CHAPTER 5: INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

B. ASSOCIATED WORDS
Ejusdem Generis

1. Cu Unijeng Sons, Inc. v. BTA and CIR (Narag)

Doctrine: The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or
phrase follows an enumeration of particular or specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include or to be restricted to the things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind of class as
those specifically mentioned.

Facts: This is an appeal, taken by Cu Unjieng Sons, Inc., from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, now
Court of Tax Appeals, dismissing the former’s petition for review of a decision of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, finding said corporation liable for the sum of P33,490.76, as deficiency income taxes for the years
1946 and 1947, plus the corresponding 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest thereon, and affirming said
decision, without costs.

Petitioner maintains that said losses were so compensated for “by insurance or otherwise”; that the said losses
were not evidenced by “closed or completed transaction,” until notice by the Philippine War Damage Commission
that further compensation therefor would not be forthcoming; and that, inasmuch as such notice was given in
1950, it follows that the losses in question were not chargeable as deductions in the year 1945. The Collector of
Internal Revenue and the Board of Tax Appeals held, however, that the said losses were not compensated for
by insurance or otherwise, and that, accordingly, the corresponding deduction was permissible, in 1945, only,
not in any other year.

Statute: “In the case of a corporation, all losses actually sustained and not charged off within the taxable year
and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”

Issue: whether losses due to the war were to be deductible from gross income of 1945 when they were
sustained, or in 1950 when Philippine War Damage Commission advised that no payment would be made for
said losses?

Ruling: No. When said term is immediately preceded by an enumeration, it should receive an ejusdem generis
interpretation, or be limited in its application by the rule noscitur a sociis. In this connection, words and phrases
uses the following language.

In other words, the vocable “otherwise” in the clause “compensated for by insurance or otherwise” (in section 30
of our National Internal Revenue Code) should be construed to refer to compensation due under a title analogous
or similar to insurance. Inasmuch as the latter is a contract establishing a legal obligation (Sec. 2, Art. No. 2427),
it follows that in order to be deemed “compensated for * * * otherwise”, the losses sustained by a taxpayer must
be covered by a judicially enforceable right, springing from any of the juridical sources of obligations, namely:
law, contract, quasi-contract, torts or crime (Art. 1157, Civil Code of the Philippines; Art. 1089, Civil Code of
Spain).

Thus, deduction may not be claimed when the taxpayer is indemnified against loss by a third party’s guaranty
(Dunne vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 F. 2d 255; Lewellyn vs. Electric Reduction Co., 275 U.S. 243)
or by an insurance policy (Allied Turriers Corporation vs. Commissioner, 24 BTA 457; Harwick vs. Commissioner,
TC Memo, October 4, 1949 aff’d 184 F. 2d 825; the case of Rose Licht, 37 BTA 1096); or when the guilty party
is bound to indemnify said loss, it being the result of a breach of contract (Foley et al. vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 94 F. 2d 958; Lucas vs. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445; Louisville Trust Co. vs. Glen. 33
F. Supp. 403, aff’d 124 F. 2d 418; Bernard Schulenklooper, T.C. Memo. Par. 47203, P.H.) ; or when the damages
resulting from one phase of a given transaction are offset by the benefits derived from another phase of the same
transaction (Taylor vs. MacLaughlin, 30 F. Supp. 19). In these cases, there was a legal right to be indemnified
and, hence, compensated.

2. Liwag v. Happy Glen Homeowners Assoc. (Jimenea)

Doctrine: The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or
phrase follows an enumeration of particular or specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include or to be restricted to the things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind of class as
those specifically mentioned.

Facts: In 1978, FRG Sales (original owner and developer of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision) obtained a loan from
Marcelo (who owns T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation). Failing to pay, FRG Sales assigned all of its rights over
several parcels of land as well as its receivables from the lots already sold. Now, Marcelo as the new owner
represented the subdivision to form a water facility to be available in the subdivision. And for almost 30 years,
all homeowners relied on this water facility as their only source of water.

Sometime in September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes and as a result, the TCT was issued
in his name. When he passed away, his wife Petitioner Emeteria Liwag filed a complaint to remove the overhead
water tank in said lot. Refusing to comply, respondent Happy Glen Homeowners Association filed with the
HLURB for the annulment of said sale and cancellation of TCT.

The HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal to the HLURB Board, they found out that Lot 11,
Block 5 was not an open space and that the use of the lot as the site of the water tank was merely tolerated.

Issue: Whether or not the lot in question is an open space as defined in PD 1216. YES.

Ruling: The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase
follows an enumeration of particular or specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include or to be restricted to the things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind of class as those
specifically mentioned.

