respective
cities to the exclusion of the regular courts therein. Such city charter provisions, to my
mind, merely constitute the basis of the city fiscal's authority to conduct preliminary
investigations but do not serve to withdraw from the Courts of First Instance as well
as from the city courts therein their power to conduct preliminary examinations and
investigations.
I believe that this was the thrust of the Court's holding in Collector of Customs vs.
Villaluz, supra, that
"It is true that this COURT held expressly and impliedly that under the charters
of the cities of Manila, Bacolod and Cebu, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is exclusively lodged in the city prosecutor (Sayo vs. Chief of Police,
80 Phil. 859, 868-869, May 12, 1948; Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, 45 OG 196;
Montelibano vs. Ferrer, 97 Phil 228, June 23, 1955; and Balite vs. People, 18
SCRA 280, 285-286, Sept. 30, 1966). But the charters of the cities of Manila,
Bacolod and Cebu do not contain any provision making such grant of power to
city prosecutors exclusive of the courts (Kapunan, Criminal Procedure, 3rd
Edition, 1960), which cannot be deprived of such authority to conduct
preliminary examination because said prerogative of the courts emanates from
the Constitution itself. Unless the Constitution is amended the judge cannot be
divested of such a power, which is an essential element of the cardinal right of an
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the present city
charters conferred on city fiscals or city prosecutors the power to issue warrants
of arrest, it would be an unconstitutional grant of power under the 1935
Constitution. As heretofore intimated, the present practice or rule of court
authorizing the judge to issue warrants of arrest based on the preliminary
investigation conducted by the city fiscal, seems to violate the 1935 Constitution,
which requires the judge himself to conduct the preliminary examination.
Neither the judge nor the law can delegate such an authority to another public
officer without trenching upon this constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
"The theory that Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts Judges
cannot exercise the power of preliminary examination and investigation, and
that as a necessary consequence, they cannot also issue warrants of arrest,
obviously collides with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
"Moreover, the theory tolerates an unthinkable - because anomalous - situation

wherein the Court of First Instance and the Circuit Criminal Court must wait for
prosecutors and courts inferior to them to conduct the preliminary examination
and/or to issue the needed warrants of arrest before they could effectively
exercise their power to try and decide the cases falling under their respective
jurisdiction. This situation would make the Courts of First Instance and Circuit
Criminal Courts totally dependent upon state prosecutors and municipal courts,
which are inferior to them, for their proper functioning. The possibility that the
administration of criminal justice might stand still will not be very remote."[8]
Consequently, the rulings in the cited cases of Sayo, Montelibano, Guerrero and
other cases must be deemed to have been abandoned and it must be held now that as
a general rule and without exception, Courts of First Instance and city courts,
regardless of the provisions in their charters which grant the city fiscal authority to
also conduct preliminary investigations, must be deemed to have retained the power
of preliminary examination and investigation, which cannot be taken from them by
mere statute.
This is as a matter of strict power, since the function of the courts as we stressed in
Villaluz, supra, is the hearing and determination of cases in litigations before them.
Hence, as therein stated, pursuant to the Court's constitutional power of
administrative supervision over all courts[9], "Circuit Criminal Judges [as well as
Court of First Instance and City Court Judges], therefore, should not encumber
themselves with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints, which they should refer to the x x x provincial or city fiscal, who in turn
can utilize the assistant state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary examination and
investigation."[10]
9/9/2019 PEOPLE v. GUILLERMO MANANTAN
[ GR No. L-14129, Jul 31, 1962 ]
PEOPLE v. GUILLERMO MANANTAN
DECISION
115 Phil. 657
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and of the facts, as recited in the brief
of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here
adopted, to wit:
"In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of

First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with
a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary
investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause
that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial
started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one
of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower
court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace Is within
the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who
cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg, (C.A.-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held
that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of
the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution,
the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority
of the ruling in the case cited by the defense."
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c3cee 1/12
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of
law: Is a justice of the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
"No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or

employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any
candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a
peace officer."
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits that the
aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which provided the following:
"Sec, 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote." When,
therefore, Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the
peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justice of the
peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or
qualified by the phrase "of First Instance," while under Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, no such modifications exists. In other words, justices of the peace were
expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the
kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of
the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity anymore to include justice
of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more
generic and broader term, "judge" It was a term not modified by any word or phrase
and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First
Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in
this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a
public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. m.
Clark 25 Fed. Case. 441, 442). According to Bouvier, Law Dictionary, "a judge is a
public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its
most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated
questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors,
it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the
above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act No. 1582 enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and
1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No, 1709 has a relation to the
discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its
subsequent amendments were later on incorporated in Chapter 18 of the
Administrative Code. Under, the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were
made through the passage of Act Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3
amendments, only Act No. 3387 has pertinence to the case at bar as shall be show
later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 233 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which
was the law enforced until June 21, 1947, when the Revised Election Code was
approved. Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts
Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960, amended by
Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the following should
be noted:
Under Act,1582, Section 29, it was provided:
"No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be
eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election at any
municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position
which he may be holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace,
provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the
Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take
part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of
being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office
whatsoever for a term of 5 years: Provided, however, that the foregoing
provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the
right to vote at any election. (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January
15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
"* * *No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal or
officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence
in any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial or Assembly election.
Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office
or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment
whatever for a term of 6 years. Provided, however, that the foregoing1 provisions
shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified or the right to
vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15,
1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code
on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote." (Italics
supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This
Act reads:
"SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province,
any officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any
municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau or the classified civil
service, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this
section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or
by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all
cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage for a period of 5 years." (Approved, December 3, 1927.) (Italics
supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22,
1938. This law provided in Section 48:
"SEC. 48. Active intermentum of public officers and employees. No justice,
judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, the Constabulary of the National, provincial, municipal or rural police,
and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor
exert influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein, except to
vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer."
The last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or
history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word
"justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and
not in the present Code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however,
that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com.
Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which, preceded in the
enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words,
whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance," the
words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the
words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the
conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep.
Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it
had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional
records which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No.
357, which legislation, as indicated above, had eliminated for the first time the word
"justice of the peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper
and additional clarifications form these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the
conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently
borne out by reason and equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in
Section 54 inasmuch as under the said section, the word "judge" is modified or
qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant
submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a
province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained.
If it is true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace
from the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial
officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of
the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the
prohibition?" The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it
qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial
officers.
'The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the
defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable
to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been
intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case
under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or
omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging
in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the
new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just
called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-
appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has
more particular application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed
out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since
proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal
statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes,
defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
construction in order to give "Fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain
line is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes,
in McBoyle vs. U.S. 283, U.S. 25, L.Ed, 816.)
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that
a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the
present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission.
There has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor
controlling the interpretation of such laws instead, the rule merely serves as an
additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of
penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various courts. (3
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found
enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet,
215, U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to
defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. vs. U.S. 252 U.S. 159).
The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular
instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws,
Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:
"The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of
it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in
the sense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose." (U.S. vs.
Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal
statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations
inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. vs. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest
Brunchan, Interpretation of the Written Law [1915] 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the
purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations. judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were
not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If
such were the evident purpose, can the Legislature intend to eliminate the justice of
the peace within its orbit? Certainly not, this point is fully explained in the brief of the
Solicitor General, to wit:
"On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of the
First Instance" and "justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was
to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judge but all judges,
whether of first instance, justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of
the Court of Industrial Relations." * * *
"The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to
so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political
activities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand,
there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices of
the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with justice of the
appellate courts and judges of the Courts of First Instance, they are given
authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-
123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decide inclusion and
exclusion cases and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an
elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open
to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation." (pp. 7-
8, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that even the
administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the
purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Traquilino O. Calo, Jr. vs. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice; etc. (G.
R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside,
among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President
of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan.
It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the
fact that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions
of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was
filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of
the peace are already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active
political participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill,
Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the
peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed
amendment to Republic Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said
Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification
of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed
amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest
any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the
individual members of the legislature, even in debates, cannot be properly taken into
consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statuary
Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), fortiori what weight can we give to a mere draft
of a bill.
On law, reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justice of the
peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is
to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from
participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law
since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the
Revised Administrative Code. Another law which expressed the prohibition to them
was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both .the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the
rule of "expressio unius, est exchisio alterius". in arriving at the conclusion that
justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals:
"Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expresio unius est
exchisio alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of
omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. *
* *"
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the
peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals
has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
change. Hence, the rule of expresio unius est exclusio alterius has been erroneously
applied (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
"Where a statue appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to
particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why
other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and
manifest injustice will follow. by not so including them, the maxim expresio
unius est exclusio alterius, should not be invoked." (Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 p.
307, 22 Cal. App. 519.)
For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set
aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
RESOLUTION
August 30, 1962
REGALA, J.:
This resolution refers to a motion for reconsideration filed by the counsel for
defendant-appellee, Guillermo Manantan.
Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this Court's ruling in the main
case. He concedes that a justice of the peace is covered by the prohibition of Section
54, Revised Election Code. However, he takes exception to the dispositive portion of
this Court's ruling promulgated on July 31, 1952, which reads:
"For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should
be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits."
It is now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of remanding the
case to the lower court for trial on the merits is to place him twice in jeopardy of being
tried for the same offense. He calls the attention of this Court to the fact that when the
charge against him was dismissed by the lower court, jeopardy had already attached to
his person. To support his claim,. he cites the case of People vs. Labatete, 107 Phil.,
697.
Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The accused cannot
now invoke the defense of double jeopardy. When the government appealed to this
Court the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could have raised that issue by way
of resisting the appeal of the state. Then again, when defendant-appellee filed his
brief, he could have argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. Yet, on neither
occasion did he do so. He must, therefore, be deemed to have waived his
constitutional right thereunder. This is in accord with this Court's ruling in the cases
of People vs. Rosalina Casiano, 111 Phil., 64; and People vs. Finuila, 103 Phil., 992;
hereunder quoted:
"* * * defendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a discussion of
the merits of the appeal. Thus, she not only failed to question, in her brief, either
expressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution to interpose the present appeal,
but, also, conceded in effect the existence of such right. She should be deemed,
therefore, to have waived her aforementioned constitutional immunity.
It is true that in People vs. Hernandez (94 Phil., 49; 49 Off. Gaz., 5342), People vs.
Ferrer, L-9072 (October 23, 1956), People vs. Bao, 106 Phil., 243; 56 Off. Gaz. (51)
7768 and People vs. Golez, 108 Phil., 855; 59 Off. Gaz. (3) 388 we dismissed the
appeal taken by the Government from a decision or order of a lower court, despite
defendant's failure to object thereto. However, the defendants in those cases, unlike
the defendant herein, did not file any brief. Hence, they had performed no affirmative
act from which a waiver could be implied. (People vs. Casiano, supra).
"In his appeal brief, appellant's counsel does not raise this question of double
jeopardy, confining himself as he does, to the discussion of the evidence in the record,
contending that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double jeopardy is that said defense may be
waived, and, that failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said
defense of double jeopardy. (People vs. Pinuila, supra).
There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for
reconsideration. The Court, however, does not believe that they were well taken.
For the above reasons, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it
hereby, denied.
Bengzon, C, J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
9/9/2019 ORLANDO PRIMERO v. CA
DIVISION
[ GR Nos. L-48468-69, Nov 22, 1989 ]
ORLANDO PRIMERO v. CA
DECISION
259 Phil. 145
PARAS, J.:
Before the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Orlando Primero was charged with
the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness and Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon.
The complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness reads:
"That on or about 5:30 P.M., November 12, 1975 in the municipality of Camiling,
Province of Tarlac, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, while armed with a deadly weapon (bayonet) and by
means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs committed lascivious acts
upon the person of the undersigned complainant at Brgy. Pindangan 2nd,
Camiling, Tarlac by then and there embracing, touching and fondling the breast
and private parts of the undersigned against the complainants' will.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
"Camiling Tarlac." (Decision, pp. 28?29, Rollo)
While the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Deadly
Weapon, to wit:
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c70e4 1/7
"That on or about November 12, 1975, at about 5:30 in the afternoon, at

Barangay Pindangan 2nd, in the Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
Orlando Primero did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry
outside of his residence a deadly weapon, to wit: a bayonet, 19 - 1/2" long, which
was not then being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn a living or
being used in connection therewith, but was used in the commission of the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness for which he was charged in Crim. Case No. 1184 of this
Honorable Court.
"Contrary to Law.
"Tarlac, Tarlac, February 19, 1976." (p. 29, Rollo)
The aforementioned offenses were jointly tried for having been committed on the
same occasion.
The evidence for the prosecution, as found by the respondent appellate Court is as
follows:
"During the time material to this case Angelita Maycong was about 24 years old,
single and a resident of Pindangan II, Camiling, Tarlac (p. 16, tsn., August 5,
1976).
"On or about November 12, 1975, on their way home from Tarlac where they
joined a parade (p. 30, tsn., August 30, 1976), Angelita Maycong and one Elena
Garcia saw Orlando Primero emerge suddenly from the talahib along their path,
brandishing a bayonet at them (p. 17, tsn., August 5, 1976). Elena Garcia ran
away (p. 6, tsn., August 30, 1976). Angelita Maycong descended on the 'pilapil'
to her left side and also tried to run away (p. 18, tsn., August 5, 1976).
Unfortunately, Angelita stumbled, as a result of which, Orlando grabbed her and
pinned her down on the ground (Ibid). He held her neck with his right hand and
held her breasts with the left hand and kissed her right cheek (pp. 19, 20, tsn.,
August 5, 1976). Fighting back, she kicked Orlando near his organ and struck
him with left hand (p. 20, Ibid.; p. 27, tsn., August 5, 1976). In the struggle,
Angelita was able to get the bayonet (p. 2, Ibid).
"In the meantime, Elena Garcia shouted for help (p. 20, tsn., August 5, 1976).
Angelita also shouted for help (p. 20, Ibid).
"Upon seeing the bayonet in the possession of Angelita, Orlando Primero ran
away (p. 23, tsn., August 5, 1976). Not long after, the father of Angelita Maycong,
who was then tending his farm from where he heard the shouts for help, arrived
(Ibid). Having learned of the attempt made on the honor of her daughter, father
and daughter reported the matter to the Barrio Captain (Ibid). The bayonet was
surrendered to the police force of Camiling, Tarlac." (pp. 3-5, Solicitor's Brief)
(Decision, p. 10, Rollo).
The defendant, in turn, claims that the filing of these two (2) criminal accusations was
motivated by revenge. He testified that he and the complainant were sweethearts who
were engaged to get married. He lived in the house of the complainant for three (3)
months where he was practically treated by the father of the complainant, Florentino
Maycong, as a son-in-law helping in the farm work and in the daily chores in the
house. However, the planned marriage did not take place because the complainant's
family wanted an ostentations ceremony which he (defendant) could not afford. As an
alternative, defendant suggested to complainant that they elope but the latter refused.
Subsequently, the defendant left the complainant and married another woman, a
decision which was allegedly resented by the complainant.
Furthermore, defendant raises the defense of alibi. It is argued that at the time the
incident was allegedly committed, he was in Paniqui, Tarlac harvesting palay with
some other farm laborers. He maintained that he worked there from 6 o'clock in the
morning to past 6 o'clock in the evening of November 12, 1975. The foregoing
testimony of the defendant was corroborated by Cipriano Sudaria and Teodoro
Cayabyab.
After trial, the lower court convicted the defendant of the two (2) offenses charged in
the two (2) separate informations and sentenced him as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Orlando Primero guilty beyond reasonable

doubt in Crim. Case No. 1184 of the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness punishable
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to a term of
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correctional, medium period, and in Crim.
Case No. 1195 on the charge of Illegal Possession of a Deadly Weapon,
punishable under PD 9, he is further sentenced to a prison term of TEN (10)
YEARS which is the maximum term imposed by the law, with costs.
"The bayonet, Exh. A, is ordered confiscated and once this decision becomes
final, the same shall be forwarded to the 184th PC Company, Paniqui, Tarlac for
disposition according to law." (p. 12, Rollo)
On appeal, the respondent Court rendered a decision,* the dispositive portion of

which reads:
"WHEREFORE, affirming the judgment of conviction in both offenses but

modifying the penalty imposed by the lower court, We hereby sentence the
defendant to the following:
"1. As regards to the accusation of acts of lasciviousness the defendant is

hereby sentenced to a penalty of Six (6) Months of Arresto Mayor to Four (4)
Years of Prision Correccional; and
"2. As regards the violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 the defendant is

hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Five (5) Years as minimum to
Ten (10) Years as maximum. The bayonet, Exhibit A is ordered confiscated in
favor of the government." (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I
The respondent Court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses.
II
The respondent Court failed to pass upon the contention that bayonet is not one
of the weapons the carrying of which outside one's residence is punished under
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 9.
III
The respondent Court erred in its non-consideration of the defense of alibi

interposed by the defendant.
After a careful perusal of the entire record of this case, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the respondent Court.
With regard to the issue of credibility, We cannot acquiesce with the argument raised
by the petitioner that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, being close
relatives (father and niece) of the complainant, should not be given weight and should
be considered biased and self-serving. Be it remembered that mere relations cannot
militate against the credibility of a witness. Neither could it distort the testimony due
from such witnesses. In point is the ruling in the case of People v. Libed reported in
14 SCRA 410:
"The fact alone of relationship to the victim does not destroy a witness'
credibility. It is not to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the deceased
would callously violate their conscience xxx by blaming it on persons whom they
know to be innocent thereof."
In this regard, it is relevant to restate herein that the trial court, which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to have the hallmarks of truth and
credibility. Thus, the trial court pertinently observed:
"The Court is inclined to believe the claim of the complainant. Angelita

