Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for
a client. There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find
validation in the proceeding at bench, at least.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law
books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal
principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the
respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and
prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly
committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of ignorance," 1 been verbally jousting with
various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas
"where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him
competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and
review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of
his interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and
circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his
adversaries, for which he is now being called to account.

Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic
transactions with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly
because of his failure to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on
imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank
(TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained
loans or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables
belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and
when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which were
quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When,
understandably, the banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively
if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the
banks in the actions brought by or against him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of
the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or
another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and
other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in
different fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil,
criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously
cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB).
On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate
mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned,
respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16,
1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as
security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT
No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney
executed by their respective owners.

Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of
P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22,
1980.2

Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused
the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by
the sheriff on September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest
bidder, for P73,529.09.

Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the properties
at their auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have
to settle his outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo
demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits commenced by him against the Bank,
its officers and counsel, as aforestated.

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.

CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific
performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No.
R-22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties
only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying the obligation
secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20,
1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals —
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by decision dated January 27,
1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can
no longer compel defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By
Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for failure . .
. to sufficiently show that the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is supported by substantial
evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by
Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution
dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19, 1989. The last
resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt
execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7,
1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated
December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that
the decision of the Court of Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . .
shall be entertained . . . ."
 2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;
CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil action
in the same Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues. The
action, against the new TRB Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order
dated May 18, 1990,3 on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in the second action — i.e.,
Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated in Civil Case No. R-
22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and, on appeal,
decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28221

In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its ownership
over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense,
Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and
lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office.
Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto
Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants,
Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario Ortiz and the law, firm,
HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged
Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal
cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for
consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case
No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by
the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506 and
CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to defendants
Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).

Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that
Court's 16th Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;

CA-G.R. SP No. 27100

Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil
action for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz
and the HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was
described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met
the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the
RTC (Branch 145) on the ground of litis pendentia.

The RTC ruled that —

Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the
Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli
Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or
nearly all of them who are impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-
10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW.
The only difference is that more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-
9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants Enriqueta Belarmino
 and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case
No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they had nothing to do with
the questioned transaction in said case. . . .

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case No.
CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent
foreclosure and consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.

For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another
Judge on November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself;
but this Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by
Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon.
Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T. Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of
Borromeo's complaint.

5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made
that event the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys —
Mario Ortiz, Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This action was
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages."
The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables
above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature consolidation
of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On defendant's motion, the trial
court 8 dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right
to seek annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will
ultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."

6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236

Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause against
TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also
venting his ire on) the members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the
Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had
theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the
Chairman and Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in
G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th
Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His
complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for —

. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence

and pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions
bereft of signatures, facts or laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal
rights to due process and against deprivation of property without said process, tolerating,
approving and legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of
defendants TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE
OF POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL
CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be
held liable under said laws.

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by
TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and
P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of
defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the
case.
 7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069

It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior
actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers,
Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on
the ground of res judicata — the subject matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506,
decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this
Court in G.R. No. 83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same as that in
Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
22356.12

8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu (Branch
22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A.
Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an early date for Borromeo's
arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by
the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion was again found
without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil
action of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there had
been unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being without
merit. 14

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated
January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of
Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
Resolution dated March 23, 1994.

a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-
Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by
a mere clerk and . . . (failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on
MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15

The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patience
drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of
Appeals and Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the same issue he
now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of
Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually
adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally stated that Borromeo "knew,
as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause —

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court
dated. _________,

thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions."
This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The record
shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's
Third Division) dealing with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also
dealt with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989,
and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989. 18 And
the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was in due course
served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897.19

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of ignorance" — to fasten
not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his
part to cause criminal prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with here.

1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders
Royal Bank." The complaints (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa
and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank and its officers, thru its
manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses,
respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his (Borromeo's)
mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for only
P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market prices, she should have received P588,030.00
more.

In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaints
observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but
between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties;
and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice thereby. The
Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter
had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of the
document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.

a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also
adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo — involving the same
foreclosed properties and directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former
Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:

a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD
SY) for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses."
— This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the City
Prosecutor's Office because based on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985,
sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion of the foreclosed
immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as new owner thereof, as
shown by the consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz
was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the
period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the transaction to the
prejudice of complainant; and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa
Through False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." — This case was
dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.
 2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court, 22 an
affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire
insurance claim over property registered in its name — one of two immovables formerly owned by
Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated
September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real
property together with the improvements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City
covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the
foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that, among others: . . . the
consolidation was premature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for
"falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office
dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any malice in its
execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in
TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order.

3. OMB-VIS-89-00136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 — sustaining the
judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra,
was made the subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas,
docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint — against "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and
Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" — was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on
February 14, 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows:

It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the
Rules of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative
of this Office to make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered
within their competence. The records do not warrant this Office to take further
proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of the
Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body;" and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the
Office of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary authority over members of the
Judiciary.

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT

PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The
mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in
Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson
K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the
vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

A. CIVIL CASES

Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had obtained
from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the
latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had
purchased from Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several
conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly
instituted a suit for consolidation of title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly
be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's
application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings foreclose the mortgage constituted by
Borromeo over the property.

This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also against
UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court
war with Traders Royal Bank.

1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.

No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273

The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in
his favor over the 122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007
of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by
Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's application.

Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding)
denying consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be construed as a sale
with pacto de retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the
sum of P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao
for capital gains and other taxes in connection with the transaction (P10,497.50).

Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his
lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision
by the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.

The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page
Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by
Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the
resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which
justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the members."
Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of judgment, Borromeo having failed
to move for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same was simply noted without action,
in a Resolution dated November 27, 1989.

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent to
Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta
Y. CARREON and Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively).

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679

Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo
attempted to vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had
given him notices of the adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No. CEB-
8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and
Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty.
Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of judicial functions,
for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution'
and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."

Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding). These
processes were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the
matter as an incident in G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By
Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En Banc ordered
Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue
summons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court."
Accordingly, Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the summonses and dismissing
the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.

The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose of
notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in
this wise:

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials
of the Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman,
Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition
of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute
resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases
do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and
resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the
resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts
and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and
therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."

xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of
its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as were a case
is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws,
where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early
execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying
due course always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta,
148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions
all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . .
This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly,
discharge its constitutional functions. . . .

. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible error in the respondent
court's decision is shown, or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution "that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the
Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the
parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case. It is the
Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the
resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the
 deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk
of Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case — G.R. No.
56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated
July 6, 1981, the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions
like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the
members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial
functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel.
When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged
decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions.

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to
require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay
the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on
functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more
profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of
important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still
struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever
increasing number of cases coming to it. . . .

b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)

6740; G.R. No. 84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the UCPB,
TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo
against administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one of the cases
adversely to him.

The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages
against a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On
January 12, 1988, the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of
action and prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).

What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988.
This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu
presided by Hon. Mario Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the
case, in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for reconsideration having been
denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by
submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund fees; it
also referred him to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was
eventually dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his
part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment. His motion for reconsideration was denied
with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.

Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989
once more remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set
forth no findings of fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him
on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court denying dismissing petitions,
like the petition in the case at bar, which was denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its
judicial function to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed
by the Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal
conclusions."

Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No.
82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed
out that minute resolutions of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-
blown decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial
and routinary function of communicating the Court's action to the parties concerned.

c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already
long series, was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J.
Garma and Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent him notices of
the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as
Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of
the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 — in which the
Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure to demonstrate any reversible
error in the challenged judgment — the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution
of February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been signed only by the defendant
clerks of court and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants
demanding an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they
ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only by them and not
by any Justice, and without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton,
malicious and patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock,
embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of
no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.

On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the
Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled
"Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all
complaints against officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28

Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the injustices"
committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered
expunged from the record (Resolution, July 19, 1990).

2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.

CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897

Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City
RTC, he filed a complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-
21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the
complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager) and Samson K. Lao. UCPB
was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima
(both being then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty. Antonio Regis.
Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr. presiding)
dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral
damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses
of P1,000.00.

Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ.,
concurring), dismissed his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it for
insufficiency in form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for
reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effected on
August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First Division) said:

The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by
petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion having
been filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apart
from being a reiteration merely of the averments of the Petition for Review dated April
14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted
that petitioner's claims have already been twice rejected as without merit, first by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires
obviously is to have a third ruling on the merits of his claims, this time by this Court.
Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there is a special and
important reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be
dismissed summarily on the ground that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted
manifestly for delay or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require consideration"
(Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are raised in the petition, or the
petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor (Sections
1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further advised that the first sentence
of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a decision, and has no
application to a resolution as to which said section pertinently provides that a resolution
denying a motion for reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and that
the resolution of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration
dated May 25, 1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is that
the petitioner's arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution denying the
petition for review and consequently bringing about a review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals — had failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to the Court of
Appeals had indeed been committed and therefore, there was no cause to modify the
conclusions set forth in that judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no point in
reproducing and restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the
Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS,
and ABSURD SELF-SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which it
has forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height
of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the letter
Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989
protesting the Court's "issuing UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'"
(2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M.
Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered
expunged from the record because containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter (Section 5,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply
"NOTED without action" by Resolution promulgated on December 13, 1989.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.

SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the
foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No.
CEB-21880. This was Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB,
et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence
Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed
the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00)
and litigation expenses (P1,000.00).

Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No.
14519); but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure
to comply with that Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of the
Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of
"the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . . order."

Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a
Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for
review by the respondents therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of counsel.
On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due
proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second
Division for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in
the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the
resolution contained no findings of fact and law, was denied.

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178

Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of
Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge
Generoso Juaban. Also impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then
Chairman, First Division), Estrella G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court
and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of
said Court — to which the case was raffled — caused issuance of summonses which were in due
course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in and of the Supreme Court.
In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 — in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge
Lee and the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.

Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a time represented
Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there
was "no compatibility" between him and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing
pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and declaring that he had "not
advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized
to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-
8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance,
were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated November 29, 1989.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.

CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248

It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise
to another action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of
Borromeo's known as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another
person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter
was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374.
Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the
purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta.
Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the
Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By
Resolution of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason
that "a) the petition as well as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; and (b)
the issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He moved for
reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution dated June 3, 1987.

He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions through
various motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that
the notice sent to him by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice — elicited the
following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987,
reading as follows:

Dear Mr. Borromeo:

This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the actual
resolution with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division in Case G.R. No.
77243 whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied
for lack of merit.

In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July 6, 1981
in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the
Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing
unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the
exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should
be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court
sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal
conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on
their case by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without
foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally
liable.

1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181

In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the judgment
of the RTC in Civil Case No. 21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on
August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First
Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey
Ordoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja,
charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's
complaint, opining that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined
by different courts including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987). The
resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for complainant to dispute and defiantly
refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this
case. . . ."

2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418

A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January
12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others,
charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for
supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices
of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a
Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed his complaint for "lack of
merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute
usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones
rendering them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial
resolutions." 33

III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY

BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-

G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the
Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate
sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment
thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00
on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB,
Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu
City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo
Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was
substituted by the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo
Navarro.

Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were sentenced to
pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less
than P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in
due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at public
auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the highest bidder, SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same was
denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went
to the Court of Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition. Failing in his
bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as
G.R. No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied
with finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history of
recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning
Borromeo's aforesaid contractual commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another
congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter, instituted by
Borromeo.

2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267

While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own
in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 —
HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of
the suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9267,
as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process, Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with
Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and
deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him through excessive attorney's
fees," which acts caused him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social
embarrassment and severe anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as
well as litigation expenses.

By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding)
granted the demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since
plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would be
superfluous to still require defendants to present their own evidence as there is nothing for them to
controvert."

2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;

CA-G.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another suit against the
same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo
Jacinto, 34 who had rendered the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial
of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo
faulted Judges Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO.
9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to
defraud plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he
had been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment for
which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata,
immunity of judges from liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.

Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.

In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of
court. The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April
13, 1993. 35 Said the Court:

Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in fact,
proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be
considered res judicata under the circumstances.

xxx xxx xxx

 By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent penchant
for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant who precariously treads
the acceptable limits of argumentation and personal advocacy. The Court, moreover,
takes particular note of the irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds
them highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation
of the Courts. That he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his
otherwise contumacious behavior is presently accorded the patience and leniency it
probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, the
appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in the future shall
accordingly be dealt with with commensurate severity.