The term ‘open space’ as defined in PD 1216 states that it is “an area reserved exclusively for parks,
playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers
and other similar facilities and amenities”. The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water
facilities and so we must resort to statutory construction to determine whether water facilities fall under the other
similar facilities and amenities. However, the enumeration stated above refers to areas reserved for the common
welfare of the community and thus the term ‘other similar facilities and amenities’ must be interpreted in the same
manner.

In this case, the water facility was undoubtedly an establishment used for the benefit of the community as water
is a basic need in human settlements and without with the community would not survive. Thus, based on the
principle of ejusdem generis, since it was the intention of the law to create and maintain a healthy environment,
the location of the water facility in the subdivision must form part of the areas reserved for open space.
 3. Pelizloy v. Province of Benguet (Navas)
Doctrine: Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase
is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

Facts: Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which has facilities like
swimming pools, a spa and function halls.

● In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59, the tax
ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."

● Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before the
Secretary of Justice. Upon the Secretary’s failure to decide on the appeal within sixty days, Pelizloy filed
a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the RTC.

● Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of local
government units under Section 133 (i) of the Local Government Code, which provides that the exercise
of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or
services except as otherwise provided.

● The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 (a) of
the LGC encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since Article
131 (b) of the LGC defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion and entertainment synonymous to
relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."

● RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction
for lack of merit. Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper remedy. However, it
gave credence to the Province of Benguet's assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 of
the LGC.

ISSUE: Should the term 'other places of amusement' in Sec 140 of the LGC encompass resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots?

Ruling: NO. Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places" include
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to
entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.

As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of something, typically
an impressive one"; while ‘performance’ means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form
of entertainment." As such, the ordinary definitions of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual
engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting)
such that actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be
considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily
venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.

4. CIR v. CTA (Tagle)

Doctrine: The ‘other matters’ that may come under the general clause should be of the same nature as those
that have preceded them applying the rule of construction known as ejusdem generis.

Facts: Petron Corporation imports alkylate as a raw material for the manufacture of motor gasoline. It claims
that its importation of akylate is exempt from excise tax. For the period 2009 to 2012, Petron transacted an
aggregate of 22 separate importations for which petitioner the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued
Authorities to Release Imported Goods (ATRIGs), categorically stating that Petron's importation of alkylate is
exempt from the payment of the excise tax.
However, in June 2012, Petron imported liters of alkylate and were subjected by the Commission of Customs to
excise taxes and additional vat. This is premised on Customs Memorandum Circular (CMC), dated June 18,
2012, stating that Alkylate is subject to excise tax under Section 148( e) of the National Internal Revenue Code.
CIR then issued assessment to Petron for deficiency tax.
Petron filed before the CTA a petition for review raising the issue of whether its importation of alkylate is subject
to excise tax as contemplated under Section 148 (e) of the NIRC. CIR filed a motion to dismiss arguing,
among others, the lack of jurisdiction of CTA. CTA ruled in favor of Petron, stating that (a) the controversy
was not essentially for the determination of the constitutionality, legality or validity of a law, rule or regulation but
a question on the propriety or soundness of the CIR's interpretation of Section 148 (e) of the NIRC which falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CTA under Section 4 thereof, particularly under the phrase "other matters
arising under [the NIRC]".
CIR is now alleging that the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion because it does not have jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case its resolution would necessarily involve a declaration of the validity or
constitutionality of the CIR's interpretation of Section 148 (e) of the NIRC, which is subject to the exclusive review
by the Secretary of Finance and ultimately by the regular courts.

Issue: Won the CTA properly assumed jurisdiction over the petition assailing the imposition of excise tax on
Petron’s importation of alkalyte. - No. CTA has no jurisdiction over the petition.

Ruling: The CTA has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of a ruling issued by the CIR or the COC in the
exercise of their quasi-legislative powers to interpret tax laws. Applying the maxim, ejusdem generis, the phrase
"other matters arising under this Code," as stated in the second paragraph of Section 4 of the NIRC, should be
understood as pertaining to those matters directly related to the preceding phrase "disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto". It cannot extend
to evaluating the soundness of the interpretation of tax laws by the CIR.

SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. - The power to interpret the provisions
of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by
the Secretary of Finance.
The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is vested in the commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.

The phrase "other matters arising under this Code," must therefore not be taken in isolation to invoke the
jurisdiction of the CTA. In other words, the subject phrase should be used only in reference to cases that are, to
begin with, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, i.e., those controversies over which the CIR
had exercised her quasi-judicial functions or her power to decide disputed assessments, refunds or internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, not to those that involved the CIR's
exercise of quasi-legislative powers.
In Enrile v. Court of Appeals, the Court, applying the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis, states
that: 'other matters' that may come under the general clause should be of the same nature as those that have
preceded them applying the rule of construction known as ejusdem generis.

