The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to

a pending case does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
|| Silverio, Sr. v. Silverio, Jr., G.R. No. 186589, July 18, 2014

Rule 65, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this clear:

The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the
proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten
(10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with
the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners are thus correct in arguing that the pendency of G.R. No. 178676 did
not interrupt the course of CA-G.R. SP No. 97196, in the absence of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued in the former case. This is
because "an original action for certiorari is an independent action and is neither a
continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the judgment complained of." 18 The
CA therefore committed error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 104060, or
petitioners' indirect contempt petition, on the ground of pendency of G.R. No.
178676. It need not wait for this Court to resolve G.R. No. 178676 before the
petitioners' contempt charge may be heard.

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt.
Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014

The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to

support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which
indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws
from the evidence established." 28 Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court,circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender "if i)
there is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is
derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." All the circumstances must be
consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent.
Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that
the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others as the guilty person.
In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of
all others, is the guilty person are the following:
1. In the morning of December 15, 1996, petitioner was heard telling his co-
accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si
Berbon" before boarding a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while
petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;
2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness Rodolfo
to be the same car he had sold to Sotero for P10,000.00 in September 1996;
3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December 15, 1996) by
unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and
4. Post-mortem examination of the victim's body showed that he sustained
multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity and characteristics of which
indicate that they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly an armalite
rifle and .22 caliber pistol. 31
The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Alberto.
Thus the courts below were forced to render their verdict of conviction on
circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133 32 of the Rules
of Court. The central issue now confronting this Court is whether the prosecution
has amply proved by circumstantial evidence petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part

on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness
by whom it is sought to produce.

Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014

The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a
statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth
of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if
the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact
that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the
truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such
statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement
may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is known as
the doctrine of independently relevant statements.
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was
investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner
telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and that he
saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an
armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay
evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial's testimony was not
presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of
establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement
containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness' oral
testimony. Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is
incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes' statement. Verily then, what
the prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such
narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth
thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an
independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes
made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a
case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay
rule does not apply.

A notarized document may be presented in evidence without further proof,

the certificate of acknowledgment being aprima facie evidence of the due
execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014
Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been
duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent
of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being aprima facie evidence of the due execution
of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, 39 a notarized
document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution
which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here, no clear and
convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome such presumption.
Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes' sworn
statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the
1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero in
September 1996 clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same red car
used in the killing of Alberto on December 15, 1996.
Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen
immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was identified as the same car
previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem
examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered
multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered guns,
served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a significant way in
establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner's escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case was
pending can also be considered as another circumstance since it is a strong
indication of his guilt.
All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of the
alleged established circumstances, which essentially were the same
circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate court, to have satisfied
the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the
incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain
of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for
the killing of the victim.
Besides, it is "[a]n established rule in appellate review . . . that the trial court's
factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and
the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from
the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual
findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the
CA," 40 as in this case.D

Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA,
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by the
Supreme Court.

Heirs of Spouses Manguardia v. Heirs of Valles, G.R. No. 177616, August 27,
2014

Time and again, this Court has reiterated that it is not a trier of facts. Well
entrenched is the principle that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted
and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal by this Court. The Court's "role in a petition under Rule 45 is limited to
reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court." This rule, however, is not without well defined exceptions. "Findings of
fact of the trial court and the CA may be set aside when such findings are not
supported by the evidence or where the lower courts' conclusions are based on a
misapprehension of facts." Considering the contention of petitioners that
misinterpretation of facts was committed, this Court embarked on the task of
reviewing the facts of this case.
After a painstaking review of the records, however, the Court finds no reason to
reverse and set aside the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA,
since these factual findings are supported by and are based on preponderant
evidence.

Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA,
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by the
Supreme Court.

Meyr Enterprises Corp. v. Cordero, G.R. No. 197336, September 3, 2014

|||

The resolution of the case hinges on the question of whether petitioner is guilty of
malice and bad faith in instituting Civil Case No. CEB-28040; if it is not so, then
there is no ground to hold it liable for malicious prosecution.
However, "the existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary; . . . it
requires that the reviewing court look into the evidence to find if indeed there is
proof that is substantial enough to show such bad faith." 24 However, this Court is
not a trier of facts; it is "not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court . . . ." 25 This being the case, the
instant Petition must fail because a question of fact cannot properly be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. 26 An appeal by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only questions of law. 27 Indeed, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; cDCHaS

(g) When the CA's findings are contrary to those [of] the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [and]
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. 28
However, these exceptions do not obtain in the instant case. On the contrary,
both the trial and appellate courts arrived at identical findings, and took a
common and undivided view of the case — that is, that petitioner is guilty of
malicious prosecution. "In the absence of compelling reasons, the Court will
not disturb the rule that factual findings of the lower tribunals are final and
binding on this Court."
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Monsanto v. Lim, G.R. No. 178911, September 17, 2014

Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that "[a] civil action is
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court." Moreover, "[e]very
ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action."
No proper initiatory pleading was filed
before the trial court.
In this case, records show that no formal complaint or petition was filed in court.
The case was supposedly "commenced" through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the
intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto on the alleged anomalous foreclosure
sale conducted by De Guzman. However, said letter could not in any way be
considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines
pleadings as "written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the
parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment." To stress, Pag-IBIG's
letter could not be considered as a formal complaint or petition. First, the parties
to the case were not identified pursuant to Section 1, 30 Rule 3 and Section
1, 31 Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim or cause of action was not properly
mentioned or specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The letter bore no caption; it was not
even assigned a docket number; the parties were not properly identified; the
allegations were not properly set forth; no particular relief is sought; in fact, only
the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is requested; it was not signed by
a counsel; and most of all, there is no verification or certification against forum-
shopping.
We have also noted that in its July 1, 2005 Order, Judge Usman of Branch 28
resolved the following incidents: (1) the motion for issuance of writ of possession
filed by Leoncio; and (2) the motion to lift writ of execution and notice to vacate.
However, the said Manifestation with Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession was not even filed before Branch 28; in fact, it was submitted for
consideration of Branch 27. Moreover, the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and
Notice to Vacate was filed by Pascual before the OCA; the RTC Branches 27
and 28 of Catbalogan, Samar, were only furnished copies thereof. DIAcTE