Maycong, her father Florentino Maycong, and her companion Elena Garcia,
appear to be credible witnesses. They impressed the Court as being innocent
farm folks, and while appearance may be deceiving, their story is not incredible
and was entirely believable. Being an unmarried woman and in the prime of her
maindenhood (she was 25 years of age when she testified on August 5, 1976),
what reason would Angelita have for unnecessarily exposing herself if indeed the
story of the accused violating her honor was not true. Her story was
corroborated in material aspects by the two other witnesses, her companion
Elena Garcia and her father Florentino Maycong." (Decision, p. 12, Rollo)
Accordingly, it need not be emphasized that the trial court's finding that the
testimonies of the witnesses were reliable, being supported by evidence of record,
should be given credence. Thus, on matters of credibility the findings of the trial court
are accorded the highest respect (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94; People v. Jones, 137
SCRA 166; People v. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141; People v. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA, Guita v.
CA, 139 SCRA 576).
Anent the second issue, We regret to say that the same is bereft of merit. It is worth
noting that the dispositive portion of the respondent Court's decision makes mention
of violation by the petitioner of P.D. No. 9 for which he was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum,
and wherein the bayonet was ordered confiscated in favor of the government. It goes
without saying that the Court of Appeals would not have sustained the trial court's
finding of petitioner's guilt as to the charge of illegal possession of deadly weapon
were it not convinced that a bayonet is a "bladed, pointed or blunt weapon" decreed
unlawful under P.D. No. 9.
It can not be disputed that, ordinarily, the enumeration of specified matters in a
statute is construed as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different
intention appears. However, the maxim expressio unius est eclusio alterius is only an
auxiliary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal application - neither is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent
which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the legislature (Statutory Construction, Martin, sixth edition,
1984, pp. 71-72). Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists
why other xxx things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest
injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius should not be invoked (Ibid, p. 79). Applying the same in the instant case, it
cannot be convincingly argued that a bayonet is not a bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon, possession of which outside of one's residence is decreed by P.D. No. 9 to be
illegal. True enough, if the carrying outside one's residence of such weapons as fan
knife, "balisong" or club, which are less deadly than the bayonet, are prohibited under
the law, there is no logical reason why the bayonet should be exempted from the
prohibition.
Finally, as regards the defense of alibi, not only is it a weak defense but also it cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused and by credible prosecution
witnesses (People. v. Obenque, 147 SCRA 448; People v. Pacada, Jr., 142 SCRA 427,
People v. Canturia, 139 SCRA 280). Moreover, defendant failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the incident.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), on leave.
* Penned by Justice Vicente G. Ericta concurred in by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez

and Jose B. Jimenez.
9/9/2019 EMETERIA LIWAG v. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 189755
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012 ]
EMETERIA LIWAG, PETITIONER, VS. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION, INC., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
[1] [2]
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
[3]
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 100454. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision
[4]
and Order of the Office of the President (O.P.) in OP Case No. 05-G-224, which had
[5]
set aside the Decision of the Board of Commissioners of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case No. REM-A-041210-0261 and affirmed
[6]
the Decision of the Housing and Land Use Arbiter in HLURB Case No. REM-
030904-12609.
The controversy stems from a water facility in Happy Glen Loop Subdivision (the
Subdivision), which is situated in Deparo, Caloocan City.
Sometime in 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, obtained
a loan from Ernesto Marcelo (Marcelo), the owner of T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation.
To settle its debt after failing to pay its obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to Marcelo all
its rights over several parcels of land in the Subdivision, as well as receivables from
[7]
the lots already sold.
As the successor-in-interest of the original developer, Marcelo represented to

subdivision lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility was available in the
[8]
Subdivision.
For almost 30 years, the residents of the Subdivision relied on this facility as their
[9]
only source of water. This fact was acknowledged by Marcelo and Hermogenes
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cd6b2 1/12
Liwag (Hermogenes), petitioner's late husband who was then the president of
respondent Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association (Association).[10]
Sometime in September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 to Hermogenes. As a
result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099
was issued to him. When Hermogenes died in 2003, petitioner Emeteria P. Liwag
subsequently wrote a letter to respondent Association, demanding the removal of the
overhead water tank from the subject parcel of land.[11]
Refusing to comply with petitioner's demand, respondent Association filed before the
HLURB an action for specific performance; confirmation, maintenance and donation
of water facilities; annulment of sale; and cancellation of TCT No. 350099 against T.P.
Marcelo Realty Corporation (the owner and developer of the Subdivision), petitioner
Emeteria, and the other surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, Housing and Land Use
Arbiter Joselito Melchor (Arbiter Melchor) ruled in favor of the Association. He
invalidated the transfer of the parcel of land in favor of Hermogenes in a Decision
dated 5 October 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:[12]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:
1. Confirming the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open
space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and
overhead tank are situated,
2. Making the Temporary Restraining Order dated 01 April 2004 permanent

so as to allow the continuous use and maintenance of the said water facility,
i.e., deep well and over head water tank, on the subject lot, by the
complainant's members and residents of the subject project, and restraining
all the respondents from committing the acts complained of and as
described in the complaint,
3. Declaring as void ab initio the deed of sale dated 26 February 2001,

involving Lot 11, Block 5 in favor of spouses Liwag, and TCT No. C-350099
in the name of same respondents without prejudice to complainant's right
to institute a criminal action in coordination with the prosecuting arms of
the government against respondents Marcelo and Liwag, and furthermore,
with recourse by Liwag against T.P. and/or Marcelo to ask for replacement
for controverted lot with a new one within the subject project; and
4. Ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay complainant the amount

of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the amount of P20,000.00 as damages
in favor of the complainant's members.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11,
Block 5 was not an open space. Moreover, it ruled that Marcelo had complied with the
requirements of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1216 with the donation of 9,047 square
meters of open space and road lots. It further stated that there was no proof that
Marcelo or the original subdivision owner or developer had at any time represented
that Lot 11, Block 5 was an open space. It therefore concluded that the use of the lot as
[13]
site of the water tank was merely tolerated.
Respondent Association interposed an appeal to the OP, which set aside the Decision
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners and affirmed that of the Housing and Land
Use Arbiter.[14]
The OP ruled that Lot 11, Block 5 was an open space, because it was the site of the
water installation of the Subdivision, per Marcelo's official representation on file with
the HLURB National Capital Region Field Office. The OP further ruled that the open
space required under P.D. 957 excluded road lots; and, thus, the Subdivision's open
space was still short of that required by law. Finally, it ruled that petitioner Liwag was
aware of the representations made by Marcelo and his predecessors-in-interest,
because he had acknowledged the existence of a water installation system as per his
Affidavit of 10 August 1982.[15]
Petitioner Liwag unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration,[16] then filed a Rule 43

Petition for Review before the CA.[17]
The CA affirmed that the HLURB possessed jurisdiction to invalidate the sale of the
subject parcel of land to Hermogenes and to invalidate the issuance of TCT No. C-
350099 pursuant thereto.[18] The appellate court agreed with the OP that an
easement for water facility existed on the subject parcel of land and formed part of the
open space required to be reserved by the subdivision developer under P.D. 957.[19]
However, it ruled that Arbiter Melchor should not have recommended the filing of a
criminal action against petitioner, as she was not involved in the development of the
Subdivision or the sale of its lots to buyers.[20] The CA likewise deleted the award of
attorney's fees and damages in favor of respondent.[21]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition before this Court.
The Court's Ruling
We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.
I
The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction
over the case at bar
The jurisdiction of the HLURB is outlined in P.D. 1344, "Empowering the National
Housing Authority to Issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of its Decision

under Presidential Decree No. 957," viz:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business
and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
National Housing Authority shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature.
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory

obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
the owner, developer, broker or salesman.
When respondent Association filed its Complaint before the HLURB, it alleged that
Marcelo's sale of Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes was done in violation of P.D. 957 in
the following manner:
12. Through fraudulent acts and connivance of [T.P. and Ernesto Marcelo] and
the late Liwag and without the knowledge and consent of the complainants all in
violation of P.D. 957 and its implementing regulations, respondents T.P. and
Ernesto Marcelo transferred the same lot where the deep well is located which
is covered by TCT No. C-41785 in favor of spouses Hermogenes Liwag and
[22]
Emeteria Liwag to the great damage and prejudice of complainants x x x.
(Empasis in the original)
We find that this statement sufficiently alleges that the subdivision owner and
developer fraudulently sold to Hermogenes the lot where the water facility was
located. Subdivisions are mandated to maintain and provide adequate water facilities
for their communities.[23] Without a provision for an alternative water source, the
subdivision developer's alleged sale of the lot where the community's sole water
source was located constituted a violation of this obligation. Thus, this allegation
makes out a case for an unsound real estate business practice of the subdivision owner
and developer. Clearly, the case at bar falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB.
It is worthy to note that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising
from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer, or those aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations to make the Subdivision a better place to live in.[24] This interpretation is
in line with one of P.D. 957's "Whereas clauses," which provides:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements,
thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers. x x x.
P.D. 957 was promulgated to closely regulate real estate subdivision and
condominium businesses.[25] Its provisions were intended to encompass all
questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums.[26] The decree aimed to
provide for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which aggrieved
parties in transactions involving subdivisions and condominiums may take recourse.
[27]
II
An easement for water facility exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen
Loop Subdivision
Easements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an immovable for the

benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner,[28] for the benefit of a
community, [29] or for the benefit of one or more persons to whom the encumbered
estate does not belong.[30]
The law provides that easements may be continuous or discontinuous and apparent or
non-apparent. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are quoted below:
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-

apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without
the intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon
the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in
view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Non-apparent easements are those which show no external indication of their

existence.
In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the Subdivision
for the benefit of the community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is used
incessantly without human intervention, and because it is continually kept in view by
the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public.
Contrary to petitioner's contention that the existence of the water tank on Lot 11,
Block 5 is merely tolerated, we find that the easement of water facility has been
voluntarily established either by Marcelo, the Subdivision owner and developer; or by
F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-in-interest and the original developer of the Subdivision.
For more than 30 years, the facility was continuously used as the residents' sole
source of water.[31] The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements
are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years.[32] It is therefore
clear that an easement of water facility has already been acquired through
prescription.
III
Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision forms part of its open
space
The term "open space" is defined in P.D. 1216 as "an area reserved exclusively for
parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals,
health centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and amenities.[33]
The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Therefore,
we resort to statutory construction to determine whether these areas fall under "other
similar facilities and amenities."
The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a
general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted
to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically
mentioned.[34]
Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find that the
enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Thus,
the phrase "other similar facilities and amenities" should be interpreted in like
manner.
Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for the benefit of the community.
Water is a basic need in human settlements,[35] without which the community would
not survive. We therefore rule that, based on the principle of ejusdem generis and
taking into consideration the intention of the law to create and maintain a healthy
environment in human settlements,[36] the location of the water facility in the
Subdivision must form part of the area reserved for open space.
IV
The subject parcel of land is beyond the commerce of man and its
sale is prohibited under the law
The law expressly provides that open spaces in subdivisions are reserved for public
use and are beyond the commerce of man.[37] As such, these open spaces are not
susceptible of private ownership and appropriation. We therefore rule that the sale of
the subject parcel of land by the subdivision owner or developer to petitioner's late
husband was contrary to law. Hence, we find no reversible error in the appellate
court's Decision upholding the HLURB Arbiter's annulment of the Deed of Sale.
Petitioner attempts to argue in favor of the validity of the sale of the subject parcel of
land by invoking the principle of indefeasibility of title and by arguing that this action
constitutes a collateral attack against her title, an act proscribed by the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioner is mistaken on both counts.
First, the rule that a collateral attack against a Torrens title is prohibited by law[38]
finds no application to this case.
There is an attack on the title when the object of an action is to nullify a Torrens title,
thus challenging the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed.
[39] In the present case, this action is not an attack against the validity of the Torrens
title, because it does not question the judgment or proceeding that led to the issuance
of the title. Rather, this action questions the validity of the transfer of land from
Marcelo to petitioner's husband. As there is no attack direct or collateral against the
title, petitioner's argument holds no water.
Second, the principle of indefeasibility of title is not absolute, and there are well-
defined exceptions to this rule.[40] In Aqualab Philippines, Inc. v. Heirs of Pagobo,
[41] we ruled that this defense does not extend to a transferee who takes the title with
knowledge of a defect in that of the transferee's predecessor-in-interest.
In this case, Spouses Liwag were aware of the existence of the easement of water
facility when Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to them. Hermogenes even executed an
Affidavit dated 10 August 1982 attesting to the sufficiency of the water supply coming
from an electrically operated water pump in the Subdivision.[42] It is undisputed that
the water facility in question was their only water source during that time. As
residents of the Subdivision, they had even benefited for almost 30 years from its
existence. Therefore, petitioner cannot be shielded by the principle of indefeasibility
and conclusiveness of title, as she was not an innocent purchaser in good faith and for
value.
From the discussion above, we therefore conclude that the appellate court committed
no reversible error in the assailed Decision and accordingly affirm it in toto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED,

and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
100454 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] CA Decision dated 13 March 2009, penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-
Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Sixto C.
Marella, Jr.; rollo, pp. 38-54.
[2] CA Resolution on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 18 September

2009, rollo, pp. 55-56.
[3] Decision of the OP dated 5 March 2007; rollo, pp. 127-134.
[4] Order of the OP dated 26 July 2007; rollo, pp. 135-137.
[5] HLURB Board of Commissioners Decision dated 7 June 2005, rendered by

Commissioners Romulo Q. Fabul, Teresita A. Desierto, Francisco L. Dagnalan (no
signature) and Jesus Y. Pang; rollo, pp. 120-123.
[6] HLURB Arbiter's Decision dated 5 October 2004, penned by Atty. Joselito F.
Melchor; rollo, pp. 86-93.
[7] CA Decision dated 13 March 2009, rollo, pp. 39-40.
[8] Id. at 40.
[9] HLURB Arbiter's Decision dated 5 October 2004, rollo, p. 87.
[10] Id.
[11] CA Decision dated 13 March 2009, rollo, p. 40.

[13] Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners dated 7 June 2005, rollo, p. 122.
[14] Decision of the OP dated 5 March 2007, rollo, p. 134.
[15] Id. at 133-134.
[16] Order of the OP dated 26 July 2007, rollo, p. 137.
[17] CA Decision dated 13 March 2009, rollo, p. 38.
[18] Id. at 47.
[19] Id. at 49.
[20] Id. at 52.
[21] Id. at 53.
[22] Complaint with a Prayer for a Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary

Restraining Order dated 8 March 2004, rollo, p. 70.
[23] Rules Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective

Decree and Other Related Laws, Sec. 11(B) (4).
[24] Arranza v. B.F. Homes, 389 Phil. 318, 329 (2000).
[25] Christian General Assembly, Inc. v. Sps. Ignacio, G.R. No. 164789, 27 August
2009, 597 SCRA 266.
[26] Sps. Osea v. Ambrosio, 521 Phil. 92 (2006).
[27] Id.
[28] CIVIL CODE, Art. 613.
[30] Id.
[33] P.D. No. 1216, Sec. 1.
[34] Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 (1999).
[35] Rules and Standards for Economic and Socialized Housing Projects to Implement
Batas Pambansa Blg. 220, Rule III, Sec. 5(B).
[36] P.D. 1216, first Whereas clause.
[37] P.D. 1216, second Whereas clause.
[38] P.D. No. 1529, Sec. 48.
[39] Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, 452 Phil. 238 (2003).
[40] Borromeo v. Descallar, G.R. No. 159310, 24 February 2009, 580 SCRA 175.
[41] G.R. No. 182673, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 435.
[42] Joint Affidavit of Gerry Bautista and Hermogenes R. Liwag dated 10 August
1982, HLURB Records, p. 10.
9/9/2019 AMELITO R. MUTUC v. COMELEC
[ GR No. L-32717, Nov 26, 1970 ]
AMELITO R. MUTUC v. COMELEC
DECISION
146 Phil. 798
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a
candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for
prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections
enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could
it be, considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent
by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication
arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a
statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the
utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral
purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five
days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a minute
resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to
explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after
setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the
position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent
Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed
him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from
using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loudspeakers, an
order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right * * * to
freedom of speech."[1] There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according
to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a
preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution
requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than
November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday,
November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c571b 1/7
answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in
the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of
the Constitutional Convention Act,[2] which made it unlawful for candidates "to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin."[3] It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be
used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that
the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, 1970,
with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmeña arguing in
behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the
election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute
resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory
authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine of
ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by
respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity,
considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding
portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on
Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing
or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles
[4]
by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory."
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was
one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a
prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the
Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions
referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets,
mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
"and the like."[5] For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify
such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our
approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to.[6] It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in
the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its
failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should
be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
[7]
constitutional command or prescription. Thus, certain Administrative Code
provisions were given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the
[8]
tenets of the fundamental law." The desirability of removing in that fashion the
taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended
itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any
collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The
objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not
[9]
only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor
obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above
provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the
use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of unconstitutionality
would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits
an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that
this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally
vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose
censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed.
Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if
he would not resort to a taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through
others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not
to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating
what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court
were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be
distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would
negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures.[10]
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting
forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the
highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.
That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which
occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice
but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the
restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The
Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In
its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its
power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate
branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that
the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to
live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly
summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive
department although independent of the President -- to which the Constitution has
given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections, ' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to
[11]
purely 'administrative questions.'" It has been the constant holding of this Court,
as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any
authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
[12]
Constitution. Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely
inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to
[13]
insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. There could be no
justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent
Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as
free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid
footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our Resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent
Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or
implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of
political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Barredo, and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., on official leave.
[1] Petition, paragraphs 1 to 5.