Petron's petition before the CTA challenged the legality and constitutionality of the CIR’s interpretation of a tax
provision. Therefore, CIR correctly argues that the CTA had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition.
Following this, the proper recourse against the subject tax ruling expressed in CMC No. 164-2012 is a review by
the Secretary of Finance and ultimately the regular courts. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of
rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.

Expresio unius est exclusio alterius

1. Coconut Oil Refiners Assn. v. Torres (Delocario)
Petitioners: COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. , PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF MEAT
PROCESSORS, INC. (PAMPI), , FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS (FFF), UKLURAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (BMP)
Respondents:HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as Executive Secretary

Facts: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit the Executive Branch,
through the public respondents Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary, the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA), the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), from allowing, and the private respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-
free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ),
and to declare the following issuances as unconstitutional, illegal, and void. Petitioners contend that the
aforecited issuances are unconstitutional and void as they constitute executive lawmaking, and that they are
contrary to Republic Act No. 7227 3 and in violation of the Constitution (Art. XII Sec 12 - preferential use of labor;
Art III Sec 1 - equal protection clause; Art. XII Sec 19 - prohibition of unfair competition and combinations in
restraint of trade).

On March 13, 1992, Republic Act No. 7227 was enacted, providing for the sound and balanced conversion of
the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of
special economic zones in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular
and the country in general.

SECTION 12.Subic Special Economic Zone. —

(b)The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring
free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone,
as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.
However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code
and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;

The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be managed and operated as a separate customs territory, ensuring
the free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into land exported out of the Subic SEZ, and to provide
incentives such as tax-free importation of raw materials, capital, and equipment. However, exportation or removal
of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to other locations in the Philippines shall be
subjected to custom duties and taxes as provided for by the Customs and Tariff Code and other taxation laws in
the Philippines, such as RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.
Petitioners contend that the wording of RA7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw
materials, capital and equipment and only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution Art III
Sec1. They also contended the validity of EO No 97A for being violative of the equal protection clause. Private
Respondents operating within the SSEZ are not different from the establishments outside of it.

The respondents filed to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it lacked legal standing and unreasonable delay
in the filing of the petition.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause by RA 7227, EO No. 97-A.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that violation of the equal protection clause was not present.
While it is true that Section 12 (b) of Republic Act No. 7227 mentions only raw materials, capital and equipment,
this does not necessarily mean that the tax and duty-free buying privilege is limited to these types of articles to
the exclusion of consumer goods. It must be remembered that in construing statutes, the proper course is to
start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the
context and promotes in full manner the legislative intent.
The phrase "tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment" was merely cited as an
example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly
argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support
their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. It is obvious from
the wording of Republic Act No. 7227, particularly the use of the phrase "such as," that the enumeration only
meant to illustrate incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its being a free port zone.
Furthermore, said expressio unius est exclusio alterius should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest, and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated
purpose of the Legislature.

2. Centeno v. Pornillos (Garcia)

Facts: Petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation
of their chapel in Bulacan. They approached and solicited from Judge Angeles, a contribution of P1,500.00. The
solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD. Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners
for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law which says: Sec. 2. Any person, corporation,
organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes
shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as
provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.

TC: found petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.

In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not expressly included
in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest sense so as to
include a religious purpose. – No.

Ruling: It is a rule that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This
rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. In the 1987
Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and "religious" separately and
independently of each other. All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in
nature, since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose"
is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious purpose
which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a "charitable"
purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. Although the term "charitable" may include matters
which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there
is a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the two terms are obviously
used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done away with by statute. The word "charitable,"
therefore, like most other words, is capable of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting
charitable uses from taxation, it has a very wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a
penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners. Hence, Centeno
is acquitted.

3. Lopez v. CA (Alejaga)

Doctrine: As such the legal maxim "[expressio] unius est exclusio [alterius]" finds application. The express
mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken
together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not
enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory.

Facts: Private respondent Atty. Romeo A. Liggayu was the Manager of the Legal Department and Resident
Ombudsman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). On January 6, 2000, the Office of the
Ombudsman found him guilty of Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest of the Service for issuing a subpoena
in relation to OMB-0-99-0591 in excess of his authority as Resident Ombudsman of the PCSO, and the penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay was imposed upon him. His motion for reconsideration
was denied. Thus, private respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the
decision. Meanwhile, on March 8, 2000, petitioners implemented the suspension of private respondent. On May
18, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting private respondent's prayer for the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the execution of private respondent's suspension. Hence, in the
present recourse, petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in enjoining the
execution of private respondent's suspension pending appeal.|||

Issue: Are decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of six months and one day suspension without
pay immediately executory pending appeal?