In addition, it is quite unfortunate that Judge Usman proceeded to take

cognizance of the case notwithstanding his prior observation as stated in the May
3, 2004 Order that no formal petition or complaint was actually filed and which
presents a judicial issue. In fact, Judge Usman even opined that the acts
complained of partake of administrative matter and thus referred the same to the
OCA for further action. The May 9, 2005 letter of OCA directing Judge Usman to
take action on the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate could not
be interpreted as vesting Judge Usman with the authority and jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the matter. Nothing to that effect could be inferred from the tenor
of the May 9, 2005 letter of OCA. Jurisdiction is vested by law. When OCA
directed Judge Usman to take action on the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and
Notice to Vacate, it did not deprive the latter of his discretion to dismiss the
matter/case for lack of jurisdiction, if the matter/case so warrants.
In fine, there being no proper initiatory pleading filed, then the RTC Branch 28 did
not acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case.
No payment of docket fees.
We have also noted that no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Section
1, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court mandates that "[u]pon the filing of the pleading
or other application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed
therefor shall be paid in full." "It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction
over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee." 32
In Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation, 33 we
ruled thus:AaSIET

A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
prescribed fees. The importance of filing fees cannot be gainsaid for
these are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of
cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe
benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the
handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment
of docket fees can entail tremendous losses to government in general
and to the judiciary in particular.
In fine, since no docket or filing fees were paid, then the RTC Branch 28 did not
acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case. It therefore erred in taking cognizance
of the same. Consequently, all the proceedings undertaken by the trial court are
null and void, and without force and effect. In, particular, the July 1, 2005 and
August 30, 2005 Orders of the RTC are null and void.
It is settled jurisprudence that "[a]ny decision rendered without jurisdiction is a
total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this
Court." 34 Prescinding from the foregoing, we hold that the RTC-Branch 28 did
not acquire jurisdiction over the instant matter/case there being no formal
initiatory pleading filed as well as non-payment of docket fees. Consequently, all
proceedings had before the RTC Branch 28 were null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
DAHEaT

In an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double

jeopardy.

People v. Torres y Nava, G.R. No. 189850,September 22, 2014

Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with
homicide as charged in the Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to
the CA was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for
robbery. And by appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his
constitutional right not to be subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery.
He claims that even assuming that the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery
charge, such error can no longer be questioned on appeal.
We cannot give credence to appellant's contentions. "An appeal in [a] criminal
case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised
by the parties." 26 "[W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws
the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the appellant." 27 In other words, when appellant appealed the
RTC's judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to have abandoned his
right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the
appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment.
Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA
modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as
charged in the Information instead of murder. ETIDaH

Against the credible and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

duly supported by documentary evidence, appellant's defense of denial
and frame-up necessarily crumble.

People v. Aplat y Sublino, G.R. No. 191727, March 31, 2014

This line of defense cannot prevail over the established fact that a valid buy-bust
operation was indeed conducted and that the identity of the seller and the drug
subject of the sale are proven. Moreover, such defenses have been invariably
viewed by the court with disfavor for they can easily be concocted and are
common and standard defense ploys in most cases involving violations
of Dangerous Drugs Act.

"Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse

judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal
or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
. . . It is expressly prohibited . . . because it trifles with and abuses court
processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court
dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum
shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also
constitute direct contempt."
Orpiano v. Spouses Tomas, G.R. No. 178611, [January 14, 2013], 701 PHIL
||

388-399

Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle
with judicial processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the annulment
case, still the said case should be dismissed because it produces the same effect
which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned to preclude. If the collection
case is not dismissed and it, together with the annulment case, proceeds to
finality, not only do we have a possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered;
an unfair situation, as envisioned by the Tomas spouses, might arise where after
having paid the balance of the price as ordered by the collection court, the
cancellation of the TCT and return of the property could be decreed by the
annulment court. Besides, allowing the two cases to remain pending makes
litigation simply a game of chance where parties may hedge their position by
betting on both sides of the case, or by filing several cases involving the same
issue, subject matter, and parties, in the hope of securing victory in at least one
of them. But, as is already well known, the "[t]rek to [j]ustice is not a game of
chance or skill but rather a quest for truth . . . ."
"In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur:
first, the appellant was at a different place at the time the crime was
committed, and second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene at the time of its commission."
Rondina v. People, G.R. No. 179059, [June 13, 2012], 687 PHIL 274-296

Victor contends that the lower courts erred in brushing aside his defense of alibi
on the sole ground that it is inherently weak. He avers that proving that he was
not at the place of the alleged incident when it happened is the most plausible
defense against the charges hurled upon him. Besides, his alibi that he was
in Brgy. Macabug, Ormoc City at the time of the alleged rape is corroborated by
the testimony of Alex, who was with him during that time.
"In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur: first, the
appellant was at a different place at the time the crime was committed, and
second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time
of its commission." 60 In this case, the second requisite is not met. Victor himself
testified that the distance between Brgy. Macabug and the place where the rape
occurred is just three to four kilometers and that the same can be traversed by
land transportation in just a few minutes. 61 Hence, it was not physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the
crime. Also, even if Victor's alibi is corroborated by Alex, said defense is still
unworthy of belief. Alex admitted that Victor was his employer 62 and that he was
testifying for Victor as he relied on him for livelihood. 63 "[I]t has been held that
alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the
accused himself and his or her relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms and not
by credible persons." 64
Moreover and most importantly, "denial and alibi are practically worthless against
the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, especially by the
rape victim." 65 Victor's weak alibi cannot thus overcome "AAA's" positive
identification of him as her rapist.
C

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the

assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an
"insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque
RTC.

