Romualdez v. Tiglao. G.R. No.

L-51151

FACTS: Paz Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao and his sureties
(including Felisa Tiglao) in 1960 for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a
hacienda and its sugar quota. CFI Rizal decided in favor of Romualdez adjudging Tiglao
et al liable for P22, 767.17. A writ of attachment was issued but the judgment was not
satisfied. Romualdez sought the revival of the judgment in 1970. When this was filed,
Felisa was already dead; therefore, her estate was made a defendant represented by
the Special Administratrix Maningning Tiglao-Naguiat. Maningning filed a Motion to
Dismiss arguing that under Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, "No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator.” The lower court nevertheless granted the revival. An
appeal is taken by the estate of Felisa.

ISSUE: Whether the action for revival was proper instead of presenting the claim
in the Special Proceeding in the settlement of Felisa’s estate

RULING: The action for revival was proper. The present action is one for the
recovery of a sum of money so that it is barred by Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court and that the remedy of Romualdez et al is to present their claim in Special Proc.
No. Q-10731 of the CFI of Rizal. The original judgment, which was rendered on May 31,
1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years (Sec.
6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate
of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is precisely why Romualdez et al
have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao
pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said
judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the
estate in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
 Ramos v. Ortuzar, G.R. No. L-3299
FACTS: Percy A. Hill, an American and retired officer of the Philippine Constabulary,
cohabited with Martina Ramos from 1905 to 1914 and had with her six children, two of whom
are Richard Hill and Marvin Hill and the others died in infancy. He started acquiring lands by
purchase or homestead and improving and cultivating them until at the time of his death on July
23, 1937, his holdings were worth over P100,000. In 1914, Percy canonically married an
American woman by the name of Helen Livingstone and of that union three children were born,
all of whom now reside in the US. Helen died in 1922, and in 1924, Hill married Caridad Ortuzar
by whom he had one daughter. On September 3, 1937, proceedings for the settlement of
Percy’s estate were commenced and Caridad was appointed administratrix. During the Intestate
proceedings, Marvin and Richard Hill intervened claiming to be the deceased’s children. The
court conducted a hearing as to the rights of the two but declared in order that they are not
rightful heirs of Hill, thereby excluding them from participating in the distribution of the estate.
Marvin and Richard failed to appeal the decision. By order of the court, the administratrix
submitted an accounting and a project of partition, and both of these having been approved,
distribution of the estate was made accordingly and the estate was closed. On March 27, 1947,
the declared heirs and distributes sold six tracts of land left by Hill to Maximo Bustos for
P120,000, this being the sale which the trial court would annul. Six years after the partition,
Martina came before the CFI claiming that she was the lawful wife and her children were the
legitimate children of the deceased. The CFI decided against her because no certificate of
marriage was produced and no record was made in the civil registry. The court also found out
that during the duration of the alleged marriage, the deceased came to Martina and introduced
another wife. Because of this, Martina asked the deceased to have another house constructed
for her right in front of their old house. The court said that this act of a lawful wife is unbelievable
because why would she instantly give up her right to use the house that the two of them built
together.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martina, after six years could still raise the issues already
answered by the CFI in the special proceedings?
HELD: No. There being no other matters to attend to the administratrix submitted a final
accounting and a project of partition by order of the court, both were in due time approved, the
partition was carried out, and the expediente was closed. It thus appears beyond doubt that all
the facts raised in the present suit were alleged, discussed, and definitely adjudicated in the
expediente of Hill's intestate. Thus, it is res judicta. The proceeding for probate is one in
rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the
notice and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them." A final order of
distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees. There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not be applied
to intestate proceedings. Moreover, the only instance that the Court can think of in which a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation SET ASIDE is when he is left out
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.