O'Neil V Neronha (Rhode Island Taser)

Case 1:19-cv-00612 Document 1 Filed 11/22/19 Page 1 of 16 PagelD #: 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
MICHAEL P. O'NEIL and NICOLA )

GRAS SO )
)
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Civil Action No.
v.
PETER F. NERONHA, in his Official )

Capacity Attorney
as General of Rhode )
Island and COLONEL JAMES M. MANNI, )
in his Official
Capacity as the )
Superintendent of the Rhode Island State )
Police
Defendants. )
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Michael P. O'Neil and Nicola Grasso, (`Plaintiffs") by and
through their undersigned counsel, and complain of the Defendants as follows:
I. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff Michael P. O'Neil ('O'Neil") is an adult male resident of the State of Rhode Island
and resides in Warwick County and is a citizen of the of the United States.
2. Plaintiff Nicola Grasso ("Grasso") is an adult male resident of the State of Rhode Island and
resides in Providence County and is a citizen of the United States.
3. Defendant Colonel James. M. Manni is the Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police.
Defendant Manni is sued in his official capacity and is responsible for the administration and
enforcement of Rhode Island's customs, policies, practices and laws related to the State of
Rhode Island's ban on stun guns and/or electronic arms across Rhode Island. Defendant
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Colonel James. M. Manni may be served at Rhode Island State Police, 311 Danielson Pike,
North Scituate, RI 02857.
4. Defendant Peter F. Neronha is the Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island and is sued
in his official capacity and is responsible for enforcing the State of Rhode Island's customs,
policies, practices and laws related to the State of Rhode Island's ban on stun guns and/or
electronic arms. Defendant Neronha may be served at the Office of Attorney General located
at 150 South Main Street, Providence, RI 02903.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343,
2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988.
6. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
a. The Second Amendment
7. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms
shall not be infringed."
8. The Second Amendment guarantees individuals a fundamental right to keep and carry arms
for self-defense and defense of others in the event of a violent confrontation. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010);
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 1027 (2016).
9. Arms are "'weapons of offence, or armor of defense.1 Dictionary of the English Language
107 (4th ed.)" They are anything that a man [or woman] wears for his defense, or takes into
2
his hands, or uses in wrath to cast at or strike another.1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary
(1771)." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.
10. The Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,
even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582;
Caetano, slip op. at 1 (per curiam).
11. Under the Second Amendment, the Defendants retains the ability presumptively to regulate the
manner of carrying arms and may prohibit certain arms in narrowly defined sensitive places,
prohibit the carrying of arms that are not within the scope of Second Amendment's protection
such as unusually dangerous arms, and disqualify specific, particularly dangerous individuals
from carrying arms. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
12. Given the decision in Heller, Defendants may not completely ban the keeping and bearing of
arms for self-defense that are not unusually dangerous, deny individuals the right to carry arms
in non-sensitive places, deprive individuals of the right to keep or carry arms in an arbitrary
and capricious manner, or impose regulations on the right to keep and carry arms that are
inconsistent with the Second Amendment. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027
(2016); Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Palmer v. District of
Columbia, 59 F. Supp.3d 173 (2014).
13. The Fifth Circuit has cited approvingly to Caetano for the proposition that stun guns are
protected arms under the Second Amendment:
Inaddressing whether stun guns are in common use, Justice Alito, joined by Justice
Thomas, implied that the number of states that allow or bar a particular weapon is
important:
[T]he number of Tasers and stun guns is dwarfed by the number of firearms.
This observation may be true, but it is beside the point.... The more relevant
statistic is that [200,000] stun guns have been sold to private citizens,
...
who it appears may lawfully possess them in 45 States.... While less popular
3
than handguns, stun guns are widely owned and accepted as a legitimate
means of self-defense across the country.
Caetano, 136 S.Ct. at 1032-33 (citations and quotation marks omitted). These two
justices suggested that the 200,000 absolute number, plus that 45 states have
"accepted [stun guns] as a legitimate means of self-defense," was enough to
determine that the stun gun is in common use.
Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 449 (5th Cir. 2016).
14. Many other jurisdictions have already found complete bans on the ownership of electric arms
is unconstitutional post-Heller. See People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Mich. Ct. App.
2012) (striking down a Michigan statute criminalizing possession of electronic
weapons), Second Amendment Society v. Porrino, No. 3:16-cv-04906-DEA (D.N.J. Nov. 16,
2016) Doc. No. 30 (consent decree where the Court found New Jersey's complete ban on
electric arms is unconstitutional), ("Pursuant to the holdings in Heller, McDonald and
Caetano, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39- 3(h), to the extent this statute outright prohibits, under
criminal penalty, individuals from possessing electronic arms, is declared unconstitutional in
that it violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and shall not be
enforcee); See, Crystal Wright v. District ofColumbia, No. 1:16-cv-01556-JEB (D.D.C. Sept.
26, 2016) Doc. No. 18 (stipulating to a stay of a motion for preliminary injunction pending
new legislation and agreeing not to enforce ban against plaintiffs); Ford v. City of New
Orleans, No. 2:16-cv16433-MVL-KWR (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2016) Doc. Nos. 17, 19-20
(stipulating that the city will not enforce the ban against plaintiff and consenting to a stay of
litigation pending enactment of legislation that decriminalized possession of stun
guns); Hulbert v. Pantelides, No. 1:16-cv-04121-JFM (D. Md. March 3, 2017) Doc. No. 16
(letter from the City of Annapolis informing the court that the City Council passed an
emergency ordinance eliminating all restrictions on ownership and possession of electronic
4
weapons for personal defense); Ramirez v. Commonwealth No. SJC-12340, 2018 Mass. LEXIS
237 (Apr. 17, 2018) (striking Mass. ban on stun guns).1

