2.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) 1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner
of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The
law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards
and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers
all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and
employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only
to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a
system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b)
and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if
their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not,
however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for
the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the
ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function
is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the
creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection.
the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the
creation of a congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,
which states that “the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification
is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based
on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following:
(1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when
it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in
the executive branch.
Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain
to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because
they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the
BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the
following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” 33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On
May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary
* FACTS:
HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature
(“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the
Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act
of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the
Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada administration, as
continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III
administrations.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency:
PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class
municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose,
the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design
within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships,
identified by a member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative
district shall have the written concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives
of the recipient or beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall
be as follows:
a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos
(P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in
the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects
listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure
projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special
Provision No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on
the use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be
released in the first semester and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the
second semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The
Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and
Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope to another
within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure
projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as
the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from
approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within
the same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1
hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of
projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not
yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted
to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall
be released to the implementing agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision
No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund
and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under
Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.
The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by
PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through
which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual
and justiciable controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to
judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation
of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on…
1.) …separation of powers
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
3.) …checks and balances
4.) …accountability
5.) …political dynasties
6.) …local autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power
* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel
System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication
since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such
as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case
becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate
the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is
geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being
a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the
President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on
PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot
and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court
in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of
the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-
delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local
autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved –
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of
public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly
presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public
interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s
flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of
the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and
the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address
the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern
of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the
findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to
be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely
due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There
is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein
in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution
of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may
be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional
principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the
recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is,
by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues
underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most
opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the
political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an
exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested
the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have
come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,
assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the
existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of
public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given
that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of
controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous
case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if,
between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article
and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is
essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment
on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate
where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers
problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority
to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each
other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-
relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of
fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses
herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason
against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full
resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings
(such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling
in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any
controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these
cases, stare decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority
of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3
and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded
post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the
2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the
2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in
“the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in
violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this
end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out
that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority
of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper
phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as
held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,
involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power
of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as
a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could,
after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA
is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget
within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point
out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not
be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment
of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes
of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed]
state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends
the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project,
and per implementing agency.”
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.”
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority
and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate
himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on
a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity
between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the
domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision
does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to
be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the
Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would
be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of
PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-
flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the
former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which
are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts
within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies
and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle
of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited;
second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has
used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend
the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The
first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the
same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“.
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure
development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure”
is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of
PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and
other consolidated cases)
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I. THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5,
declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states
that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among
some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of
the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered
the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a
clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24,
2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which
was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on
February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily
Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for publication.
The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the
warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation
1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional
power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant
to PP 1017 valid?
III. THE RULING
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made
pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by
a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless
arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]
justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting
to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria
Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-
shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to
sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and
seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be
made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the
day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (G.R. No. L23825) - Digest
FACTS:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and
as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan
ISSUE:
W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities
RULING:
On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved,
not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at
the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix
such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does,
the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities —
the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and exclusively the
exercise of legislative power”
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but,
also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end
sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred
to.
If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials,
by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely
brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating
it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising
over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the
President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over
said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB
and PDEA), regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and
(g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar
as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is
put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of public
and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection
with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator.
He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need
not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS),
a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g)
of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another,
the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to
harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be
struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and
for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE/S:
1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do
these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause?
HELD:
1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f)
and (g) are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.
RATIO:
1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-
elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the
powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean,
are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can
only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly
found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in
the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed,
it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements. A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not
only acceptable, but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and
protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random
drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and
private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this
regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug
testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the
individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and
does not merit serious consideration.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means
the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into
one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities; and while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the
guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.
Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights
of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been
held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is
really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not
telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec.
36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that
the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the
company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work
place.” It is to be noted the very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-
being of the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.
Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike the situation
covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy
when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to
the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees,
the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
“randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare
fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to
drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Bagabuyo vs COMELEC (Plebiscite)
FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before. In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA
9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the
said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. He was contending that the
2nd district was created without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province,
city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not
bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
Facts:
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman
Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The
law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo
assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to
enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo
was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was
required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
Held:
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province,
city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not
bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment
of a single legislative district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is
the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide
for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of
them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each
one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means better access to their
congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-
list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the
elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The
COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that
filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with
the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC
(Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot
for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However,
since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying
petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in
the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally
be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-
list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly
making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms.
This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of
party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from
the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who
cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are
excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to
prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the
armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941