Ruling: No. Applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius in construing the pertinent provisions
(Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Rule III, Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), the Court held in Lapid v. Court of Appeals that only orders, directives or decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of
not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence,
immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure,
reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives
the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory
only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the
said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact
that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the
stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable
would be rendered nugatory. As explained by the Court —
. . . Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office
imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one [month, or a
fine not equivalent to one month salary], is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim
"[expressio] unius est exclusio [alterius]" finds application. The express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken
together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that
are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately
executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the
immediate implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of Procedure issued
by the Ombudsman itself which states that "(I)n all other cases, the decision shall become final
after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rule 43) shall
have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770."

Petitioners' claim that the applicable provision is Rule 43, Section 12 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure,
which provides that "[t]he appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just," lacks merit.
While it is true that in Fabian v. Desierto, 19 the Court declared unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770, and all other provisions of law implementing the same, the declaration should be interpreted to mean that
the said provisions are void only insofar as they provide that administrative appeals from the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be taken to the Supreme Court. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the proper forum
for administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman is the Court of Appeals. The provisions of Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman with respect to the
finality and execution of decisions are not affected by the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, and therefore still stand. It
is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that a statute may be constitutional in one part and
unconstitutional in another and that if the invalid part is severable from the rest, the portion which is
unconstitutional may stand while that which is constitutional is stricken out and rejected. Whenever a statute
contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of the court
to so declare and to maintain the act insofar as it is valid. The separability clause found in Section 40 of Republic
Act No. 6770 creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of
the statute.

4. De La Salle Araneta University v. Bernardo (Ruzol)

Facts: On February 26, 2004, Bernardo filed a complaint against DLSAU and its owner Dr. Oscar Bautista for
the payment of retirement benefits. Bernardo claims that he started working as a part-time lecturer in 1974 for
an hourly rate of 20 pesos. By November 1977, DLSAU informed that Bernardo could not teach anymore as the
school was implementing the retirement age limit for its faculty. As he was already 75, he had no choice but to
retire.

Bernardo sought the help of DOLE regarding his entitlement to benefits after 27 years of service and they opined
that Bernardo was entitled to receive benefits under RA 7641 or the “New Retirement Law”. Dr. Bautista
contended that Bernardo was not entitled to separation pay as only full-time permanent faculty of DLSAU avail
of benefits. As Bernardo was a part-time faculty, he was not entitled.

Bernardo filed with the NLRC a complaint for non-payment of retirement benefits. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision dismissing Bernardo’s complaint on the ground that he should have filed for money claims when he
was 65 years old. (Art. 291 of Labor Code). The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and denied the
MR of DLSAU. DLSAU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition for grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

Issue: WON Bernardo is entitled to retirement benefits - YES

Ruling: The court held that as a part-time employee with a fixed-term employment, Bernardo is entitled to
retirement benefits. DLSAU denied Bernardo’s claim because only full-time permanent faculty are entitled to
benefits pursuant to university policy. However, RA 7641, a curative social legislation, intends to give the
minimum retirement benefits to employees not entitled to the same under collective bargaining agreements
(CBA).

Based on Republic Act No. 7641, it’s Implementing Rules, and Secretary Quisumbing's Labor Advisory,
Bernardo, as a part-time employee of DLS-AU, is entitled to retirement benefits. The general coverage of
Republic Act No. 7641 is broad enough to encompass all private sector employees, and part-time employees
are not among those specifically exempted from the law.

The provisions of Republic Act No. 7641 and its Implementing Rules are plain, direct, unambiguous, and need
no further elucidation. Any doubt is dispelled by the statement in Secretary Quisumbing's Labor Advisory that
Republic Act No. 7641 applies to even part-time employees.

Under STATCON, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others), Bernardo's claim for retirement benefits cannot be denied on
the ground that he was a part-time employee as part-time employees are not among those specifically exempted
under Republic Act No. 7641 or its Implementing Rules.

C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES

5. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance (Labrador)
Topic: Illustration of Exception

Doctrine: The ‘unless’ clause must be read in relation to the ‘except’ clause, because the two are really
coordinate clauses of the same sentence.

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of
goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration
by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners contend that there were violations of Sec. 26
paragraph 2, Article VI of the Constitution

It is claimed that the “except” clause in the provision of Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.”
qualifies only its nearest antecedent, namely, the distribution of the printed bill in its final form three days from
its final passage, and not the three readings on separate days.

Issue: Whether or not presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill
and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days
also.

