JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

MONTILLA V HILARIO
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official positions of the accused were connected with the offenses
charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution of stated that the motives for the crimes were "personal with political character."
It does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance
of their official functions.
Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the relation between
the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the
Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the office. In other words, the office
must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statue, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter
Two to Six, title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen
or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office,
as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime.

PEOPLE V MONTEJO
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed
by the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with
their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as
Mayor of Basilan City.

BARTOLOME V PEOPLE
The difference between Montilla and Montejo is that whereas in the former the murder was committed outside o􀀼ce hours and for
personal or political motives, the victim in the latter case was killed while he was undergoing custodial investigation in the police
substation. The crime in Montejo would not have been committed were it not for the fact that the accused were actually discharging
official functions at the time.
"The case of Montilla vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied upon by respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of the
prosecution to the appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in point, for, as stated in the decision therein:
'From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the o􀀼cial positions of the accused were connected with the offense;
charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives for the crimes were personal with political character. It
does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance
of their official functions.'
"Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar." In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsi􀀼cation was
committed by the accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, o􀀼cial functions. The information does not
allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of o􀀼cial duties and the commission of the offense. Besides,
falsi􀀼cation of an o􀀼cial document may be committed not only by public o􀀼cers and employees but even by private persons only. To
paraphrase Montilla, public o􀀼ce is not an essential ingredient of the offense such that the offense cannot exist without the office.
Clearly, therefore, as the alleged falsi􀀼cation was not an offense committed in relation to the o􀀼ce of the accused, it did not come
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in the instant case are null and void ab initio. 4

PEOPLE V MAGALLANES
Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, 26 despite the allegation that the accused public officers committed the crime of
falsification of official document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this Court held that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of
official duties and the commission of the offense."
Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court 27 and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed
not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject
cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall
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under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon
has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No.
7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan.

LACSON V SANDIGANBAYAN
5. ID.; SANDIGANBAYAN; JURISDICTION; DEFINED; SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT 8249 REQUIRES THAT THE OFFENSE CHARGED MUST
BE COMMITTED BY THE OFFENDER IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE IN ORDER FOR THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
IT. — The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint
or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. As stated
earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4
requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated
that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate
was reiterated in the new [1987] Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan "shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law."
6. ID.;ID.;ID.;MERE ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED PUBLIC OFFICER IN
RELATION TO HIS OFFICE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN. — The stringent requirement
that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office" is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion
of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's
official duties. In People vs. Magallanes,where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue,
we ruled: "It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the
result of evidence after trial. "In (People vs. Montejo (108 Phil. 613 [1960]),where the amended information alleged Leroy S. Brown
City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and
...special policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp ...at Tipo-tipo which
is under his command ...supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and
conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law
and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and
acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof. We held that the
offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides,
the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the
office of the accused. "Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate
that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations
merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained
the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they spot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction,
it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial." In the aforecited case of
People vs. Montejo,it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office does not appear in the information, which
only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific
factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and
the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge
of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over said cases.

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ESCOBAL V GARCHITORENA
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the remand of the case
to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute
in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The
jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information.[19] Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case
continues until the case is terminated.
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation
to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed
by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.[22] The amended Information filed with the RTC
against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a
salary grade below “27,” the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade “23.” He was charged with homicide
punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and
32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

INDING V SANDIGANBAYAN
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act No. 8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning
period is the time of the commission of the offense.[14] Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the crime.[15] However, Rep. Act
No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the offense.
This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of these two provisions which reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise [exclusive][16] original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, [Book II][17] of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
…
In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime charged was committed from the period of January
3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:[18]
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,[19] where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;[20]
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;[21]
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

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(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.[22]
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade “27” or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.[23]
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining the government officials that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five categories, to wit:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher. . .
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically
included the following officials as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to officials of the executive
branch as “occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.” In other words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in the executive branch
with SG 27 or higher, and the officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section
2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

