1
Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
CASE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
FACTS:
1. Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974.
2. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie,
petitioners.
3. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on
April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license.
4. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together
for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977.
5. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
6. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
7. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and
wife for at least five years exempts them from obtaining a
marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
DISPOSITVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED.
RULING:
1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage
license. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage.
In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an
affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from
the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito
and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and

Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is
still void.
2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree
is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. “A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that
the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot
be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heir ship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
2
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
Void and Voidable marriages distinguished
1. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A voidable
marriage is valid until annulled by the court; whereas a marriage
that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights.
2. A voidable marriage be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while a void marriage can never be
ratified.
3. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in
a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally.
4. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
5. An action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
6. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
7. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as
Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership (note: for marriages before effectivity of
the Family Code) and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
3

ROBERTO DOMINGO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA
SOLEDAD AVERA
G.R. No. 104818 | 1993-09-17
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
 On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A.
Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
 Unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina
dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime
in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
 January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has been working in
Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when
she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted
by her foreign employer; sometime in June 1989, while on her
one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with
another woman. She further discovered that he had been
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed
her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care
of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer
and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage.
 The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said
properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no
force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and
exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their
void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
4
 On August 20, 1991, RTC issued an Order denying the motion
to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
"Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after
a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void
(citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap
case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with
another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or
not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a
nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms,
thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326).
 A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous
application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from
receipt within which to file his answer. Instead of filing the
required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of
certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
 On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the
petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the
lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being
no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case

prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of
nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and
subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the
union can be had only upon proper determination of the status
of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not
the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner.
Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of
suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in
this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the
properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family
Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with
other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction,
the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is
merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have
been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
HELD:
Judicial Declaration of Nullity Still Required
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void
there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. (Dissenting Opinion, People vs. Aragon). A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
5
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code of the
Philippines). The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure
a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final
judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other
specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43.
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits
of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if
the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to
said donee are revoked by operation of law;
 6

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if
such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith
shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and
intestate succession.

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other
are revoked by operation of law.

Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary

consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be
separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose
is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

NICDAO CARINO v CARINO
FACTS:
1During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted
two marriages: the first in 1969, with Susan Nicdao Cariño (Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, and the second in 1992, with
Susan Yee Cariño (Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their
near ten year cohabitation starting in 1982.
Santiago S. Cariño passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care
of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both wives filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000 while Susan Yee received
a total of P21,000.
Susan Yee filed a case for collection of sum of money against Susan
Nicdao praying that the latter (Nicdao) be ordered to return to her (Yee)
at least one-half of the P146,000 collected as death benefits.
Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of, the marriage between Nicdao and the deceased. Yee,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
where Nicdao introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.
Yee further contended that the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license.
The trial court and Court Appeals ruled in favor of Susan Yee and
granted her prayer for half the benefits received by Nicdao.
HELD:
7
Lack of Marriage License
The first marriage between Susan Nicdao and Santiago Carino was void
ab initio for being solemnized without the required marriage license.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
Evidence submitted shows that the marriage contract of Susan Nicdao
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. Such a certification is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license. The certification issued by the
local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
Judicial Declaration of Nullity requirement under Art 40, Family
Code
Nonetheless, the nullity of the first marriage does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the previous marriage void. Hence, the second marriage of
Susan Yee and the deceased is likewise void ab initio for failure to
comply with Art 40, Family Code.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage,
he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage
void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise
the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the
first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to
determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.

However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For purposes such
as the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These
need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
Property Regime of Void Marriages
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, the provisions of Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code.
Property Regime of Second Marriage (Art 148)
The marriage of Susan Yee and Santiago Carino is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage
then presumed to be valid, and is governed by Article 148.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in
a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,
“only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions”
In the property regime under Article 148, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
8
ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Contributions in the form of care of the home, children
and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this
regime.
The death benefits of P146,000.00 from MBAI, NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, being renumerations, incentives
and benefits from governmental agencies earned by Santiago Carino as
a police officer, belong to him alone and Susan Yee has no right of claim
to them. Susan Yee has shown no proof that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
By intestate succession, the death benefits of the deceased shall pass to
his legal heirs. And, Susan Yee, not being the legal wife of the deceased
is not a legal heir
Property Regime of First Marriage (Art 147)
Article 147 of the Family Code governs the marriage of Susan Nicdao
and Santiago Carino. This article applies to unions of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
the absence of a marriage license.
Under Article 147, unlike in Art 148, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal
shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party
earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
Even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone
as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling Susan Nicdao to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the
first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits shall go to Susan Nicdao as
her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
 9

deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely,
his children with Susan Nicdao.