Ruling: No. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.”
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law; (i) the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.”
In other words, the ‘unless’ clause must be read in relation to the ‘except’ clause, because the two are really
coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the ‘except’ clause as simply dispensing with the second
requirement in the ‘unless’ clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only
violate the rules of grammar, but would also negate the very premise of the ‘except’ clause: Necessity of securing
the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. There is,
therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the
printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings
on separate days also.

CHAPTER 6: STATUTES CONSTRUED AS WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES

A. STATUTES CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
Intent ascertained from statute as a whole
1. Gaanan v. IAC (Cerrero)

Doctrine:

It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

Facts:
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of Pintor’s residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the
direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant
called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.

Atty. Pintor called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public
Highways. Laconico alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary,
then insisted that Atty. Pintor himself should receive the money at the Igloo Restaurant. Atty. Pintor was arrested by agents
of the Philippine Constabulary.

The next day, Atty. Gaanan executed an affidavit stating that he heard Atty. Pintor demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of
the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of Atty. Gaanan to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he
filed against Atty. Pintor. Atty. Pintor then filed a complaint against Laconico and Atty. Gaanan for violating the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.

IAC: found Atty. Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Sec. 1 of the Anti-Wiretapping Act

Atty. Gaanan filed for a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term ‘device or arrangement’ under R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-
Wiretapping Act). NO

Ruling:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or taperecorder, or however otherwise described; It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not
in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record,
or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective
date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate
the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or
trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition."

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.An extension telephone
cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No.
4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension
in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Apparently conflicting provisions reconciled
1. Republic v. CA (Evangelista)
FACTS: Acil Corporation owned land which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (RA 6657) and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. The lands were valued by Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) at a total of P439,105.39 however in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings which Acil had
earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a lower “Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner” thus
the LBP valued the land at P360,557.84 as total compensation for the lands. Acil rejected the lower offer as
nearby lands with the same crops were valued higher per hectare. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) sustained the initial lower valuation of the LBP.

Acil Corp filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court. They prayed that the DAR be ordered to pay the initial valuation however the RTC dismissed
the petition on the ground that Acil should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board(DARAB), pursuant to the Revised Rules of Procedure before recourse to the RTC could be had.
Furthermore, Acil had violated the DARAB's rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15)
days after notice of the decision of the PARAD. Acil filed with the CA contending that a petition for just
compensation under RA 6657 falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and this was sustained by the CA which set
aside the dismissal of the RTC and remanded the case.

The DAR filed this petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the fixing of just compensation for the taking
of the lands under RA 6657 is a “matter involving the implementation of agrarian reform” under §50 of the same
law which provides that the DAR shall have primary jurisdiction on the case. They invoke §16(f) of R.A. No. 6657,
which provides that "any party who disagrees to the decision [of the DAR] may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation," as confirming their construction of §50.

ISSUE: WON Acil may file their Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC? - YES

RULING: Under §57 of the same law, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original
and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The
provision of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the
determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the
plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Petitioners also contend that Rule II, §5 and Rule XIII, §1 of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure in support of their contention that decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators may only
be appealed to the DARAB however, only statutes can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies
- Rules of Procedure cannot.

2. Sajonas v. CA (Tan)
Facts: Construing the new words of a statute separately is the raison d'etre of this appeal.
- In 1983, the Sps. Uychocde sold a parcel of residential land in Antipolo to the Sps. Sajonas. In 1984, the Sps.
Sajonas caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the subject property. Upon full payment, the
Deed of Sale was executed on September 4, 1984.
- Meanwhile, Pilares filed Civil Case for collection of sum of money against Uychocde. Ultimately, a writ of
execution was issued on August 12, 1982.
- In 1985, defendant sheriff Garcia presented the Notice of Levy on Execution before the Register of Deeds.
- When the Deed of absolute sale was registered on August 28, 1985, a new TCT for the land was issued in the
name of Sps. Sajonas. The notice of levy on execution annotated was carried over to the new title.
- The Sps. Sajonas demanded cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon Pilares, but Pilares refused.
Thus, the Sps. Sajonas filed a complaint in RTC.
- Pilares argued, among others, that assuming that they filed an adverse claim against the subject property, it
ceases to have any legal force and effect 30 days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D 1529.

Issue: Whether or not the adverse claim inscribed in the new title ceases to have any legal force and effect 30
days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D 1529?

Ruling: NO. In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a
construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of
adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety.
Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
"The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration."

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days.
But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to
the sentence following, which reads:
"After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest.

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty
days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For
then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law
would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law
such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision
on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien
upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its
cancellation is no longer necessary and the process would be a useless ceremony.

Hence, the inscription of adverse claim on the new TCT was still in effect in 1985 when the notice of levy was
annotated thereto. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate
of title in favor of the petitioners

Construction as not to render provision nugatory; qualification of rule

1. Cuyegkeng v. Cruz (Dimen)

B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES

Reason why laws on the same subject are reconciled
1. Bagatsing v. Ramirez (Narag)
Doctrine: A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be express and
specific. However, in the latter case, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision
governs.