15. Judge David N. Hurd, of the Northern District of New York, recently held that New York's
ban on electric arms "... is an unconstitutional restriction on the right to bear armsll" and that
"New York's sweeping prohibition on the possession and use of tasers and stun guns by all
citizens for all purposes, even for self-defense in one's own home, must be declared
unconstitutional in light of [Heller]." Avitabile v. Beach, 368 F. Supp. 3d 404, 421 (N.D.N.Y.
2019).2
16. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Illinois found a statute banning the carry of Tasers and
stun guns unconstitutional because Illinoisprovision on carriage of weapons sets forth a
comprehensive ban that categorically prohibits possession and carriage "... of stun guns and
tasers in public." People v. Webb,2019 IL 122951,1120. And, because it is a categorical ban,
...
that provision necessarily cannot stand." Id. at ¶ 21. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the portion of the statute prohibiting "... the carriage or possession of stun guns and tasers is
facially unconstitutional under the second amendment." Id.
17. Plaintiffs are bringing an as-applied and facial challenge to the applicable Rhode Island laws
which prevent them from owning and carrying electric arms.
18. They seek an injunction preventing enforcement of the applicable Rhode Island laws against
them and declaratory relief.
Since Caetano, electronic arms bans in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Tacoma, Washington and Westminster,
Maryland were also rescinded. See https://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/10/24/stun-guns-legal-nhiladelphia/;
http://www.carrollcountytimes. com/news/westminster/ph-cc-westminster-stun-gun-ban-discussion-20170523-
story.html; http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/pol itics-government/article158619749.html.
2
The State of New York did not appeal Judge Hurd's ruling.
5
19. Additionally, they seek an injunction preventing enforcement of the applicable Rhode Island
laws as to all other law-abiding citizens.
b. Stun Guns
20. Stun guns are arms in common use for self-defense by civilians as well as by law enforcement.
21. Tasers are a type of stun gun manufactured and sold by Axon (formerly known as Taser
International).
22. A Taser is an electronic control device (ECD") that uses replaceable cartridges containing
inert, compressed nitrogen to fire two small probes that are attached to insulated conductive
wires. In the models generally marketed to non-law enforcement persons, the conductive wires
are 15 feet (4.5 meter) in length.
23. Taser models generally marketed to law enforcement agencies use conductive wires with
lengths up to 25 feet in length.
24. The probes are designed to penetrate the clothing of an attacker and imbed in the attacker's
skin. Electrical energy is sent over the wires into the probes. The charge is transmitted between
the two probes and is designed to disrupt the sensory and motor functions to inhibit muscular
control of an attacker.
25. With a Taser exposure, the attacker is momentarily incapacitated to allow the person attacked
to escape and call for law enforcement assistance, or in the case of a law enforcement officer,
to allow for the apprehension of the suspect without further risk of injury to the officer or the
suspect.
26. The Taser's electronic charge lasts from five to thirty seconds depending on whether the
civilian or the law enforcement model is employed.
6
27. The most commonly employed civilian Taser is a one-shot device with a 30 second charge.
Once fired the device can still be used as a direct contact stun device in the event of a missed
shot or in the event of multiple assailants.
28. Axon also manufactures Taser devices having the capacity for multiple shots. These multiple
shot devices are commonly used by law enforcement personnel in the performance of their
duties.
29. Tasers have several advantages over other non-lethal means of self-defence, such as self-
defence sprays or contact weapons.
30. First, self-defence sprays must be administered generally within several feet of an assailant
while a civilian model Taser can be deployed within 15 feet. The closer distance the assailant
must be to a potential victim for the victim to employ a self-defence spray increases the danger
to the potential victim. For example, it is generally recognized by law enforcement that an
assailant wielding a contact weapon such as a knife or a club can be a lethal threat at distances
of 21 feet or closer. See Dennis Tueller, How Close is Too Close, Police Policies Study
Council, available at http://www.theppsc.org/Staff Views/Tueller/How.Close.htm (originally
published in the March 1983 Edition of SWAT Magazine).