REPUBLIC VS DAYOT
GR 175581
March 14, 2008
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa were married at Pasay city solemnized by Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of marriage license they executed a sworn
affidavit that they have attained the age of maturity, unmarried and they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 yrs.
Jose filed a complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage on the Regional Trial Court of Binan Laguna on the grounds
that marriage with Felisa was a sham. No marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties. He did not even execute the sworn
affidavit stating that Felisa and he had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through
fraud.
Jose contended that he was introduced to Felisa in 1986 and
lived with her as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter as his land lady.
He said that Felisa requested him to accompany her in the City Hall so
that she could claim a package sent by her brother from Saudi Arabia.
Felisa further stated that he must sign a paper so that she would get the
package and her brother would kill them both if he refused. Thus they
signed the paper and gave it to a man who immediately left. It was
February 1987 when he had discovered that he already contracted
marriage with Felisa, when he saw in the sala table the copy of the
marriage contract.
Felisa on the other hand defended the validity of their marriage
and she expounded that while her marriage with Jose is subsisting, Jose
contracted marriage with Rufina Pascual, hence Felisa filed a case of
Bigamy against him and also an administrative case in the office of the
Ombudsman because both of them are employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. The ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct and he was
suspended from service for one year without emolument.
Regional Trial Court dismissed Jose’s version of the story and
ruled that the marriage between him and Felisa is valid on the grounds
10
that any person with the right frame of the mind wound suspect such
fraud, it took him more than three months to discover such, he wrote
Felisa Tecson as his wife in duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities and in his I.D. to contact in case of emergency, and he did not
apply for declaration of such as early as possible it took him years to
realized.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC because the
time for filing the declaration has already ceased the lacy of marriage
license were exempted by execution of a sworn affidavit, and the
solemnizing officer found no legal impediment at that time. The Court
of Appeals reversed its decision when Jose file a motion for
reconsideration contending that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false. The CA declared its decision as
follows:
The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
first exclusivity which means that no third party must be involved at any
time within the five years. And the second is continuity which means
that it must be unbroken.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab
initio?
RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking
the requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that
Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started living
together five months before the celebration of their marriage. That
according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it
means that a five years period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity,
 11

meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years
and continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation
of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration
of fraud against innocent and unwary parties.

SANTOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 (January 4, 1995)
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
 Leouel Santos, herein Petitioner, was then a First Lieutenant in
the Philippine Army when he met Julia, herein respondent.
 On September 20, 1986, the two exchanged vows before the
Municipal Trial Court Judge of Iloilo City, followed shortly by
a church wedding.
 The spouses lived with Julia’s parents. They were gifted with a
baby boy named Leouel Santos, Jr.
 The ecstasy did not last long. The spouses would start
quarrelling on a number of things, like when and where the
couple should start living independently from Julia’s parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending
few days with his own parents.
 Julia left for the US to work as a nurse. Julia called up on Leouel
only after 7 months from her departure. She promised to return
home after her contract expires. She never did.
 Leouel desperately tried to locate her, or to somehow get in
touch with Julia, but all his efforts were of no avail.
 Leouel filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental a complaint for
Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code. Julia,
through her counsel, opposed the complaint and denied the
allegations. She averred that it was Leouel who had been
irresponsible and incompetent. Julia did not appear nor submit
evidence.
 RTC: Dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
 CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC for technical ground
(non-compliance with a certification of non-shopping) and lack
of merit.
 Petition for review on Certiorari to Supreme Court.
12
ISSUE AND RULING:
Is Petitioner correct in arguing that the failure of Julia to return
home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years were circumstances that clearly showed her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life?
NO. The Supreme Court laid down the following arguments:
1. The Family Code did not define the term “psychological
incapacity”. The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee showed that the law allows some
resiliency in its application. The Committee did not even give
any examples of such incapacity for fear that it would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, findings
of experts, and decision of church tribunals.
2. The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article
36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses. Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
 13

3. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other.
 JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE - It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage
 INCURABILITY - It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

4. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of

marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code.

DISPOSITION:
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all,
can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
The petition is DENIED.

PRINCIPLES (Re: Article 36 FC):

 The elements if psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code include: a. Gravity; b. Juridical Antecedence; and
c. Incurability
 GRAVITY - It must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage
 14

CHI MING TSOI VS. C.A.
Facts: On May 22, 1988, Gina Lao married Chi Ming Tsoi. Since their
marriage until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. Gina filed a case of annulment of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity with the RTC of Quezon
City. The RTC granted annulment which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Is the failure to the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife from the time of the marriage until their separation on March 15
1989 a ground for psychological incapacity.
Ruling: On of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
is “to procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity, wholeness of the marriage.
The senseless and protracted refusal of the one of the parties of sexual
cooperation for the procreation of children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. In this case, there was no sexual contact
between the parties since their marriage on May 22, 1988 up to March
15, 1989 or for almost a year. Likewise, either spouse may file the action
to declare the marriage void, even the psychological incapacitated.
TOPIC: Family Code, Art. 36: A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization
FACTS
 Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985
and had a son named Andre O. Molina.
 After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility as a husband and father: He preferred to
spend time with his friends on whom he squandered money,
depended on his parents for financial assistance, and was never
honest with Roridel in regard of finances
 In 1986, Roridel became the breadwinner after Reynaldo lost his
job and the two had a quarrel which resulted in their estranged
relationship.
 In 1987, Roridel resigned and went to Baguio to leave with her
parents. Reynaldo left her and her son and abandoned them.
 Roridel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Reynaldo on the grounds of psychological
incapacity.
 In answer, Reynaldo admitted that they both cannot live together
as husband and wife and cited instances about Roridel’s
shortcomings.
 RTC declared the marriage void
 CA affirmed
 Dr. Gerardo Veloso’s meaning of psychological incapcity

ARGUMENTS
Petitioner Respondent
“Opposing and conflicting Marriage broke up because of
personalities” is not equivalent to opposing and conflicting
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs OLAVIANO MOLINA psychological incapacity. personalities.
G.R. 108763, February 13, 1997 Psychological incapacity is not
J. Panganiban simply neglect by parties to the
marriage but a defect in their

psychological nature which
renders them incapable of
performing marital
responsibilities and duties
Tended to establish in effect the Civil Code Revision Committee
most liberal divorce procedure also intended to liberalize the
which is an anathema to our application of the law
culture
ISSUE AND RULING
1. Whether or not psychological incapacity refer to opposing
personalities
NO, as supported by Leouel Santos v CA, psychological incapacity
refers no less than a mental or physical incapacity. Intendment of the
law is to confine psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders demonstrative of inability to give meaning or
significance to marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It must also exist during the
time that the marriage was celebrated.
2. Whether or not marriage in this case may be annulled due to
psychological incapacity
NO, in the case, it appears to be more of “difficulty” in the performance
of some marital obligations. Showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. It
is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness. There had been no showing of gravity of the problem, neither
juridical antecedence nor incurability.
Guidelines in the interpretation of Art. 36:
15
1. Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to plaintiff. Doubt shall
be resolved in favor of existence and continuance of the
marriage. This is rooted in both the Constitution and the laws
which cherish marriage
2. Root cause of psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically/clinically identified
b. Alleged in complaint
c. Sufficiently proven by experts
d. Clearly explained in the decision that incapacity is
psychological and not physical
3. Incapacity must be proven existing during time of the
celebration of marriage
4. Incapacity must be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable and relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations
5. Illness is grave enough to bring about disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage
6. Essential marital obligations must be embraced
7. Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonila Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not binding,
shall be given respect by courts. Canon law
8. Trial court must order prosecutor and Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the State
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
EMERGENCY CASE DIGEST
Roridel and Reynaldo Molina got married and had a son. However, a
year after their marriage, Reynaldo began to show signs of maturity and
irresponsibility in performing his obligations by squandering money
with his peers, relying on parents for financial aid and not being honest
in finance with Roridel. The couple had a fight which let them to be
estranged. Roridel went to her parents and Reynaldo abandoned them
and left their son with Roridel. Roridel filed for a petition on the
 16

declaration on marriage. RTC granted their petition and declared their

marriage void. CA affirmed and cited irreconcilable differences. SC
reversed these decisions and ruled that psychological incapacity is not
rooted on irreconcilable differences but a psychological defect which
renders disability in the party to perform marital obligations. SC
provided guidelines on determining psychological incapacity from
reputable sources (Presiding Justice Ricardo Puno of Family Code
Revision Committee + Oscar Cruz). See the above-mentioned criteria.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
Psychological Incapacity
Parties:
Petitioner – Luisita Estrella Hernandez (W)
Private Respondent – Mario C. Hernandez (H)
Dates:
 1997- Petitioner met the respondent at Philippine Christian
University in Dasmariñas , Cavite
 Private respondent was a student of the petitioner for 2 consecutive
semesters.
 They became sweethearts on February 1979 when private
respondent was no longer a student of the petitioner.
 Private respondent was 5 years younger than petitioner.
 January 1, 1981 – Petitioner and respondent got married in Silang
Cavite.
 Private respondent continued his studies for 2 more years. His
parents provided for his tuition and the petitioner provided for his
allowances and financial needs
 The relationship begot 3 children
 1983-1986- private respondent cannot find a stable job.
 1986- respondent was able to get a job through a recommendation
of a family friend
 March 1991- respondent availed an early retirement plan where he
received P53,000. Within 4 months, petitioner consumed the entirety
of the money.
 Petitoner discovered love letters from a certain Realita Villena
addressed to the private respondent. Subsequently, the private
respondent admitted having extra-marrital affairs with Villena.
 June 12, 1992 – private respondent left the conjugal home.
17
 July 10, 1992 – petitioner filed a petition seeking to annul her
marriage to respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity fo
the following reasons:
o Failed to perform his obligation to support the family
and contribute to the management of the
household.
o Engaged in drinking sprees with friends.
o Cohabited with another woman with whom he had
an illegitimate child.
o Having affairs with different women.
o Infected with STD that was transmitted to petitioner.
o Beats her
o Irresponsible
o Immature
o Unprepared for the duties of a married life.
o Abadoned his family.
 April 10, 1993 – RTC dismissed the petition for annulment. RTC
denied the petition for nullity because the reasons cited by the
petitioner are grounds for Legal Separation and not in accordance of
Art. 36 of the FC which is psychological incapacity.
 Petitioner appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision of
the RTC citing the ruling in Santos v. CA that the grounds for
declaration of nullity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. More so, chronic infidelity, abandonment, gambling and
use of prohibited drugs are not grounds for psychological incapacity.
Issue:
WON the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annuled
on the ground of private respondent’s psychological incapacity.
Held:
The decisions of RTC and CA were affirmed by the SC.
 18