SERANA V SANDIGANBAYAN
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise
bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. InGeduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner
falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner
falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office.47

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QUINDOZA V BANZON
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Section 4(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249[18] clearly provides that employees of the executive branch
classified as Grade “27” or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 are within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the MTC. Clearly, any crime committed by complainant, a salary grade “28” employee, in
relation to his office falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The record shows that the crimes allegedly committed by
complainant were in relation to his office as director of the BEZ.
When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[19]
Respondent judge undeniably erred in denying complainant’s motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326 and 02-7332
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, as the OCA correctly observed, respondent judge’s act of ordering the incarceration of complainant and threatening not to
grant him bail at the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326 and 02-7332 until he shall have reconnected the water and
electric supply connections of Caralipio and de Asis indubitably constitutes oppression and abuse of authority

PEOPLE V MTC OF QC
Libel cases shall be tried by the regional trial courts having jurisdiction over them to the exclusion of the metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts in cities, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts.”

PANAGUITON V DOJ
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite
finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the
information against petitioner.
In this case the general rule of rule 110 was not followed because of the special law involved in the offense.

Rule 110
AMENDMENT , SUBSTITUTION
PEOPLE V ZULUETA
Now therefore, an amended information setting forth a different manner of committing the felony, — a totally new proposition —
does it merely introduce a formal amendment?.
We do not think so. Even in civil cases — wherein the rules are more liberal as to amendments — it is not generally permissible to
alter plaintiff's theory of the case, alteration being substantial. 1
In this connection it must be recalled that under the rules of criminal procedure there is a further limitation to formal amendments,
namely, that the amendment "can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant." Surely the preparations made by herein
accused to face the original charges will have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation of
conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even
omissions 2 of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to
allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem
inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed
two-days' preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is
always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice.

UNIONBANK OF THE PHILS V PEOPLE

To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under
Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all
the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding
that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the
actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be
at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are
both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

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IBASCO V CA
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined by the place where the elements of making, issuing,
or drawing of the check and delivery thereof are committed. Thus, as explained inPeople vs. Yabut, 29 "[t]he theory is that a person
indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. . . . The place where
the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation."
In her testimony, Maria Negro categorically stated that the three checks were delivered by the petitioner to their residence in Gumaca,
Quezon.

CALME V CA
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court in that under the former law,
jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any province into which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed
shall come after the commission thereof, while the present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested “in the proper court of the first
port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage x x x.” This is the applicable
provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we do not qualify the same. We fully concur with the findings of the Court
of Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400, which according to him is the spirit behind the present Sec. 15(c), Rule 110.
The said Act specifically provides, among other things, that for crimes committed within the navigable waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any
province in which the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime.
Petitioner’s reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision of said Act vesting jurisdiction in the province where the vessel shall come
after the commission of the crime is not carried in the present Rule.

