FATIH UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS

SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT RND ITS BURDENS

AN ESSAY IN THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

-- Alparslan A~1kgen~

ISTANBUL
Fatih Oniversitesi Yaymlan: 3
Sosyal Bilimler Enstittisii Yaymlan: 3
Baskt-Cilt: Mega Bastm A.~. (0212) 551 11 19 (Pbx)
istanbul - Mart 2000
 CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE
A GENERAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
A. What is knowledge? ......................................................................................................... 25
B. The Object of Knowledge and the Mind .......................................................... .27
C. Experience and the Mental Representation of the Object .................... 30
1. External or Outer experience ............................................................................... 31
2. Internal or Inner Experience ................................................................................ 33
D. Mental Cognition ................................................................................................................44
1. Mental Consciousness ·.............................................................................................. 48
2. Memory ................................................................................................................................ 50
3. The Imagination ............................................................................................................ 52
4. The Intellect ...................................................................................................................... 53
5. The Will. .............................................................................................................................. 56
6. The Intuition ..................................................................................................................... 57

CHAPTER TWO
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE
A. The General Framework: Worldview ................................................................. 64
1. The Nature ofWorldviews .................................................................................. 67
2. The Structural Rise ofWorldviews ................................................................ 70
3. The Function of Worldviews ............................................................................... 76
B. The Inner Framework: The General Scientific Conceptual
Scheme ....................................................................................................................................... 84
1. The Concept of Knowledge .................................................................................. 88
2. The Concept of Truth ................................................................................................ 89
3. The Concept of Method ........................................................................................... 90
4. The Concept ofTheory ............................................................................................ 91
5. The Concept of Science ........................................................................................... 92
· C. The Specific Framework: The Specific Scientific Conceptual
Scheme ....................................................................................................................................... 93

v
 CHAPTER THREE
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
A. The Scientific Process .... ,................................................................................................ 97
1. The Stage of Problems ........................................................................................ 10 1
2. The Disciplinary Stage ........................................................................................ 102
3. The Stage ofNaming ............................................................................................ 104
B. TheScientific Community ........................................................................................ 105
1. The Interaction Between Science and Society .................................. 107
2. The Nature and Characteristics of Scientific
Communities ......................................................... ,................................................... 111
a) The Methodological Aim ........................................................................... 112
b) Scientific Ideals ................................................................................................. 116
c) Formal Linkage ................................................................................................. 117
d) Marginal Ideals .................................................................................................. 118
C. The Scientific Tradition .............................................................................................. 118
1. The Nucleus Contextual Causes ............................................ ~ ..................... 120
a) Moral Dynamism ........................................................ :..................·.................. 121
b) Intellectual Dynamism ................................................................................. 121
2. Marginal Contextual Causes ......................................................................... 124
a) Social Dynamism ............................................................................................. 124
b) The Institutional Dynamism .................................................................... 125

CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CASE STUDIES
A. Greek Civilization ......................................·.......................................................... 128
B. Western Civilization ............................................................................................ 133
C. Islamic Civilization ....................................... :....................................................... 139
1. The Worldview of Islam as the Environment of Islamic
Science ...................................................................................................................... 143
' a) The Emergence of the World-Structure
(610-622 A.D.) ..............................................·..................................................... 146
b) The Emergence of the Islamic Knowledge-Structure
within the Islamic Worldview (0-1 0 A.H./622-
632A.D.) .................................................................................................................. l52
2. The Emergence of the Islamic Scientific Tradition
(10-200 A.H./632-800 A.D.) ......................................................................... 158

vi
 a) The Emergence of the Islamic Scientific Conceptual
Scheme ..................................................................................................................... 158
b) The Emergence of the Early Islamic Scientific
Tradition .................................................................................................................. 162

CHAPTER FIVE
THE RISE OF PARTICULAR SCIENCES
WITHIN THE ISLAMIC SCIENTIFIC TRADITION
A. Al-Fiqh .............................................. :.............................................................................. :....... 169
1. The Stage of Scientific Problems (622 - c. 700) .................. 171
2. The Rise of a Disciplinary Tradition (c. 700 -· 750) .............. 175
3. The Emergence of the Stage of Naming in al-Fiqh
(c. 100's/750's) ........................................................................................................ 190
B. Kaltim ........................................................................................................................................ 191
1. The Stage of Problems (610 -730's) ........................................................ l92
2. The Rise of a Disciplinary Tradition in Kalam
(730's-800's) ........................................................................................................... :.203
3. The Emergence of KaHim as a Science
(200's- 350A.H./800's-950's): The Stage of Naming ................ 209
C. Political Philosophy, History and Other Sciences .................................. 212