[2]
Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).
[3] Section 12 (E), Ibid.
[4]
Resolution of Nov. 3, 1970.
[5] Section 12 (E), Constitutional Convention Act.
[6]
Cf. United States v. Santo Niño, 13 Phil. 141 (1909); Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v.
Union Insurance Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 40 (1919); People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil.
352 (1923); Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930); Ollada v. Court of Tax Appeals, 99
Phil. 605 (1956); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security
Commission, L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10.
[7] Cf. Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); Manila Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Employees Association, 79 Phil. 409 (1947); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.
368 (1949); Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 84 Phil. 847 (1949); City of
Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil. 663 (1950); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil.
50 (1950); Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950); Sanchez v. Harry Lyons
Construction, Inc., 87 Phil, 532 (1950); American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101
Phil. 386 (1957); Gonzales v. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230;
Automotive Parts and Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 248; J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064, Feb.
18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
[8]
Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950).
[9] Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Ross, 289 US 373 (1933).
[10]
Cf. Saia v. People of the State of New York, 334 US 558 (1948).
[11] Abcede v. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958). The portion of the opinion from
which the above excerpt is taken reads in full: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive
department - although independent of the President - to which the Constitution has
given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to
purely 'administrative questions.' (Article X, Sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines) It
has no authority to decide matters 'involving the right to vote. 'It may not even pass
upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 47

Off. Gaz., [6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could assert the greater and
more far-reaching authority to determine who - among those possessing the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the procedural
requirements, relative to the filing of certificates of candidacy - should be allowed to
enjoy the full benefits intended by law therefore. The question whether in order to
enjoy those benefits - a candidate must be capable of 'understanding the full meaning
of his acts and the true significance of election,' and must have - over a month prior to
the elections (when the resolution complained of was issued) 'the tiniest chance to
obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate,' is a matter
of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must be
determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions. Apart from the
absence of specific statutory grant of such general, broad power as the Commission
claims to have, it is dubious whether, if so granted - in the vague, abstract,
indeterminate and undefined manner necessary in order that it could pass upon the
factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant must not be deemed made, in
the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at
bar) - the legislative enactment would not amount to undue delegation of legislative
power. (Schechter vs. U.S., 295 US 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)" pp. 141-142.
[12]
Cf. Cortez v. Commission on Elections, 79 Phil. 352 (1947); Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 (1949); Guevara v. Commission on Elections,
104 Phil. 268 (1958); Masangcay v. Commission on Elections, L-13827, Sept. 28,
1962, 6 SCRA 27; Lawsin v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 643; Ututalum
v. Commission on Elections, L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465; Janairo v.
Commission on Elections, L-28315, Dec. 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 1173; Abes v. Commission
on Elections, L-28348, Dec. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 1252; Ibuna v. Commission on
Elections, L-28328, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1457; Binging Ho v. Mun. Board of
Canvassers, L-29051, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 829.
[13] Cf. Cauton v. Commission on Elections, L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911.
The other cases are Espino v. Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1204; Ong v.
Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan. 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 241; Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections, L-28517, Feb. 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662; Pedido v.
Commission on Elections, L-28539, March 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 1403; Aguam v.
Commission on Elections, L-28955, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 883; Pelayo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, L-28869, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1374; Pacis v.
Commission on Elections, L-29026, Sept. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377; Ligot v.
Commission on Elections, L-31380, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 45; Abrigo v. Commission
on Elections, L-31374, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 27; Moore v. Commission on Elections,
L-31394, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 60; Ilarde v. Commission on Elections, L-31446, Jan.
23, 1970, 31 SCRA 72; Sinsuat v. Pendatun, L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630.
9/9/2019 US v. VICTOR SANTO NIÑO
[ GR No. 5000, Mar 11, 1909 ]
US v. VICTOR SANTO NIÑO
DECISION
13 Phil. 141
WILLARD, J.:
Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: "An Act to regulate the importation, acquisition,
possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same
except in compliance with the provisions of this Act."
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any
bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That this
prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have
secured a license therefor or who are entitled to carry same under the provisions
of this Act."
The amended complaint in this case is as follows :

"The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Niño of the violation of Act No. 1780,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Victor Santo Niño, voluntarily, unlawfully, and criminally, had
in his possession and concealed about his person a deadly weapon, to wit; One
(1) iron bar, about 15 inches in length provided with an iron ball oh one end and
a string on the other to tie to the wrist, which weapon had been designed and
made for use in fighting, and as a deadly weapon.
"With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the Philippine
Commission."
9/9/2019 US v. VICTOR SANTO NIÑO
A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below and the Government
has appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court below was that-
"The words 'or other deadly weapon' only signify a kind of weapon included
within the preceding classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdem generis
must be applied in the interpretation of this law, which rule is as follows:
" 'The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and generic
terms of the same nature are employed in the same act, the latter following the
former. While in the abstract, general terms are to be given their natural and full
signification, yet where they follow specific words of a like nature they take their
meaning from the latter, and are presumed to embrace only things or persons of
the kind designated by them.'"
In short, the court below held that the carrying of a revolver concealed about the
person would not be a violation of this Act. The rule of construction above referred to
is resorted to only for the purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature
was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts of the law, and
such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached
by application of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. In this case the
proviso to the Act clearly indicates that in the view of the legislature the carrying of an
unlicensed revolver would be a violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its
intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein
specified.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
9/9/2019 G.R. No. 42236 - CITY OF MANILA vs. LYRIC MUSIC HOUSE, INC.
ChanRobles™Virtual Law Library™ |

chanrobles.com™
Like 0 Tweet Share

Custom Search Search
CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Home > ChanRobles Virtual Law Library > Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence >
EN BANC
G.R. No. 42236 September 24, 1935
CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LYRIC MUSIC

HOUSE, INC., Defendant-Appellant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
GODDARD, J.:
This action was instituted by the plaintiff for the purpose of

recovering from the defendant the sum of P525 as license fees
www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1935/sep1935/gr_42236_1935.php 1/10
and penalty alleged to be due the plaintiff for the period of

time from July 1, 1930, to June 30, 1932. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The parties submitted the case to the trial court on the

following agreed statement of facts:
Plaintiffs and defendant, by the their respective

undersigned attorney's hereby stipulate and agree
that the material facts involved and admitted in this
litigation are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
I. Plaintiff is, and at all times herein mentioned has

been, a municipal corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippine Islands, within main offices in the City of
Manila. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
II. Defendant is, and at all times herein mentioned

has been, engaged in the sale and distribution
throughout the Philippine Islands at wholesale and
retail, of various musical instruments and
merchandise, to wit: pianos, phonographs, radios,
sousaphones, saxophones, trombones, music sheets,
methods, and musical accessories necessary to and
used by musicians. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
III. Defendant is not, and at all times herein

mentioned has never been, engaged in the sale and
distribution throughout the Philippine Islands of ant
wares, goods and merchandise of any kind, class,
nature or description other than those specified and
enumerated in paragraph 2 hereof. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IV. The gross sales of defendant for and during the

period covered by plaintiff's herein are as follows:
January 1st, 1930 to Dec. P296,653.61

31, 1930
January 1st, 1931 to Dec. 381,283.12

31, 1931
no portion of which has been paid by defendant to

plaintiff's demand for payment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
V. The said Municipal Ordinance No. 1925, as

amended, imposing the tax aforesaid was never
submitted for approval to either the Honorable
Secretary of the Interior or the Honorable Secretary
of Finance. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
VI. That defendant is subject to and has been paying

the annual privilege tax of P2 imposed by section
457 of the Administrative Code, otherwise known as
a fixed tax upon business subject to the percentage
tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
VII. Defendant is subject to and has been paying the

percentage tax, otherwise known as the sales tax, of
1� per cent of its annual gross sales, imposed by

the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
SUPPLEMENTAL STIPULATION OF FACTS chanrobles virtual law library
1. Come now plaintiff and defendant, by their

respective undersigned attorneys, and for the
convenience of this Honorable Court, respectfully
agree and submit that the pamphlet hereto attached
and incorporated herein and marked as Exhibit A
contains a true and correct copy of the Municipal
Ordinance No. 1925 passed and approved by the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila; chanrobles virtual law library
2. That the said Municipal Ordinance No. 1925 is the

sole and only basis of plaintiff's present action
against defendant.
The trial court rendered judgement against the defendant and

sentenced it to pay the plaintiff the sum of P525 with cost. The
defendant appealed to this court and now makes the following
assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in not holding that Act No.

3669 of the Philippine Legislature under and by
virtue of which Municipal Ordinance No. 1925,
Exhibit A, was passed by plaintiff, does not include
the business of the defendant in its provisions and
does not authorize the Municipal Board of Manila to
extend the scope and meaning of the term "General
Merchandise" so as to include thereunder the
musical merchandise business of the defendant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
II. The trial court erred in not holding that the

license fees' imposed by he plaintiff under and by
virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 1925, Exhibit A,
are exorbitant, excessive, and out of proportion to
the purposes for which license fees are collected. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
III. The trial court erred in not holding that the

"license fees" imposed by the plaintiff under and by
virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 1925, Exhibit A,
are exorbitant, excessive, and out of proportion to
the purposes for which license fees are collected. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that the

license fees imposed by Municipal Ordinance No.
1925, Exhibit A, are unreasonable, unjust,
oppressive and against public policy, and hence null
and void. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
V. The trial court, in sustaining the plaintiff's claim,

erred in tacitly allowing the plaintiff to base the
license fees not only in defendant's gross sales made
in the City of Manila but also on the gross sales
made in the provinces by the defendant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
VI. The trial court erred in lying undue stress on

defendant's second special defenses in defendant's
answer. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
VII. The trial court erred in ordering defendant to

pay the plaintiff the sum of P525 and costs.
Under its first assignment of error it is contended by the

defendant that Ordinance No. 1925 upon which the action of
the plaintiff is based is ultra vires, illegal, null and void in so
far as it attempts to tax the business of the defendant, for the
reason that Act No. 3669 of the Philippine Legislature, upon
which Ordinance No. 1925 is based, does not authorize the
municipal board of the City of Manila to extend the scope and
meaning of the term "general merchandise" so as to include
thereunder the business of the defendant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The pertinent provisions of Ordinance No. 1925 read:
SECTION 1. Fees. - There shall be paid in advance to

the city treasurer of the following annual license fees
on the business, occupations and manufacturers,
below enumerated, the rates of which should be
based on the gross sales or receipts realized from
said business, occupations and manufacturers below
enumerated, the rates of which should be based on
the gross sales or receipts realized from said
business, occupations and manufacturers during
each immediately proceeding year, ending December
thirty-first:
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
Group 1-A. - Retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise,

which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of any
municipal tax such as: (1) Retail dealers in general
merchandise, and (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the
scale of rice, textiles, including knitted wares; hardwares,
including glasswares, cooking utensils, and construction
materials; groceries, including toilet articles except perfumery;
paper, books including stationery.
Class Gross sales License

fee
A P250,000 or more P250.00
B 125,000 to P125.00
P249,999
C 62,500 to 63.00
124,999
D 31,000 to 32.00
62,499
E Less than 20.00

31,250
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Establishments for miscellaneous articles. -

Establishments engaging in more than one kind of
business as named above or selling articles not
enumerated in this Ordinance, will be considered a
general merchandise store, for the purpose of this
Ordinance, and the municipal license fee therefore
will be based on the gross sales or receipts of all the
articles sold or disposed of in the said
establishments: Provided, that the business,
occupations, and manufactures enumerated in group
one of this Ordinance are hereby excepted from the
provisions of this section.
By virtue of this ordinance the business of the defendant was

classified as a general merchandise store in view of the fact
that it was dealing in articles not mentioned in the ordinance,
i, e., those listed in paragraph two of the agreed statement of
facts. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Ordinance No. 1925 was enacted upon the authority of Act No.
3669 of the Philippine Legislature, the pertinent provisions of
which read: chanrobles virtual law library
An Act to amend sections twenty-four hundred forty-four,

twenty-five hundred fourteen, twenty-five hundred twenty-six,
twenty-five hundred twenty-eight, and twenty-five hundred
thirty-three of the Revised Administrative Code, conferring
authority upon the Municipal Board of the City of Manila,
subject to certain limitations, to tax and to fix the amount of
license fees upon certain limitations, to tax and to fix the
amount of license fees upon certain industries, business or
occupations would be substituted by the power to tax and that
it likewise grants the authority to fix the amount of license
fees for the sale of wine and liquors as provided for in the
articles of the Administrative Code above referred to, and for
other purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 2. Two new subjections are hereby inserted

between subsections (m) and (n) of section twenty-
four hundred forty-four of the Revised Administrative
Code, which shall be known as subsections ( m-1)
and ( m-2) and shall read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(m-2) To tax and fix the license fee on (a)dealers in

new automobiles or accessories or both, and (b)
retail dealers in view (not yet used) merchandise,
which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of
any municipal tax. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall

be classified as (1) retail dealers in general
merchandise and (2) retail dealers exclusively
engaged in the sale of (a) textiles including knitted
wares, (b) hardwares including glasswares, cooking
utensils, electrical goods and construction materials,
(c) groceries including toilet articles except
perfumery, (d) drugs including medicines and
perfumeries, (e) books, including stationery, paper
and office supplies, (f) jewelry, (g) slippers, (h)

arms, ammunitions, and sporting goods: Provided,
however, that the combined total tax of any dealer,
or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under the
three subsections ( m-1) and ( m-2) whether dealing
in one or all of the articles mentioned herein, shall
not be in excess of five hundred pesos per annum.
The defendant contends that as "musical merchandise" is not

mentioned in paragraph ( m-2) of the ordinance, its business
cannot be taxed by the City of Manila in view of its further
contention that it is not dealing in "general merchandise." This
paragraph provides in part that "for the purpose of taxation,
these retail dealers shall be classified as (1) retail dealers in
general merchandise," etc. The principal object of Act No.
3669 is to confer authority upon the municipal board of the
City of Manila "to tax and to fix the amount of license fees
upon certain . . . business . . ." which on the date of its
enactment were not subject to the payment of such a fee.
Under this authority that board adopted the questioned
ordinance which also provides under Group 1-A, that "Retail
dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are
not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax such as
(1) Retail dealers and general merchandise . . .," shall pay
certain license fees and provides further, under section 3, that
"establishments engaging in more than one kind of business as
named above or selling articles not enumerated in this
Ordinance will be considered a general merchandise store, for
the purpose of this Ordinance and the municipal license fee
therefore will be based on the gross sales or receipts from all
the articles sold or disposed of in the said establishments: . . .
"chanrobles virtual law library
It must be admitted that musical merchandise is not

specifically mentioned in Act No. 3669, but does that omission
prevent the municipal board of the City of Manila from
providing, for the purposes of the questioned ordinance, that
establishments engaging in more than one kind of business or
those selling articles not enumerated in the ordinance will be
considered as general merchandise store? chanrobles virtual law library
The first paragraph of subsection ( m-2) of Act No. 3669

authorizes that board to tax all retail dealers in new (not yet
used) merchandise. The only limitation that paragraph puts
upon the board' taxing power is that the dealers to be taxed
are those dealing in new merchandise not yet subject to any
municipal tax as "new (not yet used) merchandise only those
articles enumerated in paragraph 2 of subsection ( m-2). To
do this it must be presumed that the legislature without any
apparent reason , deliberately exempted from taxation musical
merchandise and all other merchandise not specifically
mentioned in that paragraph. This would be rank
discrimination. Such an exemption from taxation might be
excused if done to aid or encourage a new and struggling
industry with the Government wished to foster for the good of
the country. A dealer in musical merchandise certainly does
not need such aid or encouragement in the Philippines where
not only every town, no matter how small, but practically
every barrio has a band or orchestra or both. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The rule of ejusdem generis is resorted to merely in aid of the

construction of the statute, and not where, on consideration of
the whole law on the subject and the purpose sought, it
appears that the legislature intended the general words to go

beyond the class specifically designated. (State vs. Smith, 135
S.W., 465; 233 Mo., 242; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. vs.
Wallace, 132 Pac., 908; 38 Okla., 233.) chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the evident purpose the Legislature sought when it

adopted Act No. 3669, which was to tax all dealers in "new
(not yet) merchandise", it would not be logical to restrict the
meaning of the words "retail dealers in general merchandise"
to the narrow definition which the appellant urges upon this
court. It must be held, in view of the evident purpose sought
by the Legislature in adopting Act. No. 3669, that the
municipal board of city of Manila had a perfect right to
consider as general right to consider as general merchandise
stores, for the purpose of Ordinance No. 1925, those
establishments engaging in more than one kind of business, or
those selling articles not enumerated in that ordinance. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The above conclusion is further strengthened by an

examination of the title of Act. No. 3669, the purpose of which
was to grant authority to the municipal board of the City of
Manila ". . . to tax and to fix the amount of license fees upon
certain industries, businesses or occupations which up to date
is not yet subject to the payment of such license fees or tax,
and which increases the authority of such board to such an
extent that its power to fix the amount of the license fees for
certain industries and occupations would be substituted by the
power to tax . . .." What plausible reason could there be for
the Legislature to deny the Municipal board the right to tax a
dealer in musical merchandise and authorize it to tax a dealer
in sporting goods? To uphold the contention of the defendant-
appellant would make Act No. 3669 unreasonable and
inconsistent. The courts do not sanction an interpretation that
would make the law unreasonable and absurdity where a
reasonable interpretation can be adopted.
Where a statute appears upon its face to limit the

operation of its provisions to particular persons or
things by enumerating them, but no reason exists
why other persons or things not so enumerated
should not have been included and manifest,
injustice will follow by no so including them, the
maxim, " Expressio unius est exclusivo alterius,"
should not be invoked, . . . (Blevins vs. Mullally, 135
Pac., 307; 22 Cal. App., 519.)
The first assignment of error of the defendant-appellant

contends that Ordinance No. 1925 contravenes the rule of
uniformity in taxation provided for in the Jones Law. The
uniformity rule is not violated by classifying businesses for
taxation purposes. In United States vs. Sumulong (30 Phil.,
381), this fundamental principles is sustain and supported by
numerous cases, among which appears the following:
The ordinance imposes a license tax upon persons

who carry on certain occupation in the city. Persons
in different amounts, and persons in the same
occupation are classified by maximum and minimum
amount of sales. . . ..
xxx xxx xxx
The objection that the plaintiff makes to the