ABALOS V PEOPLE
In the Dagupan case involving the cash receipts issued by the Pangasinan Photostat of Dagupan City, the Information alleges that the
offense was committed in Dagupan City. This suffices to give said court jurisdiction over the crime of falsification as charged.
Petitioner’s argument that “the crime of falsification x x x arose ONLY when the intent to cause damage became evident, that is, when
the receipts and invoices were ‘submitted in court as proof of the Bill of Costs”’ proves futile in light of the pronouncement in Lopez
(supra), that the act of falsification is committed by the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause damage and
whether the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended is in no wise a material
or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document.
As for the Lingayen case, it appears that the subject invoices were issued by the Xerox Copying Machine of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Again, it suffices for jurisdiction to vest that the Information alleges that the crime of falsification, as charged, was committed within
the municipality of Lingayen.[8]
A detailed disquisition could throw but little additional light on the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner was charged with five counts of
falsification. The first three, concerning Cash Receipts Nos. 39185, 39414, and 41775, were allegedly committed in Dagupan. The
other two counts, involving Invoices Nos. 1070 and 1071, were allegedly committed in Lingayen. It is obvious the cases had to filed
where the offenses had been committed, either in Dagupan or in Lingayen, respectively.
For jurisdiction to be acquired by a court in a criminal case, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Dagupan court could not validly take cognizance
of offenses committed in Lingayen. Nor could the Lingayen court legally entertain charges for acts done in Dagupan. The fact that the
falsified receipts and invoices were allegedly used at the same time in one court proceedings (at the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Branch 7, in connection with Civil Case No. 15958) is of no moment. The offenses of falsification took place much earlier, separately,
when the cash receipts were produced repetitively in Dagupan and Lingayen.
Likewise, considering that five separate offenses of falsification were involved, there can be no forum-shopping. It was erroneous for
petitioner to argue that only one offense was committed. There are as many acts of falsification as there are documents falsified.[9]
The real problem, however, is why the first three offenses were lumped in a single information filed in Dagupan. Likewise, why were
two offenses joined in a single information filed in Lingayen? Thus, petitioner now claims, with ostensible merit, that Section 13, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court was violated.[10]
The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110, Section 13, indeed frowns upon multiple offenses being charged in a single information.
However, petitioner failed to raise this issue during arraignment, in Lingayen as well as in Dagupan. His failure to do so amounts to a
waiver, and his objection on this point can no longer be raised on appeal.[11] In his Motion to Quash filed in Dagupan City, petitioner
alleged lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, in his Motion to Quash filed in Lingayen, petitioner alleged forum-shopping, double
jeopardy, lack of jurisdiction, and that the facts do not constitute an offense. He only raised the issue of “multifariousness of offenses
alleged” in his petition before this Court. By this time, his objection is belated, and obviously to no avail.

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RULE 111
MANUEL V ALFECHE
3. ID.; PETITIONER'S CONTENTION THAT PAYMENT OF FILING AND DOCKET FEES, BY REASON OF THE NON-SPECIFICATION OF THE
AMOUNTS OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, IS NOT NECESSARY, PURPORTEDLY ON THE AUTHORITY OF GENERAL VS.
CLARAVALL, IS LIKEWISE MISPLACED; REASON. — Petitioner also posits the non-necessity of paying the filing and docket fees by reason
of the non-specification of the amounts of moral and exemplary damages being claimed by her, purportedly on the authority of this
Court's ruling in General vs. Claravall. We hold that said General ruling was actually intended to apply to a situation wherein either (i)
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or (ii) the complainant expressly claims moral, exemplary, temperate and/or
nominal damages but has not specified ANY amount at all, leaving the quantification thereof entirely to the trial court's discretion,
and NOT to a situation where the litigant specifies some amounts or parameters for the awards being sought, even though the
different types of damages sought be not separately or individually quantified. Were we to hold otherwise, the result would be to
permit litigants to continue availing of one more loophole in the rule on payment of filing fees, and would not serve to attain the
purpose of the revised Sec. 1 of Rule 111, which is "to discourage the 'gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal's office to
include in the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple millions of pesos without paying any filing fees.'"

CASUPANAN V LAROYA
Further, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is
expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated
in a separate civil action." Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order
of dismissal by the MCTC of the civil case on the ground of forum shopping is erroneous.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL ACTION ARISING FROM THE CRIME; THE ONLY CIVIL ACTION DEEMED INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION.
— Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer
"deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.
The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based
on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run
even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY BE FILED SEPARATELY BY RESERVING SUCH RIGHT IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR IF SEPARATELY FILED, MAY BE
CONSOLIDATED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION. — Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a
separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents
its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal
action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may
be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the
same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IF IT IS RESERVED, IT COULD NOT BE FILED UNTIL AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR IF
SEPARATELY FILED, IT IS SUSPENDED UPON THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION. — Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985
Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the
separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action. . . . Thus, Section 2, Rule
111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon
the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action,
of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto. ISDHcT
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION IN ARTICLES 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE CIVIL CODE MAY BE FILED SEPARATELY BY THE
OFFENDED PARTY EVEN WITHOUT RESERVATION. — Under Section I of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended
party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil
action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising
from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFENDED PARTY CAN SEPARATELY FILE A CRIMINAL CASE AND A CIVIL CASE FOR QUASI-DELICT, WITHOUT VIOLATING
THE RULE ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING. — [T]he offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first, a
criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict
— without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will
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have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In
some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED CAN FILE A CIVIL ACTION FOR QUASI-DELICT FOR THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION HE IS ACCUSED OF IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE. — [T]he accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused
"may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period
may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second, the accused, who is presumed
innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which
is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the
law. cTaDHS
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND REGARDLESS OF
THE RESULT OF THE LATTER. — We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may
vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil
Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself,
in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared: ". . . . There can indeed be no other logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution —
whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction
in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.'" More
than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal
action although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and
irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal
with such remote possibilities.

CANCIO V ISIP
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an
independent civil action. Pertinent portion of the complaint reads:
Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondent’s obligation to make good the value of the checks in exchange for the cash he
delivered to respondent. In other words, petitioner’s cause of action is the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. It
matters not that petitioner claims his cause of action to be one based on delict.[22] The nature of a cause of action is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief.[23]
Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order of the trial court was the civil action ex delicto. To
reiterate, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code “[w]hen the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.” Thus, in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and
America,[24] the Court, applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, held that a civil case seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of
a Letter of Credit-Trust Receipt is a civil action ex contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa
case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.

SANCHEZ V FAR EAST BANK

In sum, we hold that petitioner's acquittal was based on the fact that she had not committed the offense imputed to her. Consequently,
she cannot be held civilly liable. In concluding that she, as well as her testimony, was credible, the trial court cannot be faulted with
arbitrariness or negligence. Tellingly, her testimony that she turned over the proceeds of the subject checks to Kai Chin stands
unrebutted.
Appeal of the Civil Aspect of the
Decision Acquitting the Accused
The consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused are discussed by the Court in Manantan v. CA 40 in this wise:

"Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
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has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance
is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is 'for the same act or omission.' . . . ."
In Salazar v. People, 41 the Court further expounded thus:
"The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is
only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him. cESDCa
"If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved
party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period
therefor."
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is settled that the private offended party may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite
the acquittal of the accused. But this recourse may prosper only if the nature of the trial court's judgment falls under any of the three
categories stated in Salazar.

TORRIJOS V CA
Wakat Diamnuan and his wife sold their 1/4 share of a parcel of land in favor of Torrijos. Five years later, the entire property, including
the share of Wakat and his wife, were sold to Victor de Guia. Hence, Torrijos prosecuted Wakat for estafa. After trial, the judge
convicted Wakat ordering the latter, among other things to indemnify Torrijos in the sum of P7,493. The second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the decision stated that "whatever damages may have been suffered by Torrijos before the deed of sale in favor
of Victor de Guia was made by the accused and his co-owners may be the subject of some other action, perhaps civil, but not in this
case." The indemnity was raised from P7,493 to P25,000 on motion of Torrijos.
When his motion to reconsider was denied by the Court a quo, accused appeals to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the accused died,
for which reason his counsel moved to dismiss the appeal under paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
that the death of a convict extinguishes, not only the personal penalties, but also the "pecuniary penalties," if the death occurs before
final judgment. Torrijos opposed the motion on the ground that the term "pecuniary penalty" should not include civil liability decreed
by the lower court in favor of the offended party, as the civil action therefor was not reserved, much less filed separately from the
criminal actions. The Court of Appeals sustained the motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court held that the appeal should proceed with respect to the issue of civil liability of the accused, and the title of the
case shall include the name of petitioner as offended party or plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative of heirs of deceased
accused substituted as defendants-appellants.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; WHEN CIVIL LIABILITY IS EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH. — The extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of criminal
liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided the death supervenes before final judgment. the said principle does not apply in a crime of estafa where the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. Thus, in the case at bar,
the crime of estafa did not exist until the accused re-sold the property to a second vendee about 5 years after the first sale to the first
vendee. If the accused did not comply with the sale he executed in favor of the first vendee — after receiving the purchase price from
the latter, but before the second sale to the second — there is no question that the accused would be merely civilly liable through an
action by the first vendee either for specific performance with damages or for rescission of contract also with damages. If rescission
were pursued by the first vendee, the vendor would be liable to refund the purchase price as well as be responsible in damages.
Consequently, the civil liability of the accused in the estafa cases survives his death;. because death is not a valid cause for the
extinguishment of civil obligations.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF DEATH SUPERVENES AFTER JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BUT PENDING APPEAL, ACTION FOR
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES MAY NOT BE DISMISSED. — The provision of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court that if
defendant dies before the final judgment in the Court of First Instance, an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon "shall
be dismissed to be prosecuted in manner specially provided in these rules," means that the claim should be presented in the testate
or intestate proceedings over the estate of the deceased. The implication is that if death supervenes after the judgment of the Court
of First Instance but pending appeal in the appellate court, the action for the recovery of money may not be dismissed. In such case,
the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representatives or the heirs
of the deceased accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants.
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PEOPLE V BAYOTAS
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary
to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
Issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
Ruling:
The civil liability is extinguished together with the extinguishment of criminal liability of the deceased offender since the source of civil
liability is delict (civil liability ex delicto) and not on the other source of obligation (i.e. contract, quasi-contract).

