Addison vs Felix

FACTS
Petitioner Addison sold four parcels of land to Defendant spouses Felix and Tioco located in
LucenaCity. Respondents paid P3,000.00 for the purchase price and promised to pay the
remaining by installment. The contract provides that the purchasers may rescind the contract
within one year after the issuance of title on their name.

The petitioner went to Lucena for the survey designaton and delivery of the land but only 2 parcels
were designated and 2/3 of it was in possession of a Juan Villafuerte.

The other parcels were not surveyed and designated by Addison.

Addison demanded from petitioner the payment of the first installment but the latter contends that
there was no delivery and as such, they are entitled to get back the 3K purchase price they gave
upon the execution of the contract.

ISSUE

WON there was a valid delivery.

HELD: NO

The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing sold. With respect to two of the parcels
of land, he was not even able to show them to the purchaser; and as regards the other two, more
than two-thirds of their area was in the hostile and adverse possession of a third person.

It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instruments is equivalent to
the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic
delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had
such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could
have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of
possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever
to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor,
symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if there is an
impediment, delivery cannot be deemed effected.
Spouses Santiago vs Villamor

Facts:

Spouses Villamor are the parents of respondents Mancer, Carlos and Domingo Jr. (respondents)
and the grandparents of respondent John Villamor.

In January 1982: Spouses Villamor mortgaged their 4.5-hectare coconut land in Masbate to the
San Jacinto Bank as security for a P10,000.00 loan.
For failure to pay the loan, the property was extra-judicially foreclosed by the bank. Spouses
Villamor failed to redeem the property so San Jacinto Bank obtained a final deed of sale in its
favor in 1991.

The San Jacinto Bank then offered the land for sale to any interested buyer.
The children of spouses Villamor agreed to buy the property.
The San Jacinto Bank agreed with the respondents and Catalina (one of the sisters of the
respondents) to a P65,000.00 sale, payable in installments.

Upon full payment of the children of spouses Catalina, San Jacinto bank refused to issue the deed
of conveyance. Hence, they filed an action for specific performance
Specific performance case (RTC and CA):

o RTC ruled that the issuance of the deed of registration of San Jacinto Bank in favor of spouses
Villamor was done in good faith.
o CA reversed RTC ruling saying that the children of Spouses Villamor did not act as
representatives of their parents.

In 1994 (Before the action for specific performance was filed), spouses Villamor sold the
land to petitioner-spouses Santiago for P150k.
When the children of spouses VIllamor refused to vacate the land after spouses Santiago’s
demand, the latter also filed an action for quieting of title.

Quieting of Title case (RTC and CA):

o RTC ruled that spouses Villamor were purchasers in good faith, hence they are the legal owners.
RTC also said that the notarized deed of sale in their favor resulted in constructive delivery of the
land.
o CA ruled that spouses Villamor’s action for quieting of title cannot prosper for they have no legal
or equitable title over the land.
Spouses Villamor that the deed of sale executed in their favor was equivalent to delivery of the
land under Article 1498 of the CC and that they are purchasers in good faith since they had no
knowledge of the supposed transaction between the San Jacinto Bank and the respondents and
Catalina.
The children of Spouses Villamor (respondents) hold that they have a legal title to the land since
they perfected the sale with the San Jacinto Bank as early as November 4, 1991, the first
installment payment, and are in actual possession of the land; and that petitioners-spouses
Santiago are not purchasers in good faith because they failed to show why they are not in
possession of the property.

Issue:

WON Spouses Santiago has a legal title over the property. NO

Relevance: If they have legal title, they can file for action for quieting of title and for reconveyance.

Held: NO

The Court said that spouses Santiago failed to prove that they have any legal or equitable title
over the disputed land.

Execution of the deed of sale only a prima facie presumption of delivery

Article 1477 of the Civil Code recognizes that the "ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof."
Related to this article is Article 1497 which provides that "the thing sold shall be understood as
delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee."

"A person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive
possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument."

With respect to incorporeal property, Article 1498 of the Civil Code lays down the general rule:
the execution of a public instrument "shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."
However, the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of
delivery, which is negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

No constructive delivery of the land in favor of spouses Santiago

In this case, no constructive delivery of the land transpired upon the execution of the deed
of sale since it was not the spouses Villamor, Sr. but the respondents who had actual
possession of the land. The presumption of constructive delivery is inapplicable and must
yield to the reality that the petitioners were not placed in possession and control of the
land.