ordinance is that is classifies by amount or value
with the result (1) that the lowest amount or value
of property of a class "is required to pay the same
amount of taxes with the highest amount or value of
property therein"; (2) that the differences are not in
kind, but only in amount, or value of the class
increases; (3) that the so called classes are
subdivisions of class, and taxes are imposed upon
such subdivisions without regards to common ratio,
either as between the several subdivisions, or as
between the members of each of the subdivisions.
These objections are but the expression of the effect
of classification by amount, and have been made
before and considered before by this court, and the
judgment had been adverse to the contention of
plaintiff in error. We do not think that it is necessary
to review the cases or enter again into the reasoning
upon which they were based.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff in error, however, contends that the tax in

the case at bar is a tax of property, not on the
privilege you do business, because the final
incidence of the tax in on the merchant, and is paid
by him. But every tax has its final incidence on some
individual. that effect therefore, cannot be urged to
destroy well-organized distinctions. The tax in a case
of bar is a tax on the privilege in doing business,
regulated by the amount of sales, and is not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
(Clark vs. Titusville, 184 U.S., 329, 330; 46 Law.
ed., 569.)
In Churchill and Tait vs. Concepcion (34 Phil., 969, 976), this
court quoted with approval the following form Black on
constitution law, page 292:
Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles

or kinds of property, of the same class, shall be
taxed at the same rate. it does not mean that lands,
chattels, securities, incomes, occupations,
franchises, privileges, necessities, and luxuries, shall
all be assessed at the same rate. Different articles
may be taxed at different amounts, provided the
rate uniform in the same class everywhere, with all
people, and at all times.
Under its third and fourth assignments of error the defendant

contends that the license fees exacted by Ordinance No. 1925
from retail dealers are exorbitant, excessive and out of
proportion to the purposes for which license fees are collected.
As may be seen from the title of Act No. 3669, one of its
purposes is to increase the "authority of such Board (Municipal
Board of the City of Manila) to such an extent that its power to
fix the amount of the license fees for certain industries and
occupations would be substituted by the power of tax."
Therefore, the license fees imposed by Ordinance No. 1925 are
for revenue purposes.
. . . Where under undoubted charter power, the tax

is imposed for revenue alone, or for police regulation
and revenue, the amount thereof is usually a matter

for determination by the legislative branch of the
municipal government. Ordinarily the courts will
decline to interfere on the ground that the amount is
oppressive or unreasonably large. They incline to
defer to the judgment and discretion of the
corporate authorities, and frequently presume the
absence of evidence to the contrary. (3 McQuillin's
municipal Corporations, sec. 1102, p. 485, 2d
ed.). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
. . . If the free or tax is imposed for revenue

purposes, the amount thereof is particularly within
the discretion and and judgment of the legislative
authority, state or municipal, unless the tax
imposed, or unless in excess of the needs of the
municipality and out of proportion of other taxes.
(37 C.J., 193, 194.)
The second, third and forth assignments of error of the

defendant-appellant are overruled. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In its fifth assignment of error the defendant contends that the

gross sales on which the license fee fixed by the defendant
both statement of facts copied above does not bear out
defendant's contention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs in both

instances against the defendant-appellant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
FEATURED DECISIONScralaw
Main Indices of the Library ---> Go!
Search for www.chanrobles.com
Search
QUICK SEARCH
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Copyright © 1998 - 2019 ChanRoblesPublishing Company| Disclaimer | E-mailRestrictions ChanRobles™Virtual Law Library ™ | chanrobles.com™ RED
9/11/2019 G.R. No. L-15045
Today is Wednesday, September 11, 2019
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961
IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.

Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social Security
Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations,
which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be
exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social
Security Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover
religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the
recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied
the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional
objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the Commission in
its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No.
1161, as amended.
Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be compulsory upon
all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the
service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the Commission may not compel any
employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at
the time of admission, if admitted for membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty
employees, and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x
x." The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who
carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of
another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c],
see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both
mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8).
"Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except
those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service in a
private home, employment purely casual, etc.
From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all
kinds except those expressly excluded.
Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should — following the principle of ejusdem
generis — be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or
which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the
words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis
applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature
would thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at
bar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and
charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made more
evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly,
had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not
have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.
It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of
institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from
coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jan1961/gr_l-15045_1961.html 1/2
9/11/2019 G.R. No. L-15045
provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to
include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.
In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for profit or gain,
appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however,
nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law should be limited to
organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the
problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily
explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and
industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.
Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the rule laid down in
the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies
only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the
reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural
establishments, or enterprises. .
Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines
to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the
people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate
exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full
accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate
living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations
between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social Security
Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of
any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not
public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate,
assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or
disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment
shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.
Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to
disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for
covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of
taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are
intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line
with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social Security Commission
are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
Bengzon, J., reserves his vote.
Footnotes
1 UST Hospital Employees Association vs. UST Hospital, G.R. No. L-6988, May 24, 1954; San Beda College
vs. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-7649, October 29, 1955; Quezon Institute vs. Velasco & Quezon
Institute vs. Parazo, G.R. Nos. L-7742-43, November 23, 1955.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jan1961/gr_l-15045_1961.html 2/2
9/11/2019 G.R. No. L-14787
Today is Wednesday, September 11, 2019
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws
engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from
abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium
carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For
every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special
excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident
thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise
tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act
601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges
incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be
promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." After the applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of
the Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner that of the total sum of
P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13 representing the 17% special excise tax on the
foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been
approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the
reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste
stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the auditor of
the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law
refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner
brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for review.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law,
(Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof, which reads as follows:
SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk,
cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors,
vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary readers approved
by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported by
or for publishers for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper,
book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of
Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the
quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray
films, laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding
medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the
Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the
said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time
to time to promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be
promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jan1961/gr_l-14787_1961.html 1/2
9/11/2019 G.R. No. L-14787
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those
materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the
principle of statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose."
(Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to
cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be
classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong
to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food products
because they are used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more
of a medicine than food or food product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of
medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among
those listed preceding the term in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those for
breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section of
Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer to food for human consumption, was added
among the items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it
cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported
by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish,
neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No.
15, page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food
and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and
must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of
general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be
taken in connection with other rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws
by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)
Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the other questions raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby ordered to audit petitioners
applications for refund which were approved by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total
amount of P23,958.13.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., reserves his vote.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jan1961/gr_l-14787_1961.html 2/2
9/11/2019 SPS. NEREO AND NIEVA DELFINO v. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL
DIVISION
[ GR NO. 166735, Sep 05, 2006 ]
SPS. NEREO AND NIEVA DELFINO v. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL
DECISION
532 Phil. 551
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
[1]
Procedure, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60495,
[2]
dated 20 January 2003, which affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President,
[3]
dated 26 March 1999, and the Resolution dated 11 August 2000, reinstating the
grant to respondent St. James Hospital, Inc. of a Locational Clearance and a
Certificate of Locational Viability (CLV) for its expansion as a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity hospital.
St. James Hospital was established in 1990 as a two-storey, ten-bed capacity hospital
in Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision in Santa Rosa, Laguna. In 1994, it applied for a
permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its
hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution. Thus, on 23
November 1994, Reynaldo Pambid, HLURB Deputized Zoning Administrator for
Santa Rosa, Laguna, issued a "temporary" clearance for the expansion of said hospital.
Said issuance was challenged by herein petitioners spouses Nereo and Nieva Delfino,
residents of Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, on the ground that the proposed
expansion is in violation of the provisions of the 1981 Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning
Ordinance. Thereafter, Mr. Pambid referred the matter for evaluation by his
superiors.
On 19 April 1995, HLURB Regional Office No. IV Director Alfredo M. Tan II issued a
letter explaining that the issuance of a "temporary" clearance is not allowed under
existing laws for it may be erroneously construed as a permit to start construction.
Director Tan, however, opined that under existing HLURB guidelines, CLVs may be
issued to certain projects for purposes of securing an Environment Compliance

Certification (ECC) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
On the strength of said opinion, Mr. Pambid revoked the temporary clearance issued
to St. James Hospital and declared the expansion as not viable. The municipal
engineer of Santa Rosa, Laguna, also suspended the hospital's building permit, while
DENR Regional Executive Director Antonio Principe issued a cease and desist order
on 16 August 1995. Nevertheless, upon written representation of the hospital's
operator, Dr. Jose P. Santiago, that the St. James Hospital will retain the same
number of beds maintained in the hospital, Mr. Pambid issued a CLV dated 29
October 1995 for the hospital's expansion project. Upon protest from the petitioners,
Mr. Pambid thereafter suspended the issued CLV.
In the interim, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna passed on 11 December 1995

Resolution No. 811, approving the 1991 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) or the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna. Under
the new Zoning Ordinance, hospitals are now excluded from the list of viable
institutions within the residential zone of Santa Rosa, Laguna.
Oblivious of the approval of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, Mr. Pambid issued on 1
February 1996 a Certificate of Zoning Compliance or Locational Clearance for the two-
storey, ten-bed St. James Hospital citing as basis the provisions of the 1981 Santa
Rosa Municipal Zoning Ordinance. On 14 March 1996, Mr. Pambid likewise issued a
CLV for a four-storey, forty-bed hospital expansion project in favor of St. James
Hospital.
These issuances of Mr. Pambid were, however, invalidated by HLURB Director Tan on
25 April 1996, as it violated, according to Director Tan, the provisions of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance. As a result thereof, Mr. Pambid suspended the locational clearance
issued to St. James Hospital and elevated the matter to the HLURB for disposition.
According to Mr. Pambid, he received a copy of the new Zoning Ordinance only on 14
February 1996, two weeks after issuing the locational clearance.
On 16 May 1996, petitioners filed before the HLURB Regional Office No. IV a letter-
complaint against Mr. Pambid for issuing the CLV in violation of both the 1981 and
1991 Zoning Ordinances, and against Dr. Santiago for continuing with the expansion
project despite the invalidation of the CLV issued by Mr. Pambid.
In reply to petitioners' complaint, St. James Hospital maintained that there is a need
to expand the existing hospital to address the acute deficiency of medical facilities in
the municipality, and that the project is permissible under the new Zoning Ordinance.
Furthermore, it pointed out that the project has been favorably endorsed not only by
the residents of Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, but also by the residents of other
neighboring communities. St. James Hospital also argued that it has already incurred
millions of pesos in losses for every day of delay in the construction.
Pursuant to HLURB Rules, the case was elevated to the HLURB Legal Services Group
(LSG), and was assigned to Arbiter Erwin T. Daga. During the course of the
proceedings, Arbiter Daga issued the following Orders:
1. Order dated December 6, 1996 (temporary restraining order) enjoining St.
James [Hospital] from continuing with its expansion project;
2. Order dated December 11, 1996 ordering St. James [Hospital] to cease and
desist from proceeding with its expansion project;
3. Order dated December 12, 1996 denying St. James [Hospital's] motion to
lift the temporary restraining order; and
4. Order dated December 14, 1996 ordering St. James [Hospital] to again cease
and desist from further work and construction of the hospital's expansion
[4]
building pending the resolution of the case.
On 4 March 1997, Dr. Santiago filed before the HLURB Board of Commissioners a
Motion seeking the inhibition of Arbiter Daga for partiality, which was subsequently
denied.
On 16 July 1997, after the parties have submitted their respective position papers and
draft decisions, Arbiter Daga rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

1. The Locational Clearance dated February 1, 1996 issued by public
respondent Reynaldo Pambid to the expansion hospital building of private
respondent St. James Hospital, Inc. is hereby revoked and set aside;
2. Ordering private respondent to demolish its two-storey hospital expansion

building within ONE MONTH at its cost and upon failure to comply within
the period given, pay complainants P10,000.00 per day of delay;
3. Ordering private respondent to relocate its existing ten-bed capacity

hospital within ONE YEAR and thereafter to permanently cease and desist
from operating a hospital/clinic within a residential zone, particularly in
Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, Dita, Sta. Rosa, Laguna and failure to comply
within the reglementary period given, pay complainants the amount of
P10,000.00 per day of delay;
4. Ordering private respondent to pay this Board administrative fine of

P20,000.00, aside from the other fines previously imposed;
5. Ordering private respondent to pay this Board P5,000.00 per day beginning
February 4, 1997 until the day that it ceased or finished the construction of
its expansion building as determined by the Board's Regional Office No. IV;
6. Ordering private respondent to pay complainants FIVE HUNDRED

THOUSAND PESOS as moral damages, TWO MILLION PESOS exemplary
damages, TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS as attorney's fees, and
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS cost of litigation;
The motion of private respondent dated 24 June 1997 is hereby DENIED and its
Counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Without prejudice to the filing of criminal action that may be filed with the proper
court.[5]
Aggrieved by the aforecited Decision, St. James Hospital appealed to the HLURB
Board of Commissioners asserting that the proposed expansion of the hospital
conforms to the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Resolving said appeal, the HLURB effectively
modified Arbiter Daga's Decision, ruling that the existing hospital, with its original
two-storey, ten-bed capacity, is allowable under the old 1981 Zoning Ordinance and
may be allowed to continue as a medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo
Subdivision even after the effectivity of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. However, the
HLURB opined that the new construction of commercial buildings within the said
residential zone, such as the forty-bed capacity expansion building of St. James
Hospital, is repugnant to Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Santa Rosa Municipal
Zoning Ordinance and, hence, should be disallowed. Thus, on 13 January 1998, the
HLURB Special Division rendered a Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the LSG dated July 16, 1997, is hereby SET ASIDE
and a new decision entered:
1. Declaring the original two-storey, ten-bed capacity St. James Hospital, as
allowable in the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna;
2. Ordering respondent St. James to set-up an efficient hospital waste disposal

system in conformity with the rules and regulations and standards of the
Department of Health, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and all other concerned government agencies; and present a
certification of compliance to the Board from said agencies within ninety
(90) days from finality hereof; and
3. Revoking the Locational Clerance dated February 01, 1996 issued by

respondent Pambid for the expansion Hospital building of respondent St.
[6]
James.
The separate Motions for Reconsideration of both parties having been denied by the
HLURB, the parties elevated the case to the Office of the President, which rendered a
decision on 26 March 1999 in favor of St. James Hospital. According to the Office of
the President:
Without doubt, the establishment of a ten-bed capacity hospital, like the existing
St. James Hospital, is allowed within a residential zone. This is expressly
provided under Section 2, paragraph 1(d), Article VI of the 1981 Sta. Rosa
Municipal Zoning Ordinance, the law existing at the time of the founding of the
said hospital. The term "hospital" was, however, deleted from the list of
conforming establishments within a residential zone in the recently approved
1991 CLUP or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Sta.
Rosa, Laguna. The question now is whether or not the proposed expansion of St.
James Hospital, which will transform it into a four-storey, 40-bed capacity
hospital, is allowable under the 1991 zoning ordinance. Stated differently, does
the term "institutional", as used in the said ordinance, include hospitals and
other medical establishments.
In construing words or phrases used in a law, the general rule is that, in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning (Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 160
SCRA 315). For, words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in
their ordinary and common use and acceptation (People vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil.
352).
Under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, certain activities that
are commercial and institutional in character are allowed within the residential
zone. St. James maintained the term "institutional" includes hospitals and other
medical establishments.
We agree. The word "institutional" used as it is in said ordinance without

qualification should be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning. In law, the
word "institution" is understood to mean an establishment or place, especially
one of public character or one affecting a community (Black's Law Dictionary,
Revised 4th edition, 1968, p. 940). It may be private in character, designed for
profit to those composing the organization, or public and charitable in its
purposes.
From the above definition, it is clear that hospitals fall within the pale of the term
"institution", a hospital being a public establishment and that the nature of its
business is for profit. The fact that hospitals are not categorized as dwelling unit
does not inevitably mean that it is already a non- conforming establishment
within a residential zone. As provided under aforecited provision of the 1991

Zoning Ordinance, settlement activities that are "institutional in character" are
allowed within the residential zone. Even the HLURB recognized St. James as a
medical institution within the residential zone of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. Be that as it may, St. James Hospital may be allowed to continue its
business within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision. To limit the term
"institutional" to activities conducted within the dwelling units of the residents
would be unrealistic and would contemplate undue restrictions to existing and
lawful establishments, like the St. James Hospital.
As a conforming establishment within the residential zone, St. James Hospital

may also be allowed to expand its present structure. It is not disputed that the
new zoning ordinance does not expressly prohibit expansion of existing buildings
within the residential zone. As correctly observed by St. James, it would be an
absurd requirement if such establishment, like hospitals, would have the
appearance of residential units or that its use be incidental and subordinate to its
residential purposes. The parameters mentioned in the said ordinance should
only be applied to residential units.
Foregoing considered, the locational clearance and the complementary

certificate of locational viability may now be issued in favor of St. James
Hospital.
WHEREFORE, the grant to St. James Hospital, Inc., of a Locational Clearance

and a Certificate of Locational Viability (CLV) relative to its expansion as a 4-
storey, 40-bed capacity hospital dated February 1, 1996, is hereby REINSTATED.
In all other respects, the Decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board dated January 13, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto.[7]
The Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioners having been denied in a