While the general rule says general laws cannot repeal special laws, the exception is that a special law referring
to a subject in general may be amended by a general law which treats a subject in particular.

Facts: Sometime in 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, “An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties
for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes.” City Mayor Bagatsing approved the ordinance 3 days later.

On 17 February 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced a civil case before the
CFI of Manila seeking declaration of the said ordinance mainly because the publication requirement under the
Charter of Manila has not been complied with. Judge Ramirez rendered its decision declaring the nullity of the
ordinance on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the City Charter,
which requires the ordinance to be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city before its
enactment. Neither was it published after its approval, although it was posed in the legislative hall and in all city
public markets and city public libraries.

For the petitioners’ part, they claim that only a post-publication is required under the Local Tax Code.

Issue: What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the
Revised City Charter, which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or
the Local Tax Code, which only demands publication after its approval?

Ruling: There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act, whereas the Local
Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all LGUs. The rule commonly said is that the fact
that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered. However,
the rule yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general which the general statute
treats in particular. This exactly is the circumstance in this case. The Revised Charter of the City of Manila refers
merely to “ordinances,” while the Local Tax Code refers to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees and other
charges” in particular. Thus, in the realm of “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees and other charges” the
Local Tax Code governs. This is especially true since the Local Tax Code was enacted later than the Charter.

2. Manila Jockey Club v. CA (Jimenea)

Doctrine: Every statute should be construed in such a way that will harmonize it with existing laws, as expressed
in the legal maxim, “interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi”.

Facts: Manila Jockey Club Inc (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club Inc (PRCI) were granted franchises to operate
race tracks for horse racing by virtue of RA 6631 and 6632. They were allowed to hold horse races with bets
every Saturday, Sunday and some official holidays; allocation of breakages were also given to specified
beneficiaries. Later, the Philippine Racing Commission (PHILRACOM) was created and it was given exclusive
jurisdiction over every aspect of horse racing including the scheduling of races. PHILRACOM authorized the
holding of races on Thursdays and Tuesdays and the breakages from these races were allocated by MJCI and
PRCI. EO 88 and 89 were issued and it amended the allocation of breakages mentioned in RA 6631 & 6632.
When PHILRACOM asked the Office of the President(OP) which agency is entitled to dispose of the proceeds
of the breakages from the Tuesday and Wednesday races, the OP decided it is PHILRACOM. PHILRACOM
demanded MJCI and PRCI of its share in the breakages and proof of remittances to other legal beneficiaries as
provided under the franchise laws.

Issue: Whether or not PHILRACOM is one of the rightful beneficiaries of the breakages derived from the mid-
week races. YES.

Ruling: It is a rule in statutory construction that every statute should be construed in such a way that will
harmonize it with existing laws. In this case, a reasonable reading of the horse racing laws favors the
determination that the entities enumerated in the distribution scheme provided under RA 6631 & 6632 as
amended by EO 88 & 89, are the rightful beneficiaries of breakages from mid-week races.

Since the holding of races on Wednesdays is an addition to the existing schedule of races authorized by law, it
also became part of RA 6631 & 6632. The granting of mid-week races does not require another legislative act
to reiterate the manner of allocating the proceeds of betting tickets because a supplemental law becomes an
addition to the existing statutes, or a section thereof and its effect is not to change in any way the provisions of
the latter statute but merely to extend the operation or give additional power to enforce its provisions.
The entities enumerated in the distribution scheme under RA 6631 & 6632, as amended by EO 88 & 89 are the
rightful beneficiaries of breakages from mid-week races. The period for remittance of breakages to the
beneficiaries should have commenced from the time PHILRACOM authorized the holding of mid-week races
because RA 6631 & 6632 were already in effect then.

CHAPTER 7: STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

B. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED
Penal statutes strictly construed
1. Causing v. COMELEC (Navas)
Doctrine: It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of
the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the accused.
Facts: Elsie Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued
Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 (Office Order No. 12), commanding for the detailing of Causing at the
Office of the Municipal Mayor.

Causing filed the complaint claiming that issuance made by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the
Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was
illegal and it violated of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8737. Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise
the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her co
employees and with the public transacting business in her office.

The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable
cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation.
Issue: Is the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron during the election period from her office as the Municipal
Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constitute a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the
relevant Resolution of the COMELEC?

Ruling: NO. Reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code there was no probable cause to
criminally charge Mayor Biron with the violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 are transfer and detail. Transfer
is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one
department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the
issuance of an appointment”; while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an
employee from one agency to another
without the issuance of an appointment.

The movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the
law if Mayor Biron only physically transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor

Causing WAS NOT STRIPPED of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar. She was merely required to
physically report to the Mayor’s Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely,
she is still the MCR, albeit doing her work
physically outside of her usual work station. She is also not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff
as she continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in
performing her duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff that by itself, however, does not
mean that she has lost supervision over them.

Moreover, Causing’s too literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the provisions involved
here were criminal in nature which are to be construed in favor of the accused which is the election offense
punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Adoption statutes
1. In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia (Tagle)

Doctrine: Adoption statutes should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.

Facts: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
that Stephanie’s mother was Gemma Astorga Garcia, and that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and
surname He prayed that the child's middle name ‘Astorga’ be changed to ‘Garcia’, her mother's surname, and that her
surname ‘Garcia’ be changed to ‘Catindig’, his surname.

The trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the
Family Code, she was now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Thereafter, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.

RTC denied the motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this petition.

The OSG agrees with Honorato that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother arguing that (1) it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother as she remains
to be an intestate heir; (2) there is no law expressly prohibiting her to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name; and (3) it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.

Ruling: It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,
hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.

Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." This provision is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor
of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Additional Notes:
1. The law is silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
2. The members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of
adding the surname of the child's mother as his middle name.
3. The Underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child. Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether
related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.
4. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
5. Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that
Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552, the law on adoption, provide that the adoptee remains
an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.

2. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim (Cerrero)

Facts: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession, married Primo Lim. They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of
their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The
children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, Primo died. Petitioner
married Angelo Olario, an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle
and Michael before the trial court. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years old.

Michelle’s husband gave his consent to the adoption of Michelle. Olario likewise gave his consent.

Trial court dismissed the petitions.

Issue: Whether petitioner, who has remarried, adopt singly.

Ruling: No.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions
for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There
are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or
18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of
the effects of legal adoption.

Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological
parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education
for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that
it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not
in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the
law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.
Rules of Court

1. Office of Court Administrator v. Garong (Evangelista)

Facts: Alberto V. Garong (respondent) was a Court Interpreter III of the RTC of Calapan City and he was found
guilty of the same court of frustrated homicide and sentenced to imprisonment. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC and the decision became final with an Entry of Judgment accordingly made. Three years later, Judge
Tomas Leynes wrote a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator stating that despite his issued warrant of
arrest on Garong, the respondent remained at large and was not terminated as a Court Interpreter and was still
receiving his salary and fringe benefits. Judge Leynes requested from the OCA that Garong be terminated from
service. The OCA filed an Administrative Complaint against Garong for his dismissal and forfeiture of all benefits.
Garong moved to dismiss the admin case because prior to the letter of Judge Leynes, Garong was still contesting
the CA decision and that the Order of Execution of Judgement and the Warrant of Arrest against Garong was
issued after he had contested the decision.

Garong filed with the CA a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgement and this was granted because the CA found
that though the counsel of Garong had notified the trial court of his change of address, a copy of the judgement
of conviction was sent to his old address and was returned unserved. A copy was also sent to Garong’s office
but he was not able to receive it because he was on official leave at that time and was only informed of the
decision via a long distance call thus Garong only learned of the CA’s decision 3 days before the Entry of
Judgement after which he filed a motion for reconsideration. Based on the foregoing, the CA concluded that
Garong was not properly served with notice of the decision against him and the entry of judgement was
premature therefore void and that the period to file a motion for reconsideration was counted from the day Garong
had actually received a copy of the decision thus his Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time. The CA cited
Gundayao v. CA and held that the service of the court’s order upon any person other than the counsel of record
is not legally effective and binding.

Issue: WON the CA erred in setting aside the Entry of Judgement of Judge Leynes? - NO

Ruling: Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative. Nevertheless, procedural rules were
conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve
the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. In this case, respondent's life and liberty
is at stake. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment, not to mention the social stigma
of being branded a convicted criminal for life. It is but just, therefore, that respondent be given every
opportunity to defend himself and to pursue his appeal. To do otherwise would be tantamount to a grave
injustice. A relaxation of the rules considering the particular circumstances prevailing in this case is justified.
Where personal liberty is involved, a democratic society employs a different arithmetic and insists that it is less
important to reach an unshakable decision than to do justice.