IV. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,

CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929

One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is
Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo
was granted a loan of P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the security
of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785.36 Later, Borromeo
obtained a letter of credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao
as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations; Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's obligations
to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which a deed of sale was executed in his
favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above
stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of
P240,000.00.

Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional
Trial Court alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was
rendered against him by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where his
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered judgment
affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's
motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was given short
shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution denying his petition for
review "for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed
any reversible error in its questioned judgment."

Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him were
unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken part in
approving the resolution therein mentioned.

B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528

What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of
this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu
City (Branch 18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that
a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust."
Impleaded as defendant in the action was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the
Third Division at the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O.
Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the following pertinent observations:

. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has indeed no
jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable
Supreme Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff against the herein
defendant and the other personnel of the highest Court of the land as alleged in
 paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this humble
court to consider and pass upon to determine their propriety and legality. To try to
review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court
would appear not only presumptuous but also contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer
for the defendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint clearly shows that
all material allegations thereof are directed against a resolution of the Supreme Court
which was allegedly issued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No
allegation is made directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity.
That being the case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or
judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff himself
had issued a resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower Court's
decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such violation of
the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the defendant
herein, the appropriate remedy should not have been obtained before this Court. For an
inferior court to reverse, interpret or review the acts of a superior court might be
construed to a certain degree as a show of an uncommon common sense. Lower courts
are without supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher
courts.

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient
factual and legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers

of his Court Adversaries

Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had appeared
for his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the actions above mentioned, and others. As
already mentioned, these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato
Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment. Borromeo averred that the respondent
lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de
retro as a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently depriving
complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3) defying two lawful Court
orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court.
Borromeo alleged that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his
property in favor of Lao.

B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers

The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but
pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite
Joaquin Borromeo in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses
Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B. Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U.
Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase
(Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The lawyers made the following
observations:

It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary with
deferential awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the
courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, has
cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the authority and name of the courts.
 And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-lawyer who
uses the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more
especially if their actuations do not conform with his whims and caprices.

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the
following:

The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other
members of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and
contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public
confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity
of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in the country's judicial system and
administration of justice.

. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal
profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this
Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-free would certainly be
demoralizing to members of the profession who afforded the court with all the respect
and esteem due them.

Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged "refusal"
of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed
against its members."

C. Decision of the IBP

On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this
Court the notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as well as the
corresponding records in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu City
Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint
as against all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more cautious and not
be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers." 37

VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS

Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or otherwise),
"circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or
directives against him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as
the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse dispositions — some of which scurrilous
writings were adverted to by the respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and
circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to
his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant
for argumentum ad hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . . (which
were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation
of the Courts."

In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators
of the Constitution and the laws, etc.

Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reported
conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of Texas for his
contributions in upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court
persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law,
particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES
. . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court.

He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE
after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND
INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits'
while failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter, he specified what he
considered to be some of "the terrible injustices inflicted on me by this Court."

In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not
been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being
saviours and defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute resolutions)
even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the trampling of
the rule of law and due process, and does not comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to
uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open
Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having
"been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and
landgrabbing and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your
dismissal of . . . (my) cases, despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such
facts or laws (during our talk in your house last March 12 1989);" and that "you in fact have no such
facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he
mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support
the landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center the
caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements
as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another
"circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or
signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan:
STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38

One other "circular" reads:

SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!!

— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS

by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO

NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the
judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the
supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-
exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) —
the SCRA itself.

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED,
UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in
patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is precisely through said
TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have
CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake
resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that
CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through
said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance
of court orders and naked land grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR
84999).
 Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving the
motion for reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for
the SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and declare justices
and said clerks "immune from suit" — despite their failure to file any pleading? Were
Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of law and rules of court and DUE
PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273).

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for themselves!
NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR
RESIGN!!

IMPEACH NARVASA

• ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL

"MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8,
Constitution

• VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING

CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) DISMISSED DESPITE THE
LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT

• CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN

RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN RULINGS —
TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3
MILLION

• CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL

COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH
P4 MILLION

• BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND

PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW CORRUPT
JUSTICES

• DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS TO BE

IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and
REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF

JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO

VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS

OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR

A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter

IBP, dated June 21, 1992

Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some members of
the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a
letter to this Court, dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last quoted,
above — " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other officers . . . in Cebu," described
as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks against the Supreme Court and the whole justice
system"— and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly urged the Court "to
impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by
Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The
resolution pertinently reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Acting
Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo
concerning G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal Bank [referred to by
Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter])
and two (2) other cases also filed with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin
T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by
different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained to Borromeo very
briefly the legal principles applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned
in his circular.

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases
instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court
of Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson
Lao), as well as the existence of other communications made public by Borromeo
reiterating the arguments already passed upon by the court in his cases and
condemning the court's rejection of those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking account of the related
facts on record, the Court Resolved:

1) to REQUIRE:

(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for contempt
against Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff, Cebu City, notice
of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its
annexes; and

(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of
resolution and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its
annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City; and

2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice
and the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the
letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving
copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.

SO ORDERED.

1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989

Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the
resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the principles
and established practice relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other
communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received by him on
July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R
No. 77243 39) the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to wit:
that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA
1), 42 and that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43

C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993

In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27, 1993 in
which he alleged the following:

1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Constitution which
requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;" hence,
"a certified copy duly signed by Justices is respectfully requested;"

2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since
they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be
heard by an impartial and independent body;"

3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu
Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out
"what particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and
does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of
those accused in the "libelous circular;"

4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech,
of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed
by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of public
officials;" the circular merely states the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and
the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and encouraged;
. . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements are false and lies;

5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with
pertinent facts, evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and
members of the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense the justice that they
are duty bound to dispense.

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain his
side, and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on September
30, 1993, notice of which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.

. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk of Court
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin
Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President Manuel P. Legaspi of the
relator dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of
said Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period
of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to engage the services or otherwise
seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit such further arguments in addition to or in
amplification of those set out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded.

SO ORDERED.
E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment
of October 15, 1992

Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and
allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and
amplification to . . . (said) Comment," viz.:

1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the alleged
'libelous' remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a
VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be cited in contempt of court
for making false charges and wasting the precious time of this Highest Court by filing a
baseless complaint;

2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based on the
TRUTH and the LAW", namely:

a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are
patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution;

b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the

Appelate Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption
price, since no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that
CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in right of redemption;

c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds and
defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993

Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the failure
of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the concerned
Justices to refute the charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and
admission of the thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify
their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless and false charges."

VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS

A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt,
for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges
and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice.44 He
has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the
many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final
and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of
the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution
and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his
adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and
court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings
and motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court
employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious
cases. More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious error of
his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices promulgating the same, 45 he has
mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of
time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.

1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses

The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit
themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should
be heard by an impartial and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted,
arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the field of the law: he again uses up the
time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument long since declared and adjudged to be
untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against
itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the preservation of its
dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the
prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the
prosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers
and impotent to perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of
charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt
amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in
writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel.
The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 46

His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu
Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out what particular
statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that Atty.
Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous' circular"
— is in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.

Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations claimed to
be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the
government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in
accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no
justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court
employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time,
and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

B. Basic Principles Governing

the Judicial Function

The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the
principles governing finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at some
point, and to lay down definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on
the part of lawyers and litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution
of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review
provided by law from court judgments or orders.

1. Reason for courts; Judicial

Hierarchy

Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is a
more or less established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive system
of review of judgments and final orders of lower courts.

The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of
evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments
of lower courts by higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and
legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very
nature of things, exclusive to the courts.

2. Paramount Need to end

Litigation at Some Point

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the
procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have
been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure,
there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the
conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will,
but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the
issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. 47 As
observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think
highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels
is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to
harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right."

3. Judgments of Supreme Court

Not Reviewable

The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that
judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch,
department, or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must
rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less
reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law,
flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on the
indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.

In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an
attempt by a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court
collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution'
with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly
causing "undue injury" to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution"
promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . — the following
pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established doctrine: 50

. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the
Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s
has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263
[1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the
courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining
controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law,
or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even
of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law,
into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the
courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted
to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)

xxx xxx xxx

 Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en banc or
division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the
legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the
doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who
unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democractic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court
orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs.
Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of powers calls for
the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their
duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the
same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress
would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from
speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either
coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers
presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government.
(Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).

4. Final and Executory Judgments of

Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court

In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a party
who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration)
under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on
whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar
rules and conformably with the hierarchy of courts. 51Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court
on the ground that it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, may be had through the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to review by higher
tribunals — become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they,
too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in
anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by
any other official, branch or department of Government. 52

C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action

against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic

Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase in the
resort to administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute for
or supplement to appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form
of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to
exercise them. With rising frequency, administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the
Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public
prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts
against trial judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.

1. Common Basis of Complaints

Against Judges

Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or
Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders
which are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave
abuse of discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and compensable injury to the
complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a
common requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order
of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for
a pronouncement of liability.

2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for

Correction of Judgments and Orders

The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the
prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an
administrative or criminal complaint against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having
opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and
the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the administrative or
criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait on the result thereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary postulation
can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or
decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust
judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step, confer the
prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the
determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of
law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever determination he makes could well
set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here after more fully explored.

Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the power of
public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or
final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or special civil
action — is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance
with a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No
other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.

These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code
as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in
any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who
would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper
appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or
the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no
application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment
after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-
 Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper.

xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a
member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the
regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that
very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it
is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon
his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability
to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would
be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley
vs. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).

xxx xxx xxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted
"with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of
the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and
judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and
conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would
destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of
powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this
Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to
and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and
adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law.

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and executory.
Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any
other body or authority.

3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed

Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust

To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or order is unjust — or was (or
was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his
jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially judicial
function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the
highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service or any other branch; nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review a
judicial order or decision — whether final and executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to
lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That
prerogative belongs to the courts alone.

4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness

and Leads to Absurd Consequences
Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments or
interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that
the decisions or interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are
tainted by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or immorality,
or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it
would also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences.

Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is
rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the
latter's judgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally, the
appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the
municipal trial court judge who rendered the original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly
unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the
Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary investigation, not only
that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication that the decisions or
orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an
act of supreme arrogance and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming
that the public prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision
in question — despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels — and thereafter,
disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against
the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or
the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.

Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a
Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have an
inevitable result: given the antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the
correctness of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the same
appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.

Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a
criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should
convict him of the offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices of the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction.

The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and regardless of
whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute
the judge for supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.

5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative

Criminal Prosecution

This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an
unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the
indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be
also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the judgment
rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court in the civil or criminal
action in question is challenged.

What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal
action, as to which — the same being unappealable — it would be unreasonable to deny the State or
the victim of the crime (or even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such
charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design,
through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there
be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or order in
question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a
higher court impugning the validity of the; judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the
prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the
judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicialdeclaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal
action against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an
indispensable requisite.

D. Judges Must be Free from

Influence or Pressure

Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should
not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do
and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule,
which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done
within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.

This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing
short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 56 The
error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in
these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and general
jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of
their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction."58 Based on Section 9, Act
No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with any subsequent legislative issuance or
court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of
damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the
limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which rights
are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the Constitution); — shall be liable
to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent that
the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential
element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to
the caveat already mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless
there be a final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. Afterword

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it took no
less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent
Borromeo in the different rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present
administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the unnecessary work occasioned
by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court,
however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs he suffered,
with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his understanding and
deter him from further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the
power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the
Court's forbearance had no effect on him.

Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness and
impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened
others to just as flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the
courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislative
and executive departments, the Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit
of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is time for the Court to
now draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The
Court accordingly serves notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal
with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive
sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of
the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt

repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he
may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their
authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of
Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of
any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts,
judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-981147 July 2, 1998

JESUS S. CONDUCTO, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE ILUMINADO C. MONZON, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated 14 October 1996, 1 complainant charged respondent Judge Iluminado
C. Monzon of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Pablo City, with ignorance of law, in that he
deliberately refused to suspend a barangay chairman who was charged before his court with the crime
of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.

The factual antecedents recited in the letter-complaint are not controverted.