CONCLUSION
A. The Non-Observable Foundation ........................................................................ 221
1. The Environment .................................................................................................... 223
2. The Context ............... :................................................................................................223
3. The Environmental Context ........................................................................... 224

B. The Function ofWorldview in Scientific Advancement.. ................ .224

C. The Observable Foundation .................................................................................... .228

1. The Effects of Environmental Context .................................................. 228
2 .. Material Oppurtunities ................................................................................ :..... .229
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 231
Index ........................................................................................................................ ........,.......................251

vii
 I NTHDOUCTI ON
One of the most prominent and compelling human activities since the
beginning of human history has been science, which began with the
curiosity to know in the form of a simple learning activity. Although our
initial statement here implies existence of science since the beginning of
our history on earth, this essay will exhibit that only one specific kind of a
learning activity is defined as science. As this is the main task of this
study, namely the attempt to reach a cogent definition of science, in order
to clarify this concept, we have another crucial issue at hand: In recent
decades philosophy of science has faced the debate concerning the
question whether science is absolute and universal in itself or merely
conventional depending on the society in which it flourishes. We take the
Positivist stand as defending the former thesis, and the Historicist stand
the latter; whereas our stand in this essay shall argue for a stand defending
somewhat a middle position between these extremes. If the former is held
then science cannot be put into a specific perspective. For in this sense
science is taken to be absolute and universal; it is thus the same in all
different civilizations, such as the ancient Greek, Islamic, and Western
civilizations. But we know that there are in science certain elements which
enable us to put science into such models as 'Islamic', 'secular' and
'Christian' . 1 This endeavout: as an attempt in philosophy of science, as
understood in this context, is an essay to formulate this position
epistemologically. But, at the same time, we shall argue that the matter is
not so simple, and that there arein science some epistemological elements
springing primarily from the constitution of our mental faculties of
knowledge that renders science as a universal human phenomenon. These
scientific elements will be termed here 'disciplinary elements', among
which the most crucial is the scientific consciousness, which is required
by the systematic miture of our mind.

I We must refer to such a usage as, for example, "The Early Growth of the Secular
Sciences in Andalusia", by George F. Hourani, S/ 32 (J 970). Since the term 'secular'
is a value-laden concept, once it is used in relation to science its implication for other
value-laden concepts must be acceptable as well.
 By the systematic nature of our mind, we mean that natural mental
function which forms an organized unity for itself in order to be able to
carry out its operations. As we grow up from infancy to adulthood this
mental unity is established gradually, forming itself into an architectonic
unity which, as a mental framework, we call 'worldview'. Therefore,
when we try to acquire knowledge our mind grasps that knowledge within
this unity which has been shaped in the mind. In this way, if a specific
subject of inquiry is investigated for a long period of time with an
uninterrupted chain of investigators, the knowledge accumulated therein
will be perceived gradually within a disciplinary unity. When this
awareness emerges in the min9s of ~he scholars involved in that activity
they become conscious of the fact that subjects they have been
investigating constitutes a: specific discipline, which is then given a certain
name designating thus a particular science. It is such an awareness that we
shall entitle 'scientific consciousness' which is, as we shall see, the natural
result of the constitution of our mind. If scientific consciousness belongs
thus to our mind as an epistemological characteristic, then it cannot be
conventional. It is this kind of elements that this essay will try to trace in
the concept of science in three civilizations taken as case studies; ancient
Greek, Islam and the Western. As such though it is an historical essay,
since it will utilize a different framework in its historical attempt, we need
to develop that framework itself also in this essay. Hence, it is at once
historical and philosophical through which the concept of science will be
examined from the perspective of the history and philosophy of Greek,
Islamic and West~rn science.
Among these civilizations taken as cases of study here, Islamic
science will be emphasized more in order to reach a definition of science
within a specific civilization, which can be applied to other case studies as
well. Since no underlying theory has been suggested to clarify what is
meant by Islamic science, many objections have been raised concerning
even the possibility of this concept. There is also a historical reason behind
these objections: in the High Islamic civilization one does not come across
the adjectival usage of the term "Islam" in connection to certain things, and
more particularly, with certain concepts. But today it has become a
common usage, especially in relation to certain activities which are

