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Shanelle Owens

Professor Claypool

Intro Philosophy

01 November 2019

Walton’s Position “Fearing Fiction”

Kendal Walton’s position on Fearing Fiction and various illustrations of how fearing

fiction may associate with fiction and nonfiction. It begins with the model of whether a

fictional film makes us scared, then the fear does not need concerning the fictitious thing or

location (602). It is mainly the case when we interpret that the objective is fiction. We do not

fear what we know does not exist. We only fear what we believe to be real. For example, if an

instructor narrates stories about ogres to small children who do not know about the

nonexistent of an ogre, this would conjure terror. Though it is possible to generate

experiences that stimulate real psychological responses, these simulated activities only enable

us to predict human behavior.

Walton did not define anything specific in the essay about fictional worlds, but

defining fiction and reality to myself was relevant in the way that it explained what is real and

what is not. Fictional worlds are living inside of movies, books, and stories. Alternatively,

something that we are on the outside looking in, while the real world is just our true life,

living every day. Does Walton feel that fictions cause yourself to feel real emotions? The

answer is no; he does not. He explains them in three arguments that I have broken down.

The first argument, which I call the “Physical Interaction Argument,” you can only

physically interact with situations that truly exist. This phrase is why we cannot step in and

stop a killer from killing someone in a movie or why it does not physically scare you as much

as the character(s) is because someone cannot fear something that is not physically there. If
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they do fear a burglar or killer, it is because they genuinely believe that they are there or that

there is some danger. Walton says that the fact that somebody knows that the slime is an

excellent reason to say that the “fear” that they are feeling in the movie is not real because he

knows that Charles of the movie knows that the slime is not real. Charles did not believe he is

genuinely in danger; therefore, he is indeed not afraid, or if Walton did, he would be fleeing

the movie theater calling the police. The opposing view of this argument is that some people

do believe that slimes are real and that they are a threat. Walton will say to show people that

the slime is fictional.

The second argument, which I also called “Make-Believer Acting.” A child was

playing with their father, and another child is stalking the boy comes up behind him, then he

jumps out and scare the child. Although the kid runs away like he is terrified and flees, the kid

has a smile on his face, and he is aware that the dad is only playing a game, and there is no

scary monster chasing after him. Therefore, he is not afraid. The opposing view for this was

that some people do not entirely disbelieve. For example, when it comes to knowledge, some

people do not entirely believe what they read. While they are reading a book, they are

engulfed in the stories and information. Walton’s comeback to hold up his argument is that an

average standard reader does not honestly believe Huckleberry Finn, for example, and he

knows that the novel is fiction.

The final argument, “Conflicting Desires,” is a person watching a play and find happy

endings to be dull and that they want it to end it in misery and heartbreak. Throughout the

acts, they find themselves rooting for the victim “...to escape such an undeserved fate”. The

question is, are these opposing interests? The opposing view is that some people will say

these are opposing interests, and the viewer is torn between both feelings. Walton says no that

both conflicting desires by the viewer can be wholehearted on both sides; therefore, they are

acceptable and do not contradict themselves.

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I cannot help but contradict Walton's cases that the feelings that we feel when we

experience fictional characters are pseudo emotions. I accept this affirmation is very

irrational. This case is an immediate case that occasionally we can be in a circumstance where

we are not ready to portray our feelings. In my view, there is no reasonable method to

recognize a genuine and faux emotion. This thought implies that the feelings I portrayed in

the light of fiction are actually what an individual feels. I accept the work by philosophers

who look to clarify an event for this situation, the emotion of fear, and not what the

experience ought to be. Walton, to some degree, appeared to show how Charles ought to have

responded to viewing the movie on the green slimes, and not why he responded in the manner

in which he did.
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Works Cited

Walton, Kendall L. “Fearing Fictions.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 75, no. 1, 1978,

p. 5., doi:10.2307/2025831.