On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City
against one Benjamin Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for
abuse of authority, serious irregularity and violation of law in that, among other things, said respondent
Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law, Mrs. Florian Maghirang, to the position of barangay secretary on
17 May 1989 in violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code. At the same time, complainant
filed a complaint for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City
Prosecutor against Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed 2 on 30 September 1993 on the ground
that Maghirang's sister-in-law was appointed before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of
1991, which prohibits a punong barangayfrom appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary. The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsrnan for Luzon.

On 22 October 1993, complainant obtained Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 3 from Director Jacob Montesa of
the Department of Interior and Local Government, which declared that the appointment issued by
Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated paragraph (2), Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code prior to the Local Government Code of 1991.

In its Revised Resolution of 29 November 1993, 4 the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
dismissed the case, but ordered Maghirang to replace his sister-in-law as barangay secretary.

On 20 December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
reconsider 5the order of 29 November 1993, in light of Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 of Director Montesa.

Acting on the motion, Francisco Samala, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order 6 on 8 February 1994 granting the motion for reconsideration
and recommending the filing of an information for unlawful appointment (Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code) against Maghirang. The recommendation was duly approved by Manuel C. Domingo,
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

In a 3rd indorsement dated 4 March 1994, 7 the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon transmitted the record
of the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City and instructed the latter to file the
corresponding information against Maghirang with the proper court and to prosecute the case. The
information for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was forthwith filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities in San Pablo City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 26240. On 11 April 1994, the
presiding judge, respondent herein, issued a warrant for the arrest of Maghirang, with a
recommendation of a P200.00 bond for his provisional liberty.

With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, on 4 May 1995, the City
Prosecutor filed, in Criminal Case No. 26240, a motion for the suspension 8 of accused Maghirang
pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, which reads, in part:

Sec. 13. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
single or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in Court, shall be suspended from office.

In his Order of 30 June 1995, 9 respondent judge denied the motion for suspension on the ground that:
 [T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code was committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirang's] terms (sic) of office
from 1989 to 1994 and said accused was again re-elected as Barangay Chairman during
the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence, offenses committed during previous
term is (sic) not a cause for removal (Lizarez vs. Hechanova, et al., G.R. No. L-22059,
May 17, 1965); an order of suspension from office relating to a given term may not be
the basis of contempt with respect to ones (sic) assumption of the same office under a
new term (Oliveros vs. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1971) and, the Court should
never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would deprieve (sic) the people of their right to elect their officer. When the
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or mis
conduct (sic), if he had been guilty if any. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 94115,
August 21, 1992).

The prosecution moved for reconsideration 10 of the order, alleging that the court had confused removal
as a penalty in administrative cases and the "temporary removal from office (or suspension) as a
means of preventing the public official, while the criminal case against him is pending, from exerting
undue influence, intimidate (sic) witnesses which may affect the outcome of the case; the former is a
penalty or sanction whereas the latter is a mere procedural remedy." Accordingly, "while a re-elected
public official cannot be administratively punished by removing him from office for offenses committed
during his previous term, . . . said public official can be temporarily removed to prevent him from
wielding undue influence which will definitely be a hindrance for justice to take its natural course." The
prosecution then enumerated the cases decided by this Court reiterating the rule that what a re-election
of a public official obliterates are only administrative, not criminal, liabilities, incurred during previous
terms. 11

In his order of 3 August 1995, 12 respondent denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

There is no dispute that the suspension sought by the prosecution is premised upon the
act charged allegedly committed during the accused [sic] previous term as Barangay
Chairman of Brgy. III-E. San Pablo City, who was subsequently re-elected as Barangay
Chairman again during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994. Certainly, had not the
accused been re-elected the prosecution will not file the instant motion to suspend him
as there is no legal basis or the issue has become academic.

The instant case run [sic] parallel with the case of Lizares vs. Hechanova, et al., L-
22059, May 17, 1966, 17 SCRA 58, wherein the Supreme Court subscribed to the rule
denying the right to remove from office because of misconduct during a prior term.

It is opined by the Court that preventive suspension is applicable only if there is [sic]
administrative case filed against a local official who is at the same time criminally
charged in Court. At present, the records of the Court shows [sic] that there is no
pending administrative case existing or filed against the accused.

It was held in the concluding paragraph of the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court
in Lizares vs. Hechanova, et al., that "Since petitioner, having been duly re-elected, is no
longer amenable to administrative sanctions for any acts committed during his former
tenure, the determination whether the respondent validly acted in imposing upon him
one month's suspension for act [sic] done during his previous term as mayor is now
merely of theoretical interest.

Complainant then moved that respondent inhibit himself from Criminal Case No. 26240. In his order of
21 September 1995, 13 respondent voluntarily inhibited himself. The case was assigned to Judge
Adelardo S. Escoses per order of Executive Judge Bienvenido V. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pablo City.
On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator.

In his comment dated 14 February 1997, filed in compliance with the resolution of this Court of 27
January 1997, respondent asserted that he had been "continuously keeping abreast of legal and
jurisprudential development [sic] in the law" since he passed the 1955 Bar Examinations; and that he
issued the two challenged orders "only after due appreciation of prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,"
citing authorities in support thereof. He thus prayed for dismissal of this case, arguing that to warrant a
finding of ignorance of law and abuse of authority, the error must be "so gross and patent as to produce
an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision." 14 He
emphasized, likewise, that the error had to be "so grave and on so fundamental a point as to warrant
condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or negligent;" 15 "otherwise, to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and that would be intolerable." 16

Respondent further alleged that he earned complainant's ire after denying the latter's Motion for the
Suspension of Barangay Chairman Maghirang, which was filed only after Maghirang was re-elected in
1994; and that complainant made inconsistent claims, concretely, while in his letter of 4 September
1995 requesting respondent to inhibit from the case, complainant declared that he believed in
respondent's integrity, competence and dignity, after he denied the request, complainant branded
respondent as a "judge of poor caliber and understanding of the law, very incompetent and has no
place in Court of Justice."

Finally, respondent Judge avowed that he would not dare soil his judicial robe at this time, for he had
only three (3) years and nine (9) months more before reaching the compulsory age of retirement of
seventy (70); and that for the last 25 years as municipal judge in the seven (7) towns of Laguna and as
presiding judge of the MTCC, San Pablo City, he had maintained his integrity.

In compliance with the Court's resolution of 9 March 1998, the parties, by way of separate letters,
informed the Court that they agreed to have this case decided on the basis of the pleadings already
filed, with respondent explicitly specifying that only the complaint and the comment thereon be
considered.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends that this Court hold respondent liable for
ignorance of the law and that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. In support thereof, the OCA makes the following
findings and conclusions:

The claim of respondent Judge that a local official who is criminally charged can be
preventively suspended only if there is an administrative case filed against him is without
basis. Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) states that:

Suspension and loss of benefits — Any incumbent public officer against

whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan
(or the Court) to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging
violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property is filed in court. The court trying a case has
neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to
prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. All that is required is for the
court to make a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information for
any of the above-described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for
suspension. (Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503 [August 4, 1994], 235 SCRA
103).

In the same case, the Court held that "as applied to criminal prosecutions under RA
3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety (90) days only if the case is
decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety (90) days."

Barangay Chairman Benjamin Maghirang was charged with Unlawful Appointment,

punishable under Article 244, Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, it
was mandatory on Judge Monzon's part, considering the Motion filed, to order the
suspension of Maghirang for a maximum period of ninety (90) days. This, he failed and
refused to do.

Judge Monzon's contention denying complainant's Motion for Suspension because

"offenses committed during the previous term (is) not a cause for removal during the
present term" is untenable. In the case of Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Hen. Luis Santos and
Melvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the Court held that "the rule is that a public official
cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since
his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct
committed during a prior term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases . . .
(Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, it was specifically declared in the case of Ingco vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-
23220, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1292, that "The ruling, therefore, that "when the
people have elected a man to office it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct if he had been guilty of any" refers only to an action for removal from office
and does not apply to a criminal case." (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment was committed during Maghirang's first
term as barangay chairman and the Motion for his suspension was only filed in 1995
during his second term, his re-election is not a bar to his suspension as the suspension
sought for is in connection with criminal case.

Respondent's denial of complainant's Motion for Reconsideration left the complainant

with no other judicial remedy. Since a case for Unlawful Appointment is covered by
Summary Procedure, complainant is prohibited from filing a petition for certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition involving an interlocutory order issued by the court. Neither can
he file an appeal from the court's adverse final judgment, incorporating in his appeal the
grounds assailing the interlocutory orders, as this will put the accused in double
jeopardy.

All things considered, while concededly, respondent Judge manifested his ignorance of
the law in denying complainant's Motion for Suspension of Brgy. Chairman Maghirang,
there was nothing shown however to indicate that he acted in bad faith or with malice.
Be that as it may, it would also do well to note that good faith and lack of malicious intent
cannot completely free respondent from liability.

This Court, in the case of Libarios and Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48, ruled:

In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done

in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
 such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be disciplined
for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of
judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with
basic principles.

A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the
law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to
exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if
there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench
cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

The findings and conclusions of the Office of the Court Administrator are in order. However, the penalty
recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of the fact that despite his claim that he has been
"continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in law" ever since he
passed the Bar Examinations in 1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall that as early as
18 December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez, 17 this Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public
official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his
previous term of office, thus:

The ruling, therefore, that — "when the people have elected a man to his office it must
be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any" — refers
only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because
a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or
malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious
not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the
reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for
extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at least
insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the
President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.

In Ingco, this Court did not yield to petitioner's insistence that he was benefited by the ruling in Pascual
v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija 18 that a public officer should never be removed for acts done prior to
his present term of office, as follows:

There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The basis of the investigation
which has been commenced here, and which is sought to be restrained, is a criminal
accusation the object of which is to cause the indictment and punishment of petitioner-
appellant as a private citizen; whereas in the cases cited, the subject of the investigation
was an administrative charge against the officers therein involved and its object was
merely to cause his suspension or removal from public office. While the criminal cases
involves the character of the mayor as a private citizen and the People of the Philippines
as a community is a party to the case, an administrative case involves only his
actuations as a public officer as [they] affect the populace of the municipality where he
serves. 19

Then on 20 June 1969, in Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al., 20 this Court likewise categorically
declared that criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official during his previous term of office
were not extinguished by his re-election, and that Pascual v. Provincial Governor and Lizares v.
Hechanovareferred only to administrative liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective
official, thus:

1. The first problem we are to grapple with is the legal effect of the reelection of
respondent municipal officials. Said respondents would want to impress upon us the fact
that in the last general elections of November 14, 1967 the Makati electorate reelected
 all of them, except that Vice-Mayor Teotimo Gealogo, a councilor prior thereto, was
elevated to vice-mayor. These respondents contend that their reelection erected a bar to
their removal from office for misconduct committed prior to November 14, 1967. It is to
be recalled that the acts averred in the criminal information in Criminal Case 18821 and
for which they were convicted allegedly occurred on or about July 26, 1967, or prior to
the 1967 elections. They ground their position onPascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija, 106 Phil. 466, and Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17 SCRA 58.

A circumspect view leaves us unconvinced of the soundness of respondents' position.

The two cases relied upon have laid down the precept that a reelected public officer is
no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former
tenure. But the present case rests on an entirely different factual and legal setting. We
are not here confronted with administrative charges to which the two cited cases refer.
Here involved is a criminal prosecution under a special statute, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019).

Then again, on 30 May 1974, in Oliveros v. Villaluz, 21 this Court held:

The first question presented for determination is whether a criminal offense for violation
of Republic Act 3019 committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis
of his suspension in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection to office.

Petitioner concedes that "the power and authority of respondent judge to continue trying
the criminal case against petitioner may not in any way be affected by the fact of
petitioner's reelection," but contends that "said respondent's power to preventively
suspend petitioner under section 13 of Republic Act 3019 became inefficacious upon
petitioner's reelection" arguing that the power of the courts cannot be placed over that of
sovereign and supreme people who ordained his return to office.

Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecijathat "each term is separate from other terms and that the reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced.

The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt
with administrative liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not
to criminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco vs. Sanchez the court ruled that
the reelection of a public officer for a new term does not in any manner wipe out
the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term.

In Luciano vs. Provincial Governor the Court stressed that the cases
of Pascual and Lizares are authority for the precept that "a reelected public officer is no
longer amenable to administrativesanctions for acts committed during his former tenure"
but that as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by reelection of the
public officer, since, inter alia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is
perpetual disqualification from public office and it "is patently offensive to the objectives
and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act . . . that an official may amass
wealth thru graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase
reelection and thereby launder his evil acts."

Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the body
politic. The small segment of the national electorate that constitutes the electorate of the
 municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a crime against the public justice of the
State and the entire body politic. Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a
public officer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-Graft Act
imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from
public office and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such penalty of
perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the public offices and employments
which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election."

It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a

previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed
to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in
then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the
State, "to hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability would in effect
transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to
which it was lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the
electorate. This cannot be so, for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a
corrupt official by returning him back to office, a criminal action initiated against the latter
can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious act having been
committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and
uphold. A contrary rule would erode the very system upon which our government is
based, which is one of laws and not of men."

22
Finally, on 21 August 1992, in Aguinaldo v. Santos, this Court stated:

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed from administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine enunciated in the above-mentioned
cases. If respondent has truly been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential
development [sic] in the law," it was impossible for him to have missed or misread these cases. What
detracts from his claim of assiduity is the fact that he even cited the cases of Oliveros v.
Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of his 30 June 1995 order. What is then evident is that
respondent either did not thoroughly read these cases or that he simply miscomprehended them. The
latter, of course, would only manifest either incompetence, since both cases were written in plain and
simple language thereby foreclosing any possibility of misunderstanding or confusion; or deliberate
disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced by this Court.

While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges
— and, of course, members of the Bar — comprehending the decisions is a different matter, for it is in
that area where one's competence may then be put to the test and proven. Thus, it has been said that
a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and
authoritative doctrines. 23 He should strive for excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the
end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. 24

Needless to state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in the desired level of mastery of a revered
doctrine on a simple issue.

On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberately disregarded the doctrine laid down in Ingco v.
Sanchezand reiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v. Provincial Governor, Oliveros v.
Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it may then be said that he simply wished to enjoy the privilege of
overruling this Court's doctrinal pronouncements. On this point, and as a reminder to all judges, it is
apropos to quote what this Court said sixty-one years ago in People v. Vera: 25

As already observed by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and
reiterated in subsequent cases "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to
litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts
demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and
operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.

Likewise, in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Appeals: 26

The spirit and initiative and independence on the part of men of the robe may at times be
commendable, but certainly not when this Court, not once but at least four times, had
indicated what the rule should be. We had spoken clearly and unequivocally. There was
no ambiguity in what we said. Our meaning was clear and unmistakable. We did take
pains to explain why it must be thus. We were within our power in doing so. It would not
be too much to expect, then, that tribunals in the lower rungs of the judiciary would at the
very least, take notice and yield deference. Justice Laurel had indicated in terms too
clear for misinterpretation what is expected of them. Thus: "A becoming modesty of
inferior court[s] demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." 27 In the
constitutional sense, respondent Court is not excluded from such a category. The grave
abuse of discretion is thus manifest.

In Caram Resources Corp v. Contreras, 28 this Court affirmed that by tradition and in our system of
judicial administration, this Court has the last word on what the law is, and that its decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution and laws form part of this country's legal system. 29 All other courts should
then be guided by the decisions of this Court. To judges who find it difficult to do so, Vivo v.
Cloribel 30warned:

Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases,
that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of
reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather
than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that
it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that
any deviation from the principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a
sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if
despite of what is here said, a Judge, still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings,
then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could
properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9,
C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.

Finally, the last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering
that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.

That having been said, we cannot but conclude that the recommended penalty of reprimand is not
commensurate with the misdeed committed. A fine of P5,000.00, with a warning that a commission of
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely is, at the very least, appropriate, considering
respondent is due for compulsory retirement on 29 November 2000 and that this is his first offense.

WHEREFORE, for incompetence as a result of ignorance of a settled doctrine interpreting a law, or

deliberate disregard of such doctrine in violation of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
respondent Judge Iluminado C. Monzon is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and warned that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.
The first Resolution dismissed petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for
further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order."
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.2
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St.,
La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an
area of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at ₱700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth
Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by
invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items
could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also
able to confiscate money in the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army,
stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth
Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces
and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of
Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income
and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items
seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an
intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.
Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge,
Los Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by
the Board’s consultant. Although the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not
included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of ₱104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten
and unexplained wealth in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No.
1379") 4 against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended
Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff
and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as
co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army
until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine
Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The
Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property
by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos."5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist
in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for
trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing
to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x."8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioner’s
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when
petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter
of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should
proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed
to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead,
petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or
to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties
subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because
of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage
when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare
for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence.
Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to
its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted
that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under the
circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no
further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60
days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that
failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court held in
Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President
Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to
Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to
which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE
CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND
BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING
BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE
OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not
applicable to this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or
waived by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was
allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS
SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND
THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12
The Court’s Ruling
First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the
filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on
its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGG’s power under Section
3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out
the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These
are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking
undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; 17 or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the
PCGG.18
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore,
Ramas’ case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims
that Ramas’ position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably
making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term ‘subordinate.’ The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-
gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or
his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.’
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-
‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell
& Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd
Ed., 203].’
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No.
2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee
during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General 19
does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and
its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of
former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees
of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas’
complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed
President or by former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner
argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board
conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379.
Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of
investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the
former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the
Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."20
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any
relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves
fatal to petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and
necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without
showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos.
Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas
accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution
of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of
the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on
PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-
gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent
behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and
prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under
Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-
over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or
using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten
wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under
the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG
to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1.
Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief
State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while
the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.27 The
Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of
a prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for
forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply
to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are
violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas’ case to the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained
wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined
from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper
prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise
only the powers granted to it.
Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first
place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s
powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole
task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.29 Without these
elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute
their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court
in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only
filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise
lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. 30 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of
jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action.31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject
to prescription, laches or estoppel.33
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
 Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner’s evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has
only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been
pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint
on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two
years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the
presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions.
Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion
for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion sought "to charge the delinquent properties (which
comprise most of petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully
acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioner’s evidence since petitioner
did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the
continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving
petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its
inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order
expressing its view on the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case
has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of
the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses,
allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of
evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its
alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the
developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in
progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate action
could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on
the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG prayed for
an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this
request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled
date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG
supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with
the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the
case is concerned x x x."37 Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11
July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a
case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-
Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner
ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong
even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner’s evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on
petitioner’s case since these properties comprise most of petitioner’s evidence against private
respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if
these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid
but Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these
items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber
.45; communications equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land
titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure
"on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution." 39 Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation
of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the
same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by
the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March
1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country
or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in
the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In
Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal
order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order
itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as
the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime.
This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of
making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been
said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from there is
derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government
without regard to the existing constitution."
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which
was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the
Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be
obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the
Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government,43
petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the
continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the
due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later the
1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety
of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular
remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and
sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the power and
duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-
gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the
interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And as also
already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the
"authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to
include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse
by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is
instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of
the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the
Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister
Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as
an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus
suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties
or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The
answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are
asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but
let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence,
we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the
same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism.
That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule
of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even
before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report
asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress,
and Congress may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is
asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of
Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think
that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That
would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is
very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and
repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill
of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. "Open
your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in
your private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is
the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can
it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would become
convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8
of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted,
the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument — that what the
PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go
on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the
PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what
another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More
said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nation’s safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the devil
benefit of law for our nation’s sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment
as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware
that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of
Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum
the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article
17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it
as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.46 Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights47 of
individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings
are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it
repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international
law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the
revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioner’s witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from
the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land
titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano.
Do you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search
warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they
also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other
jewelries were contained in attaché cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three
(3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attaché cases and the steel safes were containing firearms,
they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this
money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the
money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that
because they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite
rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or
contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the
communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search
warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when…
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in
the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many
ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscal’s office who
charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscal’s office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in
the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the
jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these
articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken
because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search
warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be
contained in attaché cases.1âwphi1 These attaché cases were suspected to be containing pistols or
other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So
the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the
money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like
Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.51
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,53 and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do
not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold
that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any
tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I concur with Mr. Justice Vitug in his concurring opinion.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., in the result. I concur in the separate opinion of J. Reynato Puno.
Tinga, J., separate opinion reserved.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether
the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of
the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC

—

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified
Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC
the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

—

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than

October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
 b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on
Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained.3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched
the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10
October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . .
.5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it
by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an
earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to
lay down conditions under which business may be done."9

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of
the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel
historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of
the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the
privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a
matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares
and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken
place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner
has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform
the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch
or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than

non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the

Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is
given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to
qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we
not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to

remove the word "QUALIFIED?".

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS"
as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the

word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will
always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For
example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then
a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision
may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in
point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions
on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the
promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers
to the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on
education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion
of total human liberation and development. 33A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that
they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very
terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained
to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by
its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains —

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to
out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our
lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,
as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded
the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. 37During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected
by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the
1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international
recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo

amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE
CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable,

but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-
percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual

Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say

that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
 MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities
or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be

read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos"
here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual
Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by
Filipinos. 40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner

Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND

CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS."

MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is

qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."

MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE
STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-
called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the
grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject
provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic

concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions . . . .
 The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and
inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be
made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen
over the former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and
selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject
provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to
violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt
such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even
some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical
life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In
fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility
for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative
of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court,
for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command.
That is not how constitutional government operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC
a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction.
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command. 46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government
as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power —
legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the
subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals.
Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to
enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide
by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should
be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified
for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose
their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These
are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction.
Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of
the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match
the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet
matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm
and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group
willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences
to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution
not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is
worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they
are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the
Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values.
A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride
and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state,
with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no
higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property
in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important
events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a
qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a
non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a
foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain
and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court,
heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the
nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a bit more
on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions such as the
Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qualified
Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos.1

Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I)
consisting of land, sea, and air.2study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national
patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive
expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not
only their natural resources of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people,
the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the
people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation
alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only through development as a correlative
factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their
national patrimony).3

Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race.4

There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and,
as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This
institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a
historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign
heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President Manuel
L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do so with.
an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of
the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the intent
of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for
nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put more teeth into
our laws, and; not make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary
legislation but of constitutional enactment"6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and
trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free
from all foreign liens and encumbrances".7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, must refer
not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of
the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national
patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher
bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the
non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino.
The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the
higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at
all.

It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our country,
stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While government
agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and
even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from
reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In
the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the
Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51%
of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping
with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and
cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice Reynato
S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos"1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be amplified
or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila
Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of
the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to
take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before
us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the
foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be
at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it
becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the
dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown
that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the
peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at
time is seen, to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it
even takes on non-justiciable controversies.

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional
mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal
the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the
Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it
over a foreign national corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and
the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking
the larger ownership interest in MHC,"2 so that petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to
the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently,
it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential
treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks.3 That, to
me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos
whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to Filipino
citizens in the lease of public market stalls."5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing leases
covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls
to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado
v. De la Fuente,6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the
statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting preference to
Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao
v. Raymundo,7 the preference granted under the statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino
vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were
available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever
there is a conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets,
in which situation the right to preference immediately arises."8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 1970s in
America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination
programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as employment,
contracting and licensing.9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are situations in which
the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated in the
Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with
aliens.

There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or deprive the
country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common trades of
common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of government
property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and concessions covering the
national economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our
citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned
by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment of the
business in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be trading
competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are qualified, having
hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding that is sought to be
modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest bid
of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do would be not to
make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the
highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on
public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for a
range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand, if
the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be
allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who
have "validly submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in the case
at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of history. The
reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of
history is worth a volume of logic."

I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and cultural
aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the nation".

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

 In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national goals and priorities.

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —

The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively by
Filipinos. (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the 1987
Constitution Commission proceedings thus:

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN THE

GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS". And the word "Filipinos" here,
as intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-Controlled entities fully
controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 608).

MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as Commissioner

Villegas said, this committee and this body already
approved what is known as the Filipino First policy which
was suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that it is
now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:

MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges and

concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign

enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects

than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred:?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p. 616,

Records of the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no reneged on
this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said —

The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . . . It

cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional
(Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).

I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the product
of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the
collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to
historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the legal
largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively discussed in
the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in
the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished historical
values of our people.

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in the
words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps
flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If you look
towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the
river or people towards the future, and if you look the other way, you progress."

Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.

I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.

I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he
makes mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding the
belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.

I vote GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates
the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the Manila
Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was included
in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers
30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel
Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale
was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic
partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel"1 The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.

