HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON VS.

RICAFORTE

FACTS:

On July 29, 2010, heirs of MagdalenoYpon, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages against GaudiosoRicaforte, alleging that Magdalenodied intestate and childless, leaving 2 parcels of lots.
Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Ricaforte executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of title,
leading to their transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by
the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

The RTC found that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had
established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not
mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

RULING:

YES! Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence
of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of
action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if
the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the
defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of
Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and
that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be
made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from
granting the same.

In the case of Heirs of TeofiloGabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the
decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and/or possession.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over
the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of
filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an
heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the
sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had
been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the
proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot
disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since
a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of the case
was also proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein
discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore
be devoid of any legal effect.
 ZUÑIGA-SANTOS VS. SANTOS-GRAN

FACTS:

On January 9, 2006, Eliza Zuñiga-Santos, through Nympha Z. Sales, filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title
against DivinaGracia Santos-Gran and the Register of Deeds-Marikina before the RTC.

Eliza alleged that: (a) she was the registered owner of 3 parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal,prior to their transfer in the name of
Gran; (b) she has a second husband, Lamberto C. Santos, with whom she did not have any children; (c) she was forced to take care of
Lamberto’s daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear that she was Lamberto’s daughter; (d) pursuant to void
and voidable documents (Deed of Sale),Lamberto succeeded in transferring the properties to Gran; (e) despite diligent efforts, said
Deed of Sale could not be located; and (f) she discovered that the subject properties were transferred to Gran sometime in November
2005.

Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that (a) the action filed by petitioner had prescribed and (b) the Amended Complaint failed to
state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to be nullified were not properly identified nor the substance thereof.
RTC dismissed the case for its failure to state a cause of action and prescription of the action. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Eliza’s Amended Complaint should be sustained.

RULING:

YES! Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former refers
to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule16 of
the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on
the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

x xxWhat is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to statea cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of
insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the
situation where the evidence does not provea cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a
cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading,
whilethe remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section.
The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the
trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.28

In the case at bar, both the RTC and the CA were one in dismissing petitioner’s Amended Complaint, but varied on the grounds thereof
– that is, the RTC held that there was failure tostate a cause of action while the CA ruled that there was insufficiency of factual basis.

At once, it is apparent that the CA based its dismissal on an incorrect ground. From the preceding discussion, it is clear that
"insufficiency of factual basis" is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Rather, it is a ground which becomes available only after the
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. The procedural
recourse to raise such ground is a demurrer to evidence taken only after the plaintiff’s presentation of evidence. This param eter is clear
under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court:

RULE 33

Demurrer to Evidence

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion isdenied he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.

At the preliminary stages of the proceedings, without any presentation of evidence even conducted, it is perceptibly impossible to
assess the insufficiency of the factual basis on which the plaintiff asserts his cause of action, as in this case. Therefore, that ground
could not be the basis for the dismissal of the action.

However, the Amended Complaint is still dismissible but on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, as correctly held by the
RTC. Said ground was properly raised by Granin a motion to dismiss pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court:

RULE 16
Motion to Dismiss

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

x xxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

x xxx

A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant tothe plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.29 If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.30

It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be "stated" but, importantly, the statement thereof should be
"sufficient." This is why the elementarytest in a motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if
true would justify the relief demanded.31 As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary
facts are considered for purposes of applying the test.32 This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that
the complaint need only allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if
they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.33 Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency,
not the veracity, of the material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no
other.34

A judicious examination of petitioner’s Amended Complaint readily shows its failure to sufficiently state a cause of action. Contrary to
the findings of the CA, the allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts which would warrant an action for nullification of the sale and
recovery of the properties in controversy, hence, rendering the same dismissible.

Aside from the insufficiency of petitioner’s allegations with respect to her right to the subject properties sought to be recovered, the
ultimate facts supposedly justifying the "annulment of sale," by which the reconveyance of the subject properties is sought, were also
insufficiently pleaded. The following averments in the Amended Complaint betray no more than an insufficient narration of facts:

A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions
of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations thata contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair, and reasonable, are mere conclusions of
law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts
showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.

In any event, the Court finds the Amended Complaint’s dismissal to be in order considering that petitioner’s cause of action had already
prescribed.

It is evident that Eliza ultimately seeks for the reconveyance to her of the properties through the nullification of their supposed sale to
Gran. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.

ALMA JOSE VS. JAVELLANA

FACTS:

On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold for consideration of ₱160,000.00 to Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional
sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 sqm located in Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay
₱80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of ₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the
Torrens System; and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal, and her daughter, Priscilla M.
Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.

After Margarita and Juvenal died, Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir, did not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties . Javellana filed an action for
specific performance against her in the RTC-Malolos. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred
by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss, but was subsequently reversed, opining that Javellana had no cause of action
against her, not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party; that there was no evidence
showing the payment of the balance; that he had never demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a
suit for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the balance was not credible.

Javellana moved for reconsideration, but was denied by RTC on its June 21, 2000 Order. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
dismissal of the case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in not outrightly dismissing Javellana’s appeal on the ground that the June21, 2000 RTC order was not
appealable and the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days.

RULING:
NO! The denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order and appealable. The distinction between a
final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter
does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of
the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may
be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The
explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:

xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which
necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple
appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to
incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and
as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only
after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that
the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.

Also, the appeal was made on time. Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he received
a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12
days); that the RTC denied his MR through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days
from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000,
his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)

Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an
appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the
notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.

The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period
rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.26

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to "actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure."27 According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:28
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer
justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this
will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event
that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period
rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of
judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in
Neypes which were issued in 1998.

FELS ENERGY VS. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS

FACTS:

On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan
Bay in Calaca, Batangas for a period of five years. Under the Contract, NPC shall be responsible for the payment of all taxes, import
duties, fees, charges and other levies imposed by the National Government and all real estate taxes and assessments, rates and other
charges in respect of the Power Barges. Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the Agreement to FELS.

On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from Provincial of Batangas City. FELS
referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation to pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to
represent it in any conference regarding the real property assessment.

NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges which was denied.
This prompted NPC to file a petition with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) for the setting aside of the assessment and
the declaration of the barges as non-taxable items; it also prayed that should LBAA find the barges to be taxable. Provincial Assessor
averred that the barges were real property. NPC informed the LBAA that the DOF had rendered an opinion that power barges are not
real property subject to real property assessment. The LBAA denied the petition.

The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are nevertheless
considered real property for taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of permanency. The
LBAA also pointed out that the owner of the barges–FELS is the one being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC
responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; such a privilege can only be
granted to NPC and cannot be extended to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also ruled that the petition was filed out of time.

FELS appealed the LBAA’s ruling to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). The NPC filed a Motion for Intervention which
was granted.The CBAA found the power barges exempt from real property tax and found that power barges belong to NPC; since they
are actually, directly and exclusively used by it. The Provincial Assessor filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the
CBAA. FELS and NPC filed separate motions for reconsideration, which were denied.

FELS and NPC separatelyfiled a petition for review before the CA, which was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is barred by res judicata on the ground that the final and executory judgment effectively precludes the claims
herein.

RULING:

NO! Res judicata pervades every organized system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of
common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation
– republicaeut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause – nemo debetbisvexarieteadem
causa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the regalement
of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. As we ruled in Heirs of
Trinidad De Leon Vda. deRoxas v. Court of Appeals:

x xx An existing final judgment or decree – rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction
acting upon a matter within its authority – is conclusive on the rights of the parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all other actions
or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit.

Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a
question once it has been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The
effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be
deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties.
This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the following elements: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. The application of the
doctrine of res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties but merely substantial identity of parties. There is substantial identity
of parties when there is community of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first and a party in the second case even if the
first case did not implead the latter.43

To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any proceeding regarding real property assessment. Therefore,
when NPC filed its petition for review, it did so not only on its behalf but also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assailed decision in the
earlier petition for review filed in this Court was the decision of the appellate court, in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decision
is binding on FELS under the principle of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are substantially "identical parties" as to warrant the
application of res judicata. FELS’s argument that it is not bound by the erroneous petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing.

On the issue of forum shopping, we rule for the Provincial Assessor. Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse judgment
in one forum, a party seeks another and possibly favorable judgment in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action or
certiorari. There is also forum shopping when a party institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on
the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

Petitioner FELS alleges that there is no forum shopping since the elements of res judicata are not present in the cases at bar; however,
as already discussed, res judicata may be properly applied herein. Petitioners engaged in forum shopping when they filed G.R. Nos.
168557 and 170628 after the petition for review in G.R. No. 165116. Indeed, petitioners went from one court to another trying to get a
favorable decision from one of the tribunals which allowed them to pursue their cases.