Spouses Santiago were not purchasers in good faith

In this case, the spouses Villamor, Sr. were not in possession of the land. The petitioners, as
prospective vendees, carried the burden of investigating the rights of the respondents who were
then in actual possession of the land. The petitioners cannot take refuge behind the allegation
that, by custom and tradition in San Jacinto, Masbate, the children use their parents' property,
since they offered no proof supporting their bare allegation.

The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon the party asserting that
status and cannot be discharged by reliance on the legal presumption of good faith. The
petitioners failed to discharge this burden.
LA FUERZA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED ENGINEERING CO., INC., respondents.

FACTS

Associated engineering offered to make a conveyor system that will transport the bottles from the
storage room to the washroom for la fuerza. On May 1960 work was done but trial runs were still
being done. After the trial runs it was discovered that the system did not function as intended.
Despite this, On March 22, 1961, the contractor commenced the present action to recover the
sums of P8,250, balance of the stipulated price of the aforementioned conveyors, and P2,000, as
attorney's fees, in addition to the costs.
La Fuerza alleged that the "conveyors furnished and installed by the plaintiff do not meet the
conditions and warrantings" (warranties?) of the latter, and set up a counterclaim for the P5,000
advanced by La Fuerza, which prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that its contract with the
plaintiff be rescinded; and that plaintiff be sentenced to refund said sum of P5,000 to La Fuerza,
as well as to pay thereto P1,000 as attorney's fees, apart from the costs.

Issue

WN there was delivery? Yes

WN the action prescribed? Yes

Facts

The plaintiff (Associated Engineering, Co., Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and
installation of flat belt conveyors. The defendant (La Fuerza, Inc.) is also a corporation engaged
in the manufacture of wines. Sometime in the month of January, 1960, Antonio Co, the manager
of the plaintiff corporation, who is an engineer, called the office of the defendant located at 399
Muelle de Binondo, Manila and told Mariano Lim, the President and general manager of the
defendant that he had just visited the defendant's plant at Pasong Tamo, Makati, Rizal and was
impressed by its size and beauty but he believed it needed a conveyor system to convey empty
bottles from the storage room in the plant to the bottle washers in the production room thereof.
He therefore offered his services to manufacture and install a conveyor system which, according
to him, would increase production and efficiency of his business. The president of the defendant
corporation did not make up his mind then but suggested to Antonio Co to put down his offer in
writing. Effectively, on February 4, 1960, marked as Exhibit A in this case. Mariano Lim did not
act on the said offer until February 11, 1960, when Antonio Co returned to inquire about the action
of the defendant on his said offer. The defendants president and general manager then expressed
his conformity to the offer made in Exhibit A by writing at the foot thereof under the word
"confirmation" his signature. He caused, however, to be added to this offer at the foot a note which
reads: "All specifications shall be in strict accordance with the approved plan made part of this
agreement hereof." A few days later, Antonio Co made the demand for the down payment of
P5,000.00 which was readily delivered by the defendant in the form of a check for the said amount.
After that agreement, the plaintiff started to prepare the premises for the installations of the
conveyor system by digging holes in the cement floor of the plant and on April 18, 1960, they
delivered one unit of 110' 26" wide flat belt conveyor, valued at P3,750.00, and another unit
measuring 190' and 4" wide flat conveyor, valued at P4,500.00, or a total of P13,250.00.
Deducting the down payment of P5,000.00 from this value, there is a balance, of P8,250.00 to be
paid by the defendant upon the completion of the installation, Exhibit B.

The work went under way during the months of March and April, during which time the president
and general manager of the defendant corporation was duly apprised of the progress of the same
because his plant mechanic, one Mr. Santos, had kept him informed of the installation for which
he gave the go signal. It seems that the work was completed during the month of May, 1960. Trial
runs were made in the presence of the president and general manager of the defendant
corporation, Antonio Co, the technical manager of the plaintiff, and some other people. Several
trial runs were made then totalling about five. These runs were continued during the month of
June where about three trial runs were made and, lastly, during the month of July, 1960.

As a result of this trial or experimental runs, it was discovered, according to the defendant's
general manager, that the conveyor system did not function to their satisfaction as represented
by the technical manager of the plaintiff Antonio Co for the reason that, when operated several
bottles collided with each other, some jumping off the conveyor belt and were broken, causing
considerable damage. It was further observed that the flow of the system was so sluggish that in
the opinion of the said general manager of the defendant their old system of carrying the bottles
from the storage room to the washers by hand carrying them was even more efficient and faster.