In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules were
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong
Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified.2

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:

I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than
October 23, 1995;

xxx xxx xxx

IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide

management expertise and/or an international marketing reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to
the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of the following
qualifications:

a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board representation)

in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing expertise to

successfully operate the Manila Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide access to

the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.

xxx xxx xxx

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
 xxx xxx xxx

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration Office

between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period
specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the following:

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification

and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization

b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila

Hotel Corporation

c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and Bidding

Conference

xxx xxx xxx

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila Hotel

on the date specified in Section III to allow the Applicant to seek
clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines and
procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification documents
will be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this conference is
strongly advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it does not
attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents (1

original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to
4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS

1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the

assistance of the TEC based on the Information Package
and other information available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the

evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of the
group, taking into account the contribution of each member
to the venture.

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results of

the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the

criteria set forth below:
 a. Business management expertise, track
record, and experience

b. Financial capability.

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the

proposed strategic plan for the Manila Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem

appropriate.

6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding — ITT
Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels International
Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the
Public Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification process
again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Qualified

Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the date specified in
Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by member

whose qualification was a material consideration for being included in the
shortlist is ground for disqualification of the Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to participate

in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred

Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing Thirty Percent to
Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of
MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified
Bidders will have the Option of determining the number of shares within
the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract bidders with different
preferences and objectives for the operation and management of The
Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum bid
required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is Thirty-Six
Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the minimum
required will not considered.
 D. TRANSFER COSTS

xxx xxx xxx

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy of

which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be properly
accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may be a sufficient
basis for disqualification.

2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the Official
Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in a sealed
envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be submitted

along with the bid in a separate envelop marked "SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS":

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the Qualified

Bidder should submit a Board resolution which adequately authorizes
such representative to bid for and in behalf of the corporation with full
authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified
Bidder.

If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of the

Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board resolution authorizing
one of its members and such member's representative to make the bid on
behalf of the group with full authority to perform such acts necessary or
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos

(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of:

i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft payable

to the "Government Service Insurance System" and issued
by a reputable banking institution duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable banking

institution acceptable to the GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:

i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than
the required amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or unconditional
demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security will be for the
account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic Partner,

the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on the Qualified
Bidder's offered purchase price.

e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned immediately

after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not declared the Highest
Bidder.

f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest
Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of GSIS
if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the Management
Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract specified
by the Highest Bidder or other types of contract in its strategic plan for
The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with

GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not
later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any

other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the following

location:

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding to

accept any and all bids and supporting requirements. Representatives
from the Commission on Audit and COP will be invited to witness the
proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid Form.
The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in a sealed
envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents

in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS"

a. Written Authority Bid

 b. Bid Security

5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted simultaneously to
the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard Time,
on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after the
closing time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of the
two sealed envelopes. The actual time of submission will also be
indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.

7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the
corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes will be in
full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding, the
PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those who
submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which is/are
not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be disqualified. The
envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately returned to
the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at 3:00

PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price will be read
publicly as the envelopes are opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will formally
announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis. In the
event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same equivalent price
per share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger ownership
interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:

a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed period;

or

b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and

acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by
October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the
Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with

GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
 Marketing Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan
for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is intending to
provide only financial support to The Manila Hotel, a
separate institution may enter into the aforementioned
contract/s with GSIS/MHC.

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase

and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of which will be
distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is completed.

2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management Contract

for The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the management fee
structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in the Management
Contract are as follows:

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross

revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating

profit(1) after deducting undistributed overhead expenses
and the basic management fee.

c. Fixed component of the international

marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of
gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant should indicate in
its Information Package if it is wishes to charge this fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for the
hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with the Highest
Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.

A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The Manila

Hotel should determine whether or not the management fee structure
above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification documents to
GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be in

accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their respective bids in
their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority will be given to the
Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bids on
the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner
after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC not

later than October 23, 1995; and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and

COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than October
23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares after
deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Check or

unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government Service
Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution licensed to
do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all

applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such application as
maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS similarly
reserves the right to require the submission of any additional information
from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.

2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding prior to
acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding under amended
rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the Qualified
Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the submission of the
prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or other
pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the respective
deadlines/target dates.

4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it has on
the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders, except

the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public Bidding is

final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the Public Bidding, are
deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, suit or
allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders who
have participated in the Public Bidding.3
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The GSIS
declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.

On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid
price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph of
Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three million pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditions of
the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain petitioner's
request.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 18,
1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution4 on the
"National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the

controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement section
10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner,
a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in
the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further
legislative action.6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws
enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe. The
key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its language. A
searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment,
complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and
enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in
question.8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,9 rather than as requiring
future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not
treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be
easily ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that
legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
suffocate them. 12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and
seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and the
privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection
of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or
damaging of property for public use without just compensation.18

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which
the policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our
Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as
mere statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of Article XIII on
"Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts,
Culture end Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is
addressed to the discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to
effectuate their policy content. 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:

Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country 25 to
Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact
laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical
command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of
investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned
 Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to
breathe life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from
section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed
our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28where we upheld the
discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of investments. 29 By reenacting
the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to
nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to
Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also
broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the]
national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be
read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to
qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy and patrimony.
Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to
hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is
unconditional and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-
executing.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in
our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the whole
State without any pause or a half- pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission
show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner
Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. 30 By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional
provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national
patrimony. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a
myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day
Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular
Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous
materials and Filipino craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively
used by American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American
Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during
the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters
and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the
Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served
foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous
international film and sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international
conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and
conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions
and awards from international hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino
talent and ingenuity. These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No.
4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846, "The Cultural
Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural
property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property. 32 Approved
on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read
as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law
does not equate cultural treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the
nation."
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A
look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the
government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the
employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS, 35Excess funds, however, are
allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus
contended that the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture,
hence, an act beyond the contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject
to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-owned
and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the general welfare of
the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a
constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their
"preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a
Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet today's manifest
needs and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a
living constitution.

Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to define the
phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that present
and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens over
aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the
existing laws or the prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business map be done, for
example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera.

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as giving
preference to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos who
are not qualified.
 MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the intention
of the proponents. The committee has accepted the
amendment.

xxx xxx xxx

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is
addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and
regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-
making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the standards to
measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed
that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a
second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the second
paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino
for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar
aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.
Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights,
privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.

In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of our
State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to
develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to
keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the
degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve
the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet
the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be
determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien
assistance, the greater the degree of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at any
given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right primarily
belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of government,
and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the
limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of this right
of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national economy and judicial
duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate the policy.

To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently,
we must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS to
determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale.
A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential
right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to
mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article
XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics
which demand that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of
preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand
equal, and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the
rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to
match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of
shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It
complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest
bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for
the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a
foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with
petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as
defined by the rules. The parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors
whose determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the State.
We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment.
The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is
not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in
and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.

Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner
was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do not
provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that
the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner
cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the
rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc
on he essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much
funds as possible for the government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our
people. This is a duty that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding
contest and the rules are carefully written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are
prequalified to insure their financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent
collusion among the parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege to
know the winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a
bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M.
Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own land.
The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the Filipino First policy
requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy makers can
write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a
foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as written,
by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against
unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno,
may I just add

1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus
to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . .
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos."
The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that
of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained interpretation, I
respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham
where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and, viewed properly,
gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the guise of reverse
comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by
authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprises
solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their
nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the global marketplace with
absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermit
kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-
term, self-destructing.

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the
bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being
unfair to the foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But
not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a bit more
on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions such as the
Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qualified
Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos.1

Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I)
consisting of land, sea, and air.2study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national
patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive
expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not
only their natural resources of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people,
the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the
people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation
alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only through development as a correlative
factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their
national patrimony).3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race.4

There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and,
as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This
institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a
historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign
heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President Manuel
L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do so with.
an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of
the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the intent
of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for
nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put more teeth into
our laws, and; not make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary
legislation but of constitutional enactment"6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and
trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free
from all foreign liens and encumbrances".7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, must refer
not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of
the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national
patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher
bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the
non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino.
The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the
higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at
all.

It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our country,
stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While government
agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and
even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from
reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In
the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the
Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51%
of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping
with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and
cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice Reynato
S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:

First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos"1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be amplified
or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila
Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of
the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to
take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before
us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the
foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be
at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it
becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the
dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown
that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the
peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at
time is seen, to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it
even takes on non-justiciable controversies.

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional
mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal
the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the
Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it
over a foreign national corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and
the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking
the larger ownership interest in MHC,"2 so that petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to
the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently,
it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential
treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks.3 That, to
me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos
whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to Filipino
citizens in the lease of public market stalls."5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing leases
covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls
to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado
v. De la Fuente,6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the
statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting preference to
Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao
v. Raymundo,7 the preference granted under the statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino
vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were
available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever
there is a conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets,
in which situation the right to preference immediately arises."8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 1970s in
America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination
programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as employment,
contracting and licensing.9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are situations in which
the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated in the
Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with
aliens.

There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or deprive the
country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common trades of
common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of government
property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and concessions covering the
national economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our
citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned
by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment of the
business in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be trading
competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are qualified, having
hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding that is sought to be
modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest bid
of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do would be not to
make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the
highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on
public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for a
range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand, if
the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be
allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who
have "validly submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in the case
at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of history. The
reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of
history is worth a volume of logic."

I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and cultural
aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the nation".

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national goals and priorities.

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —
 The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively by
Filipinos. (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the 1987
Constitution Commission proceedings thus:

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN THE

GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS". And the word "Filipinos" here,
as intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-Controlled entities fully
controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 608).

MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as Commissioner

Villegas said, this committee and this body already
approved what is known as the Filipino First policy which
was suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that it is
now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:

MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges and

concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign

enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects

than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred:?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p. 616,

Records of the Constitutional Commission).

The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no reneged on
this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said —

The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . . . It

cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional
(Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the product
of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the
collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to
historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the legal
largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively discussed in
the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in
the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished historical
values of our people.

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in the
words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps
flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If you look
towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the
river or people towards the future, and if you look the other way, you progress."

Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.

I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.

I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he
makes mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding the
belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.

I vote GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates
the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the Manila
Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was included
in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers
30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel
Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale
was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic
partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel"1 The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.

In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules were
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong
Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified.2

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than
October 23, 1995;

xxx xxx xxx

IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide

management expertise and/or an international marketing reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to
the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of the following
qualifications:

a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board representation)

in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing expertise to

successfully operate the Manila Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide access to

the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.

xxx xxx xxx

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

xxx xxx xxx

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration Office

between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period
specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the following:
 a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification
and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization

b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila

Hotel Corporation

c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and Bidding

Conference

xxx xxx xxx

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila Hotel

on the date specified in Section III to allow the Applicant to seek
clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines and
procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification documents
will be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this conference is
strongly advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it does not
attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents (1

original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to
4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS

1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the

assistance of the TEC based on the Information Package
and other information available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the

evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of the
group, taking into account the contribution of each member
to the venture.

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results of

the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the

criteria set forth below:

a. Business management expertise, track

record, and experience

b. Financial capability.

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the

proposed strategic plan for the Manila Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem

appropriate.
 6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding — ITT
Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels International
Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the
Public Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification process
again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Qualified

Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the date specified in
Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by member

whose qualification was a material consideration for being included in the
shortlist is ground for disqualification of the Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to participate

in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred

Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing Thirty Percent to
Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of
MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified
Bidders will have the Option of determining the number of shares within
the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract bidders with different
preferences and objectives for the operation and management of The
Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum bid
required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is Thirty-Six
Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the minimum
required will not considered.

D. TRANSFER COSTS

xxx xxx xxx

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy of

which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be properly
accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may be a sufficient
basis for disqualification.
 2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the Official
Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in a sealed
envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be submitted

along with the bid in a separate envelop marked "SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS":

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the Qualified

Bidder should submit a Board resolution which adequately authorizes
such representative to bid for and in behalf of the corporation with full
authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified
Bidder.