31. Second, pepper sprays can often be ineffectual against highly intoxicated or highly agitated
assailants. See generally Steven M. Edwards, et al., Evaluation of Pepper Spray, National
Institute of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Research in Brief
(February 1997), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/162358.txt. Tasers, on the other
hand, when effectively employed will likely stop an attack from an intoxicated or mentally
disturbed attacker.
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32. Third, for optimum effect, self-defence sprays should be deployed at the face of the attacker,
which is a small target. The Taser is most effective when deployed at other larger parts of the
body of the attacker.
33. Fourth, self-defence sprays can end up being blown back at the victim if used in a windy
environment, resulting in incapacitating the victim rather than the attacker. This is not an issue
with an electric arm.
34. Likewise, Tasers have advantages over the variety of contact weapons as well such as police
type batons or knives. Allowing an attacker too close to contact distance creates a high degree
of danger to a potential victim.
35. Contact weapons can also be more difficult for persons of lesser strength to deploy, compared
to a Taser.
36. Moreover, use of any contact weapon, such as a knife or club, carries a high degree of risk of
death or serious bodily harm to the assailant, whereas risk of death or serious bodily harm from
a Taser or stun gun is minimal.
37. On a related note, given that use of a knife or club could qualify as the use of deadly force, an
individual using a knife or club to defend against a criminal attack, has a high legal standard
to meet to sustain a claim self-defence.
38. Tasers have been widely used by law enforcement agencies throughout the United States and
the world. More than 18,000 law enforcement agencies use the devices.
39. Studies have shown Tasers to reduce injuries to both law enforcement officers and to suspects.
The United States Department of Justice found that Tasers result in fewer injuries to suspects
and officers than all other means of subduing suspects.
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40. In the event of deployment of a civilian Taser, the device releases some 24 small confetti like
tags called AFIDs which are packed into the firing mechanism. When the Taser cartridge is
engaged, the AFIDs fly out of the Taser and scatter around the area where the device was
utilized.
41. The term AFID stands for Anti Felon Identification. Taser utilizes AFIDs to deter criminal
misuse of its product. Taser can trace the purchaser of the device from data contained on an
AFID.
42. Tasers and other electronic weapons are in common use for self-defence. The Michigan Court
of Appeals found that "Hundreds of thousands of Tasers and stun guns have been sold to
private citizens," People v. Yanna, 297 Mich. App. 137, 144, 824 N.W. 2d 241, 245 (2012).
Concurring in the per curiam reversal of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Courts
upholding of a ban on stun guns, Justice Alito stated, "While less popular than handguns, stun
guns are widely owned and accepted as a legitimate means of self-defence across the country."
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (March 21, 2016) (Alito, J., concurring).
43. Other forms of stun guns that do not deploy probes are also used for self-defense.
44. These stun guns range from contact weapons which require the user to come in close vicinity
to ranged weapons like the Taser.
45. Depending on the situation there are benefits to deploying a Taser in drive stun mode or a
deploying a stun gun over deploying the Taser probes.