After the last trial run made in the month of July and after the plaintiff's technical manager had
been advised several times to make the necessary and proper adjustments or corrections in order
to improve the efficiency of the conveyor system, it seems that the defects indicated by the said
president and general manager of the defendant had not been remedied so that they came to the
parting of the ways with the result that when the plaintiff billed the defendant for the balance of
the contract price, the latter refused to pay for the reason that according to the defendant the
conveyor system installed by the plaintiff did not serve the purpose for which the same was
manufactured and installed at such a heavy expense. The flat belt conveyors installed in the
factory of the defendant are still there....

xxx xxx xxx

On March 22, 1961, the contractor commenced the present action to recover the sums of P8,250,
balance of the stipulated price of the aforementioned conveyors, and P2,000, as attorney's fees,
in addition to the costs.

In its answer to the complaint, La Fuerza alleged that the "conveyors furnished and installed by
the plaintiff do not meet the conditions and warrantings" (warranties?) of the latter, and set up a
counterclaim for the P5,000 advanced by La Fuerza, which prayed that the complaint be
dismissed; that its contract with the plaintiff be rescinded; and that plaintiff be sentenced to refund
said sum of P5,000 to La Fuerza, as well as to pay thereto P1,000 as attorney's fees, apart from
the costs.

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision the
dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered rescinding the contract entered into by the parties
in this case, marked as Exhibit A, and ordering the plaintiff to refund or return to the defendant
the amount of P5,000.00 which they had received as down payment, and the costs of this action.
On the other hand, defendant is ordered to permit the plaintiff to remove the flat belt conveyors
installed in their premises.
As above indicated, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which, on motion for
reconsideration of the plaintiff, later set aside its original decision and rendered another in
plaintiff's favor, as stated in the opening paragraph hereof.

The appealed resolution of the Court of Appeals was, in effect, based upon the theory of
prescription of La Fuerza's right of action for rescission of its contract with the plaintiff, for — in
the language of said resolution — "Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides that an action to rescind
'shall be barred after six months from delivery of the thing sold'", and, in the case at bar, La Fuerza
did not avail of the right to demand rescission until the filing of its answer in the Court of First
Instance, on April 17, 1961, or over ten (10) months after the installation of the conveyors in
question had been completed on May 30, 1960.

La Fuerza assails the view taken by the Court of Appeals, upon the ground: 1) that there has
been, in contemplation of law, no delivery of the conveyors by the plaintiff; and 2) that, assuming
that there has been such delivery, the period of six (6) months prescribed in said Art. 1571 refers
to the "period within which" La Fuerza may "bring an action to demand compliance of the warranty
against hidden defects", not the action for rescission of the contract. Both grounds are untenable.

With respect to the first point, La Fuerza maintains that plaintiff is deemed not to have delivered
the conveyors, within the purview of Art. 1571, until it shall have complied with the conditions or
requirements of the contract between them — that is to say, until the conveyors shall meet La
Fuerza's "need of a conveyor system that would mechanically transport empty bottles from the
storage room to the bottle workers in the production room thus increasing the production and
efficiency" of its business-and La Fuerza had accepted said conveyors.

On this point, the Court of Appeals had the following to say:

Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides that an action to rescind 'shall be barred after six months,
from delivery of the thing sold". This article is made applicable to the case at bar by Article 1714
which provides that "the pertinent provisions on warranty of title against hidden defect in a contract
of sale" shall be applicable to a contract for a piece of work. Considering that Article 1571 is a
provision on sales, the delivery mentioned therein should be construed in the light of the
provisions on sales. Article 1497 provides that the thing sold shall be understood as delivered
when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. Therefore, when the thing subject
of the sale is placed in the control and possession of the vendee, delivery is complete.
Delivery is an act of the vendor. Thus, one of the obligations of the vendor is the delivery of the
thing sold (Art. 1495). The vendee has nothing to do with the act of delivery by the vendor. On
the other hand, acceptance is an obligation on the part of the vendee (Art. 1582). Delivery and
acceptance are two distinct and separate acts of different parties. Consequently, acceptance
cannot be regarded as a condition to complete delivery.

xxx xxx xxx

We find no plausible reason to disagree with this view. Upon the completion of the installation of
the conveyors, in May, 1960, particularly after the last trial run, in July 1960, La Fuerza was in a
position to decide whether or not it was satisfied with said conveyors, and, hence, to state whether
the same were a accepted or rejected. The failure of La Fuerza to express categorically whether
they accepted or rejected the conveyors does not detract from the fact that the same were actually
in its possession and control; that, accordingly, the conveyors had already been delivered by the
plaintiff; and that, the period prescribed in said Art. 1571 had begun to run.