It must be stressed that an important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. The rationale against forum shopping is that a party
should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of
court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.46

Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other.47

Having found that the elements of res judicata and forum shopping are present in the consolidated cases, a discussion of the other
issues is no longer necessary. Nevertheless, for the peace and contentment of petitioners, we shall shed light on the merits of the case.

PINEDA VS. HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARRA

FACTS:

On 7 September 1995, the Guevara heirs, filed an action for the nullification of TCTs of a parcel of land situated in Marikina against .
the estate of the late Pedro Gonzales, Virginia Perez, Crisanta Perez, Jose Perez, Roy Guadalupe, LinoBucad and Florentino Pineda.

The Guevara heirs alleged that they were the co-owners of a property. The couple’s son, and the Guevara heirs’ predecessor-in-
interest, Eliseo Guevara, purchased the property and had exercised ownership over the property since then by selling and donating
portions to third persons. The Guevara heirs averred that the sale of the property to Eliseo Guevara was annotated at the OCT.

According to the Guevara heirs, the defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession over a certain portion of the property.
Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of cause of action, prescription, laches and estoppel. He averred
that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in actual possession of the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an
owner. He registered the property in his name.

Virginia, Crisanta, and Jose, all surnamed Perez, filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim and averred that their father, Marcos
Perez, purchased the property from the late Pedro Gonzales and had it declared in Perez’s name for taxation purposes. The rest of the
defendants, including the estate of Pedro Gonzales, also filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the same defenses of laches and
prescription and res judicata.

RTC dismissed the action on the ground of laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of dismissal. On appeal, the CA set aside the
RTC’s order of dismissal and ruled that a complaint cannot be dismissed under Rule 16, Sec 12 based on laches since laches is not
one of the grounds enumerated Only Pineda sought reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not considering the affirmative defense of laches as analogous to prescription.

RULING:

NO! Well-settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both
parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of
the defendant’s conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.

Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by the trial court. There is no absolute
rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.10
Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time, rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in
order that the delay may sufficiently constitute laches. Without prejudging the instant case, an apparent delay in the enforcement of
one’s claim does not automatically constitute laches. The party charged with negligence or omission in invoking his right must be
afforded the opportunity to raise his defenses, which can be accommodated only in a contentious proceeding.

In reversing the RTC’s order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that "laches could not be a ground to dismiss the complaint as it is
not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1." This is not entirely correct. Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth
in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, the same may be raised in a motion to dismiss.
The language of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words "abandoned" and "otherwise extinguished" to the phrase "claim or
demand deemed set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading" is broad enough to include within its ambit the defense of bar by laches. However,
when a party moves for the dismissal of the complaint based on laches, the trial court must set a hearing on the motion where the
parties shall submit not only their arguments on the questions of law but also their evidence on the questions of fact involved. Thus,
being factual in nature, the elements of laches must be proved or disproved through the presentation of evidence by the parties. As
discussed above, an apparent delay in the filing of a complaint as shown in a pleading does not automatically warrant the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of laches.

In the case at bar, while the trial court correctly set the case for hearing as though a motion to dismiss had been filed, the records do
not reveal that it extended to the parties the opportunity to present evidence. For instance, counsel for the heirs of Guevara filed and
served written interrogatories on one of the defendants but the trial court held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to order the
defendant to submit answers to the written interrogatories. The trial court likewise denied the Ex Parte Motion To Set Trial filed by the
heirs of Guevara. These were the instances which would have enabled the trial court to receive evidence on which to anchor its factual
findings. Although the trial court heard oral arguments and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, the presentation
of evidence on the defenses which are grounds for a motion to dismiss was not held at all. Otherwise, the oral arguments and
memoranda submitted by the parties would have enabled this Court to review the trial court’s factual finding of laches instead of
remanding the case for trial on the merits. A perusal of the records precludes this Court from making a categorical declaration on
whether the heirs of Guevara were guilty of laches.

Neither does the affirmative defense of prescription alleged in an answer automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint under
Rule 16. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that
indeed the action has already prescribed. Otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown
trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss. Pineda’s theory that the defense of laches should be treated
as an affirmative defense of prescription warranting the dismissal of the complaint is erroneous.