46. The most notable one is if a person is surprised and attacked at extreme close range, i.e. in a
grappling situation, a contact stun gun or a Taser in drive stun mode may be more effective
than deploying the Taser probes because it is easier to deploy at this distance.
47. At this range, contact stun guns also have an advantage over other arms.
9
48. A baton requires space to swing which may be unavailable at close range.
49. A knife will only subdue an attacker if it scores a hit on a vital spot whereas the electric shock
of a stun gun can subdue an attacker with a strike on any part of the body. Additionally, usage
of knives can cause severe bodily injury and even death.
50. A stun gun does not require strength to use where as both knives and batons require a
significant amount of upper body strength to use effectively

51. At extremely close range, defensive sprays are hard to deploy and can irnpact both the attacker
and the person deploying the spray.
52. There are more than 5 million stun guns legally in use by civilians in the United States.
53. Electric arrns are designed for use during self-defense against a hurnan attacker.
54. Electric armsprimary function and purpose is to be used as a nonlethal form of self-defense
against a human attacker.

55. Only two states currently ban electric arms: Hawaii and Rhode Island.
c. State of Rhode Island Law.
56. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-42(a)(1) provides that: "[n]o person shall carry or possess or attempt
to use against another any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack,
slingshot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, metal knuckles, slap glove, bludgeon, stun-gun, or the so
called "Kung-Fu" weapons."
57. This provision provides that "[a]ny person violating the provisions of these subsections shall
be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both, and the weapon so found shall be confiscated." Id.
58. This prohibition also applies to Tasers as a form of electric arms because a Taser can be used
as a stun gun without deploying its probes.
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59. Thus, it is unlawful under Rhode Island law to possess in one's home or to be armed with a
stun gun or Taser. As such, Rhode Island's law is a complete ban on a class of aims.
d. Plaintiff Michael P. O'Neil
60. Plaintiff O'Neil desires to purchase an electric arm for self-defense and other lawful purposes
in his home, outside his home, whilst traveling between these locations and in all other
locations.
61. Plaintiff O'Neil is an aircraft mechanic and the Vice-President of Rhode Island 2" Amendment
Coalition.
62. Plaintiff O'Neil currently wishes to purchase a stun gun or Taser for lawful self-defense and
does not solely due to Rhode Island law.
63. Plaintiff O'Neil has never been convicted of a crime that would disqualify him from firearms
ownership under either Rhode Island or federal law.
64. Plaintiff O'Neil has never been diagnosed with a mental disorder that would disqualify him
from firearms ownership under Rhode Island or federal law.

65. Plaintiff O'Neil does not abuse alcohol or use illegal drugs.
66. Plaintiff is aware of the potential legal, economic and psychological ramifications of even the
justified use of deadly force to defend himself or his home against a violent criminal attack.
67. Plaintiff would prefer to minimize the likelihood that he would have to resort to deadly force
in the event he was forced to defend himself or his home from a violent criminal attack.
68. Plaintiff would desire to possess a Taser and stun gun to have readily accessible within the
home for self-defense and protection of his family.
69. Plaintiff O'Neil desires to purchase a Taser Pulse or a stun gun. However, Plaintiff fears
prosecution for possessing and carrying a Taser. See Exhibit "1."
11
70. But for Rhode Island law, O'Neil would acquire, possess, carry and where appropriate use a
Taser and/or stun gun to protect himself, his home, and his family.
e. Plaintiff Nicola Grasso
71. Plaintiff Grasso desires to purchase an electric arm for self-defense and other lawful purposes
in his home, business, whilst traveling between these locations and in all other locations.
72. Plaintiff Grasso is the former President of the Rhode Island Federated Sportsman's
Association.
73. Plaintiff Grasso currently wishes to purchase a stun gun or Taser for lawful self-defense and
does not solely due to Rhode Island law.
74. Plaintiff Grasso has never been convicted of a crime that would disqualify him from firearms
ownership under either Rhode Island or federal law.
75. Plaintiff Grasso has never been diagnosed with a mental disorder that would disqualify him
from firearms ownership under Rhode Island or federal law.
76. Plaintiff Grasso does not abuse alcohol or use illegal drugs.
77. Plaintiff is aware of the potential legal, economic and psychological ramifications of even the
justified use of deadly force to defend himself or his home against a violent criminal attack.
78. Plaintiff would prefer to minimize the likelihood that he would have to resort to deadly force
in the event he was forced to defend himself or his home from a violent criminal attack.
79. Plaintiff would desire to possess a Taser and stun gun to have readily accessible within the
home for self-defense and protection of his family.
80. Plaintiff Grasso desires to purchase a Taser Pulse or a stun gun. However, Plaintiff fears
prosecution for possessing and carrying one. See Exhibit "2."
12
81. But for Rhode Island law, Grasso would acquire, possess, carry and where appropriate use a
Taser and/or stun gun to protect himself, his home, and his family.
COUNT I
U.S. CONST., AMEND. II
82. The Defendants prohibit Plaintiffs from acquiring, possessing, carrying and using a defensive
arm in common use, i.e., an electric arm. As such it violates PlaintiffsSecond Amendment
rights.
83. Defendants' laws, customs, practices and policies generally banning the acquisition,
possession, carrying and use of Tasers and other electronic arms violates the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution, facially and as applied against the Plaintiffs in
this action, damaging Plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled
to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against such laws, customs, policies, and
practices.
COUNT II
(DECLARATORY JUDGMENT)
84. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations of the preceding paragraphs as if set forth herein.
85. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides: "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,
any court of the United States may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C.
2201(a).
86. Absent a declaratory judgment, there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs will suffer
irreparable injury in the future.
13
87. There is an actual controversy between the parties of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant issuance of a declaratory judgment.
88. This Court possesses an independent basis for jurisdiction over the parties to declare the
partiesrights with respect to the Second Amendment.
89. A judgment declaring that the State of Rhode Island's ban on the ownership and carry of
electric arms violates the Second Amendment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and
settling the legal relations at issue and will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty,
insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
90. Defendants' laws, customs, practices and policies generally banning the acquisition,
possession, carrying and use of Tasers and other electronic arms violates the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution, facially and as applied against the Plaintiffs in
this action, damaging Plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled
to a declaration declaring such laws, customs, policies, and practices unconstitutional.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that judgment be entered in their favor and against
Defendants as follows:
1. An order preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice of the injunction, from enforcing R.I. Gen. Laws §11-47-42 ban the
on acquisition,
possession, carrying or use of Tasers and other electronic arms as-applied to Plaintiffs and
additionally against other similarly situated law abiding persons;
14
2. An order declaring that R.I. Gen. Laws §11-47-42 with regard to the ban on electric arms, is
unconstitutional and violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution as-
applied to Plaintiffs and facially;
3. An order declaring R.I. Gen. Laws §11-47-42 unenforceable as-applied to Plaintiffs and
facially;
4. Costs of suit, including attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988;
5.. Such other Declaratory relief consistent with the injunction as appropriate; and
6. Such other further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.
Dated: November "20, 2019.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL P. O'NEIL AND NICOLA GRASSO
By and through their legal counsel,
1--7
CT2eet-0/
Frannt Saccoc io
A
Alleietec-Ze"Gt
Esq. #5949
Comerford & Saccoccio
928 Atwood Avenue
Johnston, Rhode Island 02919
(401) 944-1600 * 942-8921 Fax
Frank.CSLawOffice@gmaiI.com
Co-Counsel / Cooperating Attorney for Plaintiff

Alan Alexander Beck
Law Office of Alan Beck
2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
Alan.alexander.beck@gmail.com
(Pro Hac Vice Paperwork Forthcoming)
15
Co-Counsel / Cooperating Attorney for Plaintiff

Stephen D. Stamboulieh
Stamboulieh Law, PLLC
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
Mississippi Bar No. 102784
(Pro Hac Vice Paperwork Forthcoming)
16
Case 1:19-cv-00612 Document 1-1 Filed 11/22/19 Page 1 of 2 PagelD #: 17

MICHAEL P. O'NEIL and NICOLA

GRASSO
Plaintiffs, )
) Civil Action No.
v.

Capacity as Attorney General of Rhode )
Capacity as the
in his Official )
Police )
Defendants. )
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL P. O'NEIL
COMES NOW, Michael P. O'Neil, and states as follows:
1. I am an adult male resident of the State of Rhode Island and reside in Warwick County.
2. I am an aircraft mechanic and the Vice-President of Rhode Island 2"d Amendment Coalition.
3. I have never been convicted of a crime that would disqualify me from owning firearms under
Rhode Island or federal law.
4. I have never been diagnosed with a mental disorder that would disqualify me from firearms
ownership under Rhode Island or federal law.

5. I do not abuse alcohol or use illegal drugs.
6. I wish to purchase a stun gun or Taser Pulse for self-defense, but have not because Rhode
Island bans electric arms and I fear prosecution for possessing and carrying one.
7. If stun guns or Tasers were legal in Rhode Island, I would acquire, possess, carry and where
appropriate use a Taser or stun gun to protect myself, my home and rny family.
FURTHER, DECLARANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on November 21, 2019.

/ 7
MICHAEL
7
P. ()NEIL
/ (/), <(.7 fl -
State of Rhode Island
County of Providence
On this the 21st day of November, 2019 personally appeared Michael P. O'Neil, known to
me to be the person executing this document, and he acknowledged the same being his free act
and
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MICHAEL P. O'NEIL and NICOLA )

GRASSO )
)
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Civil Action No.
v.

Capacity as Attorney General of Rhode )
in his Official
Capacity as the )
Police
Defendants. )
DECLARATION OF NICOLA GRASSO
COMES NOW, Nicola Grasso, and states as follows:
1. I am an adult male resident of the State of Rhode Island and reside in Providence County.
2. I the former President of the Rhode Island Federated Sportsman's Association.
3. I have never been convicted of a crime that would disqualify me from owning firearms under
Rhode Island or federal law.
4. I have never been diagnosed with a mental disorder that would disqualify me from firearms
ownership under Rhode Island or federal law.
5. I do not abuse alcohol or use illegal drugs.

6. I wish to purchase a stun gun or Taser Pulse for self-defense, but have not because Rhode
Island bans electric arms and I fear prosecution for possessing and carrying one.
7. If stun guns or Tasers were legal in Rhode Island, I would acquire, possess, carry and where
appropriate use a Taser or stun gun to protect myself, my home and rny family.
FURTHER, DECLARANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on November 21, 2019.
`fd(/e.'
NI LA G RASSO
State of Rhode Island
County of Providence
On this the 21st day of November, 2019 personally appeared Nicola Grasso, known to me
to be the person executing this document, and he acknowledged the same being his free act and
deed.
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JS 44 (Rev. 08/18) CIVIL COVER SHEET
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States M September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

Michael P. O'Neil and Nicola Grasso Department of the Attorney General, Peter F.
Nerona, in his capacity as Attorney General, Rhode Island State
Police, Colonel James M. Manni, in his capacity as Colonel
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Kent County of Residence of First Listed Defendant Providence
(EXCEPT IN US. PLAIArfIFF CASES) (7N US. PIAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE ME LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.
Name, Address, and Thlephone Attorneys at. Known)

Fr Vk Attorneys (Finn
R. Saccocao
*
-
Number)
Comerford & Saccocao 928 Atwood Ave, Johnston Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island
RI (401) 944-1600 942-8921 Fax Alan A. Beck and Stephen D.
-
Stamboulieh, of counsel
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff
(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)
O 1 U.S. Government K3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF
Plaintiff (US Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State 0 1 0 1 Incotporated or Principal Place CI 4 0 4
of Business In This State
O 2 U.S. Government 0 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State CI 2 CI 2 Incmporated andPrincipal Place 0 5 II 5

Defendant (Indicate Citizenship ofParties in Item ///) I of Business In Another State
Citizen or Subject of a 0 3 CI 3 Foreign Nation 0 6 0 6
ly NATURE'. CIF STITT "Y" nm. Rm. 11PIM Click here for Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.
-
I CONTRACT TORTS FORFEITUREPPENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES 1

0 110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY 0 625 Drug Related Seizure 0 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 il 375 False Claims Act
O 120 Marine 11 310 Airplane CI 365 Personal Injury -
of Property 21 USC 881 0 423 Withdrawal 0 376 Qui Tam (31 USC
O 130 Miller Act 0 315 Airplane Product Product Liability 0 690 Other 28 USC 157 3729(a))
O 140 Negotiable Instniment Liability II 367 Health Care/ 0 400 State Reapportionment
O 150 Recovery of Overpayment 0 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS 0 410 Antitrust
& Enforcement ofJudgment Slander Personal Injury 0 820 Copyrights 0 430 Banks and Banking
O 151 Medicare Act CI 330 Federal EtnployersProduct Liability 11 830 Patent il 450 Commerce
O 152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability 0 368 Asbestos Personal 0 835 Patent Abbreviated
- il 460 Deportation
Student Loans 0 340 Marine Injury Product New Drug Application 0 470 Racketeer Influenced and
(Excludes Veterans) 11 345 Marine Product Liability 0 840 Tradeinark Corrupt Organizations
O 153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY LABOR SOCIAL SECURITY 0 480 Consumer Credit
of Veteran's Benefits 0 350 Motor Vehicle 0 370 Other Fraud CI 710 Fair Labor Standards 0 861 HIA (1395ff) CI 485 Telephone Consumer
O 160 Stockholders' Suits 0 355 Motor Vehicle 0 371 Truth in Lending Act II 862 Black Lung (923) Protection Act
O 190 Other Contract Product Liability 0 380 Other Personal 0 720 Labor/Management 0 863 D1WC/DIWW (405(g)) 0 490 Cable/Sat TV
0 195 Contract Product Liability C7 360 Other Personal Property Damage Relations CI 864 SSID Title XVI 0 850 Securities/Commodities/
CI 196 Franchise Injury 0 385 Property Damage 0 740 Railway Labor Act II 865 RSI (405(g)) Exchange
il 362 Personal Injury -
Product Liability 0 751 Family and Medical CI 890 Other Statutory Actions
Medical Malprzeice Leave Act 0 891 Agricultural Acts
t REAL PROPERTY CIVIL RIGHTS, PRISONER PETITIONS 0 790 Other Labor Litigation FEDERAL TAX SUITS 0 893 Environmental Matters
0 210 Land Condenmation -in 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: 0 791 Employee Retirement 0 870 Taxes
(U.S. Plaintiff 0 895 Freedom of Information
0 220 Foreclosure 0 441 Voting 0 463 Alien Detainee Income Security Act or Defendant) Act
il 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment CI 442 Employment 0 510 Motions to Vacate 0 871 1RS—Tliird Party 0 896 Arbitration
CI 240 Torts to Land 0 443 Housing/ Sentence 26 USC 7609 0 899 Administrative Procedure
0 245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations 0 530 General Act/Review or Appeal of
CI 290 All Other Real Property 0 445 Amer. w/Disabilities 0 535 Death Penalty
-
IMMIGRATION Agency Decision
Employment Other: 0 462 Naturalization Application x 950 Constitutionality of
0 446 Amer. w/Disabilities -
0 540 Mandamus & Other CI 465 Other Immigration State Statutes
Other 0 550 Civil Rights Actions
il 448 Education 0 555 Prison Condition
0 560 Civil Detainee -
Conditions of
Confinement
V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

X1 Original 0 2 Removed from 0 3 Remanded from 0 4 Reinstated or II 5 Transferred from CP 6 Multidistrict CI 8 Multidistrict
Proceeding State Court Appellate Court Reopened Another District Litigation -
Litigation -
(sPeci.6) Transfer Direct File

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not eitejmildictionalsnaides unless diversity):
42 USC 1983 and 28 USC 2201(a)
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief
description of cause:
Challenge to the Constitutionality of RIGL 11-47-42 ban on Stun-Guns and Tasers
VII. REQUESTED IN El CHECK IF MIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMAND S CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
COMPLAINT: UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. JURY DEMAND: 0 Yes 0 No
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)

IF ANY (See instructions):
JUDGE DOCKET
NUMEJER
DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD .41
.--- ,_.
11/21/2019 r .e4:'
RECEIPT 11 AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Rhode Island
Michael P. O'Neil and Nicola Grasso
Plaintiff(s)
V. Civil Action No.
Peter F. Neronha, in his Official Capacity as Attorney

General of Rhode Island and Colonel James M.
Manni, in his Official Capacity as the Superintendant
of the Rhode Island State Police
Defendant(s)
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant's name and address) Peter F. Neron ha, as Attorney General, 150 South Main Street, Providence, RI 02903
A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) or 60 days if you—
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
—
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion rnust be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff s attorney,
whose name and address are: Attorney Frank R. Saccoccio, c/o Comerford & Saccoccio, 928 Atwood Avenue in
*
Johnston RI 02919 (401) 944-1600 942-8921 Fax
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)
was received by me on (date)
CI I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

on (date); or
01 I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with
(name),
a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
On (date), and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or
171 I served the summons on (name of individual), who is
designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date); or
01 I returned the summons unexecuted because; or
10 Other (specifr):
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date
Server's signature
Printed name and title
Server's address
Additional information regarding atternpted service, etc:

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Rhode Island
Michael P. O'Neil and Nicola Grasso
Plaintiff(s)
v. Civil Action No.
Peter F. Neronha, in his Official Capacity as Attorney

General of Rhode Island and Colonel James M.
Manni, in his Official Capacity as the Superintendant
of the Rhode Island State Police
Defendant(s)
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant's name and address) Colonel James M. Manni, in his capacity as the Superintendent of the Rhode Island
State Police, 311 Danielson Pike, North Scituate, RI 02857
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) or 60 days if you
—
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
—
tbe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion rnust be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff s attorney,
whose name and address are: Attorney Frank R. Saccoccio, c/o Comerford & Saccoccio, 928 Atwood Avenue in
*
Johnston RI 02919 (401) 944-1600 942-8921 Fax
If you fail to respond, judgrnent by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (1))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)
was received by me on (date)
11 I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)
on (date); or
O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with
(name),
a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date), and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or
O I served the summons on (name of individual), who is
designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date); Or
O I returned the summons unexecuted because; or
O Other (specij):
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date
Server's signature
Printed name and title
Server's address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

O'Neil V Neronha (Rhode Island Taser)

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O'Neil V Neronha (Rhode Island Taser)

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Case 1:19-cv-00612 Document 1 Filed 11/22/19 Page 1 of 16 PagelD #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MICHAEL P. O'NEIL and NICOLA )

PETER F. NERONHA, in his Official )

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

through their undersigned counsel, and complain of the Defendants as follows:

resides in Providence County and is a citizen of the United States.

North Scituate, RI 02857.

at 150 South Main Street, Providence, RI 02903.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988.

6. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

a. The Second Amendment

shall not be infringed."

Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 1027 (2016).

(1771)." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.

Caetano, slip op. at 1 (per curiam).

from carrying arms. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.

Columbia, 59 F. Supp.3d 173 (2014).

protected arms under the Second Amendment:

Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 449 (5th Cir. 2016).

2012) (striking down a Michigan statute criminalizing possession of electronic

electric arms is unconstitutional), ("Pursuant to the holdings in Heller, McDonald and

criminal penalty, individuals from possessing electronic arms, is declared unconstitutional in

litigation pending enactment of legislation that decriminalized possession of stun

emergency ordinance eliminating all restrictions on ownership and possession of electronic

237 (Apr. 17, 2018) (striking Mass. ban on stun guns).1

stun guns unconstitutional because Illinoisprovision on carriage of weapons sets forth a

tasers in public." People v. Webb,2019 IL 122951,1120. And, because it is a categorical ban,

facially unconstitutional under the second amendment." Id.

which prevent them from owning and carrying electric arms.

them and declaratory relief.

laws as to all other law-abiding citizens.

are 15 feet (4.5 meter) in length.

lengths up to 25 feet in length.

civilian or the law enforcement model is employed.

shot or in the event of multiple assailants.

defence sprays or contact weapons.

Council, available at http://www.theppsc.org/Staff Views/Tueller/How.Close.htm (originally

published in the March 1983 Edition of SWAT Magazine).

(February 1997), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/162358.txt. Tasers, on the other

body of the attacker.

with an electric arm.

of danger to a potential victim.

a Taser or stun gun is minimal.

to meet to sustain a claim self-defence.

and officers than all other means of subduing suspects.

to ranged weapons like the Taser.

deploying a stun gun over deploying the Taser probes.

of knives can cause severe bodily injury and even death.

significant amount of upper body strength to use effectively

and the person deploying the spray.

against a human attacker.

c. State of Rhode Island Law.

called "Kung-Fu" weapons."

as a stun gun without deploying its probes.

d. Plaintiff Michael P. O'Neil

does not solely due to Rhode Island law.

ownership under either Rhode Island or federal law.

from firearms ownership under Rhode Island or federal law.

home for self-defense and protection of his family.

prosecution for possessing and carrying a Taser. See Exhibit "1."