Resolution dated 11 August 2000, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the
assailed Decision dated 20 January 2003, the appellate court affirmed the Decision of
the Office of the President, adopting the latter's conclusion that the
establishment/expansion of the St. James Hospital is not a proscribed land use in the
designated residential zone known as Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied in a Resolution

dated 14 January 2005. Hence, the instant Petition.
From the facts of the case, it is undisputed that the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision
located at Barangay Dita, Santa Rosa, Laguna, is located within an area classified as a
residential zone under both the 1981 and 1991 Zoning Ordinances. There is also no
question that a two-storey, ten-bed capacity hospital, such as St. James Hospital, was
allowed to be constructed within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance.
Likewise, it is apparent that under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance, the proposed
expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity hospital
would be disallowed as it violates the restriction set by said Zoning Ordinance
regarding permissible activities within a residential zone, which specifically limits any
medical institution built within a residential zone to a two-storey, ten-bed capacity
structure.
Nonetheless, with the passage of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, the proposed expansion
of the St. James Hospital must now be decided in light of the provisions of the new
Zoning Ordinance. Hence, the pivotal issue now to be resolved in this Petition is
whether or not the proposed expansion of St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-
bed capacity medical institution may be permitted under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
However, in order to settle the present controversy, it is essential that we determine
the effect of the enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance with respect to the proposed
expansion of the St. James Hospital in view of the deletion therein of the phrase
"hospitals with not more than ten capacity" from those enumerated as allowable uses
in a residential zone as contained in Section 2, Article VI of the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance.
Section 2, Article VI of the 1981 Zoning Ordinance states:
SECTION 2. REGULATIONS FOR URBAN CORE ZONE. - This zone shall be

devoted to various settlement activities that are residential and commercial, or
institutional in character, subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. In the Residential Sector, only the following uses shall be allowed:
a) All types of dwelling units (one-family detached, two-family detached, one-family

semi-detached, two- family semi-detached and multi-family of not more than 5 doors)
b) Home occupation, or the practice of one's profession or occupation, such as

tailoring, dressmaking, banking, and like provided that:
b.1. Not more than five (5) outside assistants or helpers shall be employed;
b.2. The use of the dwelling unit for the home occupation shall be clearly
incidental and subordinate to its use for residential purpose by its occupants;
b.3. As much as possible there shall be no change in the outside appearance of

the building or premises;
b.4. No equipment or process shall be used in such home occupation which

creates noise, vibration, glare, fumes, odors, or electrical interference or outside
the dwelling unit if conducted in a place other than a single-family residence. In
the case of electrical interference, no equipment or process shall be used which
creates visual or audible interference in any radio or television receiver or causes
fluctuation in line voltage off the premises.
a) Elementary schools
b) High Schools and vocational schools
c) Chapels, churches, and other place of worship
d) Clinics, hospitals with not more than ten (10) capacity
e) Drugstores
f) Backyard gardens and raising of pigs, poultry and other animals and fowls
provided:
1. That they are only for family consumption

2. No undue noise shall be created
3. No foul smell shall be emitted
4. Other sanitary requirements enforced in the municipality
g) Boarding House
h) Parks and playground
i) Barangay tanod stations
j) Neighborhood assembly hall
k) Recreation centers[8]
On the other hand, Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance reads:
SECTION 2. REGULATIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL ZONE. - This zone shall be
devoted to various settlements, activities that are residential, commercial, and
institutional in character and other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and
maintenance of ecological balance of the municipality, subject to the following
terms and conditions:
The following uses shall be allowed:

1. Single detached family dwellings
2. Semi-detached family dwelling
3. Two detached family dwelling
4. Two semi-detached family dwelling
5. Multi-family dwelling with not more than five (5) families residing
6. Residential Subdivision Projects
7. Home occupation for the practice of one's profession or for engaging an in-
house business such as dressmaking, tailoring, baking, running a sari-sari
store and the like, provided that:
7.1. Only members of the family residing within the premises shall be
engaged in such home occupation;
7.2. Maximum of five (5) outside helpers or assistants shall be employed;
7.3. The use of the dwelling unit for home occupation shall be clearly
incidental and subordinate to its use for residential purpose by its
occupants and for the conduct of the home occupation, not more than
twenty-five (25%) percent of the floor area of the dwelling unit shall be
used;
7.4. As much as possible there shall be no change in the outside appearance

of the building premises;
7.5. No home occupation shall be conducted in any accessory building;
7.6. No traffic shall be generated by such home occupation in greater

volume than would normally be expected in a residential neighborhood and
any need for parking generated by the conduct of such home occupation
shall be met off the street and in a place other than in a required front yard;
7.7. No equipment or process shall be used in such home occupation which

created noise, vibration, glare, fumes, odors, or electrical interference
detectable to the normal sense off the lot, if the occupation is conducted in a
single family residence or outside the dwelling unit if conducted in a place
other than a single-family-residence. In the case of electrical interference,
no equipment or process shall be used which created visual or audible
interference in any radio or television receiver or causes fluctuation in line
voltage off the premises.
8. 8. Backyard gardens and raising of pigs, poultry and other animals and
fowls provided:
8.1. That they are only for family consumption;
8.2. No undue noise shall be created;
8.3. No foul smell shall be emitted; and
8.4. Other sanitary requirements enforced in the municipality are complied

with.
9. Barangay Tanod Stations.
[9]
10. Police outposts.
The enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance effectively repealed the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance. This intent to repeal is manifested in the very wordings of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance. The complete title of said Ordinance, "An Ordinance Adopting a
Comprehensive Zoning Regulation for the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna and
Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment Thereof. And for
the Repeal of all Ordinances in Conflict Therewith," as well as the Repealing
Clause[10] of the same Ordinance which states that "all other ordinances, rules or
regulations that are in conflict with the provisions of this ordinance are hereby
repealed,"[11] clearly express the intent of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Rosa,
Laguna, to repeal any enactment that is inconsistent with the new Ordinance. The
inclusion of this general repealing provision in the Ordinance predicated the intended
repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and
prior acts.
This is what is known as an implied repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds on the

premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
[12] There are two categories of implied repeal. The first is where the provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the latter act to
the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.[13] The
second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.[14] The second
category of repeal is only possible if the revised statute was intended to cover the
whole subject matter and as a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a
subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole
subject matter of the former statute.[15]
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the 1991 Zoning Ordinance not only covers
the same, but embraces the whole subject matter contained in the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance, and was enacted to substitute the latter. A perusal of the two pieces of
legislation will reveal that both Ordinances were enacted to guide, control, and
regulate the future growth and development of the Municipality of Santa Rosa,
Laguna, in accordance with the municipality's development plan, as well as to
promote the general welfare of the residents of the community by regulating the
location and use of all buildings and land within the municipality. However, unlike the
1981 Zoning Ordinance, the 1991 Zoning Ordinance clearly identifies the development
plan to which it is patterned after, specifically the development plan adopted by the
Sangguniang Bayan through Kapasiyahan Blg. 20-91, dated 20 February 1991.
Considering that the 1981 Zoning Ordinance was not in furtherance of the later
development plan, consequently, there was the necessity to adopt a new statute to
effect the changes contained therein, hence, the adoption of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance.
Since it is presumed that the Sangguniang Bayan knew of the existence of the older
Ordinance, by enacting the later law embracing the complete subject matter of the
1981 Zoning Ordinance, it must be concluded that the legislative body had intended to
repeal the former Ordinance. With respect to the omission of the phrase "hospitals
with not more than ten capacity" from the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we conclude that
the Sangguniang Bayan did intend to remove such building use from those allowed
within a residential zone. As ruled by this Court, when both intent and scope clearly
evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are
omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.[16]
Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive scrutiny of both

Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone
under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of
worship, and clinics and hospitals have now been transferred to the institutional
zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.[17] This clearly demonstrates the intention of
the Sangguniang Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the residential zone only to
those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance,
which no longer includes hospitals.
It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals gave
undue emphasis to the word "institutional" as mentioned in Section 2, Article VI of
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and even went through great lengths to define said term in
order to include hospitals under the ambit of said provision. However, they neglected
the fact that under Section 4, Article VI of said Ordinance[18], there is now another
zone, separate and distinct from a residential zone, which is classified as
"institutional", wherein health facilities, such as hospitals, are expressly enumerated
among those structures allowed within said zone.
Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed to consider
that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term "institutional" as used in
Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration of
allowable uses contained in the same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body
had intended in employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light of the
restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of
others not expressly mentioned.[19] Thus, in interpreting the whole of Section 2,
Article VI, it must be understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses
within a residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded.
Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as
allowable uses within the residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from said
exclusion is that said hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from those
structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in Santa Rosa,
Laguna.
Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing

omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the
omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning
Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone
classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that
said use be removed from those allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the
construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital, within a residential
zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
Be that as it may, even if the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming
structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as it is located in a residential zone where
such use is no longer allowed, said structure cannot now be considered illegal. This is
because the St. James Hospital was constructed during the effectivity of the 1981
Zoning Ordinance, and, as earlier stated, under the said Ordinance, the construction
of a two-storey, ten-bed capacity hospital within a residential zone is explicitly
allowed.
Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming
structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the legality of
the proposed expansion of said hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed medical
institution. We shall decide this said issue in accordance with the provisions of the
1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-conforming buildings, the applicable law at the
time of the proposal. As stated in Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance:
Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful
uses of any building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of
this Ordinance may be continued, although such does not conform with the
provisions of this Ordinance.
1. That no non-conforming use shall [be] enlarge[d] or increased or
exten[ded] to occupy a greater area or land that has already been
occupied by such use at the time of the adoption of this
Ordinance, or moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot
parcel of land where such [non]-conforming use exist at the time of the
[20]
adoption of this Ordinance. (Emphasis ours.)
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the
expansion of a non- conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve
that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity
medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited under the
provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60495, dated 20 January 2003, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new Decision entered:
1. Sustaining that the original two-storey, ten-bed capacity St. James Hospital
is allowable within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna as
long as it shall comply with the provisions on existing non-conforming
buildings under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, as well as the rules and
regulations and standards of the Department of Health, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and all other concerned government
agencies; and
2. Prohibiting the proposed expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-
storey, forty-bed capacity hospital, the proposed expansion being illegal
under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo,

Sr., JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. with Associate Justices
Eduardo P. Cruz and Mario L. Guariña III, concurring. Rollo, pp. 9-19.
[2] O.P. Case No. 98-J-8560. CA rollo, pp. 27-35.
[3] Id. at 36-38.
[4] Id. at 30.
[5] Id. at 32-33.
[6] Id. at 27.
[7] Id. at 34-35.
[8] Id. at 153-154.
[9]
[9] CA rollo, p. 50 and 52.
[10] Section 5, Article XIII.
[11] CA rollo, p. 81.
[12] Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992, 216 SCRA
500, 505, citing Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L. Ed. 351 (1936).
[13] Id. at 506.
[14] Id.
[15] People v. Almuete , 161 Phil. 534, 541 (1976).
[16] People v. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208, 210 (1935).
[17] Article VI, Section 4. USE REGULATIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL ZONE - In the

Institutional Zone, only the following shall be allowed:
1. Government center to move all national, regional, or local offices in the area;
2. Schools;
2.1. Public/Private elementary schools.
2.2. Municipal/Barangay/Private high schools
3. Health facilities;
3.1. Emergency hospital
3.2 health centers
3.3. Multi-purpose clinics
3.4 Day-care centers
4. Religious Facilities such as churches, chapels and other places of worships.
5. Scientific, cultural and academic centers and research facilities. (CA rollo, pp. 51
and 54)
[18]
Id.
[19]
Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, 11 September 1980, 99 SCRA 651, 656.
[20]
CA rollo, p. 69.
9/11/2019 CALTEX INC. v. ENRICO PALOMAR
[ GR No. L-19650, Sep 29, 1966 ]
CALTEX INC. v. ENRICO PALOMAR
DECISION
124 Phil. 763
RUIZ CASTRO, J.:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)
conceived and laid the ground-work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up
patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls
for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex
(Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families
excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is
required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms
are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be
provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called
"Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of
liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next
closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner
kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second;
and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third.
The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional
Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in
each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize
and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners
will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National
Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of
P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional
first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the
final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in
store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; P1,500
for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative
thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and
1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as
follows:
"SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. - No matter belonging to any

of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be
imported into the Philippines through the mails, or be deposited in or carried by
the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts;
(a) Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any
manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or
in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any
money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises."
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders. - Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or
company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the
mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of
the Bureau to return to the person, depositing same in the mails, with the word
'fraudulent' plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail
matter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or
the representative or agent of such person or company."
"SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic
transfer service. - The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him
that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise,
or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting
any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind
through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money
order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any
such person or company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a
firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or
telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent."
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated
October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest
rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-
lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster
General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid
and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7,
1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there
being involved no consideration on the part of any contestant, the contest was not,
under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before
(Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the
contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift
enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December
10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but
as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be
issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for
declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment
be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the
Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring
the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the
respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed
'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner
under the rules marked as Annex B of the petition do not violate the Postal Law
and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the
mails."
The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first,
whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and,
second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law.
We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the
applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is
available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute * * * to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the * * * statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules
of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on
the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination
(Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951;
Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 578, 578-579;
Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the
appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing
crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a
number of significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex) as a
business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to
exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and
stimulate increased patronage for its products, in contrast, the appellant, as the
authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power
and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof - particularly thru the issuance of
fraud orders, under sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code,
against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the
appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To
forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the
mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an
advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the
premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw
a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A
point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute
was thus reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their
respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted
upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood
his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the
appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be
issued against it and all its representatives".
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The
appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed
contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the
privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the
dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on
one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real - not a mere theoretical -
question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To the
appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the
appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a
law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's
bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if
carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent
and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a
tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is
long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted
by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" - which admittedly does not confer a
cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy
when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is
actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133,
citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question
of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the
law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no
room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds
from the assumption that, in the circumstances here presented, the construction of
the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the
appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here.
Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question
of construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the
matter at hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing
down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the
Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction
thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape,
presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the
battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety - nay, the necessity - of
setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity, distemper, animosity,
passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded.
Paraphrasing the language to Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr.,
800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the
appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose
between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive
pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its
proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and
uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually
threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma
which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the
contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect
a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we
weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which
the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1,
Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) - which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law -
we cannot see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility
or prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we
hand down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying
function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the
appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this
jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law * * * shall form a part
of the legal system" (article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial
decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but
also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no
misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just
reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117
A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by
the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics
of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would
be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to
maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the
legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17
App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra.; Thrillo, Inc. vs.
Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost
identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as
absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders
against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any
information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".
Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El
Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the
power of the postal authorities under the above-mentioned provisions of the Postal
Law, this Court declared that -
"* * * while countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the

authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court,
in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States Postmaster
General, viz.: The term 'lottery' extends to all schemes for the distribution of
prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at
fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs.
United States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194
U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and
Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel
Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)"
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance
are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently,
as the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the
existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is
considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid
down a definitive yardstick in the following terms -
"In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the
gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as
criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly
or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. "
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the
language in which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus -
"No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't
have to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liters the Caltex gas
pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from___to ___,
and win valuable prizes x x x."
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the
entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the
drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to
exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even
as we heed the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in
order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking
to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our
appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy
Caltex products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a
consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the
purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to
participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to
buy anything or to give anything of value.
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales
promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by
those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to
draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration does
not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid
down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of
the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that
matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum,
should set the matter at rest:
"The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does
receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the
drawing, does not supply the element of consideration. - Griffith Amusement Co.
v. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W. 2d., 844." (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution
of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind",
which is equally proscribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have
concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if
the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both
curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated,
amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which
opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of consideration, may
nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the
determination of whether or not the proposed contest - wanting in consideration as
we have found it to be, is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub
silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in
explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard
authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods
are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a
chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed.,
p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section
of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13;
Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5
Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at
bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is
attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be
encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of
being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As
stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift
enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of
consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. State,
235 Ala. 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga., 154, 58 S.E.,
88; State ex. rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689,
694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive
authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive
statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration
(E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P.
563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of
Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo. 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas.,
521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18
Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is
explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not
identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift
enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity
for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute
(54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great
Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the
pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the
particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in
association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and
consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis - which
Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only in so far as the element of
chance is concerned - it is only logical that the term under construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration,
so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in
the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration
from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law,
resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory
construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the
mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public
policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar
schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to
inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d.,
839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be
hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no
consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can
hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held -
"Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute 'lottery',

if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is
derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling
spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P.
2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm, ed., p. 695, underscoring
supplied),
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are
persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we
have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated
are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be
denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the
rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
9/11/2019 MAPALAD AISPORNA v. CA
DIVISION
[ GR No. L-39419, Apr 12, 1982 ]
MAPALAD AISPORNA v. CA
DECISION
198 Phil. 838
DE CASTRO*, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the
[1]
decision dated August 14, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the
Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-appellant" of
respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the City Court of
[2]
Cabanatuan rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the petitioner guilty for
having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and
sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of
[3]
Section 189 of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970 in an information which
reads as follows:
"That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of Cabanatuan,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application for
insurance by soliciting therefor the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and
in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized insurance
company, registered under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, resulting
in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the
amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) dated June 21,
1969, without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as
such agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the
Philippines.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
[4]
The facts, as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:
"IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7 March, 1969 and as of 21
June, 1969, appellant's husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by
Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to
expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal
Accident Policy, Exh. D was issued by Perla thru its authorized representative,
Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana
M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during
lifetime of policy, and for reasons not explained in record, present information
was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private prosecutor, charging wife of
Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously acted,
'as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the application of one
Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaña de Seguros, x x x without said
accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the
office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines.'
and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly disputed, that
aforementioned policy was issued with active participation of appellant wife of
Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the wife of
true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was
merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and
at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her
husband's desk to renew x x x."
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the
trial court's decision was affirmed by the respondent appellate court finding the
petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance
[5]
Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed on October 22, 1974.
In its resolution of October 28, 1974,[6] this Court resolved, without giving due course
to this instant petition, to require the respondent to comment on the aforesaid
petition. In the comment[7] filed on December 20, 1974, the respondent, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted that petitioner may not be considered
as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.[8] On April 3, 1975, petitioner
submitted his Brief[9] while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a
manifestation[10] in lieu of a Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the
petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the following
[11]
errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
"1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
CRIME DEFINED BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE
INSURANCE ACT.
"2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE
WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17, INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
"3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
HEREIN PETITIONER."
We find the petition meritorious.