If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of the

Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board resolution authorizing
one of its members and such member's representative to make the bid on
behalf of the group with full authority to perform such acts necessary or
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos

(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of:

i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft payable

to the "Government Service Insurance System" and issued
by a reputable banking institution duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable banking

institution acceptable to the GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:

i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than
the required amount.

c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or unconditional

demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security will be for the
account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic Partner,

the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on the Qualified
Bidder's offered purchase price.

e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned immediately

after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not declared the Highest
Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest
Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of GSIS
if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the Management
Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract specified
by the Highest Bidder or other types of contract in its strategic plan for
The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with

GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not
later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any

other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the following

location:

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding to

accept any and all bids and supporting requirements. Representatives
from the Commission on Audit and COP will be invited to witness the
proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid Form.
The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in a sealed
envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents

in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS"

a. Written Authority Bid

b. Bid Security

5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted simultaneously to
the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard Time,
on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after the
closing time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of the
two sealed envelopes. The actual time of submission will also be
indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the
corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes will be in
full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding, the
PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those who
submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which is/are
not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be disqualified. The
envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately returned to
the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at 3:00

PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price will be read
publicly as the envelopes are opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will formally
announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis. In the
event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same equivalent price
per share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger ownership
interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:

a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed period;

or

b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and

acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by
October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the
Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with

GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan
for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is intending to
provide only financial support to The Manila Hotel, a
separate institution may enter into the aforementioned
contract/s with GSIS/MHC.

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase

and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of which will be
distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is completed.
 2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management Contract
for The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the management fee
structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in the Management
Contract are as follows:

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross

revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating

profit(1) after deducting undistributed overhead expenses
and the basic management fee.

c. Fixed component of the international

marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of
gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant should indicate in
its Information Package if it is wishes to charge this fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for the
hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with the Highest
Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.

A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The Manila

Hotel should determine whether or not the management fee structure
above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification documents to
GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be in

accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their respective bids in
their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority will be given to the
Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bids on
the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner

after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC not

later than October 23, 1995; and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and

COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

 1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the
Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than October
23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares after
deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Check or

unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government Service
Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution licensed to
do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all

applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such application as
maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS similarly
reserves the right to require the submission of any additional information
from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.

2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding prior to
acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding under amended
rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the Qualified
Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the submission of the
prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or other
pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the respective
deadlines/target dates.

4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it has on
the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders, except

the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public Bidding is

final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the Public Bidding, are
deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, suit or
allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders who
have participated in the Public Bidding.3

The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The GSIS
declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.

On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid
price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph of
Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three million pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditions of
the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain petitioner's
request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 18,
1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution4 on the
"National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the

controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement section
10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner,
a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in
the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further
legislative action.6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws
enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe. The
key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its language. A
searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment,
complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and
enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in
question.8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,9 rather than as requiring
future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not
treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be
easily ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that
legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
suffocate them. 12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and
seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and the
privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection
of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or
damaging of property for public use without just compensation.18

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which
the policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our
Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as
mere statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of Article XIII on
"Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts,
Culture end Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is
addressed to the discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to
effectuate their policy content. 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:

Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country 25 to
Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact
laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical
command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of
investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned
Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to
breathe life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from
section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed
our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28where we upheld the
discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of investments. 29 By reenacting
the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to
nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to
Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also
broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the]
national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be
read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to
qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy and patrimony.
Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to
hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is
unconditional and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-
executing.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in
our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the whole
State without any pause or a half- pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission
show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner
Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. 30 By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional
provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national
patrimony. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a
myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day
Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular
Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous
materials and Filipino craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively
used by American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American
Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during
the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters
and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the
Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served
foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous
international film and sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international
conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and
conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions
and awards from international hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino
talent and ingenuity. These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No.
4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846, "The Cultural
Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural
property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property. 32 Approved
on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read
as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law
does not equate cultural treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the
nation."

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A
look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the
government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the
employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS, 35Excess funds, however, are
allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus
contended that the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture,
hence, an act beyond the contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject
to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-owned
and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the general welfare of
the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a
constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their
"preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a
Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet today's manifest
needs and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a
living constitution.

Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to define the
phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that present
and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens over
aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the
existing laws or the prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business map be done, for
example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera.

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as giving
preference to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos who
are not qualified.

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the intention

of the proponents. The committee has accepted the
amendment.

xxx xxx xxx

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is
addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and
regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-
making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the standards to
measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed
that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a
second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the second
paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino
for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar
aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.
Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights,
privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.

In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of our
State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to
develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to
keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the
degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve
the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet
the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be
determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien
assistance, the greater the degree of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at any
given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right primarily
belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of government,
and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the
limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of this right
of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national economy and judicial
duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate the policy.

To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently,
we must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS to
determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale.
A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential
right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to
mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article
XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics
which demand that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of
preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand
equal, and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the
rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to
match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of
shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It
complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest
bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for
the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a
foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with
petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as
defined by the rules. The parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors
whose determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the State.
We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment.
The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is
not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in
and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner
was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do not
provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that
the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner
cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the
rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc
on he essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much
funds as possible for the government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our
people. This is a duty that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding
contest and the rules are carefully written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are
prequalified to insure their financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent
collusion among the parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege to
know the winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a
bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M.
Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own land.
The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the Filipino First policy
requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy makers can
write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a
foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as written,
by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against
unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno,
may I just add

1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus
to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . .
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos."
The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that
of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained interpretation, I
respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham
where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and, viewed properly,
gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the guise of reverse
comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by
authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprises
solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their
nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the global marketplace with
absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermit
kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-
term, self-destructing.

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the
bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being
unfair to the foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But
not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

EN BANC
April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 213948
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner.
vs.
DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
Bury me in the ground, place a stone and a cross over it.
 My name, the date of my birth, and of my
death. Nothing more.
 If you later wish to surround my grave with a fence, you may do so.
 No
anniversaries. I prefer Paang Bundok.
- Jose Rizal

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Injunction, with Applications for Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Others 1 filed by the Knights of Rizal (KOR) seeking, among others, for an
order to stop the construction of respondent DMCI Homes, Inc. 's condominium development project
known as the Torre de Manila. In its Resolution dated 25 November 2014, the Court resolved to treat
the petition as one for mandamus. 2
The Facts