Pacific Ace Finance, Ltd. v. Yanagisawa, G.R. No. 175303, [April 11, 2012], 685
PHIL 505-517

Contrary to petitioner's stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who
between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that
the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not
have been interfered with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it
was improper for the Parañaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal
court.DcTSHa

The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of
properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted
for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending 41 appeal before the CA. The
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by
the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the
subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC. 42 By insisting on ruling on the
same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC's
resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting
decisions. Cojuangco v. Villegas 43 states: "The various branches of the [regional
trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority
and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not,
cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less
with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion
and seriously hamper the administration of justice." The matter is further
explained thus:
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also,
axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other
courts."
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent
jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its
authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the
matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-
ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is
applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial.
The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the
laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of
judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations
exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process. 44
|||

The variance between the dates of the verification/certification and the

Petition does not necessarily contradict the categorical declaration made
by petitioners in their affidavit that they read and understood the contents
of the pleading

Peak Ventures Corp. v. Heirs of Villareal, G.R. No. 184618, November 19, 2014
In explaining the variance between the date of the Petition and the date it was
verified, petitioners submitted Almario's Affidavit 46 dated May 22, 2009. Almario,
the Director for Security Operations of Peak Ventures, attested to the fact that
the final draft of the Petition was shown to him on November 6, 2008 and on the
same date, he read the same and executed a verification and certification of non-
forum shopping. He further affirmed that the final draft of the Petition shown to
him on November 6, 2008 is the same Petition dated November 10, 2008 that
was filed in this Court. He explained that the variance in dates came about
because petitioners wanted the Petition to bear the same date as the date of its
actual filing.
"[T]he requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional
and . . . the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith." 47 With respect to the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping,
"[t]he fact that the [Rules] require strict compliance merely underscores its
mandatory nature that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether
disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its
provisions under justifiable circumstances." 48
In Spouses Valmonte v. Alcala, 49 the Court held that the variance between the
dates of the verification/certification and the Petition does not necessarily
contradict the categorical declaration made by petitioners in their affidavit that
they read and understood the contents of the pleading. In that case, the Court
noted that as the pleading and the verification are prepared separately, a
variance in their dates is a matter that may satisfactorily be explained. It held that
to demand the litigants to read the very same document that is to be filed in court
is too rigorous a requirement since what the Rules require is for a party to read
the contents of a pleading without any specific requirement on the form or
manner in which the reading is to be done. The Court stressed that what is
important is that efforts were made to satisfy the objective of the Rule, that is, to
ensure good faith and veracity in the allegations of a pleading, thereby allowing
the courts to act on the case with reasonable certainty that the petitioners' real
positions have been pleaded.
Thus, here, the variance between the date of the Petition and the date it was
verified is not fatal to petitioners' case. As explained, any variance does not
necessarily mean that no valid verification/certification was made. Moreover, it
must be emphasized that the rules of procedure, especially in labor cases, ought
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice. 50
It is a basic rule in evidence that he who alleges must prove his case or
claim by the degree of evidence required.

Manlar Rice Mill, Inc. v. Deyto, G.R. No. 191189, [January 29, 2014, 725 PHIL
526-541

. . . Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. This Court has
consistently applied the ancient rule that "if the plaintiff, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense." 28
In civil cases, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence, which
connotes "that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that
which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that
the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that
the probability of truth is on one side than on the other." 29
The CA is correct in concluding that there is no legal basis to hold Deyto
solidarily liable with Ang for what the latter may owe Manlar. The evidence does
not support Manlar's view that both Deyto and Ang contracted with Manlar for the
delivery of rice on credit; quite the contrary, the preponderance of evidence
indicates that it was Ang alone who entered into the rice supply agreement with
Manlar. Pua's own direct testimony indicated that whenever rice deliveries were
made by Manlar, Deyto was not around; that it was solely Ang who issued the
subject checks and delivered them to Pua or Manlar. On cross-examination, he
testified that no rice deliveries were in fact made by Manlar at Deyto's Bulusan
Street residence; that although Deyto guaranteed Ang's checks, this guarantee
was made verbally; and that while he ordered Manlar's drivers to deliver rice at
Deyto's residence at Bulusan Street, the deliveries would actually end up at
Ang's Sabucoy residence.
The documentary evidence, on the other hand, shows that the subject checks
were issued from a bank account in Chinabank del Monte branch belonging to
Ang alone. They did not emanate from an account that belonged to both Ang and
Deyto. This is supported by no less than the testimony of Chinabank del Monte
branch Operations Head Petallano.

Under the Rules of Court, the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a

judgment, final order, or resolution of the CA is to file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 15
days from notice of the judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from.

Vda. de Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937, [June 13, 2012], 687
PHIL 185-196

Obviously, petitioner, in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, availed of the wrong remedy.
Unlike a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of
the appellate process over the original case, a special civil action
forcertiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action 44 based on grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 45 It will lie only if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. 46 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal,
especially if such loss or lapse was due to one's own negligence or error in the
choice of remedies. 47
In this case, the remedy of appeal was available; thus, the filing of petition
for certiorari was inapt. Petitioner should have filed a petition under Rule 45
within 15 days from receipt of the Resolution dated September 12, 2006, denying
her motion for reconsideration.
While in certain cases we have considered petitions erroneously filed under Rule
65 as filed under Rule 45, we cannot do so in this case because the petition was
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. 48 Records show that petitioner filed
her petition 33 days after receipt of the Resolution dated September 12, 2006. 49
In contrast, although there are cases when certiorari may be allowed despite the
availability of appeal, such as: "(a) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c)
when the writs issued are null and void; and (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority," 50 no such persuasive
reason exists in this case. And even if we were to consider this case as an
exception, the petition must still fail as no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction was committed by the CA in affirming the ruling of
the RTC in favor of respondent-spouses. "Grave abuse of discretion" is defined
as "the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law." 51
In fact, whether we treat the petition as an appeal or as a special civil action
for certiorari, the petition must be dismissed as the core issue of whether
petitioner's signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1982 was
forged, is a question of fact not allowed in both instances. 52

The rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition brought
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not without exception.