With respect to the second point raised by La Fuerza, Art. 1571 of the Civil Code provides:
Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding ten articles shall be barred after six months,
from the delivery of the thing sold.

xxx xxx xxx

Among the "ten articles" referred to in this provision, are Articles 1566 and 1567, reading:

Art. 1566. The vendor is responsible to the vendee for any hidden faults or defects in the thing
sold, even though he was not aware thereof. ."This provision shall not apply if the contrary has
been stipulated, and the vendor was not aware of the hidden faults or defects in the thing sold.

Art. 1567. In the cases of articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect
between withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with
damages in either case.

xxx xxx xxx

Pursuant to these two (2) articles, if the thing sold has hidden faults or defects — as the conveyors
are claimed to have — the vendor — in the case at bar, the plaintiff — shall be responsible therefor
and the vendee — or La Fuerza, in the present case — "may elect between withdrawing from the
contract and demanding a proportional reduction of the price, with damages in either case." In the
exercise of this right of election, La Fuerza had chosen to withdraw from the contract, by praying
for its rescission; but the action therefor — in the language of Art. 1571 — "shall be barred after
six months, from the delivery of the thing sold." The period of four (4) years, provided in Art. 1389
of said Code, for "the action to claim rescission," applies to contracts, in general, and must yields,
in the instant case, to said Art. 1571, which refers to sales in particular.

Indeed, in contracts of the latter type, especially when goods, merchandise, machinery or parts
or equipment thereof are involved, it is obviously wise to require the parties to define their position,
in relation thereto, within the shortest possible time. Public interest demands that the status of the
relations between the vendor and the vendee be not left in a condition of uncertainty for an
unreasonable length of time, which would be the case, if the lifetime of the vendee's right of
rescission were four (4) years.

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant, La Fuerza, Inc. It is so ordered.
Designer Baskets, Inc v. Air Sea Transport
Facts:
 DBI is a domestic corporation engaged in the production of housewares and handicraft items for export.
 In October 1995, Ambiente, a foreign-based company, ordered from DBI 223 cartons of assorted wooden items.
 Ambiente designated ACCLI as the forwarding agent that will ship out its order from the Philippines to the United States.
ACCLI is a domestic corporation acting as agent of ASTI, a US based corporation engaged in carrier transport business,
in the Philippines.
 On January 7, 1996, DBI delivered the shipment to ACCLI for sea transport from Manila and delivery to Ambiente. To
acknowledge receipt and to serve as the contract of sea carriage, ACCLI issued to DBI triplicate copies of ASTI Bill of
Lading. DBI retained possession of the originals of the bills of lading pending the payment of the goods by Ambiente.
 On January 23, 1996, Ambiente and ASTI entered into an Indemnity Agreement. Under the Agreement, Ambiente
obligated ASTI to deliver the shipment to it or to its order “without the surrender of the relevant bill(s) of lading due to the
non-arrival or loss thereof.” In exchange, Ambiente undertook to indemnify and hold ASTI and its agent free from any
liability as a result of the release of the shipment. Thereafter, ASTI released the shipment to Ambiente without the
knowledge of DBI, and without it receiving payment for the total cost of the shipment.
 DBI then made several demands to Ambiente for the payment of the shipment, but to no avail. Thus, on October 7, 1996,
DBI filed the Original Complaint against ASTI, ACCLI and ACCLI’s incorporators-stockholders
 DBI claimed that under Bill of Lading is “to release and deliver the cargo/shipment to the consignee, x x x, only after the
original copy or copies of [the] Bill of Lading is or are surrendered to them; otherwise, they become liable to the shipper for
the value of the shipment.” DBI also averred that ACCLI should be jointly and severally liable with its codefendants
because ACCLI failed to register ASTI as a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. In addition, ACCLI failed
to secure a license to act as agent of ASTI.

Issue: WON ASTI, ACCLI, and Ambiente are solidarily liable to DBI for the value of the shipment.

Held:
Petition Denied.
1) A common carrier may release the goods to the consignee even without the surrender of the bill of lading.

The general rule is that upon receipt of the goods, the consignee surrenders the bill of lading to the carrier and their respective
obligations are considered canceled. The law, however, provides two exceptions where the goods may be released without the
surrender of the bill of lading because the consignee can no longer return it. These exceptions are when the bill of lading gets lost or
for other cause. In either case, the consignee must issue a receipt to the carrier upon the release of the goods. Such receipt shall
produce the same effect as the surrender of the bill of lading.
We have already ruled that the non-surrender of the original bill of lading does not violate the carrier’s duty of extraordinary diligence
over the goods (Republic v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation). Thus, we held that the surrender of the original bill of lading is not a
condition precedent for a common carrier to be discharged of its contractual obligation.
Clearly, law and jurisprudence is settled that the surrender of the original bill of lading is not absolute; that in case of loss or any
other cause, a common carrier may release the goods to the consignee even without it.
2) Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 of the Civil Code are not applicable.

Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 speak of the common carrier's responsibility over the goods. They refer to the general liability of
common carriers in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods and the presumption of negligence against them.
The applicable provision instead is Article 353 of the Code of Commerce, the Article allows the release of the goods to the
consignee even without his surrender of the original bill of lading. In such case, the duty of the carrier to exercise extraordinary
diligence is not violated. Nothing, therefore, prevented the consignee and the carrier to enter into an indemnity agreement of the
same nature as the one they entered here. No law or public policy is contravened upon its execution.
3) Article 1503 of the Civil Code does not apply to contracts for carriage of goods.

Articles 1523 and 1503, refer to a contract of sale between a seller and a buyer. In particular, they refer to who between the seller
and the buyer has the right of possession or ownership over the goods subject of the sale. Articles 1523 and 1503 do not apply to a
contract of carriage between the shipper and the common carrier.

The third paragraph of Article 1503, upon which DBI relies, does not oblige the common carrier to withhold
delivery of the goods in the event that the bill of lading is retained by the seller. Rather, it only gives the
seller a better right to the possession of the goods as against the mere inchoate right of the buyer. Thus,
Articles 1523 and 1503 find no application here. The case before us does not involve an action where the
seller asserts ownership over the goods as against the buyer. Instead, we are confronted with a complaint
for sum of money and damages filed by the seller against the buyer and the common carrier due to the non-
payment of the goods by the buyer, and the release of the goods by the carrier despite non-surrender of the
bill of lading. A contract of sale is separate and distinct from a contract of carriage. They involve different
parties, different rights, different obligations and liabilities. Thus, we quote with approval the ruling of the
CA, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

On the third assigned error, [w]e rule for the defendants-appellants [ASTI and ACCLI]. They are correct in
arguing that the nature of their obligation with plaintiff [DBI] is separate and distinct from the
transaction of the latter with defendant Ambiente. As carrier of the goods transported by plaintiff,
its obligation is simply to ensure that such goods are delivered on time and in good condition. In
the case [Macam v. Court of Appeals], the Supreme Court emphasized that "the extraordinary responsibility
of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the
person who has the right to receive them." x x x

It is therefore clear that the moment the carrier has delivered the subject goods, its responsibility
ceases to exist and it is thereby freed from all the liabilities arising from the transaction. Any
question regarding the payment of the buyer to the seller is no longer the concern of the
carrier. This easily debunks plaintiffs theory
Arcaina and Banta v. Ingram, G.R. No. 196444, 15 February 2017.
[JARDELEZA, J.]

FACTS:
Arcaina is the owner of Lot No. 3230 (property). Arcaina’s attorney-in-fact, Banta, entered into a
contract with Ingram for the sale of the property. Banta showed Ingram and the latter’s attorney-
in-fact, the metes and bounds of the property and represented that Lot No. 3230 has an area of
more or less 6,200 square meters (sq. m.) per the tax declaration covering it. The contract price
was P1,860,000.00, with Ingram making installment payments for the property. They also
separately executed deeds of absolute sale over the property in Ingram’s favor, dated March 21,
2005 by Banta, and April 13, 2005 by Arcaina. Subsequently, Ingram caused the property to be
surveyed and discovered that Lot No. 3230 has an area of 12,000 sq. m. Upon learning of the
actual area of the property, Banta allegedly insisted that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. remains
unsold. This was opposed by Ingram who claims that she owns the whole lot by virtue of the
sale.