On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) 3 acquired a 7,716.60-square meter
lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building
and Adamson University.4 The lot was earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila
condominium project.
On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the construction of its project. It
then obtained a Zoning Permit from the City of Manila's City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)
on 19 June 2012.5
Then, on 5 July 2012, the City of Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI-PDI a Building
Permit, allowing it to build a "Forty Nine (49) Storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level
Res'l./Condominium" on the property. 6
On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the
Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the
Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high
above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such
towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas
Boulevard vantage point[.]"7
Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of Manila's City Legal Officer on
whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121.8 In his letter dated 12 September 2012, City
Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is "no legal justification for the temporary
suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]" since the construction "lies outside the
Luneta Park" and is "simply too far to I be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the
artistic and historical significance" of the Rizal Monument. 9 He also pointed out that "there is no
showing that the [area of subject property has been officially declared as an anthropological or
archeological area. Neither has it ' been categorically designated by the National Historical Institute as
a heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure."
Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion or the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) on the matter. In the letter10 dated 6 November 2012 from
NHCP I Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno addressed to DMCI-PDI and the letter 11 dated 7
November 2012 from NHCP Executive Director III Ludovico D. Bado)f addressed to then Manila Mayor
Alfredo S. Lim, the NHCP maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of
the Rizal f.ark and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal
view of the National Monument.
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre de Manila project that garnered
about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in
Resolution No. 121 1 enjoining the City of Manila's building officials to temporarily suspend ~MCI-PDI's
Building Permit. 12
In a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada dated 18 December 2013, DMCI-PIDI President Alfredo R.
Austria sought clarification on the controversy surrounding its Zoning Permit. He stated that since the
CPDO granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the application for the Building Permit,
which was granted, and did not deem it necessary to go through the process of appealing to the local
zoning board. He then expressed DMCI-PDI's willingness to comply with the process if the City of
Manila deemed it necessary. 13
On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning
Board Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, 14 recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application for
variance. ;The MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila project "exceeds the prescribed maximum
Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and exceeds the prescribeµ Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as
stipulated in Article V, Section 17 of City Ordinance No. 8119[.]" However, the MZBAA still
recommended the approval of the variance subject to the five conditions set under the same resolution.
After some clarification sought by DMCI-PDI, the MZBAA issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06-A,
Series of 2013, 15 on 8 January 2014, amending condition (c) in the earlier resolution. 16
On 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, 17 adopting
Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06- A. The City Council resolution states that "the City Council of
Manila find[ s] no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the [MZBAA]
and hereby ratif[ies] and confirm[s] all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the
City [Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]"
Arguments of the KOR
On 12 September 2014, the KOR, a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, non-sectarian and non-profit
organization" 18 created under Republic Act No. 646, 19 filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a
temporary restraining I order, and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of DMCIPDI's
Torre de Manila condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is
one of "transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, or
with far-reaching implication" involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument.
The KOR asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure will "[stick] out like a sore thumb, [dwarf]
all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal
Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila building would loom at the back I and overshadow the
entire monument, whether up close or viewed from a distance. ''20
 Further, the KOR argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National Treasure, is entitled to "full protection
of the law"21 and the national government must abate the act or activity that endangers the nation's
cultural heritage "even against the wishes of the local government hosting it." 22
Next, the KOR contends that the project is a nuisance per se23 because "[t]he despoliation of the sight
view of the Rizal Monument is a situation that annoy's or offends the senses' of every Filipino who
honors the memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal. It is a present, continuing, worsening and
aggravating status or condition. Hence, the PROJECT is a nuisance per se. It deserves I to be abated
summarily, even without need of judicial proceeding. "24
The KOR also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates the NHCP's Guidelines on Monuments
Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and Other Personages, which state that historic
monuments should assert a visual "dominance" over its surroundings,25 as well as the country's
commitment under the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and
Sites, otherwise known as the Venice Charter. 26
Lastly, the KOR claims that the DMCI-PDI's construction was commenced and continues in bad faith,
and is in violation of the City of Manila's zoning ordinance. 27
Arguments of DMCI-PDI
In its Comment, DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR's petition should be dismissed on the following
grounds:
I.
THXS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THIS ACTION.
II.
KOR HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT OR INTEREST TO FILE OR PR0SECUTE THIS ACTION.
III.
TORRE DE MANILA IS NOT A NUISANCE PER SE.
IV.
DMCI-PDI ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN CONSTRUCTING TORRE DE MANILA; AND
V.
KOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORPER AND/OR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 28
First, DMCI-PDI asserts that the Court has no original jurisdiction over actions for injunction. 29 Even
assuming that the Court has concurrent jurisdiction, DMCI-PDI maintains that the petition should still
have been filed with the Regional Trial Court under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and because the
petition involves questions of fact. 30
DMCI-PDI also contends that the KOR's petition is in actuality an opposition' or appeal from the
exemption granted by the City of Manila's MZBAA, a matter which is also not within the jurisdiction of
the Court. 31 DMCI-PDI claims that the proper forum should be the MZBAA, and should the KOR fail
there, it should appeal the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 32
DMCI-PDI further argues that since the Rizal Monument has been declared a National Treasure, the
power to issue a cease and desist order is lodged with the "appropriate cultural agency" under Section
25 of Republic Act No. li0066 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009. 33 Moreover, DMCI-PDI
asserts that the KOR availed of the wrong remedy since an action for injunction is not the proper
remedy for abatement of a nuisance. 34
Second, DMCI-PDI maintains that the KOR has no standing to institute this proceeding because it is
not a real party in interest in this case. The purposes of the KOR as a public corporation do not include
the preservation of the Rizal Monument as a cultural or historical heritage site. 35 The KOR has also not
shown that it suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City
of Manila. If there is any injury to the KOR at all, the same was caused by the private conduct of a
private entity and not the City of Manila. 36
Third, DMCI-PDI argues that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. DMCI-PDI reiterates that it
obtained all the necessary permits, licenses, clearances, and certificates for its construction. 37 It also
refutes the KOR's claim that the Torre de Manila would dwarf all other structures around it; considering
that there are other tall buildings even closer to the Rizal Monument itself, namely, the Eton Baypark
Tower at the corner of Roxas Boulevard and T.M. Kalaw Street (29 storeys; 235 meters from the Rizal
Monument) and Sunview Palace at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and T.M. Kalaw Streets (42 storeys;
250 meters from the Rizal Monument). 38
Fourth, DMCI-PDI next argues that it did not act in bad faith when it started construction of its Torre de
Manila project. Bad faith cannot be attributed to it since it was within the "lawful exercise of [its] rights."
39
The KOR failed to present any proof that DMCI-PDI did not follow the proper procedure and zoning
restrictions of the City of Manila. Aside from obtaining all the necessary permits from the appropriate
government agencies,40 DMCI-PDI also sought clarification on its right to build on its site from the Office
of the City Legal Officer of Manila, the Manila CPDO, and the NHCP. 41 Moreover, even if the KOR
proffered such proof, the Court would be 1 in no position to declare DMCI-PDI's acts as illegal since the
Court is not a trier of facts. 42
Finally, DMCI-PDI opposes the KOR's application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction. DMCI-PDI asserts that the KOR has failed to establish "a clear and unmistakable
right to enjoin I the construction of Torre de Manila, much less request its demolitior." 43 DMCI-PDI
further argues that it "has complied with all the legal requirements for the construction of Torre de
Manila x x x [and] has violated o right of KOR that must be protected. Further, KOR stands to suffer o
damage because of its lack of direct pecuniary interest in this petiti1 on. To grant the KOR's application
for injunctive relief would constitute an unjust taking of property without due process of law. " 44
Arguments of the City of Manila
In its Comment, the City of Manila argues that the writ of mandamus cannot issue "considering that no
property or substantive rights whatsoever in favor of [the KOR] is being affected or x x x entitled to
judicial protection[.]"45
The City of Manila also asserts that the "issuance and revocation of a Building Permit undoubtedly fall
under the category of a discretionary act or duty performed by the proper officer in light of his
meticulous appraisal and evaluation of the pertinent supporting documents of the application in
accordance with the rules laid out under the National Building Code [and] Presidential Decree No.
1096,"46 while the remedy of mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial
duty. 47
Further, the City of Manila maintains that the construction of the Torre de Manila did not violate any
existing law, since the "edifice [is] well behind (some 789 meters away) the line of sight of the Rizal
Monument."48 It adds that the City of Manila's "prevailing Land Use and Zoning Ordinance [Ordinance
No. 8119] x xx allows an adjustment in Floor Area Ratios thru the [MZBAA] subject to further final
approval of the City Council."49 The City Council adopted the MZBAA's favorable: recommendation in
its Resolution No. 5, ratifying all the licenses and permits issued to DMCI-PDI for its Torre de Manila
project.
In its Position Paper dated 15 July 2015, the City of Manila admitted that the Zoning Permit issued to
DMCI-PDI was "in breach of certain provisions of City Ordinance No. 8119."50 It maintained, however, 1
that the deficiency is "procedural in nature and pertains mostly td the failure of [DMCI-PDI] to comply
with the stipulations that allow an excess in the [FAR] provisions." 51 Further, the City of Manila argued
that the MZBAA, when it recommended the allowance of the project's variance, imposed certain
conditions upon the Torre de Manila project in order to mitigate the possible adverse effects of an
excess FAR. 52
The Issue
The issues raised by the parties can be summed up into one main point: Can the Court issue a writ of
mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de
Manila project?
The Court's Ruling
The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court held that "what is not
expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to
morals, customs and I public order." This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to protect
the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual citizen against the
government. In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of
law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the
rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the
shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or those who can gather the biggest crowd or the
most number of Internet trolls. In other instances,54 the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were
not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary to morals,
customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the
 controversy. However, it is the law itself - Articles 130655 and 1409(1)56 of the Civil Code - which
prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if
also not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals,
customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary,
the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent
laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the
Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal
Monument.
Specifically, Section 47 reads:
SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards. - Historic site and facilities shall be
conserved and preserved. These shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible for the educational
and cultural enrichment of the general public.
The following shall guide the development of historic sites and facilities:
1. Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed to conserve and enhance their heritage
values.
2. Historic sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used.
3. Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially demolish a designated heritage property will
require the approval of the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and shall be required to
prepare a heritage impact statement that will demonstrate to the satisfaction of CPDO that the proposal
will not adversely impact the heritage significance of the property and shall submit plans for review by
the CPDO in coordination with the National Historical Institute (NHI).
4. Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated heritage properties shall be evaluated based on
criteria established by the heritage significance of the particular property or site.
5. Where an owner of a heritage property applies for approval to demolish a designated heritage
property or properties, the owner shall be required to provide evidence to satisfaction that demonstrates
that rehabilitation and re-use of the property is not viable.
6. Any designated heritage property which is to be demolished or significantly altered shall be
thoroughly documented for archival purposes with! a history, photographic records, and measured
drawings, in accordance with accepted heritage recording guidelines, prior to demolition or alteration.
7. Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be sensitive to the existing scale and pattern
of those areas, which maintains the existing landscape and streetscape qualities of those areas, and
which does not result in the loss of any heritage resources.
8. Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities (surface lots residential garages, stand-alone
parking garages and parking components as parts of larger developments) are compatibly integrated
into heritage areas, and/or are compatible with adjacent heritage resources.
9. Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable) shall be required to place metering equipment,
transformer boxes, power lines, conduit, equipment boxes, piping, wireless telecommunication towers
and other utility equipment and devices in locations which do not detract from the visual character of
heritage resources, and which do not have a negative impact on its architectural integrity.
10. Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO for any alteration of the heritage property
to ensure that design guidelines and standards are met and shall promote preservation and
conservation of the heritage property. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 only serve as guides, as it
expressly states that "the following shall guide the :development of historic sites and facilities." A guide
simply sets a direction 'or gives an instruction to be followed by prope1iy owners and developers in
order to conserve and enhance a property's heritage values.
On the other hand, Section 48 states:
SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards. - The City considers it in the public interest that all projects are
designed and developed in a safe, efficient and aesthetically pleasing manner. Site development shall
consider the environmental character and limitations of the site and its adjacent properties. All project
elements shall be in complete harmony according to good design principles and the subsequent
development must be visually pleasing as well as efficiently functioning especially in relation to the
adjacent properties and bordering streets.
The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every facility shall be in harmony with the
 existing and intended character of its neighborhood. It shall not change the essential character of the
said area but will be a substantial improvement to the value of the properties in the neighborhood in
particular and the community in general.
Furthermore, designs should consider the following:
1. Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and developed with1 regard to safety, efficiency and
high standards of design. The natural environmental character of the site and its adjacent properties
shall be considered in the site development of each building and facility.
2. The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be so designed that it does not impair the entry
of light and ventilation, cause the loss I of privacy and/or create nuisances, hazards or inconveniences
to adjacent developments.
3. Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed without the neighbor's prior written consent
which shall be required by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) prior to the granting of a
Zoning Permit (Locational Clearance).
4. The capacity of parking areas/lots shall be per the minimum requirements of the National Building
Code. These shall be located, developed and landscaped in order to enhance the aesthetic quality of
the facility. In no case, shall parking areas/lots encroach into street rights-of-way and shall follow the
Traffic Code as set by the City.
5. Developments that attract a significant volume of public modes of transportation, such as tricycles,
jeepneys, buses, etc., shall provide on-site parking for the same. These shall also provide vehicular
loading and unloading bays so as street traffic flow will not be impeded.
6. Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-absorbing I materials shall be provided to all
noise and vibration-producing machinery. Noise levels shall be maintained according to levels specified
in DENR DA9 No. 30 - Abatement of Noise and Other Forms of Nuisance as Defined by Law.
7. Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be radiated, seen or felt from any point beyond
the limits of the property.
8. No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be detrimental to the skyline, shall be
allowed.
9. Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property management plans and other regulatory tools that
will ensure high quality developments shall be required from developers of commercial subdivisions
and condominiums. These shall be submitted to the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) for
review and approval. (Emphasis supplied)
Se9tion 4 7 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the "development of historic sites and
facilities." Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is nothing in
Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the
boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the1 background of a historic
site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument
and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument." 57 Likewise, ;the Torre de Manila
is not in an area that has been declared as an "anthropological or archeological area" or in an area
designated as a heritage zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the
NHCP. 58
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and culture, provides that
"[t]he State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and
resources x x x." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress passed laws dealing with the
preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage.
One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which
empowers the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a
cease and desist order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important
cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original
state."60 This law declares that the State should protect the "physical integrity" of the heritage property
or building if there is "danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state." Physical
integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong and sound the structure is. The same law does
not mention that another project, building, or property, not itself a heritage property or building, may be
the subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, or
sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre de
Manila condominium project.
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
 The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 1property without due
process of law x x x." 61 It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from an
individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The dispossession of property, or in
this case the stoppage of the construction of a building in one's own property would violate substantive
due process.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty
imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party
seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that
matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the
background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City
of Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, "the standards set under Ordinance
No. 8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance
these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park
has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a
privately-owned property that is "not pap: of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National
Heritage Site in 1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park, according
to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno. 62 Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been
designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure." 63
Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119
would involve making a finding of fact. A finding lot fact requires notice, hearing, and the submission of
evidence to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case, it is the Regional Trial
Court which has the jurisdiction to hear the case, receive evidence, make a proper finding of fact, and
determine whether the Torre de Manila project properly complied with the standards set by the
ordinance. In Meralco v. Public Service Commission, 64 we held that it is the cardinal right of a party in
trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence
presented considered by the proper court or tribunal.
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de
Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park -
and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the officials
The KOR also invokes this Court's exercise of its extraordinary certiorari power of review under Section
1, Article VIII65 of the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise its extraordinary certiorari
power if the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits and licenses, gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither the majority nor minority opinion in this
case has found that the City of Manila committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and
licenses to DMCI-PDI. Thus, there is no justification at all for this Court to exercise its extraordinary
certiorari power.
Moreover, the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power is limited to actual cases and
controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the Constitution or the determination of the
constitutionality or validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a statute that does
not raise the issue of constitutionality or validity of the statute cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the
Court's direct exercise of its expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR's recourse lies with other
judicial remedies or proceedings allowed under the Rules of Court.
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc., 66 we held that in cases where the question of constitutionality of a governmental
action is raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise identified as the power of judicial
review - the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of other branches of government. As a
rule, as required by the hierarchy of courts principle, these cases are filed with the lowest court with
jurisdiction over the 1subject matter. The judicial review that the courts undertake requires:
1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case.
 The lower court's decision under the constitutional scheme reaches the Supreme Court through the
appeal process, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the KOR elevated this case immediately to this Court in an original petition for
injunction which we later on treated as one for mandamus under Rule 65. There is, however, no clear
legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the provisions of Ordinance No. 8119 for applications for
permits to build outside the protected areas of the Rizal Park. Even if there were such legal duty, the
determination of whether the City of .Manila failed to abide by this legal duty would involve factual
matters which have not been admitted or established in this case. Establishing factual matters is not
within the realm of this Court. Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining the background sightline that is
supposed to be protected or that is part of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal Monument. How far
should a building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument - one, two, three, four, or five
kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during the Oral Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does
not prescribe how sightline is determined, neither is there any way to measure by metes and bounds
whether al construction that is not part of the historic monument itself or is outside the protected
area can be said to violate the Rizal Monument's physicalintegrity, except only to say "when you
stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is marred and impaired."
This kind of a standard has no parameters and can include a sightline or a construction as far as the
human eyes can see when standing in front of the Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court cannot apply
such a subjective and non-uniform standard that adversely affects property rights several kilometers
away from a historical sight or facility.
The Dissenting Opinion claims that "the City, by reason of a mistaken or erroneous construction of its
own Ordinance, had failed to consider its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it issued permits in
DMCI-PDI's favor." However, MZBAA Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A67 easily dispel this
claim. According to the resolutions, the City of Manila, through the MZBAA, acted on DMCI-PDI's
application for variance under the powers and standards set forth in Ordinance No. 8119.
Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily in issuing said
resolution, the Court should respect MZBAA's exercise of discretion. The Court cannot "substitute its I
judgment :for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the
light of the authority specifically vested in them by law." 68 Since the Court has "no supervisory power
over the proceedings I and actions of the administrative departments of the government," it "should not
generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions.; 69 The power of the Court in
mandamus petitions does not extend "to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either."70
Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re-evaluation by the City of Manila, through the
CPDO, of the permits previously issued in favor of the Torre de Manila project to determine compliance
with the standards ]under Ordinance No. 8119. It also declares that the circumstances in this case
warrant the prohacvice conversion of the proceedings in the issuance of the permits into a "contested
case" necessitating notice and hearing with all the parties involved.
Prohac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent because the decision is for the
specific case only, not to be followed in other cases. A prohac vice decision violates statutory law -
Article 8 of the Civil Code - which states that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." The decision of the Court in this case
cannot be prohac vice because by mandate bf the law everydecision of the Court forms part of the
legal system of the Philippines. If another case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that
case must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal
protection of the law. Thus, a prohac vice decision also violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary executive acts of the executive branch
unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Mandamus does not lie against the legislative and executive branches or their members acting in the
exercise of their official discretionary functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by the
judiciary to said branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of powers.
In De Castro v. Salas,71 we held that no rule of law is better established than the one that provides that
mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of an officer or a court when honestly exercised and
when such power and authority is not abused.
In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel action in matters
involving judgment and discretion, only "to act, but not to act lone way or the other," 72 and only in
cases where there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or
palpable excess of authority.73
In this case, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of Manila had been negligent or
remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this determination will involve questions of
fact. DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper permits and had secured all approvals and licenses
months before the actual construction began. Even the KOR could not point to any law that respondent
City of Manila had violated and could only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice
Charter which do not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a writ of mandam1s.
The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration of
ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings I together principles in the field of historical
conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and and laid down by experts
over the years. Each country, however, remains "responsible for applying the plan within the framework
of its own culture and traditions."74
The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The Philippines
is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines - a set
of the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the years to be the most effective in
preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and buildings.
The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI's Zoning Permit was granted without going through the
process under Ordinance No. 8119. However, the same was properly rectified when, faced with
mounting opposition, DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from the City of Manila and immediately
began complying with the procedure for applying for a variance. The MZBAA did subsequently
recommend the approval of the variance and the City Council of Manila approved the same, ratifying
the licenses and permits already given to DMCI-PDI. Such ratification was well within the right of the
City Council of Manila. The City Council of Manila could have denied the application had it seen any
reason to do so. Again, the ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its
discretion1 and well within the authority granted it by law and the City's own Ordinance No. 8119.
The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and welfare. There
is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger, or hazard to the people in the
surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly view on the taking of photos or
the visual appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists. In fact, the Court must take the
approval of the MZBAA, and its subsequent ratification by the City Council of Manila, as the duly
authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials. Great care must be taken that the Court does not
unduly tread upon the local government's performance of its duties. It is not for this Court to dictate
upon the other branches bf the government how their discretion must be exercised so long as these
branches do not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be determined in the proper case and before the
proper forum. It is not within the power of this Court in this case to make such determination. Without
such determination, this Court cannot simply declare that the City of Manila had failed to consider its
duties under Ordinance No. 8119 when it issued the permits in DMCI-PDI's favor without making a
finding of fact how the City of Manila failed "to consider" its duties with respect to areas outside the
boundaries of the Rizal Park. In the first place, this Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact in
an original action like this before this Court. Moreover the City of Manila could not legally apply
standards to sites outside the area covered by the ordinance that prescribed the standards. With this, I
taken in light of the lack of finding that there was grave abuse of discretion I on the part of the City of
Manila, there is no basis to issue the writ of mandamus against the City of Manila.
During the Oral Arguments, it was established that the granting of a variance neither uncommon nor
irregular. On the contrary, current practice has made granting of a variance the rule rather than the
exception:
JUSTICE CARPIO: Let's go to Ordinance 8119. For residential condominium that stand alone, in other
words not part of a commercial complex or an industrial complex ...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: The [Floor Area Ratio (FAR)] is uniform for the entire City of Manila, the FAR 4,
correct? ATTY. FLAMINIANO: I believe so, Your Honor, it's FAR 4.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So it's FAR 4 for all residential condominium complex or industrial projects.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There might be, the FAR might be different when it comes to condominiums in
commercial areas, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, I'm talking of stand-alone ...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUITICE CARPIO: ... residential condominiums...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Uniform at FAR 4, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: And the percentage of land occupancy is always 60 percent.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: 60 percent correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay ... how many square meters is this Torre de Manila?
xxx
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: The land area, Your Honor, it's almost 5,000 ... 5,556.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So, it's almost half a hectare.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: And at FAR 4, it can only build up to 18 storeys, I mean at FAR 4, is that correct?
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: If the 60 percent of the lot...
JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, but that is a rule.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: That is a rule, that's the rule, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: 60 percent of...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Of the land area.
JUSTICE CARPIO: ... buildable, the rest not buildable.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay, so if you look around here in the City of Manila anywhere you go, you look at
stand alone residential condominium buildings...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There's a lot of them, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: It's always not FAR 4, it's more than FAR 4.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: And the buildable area is to the edge of the property ...it's not 60 percent, correct?
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So, if you look at all the ... residential buildings in the last ten years, they
[have] all variances. They did not follow the original FAR 4 or the 60 percent (of land
occupancy). Every residential building that stand alone was a variance. ATTY. FLAMINIANO:
That's correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So the rule really in the City of Manila is variance, and the exception which is
never followed is FAR 4.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: FAR 4, it appears to be that way, Your Honor.
xxxx
JUSTICE CARPIO: Every developer will have to get a variance because it doesn't make sense to
follow FAR 4 because the land is so expensive and if you can build only two storeys on a 1,000-
square meter lot, you will surely lose money, correct? ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Exactly, Your Honor.
75
(Emphasis supplied)
This, the MZBAA's grant of the variance cannot be used as a basis to grant the mandamus
petition absent any clear finding that said act amo'1nted to "grave abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority."
The KOR is Estopped from Questioning the
 Torre de Manila Construction.
The KOR is now estopped from questioning the construction of the Torre de Manila project. The KOR
itself came up with the idea to build a structure right behind the Rizal Monument that would dwarf the
Rizal Monument.
In the mid-1950s, the Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission (JRNCC) l formulated a plan to build
an Educational Center within the Rizal Park. In July 1955, the KOR proposed the inclusion of a national
theater on the site of the Educational Center. The JRNCC adopted the proposal. The following[ year, a
law - Republic Act No. 142776 - authorized the establishment of the Jose Rizal National Cultural Shrine
consisting of a national theater, a national museum, and a national library on a single site. 77
To be built on the open space right behind the 12.7 meter high Rizal Monument were: the KOR's
proposed nationaltheater, standing 29.25 meters high and 286 meters in distance from the Rizal
Monument; the nationallibrary, standing 25 .6 meters high and 180 meters in distance from the Rizal
;Monument, with its rear along San Luis Street (now T.M. Kalaw Street); and facing it, the
 nationalmuseum, at 19.5 meters high and 190 meters in I distance from the Rizal Monument, with its
back along P. Burgos Street. 78
However, several sectors voiced their objections to the construction for various reasons. Among them,
the need to preserve the open space of the park, the high cost of construction, the desecration of the
park's hallowed grounds, and the fact that the proposed cultural center including the 129.25 meter
high national theater proposed by the KOR would dwarf the 12.7 meter high Rizal Monument. 79
The JRNCC revised the plan and only the National Library - which still stands today - was built. 80
According to the NHCP, the KOR even proposed to build a Rizal Center on the park as recently as
2013.81 The proposal was disapproved by the NHCR and the Department of Tourism.
Surely, as noble as the KOR's intentions were, its proposed center would have dwarfed the Rizal
Monument with its size and proximity.
In contrast, the Torre de Manila is located well outside the Rizal Park, and to the rear of the Rizal
Monument - approximately 870 meters from the Rizal Monument and 3 0 meters from the edge of Rizal
Park. 82
It is a basic principle that "one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands. "83 In
Jenosa v. Delariarte, 84 the Court reiterated ,that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. This "signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent,
or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. " 85 Thus, the KOR, having earlier proposed a national
theater a mere 286meters in distance from the back of the Rizal Monument that would have dwarfed
the Rizal Monument, comes to this I Court with unclean hands. It is now precluded from "seeking any
equitable refuge" 86 from the Court. The KOR's petition should be dismissed on this ground alone.
Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.
In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance perse that deserves to be
summarily abated even without judicial proceedings. 87 However, during the Oral Arguments, counsel
for the KOR argued that the KOR now believes that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens and
not a nuisance perse. 88
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2)
annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property.
Thy Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first, nuisance perse, is on "recognized as a
nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or
safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity." 89 The
second, nuisance peraccidens, is that which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and
its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance. "90
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila project
cannot be considered as a "direct menace to I public health or safety." Not only is a condominium
project commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the proper government
agencies, complied with health and safety standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the
following permits and clearances prior to starting the project: (1) Height Clearance Permit from the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines;91 (2) Development Permit from the HLURB;92 (3) Zoning
Certification from the HLURB;93 (4) Certificate of Environmental Compliance Commitment from the
Environment Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources;94 (5)
Barangay Clearance95 (6) Zoning Permit;96 (7) Building Permit;97 (8) and Electrical and Mechanical
Permit.98
Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance recommended by the MZBAA and
granted by the City Council of Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Torre de Manila project is
not a nuisance perse.
On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance peraccidens.
By definition, a nuisance peraccidens is determined based on its surrounding conditions and
circumstances. These conditions and circumstances must be well established, not merely alleged. The
Court cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as established facts as the KOR would
have us do in this case. 99 The KOR itself concedes that the question of whether the Torre de Manila is
 a nuisance peraccidens is a question of fact. 100
The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their force, and
to apply rules of law to the case thus made. 101 1lhis Court is no such authority. It is not a trier of facts. It
cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as facts, more so in this case where
these allegations are contested by the respondents.
The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial courts. The question, then, of whether
the Torre de Manila project is a nuisance peraccidens must be settled after due proceedings brought
before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent the process in the guise be
protecting national culture and heritage.
The TRO must be lifted.
Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further injury102 until final
adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not
well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted.
The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of I administrative agencies when they are
supported by substantial evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights in the various
permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order to build a 49-storey building which is, and
had been, allowed by the City of Manila's zoning ordinance.
As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review discretionary decisions or actions
of administrative agencies in the absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa, 103 we held that mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be
shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment
be a right to which he is clearly entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they
are clear and certain. If the legal rights of th6 petitioner are not well-defined, definite, clear, and certain,
104
the petition must be dismissed. Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and
to perform a duty already imposed. 105
In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary acts of the executive department
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, 106 and considering that mandamus may only be issued to
enforce a clear and certain legal right, 107 the present special civil action for mandamus must be
dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be lifted.
A FINAL WORD
It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo Adios, the poem he left for his
family the night before he was executed, Rizal wrote:
Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora
 Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz 108
[Ako’y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas
 na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag
 yaong maligayang
araw na sisikat
 sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.] 109
[I die just when I see the dawn break,
Through the gloom of night, to herald the day] 110
Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West towards Manila Bay, with his back
to the firing squad, like the traitor the colonial government wished to portray him. He asked to face his
executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it was early morning, but the Spanish
captain did not allow it. As he was shot and a single bullet struck his frail body, Rizal forced himself,
with his last remaining strength, to turn around to face the East and thus he fell on his back with] his
face to the sky and the rising sun. Then, the Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off
with one pistol shot to his head.
Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a simple tomb, marked with a cross and
a stone with only his name and the date of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations; and
interment at Paang Bundok (now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal never wanted his grave to be a
burden to future generations.
The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried out. The letter was discovered
many years later, in 1953. By then, his remains had been entombed at the Rizal Monument, countless
anniversaries had been . celebrated, with memorials and monuments built throughout the world.
Rizal's wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or pageantry; to the point of reaching oblivion
or obscurity in the future. 111 For Rizal's life was never about fame or vainglory, but for the country he
loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.
The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal' s own wishes. That Rizal's statue now stands facing
West towards Manila Bay, with Rizal's back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we continue the
present orientation of Rizal's statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like the Spanish captain who
refused Rizal's request to die facing the rising sun in the East. On the other hand, if Rizal' s statue is
made to face East, as Rizal had desired when he was about to be shot, the background - the blue sky
above Manila Bay - would forever be clear of obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal's dying wish.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

(please see concurring opinion) I join the dissent of Justice Jardeleza MARIA
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LOURD
Associate Justice Associate Justice ES P.
I join the dissent of Justice A.
Jardeleza LUCAS P. BERSAMIN SEREN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice O
Associate Justice Chief
I join separate of Justice Jardeleza Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Please
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice see
Associate Justice
Please see separate concurring opinion separat
BIENVENIDO L. REYES e
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice concurri
Associate Justice
I concur, see separate opinion Please see dissenting opinion ng
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA opinion
NOEL
Associate Justice Associate Justice
G.
I join the dissent of J. Jardeleza
I join the dissent of J. Jardeleza TIJAM
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES Associa
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice te
Associate Justice
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.