The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated
the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second
paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is necessary to determine whether or
not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by
the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph.
The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:
"No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any
agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for
services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first procured
from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of
such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, subagent, or
broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance, or receive
for services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation
from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent
thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of
January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the
Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring
such authority, such application being approved and countersigned by the
company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by
the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he may require. The
Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to
revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid,
however, in any event after the first day of July of the year following the issuing
of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of the
company.
"Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any
insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an application
for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in
the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent
of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.
"Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in
the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent,
subagent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the
business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the
certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be
issued to such convicted person."
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph thereof
prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or
procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph
defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section and, finally, the
third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the
second paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph.
Thus -
"x x x it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most active endeavors
that resulted in issuance of policy to Isidro, she was there and then acting as
agent, and received the pay therefor - her defense that she was only acting as
helper of her husband can no longer be sustained, neither her point that she
received no compensation for issuance of the policy because
'any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any
insurance company or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a
policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and
penalties, to which an agent of such company is subject.' paragraph 2, Sec. 189,
Insurance Law,
now it is true that information does not even allege that she had obtained the
insurance,
'for compensation'
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its 2nd
paragraph, but what appellant apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not
under the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it is provided that,
'No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker, in the solicitation or procurement
of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance any
commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in
the Philippine Island, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of
authority to act from the insurance commissioner, which must be renewed annually
on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter.'
therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of the charge, so that Errors 2
and 4 must be overruled."[12]
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to imply that
the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not
applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph. Parenthetically,
the respondent court concludes that under the second paragraph of Section 189, a
person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation,
but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for
compensation in order to be called an insurance agent.
We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is
intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of
the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly
provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.
Hence -
"Any person who for compensation x x x shall be an insurance agent within the
intent of this section, x x x."
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true
with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section.
The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended
to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the
aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent
mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid
three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce harmonious whole.[13] A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.[14] The meaning of
the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion
or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole.[15] Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently.[16] More
importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where
a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.[17]
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a
compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph
of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has established ultimately that the
petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance
policy of Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate
court for, according to the latter, the receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance
policy is not an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189
of the Insurance Act.
We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a
misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance
without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing
to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly,
charges no offense.[18] In the case of Bolen vs. Stake,[19] the provision of Section
3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only
who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in such capacity
negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted that
the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance
contract by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation
is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be
sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every
element of the crime must be alleged and proved.[20]
After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the Solicitor
General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted
of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Plana, J., no part.
[*] Mr. Justice de Castro was designated to sit with the First Division under Special
Order No. 225.
[1] p. 21, Rollo.
[2]
p. 11, CA Rollo.
[3] p. 10, CA Rollo.
[4]
pp. 21-22, Rollo.
[5] p. 7, Rollo.
[6]
p. 36, Rollo.
[7] p. 51, Rollo.
[8]
p. 58, Rollo.
[9] p. 69, Rollo.
[10]
p. 71, Rollo.
[11] p. 69, Rollo; p. 6, Brief for the Petitioner.
[12]
pp. 25 and 26, Rollo.
[13] Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709; Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953; Lopez vs. El
Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil. 249; Chartered Bank vs. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931.
[14]
People vs. Polmon, 86 Phil. 350.
[15] 82 C.J.S., Section 345, pp. 699-700.
[16]
Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953.
[17] Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh & Dizon, 75 Phil. 371.
[18]
Jasper vs. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R 197; 164 S.W. 851.
[19] 149 p. 1074, 11 Okla. Crim. 594.
[20]
People vs. Sy Gesiong, 60 Phil. 614.
9/11/2019 PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO. v. IAC
DIVISION
[ GR No. 72005, May 29, 1987 ]
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO. v. IAC
DECISION
234 Phil. 512
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985
[1]
of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 granting private
respondent's motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by
petitioner. The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending
appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In the Resolution of
[2]
September 25, 1985 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course
to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the order complained of.
The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit,
private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial
Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond.[3] The latter in turn posted a
counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00[4] thru petitioner Philippine British
Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.
On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED,

and judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
Varian Industrial Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:
1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with

12% interest per annum from the date of default until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages;
3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and for

attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit.
[5]
SO ORDERED."
Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin
then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in
respondent Court. Varian was required to file its comment but none was filed. In the
Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent Court ordered the execution pending appeal as
prayed for.[6] However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian
failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. In a
Petition dated August 13, 1985filed with respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the
surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond.[7] In compliance
with the Resolution of August 23, 1985 of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed
its comment.[8] In the Resolution of September 12, 1985,[9] the respondent Court
granted the petition. Hence this action.
It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for
reconsideration of the questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a
general rule a motion for reconsideration has been considered a condition sine qua
non for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply when special
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c6d42 [10] 2/8

circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.[10] It has been held further
that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where
execution had been ordered and the need for relief was extremely urgent.[11]
The counterbond provides:
"WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court,

National Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of
Attachment was issued against above-named Defendant;
WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order
of attachment issued against them in the above-entitled case, have offered to file
a counter-bond in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as provided for in
Section 5, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal

and the PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation
duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, as
Surety, in consideration of the above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order
of attachment, hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the above
Plaintiff in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the condition that in case
the Plaintiff recovers judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-
deliver the attached property so released to the Officer of the Court and the same
shall be applied to the payment of the judgment, or in default thereof, the
defendant and Surety will, on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of the
property released.
[12]
EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984."
Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:
SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. - The officer executing the order shall
without delay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the
properties of the party against whom the order is issued in the province, not
exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of
the court from which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the
applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an
amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be attached, to
secure payment to the applicant of any judgment which he may recover in the
action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of the applicant's affidavit
and bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found
within the province.
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. - At any time after
an order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been
attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to
the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the
court in which the action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment
wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the
discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond
executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the
clerk or judge of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to
the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.
Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served on
the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in
accordance with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the
proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or
giving the counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released.
Should such counter-bond for any reason be found to be, or become, insufficient,
and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the
attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.
SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. - If the
execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on
any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the pay-
ment of the judgment shall become charged on such counter-bond, and bound to
pay to the judgment creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment,
which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and
summary hearing in the same action. (Underscoring supplied)
Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the
counterbond is intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching
creditor may recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it provides that
when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that
"payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counterbond."
The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed
reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated
that the counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the judgment". Neither the
rules nor the provisions of the counter-bond limited its application to a final and
executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment of any
judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that
an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied
maybe charged against such a counterbond.
It is well recognized rule that where the Law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. UbiLex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.[13] The rule,
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a
statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.[14] The
rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one
part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of
the law.[15] In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated.[16] For courts are not authorized to distinguish
where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as
they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.[17]
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception,
courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason
[18]
apparent in the law to justify it. Thus where a statute grants a person against
whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for
unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of
land, whether agricultural, residential, or mineral.[19] Since the law in this case does
not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it speaks of "any
judgment" which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to
refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment
pending appeal.
All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as
[20]
outlined in the case of Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart,
"Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the
surety on the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued
against the principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in
whole or in part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a
summary hearing on the same action as to his liability for the judgment under
his counterbond."
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not
only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending
appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
restraining order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.
[1]
Annex A, Petition, page 22, Rollo.
[2] Page 61, Rollo.
[3]
[3] Annex H, Petition, page 56, Rollo.
[4]
Annex D, page 36, Rollo.
[5] Annex B, Petition, page 29, Rollo.
[6]
Annex C, Pages 31-35, Rollo, Annex C, Page 40, Rollo.
[7] Annex F, Pages 41-42, Rollo.
[8]
Annex G, Pages 47-55, Rollo.
[9] Annex A, Pages 22-23, Rollo.
[10]
Uy Chu vs. Imperial, et al., 44 Phil. 27, Matutina vs. Buslon, et al., L-14637, Aug.
24, 1960, 109 Phil. 140.
[11] Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De Marbella, et al., L-16088, September 30, 1960, 109
Phil. 734 and Socio vs. Vda. de Leary, 12 SCRA 326, 329.
[12]
Annex D, page 36, Rollo.
[13] Colgate-Palmolive Phil., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 14787, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA
267 (1961); Libudan v. Gil, G.R. No. 21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17 (1972);
Dominador v. Derahunan, 49 Phil. 452 (1926); Guevarra v. Inocentes, G.R. No. 25577,
March 15, 1966, 16 SCRA 379 (1966); Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522,
Jan. 28, 1963; Alfato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749, March 31, 1981,
103 SCRA 741 (1981); Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986, pp. 143-144.
[14]
14 Loc Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946).
[15] Social Security System v. City of Bacolod, G.R. No. 35726, July 21, 1982, 115
SCRA 412 (1982); Director of lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, Jan. 28, 1983.
[16]
Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, supra.
[17] Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720 (1903).
[18]
Tolentino v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948).
[19] Social Security System v. City of Bacolod, supra; see also Robles v. Zambales
Chromite Co., 104 Phil. 688 (1958); Government v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32
Phil. 634 (1915); Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, Jan. 28, 1983; Oliva
v. Lamadrid, G.R. No. 23196, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 737 (1967); Escosura v. San
Miguel Brewery, Inc., 114 Phil. 225 (1962); Alfato v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 52749, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741 (1981); Liggett & Myers Tobacco v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 9415, April 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 106 (1957); Tiu
San v. Republic, 96 Phil. 817 (1955); Agpalo, supra, pp. 143-147.
[20]
80 SCRA 262, 264 (1977); See also Leelin Marketing Corp. v. C & S Agro Dev.
Co., 121 SCRA 725, 730-731 (1983); Dizon vs. Valdez, 23 SCRA 200, 203 (1968).
9/11/2019 BANCO DE ORO SAVINGS v. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION
DIVISION
[ GRNo. L-74917, Jan 20, 1988 ]
BANCO DE ORO SAVINGS v. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION
DECISION
241 Phil. 187
GANCAYCO, J.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City promulgated on March 24, 1986 in Civil Case No. Q-46517 entitled Banco
de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank versus Equitable Banking Corporation and the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation after a review of the Decision of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) in the case of
Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC) vs. Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage
(BCO), ARBICOM Case No. 84-033.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cebc9 1/15
“It appears that sometime in March, April. May and August 1983, plaintiff
through its Visa Card Department, drew six crossed Manager's check (Exhibits
‘A’ to ‘F’, and herein referred to as Checks) having an aggregate amount of Forty-
Five Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty-Two & 23/100 (P45,982.23) Pesos and
payable to certain member establishments of Visa Card. Subsequently, the
checks were deposited with the defendant to the credit of its depositor, a certain
Aida Trencio.
Following normal procedures, and after stamping at the back of the Checks the
usual endorsements: ‘All prior and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed' the
defendant sent the checks for clearing through the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC). Accordingly, plaintiff paid the Checks; its clearing account
was debited for the value of the Checks and defendant’s clearing account was
credited for the same amount.
Thereafter, plaintiff discovered that the endorsements appearing at the back of

the Checks and purporting to be that of the payees were forged and/or
unauthorized or otherwise belong to persons other than the payees.
Pursuant to the PCHC Clearing Rules and Regulations, plaintiff presented the
Checks directly to the defendant for the purpose of claiming reimbursement
from the latter. However, defendant refused to accept such direct presentation
and to reimburse the plaintiff for the value of the Checks; hence, this case.
In its Complaint, plaintiff prays for judgment to require the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P45,982.23 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
the date of the complaint plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00 as
well as the cost of the suit.
In accordance with Section 38 of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations, the
dispute was presented for Arbitration; and Atty. Ceasar Querubin was designated
as the Arbitrator.
After an exhaustive investigation and hearing the Arbiter rendered a decision in

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the PCHC to debit the
clearing account of the defendant, and to credit the clearing account of the
plaintiff of the amount of P45,982.23 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from date of the complaint a.d Attorney's fee in the amount of P5,000.00. No
pronouncement as to cost was made.”[1]
In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the Board of Directors of the
PCHC affirmed the decision of the said Arbiter in this wise:
“”In view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Arbiter is confirmed"; and the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation is hereby ordered to debit the clearing
account of the defendant and credit the clearing account of plaintiff the amount
of Forty Five Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Two & 23/100 (P45,982.23) Pesos
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date of the complaint, and the
Attorney’s fee in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos.”’
Thus, a petition for review was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch XCH, wherein in due course a decision was rendered affirming in toto the
decision of the PCHC.
Hence this petition.
The petition is focused on the following issues;

1. Did the PCHC have any jurisdiction to give due course to and adjudicate
Arbicom Case No. 84-033?
2. Were the subject checks non-negotiable and if not, does it fall under the
ambit of the power of the PCHC?
3. Is the Negotiable Instrument Law, Act No. 2031 applicable in deciding

controversies of this nature by the PCHC?
4. What law should govern in resolving controversies of this nature?
5. Was the petitioner bank negligent and thus responsible for any undue
payment?
Petitioner maintains that the PCHC is not clothed with jurisdiction because the
Clearing House Rules and Regulations of the PCHC cover and apply only to checks
that are genuinely negotiable. Emphasis is laid on the primary purpose of the PCHC in
the Articles of Incorporation, which states:
“To provide, maintain and render an effective, convenient, efficient, economical
and relevant exchange and facilitate service limited to check processing and
sorting by way of assisting member banks, entities in clearing checks and other
clearing items as defined in existing and in future Central Bank of the Philippines
circulars, memoranda, circular letters, rules and regulations and policies in
pursuance to the provisions of Section 107 of R.A. 265. . .”.
and Section 107 of R.A. 265 which provides:

“xxx xxx xxx
The deposit reserves maintained by the banks in the Central Bank, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 1000 shall serve as a basis for the clearing of
checks, and the settlement of interbank balances . . .”
Petitioner argues that by law and common sense, the term check should be
interpreted as one that fits the articles of incorporation of the PCHC, the Central Bank
and the Clearing House Rules stating that it is a negotiable instrument citing the
definition of a “check” as basically a “bill of exchange” under Section 185 of the NIL
and that it should be payable to “order” orto “bearer” under Section 126 of same law.
Petitioner alleges that with the cancellation of the printed word “or bearer” from the
face of the check; it becomes non-negotiable so the PCHC has no jurisdiction over the
case.
The Regional Trial Court took exception to this stand and conclusion put forth by the
herein petitioner as it held:
“Petitioner’s theory cannot be maintained. As will be noted, the PCHC makes no

distinction as to the character or nature of the checks subject of its jurisdiction.
The pertinent provisions quoted in petitioners memorandum simply refer to
check(s). Where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish.
In the case of Reyes vs. Chuanico (CA-G.R. No. 208.13-R, Feb. 5, 1962) the
Appellate Court categorically stated that there are four kinds of checks in this
jurisdiction; the regular check; the cashier's check; the traveler’s check; and the
crossed check. The Court, further elucidated, that while the Negotiable
Instruments Law does not contain any provision on crossed checks, it is common
practice in commercial and banking operations to issue checks of this character,
obviously in accordance with Article 541 of the Code of Commerce. Attention is
likewise called to Section 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:
‘Sec. 185. Check defined. — A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank
payable on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of
this act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a
check.’
and the provisions of Section 61 (supra) that the drawer may insert in the instrument
an express stipulation negating or limiting his own liability to the holder.
Consequently, it appears that the use of the-term ‘check’ in the Articles of
Incorporation of PCHC is to be perceived as not limited to negotiable checks only, but
to checks as is generally known in use in commercial or business transactions.
Anent Petitioner’s liability on said instruments, this court is in full accord with the
ruling of the PCHC Board of Directors that:
‘In presenting the Checks for clearing and for payment, the defendant made an
express guarantee on the validity of ‘all prior endorsements.’ Thus, stamped, at
the back of the checks are the defendant’s clear warranty; ALL PRIOR
ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED.
Without such warranty, plaintiff would not have paid on the checks.
No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant's

warranty. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is
liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.
The principle of estoppel, effectively prevents the defendant from denying

liability for any damage sustained by the plaintiff which, relying upon an action
or declaration of the defendant, paid on the Checks. The same principle of
estoppel effectively prevents the defendant from denying the existence of the
Checks.’ (Pp. 10-11 Decision; pp. 43-44, Rollo)”
We agree.
As provided in the aforecited articles of incorporation of PCHC its operation extend to

“clearing checks and other clearing items.” No doubt transactions on non-negotiable
checks are within the ambit of its jurisdiction.
In a previous case, this Court had occasion to rule: “Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos
distinguere debemos.[2] It was enunciated in Loc Cham v. Ocampo, 11 Phil. 636
(1946):
“The rule, founded on logic is a corollary of the principle that general words and
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general
significance. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated.”
There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated

for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They
should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it
and without regard to consequences.[3]
The term, check as used in the said Articles of Incorporation of PCHC can only
connote checks in general use in commercial, and business activities. It cannot be

conceived to be limited to negotiable checks only.
Checks are used between banks and bankers and their customers, and are designed to
facilitate banking operations. It is of their essence to be payable on demand, because
the contract between the banker and the customer is that the money is needed on
demand.[4]
The participation of the two banks, petitioner and private respondent, in the clearing
operations of PCHC is a manifestation of their submission to its jurisdiction. Sec. 3
and 36.6 of the PCHC-CHRR clearing rules and regulations provide:
“SEC. 3. AGREEMENT TO THESE RULES. — It is the general agreement and
understanding, that any participant in the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation, MICR clearing operations by the mere fact of their participation,
thereby manifests its agreement to these Rules and Regulations and its
subsequent amendments.”
Sec. 36.6. (ARBITRATION) — The fact that a bank participates in the clearing
operations of the PCHC shall be deemed its written and subscribed consent to
the binding effect of this arbitration agreement as if it had done so in accordance
with Section 4 of (the) Republic Act No. 876, otherwise known as the Arbitration
Law.”
Further Section 2 of the Arbitration Law mandates:

“Two or more persons or parties may submit to the arbitration of one or more
arbitrators any controversy existing between them at the time of the submission
and which may be the subject of an action, or the parties of any contract may in
such contract agree to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
between them. Such submission or contract shall be valid and irrevocable, save
upon grounds as exist at law for the revocation of any contract.
"Such submission or contract may include question arising out of valuations,

appraisals or other controversies which may be collateral, incidental, precedent
or subsequent to any issue between the parties x x x"
Sec. 21 of the same rules, says:

“Items which have been the subject of material alteration or items bearing a
forged endorsement when such endorsement is necessary for negotiation shall
be returned by direct presentation or demand to the Presenting Bank and not
through the regular clearing house facilities within the period prescribed by law
for the filing of a legal action by the returning bank/branch, institution or entity
sending the same.” (Italics supplied)
Viewing these provisions the conclusion is clear that the PCHC Rules arid Regulations
should not be interpreted to be applicable only to checks which are negotiable
instruments but also to non-negotiable instruments, and that the PCHC has
jurisdiction over this case even as the checks subject of this litigation are admittedly
non-negotiable.
Moreover, petitioner is estopped from raising the defense of non-negotiability of the

checks in question. It stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks and
subsequently presented these checks for clearing and it was on the basis of these
endorsements by the petitioner that the proceeds were credited in its clearing account.
The petitioner by its own acts and representation can not now deny liability because it
assumed the liabilities of an endorser by stamping its guarantee at the back of the
checks.
The petitioner having stamped its guarantee of “all prior endorsements and/or lack of
endorsements” (Exh. A-2 to F- 2) is now estopped from claiming that the checks
under consideration are not negotiable instruments. The checks were accepted for
deposit by the petitioner stamping thereon its guarantee, in order that it can clear the
said checks with the respondent bank. By such deliberate and positive attitude of the
petitioner it has for all legal intents and purposes treated the said checks as negotiable
instruments and accordingly assumed the warranty of the endorser when it stamped
its guarantee of prior endorsements at the back of the checks. It led the said
respondent to believe that it was acting as endorser of the checks and on the strength
of this guarantee said respondent cleared the checks in question and credited the
account of the petitioner.
Petitioner is now barred from taking an opposite posture by claiming that the
disputed checks are not negotiable instrument.
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cebc9 [ ] 8/15
This Court enunciated in Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[5] a point
relevant to the issue when it stated – “the doctrine of estoppel is based upon the
grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice and its purpose is to
forbid one to speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the injury
of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.”
A commercial bank cannot escape the liability of an endorser of a check and which
may turn out to be a forged endorsement. Whenever any bank treats the signature at
the back of the checks as endorsements and thus logically guarantees the same as such
there can be no doubt said bank has considered the checks as negotiable.
Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this Court has succinctly emphasized
that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the
duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of
presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making
the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements.
This is laid down in the case of PNB vs. National City Bank.[6] In another case, this
court held that if the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged
after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof, it can recover the
amount paid from the collecting bank.[7]
A truism stated by this Court is that — “The doctrine of estoppel precludes a party
from repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed after having accepted benefits
therefrom. To countenance such repudiation would be contrary to equity and put
premium on fraud or misrepresentation.”[8]
We made clear in Our decision in Philippine National Bank vs. The National City
Bank of NY & Motor Service Co. that:
“Where a check is accepted or certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the bank is
estopped to deny the genuineness of the drawer's signature and his capacity to issue
the instrument.
If a drawee bank pays a forged check which was previously accepted or certified by the
said bank, it can not recover from a holder who did not participate in the forgery and
did not have actual notice thereof.
The payment of a check does not include or imply its acceptance in the sense that this
word is used in Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.”[9]
The point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing
to discover the alteration or the forgery.
Very akin to the case at bar is one which involves a suit filed by the drawer of checks
against the collecting bank and this came about in Farmers State Bank[10] where it
was-held:
“A cause of action against the (collecting bank) in favor of the appellee (the
drawer) accrued as a result of the bank breaching its implied warranty of the
genuineness of the indorsements of the name of the payee by bringing about the
presentation of the checks (to the drawee bank) and collecting the amounts
thereof, the right to enforce that cause of action was not destroyed by the
circumstance that another cause of action for the recovery of the amounts paid
on the checks would have accrued in favor of the appellee against another or to
others than the bank if when the checks were paid they have been indorsed by
the payee.” (United States vs. National Exchange Bank, 214 US, 302, 29 S CT-
665, 53 L.Ed 1006,16 Am. Cas. 1184; Onondaga County Savings Bank vs. United
States (E.C. A.) 64 F 703).”
Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments ordains that:

“Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent
holders in due course" (a) that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what
it purports to be; (b) that he has good title to it; (c) that all prior parties have
capacity to contract; and (d) that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement
[11]
valid and subsisting.
It has been enunciated in an American case particularly in American Exchange

National Bank vs. Yorkville Bank[12] that: "the drawer owes no duty of diligence to
the collecting bank (one who had accepted an altered check and had paid over the
proceeds to the depositor) except of seasonably discovering the alteration by a
comparison of its returned checks and check stubs or other equivalent record, and to
inform the drawee thereof.”
In this case it was further held that:

“The real and underlying reasons why negligence of the drawer constitutes no
defense to the collecting bank are that there is no privity between the drawer and
the collecting bank (Corn Exchange Bank vs. Nassau Bank, 204 N.Y.S. 80) and
the drawer owes to that bank no duty of vigilance (New York Produce Exchange
Bank vs. Twelfth Ward Bank, 204 N.Y.S. 54) and no act of the collecting bank is
induced by any act or representation or admission of the drawer (Seaboard
National Bank vs. Bank of America (supra) and it follows that negligence on the
part of the drawer cannot create any liability from it to the collecting bank, and
the drawer thus is neither a necessary nor a proper party to an action by the
drawee bank against such bank. It is quite true that depositors in banks are
under the obligation of examining their passbooks and returned vouchers as a
protection against the payment by the depository bank against forged checks,
and negligence in the performance of that obligation may relieve that bank of
liability for the repayment of amounts paid out on forged checks, which but for
such negligence it would be bound to repay. A leading case on that subject is
Morgan vs. United States Mortgage and Trust Col. 208 N.Y. 218, 101 N.E. 871
Amn. Cas. 19I4D, 462, L.R.A. 1915D, 74.”
Thus We hold that while the drawer generally owes no duty of diligence to the
collecting bank, the law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to
scrutinize checks deposited with it for the purpose of determining their genuineness
and regularity. The collecting bank being primarily engaged in banking holds itself out
to the public as the expert and the law holds it to a high standard of conduct.
And although the subject checks are non-negotiable the responsibility of petitioner as
indorser thereof remains.
To countenance a repudiation by the petitioner of its obligation would be contrary to

equity and would deal a negative blow to the whole banking system of this country.
The court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the PCHC in its
decision —
Payments To Persons Other

Than The Payees Are Not Valid
"II.
And Give Rise To An Obligation
To Return Amounts Received.
Nothing is more clear than that neither the defendant’s depositor nor the
defendant is entitled to receive payment for the Checks. As the checks are not
payable to defendant’s depositor, payments to persons other than payees named
therein, their successor-in- interest or any person authorized to receive payment
are not valid. Article 1240, New Civil Code of the Philippines unequivocably
provides that:
‘Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation
has been constituted, or his successor-in-interest, or any person authorized to
receive it.’
Considering that neither the defendant’s depositor nor the defendant is entitled
to receive payments for the Checks, payments to any of them give rise to an
obligation to return the amounts received. Section 2154 of the New Civil Code
mandates that: —
‘Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
It is contended that plaintiff should be held responsible for issuing the Checks
notwithstanding that the underlying transactions were fictitious. This contention
has no basis in our jurisprudence.
The nullity of the underlying transactions does not diminish, but in fact
strengthens, plaintiffs right to recover from the defendant. Such nullity clearly
emphasizes the obligation of the payees to return the proceeds of the Checks. If a
failure of consideration is sufficient to warrant a finding that a payee is not
entitled to payment or must return payment already made, with more reason the
defendant, who is neither the payee nor the person authorized by the payee,
should be compelled to surrender the proceeds of the Checks received by it.
Defendant does not have any title to the Checks; neither can it claim any
derivative title to them.
Having Violated Its Warranty

On Validity Of All Endorsements,
"III. Collecting Bank Cannot Deny
Liability To Those Who Relied
On Its Warranty.
In presenting the Checks for clearing and for payment, the defendant made an
express guarantee on the validity of all prior endorsements.’ Thus, stamped at
the bank of the checks are the defendant’s clear warranty: ALL PRIOR
ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED.
Without such warranty, plaintiff would not have paid on the checks.
No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant's

warranty. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is
liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.
The principle of estoppel effectively prevents the defendant from denying

liability for any damages sustained by the plaintiff which, relying upon an action
or declaration of the defendant, paid on the Checks..The same principle of
estoppel effectively prevents the defendant from denying the existence of the
Checks.
Whether the Checks have been issued for valuable considerations or not is of no
serious moment to this case. These Checks have been made the subject of
contracts of endorsement wherein the defendant made expressed warranties to
induce payment by the drawer of the Checks; and the defendant cannot now
refuse liability for breach of warranty as a consequence of such forged
endorsements. The defendant has falsely warranted in favor of plaintiff the
validity of all endorsements and the genuineness of the checks in all respects
what they purport to be.
The damage that will result if judgment is not rendered for the plaintiff is
irreparable. The collecting bank has privity with the depositor who is the
principal culprit in this case. The defendant knows the depositor; her address
and her history. Depositor is defendant's client. It has taken a risk on its
depositor when it allowed her to collect on the crossed-checks.
Having accepted the crossed checks from persons other than the payees, the
defendant is guilty of negligence; the risk of wrongful payment has to be
assumed by the defendant.
On the matter of the award of the interest and attorney’s fees, the Board of
Directors finds no reason to reverse the decision of the Arbiter. The
defendant’s failure to reimburse the plaintiff has constrained the plaintiff to hire
the services of counsel in order to protect its interest notwithstanding that
plaintiffs claim is plainly valid, just and demandable. In addition, defendant's
clear obligation is to reimburse plaintiff upon direct presentation of the checks;
and it is undenied that up to this time the defendant has failed to make such
reimbursement.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement

as to costs. The decision of the respondent court of 24 March 1986 and its order of 3
June 1986 are hereby declared to be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and Paras, JJ., concur.
[1]
Decision, pp. 2-3. pp. 35-36, Rollo. These arc the findings of facts in the said
decision of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC), board of directors in
Arbitration Case No. 84-033, which are final and conclusive upon all patries in said
arbitration dispute appealable only on question of law. (Section 13 PCHC-ARR, rules
of procedure).
[2]
Phil. Veiriah Assurance Co. Inc. vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court,
Sycwin Coating and Wires Inc. and Aminador Cacpal. Chief Deputy Sheriff of
Manila G.R. 72005.
[3]
Loc Cham vs. Ocampo, supra.
[4] Barker v. Anderson, 21 Wend. (N.Y.), 2 Sto. 502, Fed. Case No. 1,985; Merchants
National Bank v. Bank, 10 Wall (U.S.) 647,19 L. Ed. 1008; Wood River Bank v. Bank,
36 Neb. 744 N.W. 239.
[5] 94 SCRA 357.
[6] 63 Phil. 711.
[7] Republic Bank vs. Ebrada, 65 SCRA 680.
[8] 10 Saura Import & Export Co., 24 SCRA 974.
[9] Supra.
[10] Markel vs. United States, 62 F ed. 178.
[11] Ang Tiong vs. Ting, L-16767, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 713.
[12] 204 N.Y.S. 621 101 N.E. 871 Amn. Cas. 1914D, 462, L.R.A. 191D, 74.
9/11/2019 ELENA SALENILLAS v. CA
DIVISION
[ GR No. 78687, Jan 31, 1989 ]
ELENA SALENILLAS v. CA
DECISION
251 Phil. 764
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
[1] [2]
decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari against
Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private
respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question of law, i.e., the coverage and
application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known
otherwise as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of
the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of
title was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on
December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an
Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena
Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena
Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte
was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by
T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently
released on November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00.
Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time
in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c6fa7 1/7
a loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding,
pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the
mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981.
The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said
public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the
Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a
"Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17, 1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent,
Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September
22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private
respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however attempted on
November 17, 1983, to place the property in the possession of the private respondent,
the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead
offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984,
another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by
the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984,
opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to
repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal
offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession
prayed for by the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
the order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial
court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12,
1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying
their motion for reconsideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due
course to the petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in
support of their respective positions; and restrained the trial court and the private
respondent from executing, implementing, or otherwise giving effect to the assailed
writ of possession until further orders from the court.[3] However, in a decision
promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the
case for lack of merit. According to the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT
No. P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on
February 28, 1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property provided for in
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already started.
From this fact alone, the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting that
the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance"
contemplated by the law, We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners.[4]
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,[5] the appellate court went on to
hold that the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent
court in consonance with Monge, is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the
property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to
repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration.
Their motion apparently went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent
appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below,
their right to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act
has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of
Paras vs. Court of Appeals[6] and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.[7]
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision,
states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners
disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they
(the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of
Section 119 of the Public Land Act.[8]
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the
petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of
the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative,
whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their
property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are
bestowed the right to repurchase -- the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal
heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the the
respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of
repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale,
has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the
Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena
Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even
on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs", makes no distinction.
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate
court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act
which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and
his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor
in clearing and cultivating it.[9] Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of
the spouses Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that
allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in
keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two
statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should
prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised,
we rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property has
not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,[10] cited as authority by the respondent
Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there
are substantially different from those in this case. In Monge, the conveyance involved
was a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question
raised there was whether the five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be
counted from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or
from the date the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the
purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it."[11] It is therefore
understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro
immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally, possession over the property on the
vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase within the
stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.
The cases[12] pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other
hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases
involved properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or
free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and,
upon failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed.
In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to repurchase a homestead
sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the
expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed
thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not otherwise.
Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property
sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the
"Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to
repurchase -- the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31,
1984 -- were both made within the prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of
the purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per
month up to November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes
on the property that the private respondent might have paid after purchase and
interest on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price.[13]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986,
and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated
September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial
Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another
one ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey the subject property and
to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners
upon the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of
assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both
amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1] Promulgated on September 17, 1986; Ejercito, B.C., J., ponente; Coquia, J.R. and
Martinez, A.M., JJ., concurring.
[2] CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04603, Elena Salenillas, et al. vs. Hon. Raymundo Seva, etc., et
al.
[3] Rollo, 20.
[4] Id., 16.
[5] 101 Phil 563 (1957).
[6] 91 Phil 389 (1952).
[7] 101 Phil 968 (1957).
[8] Rollo, id., 44.
[9]
[9] Santana vs. Mariñas, No. L-35537, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 853; Vargas vs.
Court of Appeals, No. L-35666, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 195; Simeon vs. Peña, No. L-
29049, December 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 610.
[10] Supra.
[11] Id., 564.
[12] Paras vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; and Manuel vs. Philippine National
Bank, et al., supra.
[13] PNB vs. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-60208, December 5, 1985, 140 SCRA 360;
Dulay vs. Carriaga, No. L-52831, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 794; DBP vs. Zaragosa, No.
L-23493, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 668.
9/11/2019 AGRIPINO DEMAFILES v. COMELEC
[ GR No. L-28396, Dec 29, 1967 ]
AGRIPINO DEMAFILES v. COMELEC
DECISION
129 Phil. 792
RUIZ CASTRO, J.:

[1]
The new municipality of Sebaste in Antique province held its first election of
officers in the general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino
Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty.
On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as
municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167(b) of the Revised Election
Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return from precinct 7
on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188
voted), when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182
had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1967. At its session on the following
day, November 22, the board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject the
return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the
other precincts. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for
Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of
Sebaste.
On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the
board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent
proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito
Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Acting
on the protest, the COMELEC resolved on November 28, 1967:
"To annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new
municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the Provincial Board of
Antique;
"To constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant

to the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the Revised Election Code, which shall canvass
anew the results of the election for local offices of Sebaste, Antique, in accord-
ance with the Instructions to Boards of Canvassers contained in the Resolution of
the Commission No. RR-544, particularly No. 5-K thereof, and thereafter to
proclaim the winning candidates for local offices of said municipality."
In turn, Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two members of the
provincial board who were reelectionists were disqualified from sitting only when the
board was acting as a provincial, but not as a municipal, board of canvassers and that
the COMELEC resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was
issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. In its resolution of December
4, 1967 the respondent Commission reconsidered its previous order and held "that the
canvass and proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands".
Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed the present
petition for mandamus and certiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC, to annul the proclamation of Galido, and to secure an order directing the
COMELEC to appoint substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new
canvass of the returns, including that from precinct 7.
The three principal issues tendered for resolution in this case are: (1) whether the
respondent board of canvassers was within the periphery of its power in rejecting the
return from precinct 7 on the strength of an election registrar's certificate that a less
number of votes than that shown in the return had registered; (2) whether the
provincial board members, who were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from
sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvasssers; and (3)
whether the Commission on Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a
return from a given precinct.
These issues, together with the arguments of the parties, will be discussed seriatim,
but we must first proceed to dispose of the preliminary question raised by the res-
pondent Galido, namely, that this case is moot because he had taken his oath and
assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870.
Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads:
"The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste shall
be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified
[sic]."
In our view the last portion of the provision -- "and shall have qualified" -- is devoid of
any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the res-
pondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste
begins immediately after their proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the
legislature meant. But here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a
becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and,
consequently, from supplying. "If there is no meaning in it," said the King in Alice in
Wonderland, "that saves a world of trouble you know, as we needn't try to find any."
Frankfurter, who himself was fond of quoting this passage, admonishes that "a judge
must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations
the statemanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew
interpolation and evisceration."[2] Accordingly, we have to go by the general rule that
the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January
following their election,[3] and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido
in no way affected the basic issues in this case, which we now reach and resolve.
First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function - that of compiling
and adding the results as they appear in the returns transmitted to it. This is the
[4]
teaching in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections: "the canvassers are to
be satisfied of the genuiness of the returns - namely, that the papers presented to
them are not forged and spurious, that they are returns, and that they are signed by
the proper officers. When so satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns because of
informalities in them or because of illegal and fraudulent practices in the elections."
[5]
Thus, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it
from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it
[6]
came are illegal.
But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that
it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there
were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election
registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967. Lagumbay v.
Commission on Elections[7] is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns
were palpably false as it was indeed statistically improbable that "all the eight
candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same
number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing." In
other words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not needed, as "the fraud [being] so
palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur -the thing speaks for itself), there is
no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value."
On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face from which the
canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the truth. It is only when it is
compared with the certificate of the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to
the number of registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously
manufactured" so as to justify its exclusion.
This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered voters
were allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the petitioner claims
that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed to register (making a total
of 190 voters), and on the day of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to precinct
6 were allowed to vote in precinct 7 because that was where they were really assigned.
The point is simply that this question should be threshed out in an election contest.
Lagumbay itself explicitly says -?
"Of course we agree that fraud in the holding of the election should be handled -
and finally settled - by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is
the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence is necessary . . . "
[8]
Consequently, the canvass made and proclamation had should be annulled.
Second, the canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four
members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being
candidates for reelection. As this Court held in Salcedo v. Commission on Elections:
[9]
"An added reason for the nullification of the actuation of the Provincial Board of
Oriental Mindoro is the fact that its members were disqualified to act it
appearing that they were all candidates for reelection. This is clear from Section
28 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any member of the
provincial board who is a candidate for an elective office shall be incompetent to
act in said board in the performance of its duties in connection with the
election."
Branding the above statement as obiter dictum, the respondent Galido argues that re-
electionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only
when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them from
canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers.
With respect to the canvass and proclamation made by the provincial board of
Oriental Mindoro, three issues were raised in Salcedo, in resolving which this Court
held (1) that a provincial board cannot act as a municipal board of canvassers where a
municipal council has been formed; (2) that provincial board members who are
candidates for reelection are disqualified to sit in the board; and (3) that a board of
canvassers which excludes from canvass the return from a precinct acts "in
contravention of law."
At any rate the language of section 28 is all-inclusive. Thus:
"Any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council who is a candidate

for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on said body in the
performance of the duties thereof relative to said election . . . "
The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial
board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal canvassing body for
new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distingueredebemos.
Third, it is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal
canvass and an illegal proclamation as when they are based on incomplete returns,
and order a new canvass to be made by counting the returns wrongfully excluded.[10]
If it has power to direct that certain copies of election returns be used in preference to
other copies of the same returns,[11] there is no reason why it cannot direct can-
vassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. Indeed, it is its duty
to do so, failing which it may be compelled by mandamus. As earlier pointed out, it is
the ministerial function of a board of canvassers to count the results as they appear in
the returns which on their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions dated December 4 and 8, 1967 of the Commission
on Elections are set aside, and the canvass of returns made and the subsequent
proclamation of the respondent Benito B. Galido are annulled. The respondent
Commission on Elections is hereby directed (1) to appoint new members of the board
of canvassers in substitution of Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, and (2)
immediately thereafter to order the board of canvassers as reconstituted to convene,
canvass all votes including those appearing in the return from precinct 7, and, in
accordance with the results of such canvass, proclaim the winning candidates. Costs
against the private respondent Galido.
Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, Sanchez, and Angeles JJ., concur.
Dizon, Zaldivar, and Fernando. JJ., took no part.
[1]
Created by virtue of Republic Act 4870.
[2] Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Readingof Statutes, 47 Columbia Law
Review 527, 533 (1947).
[3]
Revised Election Code, Sec. 7
[4] 85 Phil. 149, 157-158 (1949).
[5]
Id. at 157-158.
[6] Abendante vs. Relato, 94 Phil. 8 (1953).
[7]
L-25444, Jan. 31, 1966
[8] Salcedo vs. Commission on Elections, L-16360, Jan. 30, 1960.
[9]
Id..
[10] Abendante vs. Relato, supra, note 6; Olaño vs. Ronquillo, L-17912, May 31, 1963;
Lacson vs. Commis- sion on Elections, L-16261, Dec. 28, 1961.
[11]
Espino vs. Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967.
9/11/2019 TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION v. RUFINA
523 Phil. 766
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 160191, June 08, 2006 ]
TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. RUFINA AND

COMPANY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
From the records, it appears that on 3 December 1991, Twin Ace Holdings
[1]
Corporation (Twin Ace) filed a Complaint for recovery of possession of personal
property, permanent injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin, temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against
Rufina and Company (Rufina).
As alleged in the complaint, Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture of rhum, wines and liquor under the name and style "Tanduay
Distillers." It has registered its mark of ownership of its bottles with the Bureau of
Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer under Republic Act No. 623. In the
conduct of its business, it sells its products to the public excluding the bottles. It
makes substantial investments in brand new bottles which it buys from glass factories
and which they use for about five times in order to recover the cost of acquisition.
Twin Ace thus retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses them over and over
again as containers for its products.
On the other hand, Rufina is engaged in the production, extraction, fermentation and
manufacture of patis and other food seasonings and is engaged in the buying and
selling of all kinds of foods, merchandise and products for domestic use or for export
to other countries. In producing patis and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as
containers bottles owned by Twin Ace without any authority or permission from the
latter. In the process, Rufina is unduly benefited from the use of the bottles.
Upon the posting of Twin Ace of the required bond, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/ca1df 1/11
Manila, Branch 26, issued an Order dated 5 February 1992 granting the application
for the issuance of a writ of replevin.[2] Upon the implementation of the said writ,
Deputy Sheriff Amado P. Sevilla was able to seize a total of 26,241 empty bottles
marked "TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC.,"[3] at the address of Rufina.
In its Answer with counter-application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina

claimed that the marked bottles it used as containers for its products were purchased
from junk dealers; hence, it became the owner thereof.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision dated 20 May 1995 the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the defendant as follows:
a) dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;
b) dissolving the order of replevin;
c) ordering the plaintiff to return 26,241 bottles to the defendant in the place
where the bottles were seized at the expense of the plaintiff within 48 hours from
receipt hereof;
d) ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P100,000.00 as actual
damages sustained by the latter to be taken from the replevin bond;
e) ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P1,000,000.00 as

damages for besmirched reputation;
f) ordering the plaintiff to pay the sum of P100,00.00 as nominal damages;
g) ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P50,000.00 as

attorney's fee; and
[4]
h) ordering the plaintiff to pay the cost of the suit.
Twin Ace appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 September 2002, the appellate
court rendered its decision[5] modifying the decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision dated May 20,
1995 of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court, Manila, in Civil Case No. 92-59862 is
MODIFIED, in that the award of damages, except nominal damages, and
attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of legal and factual basis. The award of
nominal damages is reduced to P50,000.00. In all other respects, the assailed
decision is AFFIRMED.
[6]
Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
A motion for reconsideration dated 19 October 2002[7] filed by Twin Ace was denied
in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 29 September 2003.[8] Hence, this
Petition for Review.
For resolution are the following issues:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT RUFINA IS NOT COVERED WITHIN THE EXEMPTION
PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF R.A. 623, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 5700.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING NOMINAL
DAMAGES AGAINST PETITIONER TWIN ACE CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS
THE ONE WHOSE RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED OR INVADED BY
RESPONDENT RUFINA.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PETITIONER AS OWNER OF THE SUBJECT BOTTLES IS ENTITLED TO
COMPENSATION FOR ITS UNAUTHORIZED USE BY RESPONDENT
[9]
RUFINA.
Pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 623,[10] as amended by Republic Act No.
5700,[11] is quoted hereunder for clarity:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the
manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has successfully registered the marks of
ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill
such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or
other similar containers so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell,
dispose of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not
to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes,
for any other purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller.
Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one
thousand pesos or imprisonment of not more than one year or both.
Sec. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or
seller, without written permission of the latter of any such bottle, cask, barrel,
keg, box, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar containers,
or the possession thereof without written permission of the manufacturer, by any
junk dealer or dealer in casks, barrels, kegs, boxes, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks,
accumulators, or other similar containers, the same being duly marked or
stamped and registered as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie
[12]
presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.
Sec. 4. The criminal action provided in this Act shall in no way affect any civil
action to which the registered manufacturer, bottler, or seller, may be entitled by
law or contract.
Sec. 5. No action shall be brought under this Act against any person to whom the
registered manufacturer, bottler, or seller, has transferred by way of sale, any of
the containers herein referred to, but the sale of the beverage contained in the
said containers shall not include the sale of the containers unless specifically so
provided.
Sec. 6. The provisions of this Act shall not be interpreted as prohibiting the use
of bottles as containers for "sisi," "bagoong," "patis," and similar native products.
[13]
In sum, Twin Ace asserts that the provision under the law affords protection only to
small scale producers/manufacturers who do not have the capacity to buy new bottles
for use in their products and cannot extend to Rufina which had unequivocably
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/ca1df [14] 4/11
admitted in its Answer[14] and affirmed in the decision of the trial court that it is
engaged, on a large scale basis, in the production and manufacture of food seasonings.
For its part, Rufina counters that the law did not really distinguish between large scale
manufacturers and small time producers.
The petition is not meritorious.
The earlier case of Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[15] applies to
the present petition. In said case, Twin Ace filed a Complaint for Replevin against
Lorenzana Food Corporation to recover three hundred eighty thousand bottles
allegedly owned by Twin Ace but detained and used by Lorenzana Food Corporation
as containers for its native products without its express permission, in violation of the
law. In that case, this Court acknowledged that the exemption under the law is
unqualified as the law did not make a distinction that it only applies to small scale
industries but not to large scale manufacturers. Thus, even if the court in said case
held that the exemption is primarily meant to give protection to small scale industries,
it did not qualify that the protection therein was intended and limited only to such.
The Court held:
Petitioner itself alleges that respondent LORENZANA uses the subject 350 ml.,
375 ml. and 750 ml. bottles as containers for processed foods and other related
products such as patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar and other food seasonings.
Hence, Sec. 6 squarely applies in private respondent's favor. Obviously, the
contention of TWIN ACE that the exemption refers only to criminal liability but
not to civil liability is without merit. It is inconceivable that an act specifically
allowed by law, in other words legal, can be the subject of injunctive relief and
damages. Besides, the interpretation offered by petitioner defeats the very
purpose for which the exemption was provided.
Republic Act No. 623, "An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked
Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers," as amended
by RA No. 5700, was meant to protect the intellectual property rights of the
registrants of the containers and prevent unfair trade practices and fraud on the
public. However, the exemption granted in Sec. 6 thereof was deemed extremely
necessary to provide assistance and incentive to the backyard, cottage and small-
scale manufacturers of indigenous native products such as patis, sisi and toyo
who do not have the capital to buy brand new bottles as containers nor afford to
pass the added cost to the majority of poor Filipinos who use the products as
their daily condiments or viands. If the contention of petitioner is accepted, i.e.,
to construe the exemption as to apply to criminal liability only but not to civil
liability, the very purpose for which the exemption was granted will be defeated.
None of the small-scale manufacturers of the indigenous native products
protected would possibly wish to use the registered bottles if they are vulnerable
to civil suits. The effect is a virtual elimination of the clear and unqualified
exemption embodied in Sec. 6. It is worthy to note that House Bill No. 20585
was completely rejected because it sought to expressly and directly eliminate that
[16]
which petitioner indirectly proposes to do with this petition. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is worth noting that Lorenzana Food Corporation which prevailed in the case filed
by Twin Ace against it is certainly not a small scale industry. Just like Rufina,
Lorenzana Food Corporation also manufactures and exports processed foods and
other related products, e.g., patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar and other food seasonings.
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. As has been
our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application.[17]
Notably, attempts to amend the protection afforded by Section 6 of Republic Act No.
623, by giving protection only to small scale manufacturers or those with a
capitalization of five hundred thousand pesos or less (P500,000.00), through then
House Bill No. 20585,[18] and subsequently through House Bill No. 30400,[19]
proved unsuccessful as the amendment proposed in both Bills was never passed.
In view of these considerations, we find and so hold that the exemption contained in
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 623 applies to all manufacturers of sisi, bagoong, patis and
similar native products without distinction or qualification as to whether they are
small, medium or large scale.
On the issue of nominal damages, Article 2222 of the Civil Code[20] states that the
court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source
enumerated in Article 1157,[21] or in every other case where any property right has
been invaded.[22] Nominal damages are given in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him.[23] In another case,[24] this Court held that when plaintiff suffers some
species of injury not enough to warrant an award of actual damages, the court may
award nominal damages. Considering the foregoing, we find that the award of
nominal damages to Rufina in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is
reasonable, warranted and justified.
As to the third issue, Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised Rules of Court mandates
that a party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property must show by
his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts that he
is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof.[25] It must be borne in mind that replevin is a possessory action
the gist of which focuses on the right of possession that, in turn, is dependent on a
legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be
replevied.[26] Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an
action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment
thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.[27] In this case, Twin Ace has not
shown that it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and consequently
there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation. As stated by the
court in the earlier case of Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals[28]:
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Sec. 5 of RA No. 623 to support its claim of
continuing ownership over the subject bottles. In United States v. Manuel [7
Phil. 221 (1906)] we held that since the purchaser at his discretion could either
retain or return the bottles, the transaction must be regarded as a sale of the
bottles when the purchaser actually exercised that discretion and decided not to
return them to the vendor. We also take judicial notice of the standard practice
today that the cost of the container is included in the selling price of the product
such that the buyer of liquor or any such product from any store is not required
to return the bottle nor is the liquor placed in a plastic container that possession
of the bottle is retained by the store.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit
and the decision dated 27 September 2002 and resolution dated 29 September 2003,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52852, both of the Court of Appeals are Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairman), and Callejo,

Sr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
[1] Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-8.
[2] Id., p. 67.
[3] Rollo, Annex B, p. 83.
[4] Penned by Judge Guillermo L. Loja, Sr., Rollo, pp. 160-161.
[5] Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52852, penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño
with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Teodoro P. Regino concurring.
[6]
[6] Rollo, p. 49-A.
[7] CA rollo, pp. 118- 129.
[8] Rollo, p. 52
[9] Id., p. 239.
[10] AN ACT TO REGULATE THE USE OF DULY STAMPED OR MARKED

BOTTLES, BOXES, CASKS, KEGS, BARRELS AND OTHER SIMILAR CONTAINERS.
[11] AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED

SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-THREE AS TO INCLUDE THE CONTAINERS OF
COMPRESSED GASES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE SAID ACT.
[12] Republic Act No. 5700.
[13] Republic Act No. 623.
[14] "7. That with respect to paragraph 9, it admits that it produces patis on a large
scale at its big factory in 290 C. Arellano Street, Malabon, Metro Manila and that it
distributes the same to supermarkets and big grocery stores and exports the same but
denies the rest of the allegations of the paragraph; x x x. (Rollo, p. 111.)
[15] 345 Phil. 1133 (1997).
[16] Id., pp. 1139-1140.
[17] Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 378 Phil.
10, 22 (1999) citing Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 133
Phil. 695, 699 (1968); Carriaga v. Judge Anasario, 444 Phil. 685, 690 (2003).
[18] "An Act Prohibiting The Use of Duly Registered and Marked Containers Of
Liquor, Wines and Spirits As Containers For "Sisi", "Bagoong", "Patis" and Similar
Native Products Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. Six Hundred Twenty-
Three, As Amended, And Increasing Penalty For Violation Therefor." (Records, Vol. I,
pp. 259-260.)
[19] "An Act Prohibiting The Use of Duly Registered and Marked Containers for any
purpose other than that registered amending for the purpose of Republic Act
Numbered Six Hundred Twenty-Three, As Amended, and Increasing The Penalty For
Violation Therefor." (Records, Vol. I, p. 262).
[20] Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising
from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right
has been invaded.
[21] Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
[22] Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
100727, 18 March 1992, 207 SCRA 343, 347.
[23] Citytrust Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.84281,

27 May 1994, 232 SCRA 559, 565; National Power Corporation v. Spouses Campos,
453 Phil. 79, 98 (2003).
[24] China Airlines, Ltd., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129988, 14 July 2003, 406
SCRA 113, 134.
[25] Sec. 1. Application. - A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal
property may, at the commencement of the action or at any time before answer, apply
for an order for the delivery of such property to him, in the manner hereinafter
provided.
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. - The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of
some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the
cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief; x x x.
(Rule 60, REPLEVIN, Revised Rules of Court.).
[26] Distilleria Washington, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 622, 630 (1996).
[27] Factoran, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 282, 294 (1999).
[28] Supra note 15, p. 1140.

Part 4 Latin Rules - Full Text

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Part 4 Latin Rules - Full Text

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

9/9/2019 G.R. No.

Today is Monday, September 09, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 109005 January 10, 1994

JUAN D. VICTORIA, petitioner,

Juan D. Victoria for himself and in his own behalf.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Name No. of Votes Garnered

1. Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes

1. Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes

1. Ramon Fernandez, Jr. 19,315 votes

(Rollo, pp. 27-28)

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner gives the following illustration:

1. for private respondent.

107,216 (actually voted)

(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30)

121,423 (actually voted)

We are not persuaded.

The Local Government provides:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Monday, September 09, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented by ATTY. CARLOS R.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.

Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO* ARTURO D. BRION

1 Rollo, pp. 75-85.

3 Annex "A" of Reply, id. at 111-113.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

148 Phil. 295

[ G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971 ]

CORNELIA MATABUENA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PETRONILA

Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila

[ GR NO. 154380, Oct 05, 2005 ]

REPUBLIC v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between

Brief Historical Background

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are

we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

[1] Rollo, pp. 20-22.

[2] Id. at 27-29.

[3] Id. at 21-22.

[4] Id. at 105.

[5] Id. at 106-110.

[6] Id. at 110.

[9] Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.

[10] No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

[11] G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

Phil. 850, 855.