 Psychological incapacity should refer to no less that a mental

incapacity and not physical incapacity .
 The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
 Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism
merely renders the marriage contract VOIDABLE under Art. 55 of the
FC, these are mere grounds for LEGAL SEPARATION.
 Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
 Lack of drive to work, philandering, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not themselves
constitute grounds for finding that the private respondent is suffering
from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the FC.

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, ,vs.WILSON G. MARCOS,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
CASE:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for
such declaration.
FACTS:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice:
Judge and Chief Chaplain
 Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the
Marcos Regime.
 Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.
XXX
 "They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacañang Palace, Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
 "After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military
service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures
that did not however prosper.
19
 As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family
and a good provider.
 Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they
would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat
her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness.
 He would also inflict physical harm on their children.
 for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
 All the while, she was engrossed in her business of selling while
she was still in the military
 they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately,
she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day,
when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him.
 He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even
on her mother who came to her aid, her injuries were diagnosed
as contusions
 In August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver,
went to him to look for their missing child, Niko.
 Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for
their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and
even [beat] her driver.
 the children described their father as cruel and physically
abusive to them
 The appellee submitted herself to psychologist , while the
appellant on the other hand, did not.
 "The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because
of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated
in this wise:
 "Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also
be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision.
 incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
 be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to
assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in
Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged
in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the
decision.
 appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation.
 there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was
suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or
mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known
the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity was grave,
had preceded the marriage and was incurable.
Issues:
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration
the following issues:
 Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set
aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
20
 Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
 We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
 Petitioner contends that she had no choice but to rely on other
sources of information in order to determine the psychological
capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to
such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application
and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article
36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
 medically or clinically identified,
 alleged in the complaint,
 sufficiently proven by experts
 clearly explained in the decision.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of
the celebration' of the marriage.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:11
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by
 gravity
 juridical antecedence, and
 incurability."
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
21
Main Issue: whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to
sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced
that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.
There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves.
Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for
her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.

GARCIA-QUIAZON v BELEN
G. R. No. 189121 | 2013-07-31
The Case:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate
of Eliseo Quiazon, filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon.
Facts:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon, represented by
her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pinas
City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo
having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo
and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico.
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to
the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certicate of Live Birth
signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to
prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late father’s estate.
22
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance
of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pinas City, at the
time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have
been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pinas City. In addition to their
claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual
and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the
petition was properly laid in Las Pinas City, thereby discrediting the
position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in
Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed . Court of Appeals
held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together
as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pinas City, from 1975 up
to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las
Pinas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals .

Issues:
I. The court of appeals gravely erred in affirming that Eliseo Quiazon
was a resident of Las Pinas and therefore,the petition for Letters of
Administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Pinas;
Ii. The court of appeals gravely erred in declaring that Amelia was not
legally married to Eliseo due to pre-existing marriage;
Iii. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that Elise Quiazon has not
shown any interest in the petition for Letters of Administration.
Held:
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC
of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the... terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."[15] In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or... place of abode.
As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot
be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It
is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No.
26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this
reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said
city.
23
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention
that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase
"next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the... decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[28]
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be
benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced
by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding... on
her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's estate, is just
a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good... grounds. It is founded
on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her
legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right
in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural children, Elise
can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of
the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28
November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, are
AFFIRMED in toto.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner , versus CRASUS
L. IYOY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 152577 | 2005-09-21
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
 The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of
a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997.
 According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married
Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five
children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant."
 In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of
America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, to the care
of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,
respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he
sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through
the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to
an American, with whom she eventually had a child.
 At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since
Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no
more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent
Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely's acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
 Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05
June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an
24
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen
Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely
refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his
Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered
than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at
respondent but it was because of the latter's drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and
to contribute to the maintenance of their household.
 After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married
her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed
out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which
she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void;
and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
 Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings -
The ground bearing defendant's psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed,
plaintiff's testimony is decidedly credible. The Court
finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that
the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a
divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another
 25