Apo Cement Corp. v. Baptisma, G.R. No. 176671, [June 20, 2012], 688 PHIL
468-484

Factual review may warrant when the factual findings of the NLRC are contrary
to those of the Labor Arbiter and the CA; 51 or when the CA's findings of fact,
supposedly premised on the absence of evidence, are contradicted by evidence
on record. 52 In this case, the Labor Arbiter and the CA found no just cause to
warrant the dismissal of respondent. The NLRC, however, found otherwise. A
factual review is, therefore, in order.

The petitioner in anamparo case has the burden of proving by substantial

evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, [June 19, 2012], 688 PHIL 266-282
|||

Virginia's Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be
dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to
arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the
country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity." 40
Here, Ben's right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not
dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners'
security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso
facto established Ben's inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty
and security. Article 6 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 42 recognizes every human being's inherent right to life, while Article
9 43 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right
to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be
impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This
overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due
process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law. 44
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Ben's disappearance as
alleged in Virginia's petition and proved during the summary proceedings
conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC's coverage, said Rules does not,
however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission
was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which
drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by
Congress. 45 Then, the budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed inRazon,
Jr. v. Tagitis 46 when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court in
that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance's definition of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." 47
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851 48 on
December 11, 2009. Section 3 (g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary
disappearances as follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the
arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
 authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation
of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo 49 where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote
in his Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, "the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional
rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory
definition as well of what an 'enforced or involuntary disappearance'
is." 50 Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC's reference to enforced disappearances
should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of
persons contemplated in Section 3 (g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing
enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:HcaDIA

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of

deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough.
It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in anamparo case
has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bong's testimony that Navia had a
menacing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows
upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at
that time, his threatening statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig,
papatayin ko na si Ben," cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his
predisposition at that time. In addition, there is nothing on record which would
support petitioners' assertion that they released Ben on the night of March 31,
2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how she was
prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook without reading the entries
therein. And so far, the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best,
like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or
presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is
not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was
carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of
the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present
in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and
none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Ben's disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or
employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons. 51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or
proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben's disappearance or
that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the
Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may
lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity,
still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision
in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private
entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that
would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental
operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some
governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines "burden of proof" as "the
duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."
In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required
to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. 55 Once the plaintiff
has established his case, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant,
who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense.
De Leon v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 184565, [November 20,
2013], 721 PHIL 839-851

In this case, respondent BPI, as plaintiff, had to prove that petitioner-spouses

failed to pay their obligations under the Promissory Note. Petitioner-spouses, on
the other hand, had to prove their defense that the obligation was extinguished
by the loss of the mortgaged vehicle, which was insured.
However, as aptly pointed out by the MeTC, the mere loss of the mortgaged
vehicle does not automatically relieve petitioner-spouses of their obligation57 as
paragraph 7 of the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage provides that:
7. The said MORTGAGOR covenants and agrees to procure and
maintain through the MORTGAGEE, a comprehensive insurance from
a duly accredited and responsible insurance company approved by the
MORTGAGEE, over the personalty hereinabove mortgaged to be
insured against loss or damage by accident, theft, and fire for a period
of one (1) year from date hereof and every year thereafter until the
mortgage DEBTS are fully paid with an insurance company or
companies acceptable to the MORTGAGEE in an amount not less
than the outstanding balance of the mortgage DEBTS; that he/it will
make all loss, if any, under such policy or policies payable to the
MORTGAGEE forthwith. . . . TEacSA

xxx xxx xxx

MORTGAGOR shall immediately notify MORTGAGEE in case of los[s],
damage or accident suffered by herein personalty mortgaged and submit
proof of such los[s], damages or accident. Said los[s], damage or
accident for any reason including fortuitous event shall not suspend,
abate, or extinguish [petitioner spouses'] obligation under the promissory
note or sums due under this contract . . .
In case of loss or damage, the MORTGAGOR hereby irrevocabl[y]
appoints the MORTGAGEE as his/its attorney-in-fact with full power and
authority to file, follow-up, prosecute, compromise or settle insurance
claims; to sign, execute and deliver the corresponding papers, receipts
and documents to the insurance company as may be necessary to prove
the claim and to collect from the latter the insurance proceeds to the
extent of its interest. Said proceeds shall be applied by the
MORTGAGEE as payment of MORTGAGOR's outstanding obligation
under the Promissory Note and such other sums and charges as may be
due hereunder or in other instruments of indebtedness due and owing by
the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE and the excess, if any, shall
thereafter be remitted to the MORTGAGOR. MORTGAGEE however
shall be liable in the event there is a deficiency.
 xxx xxx xxx 58
Based on the foregoing, the mortgagor must notify and submit proof of loss to the
mortgagee. Otherwise, the mortgagee would not be able to claim the proceeds of
the insurance and apply the same to the remaining obligation.
This brings us to the question of whether petitioner-spouses sent notice and
proof of loss to Citytrust or respondent BPI.