ISSUE:
Was Lot 3230 sold for a lump sum or for a unit price contract? To what extent of lot area is
Ingram entitled to?

HELD:
Lot No. 3230 was sold for a lump sum. Ingram is entitled only to 6,200 square meters.

In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing agreement: a
unit price contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of reference to a stated rate
per unit area (e.g., P1,000.00 per sq. m.) or a lump sum contract which states a full purchase
price for an immovable the area of which may be declared based on an estimate or where both
the area and boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000 sq. m., etc.). Here, the Deed of
Sale executed by Banta on March 21, 2005 and the Deed of Sale executed by Arcaina on April
13, 2005 both show that the property was conveyed to Ingram at the predetermined price of
P1,860,000.00. There was no indication that it was bought on a per-square-meter basis. Thus,
Article 1542 of the Civil Code governs the sale.

In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated to deliver all the land covered within the
boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in
the deed. However, in case there is conflict between the area actually covered by the
boundaries and the estimated area stated in the contract of sale, he/she shall do so only when
the excess or deficiency between the former and the latter is reasonable.

Applying Del Prado to the case before us, we find that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. is too
substantial to be considered reasonable. We note that only 6,200 sq. m. was agreed upon
between petitioners and Ingram. Declaring Ingram as the owner of the whole 12,000 sq. m. on
the premise that this is the actual area included in the boundaries would be ordering the delivery
of almost twice the area stated in the deeds of sale. Surely, Article 1542 does not contemplate
such an unfair situation to befall a vendor — that he/she would be compelled to deliver double
the amount that he/she originally sold without a corresponding increase in price. In Asiain v.
Jalandoni, we explained that “[a] vendee of a land when it is sold in gross or with the description
‘more or less’ does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land. The use of ‘more or
less’ or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency.”
Therefore, we rule that Ingram is entitled only to 6,200 sq. m. of the property. An area of 5,800
sq. m. more than the area intended to be sold is not a reasonable excess that can be deemed
included in the sale.
Del Prado vs.Caballero
G.R. No. 148225, March 3, 2010

FACTS:
On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner a lot on the basis of tax declaration located at
Guba Cebu City. Petitioner registered the same under PD 1529. Petitioner claimed that the sale
was for a lump sum containing an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less.

However, when the land was registered on December 1990, the technical description states that
the lot measures 14,457 square meters, more or less.

Subsequently, petitioner filed an action in order to compel vendor to deliver all that was included
within said boundaries even if it exceeded the area specified in the contract. Petitioners, likewise,
alleged that the sale was of a lump sum.

In their defense, respondents contended that only 4,000 square meters was sold to petitioner and
the sale was not for a lump sum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the land was for a lump sum

HELD:
The Court held in negative.

In the instant case, the sale was not a unit price contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price
of Php40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 square meters, more or less.

Petitioner asserts that the plain language of the Deed of Sale shows that it is a sale of a real
estate for a lump sum, governed under Article 1542 of the Civil Code thus respondents are,
therefore, duty-bound to deliver the whole area within the boundaries stated, without any
corresponding increase in the price.

The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article 1542 is not hard and fast and
admits of an exception. It held:

A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity
covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the
description "more or less" with reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of
quantity in the land..

In a contract of sale of a land mass, the specific boundaries stated therein must control over any
other statement, with respect to area contained within its boundaries.

“More or less” is defined as approximately, or which intend to cover slight or unimportant

inaccuracies in quantity. This implies both parties assume risk of ordinary discrepancy.

The Court, however, held that a discrepancy of 10,475 square meters cannot be considered a
slight difference in quantity. The difference in the area is sizeable and too substantial to be
overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or deficient that should be deemed included in the deed
of sale.
We take exception to the avowed rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. After an assiduous
scrutiny of the records, we lend credence to respondents’ claim that they intended to sell only 4,000
sq m of the whole Lot No. 11909, contrary to the findings of the lower court. The records reveal that
when the parties made an ocular inspection, petitioner specifically pointed to that portion of the lot,
which she preferred to purchase, since there were mango trees planted and a deep well thereon.
After the sale, respondents delivered and segregated the area of 4,000 sq m in favor of petitioner by
fencing off the area of 10,475 sq m belonging to them