NECESSITY

1. The Court will rule to convict defendants because they willfully took the life of another.

The ordinary meaning of the statutory language must be applied if there is no ambiguity
in the language used, unless the outcome is so absurd as to suggest that it is altogether
different from the exemplary cases that account for the statute’s existence. If the
statute contains no statutory ambiguity and at best only seems to raise excessive
generality, resort to the identification of prototypical and exemplary cases is a must.

The statutory term ‘willfully’ does not create an ambiguity because undoubtedly, the
defendants acted willfully under any possible meaning of that word. There is only a
problem of excessive generality which makes references to prototypical or exemplary
cases necessary. These are the cases that are within the purview of the limits of the
statute which include the willful killing of an innocent party, motivated by anger, greed,
or self-interest. It also considerable to include cases that are at the opposite pole as
decided in several jurisprudence where there is a legal justification when a defendant
has killed someone who has put his life in danger. In the latter case, the victim is the
wrongdoer, one whose life-threatening and unlawful act triggered the killing in
question. A departure from the aforementioned exemplary cases makes the application
of the statute according to its ordinary meaning unwarranted.

In the present case, the Roger Whetmore was not the wrongdoer and he did not
threaten the life of anyone. Therefore, there is no legal justification available for the
defendants. Furthermore, the defendants’ acts were motivated by self-interest - that is
to ensure their survival at the expense of the life of the victim despite the act being non-
consensual - which makes their acts fall within the purview and contemplation of NCSA
Section 12.

Thus, the Court should convict the defendants because their acts fall within the ordinary
meaning of the statutory language and the application of such statute is not absurd as
to make available to them a legal justification.

ISSUE: Whether the statute prohibiting willful killing with the punishment of death is
to be applied with its ordinary meaning in the present case.

2. The Court will favor conviction because the unfortunate proceedings between
Whetmore and the defendants were not consensual at all.

The absurdity exception from application of the ordinary meaning of the statute will not
apply in proceedings where it was not consensual at all times.

The legal justification of the defendants would not have been excluded if the
agreement, or disagreement, between Whetmore and the defendants were consensual.
 It would be conceivable for the absurdity exception to be given consideration had it
been the case.

In the present case, Roger Whetmore’s consent was withdrawn before the dice was
cast. At that precise moment, the victim expressly said that he did not wish to
participate in this method of deciding who should die so that the rest will live.

Where there was no consent to participate in the process that led to the death of the
victim, the answer has never been clearer: those who killed acted in violation of the
statute.

ISSUE: Whether the non-consensual nature of the proceedings between the

defendants and Whetmore warrants the absurdity exception

3. There should be conviction of the defendants because the killing by way of cost-benefit
exception is not morally excusable even if it was necessary in order to ensure that more
people would live.

As a matter of principle, the killing is morally inexcusable because this undermines the
statutory prohibition such that the exemption in this case could not be clearly
distinguished from a claimed exemption in other cases in which judgment would argue
otherwise. As a matter of practice, this exemption undermines the deterrent value of
the criminal law of Newgarth.

As a matter of principle, this opens a floodgate of other claimed exemption where moral
judgment in other cases have already decided otherwise. As a matter of practice, it is at
least possible that some people would kill in the belief or hope that they would be able
to claim an exemption.

In the present case, cost-benefit has its own place but never when it comes to matters
of life and death, especially when the law forbids ‘willful taking of life’. When a cost-
benefit exception is allowed, people will be bound to think that the willful taking of life
is morally excusable as long the as the benefit outweighs the cost.

Thus, it is necessary for the Court to convict the defendants in order not to send a
confusing signal of the criminal law where necessity can be a moral excuse for willful
killing.

ISSUE: Whether the necessity to kill in order to survive through cost-benefit calculus is
morally excusable
BENEFICIALITY
1. It is beneficial for the Court to convict the defendants because the approach of applying
the ordinary meaning of a statute will have the benefit of certainty in future cases of the
court.

Insisting on the use of the ordinary meaning of words and by refusing to enforce
statutes that require courts to engage in guessing games, we can require crucial
information to be provided to all relevant parties, and in the process contribute to the
greater clarity of the law. Presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of the enacted
law is a close cousin of the void-for-vagueness rule.

This kind of approach will, in the future, have the benefit of increasing certainty in a way
that reduces difficulty for the court to arrive at decisions. This further enables people to
know the content of the law that is consistent, certain, and clear. Associating the
presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning to the void-for-vagueness rule, despite
being applicable only to free speech cases, clearly indicates that when the people is
misled by the text, the law is nothing in the first place.

In the present case, the Newgarth statute is clear and direct in its language. It provides
no confusion in the language it uses. Deviating from such would create inconsistency
and send the wrong signal of what the law limits.

Therefore, the application of the ordinary meaning of the statute where there is not a
single hint of ambiguity will benefit the justice system by increasing certainty,
predictability, and clarity.

ISSUE: Whether the application of the ordinary meaning of the statute contribute to
increased certainty, clarity, and predictability in future decisions of the court.

2. It is beneficial to convict the defendants as this will uphold the supremacy of the law of
civil society.

Extreme circumstances do not displace the positive law of the state and then effectively
replaced by the law of the state of nature.

Extreme circumstances are the substance of hard cases, and what makes for the
difficulty is the extreme nature of the circumstances, not anything geographical.

In this case, the separation of the explorers from outside the cave by virtue of the
landslide completely blocking the entrance does not displace and negate the law of civil
society of the state. No law of the state of nature can then become effective and
acquire jurisdiction because the extreme circumstances is what makes the present case
difficult, not anything geographical. Whether inside or outside the cave, what governs
 the victim, the defendants, their acts, and the circumstances surrounding them is the
law of civil society.

Thus, conviction is beneficial so that it becomes further known that the law of civil
society governs despite the difficult circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether the geographical divide brought by extreme circumstances will

effectively replace the law of civil society by the law of the state of nature.

PRACTICABILITY
1. It is practicable to convict the defendants as a form of retribution to the willful act
committed and to deter any similar act in the future.

In retribution, those who have killed have plausibly committed a wrongful act even if
that act was necessary to save a number of lives. For the Kantians or those who believe
that criminal laws are for deterrence, conviction is for the purpose of reducing
repetition of such crime in the future.

The retributivists and Kantians often disagree on the purpose of the criminal laws but
they are both unwilling to condemn someone who has killed a life-threatening
wrongdoer. Here, the retributivists and Kantians could certainly condemn and agree
with the conviction of the defendants because the latter took the life of an innocent
person, one who withheld his consent at the crucial moment.

In the present case, the acts of Roger Whetmore were not life-threatening and neither
was he a wrongdoer. It is not unreasonable to say that Whetmore deserved a treatment
other than being a means to the defendant’s ends. At the very least for retributivists,
conviction is not absurd. On the other hand, the Kantians can submit to the fact that a
verdict of innocence sends a wrong signal of the criminal laws of Newgarth and hence
result in more killings justified by a cost-benefit calculus which can effectively unravel
the deterrent nature of crimes. Here, the deterrent value starts to loosen arising from
concerns of increased uncertainty and muffled signals brought about by a verdict of
innocence. Therefore, it is not absurd to convict the defendants in the point of view of
deterrence.

Thus, it would be practicable to convict the defendants in line with the retributive and
deterrent nature of the criminal laws.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction is practicable because it is in line with the retributive
and deterrent nature of criminal laws.