Testimonial evidence, to be believed, must come not only from the mouth
of a credible witness, but must also "be credible, reasonable, and in accord
with human experience."
De Leon v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 184565, [November 20,
2013], 721 PHIL 839-851
A credible witness must, therefore, be able to narrate a convincing and logical
story.SCDaET

In this case, petitioner Manolito's testimony that he sent notice and proof of loss
of the mortgaged vehicle to Citytrust through fax lacks credibility especially since
he failed to present the facsimile report evidencing the transmittal. 60 His failure
to keep the facsimile report or to ask for a written acknowledgement from
Citytrust of its receipt of the transmittal gives us reason to doubt the truthfulness
of his testimony. His testimony on the alleged theft is likewise suspect. To begin
with, no police report was presented. 61 Also, the insurance policy was renewed
even after the mortgaged vehicle was allegedly stolen. 62 And despite repeated
demands from respondent BPI, petitioner-spouses made no effort to
communicate with the bank in order to clarify the matter. The absence of any
overt act on the part of petitioner-spouses to protect their interest from the time
the mortgaged vehicle was stolen up to the time they received the summons
defies reason and logic. Their inaction is obviously contrary to human
experience. In addition, we cannot help but notice that although the mortgaged
vehicle was stolen in November 1997, petitioner-spouses defaulted on their
monthly amortizations as early as August 10, 1997. All these taken together cast
doubt on the truth and credibility of his testimony.
Thus, we are in full accord with the findings of the MeTC and the CA that
petitioner Manolito's testimony lacks credence as it is dubious and self-
serving.63 Failing to prove their defense, petitioner-spouses are liable to pay their
remaining obligation.

A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by

the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Villondo v. Quijano, G.R. No. 173606, [December 3, 2012], 700 PHIL 18-31

As we have explained:
'Interest' within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A
real party-in-interest is one who has a legal right. . . . The action must be
brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right
sought to be enforced. . . . 44
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be the plaintiff in an
action for forcible entry, viz.:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — . . . a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship, the provision
clearly allows Valeriana to institute the action for the recovery of the physical
possession of the property against the alleged usurper. She has a right or
interest to protect as she was the one dispossessed and thus, she can file the
action for forcible entry. Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the
forcible entry action will bind and definitely affect her claim to possess the subject
property. The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the Certificate of
Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case. This matter already delves
into the character of her possession. We emphasize that in ejectment suits, it
does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable. 45 TAcSaC

The MTCC correctly considered Valeriana as a real party-in-interest and correctly

delved strictly with the issue of physical possession. Notably, the CA, other than
dismissing the case for lack of cause of action, did not seem to dispute the
MTCC's factual finding of Valeriana's prior physical possession. Absent any
evidence of respondents' prior physical possession, Valeriana, who has cogently
convinced us that she was dispossessed of the land by force, is entitled to stay
on the property until she is lawfully ejected by others who can prove in a
separate proceeding that they have a better right.

A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, however, is more cautiously

regarded because it commands the performance of an act. 71 Accordingly,
it must be issued only upon a clear showing that the following requisites
are established: (1) the applicant has a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such
right; and (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable
injury to the applicant.
Sy v. Autobus Transport Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 176898, [December 3, 2012],
700 PHIL 31-47

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance
of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject
of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
A preliminary injunction may be issued at any time before judgment or final
order. 69 It may be a prohibitory injunction, which requires a party to refrain from
doing a particular act, or a mandatory injunction, which commands a party to
perform a positive act to correct a wrong in the past. 70 A writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, however, is more cautiously regarded because it
commands the performance of an act. 71 Accordingly, it must be issued only
upon a clear showing that the following requisites are established: (1) the
applicant has a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; (2) there is a
material and substantial invasion of such right; and (3) there is an urgent need for
the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant. 72 cCSDTI
In this case, the RTC, in granting respondent's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, explained that:
From the verified complaint filed in this case as well as the
[respondent's] verified Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, it is clear that the five (5) land titles registered in
the name of Gregorio Araneta III were delivered by the [respondent] to
the [petitioner] to secure the latter's advances to CMC for the financing
of the twenty two (22) bus chassis which [respondent] purchased from
CMC. However, [petitioner] defaulted in his obligations to CMC which
compelled the [respondent] to directly pay CMC some of the obligations
of the [petitioner]. Since the condition for the delivery of the land
titles which is the payment by the [petitioner] of the obligations of
the [respondent] to CMC has not been complied with by the
[petitioner], there is no further justification for the [petitioner] to
hold on to the possession of the land titles.
In this connection, extant in the records of this case are the two (2)
letters of the [petitioner] to the lawyers of the [respondent] wherein he
expressly admitted his failure to comply with his obligations to CMC on
behalf of the [respondent] . . . . These letters were not denied by the
[petitioner]; in fact, it was admitted by him in his Answer . . . .
It must be noted that the land titles are in the name of Gregorio Araneta
III who is not a party to the transaction between the [respondent] and the
[petitioner] and that there is no document between the parties
concerning the terms and conditions behind the possession of the said
titles by the [petitioner]. There is no Deed of Mortgage over the
properties covered by the said titles. The only document on record is the
acknowledgment receipt dated March 18, 1997 signed by the [petitioner]
. . . but other than the acknowledgment of the receipt of the titles, there
is nothing else to show the terms and conditions under which [petitioner]
is to possess the same. At best, therefore, the [petitioner] is merely a
depository of the said titles. He cannot foreclose, dispose of, assign or
otherwise deal with the same. Thus, the damages that he may suffer
if the land titles are returned to the [respondent] is practically
inexistent compared to the damages which [respondent] and the
owners of the land titles have suffered due to the continuous
possession of the [petitioner] of the said titles, as they cannot
exercise their proprietary rights to the properties covered by the
titles. 73 (Emphasis supplied)
The CA affirmed the Order 74 since it found no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. It said:
. . . we find the issuance of the writ to be in order. FIRST, there is no
denying that the titles to the subject five (5) properties belonged to and
were in fact registered under the name of Mr. Gregorio Ma. Araneta III
 of AUTOBUS. NEXT, as stated in AUTOBUS' complaint and admitted
in OPM's answer, the purpose in handing over the five (5) titles to OPM
was to secure the advances to be made by the latter to CMC. Hence,
when OPM failed to meet its obligations with CMC, AUTOBUS' rights
over the twenty-two (22) buses were materially and substantially
compromised by a threatened foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
Again, this cannot be denied for a chattel mortgage was executed by
AUTOBUS over the buses in favor of CMC which shall be transferred
to OPM once CMC is paid by OPM, although claimed by OPM as
additional collateral. AUTOBUS in its Comment and Memorandum
asserts that it has paid all its obligations to CMC which is not denied by
OPM. Consequently, OPM no longer had any reason to hold on to the
five (5) titles for its failure to pay CMC. THIRDLY, the urgency of the
situation necessitating the issuance of the mandatory writ was
sufficiently established by AUTOBUS before the trial court, thus:
[Respondent] has expressed fear that the [petitioner] (OPM) has
turned over the possession of the said titles to Metrobank in order
to obtain a loan from the bank or to secure an existing loan from
the said bank. [Petitioner] has admitted that Metrobank has
possession of the titles, but according to him, it is only for
safekeeping. Considering this admission, this Court gives
credence to the [respondent's] fear.
We . . . agree with the trial court for it is very unlikely that the purpose for
handing over the titles to the bank was merely for safekeeping when the
bank itself conducted inspections and appraisals on the subject five (5)
properties of Mr. Araneta.
As regards OPM's offer to post a counter bond, the same on its own
does not however warrant the [writ's] dissolution. 75
Based on the foregoing disquisition, we find that the RTC had sufficient bases to
issue the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as all the requisites for the
issuance of such writ were established. We agree with the RTC that respondent
has a right to recover the five titles because petitioner failed to comply with his
obligation to respondent. It bears stressing that respondent was compelled to
directly pay CMC to avoid the foreclosure of the chattel mortgages, which
respondent executed in favor of CMC. Considering that respondent has paid
most, if not all, of its obligations to CMC, there is no reason for petitioner to hold
on to the titles.

While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a
mere photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a
photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in
evidence by the party proponent.
Spouses Santos v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 183034, [March 12, 2014], 729 PHIL 277-
297

Respondent's failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during

the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere
photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the
case. It was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have been cured and did
not affect petitioners' cause in any manner. As conceded by them and as held by
the CA, the original exists and was made part of the records of the case when
respondent's evidence was first taken. Though respondent now claims that she
had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the document resides in the record.
This would explain then why respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with
the court as an exhibit. Besides, it evidently appears that there is no question
raised on the authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was presented and
identified in court; petitioners merely insist that the photocopy is inadmissible as
a result of respondent's failure to present the original, which they nevertheless
admit to exist and is found and included in the record of the case.
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere
photocopy, 32 there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy
thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the party
proponent.
More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath
the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The
effect of this is that the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment
is deemed admitted. "By the admission of the genuineness and due execution [of
such document] is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he
signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the
time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of
the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal
requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the
signature is a forgery . . .; or that it was unauthorized . . .; or that the party
charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the
pleading setting it out . . .; or that it was never delivered . . ., are cut off by the
admission of its genuineness and due execution." 33
"There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to
documents the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the
adverse party." 34 With the consequent admission engendered by petitioners'
failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its
proper authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, not to mention
petitioners' admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they are indeed
indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment may be had solely on
the document, and there is no need to present receipts and other documents to
prove the claimed indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary
acknowledgment receipt, is "valid and binding between the parties who executed
it, as a document evidencing the loan agreement they had entered into." 35 The
absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by petitioners' waiver of their right to
present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the
transactions between the parties and the consequential indebtedness
incurred. 36 Indeed, the effect of the admission is such that "a prima facie case is
made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part
and entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of new
matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant." 37

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to

redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or
omission which had violated the legal right of the former."
Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL
337-354

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former." 57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since
they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance
cameras. 58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents
are not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that
they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video
surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against
petitioners in another case. 59 During the hearing of the application for
Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the
video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did
not seem to care, 60 and thus, he reported the matter to thebarangay for
mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the
RTC. 61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute
between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their
respective properties. 62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe
that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the
Choachuy family. 63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that
they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of
Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured
Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions
regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras. 64 And
when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18,
2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer
damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and
transferred. 65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents
and Aldo seem to merge. acAESC

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are
merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from
this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties
to this suit.

Failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration before filing a Petition for

Certiorari is a fatal infirmity.
Philippine National Bank v. Arcobillas, G.R. No. 179648, [August 7, 2013], 716
PHIL 75-89

At the outset, the Court notes that after PNB received a copy of the August 31,
2004 Decision of the NLRC on October 14, 2004, it did not file any Motion for
Reconsideration such that the said Decision became final and executory on
October 19, 2004. Instead, PNB went directly to the CA to assail the NLRC
Decision through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which the said court took cognizance of.
The Court recognizes that "[t]he finality of the NLRC's [D]ecision does not
preclude the filing of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of judgment after the lapse of ten (10)
days from the parties' receipt of its [D]ecision will only give rise to the prevailing
party's right to move for the execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from
taking cognizance of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations." 24 However, it is a well-established rule that "a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can
resort to the special civil action for certiorari . . . . The rationale for the rule is that
the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or
mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. Of
course, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when
the filing of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a
[M]otion for [R]econsideration," 25 such as "(a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a [M]otion for [R]econsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relied by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved." 26 Here,
PNB did not at all allege to which of the above-mentioned exceptions this case
falls. Neither did it present any plausible justification for dispensing with the
requirement of a prior Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC. HDIaET

Despite this, the CA still took cognizance of PNB's Petition for Certiorari and
ignored this significant flaw. It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. 27 It is a jurisdictional
and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. 28 Thus, PNB's
"failure to file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration with the NLRC before availing
[itself] of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity." 29 In view thereof,
the CA erred in entertaining the Petition for Certiorari filed before it. It follows,
therefore, that the proceedings before it and its assailed Decision are considered
null and void. 30 Hence, the final and executory Decision of the NLRC dated
August 31, 2004 stands.
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded
as appearing from the allegations in the Complaint.
Cabrera v. Francisco, G.R. No. 172293, [August 28, 2013], 716 PHIL 574-591

