BURGOS V.

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 183711
22 June 2010

PONENTE: Brion, J.

PARTIES:
1. PETITIONER: EDITA BURGOS
2. RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN.
JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Court of Appeals: Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

FACTS:
At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos – a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan
was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the
ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the
petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and Land
Transportation Office (LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain
Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle was seized and impounded on June 24, 2006 for transporting timber without permit. However, in May 2007,
right after Jonas’ abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the
engine and other spare parts were “cannibalized.” The police was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches of two of the abductors of Jonas
based on its interview of eyewitnesses.

On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka
Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements of the New People’s
Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas.

In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioner’s
motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially, the
CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection between the abductors of Jonas and the
military. It also found that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of investigation. The
CA ruled that the AFP has the burden of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of Ka Ramon and the allegation that Ka Ramon is
indeed Jonas in the “Order of Battle.” As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as “rather shallow” and “conducted haphazardly.”

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is a fatal to the grant of the p

ANSWER: Yes.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties – Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and
the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the
extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative
shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.

DISPOSITIVE:

In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following directives:

1. DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field investigations – acting as
the Court’s directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

2. REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make available and to provide
copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on Human Rights may
require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;

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 3. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights the records and results of the
investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous submissions to
the Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant to the authority granted
under this Resolution;

4. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the
authority granted under this Resolution;

5. AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of
the case (not limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo; and

6. REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner,
the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of the Resolution.

In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other respondents who have all been impleaded in their official
capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from the Supreme Court were served on, and directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the
impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the
responsibilities and accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President
Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo.

Human Rights Law Case Digest: Mejoff V. Director Of Prisons (1951)

G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951

Lessons Applicable: characteristics of human rights, constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law,

Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights

FACTS:

 Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's
regime in these Islands. (The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government
whose decrees were law furing the occupation.)
 He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. and later there was an order for his release.
 But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be
deported on the first available transportation to Russia.
 He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on October, 1948.
 He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - denied
 Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not found way and means of removing the petitioner
out of the country, and none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country
would take the petitioner.
 This is his 2nd petition for writ of habeas corpus
ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be granted since he was detained longer than a reasonable time

HELD: YES. writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance
of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First
Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which
bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
 Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be.
 The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to
Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
 Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines
is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were
proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social
origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
 petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that
is by no means actual, present, or uncontrollable
 Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses
and injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand
convicted.
 If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of universal application.
 As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.

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Navia, et al. v. Pardico
EDGARDO NAVIA,RUBEN DIO,and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners, v. VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR
V. PARDICO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 184467 : June 19, 2012

FACTS:

A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened
Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to
investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find
her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of
Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter,
Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City.
A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the
petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is available only in cases
where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are
clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face
as it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a
threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is
missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the
signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus
posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity.”

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9
thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty
and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against
deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court in
that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form
of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are
missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable
element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of
the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or
accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the
government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the
person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement
in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.

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Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been
presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within
the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement.
This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 180906

October 7, 2008
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of
Armed Forces of the Philippines; Petitioners
Vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO;
Respondents
FACTS:
The brothers Raymond and Reynald Manalo, farmers from Bulacan were abducted,
detained in various locations, tortured by Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on
the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After
eighteen (18) months of restrained liberty, torture, and other dehumanizing acts, were able to
escape. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to prevent military officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Existing petition was
treated as Amparo petition. The Supreme Court granted the Writ of Amparo and ordered the
Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not statements from the victims is sufficient for amparo petitions.
2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary to invoke the right to security of a
person
RULING:
1. Yes. Much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims
themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence
such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in
the places where they were detained.
2. Yes. Covered by the privilege of the writ, respondents must meet the threshold requirement
that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or
omission. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people.” Moreover, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
protection of one’s rights by the government. As the government is the chief guarantor of
order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat.