B.

DONATIONS PROPER NUPTIAS

Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda de Batocael

Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in
Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property.
Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after his
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba,
to take care of his house and store.

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco.
Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed
that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper
and that Francisco was too old for her.

A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in
the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful
services she had rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed
a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of
possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of
Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be
declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one
in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and
void.

MERCEDES CALIMLIM-CANULLAS v. WILLELMO FORTUN

Facts:
Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were married on
December 19, 1962.
Presumably, Fernand's father owns the land.

They lived in a small house on the residential land in question with an area of approximately
891... square meters, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After FERNANDO's father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the land.
Eventually convicted by final judgment...

In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living with private respondent Corazon
DAGUINES. During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage
FERNANDO sold the subject property with the house thereon to DAGUINES for the sum of
P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO described the house as "also inherited by
me from my deceased parents".
Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a complaint on June
19, 1980 for quieting of title and damages against MERCEDES.
The latter resisted and claimed that the house in dispute where she and her children were
residing, including the coconut trees... on the land, were built and planted with conjugal
funds and through her industry; that the sale of the land together with the house and
improvements to DAGUINES was null and void because they are conjugal properties, and
she had not given her consent to the sale.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the
husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property
(2) whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and... improvements thereon
was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
Ruling:
pursuant to the foregoing provision both the land and the building belong to the conjugal
partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land.
The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for... the value of
the lot[1] , which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Ruling in Padilla v. Paterno... heir conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should
be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at
the very latest, to the tine immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that ended...
the conjugal partnership. They can not be considered to have become conjugal property
only as of the tine their values were paid to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno
because by that time the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire the
ownership... of said properties. The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was,
under the 1943 decision, subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be
reimbursed to the widow at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects
of the... fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation
was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil Code).
FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES
had not given her consent to said sale.
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being
contrary to morals and public policy.
That sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects.
the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to
certain exceptions.
And this is so because if... transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during
marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law.
The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage
Principles:
Article 158 of the Civil Code

"Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land
shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same."... their conversion from
paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal
buildings were first constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the tine immediately before
the death of Narciso A. Padilla that ended... the conjugal partnership.
They can not be considered to have become conjugal property only as of the tine their
values were paid to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno because by that time the
conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire the ownership... of said
properties. The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was, under the 1943
decision, subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed to the
widow at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the... fulfillment
of the condition should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art.
1187, New Civil Code).
C. ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY:

1. APPLICABILITY

Valdes v. Regional Trial Court

G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a
petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed
a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family.

CASE DIGEST: ALAIN M DI v. MA. CARIDAD L. DI. (G.R. No. 178044;

January 19, 2011).

FACTS: Alain and Caridad were childhood sweethearts. They started living
together until they separated in 1994, got back together in 1996 then finally got
married in 1998. In 2001 petitioner Alain filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against respondent Caridad, citing psychological incapacity.
Extrajudicial summons was served upon Caridad, who was already living in the
United States. Despite receipt of summons, she failed to file an answer to the
complaint within the reglementary period. She was diagnosed by a clinical
psychologist to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which had
been deeply ingrained in her system since her formative years, long-lasting by
nature and incurable. The trial court granted the petition based on the evidence
presented. The dispositive portion of the decision indicated the dissolution of the
absolute community of property and that the Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage will only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.

Petitioner Alain questioned the said part of the dispositive portion. The trial court
partially granted the motion and modified the decision, now stating that the
decree of absolute nullity shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Did the trial court err when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?

HELD: The marriage in this case was annulled under Article 36 (psychological
incapacity) of the Family Code wherein the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules of co-ownership. There is no need for liquidation, partition and distribution
of properties unlike when the marriage is annulled under Articles 40 (bigamous
marriage) or 45 (voidable marriages) wherein the marriage is governed by either
the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the
parties agree to separation of properties. In such cases there is a need for
liquidation, partition and distribution of properties before the decree annulment
can be issued.

Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.xxx."It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage. GRANTED.

2. ALIEN SPOUSE

ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,

vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.

Doctrine:

He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands.

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller got married and
lived in Germany owned by the respondent parents but then they decided to reside in
the Philippines permanently. The respondent had inherit the house in Germany from
his parents which he sold and used to proceeds for purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal and he registered it in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura
Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and maltreatment of respondent to the petitioner, the spouses
eventually separated.
The respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before RTC Quezon City. The
court granted said petition and ordered equal partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.
With regard to the Antipolo property the court ruled that he cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not, respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Held:

No, Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put
the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.

3. FOR THE BENEFIT

Ayala Investments cs CA GR No. 118305 February 12, 1998

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00
loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching,
Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on
March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to
AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum of money
against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then CFI of Rizal entitled “Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming Mills and Alfredo Ching,”

ISSUE: Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in

favor of his employer considered ‘for the benefit of the family’, thus chargeable to the conjugal
property?

RULING: (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term “x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan
or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession
fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of
the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized
as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety
or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof
must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Petition denied.

4. NET PROFIT

Facts:
Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977 and got four
children. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage.

In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with
another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the
legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55, thereby awarding the custody of
their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject
to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the
trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ
was partially executed.

After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC
to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating
that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the
Family Code. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last
ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in
the conjugal partnership.

Held:
In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.

The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily,
what remains in the listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses
and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

D. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

1. PRESUMPTION

Corazon G. Ruiz v. Court of Appeal and Consuelo Torres

G.R. No. 146942 April 22, 2003

PUNO, J.:

Facts:
Herein petitioner Ruiz made several loans with respondent Torres. To loan was summed
up at 750,000 pesos on one set of transactions which is evidenced by one promissory note.
Another, 300,000 pesos was further loaned after the execution of the first promissory note.

The first promissory note states that surcharges at 1% compounded interest per month
and a penalty charge of 10% compounded interest per month was imposed upon default, and the
obligation to pay 750,000 pesos shall subsist from April 1995 to April 1996, during which the
outstanding obligation shall accrue 3% compounded interest per month. All loans are secured
with mortgages in the form of jewelries pledged and real property.

Ruiz eventually defaulted and the mortgaged property are about to be subjected for
auction, Ruiz petitioned for an injunction against the auction proceedings in the trial court, which
was approved, but it was set aside by the Court of Appeals. The trial court contended that it was
a unilateral contract of adhesion which was invalidated by the same, because of its repugnancy to
public policy and that Ruiz, being the weaker party, was disadvantaged because of the
transaction. This contention was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which now contends that
Ruiz made multiple loan agreements with Torres with almost similar imports of the promissory
notes, there being only minor differences in interest rates; there being no contract of adhesion,
Ruiz gave her consent.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject loan agreement and evidenced by the promissory notes are
contracts of adhesion

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no contract of adhesion; Ruiz could not have her
consent to the transaction vitiated. It was clear in the records that Ruiz made multiple loan
agreements with Torres, all of which had similar imports when it comes to the period of
payment, interests, charges and penalties, she had all those chances to ensure that she knows
what she was consenting herself to do. There is no fine print of whatever nature that can be
found anywhere in the promissory notes that could not have vitiated Ruiz’ will to consent.

To further bolster her claims, she was compelled to pay the outstanding balance of loan.
The Supreme Court does not agree to this claim. She was not compelled to give her consent and
agree to the stipulations in the promissory notes; she had all the choice to reject the imports of
the document. There is nothing in the records that show that she was compelled to agree to the
stipulations. She had every opportunity to study the agreement and make her decision from the
same. The Supreme Court affirms the deletion of the 3% monthly compounding interest, and the
10% compounding interest by the trial court and Court of Appeals for being usurious.

2. VOID DISPOSITIONS

G.R. NO. 153802

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO

FACTS:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the
spouses purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City, registered in the name of Marcelino Dailo to the exclusion of
his wife.

In 1993, through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth Osmundo, Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank, secured by the property in San Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate
Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the knowledge and consent of respondent.
The loan matured and remained outstanding which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage.

In 1993, Marcelino died.

Respondent found out later about the mortgage and claimed that she had no knowledge of it. She further claims that
the property was conjugal in nature and so she consequently filed for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. The Court of appeals favored Miguela. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the mortgage entered into by respondent’s husband without her knowledge was valid.
2.) Whether or not the property may be held liable for the obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo.

HELD:
The court held that the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only
when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

Marcelino and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, their properties were governed by the system of Conjugal Partnership of gains, which was made also
made applicable after the effectivity of the Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The Court ruled that the mortgage entered into by
Marcelino without his wife’s consent and, thus, was void.

As to the issue of liability of the property for the obligation obtained by Marcelino, the court held that for failure to
present clear proof that the said obligation redounded to the benefit of the family which under Article 121 of the
Family Code, the subject property could not be held liable.
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA VS. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF
INGRID D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D’WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND
INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE

QUISUMBING, ACTING C.J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also
parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located in Davao City, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when
he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a
house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements,
including a poultry house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to
support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein
petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro
nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the
said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed
members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners [6] began
transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the
gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene,
saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much
so that one flunked at school.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same being contrary to law and
evidence.[10]
RULING:
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from the family home
deserves our condemnation. While respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance
with the petitioners[21] surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not
allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” [22] When a right
is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. [23] It is
patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

Fuentes vs. Roca

G.R. No. 178902, [April 21, 2010]

FACTS:

Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son,
Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes
spouses). They met in the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare
the documents of sale and signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared. It
expressly stated that the sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his
estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.

Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take
possession of the lot and pay him an additional pay besides the downpayment,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If
Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would
become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.
 The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his
trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. After 6 months, a new title was
issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot.
Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine
months afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-
conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC.

The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario,
did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged.
They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the
price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.

The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified
that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He admitted,
however,that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months later. All the
same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to
Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for
nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s

sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged?

2. Whether the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed?

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the
action to annul that sale?

HELD:

1. It was forged
2. It did not prescribe
3. The heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the sale.

RATIO:

1. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her
consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely
academic. The SC agreed with the CA that the signature was forged.
While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of
forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale
of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof
of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.

2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system
of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made
Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him
from selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold
the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario
the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of
the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage,
only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold.

But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code
on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions
were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
vested rights.

Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships
of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws, as provided in Article 256.

(n)

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not
provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s
sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract
has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that
are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale
of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. But, although a void
contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its
terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary
to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action, according to Article
1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of
sale and re-conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s
(his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an
action.

3. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died,
they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,

Uy vs CA GR No 109557 November 29, 2000

FACTS: This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one
hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy
and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a
result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke which left him comatose and bereft of
any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent
Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Respondent wife filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of his husband and
assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell one
piece of real properties.
RTC granted said petition. Respondent opposed and filed a Motion for Reconsideration
contending that such petition is essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of Jardeleza Sr and that a summary proceedings was irregularly applied.
RTC denied the motion. CA reversed RTC’s decision for lack of due process on the
part of the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not
be granted.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a
stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties,
and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a
parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the approval
of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law,
for the amount of eight million pesos.

RULING: NO. “ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
“In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors..”
 Art 124 does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. The situation contemplated in Art 124 is that one where the spouse
is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained. . Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an
incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the
conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of
judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.

Court affirmed in toto CA’s decision.

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO

G.R. No. 157537, [September 7, 2011]

FACTS:

Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later,
Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that
it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said
property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the
property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence
this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner was
that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and
that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community
property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of
the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the
sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally
allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of
the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the
aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.

The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and
Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the
validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: [1] Is Article 130 of the Family Code the applicable law?
[2] Is that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio void for being
made without prior liquidation?
HELD: Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains
must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being
no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly
characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon
Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article
175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of
the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. The
ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil
Code, to wit:

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of

Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell
his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the
sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas
share. This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so
(quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).

Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of
the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void.
Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already
acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the
sale. DENIED.
3. CONVERSION

MUNOZ vs. RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 156125

FACTS:

Spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to the GSIS to
secure a housing loan. Thereafter, they used the money loaned to construct a
residential house on said lot. It is alleged that Munoz granted the spouses for
a loan, which the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS. The balance of the loan
will be delivered by Munoz upon surrender of the title over the property and an
affidavit of waiver of rights (over the property) to be executed by the husband.
While the spouses were able to turn over the title, no affidavit was signed by
the husband. Consequently, Munoz refused to give the remaining balance of
the loan and since the spouses could no longer return the initial amount
handed (which was already paid to GSIS), Munoz kept the title over the
property and subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in his own
name.

The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the
property in favor of Munoz. The RTC ruled that the property was the wife’s
exclusive paraphernal property (since she inherited it from her father) and as
such, the sale is valid even without the husband’s consent. The Court of
Appeals reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive
paraphernal property of the wife, it became conjugal property when it was
used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds.
Hence, the sale is void.

ISSUE:

Is the property paraphernal or conjugal?

RULING:

Paraphernal Property. As a general rule, all property acquired during the

marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In this
case, clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Consequently,
the residential lot is the wife’s exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to
Article 92 and 109 of Family Code).
It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the Civil Code. True,
respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code and thus its
provisions should govern their property relations. With the enactment of the
Family Code however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership of
gains superseded those of the Civil Code. Thus, it is the Family Code that
governs the present case and not the Civil Code. The law states that, when
the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the value are more
than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement;
otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement. In this case,
the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan. Thus, it
is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is
considerably more than the contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the
property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time
she contracted with Munoz; the written consent of the husband was not
necessary.

4. LIABILITY

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of
murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was
sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly
and severally for civil indemnity and damages.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance
of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and
Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that
the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to
the partnership.

The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced
against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the
murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

E. SEPARATION OF PROPERTY

Partosa-Jo v. CA
G.R. No. 82606

December 18, 1992

Facts:

Jose Jo is a Chinese national, and Prima Partosa is his legal wife. Jose Jo admitted that
he had cohabited with three other women and fathered 15 children. The two agreed
that Prima would temporarily leave their conjugal home in Dumaguete City to stay
with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and
support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. In 1942, Prima went back to
Dumaguete, but she was not accepted by her husband.

In 1980, Prima filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as well as
for support. The trial court judge rendered the decision granting Prima a monthly
support of Php500, Php40,000 for the construction of a house where she may live
separately, Php19,200 by way of support in-arrears, and Php3,000 for attorney’s fees.
However, the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed for
lack of a cause for action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not
covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
Jose contended that the decision of the trial court could no longer be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals because it has long since become final and executory. Prima, on the
other hand, argued that a disposition of that case was made in the penultimate
paragraph of the decision. It reads:

“It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered
properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property
under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code, which is subject of separate
proceedings as enunciated herein.”

Prima believed this to be the dispositive portion of the case.

Issues:

1. Can the appellate court still rule on the dispositive portion of the trial court’s
decision?

2. Is Prima Partosa-Jo entitled to a judicial separation of conjugal property?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the drafting of the decision was not exactly
careful. Although the petitioner’s counsel should have taken immediate steps in
rectifying the ruling, a mere technical defect is not insuperable. It has been ruled that
where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive
portion of the decision, the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment
even after the judgment has become final.

2. Yes. The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, invoked Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code,
which reads

Article 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial
approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership except that

****

(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she
may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal
partnership property or separation of property.
Article 178 of the Civil Code had been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code
at the time of the decision by the Supreme Court. As was ruled in Ramirez v. CA, “an
appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question
according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to
the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment.”

Article 128 of the Family Code reads:

If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership,
for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court
may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital,
parental or property relations.

As early as 1942, Jose had already rejected his wife and refused to give financial
support to her. This falls squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, which
provides that if at the time of the petition, the spouses had been separated for at least
one year and reconciliation is highly improbable, it should be considered sufficient
cause for judicial separation of property.

Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo’s petition for judicial separation of property is granted.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007

FACTS:

Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a
blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their
once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private
respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus,
prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and
the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime
charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered
into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT.

This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
property. The Petition was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for

her to share in the conjugal property?

HELD:

No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil
interdiction: It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime
of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such
property inter vivos.

* civil interdiction – a legal restraint upon a person incapable of managing his estate because
of mental incapacity, from signing any deed or doing any act to his own prejudice with the
consent of his curator or interdictor

The Supreme Court ruled that a partial voluntary separation of property agreed upon by
the parties via a compromise agreement duly approved by the Court prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the
requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage
shall be null and void.

COMMENT:
After Compliance With Requirements

After complying with the requirements of Art. 52, either of the former spouse may marry
again. To do otherwise renders the subsequent marriage null and void.

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity
of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executor, shall be considered
legitimate. Children conceived or born with the subsequent marriage under Article 53
shall likewise be legitimate.

COMMENT:

(1) Illustrative Problems

(a) A married B and had a child C. Later, there marriage was declared void because
of A’s psychological incapacity. What is the status of the child? — If conceived or born
before the decision of the court declaring the marriage VOID becomes final and
executory, the child would be considered legitimate. (Art. 54, Family Code).

(b) A married B through fraud. Later a child C was born. One month afterwards, an
action for annulment was brought by B,and after a few weeks, the decree of annulment
was granted. What is the status of C? — Legitimate because it had been born previous
to the annulment.

(c) A married B through force and intimidation. Later, a child C was conceived. In the
meantime, B had brought an action for annulment. A few weeks later, the
annulment was granted. Some months afterwards, C was finally born. What is
the status of C ?— Legitimate. Although it was born after the decree of annulment, it
had been conceived prior thereto, and by provision of law, is to be considered
legitimate.

(d) Although A forced B to marry him, B soon grew to be fond of him, and they freely
cohabited with each other. Later, B filed an action for annulment. Because of this free
and willing cohabitation with each other, a child was conceived after the action for
annulment had been filed in court. A few months thereafter, the child C was born. What
is the status of C? Legitimate. In the first place, C was the result of free cohabitation on
the part of its parents, and therefore the action of annulment cannot be successfully
brought. In the second place, granting that the cohabitation was not free, and granting
further that the decree of annulment was given, still the child had been conceived prior
thereto, and should therefore be considered legitimate.

(2) Problems on Double Marriages

A woman in good faith married a man whom she thought to be unmarried but who was
in reality already married.

(a) Is the second marriage valid?

ANSWER: No, the second marriage is not valid. Being bigamous, it is both illegal and
void ab initio.

(b) Is the man guilty of bigamy?

ANSWER: Yes.

(c) But suppose the man thought that his first wife was already dead, but did not make
diligent efforts to ascertain this fact, would he still be criminally liable?

ANSWER: Yes, he would still be guilty of bigamy. Besides, he should have first asked
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death.(Art. 41, 2nd par., Family Code).

Noveras vs. Noveras

GR No. 188289, Aug. 20, 2014
Facts:
In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia got married. They lived in
California and eventually granted with American citizenship. Out of
this marriage, they produce two children and also several properties
both in USA and Philippines.
In 2001, David returned to the Philippines to supervise their business.
But after a year, Leticia learned that David had an extra-marital affair
with other woman. She then filed a petition for divorce in California
and in 2005 the court granted the decree of nullification of their
marriage. Also, the California court granted to Leticia the custody of
her two minor children, as well as all the couple’s property in USA.

In Aug. 2005, Leticia filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal property

in Baler, Aurora. In his answer, David filed for a petition to grant him
all of their properties in the Philippines considering that Leticia got all
of their properties in USA.
Issue:
Whether or not David is right in claiming all of their properties in the
Philippines?

Ruling:
The court held no, David was wrong in claiming all of their
properties in the Philippines.
Article 91 of this Code, provides that property owned before and
during marriage are under ACP of Absolute Community Property.

In this case their marriage contracted in Dec. 1988, therefore ACP

governs. But, considering that they are both American citizen, the
California court decision with regards to their property in USA governs.
The property in the Philippines will be equally divided between them.

F. PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

Erlinda Agapay vs Carlina Palang, Herminia Palang Delacruz

FACTS: Petitioner and Miguel Palang contracted a bigamous marriage when Petitioner was still
19 y/old and Miguel 63 y/old. 2 months before their cohabitation, they jointly purchased a parcel
of agricultural land. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by petitioner as the sole
vendee. A son was produced during their cohabitation. Both were convicted of concubinage
upon Carlina’s complaint. Prior to the case, Miguel and Carlina executed a compromise
agreement to donate their conjugal property to their only child, Herminia, also a respondent. 2
yrs later, Miguel died. Respondents instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession
of property with damages against petitioner.
RTC dismissed the complaint, confirmed ownership of petitioner over the disputed properties
and adjudicated ½ of agricultural land to the son as his inheritance to his deceased father.
CA reversed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES: 1. WON petitioner has a valid claim of ownership of said properties.
 2. WON a compromise agreement in effect partakes the nature of judicial
confirmation of the separation of property between the spouses and the termination of their
conjugal property, as adopted by the RTC.
3. WON the son’s claim of status as an illegitimate son and heir can be adjudicated in
the case at bar.

RULING: SC affirmed CA’s decision and found RTC gravely erred in all its decisions.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.
Petitioner failed to prove her contributions.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly
void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against
donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal
property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. Separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment
when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted
from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and
should not be so inferred.

Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate
children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated
in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be
adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and
possession.

Petition denied.

Salas vs. Aguila

Facts: On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila
were married. Aguila gave birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later,
Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or
their child.
On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that
they “have no conjugal properties whatsoever”.
On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of their
conjugal property, if any.

On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion stating that she
discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.

However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends
that conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.

RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by proper instruments of conveyance the
discovered properties. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of
Salas and Aguila, thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.
Ruling: Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas
during the validity of their marriage.
The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner, Salas.

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property
regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership.

Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.

Ventura vs. Abuda

Facts:

Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes married on June 9, 1980. Both were previously married. Esteban's
marriage was dissolved by his first wife's death in 1960, with whom he had a daughter, Evangeline
Abuda. Soccoro's first marriage to Crispin Roxas in 1952, however, was not dissolved and was still
subsisting at the time of her marriage with Esteban. Socorro also had a son from her first marriage, the
father of Edilberto U. Ventura Jr. (Socorro is Edilberto Jr.'s grandmother).

In 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo,
Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father's
behalf sometime in 1970. 4 The Vitas property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782,
dated 11 December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro
Torres."|||
Esteban also operated small businesses on a property on Delpan St., Tondo, Manila. On September 6,
1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to his daughter, Evangeline and her husband,
Paulino Abuda. Esteban and Socorro died in 1997 and 1999, respectively.

In 2000, Leonora Urquila (Ediberto's mother) discovered the sales made by Esteban in favor of
Evangeline and her husband. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of
Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent
because Esteban's signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued
that because of Socorro's prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and
void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents.

The RTC denied Edilberto's petition. The CA sustained the RTC's decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Edilberto is entitled to the sold properties by virtue of Socorro's marriage to Esteban.

Ruling:

NO, for two reasons:

1. Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:
Art 148.In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each
other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property
if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence
that the properties were acquired through the parties' actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is
co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11
December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."
The title shows that the Vitas property was owned by Esteban alone as he acquired it in 1968 before his
marriage with Socorro even if the certificate of title was issued after the marriage as registration under
the Torrens system merely confirms and does not vest title . The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is
merely descriptive of his civil status and does not indicate that Esteban co-owned the property with
Socorro.

2. Edilberto claims that Esteban's actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not
sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.
Edilberto's claim cannot be sustained. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property
was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the
purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of
her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238.Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by
the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor's consent. But the
payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan
property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the
Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro's alleged
monetary contributions.