Section 19 (1) and (2) of BP 129 32 as amended by RA 7691 33 read:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx
Insisting that the RTC has jurisdiction over their Complaint, petitioners contend
that the same is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation or involves
interest in a real property the assessed value of which exceeds P200,000.00. ACTaDH

The Court does not agree. To ascertain the correctness of petitioner's contention,
the averments in the Complaint and the character of the relief sought in the said
Complaint must be consulted. 34 This is because the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations
in the Complaint. 35 Hence, the pertinent portions of petitioners' Complaint are
hereunder reproduced:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That on October 25, 1976 the defendants' father the late Atty. Lorenzo
Gella, . . . designated . . . Severino Cabrera as agent or [administrator of
all his real properties located in San Jose, Antique] . . . .
3. That said Severino Cabrera immediately assumed his duties and
responsibilities faithfully as agent or administrator until his death in 1991
of the properties of Lorenzo Gella in San Jose, Antique consisting of
about 24 hectares . . . [which later] became Lot No. 1782-B in the name
of the defendants, covered by T.C.T. No. T-16987, Register of Deeds of
Antique . . . .
4. That after the death of said Severino Cabrera in 1991, with the
consent of the defendants, his wife took over his duties and
responsibilities as agent or administratrix of the above-named properties
of the defendants in San Jose, Antique with the help of her son, Arnel
Cabrera as 'encargado'and the plaintiffs were also instructed by the
defendants to look for buyers of their properties and plaintiffs were
promised by defendants a commission of five percent of the total
purchase price of the said properties as compensation for their
long and continued administration of all the said properties.
5. That sometime in 1994 plaintiffs approached the real estate broker
Erlinda Veñegas to sell the above-described Lot No. 1782-B and the
plaintiffs gave her the addresses of the defendants who at all times live
in Metro Manila[. T]hereafter defendants agreed to have the said
property developed by ESV Marketing & Development Corporation
represented by its President, said Erlinda Veñegas and defendants also
designated said Erlinda Veñegas as administratrix of said property and
at the same time defendants dismissed plaintiffs as agents or
administrators thereof;
6. That on August 1, 2001 plaintiffs, through counsel wrote
defendants demanding payment of their five percent of twenty four
hectares properties under their administration for twenty five years in
[the] form [of] real estate in [the] subdivision of Lot 1782-B as their
compensation or commission, but defendants refused and failed to pay
plaintiffs in cash or in kind of what is due them;
7. That in view of the aforesaid failure and refusal of defendants to pay
their compensation or commission and instead they were dismissed and
replaced by the said Erlinda Veñegas they themselves recommended to
defendants, the plaintiffs have suffered public humiliation, mental
anguish, and serious anxiety for which plaintiffs should be adjudged and
entitled to moral damages in the sum of not less than Php100,000.00
each.
8. That defendants' ingratitude and unjustified refusal to pay plaintiffs . . .
their compensation or commission for twenty five years service as
administrators and had successfully found [a] developer of defendants'
property but only to be dismissed, plaintiffs were compelled to institute
this action and incur expenses as well as attorney's fees in the sum of
Php100,000.00.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing, judgment
be rendered against defendants jointly and severally in favor of the
plaintiffs, as follows:
 a. To pay plaintiffs their compensation or commission in [the] form
of real estate from Lot No. 1782-B subdivision equivalent to five percent
of twenty four hectares properties under their administration;
b. To pay plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of not less than
Php100,000.00 each;
c. Attorney's fee and litigation expenses in the amount of not less than
Php100,000.00 each and pay the costs of suit. DcITaC

xxx xxx xxx 36 (Italics and Emphases supplied)

The Court in Ungria v. Court of Appeals 37 restated the criterion laid down
in Singson v. Isabela Sawmill 38 to ascertain if an action is capable or not of
pecuniary estimation, viz.:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion
of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional
Trial Courts).
It can be readily seen from the allegations in the Complaint that petitioners' main
purpose in filing the same is to collect the commission allegedly promised them
by respondents should they be able to sell Lot No. 1782-B, as well as the
compensation for the services rendered by Severino, Araceli and Arnel for the
administration of respondents' properties. Captioned as a Complaint for
Collection of Agent's Compensation, Commission and Damages, it is principally
for the collection of a sum of money representing such compensation and
commission. Indeed, the payment of such money claim is the principal relief
sought and not merely incidental to, or a consequence of another action where
the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money. In fact,
petitioners in this case estimated their claim to be equivalent to five percent of
the purchase price of Lot No. 1782-B. Therefore, the CA did not err when it ruled
that petitioners' Complaint is not incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Court cannot also give credence to petitioners' contention that their action
involves interest in a real property. The October 25, 1976 letter 39 of Atty. Gella
confirming Severino's appointment as administrator of his properties does not
provide that the latter's services would be compensated in the form of real estate
or, at the very least, that it was for a compensation. Neither was it alleged in the
Complaint that the five percent commission promised to Araceli and Arnel would
be equivalent to such portion of Lot No. 1782-B. What is clear from paragraph 4
thereof is that respondents instructed petitioners to look for buyers of their
properties and "were promised by [respondents] a commission of five percent of
the total purchase price of the said properties as compensation for their long
and continued administration of all the said properties." Also, petitioners'
allegation in paragraph 6 that respondents failed to pay them "in cash or in
kind" of what is due them negates any agreement between the parties that they
should be paid in the form of real estate. Clearly, the allegations in their
Complaint failed to sufficiently show that they have interest of whatever kind over
the properties of respondents. Given these, petitioners' claim that their action
involves interest over a real property is unavailing. Thus, the Court quotes with
approval the CA's ratiocination with respect to the same:
As to their weak claim of interest over the property, it is apparent that
their only interest is to be compensated for their long-term administration
of the properties. They do not claim an interest in the properties
themselves but merely payment for their services, such payment they
compute to be equivalent to five (5%)percent of the value of the
properties. Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is
an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property. Plaintiffs-appellants' interest is obviously not
the one contemplated under the rules on jurisdiction. 40
Petitioners' demand is below the
jurisdictional amount required for RTCs
outside of Metro Manila, hence, the RTC
concerned in this case has no
jurisdiction over petitioners' Complaint.
To determine whether the RTC in this case has jurisdiction over petitioners'
Complaint, respondents correctly argued that the same be considered vis-Ã -
vis Section 19 (8) of BP 129, which provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
aAHSEC