family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already married
to another man in another country.
 The Republic appealed before the appellate court. The CA
affirmed the decision and added that under Article 26, the
Filipino spouse may remarry after the alien spouse had validly
obtained divorce abroad which capacitated him to marry. The
Republic argued before the SC that abandonment and sexual
infidelity of the wife did not constitute per se psychological
incapacity and that the CA erred in applying Article 26
paragraph 2 in the present case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute
psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING:
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and
his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she
was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the
RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which
she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer,
she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988.
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could
not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy
and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

1. The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient

to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. Using
the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and
Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented
by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore,
there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.
2. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino

BUENAVENTURA v CA
FACTS:
The case involved a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on the ground of psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Buenaventura. After respondent filed her
answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating
that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed
an amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically
incapacitated.
The trial court ruled for the nullification of the marriage between Noel
and Isabel. Noel was ordered to pay moral damages to Isabel and to give
regular support to their son, Javy. Isabel was also awarded the care and
custody of their son.
Noel appealed and the appellate court dismissed his appeal for lack of
merit and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
HELD:
Psychological Incapacity Not Merely Physical Incapacity
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (Article 36, Family
Code)
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus: no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
26
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. (Santos vs. Court of Appeals)
Acts Proving Psychological Incapacity Contradict Grant of Moral
Damages
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered
these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages.
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an
innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts
as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated,
the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the
mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it
was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge
of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
Award of Moral Damages No Basis in Law and in Fact
Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a
consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the
 27

petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage
respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be
the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the
grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides
that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.

Final Judgment Should Provide for Liquidation, Partition and

Distribution of Properties
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all
property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in
the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be
given 1/2 share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the
plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership properties
having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or
profession of Noel.
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and
43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not

Jaime F. Villalon vs. Ma. Corazon N. Villalon
G.R. No. 167206
November 18, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Jaime Villalon and respondent Corazon Villalon met in the
early 70’s. They began dating in 1975 and eventually got married on
April 22, 1978. In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode
moved into an apartment near the conjugal home. Despite the
separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with
him on alternate weekends. He voluntarily gave monthly support to the
children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the children’s
medical expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for
the conjugal abode.
On July 12, 1996, petitioner filed for a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage on the ground of his psychological incapacity.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological
incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family
relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his
immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential
obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other
women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his
false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and
consortium towards respondent.
On September, 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer denying
petitioner’s allegation and described her marriage to the petitioner as
“fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more
growth in their relationship" and that their marital squabbles were
normal based on community standards.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to
testify on his alleged psychological disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic
28
Personality Disorder" with "Casanova Complex". To controvert the
findings of petitioner’s expert witness, respondent presented a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayan’s
findings were incomplete because a "team approach" was necessary in
evaluating an individual’s personality.
RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and respondent as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision
of the trial court to the CA.
CA reversed the decision of the RTC., the appellate court held that
petitioner failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Although Dr.
Dayan testified that petitioner's psychological incapacity preceded the
marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis for such a finding. Dr. Dayan
also stated that parental marital instability was the root cause of
petitioner's psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon or
link the two variables. Moreover, petitioner's sexual infidelity was made
to appear as symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in
reality, the same merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the
marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the totality of the evidence and the psychological reports
supported the alleged psychological incapacity of Jaime Villalon.
Ruling: The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a
finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that
petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of
time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at
 29

least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a

grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a
general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological
disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the court held that psychological

incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must
be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability.
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered
from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova
Complex even before the marriage. Further, sexual infidelity, by itself,
is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. As
held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, refusal to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity
within the meaning of the law.

Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.


MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS VS. BRIX FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368 (July 17, 2006)
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
 The couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during
their brief union was not all bad since Armida was happy and
contented with her life in the company of Brix. Their problems
began when Armida started doubting Brix’s fidelity. It was only
when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix
failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could
not understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not
relate to her anger, temper and jealousy.
 The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denied the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed against Brix Ferraris. The
RTC stated that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish
that Brix was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his
“defects” were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage. It also found that Dr. Dayan’s testimony failed to
establish the substance of Brix’s psychological incapacity.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court, which was likewise denied for failure of
petitioner to show that the CA committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed this present instant motion for reconsideration.
[NOTE: This case is a Resolution Case. No other antecedent facts
stipulated in the case.]
30
ISSUE AND RULING:
Is psychological incapacity present in the instant case?
NO. The Supreme Court laid down the following discussions:
1. The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
2. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which Armida failed to convincingly demonstrate.
3. In the case at bar, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at
her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called “schizoid,” and why he is the “dependent and avoidant
type.” Also, his information that Brix had extramarital affairs
was supplied by Armida herself. Notably, Dr. Dayan failed to
demonstrate that there was really “a natal or supervening
disabling factor” on the part of Brix, or an “adverse integral
element” in Brix’s character that effectively incapacitated him
from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations.
4. Mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude, the
violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity,
the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to

spend more time with his band mates than his family are not
manifestations of psychological incapacity and are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
5. [In psychological incapacity], it is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable
of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
(See Republic v. Court of Appeals)
DISPOSITION:
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
PRINCIPLES (Re: Article 36 FC):
 The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
FACTS: In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his
senior. In 1993, Leo filed to annul the marriage due to Marie’s
Psychological Incapacity. Leo claimed that Marie persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a
psychologist but she is not. She’d claim she is a singer with the company
Blackgold and that she is the latter’s number 1 money maker but she’s
not. She’d also spend lavishly as opposed to her monthly income. She
31
fabricates things and people only to serve her make-believe world. Leo
presented an expert that proved Marie’s PI. Marie denied all Leo’s
allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC
ruled against Marie and annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial
Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and was affirmed by
the Vatican’s Roman Rata. The CA reversed the decision hence the
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Psychological Incapacity is attendant to the
case.
HELD: Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines
established in the Molina case is properly established in the case at bar.
The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45
(3) of the FC vis a vis Art 46 of the FC. In PI, the misrepresentation
done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Art 45 (3), marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud
under the previous article, clarifies that “no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.” These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied
in the case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not
considered as fraud but rather such misrepresentations constitute her
aberrant behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her misrepresentations
are not lies sought to vitiate Leo’s consent to marry her. Her
misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish
fiction/fantasy from reality which is so grave and it falls under the fourth
guideline laid down in the Molina Case.
 32

LOLITA ENRICO vs HEIRS OF MEDINACELI
G.R. 173614, September 28, 2007
J. Chico-Nazario
TOPIC: A.M. N. 02-11-10-SC, Proposed Rule on the Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages
FACTS
 Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli were married on June 14, 1962
in Cagayan. They begot 7 children: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma,
Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle, and Joseph Lloyd.
 On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died
 On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner Lolita Enrico
before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.
 6 months after the marriage, Eulogio died.
 Heirs of spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed an action
for the declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and Enrico.
They averred that the marriage was entered into without the
requisite marriage license (Art. 34, Family Code not applicable)
 In her answer, Enrico stated that she and deceased lived
together for 21 years and had 2 children: Elvin and Marco.
Enrico sought dismissal on the ground that only contracting
parties can file action for the declaration of nullity
 RTC dismissed complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that said petition can only be
filed by the husband or the wife
 Motion for reconsideration in the RTC granted
 RTC reversed its own decision because it disregarded the ruling
on Ninal v Bayadong (heirs have the legal standing to file an
action for the nullity of marriage) in its earlier decision. Section
2a of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC can only be applied if both parties
to a void marriage are still living to not impair the vested rights
of the heirs.
 Principle of hierarchy of courts to be observed
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner Respondents
Marriage of Enrico and Marriage of Enrico and
Medinaceli is valid Medinaceli void because of lack
of marriage license.
Enrico and Medinaceli lived Lack of marriage license cannot
together as husband and wife for be exempt under Art. 34 of the
21 years openly and publicly Family Code because the first
marriage was only dissolved after
Trinidad’s death and cannot meet
the 5-year requirement
Only the wife of the husband can Heirs are capacitated to file an
file for an action on the action for the declaration of nullity
declaration of nullity of marriage of marriage (Ninal v. Bayadong)
(A.M, 02-11-10-SC)
ISSUE AND RULING
3. Whether or not the ruling on Ninal v. Bayadong can be applied
to the case
NO, because the marriage in Ninal was solemnized before the
effectivity date of the Family Code, thus, the Civil Code was in effect at
the time of their celebration. The marriage in this case was celebrated
in 2004 and governed by the Family Code
4. Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC may be applied in this
case
YES, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 2003 and governs petitions
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. Sec. 2 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC declares that only the husband or the wife can file a
petition and there is no ambiguity in the Rule. Respondents clearly have
no cause of action before the court a quo.
However, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
DISPOSITION
 33