2. Cabrera v. Ng (Tan)
FACTS: On February 14, 2004, Felix Ng (respondent) filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against
petitioner and her husband Marionilo Cabrera (Sps. Cabrera).
On August 7, 2007, the RTC ordered the spouses Cabrera to pay the respondent.
On August 14, 2007, the Sps. Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration (MR), which they set for
hearing on August 17, 2007. On the same date, the Sps. Cabrera sent a copy of their MR to the respondent
through registered mail which eventually received by the respondent on August 21, 2007.
The motion was not heard on the ff. dates August 17, 2007, August 28, 2007, and September 25, 2007.
On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the MR filed by the Sps. Cabrera.
The RTC stated that the Sps. Cabrera violated Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that
every motion required to be heard should be served by the movant in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by
the other party at least three days before the date of hearing.
The record reveals that the MR was mailed to plaintiff’s counsel on August 14, 2007, the hearing was set on
August 17, 2007. The copy of the said motion had reached plaintiff and counsel only on August 17, 2007, 4 days
after it was supposed to be heard. The RTC opined a motion as a mere scrap of paper not entitled to judicial
cognizance. The RTC thus held, its Decision dated August 7, 2007 had already become final for failure of the
Sps. Cabrera to comply with the three-day notice requirement.

ISSUE: Whether the MR filed by the Sps. Cabrera was a mere scrap of paper not entitled to judicial cognizance
for failure to follow the three-day notice requirement under the Rules of Court?

HELD: NO. The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the
Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process to avoid surprises and enable
it to meet the arguments interposed in the motion filed. Otherwise, it is a scrap piece of paper.

Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been
afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has indeed been heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to the
motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. A liberal construction of the
procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not
prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate justice. The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well
as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.

It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera was reset by the
RTC twice with due notice to the parties; it was only on October 26, 2007 that the motion was actually heard by
the RTC. At that time, more than two months had passed since the respondent received a copy of the said
motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The respondent was thus given sufficient time to study the motion
and to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein. His right to due process was therefore not impinged
as he was afforded the chance to argue his position.

3. William Go v. CA (Dimen)
FACTS: Singson, Pasaqui, Lominiqui and Andales (private respondents) filed complaints for illegal dismissal
against petitioner William Go Que Construction and/or William Go Que (petitioner) before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), claiming that they were hired as steelmen on various dates, and were regular
employees of petitioner until their illegal dismissal on June 3, 2006. Moreover, they alleged that petitioner failed
to pay their monetary benefits, such as service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, and 13th month pay. However,
Go contends that private respondents were hired as project employees, and were informed of the specific period
or phase of construction wherein their services were needed. Sometime in May 2006, petitioner learned that
some workers were getting excess and cutting unused steel bars, and selling them to junk shops, prompting him
to announce that he will bring the matter to the proper authorities. Thereafter, private respondents no longer
reported for work, and were identified by the other workers as the thieves.

CA noted that the Affidavit of Service and the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping contained a
defective jurat. Thus, private respondents were directed to cure the defects within five (5) days from notice.
Private respondents submitted their Manifestation and Compliance wherein they admitted that Andales could
not be located as he was purportedly on vacation in Samar, but they attached a verification bearing their
signatures including Andales's; a photocopy of private subdivision IDs of Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui; and
a photocopy of the driver's license of the affiant in the Affidavit of Service.Thereafter, the CA held that the
photocopies of the IDs submitted by Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui, as well as their Joint-Affidavit attesting to
the identity of Andales who was unable to submit his ID, served as competent evidence of private respondents'
identities and cured the defect in the Affidavit of Service, and Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
Without giving due course to the petition.

Go moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondents
substantially complied with the requirements of a valid verification and certification against forum shopping.

RULING: Yes. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit
that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "the plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided. In this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against Forum Shopping attached to the
petition for certiorari was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified under oath. This was because
the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not indicate the pertinent details regarding the affiants' (private
respondents) competent evidence of identities.

Under Section 6, Rule II of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC63 entitled the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice & jurat refers to
an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.

Under Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, competent evidence of identity as used in the
foregoing provision refers to the identification of an individual based on at least one current identification
document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual and that the oath
or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction.

Evidently, not being documents of identification issued by an official agency, the photocopies of the IDs of private
respondents Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui do not constitute competent evidence of their identities under
Section 12 (a), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Also, their Joint-Affidavit identifying Andales and
assuring the CA that he was a party-litigant is not competent evidence of Andales's identity under Section 12
(b), Rule II of the same rules, considering that they themselves are privy to the instrument, in which Andales's
participation is sought to be proven. To note, it cannot be presumed that an affiant is personally known to the
notary public; the jurat must contain a statement to that effect. Tellingly, the notarial certificate of the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to private respondents' petition before the CA did not
state whether they presented competent evidence of their identities, or that they were personally known to the
notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping
under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, it is well to stress that procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored
at will to suit the convenience of a party, Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. Procedural rules must, at all times, be followed, save for instances when
a litigant must be rescued from an injustice far graver than the degree of his carelessness in not complying with
the prescribed procedure. The limited exception does not obtain in this case.