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
This jurisdictional amount of exceeding P100,000.00 for RTC's outside of Metro
Manila was adjusted to P200,000.00 effective March 20, 1999 in pursuance to
Section 5 of RA 7691 41 which further provides:
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec.
33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be
adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years
thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the
case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall
be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Hence, when petitioners filed their Complaint on September 3, 2001, the said
increased jurisdictional amount was already effective. The demand in their
Complaint must therefore exceed P200,000.00 in order for it to fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners prayed that they be paid five percent of the total purchase price of Lot
No. 1782-B. However, since the Complaint did not allege that the said property
has already been sold, as in fact it has not yet been sold as respondents
contend, there is no purchase price which can be used as basis for computing
the five percent that petitioners are claiming. Nevertheless and as mentioned,
petitioners were able to attach to their Complaint a copy of the tax declaration for
Lot No. 1782-B showing a total market value of P3,550,072.00. 42 And since
"[t]he fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller,
who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to
buy," 43 the RTC correctly computed the amount of petitioners' claim based on
the property's market value. And since five percent of P3,550,072.00 is only
P177,503.60 or below the jurisdictional amount of exceeding P200,000.00 set for
RTCs outside of Metro Manila, the RTC in this case has no jurisdiction over
petitioners' claim.
There is no merit to petitioners' averment that their demand for moral damages
should be included in the computation of their total claims. Paragraph 8, Section
19 of BP 129 expressly speaks of demand which is exclusive of damages of
whatever kind. This exclusion was later explained by the Court in Administrative
Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994 as follows:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining
the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Here, the moral damages being claimed by petitioners are merely the
consequence of respondents' alleged non-payment of commission and
compensation the collection of which is petitioners' main cause of action. Thus,
the said claim for moral damages cannot be included in determining the
jurisdictional amount.
In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC's conclusion that
it has no jurisdiction over petitioners' claim.
The CA's affirmance of the RTC's
findings that the Complaint states no
cause of action and that Araceli and
Arnel have no authority to sue in behalf
of Severino's other heirs cannot be
raised in this Petition.
As pointed out by respondents, petitioners failed to question in their Motion for
Reconsideration before the CA its affirmance of the RTC's findings that the
Complaint states no cause of action and that Araceli and Arnel have no authority
to sue in behalf of the other heirs of Severino. Suffice it to say that "[p]rior to
raising [these arguments] before this Court, [they] should have raised the matter
in [their Motion for Reconsideration] in order to give the appellate court an
opportunity to correct its ruling. For [them] to raise [these issues] before [this
Court] now would be improper, since [they] failed to do so before the CA."
CITDES

Demurrer to the evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an

action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue.

People v. Go, G.R. No. 191015, [August 6, 2014

The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to

sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt. . . . Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer
thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify
the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be
considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission
of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the
accused". 41 Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must
evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 42
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed
in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." 43 As to effect, "the grant
of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed
because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is
reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction". 44 When grave abuse of discretion
is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused's demurrer to evidence
amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when
the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a
finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to
evidence, its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People
v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused's demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result
in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set
aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action
via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is
not violated.
DcaECT

In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial court when it granted the accused's
demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order of acquittal void. 45

Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence

should . . . be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the
rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be
vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused
is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy.
In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the
accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are
reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their
duties as members of the Bench . . . ."
An aggrieved party is allowed a fresh period of 15 days counted from
receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC.

Heirs of Bihag v. Heirs of Bathan, G.R. No. 181949, [April 23, 2014], 734 PHIL
191-203

In Neypes, the Supreme Court, in order to standardize the appeal periods

provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
declared that an aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration, within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we agree with petitioners that their Notice
of Appeal was timely filed as they had a fresh 15-day period from the time they
received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration within which to file
their Notice of Appeal.
A decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party fails
to appeal or move for a reconsideration within 15 days from his receipt of
the court's decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding.
Heirs of Bihag v. Heirs of Bathan, G.R. No. 181949, [April 23, 2014], 734 PHIL
191-203

But while we agree with petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was erroneously
denied by the RTC, we are nevertheless constrained to deny the instant Petition
as the January 5, 2007 Order, denying petitioners' Notice of Appeal, has attained
finality. It is a settled rule that a decision or order becomes final and executory if
the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a reconsideration within 15 days
from his receipt of the court's decision or order disposing of the action or
proceeding. 54 Once it becomes final and executory, the decision or order may no
longer be amended or modified, not even by an appellate court. 55
In this case, petitioners, through their counsel, received a copy of the assailed
January 5, 2007 Order, under Registry Receipt No. E-0280, on January 22,
2007, as evidenced by the Certification of the assistant postmaster. As such,
petitioners should have filed their motion for reconsideration within 15 days, or on
or before February 6, 2007, but they did not. Instead, they filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 10, 2007. At this time, the
RTC's January 5, 2007 Order denying the Notice to Appeal had long become
final and executory. Petitioners' mere denial of the receipt of the assailed Order
cannot prevail over the Certification issued by the assistant postmaster as we
have consistently declared that "[t]he best evidence to prove that notice was sent
would be a certification from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the
notice was issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery and
receipt was made." 56
Considering that the January 5, 2007 Order has attained finality, it may no longer
be modified, altered, or disturbed, even if the modification seeks to correct an
erroneous conclusion by the court that rendered it. 57