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is
ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of
the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
EMERGENCY CASE DIGEST
Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli married on 1962 and had 7 children
which are the respondents in the case. On May 2004, Trinidad died and
after 3 months, Eulogio married Lolita Enrico, the petitioner. After 6
months of the marriage, Eulogio died. The respondents or heirs of
Eulogio from the 1st marriage filed an action for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of Eulogio and Lolita for lacking a marriage license
and is not exempt acquiring one because the two only lived together 3
months after the death of the 1st wife instead of the required 5 years.
RTC dismissed the case because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provided that
only contracting parties can file for an action for the declaration of nullity
of marriage. However, RTC reversed this decision because it ignored
the ruling on Ninal v. Bayadong (heirs have legal standing is one of the
parties are deceased). SC ruled that the Ninal case cannot be applied
in this case at Bar because in Ninal, the marriage was solemnized
before the Family Code took effect. The marriage in this case is
governed by the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that
only contracting parties in the marriage have legal standing to file an
action for the declaration on the nullity of marriage.

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, a
REYES, R.T., J.:
CASE:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for
marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except
cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of
a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child,
recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
 Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They
left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
 There are 6 parcels of land
 During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his
estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid
the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos.
 Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred
and registered in the name of Teofilo.
 Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot
is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.
 On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in
the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo
II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos.
219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Manila.
34
 In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City,. In the said case, the parties
submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise
agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged
their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a
portion of the first parcel of land.
 On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
 Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,
o second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs
Rillo. The remaining portion was later divided between
petitioner and respondents.
o The division was incorporated in a supplemental
compromise agreement
o The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
 Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in
August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
 In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes
of action:
 declaration of nullity of marriage;
 status of a child;
 recovery of property;
 reconveyance; and
 sum of money and damages.
 In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between
his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity
in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
 Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he
entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the
subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of
the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.

 Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.
 Respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended
that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage
license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child
of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
 On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked
that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees, be granted.
 But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the
certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
 petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage..
Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no
record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
 Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary
judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case.
 In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-
respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. That the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo
II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling
The CA opined:
35
The summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and
public policy
appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived
together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the
annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter
is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the
former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the case.
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved."
While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is
among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial
number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then
Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage
license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis
of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos
and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage
license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage
contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled
up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may
have overlooked the same."

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said
of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant
Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We
find appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was
merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be
a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative
filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the
illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when
considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of
his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name
and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could
have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in
order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the
filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the
inhibition of the ponente,. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code
2. Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules
of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule
35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion,
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.9
36
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be
declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary
judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural
issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the
action for nullity of marriage.
HELD:
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial
court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
"Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or
annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity.
SEC. 17. Trial.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or
annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order
the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this
stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of
evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the

public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or
laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the
public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits
to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor
General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of
marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses
by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife
to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The
rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
37
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts dissolution.
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent
Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took
place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring
an action to declare the marriage void.
The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise
stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest.26
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner
is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the
marriage in controversy.
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the
surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
 Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
 In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
 The widow or widower;
 Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
 Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the
Civil Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But
although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the
ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate.
Articles 1001 and 1003
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate
children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the
decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or
children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives,
like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son
of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to
determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But
the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case
for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is
38
a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the
deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of
respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate
the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been
conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo
II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total
forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation.
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of
Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother
against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.37
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to
the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II
and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad
Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate,
or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage
for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its
decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
39

Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104818 | 1993-09-17
Facts:
Private respondent Delia Soledad Domingo filed a petition before the
RTC of Pasig for the nullity of marriage and separation of property
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. She alleged that they were married
in 1976 and that she did not know that Roberto had a previous marriage
with one Emerlina dela Paz. She came to know of the first marriage only
in 1983 when Emerlina sued them for bigamy.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated
no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for
the declaration of its nullity was, therefore, superfluous and
unnecessary. It added that private respondent had no property which was
in his possession.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, there was still
the need for judicial declaration of its nullity, as culled from cases
decided by the Supreme Court.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.
Thus, this case petitioner argued that the judicial declaration of a void
marriage was not necessary for being superfluous and that such was only
needed for the purpose of remarriage.
40
Issue: WON petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for
purposes of remarriage.
Held:
Judicial Declaration of Nullity Still Required
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void
there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. (Dissenting Opinion, People vs. Aragon)
According to the Family Code, a declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy.
Necessity of Judicial Declaration Not Only Required for Purposes
of Remarriage
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (Article 40, Family Code)

Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that is it
meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the
precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as
it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in
which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of
remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of
petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
In the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage
which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which
is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous
one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
41
MARIA LUISA O. COJUANGCO, and LEO J. PALMA, petitioners,
vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC
BRANCH XXVII, PASAY CITY AND SPOUSES EDUARDO M.
COJUANGCO, JR., AND SOLEDAD O. COJUANGCO,
G.R. No. L-69550
CASE:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
seeking: (1) to annul and set aside: (a) the Order dated August 17, 1984
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXVII, Pasay City, which reconsidered and set aside its Order of July
19, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P, an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage, entitled Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco et al. v. Leo J.
Palma and reinstating the same and (b) the Order dated December 10,
1984 denying the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of aforesaid
resolution; and (2) to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with
Case No. Pq-0401-P.
Facts:
 On August 24, 1982, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage between Leo J. Palma and Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners) was filed with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court Branch
XXVII, Pasay City by Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco and Spouses
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Soledad O. Cojuangco
 The complaint alleged that Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco is 22
years of age, single and daughter of private respondents,
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Soledad O. Cojuangco, while
defendant Leo J. Palma, is a lawyer, 35 years of age and
married to Elizabeth H. Palma with whom he contracted
marriage on December 19, 1971 at Cebu City and with whom
he has been continuously cohabiting, begot 3 children.
 Palma was a former personal and confidential counsel of
Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr. for his family and company.

 Palma became so close to the family that he was requested to
become a tutor for petitioner Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco, who
was then a student.
 with grave abuse and betrayal of trust and confidence reposed
in him and with his moral and intellectual ascendancy over
Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco, he succeeded in courting and
contracting a second marriage with her on June 22, 1982 by
falsely representing to the Hongkong authorities that he is a
"bachelor".
 Consequently, the marriage between Leo Palma and Maria
Luisa O. Cojuangco, is null and void for being bigamous and or
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy.
Complainants (herein private respondents) prayed that
judgment be rendered declaring the marriage null and void ab
initio and ordering petitioner Palma to pay private respondents
reasonable amounts as moral, nominal and exemplary
damages, reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
as may be proved in the course of the trial.
 Maria wanted to continue her marital union with the respondent
that on September 27, 1982 she sought the immediate
dismissal of the aforecited case.
 On the same date, respondent Judge issued an order granting
Leo J. Palma three (3) days ending on September 30, 1982
within which to file his answer to the complaint
itself. Susequently, Palma was declared default so he prayed
for reconsideration and an extension of 15 days.
 On October 25, 1982, Maria Luisa filed a Motion to Dismiss
which apparently was not acted upon by respondent Judge.
Instead, an Order was issued on the same date denying
Palma's motion for reconsideration.
 On November 2, 1982, the lower court issued a decision
declaring the marriage of herein petitioner on June 22, 1982 as
null and void ab initio, while on February 18, 1983, Palma's
motion for reconsideration (of aforesaid decision) with motion to
lift order of default was denied.
 Hence, the petition for Certiorari, Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction, filed in G.R. No. 64538.
42
 On December 21, 1983, the First Division of this Court set aside
the judgment of November 2, 1982 of the lower court.
 In the lower court, a notice of dismissal dated July 13, 1984 was
filed by petitioner Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco affirming her
avowal of not being a part of the case and of her desire for its
dismissal with prejudice. Palma filed a Motion and Rejoinder to
Notice of Dismissal with Reservation to File Responsive
Pleading after receipt of resolution dated July 18, 1984.
Accordingly, on July 19, 1984, an order was issued by the lower
court dismissing Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P with prejudice.
 On August 17, 1984, Palma filed an opposition to the motion for
reconsideration. On the same day, August 17, 1984, an order
was issued granting the motion for reconsideration, setting
aside the order of July 19, 1984.
 On September 5, 1984, petitioners Maria O. Cojuangco and Leo
Palma, filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the order of
August 17, 1984 which was denied for lack of merit in the order
of December 10, 1984. Hence this petition
.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to want of jurisdiction, in refusing to dismiss the
case in the lower court.
Held:
No. A careful perusal of the records shows that such refusal by
respondent Judge was in obedience to the resolution of the First
Division of this Court of December 21, 1983 in G.R. No. 64538 entitled
"Leo Palma v. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., et al.", specifically ordering
respondent Judge to conduct a new trial in the case below and to allow
petitioner to file his answer.
the Court, in general does not entertain a petition for certiorari
questioning the propriety of an interlocutory order unless grave abuse
of discretion was patently committed by the trial court or where broader
interests of justice require exception. An order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of a petition for
 43

certiorari unless in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash,

the court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion; in which case certiorari or prohibition lies.

Unquestionably, respondent Judge cannot be faulted for following the

resolution of this Court. In the exercise of his jurisdiction, errors
allegedly committed by respondent Judge may be corrected by a timely
appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit. The case is thus hereby REMANDED to the respondent trial court
for further proceedings.

In relation to AM No. 02-11-10-SC

Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall
be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other
ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as
an affirmative defense in an answer.