GLORIA DY V PEOPLE
Thus, whether an exoneration from the criminal action should affect the corresponding civil action depends on the varying kinds of
acquittal. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 31 we explained —
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance
is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although
the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case.
However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined,
even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily,
different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining
whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence. 32
In Dayap v. Sendiong, 33 we further said —
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on
delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. 34
Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil liability ex delicto, even if mandatorily instituted with the corresponding
criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is based on the presence of reasonable doubt. In these instances, while the evidence
presented does not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action still prevails for as long as the greater weight
of evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability. This means that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in penalizing the accused
for the commission of a crime, it nevertheless finds that he or she committed or omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate
source of obligation. There is no sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a
preponderance of evidence to show that the act or omission caused injury which demands compensation.
Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary estimation through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa are:
(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to cause damage. As this Court previously held, "the
element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable." 35 Our law abhors the act of defrauding another person by abusing his trust or
deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances which constitute estafa. Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) states that
estafa is committed by abuse of confidence —
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — . . . (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or conversion. When the element of
misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex
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delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when an
accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may
still be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court to the
point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof
justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists.
In this case, the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner because the prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the element of
misappropriation or conversion. There was no adequate evidence to prove that Mandy gave the checks to petitioner with the
instruction that she will use them to pay the ICBC loan. Citing Mandy's own testimony in open court, the RTC Manila held that when
Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner, their agreement was that it was a "sort of loan." 36 In the dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision, the RTC Manila ruled that the prosecution "failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." 37 It then
proceeded to order petitioner to pay the amount of the loan.
The ruling of the RTC Manila was affirmed by the CA. It said that "[t]he acquittal of Gloria Dy is anchored on the ground that her guilt
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt — not because she is not the author of the act or omission complained of. . . . The trial court
found no trickery nor deceit in obtaining money from the private complainant; instead, it concluded that the money obtained was
undoubtedly a loan." 38
Our jurisprudence on this matter diverges.
Earlier cases ordered the dismissal of the civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto whenever there is a finding that there was
no estafa but rather an obligation to pay under a contract. In People v. Pantig, 39 this Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court
acquitting Pantig, but revoked the portion sentencing him to pay the offended party the amount of money alleged to have been
obtained through false and fraudulent representations, thus —
The trial court found as a fact that the sum of P1,200, ordered to be paid in the judgment of acquittal, was received by the defendant-
appellant as loan. This finding is inconsistent with the existence of the criminal act charged in the information. The liability of the
defendant for the return of the amount so received arises from a civil contract, not from a criminal act, and may not be enforced in
the criminal case.
The portion of the judgment appealed from, which orders the defendant-appellant to pay the sum of P1,200 to the offended party, is
hereby revoked, without prejudice to the filing of a civil action for the recovery of the said amount. 40
This was also the import of the ruling in People v. Singson. 41 In that case, this Court found that "the evidence [was] not sufficient to
establish the existence of fraud or deceit on the part of the accused. . . . And when there is no proven deceit or fraud, there is no crime
of estafa." 42 While we also said that the established facts may prove Singson's civil liability (obligation to pay under a contract of
sale), we nevertheless made no finding of civil liability because "our mind cannot rest easy on the certainty of guilt" 43 considering
the above finding. The dispositive portion stated that Singson is acquitted "without prejudice to any civil liability which may be
established in a civil case against her." 44
However, our jurisprudence on the matter appears to have changed in later years.
In Eusebio-Calderon v. People, 45 this Court affirmed the finding of the CA that Calderon "did not employ trickery or deceit in obtaining
money from the private complainants, instead, it concluded that the money obtained was undoubtedly loans for which [Calderon]
paid interest." 46 Thus, this Court upheld Calderon's acquittal of estafa, but found her civilly liable for the principal amount borrowed
from the private complainants. 47
The ruling was similar in People v. Cuyugan. 48 In that case, we acquitted Cuyugan of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove
fraud. We held that the transaction between Cuyugan and private complainants was a loan to be used by Cuyugan in her business.
Thus, this Court ruled that Cuyugan has the obligation, which is civil in character, to pay the amount borrowed. 49
We hold that the better rule in ascertaining civil liability in estafa cases is that pronounced in Pantig and Singson. The rulings in these
cases are more in accord with the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, and the Rules of Court. They are also logically consistent with
this Court's pronouncement in Manantan.
Under Pantig and Singson, whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any personal property was
made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil
liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil
liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is civil liability ex contractu where the civil liability arises from an entirely
different source of obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case, and consequently
must be filed separately. This is necessarily so because whenever the court makes a finding that the elements of estafa do not exist,
it effectively says that there is no crime. There is no act or omission that constitutes criminal fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be
awarded as it cannot be sourced from something that does not exist.
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a position completely
inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a
contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give something or to render some service. 50 In estafa, the accused's failure to
account for the property received amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to comply with his obligation is only a
contractual breach. Thus, any finding that the source of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that there
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is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are consistent with the concept of fused civil and criminal actions,
and the different sources of obligations under our laws.
We apply this doctrine to the facts of this case. Petitioner was acquitted by the RTC Manila because of the absence of the element of
misappropriation or conversion. The RTC Manila, as affirmed by the CA, found that Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner pursuant
to a loan agreement. Clearly, there is no crime of estafa. There is no proof of the presence of any act or omission constituting criminal
fraud. Thus, civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded because there is no act or omission punished by law which can serve as the
source of obligation. Any civil liability arising from the loan takes the nature of a civil liability ex contractu. It does not pertain to the
civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
In Manantan, this Court explained the effects of this result on the civil liability deemed instituted with the criminal case. At the risk of
repetition, Manantan held that when there is no delict, "civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which
may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of." 51 In Dy's case, the civil liability arises out of contract
— a different source of obligation apart from an act or omission punished by law — and must be claimed in a separate civil action.
The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil obligation arising from a contract of loan in the same criminal
case where she was acquitted on the ground that there was no crime. Any contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in a
separate civil action involving the contract of loan. We clarify that in cases where the accused is acquitted on the ground that there is
no crime, the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely because there is no delict from which any
civil obligation may be sourced. The peculiarity of this case is the finding that petitioner, in fact, has an obligation arising from a
contract. This civil action arising from the contract is not necessarily extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper court through the
proper civil action.
We note that while there is no written contract of loan in this case, there is an oral contract of loan which must be brought within six
years. 65 Under the facts of the case, it appears that any breach in the obligation to pay the loan may have happened between 1996
and 1999, or more than six years since this case has been instituted. This notwithstanding, we find that the civil action arising from
the contract of loan has not yet prescribed.

LANDICHO V RELOVA
ACTIONS; PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; WHEN ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE. — The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused
in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of
the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.||| (Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, [February 23, 1968], 130 PHIL 745-750)

YAP V PARAS
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; DEFINED. — A prejudicial question
is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction
to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.||| (Yap v. Paras, G.R. No.
101236, [January 30, 1992], 282 PHIL 647-654)

UMALI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling
of the respondent Court of Appeals that the resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence, no prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2) cases.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, the issue in CR No. 1423-I is whether or not the petitioners could be found guilty under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 8 or under Article 315, No. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
CIVIL LAW; PRE-JUDICIAL QUESTION; ELEMENTS. — The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question to exist are: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in
the civil action determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

RAS V RASUL
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 1 It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
2
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For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the
determination of the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is
based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. 3
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a
prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras'
defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in
the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative
of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then
there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were
allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that
indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious. prLL
The Solicitor General in his comment expressed his concurrence with the petition thus: "The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his
answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his
signatures in the alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity
of such claim be first determined because if his claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The
question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action."

PLACER V VILLANUEVA
We sustain the position of respondent judge.

The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of probable cause. Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution provides that —

". . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer, as may be recognized by law, after examination under oath or affirmance of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce . . ."

P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the existence of probable cause. Thus,

"If on the basis of complainant's sworn statements and documents submitted, the investigating fiscal or state prosecutor finds no
probable cause to conduct a preliminary investigation, he shall dismiss the case. If probable cause is established by complainant's
evidence, he shall notify the respondent by issuing a subpoena . . . (Sec. 1 [b], RA 5180, as amended by P.D. Nos. 77 and 911).

"The fiscal or state prosecutor shall certify under oath in the information to be filed by him that he has examined the complainant and
his witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements and other evidence submitted before him there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, . . ." (Sec. 1 [d], id.).

There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But does such certification bind the judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this query in
the negative. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of
the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

"Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating
officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has
committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest."

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on
the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission
of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since
U.S. vs. Ocampo 8 and Amarga vs. Abbas. 9 And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders
of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a
matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate

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bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required
affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.
||| (Placer v. Villanueva, G.R. Nos. L-60349-62, [December 29, 1983], 211 PHIL 615-623)

LIM V FELIX
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts."
The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990), reiterated the above interpretation of
"personal" determination by the Judge:
"We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that '. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge . . .' (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election
Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of
probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself the Prosecutor's certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stereographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about
the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation
proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear m the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [1989]):
'Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That
authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13,14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964 (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules
of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed
from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted
all provisions granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point this out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to
stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is 'not a judicial function . .
. (but) part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive,' (2) that whenever 'there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct
preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them,' and the fact 'that a certain
power is granted does not necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were
published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said
amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make a preliminary examination for the
purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power
— indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power — has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in
the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby
placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an
RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal
complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable
cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the
rationale of Salta because both law and role, in restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be judicial
in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a
sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind

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of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. .
. ."
Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990) there is a statement that the judge
may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however, also reiterated that ".
. . the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause
which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest." (Section 2, Article III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the
Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge
and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant
issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. Cdpr

It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges are still bound by the inertia of decisions
and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and are sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also interested in a clear cut
ruling. We will, therefore, restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms.
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is no duplication of work
between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a
Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page
and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more
time for his or her more important judicial functions. LexLib
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . . probable cause to be personally
determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate,
he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional
requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier
gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's
sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest

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