2
 borrowed from other civilizations and adopted by Muslims to their society;
constructions such as Islamic science, Islamic economics, Islamic theory
of knowledge, Islamic ethics, and so on, were unheard of before. We are
thus left with a controversy to determine what kind of an activity and a
concept, doctrine or idea is Islamic. A noun is also derived from this
adjective; Islamicity. We shall, then, refer to the problems surrounding
this concep.t as the 'controversy of Islamicity'. Although this controversy
has no relation to philosophy of science in general, it is related to one
particular problem to be discussed in this essay; can there be such
designations as Islamic science or Western science? Of course no one
would object to the simple usage of these terms to refer to merely the
scientific achievements in these civilizations without implying any
epistemological attribution of these adjectives.
Let us try to give an example, taking into consideration one of our
case study civilizations, Islam: That physics is a science no one can doubt;
and it is an organized and systematized body of knowledge. Yet in it one
may find many propositions in contradiction with the Qur'an, such as the
eternity of the world, and its implication of the unnecessity of a creator.
Therefore, one must either admit that an organized body of knowledge can
be in conflict with the Revelation, in which case it is to be chara~terized
unislamic, or that all knowledge. is necessarily Islamic, hence, the piece of
information contradicting the Revelation is not know ledge at all. Of
course, the latter conclusion is also a solution, but unfortunately it leads to
some disturbances even from the Islamic perspective.
In order to show this point, let us consider the following f:tadlth,
which is the other major source of Islamic belief, Qur' an being the first:
"My Lord! I seek refuge to youfrom the harmful knowledge." (Muslim,
"Kitab al-Dhikr", 73; Abu Dawud, "Witr", 32 and many other l}.adHh
books) . It seems that there can be unislamic knowledge, which is a fact
that seems so baffling to many Muslim intellectuals and even scientists
today and as a result they argue in vain that science is science and it is
value-free, hence it is neutral so far as cultures are concerned. This
conclusion may not be acceptable to the one who thinks that something
unislamic cannot be knowledge, but this is a naive solution and does not
 provide an epistemological way out. In that case definition of knowledge
from the Islamic perspective must also be studied with much care.
One of the most significant intellectual challenges that faces Muslim
societies today is also to catch up with the scientific advancement of our
time. Unfortunately many individuals within the Muslim civilization today
try to encounter this intellectual challenge by resorting to technology which
seems to provide a temporarY. brute might. Although especially military
might has become very critical for Muslims as well, even such a
superiority is not the result of technology alone. The most enduring power
is knowledge, but Muslims have never pursued knowledge for this
purpose and we should not encourage it either. This brings us to a
proposition which is held with a degree of emphasis in one of our case
study civilizations, the Western. First of all, we have to admit the truth of
this proposition. For truth is powerful, rriaybe not in a physical sense but
ultimately in a compelling moral sense. But, secondly, if knowledge is
used as power to subjugate nature, animals and other human fellows, then
this proposition has a physical sense too. As far as the powerful aspect of
knowledge is concerned, it is the use involved in knowledge that makes it
a moral concept, not the fact that it renders its beholder powerful. For, the
moral power it endows us with makes us indeed feel very weak in an
ultimate sense of awareness that all our knowledge compared to the
immense Wisdom involved in the system of the universe arriounts to
almost nothing, which makes us realize that all we know is the fact that we
do not indeed know anything.
Therefore, though knowledge is not independent of our mind, yet we
can ideally think that in itself it is pure goodness and thus we have
\
perceived i~ as pure light opposing darkness in the sense of ignorance. If
that is the case, then pow can we face firmly this intellectual challenge that
is leveled from the scientific front? This essay is a response to this
question from another intellectual front, the epistemological. This means
that we must first try to clarify from the Islamic perspective how scientific
knowledge is acquired, so that we may approach science from this
perspective.
Since Islamic science is nothing but science carried out within the
Islamic worldview and as such the Islamic worldview is the conceptual, or

4
 mental environment within which scientific activities in the Islamic
civilization is carried out, we must first attempt to outline in general the
Islamic worldview itself, so that we can see what kind of a concept of
science may be yielded from such a world view. In order to do that,
however, we must clarify what is meant by the concept of worldview in
general. This concept, as the general framework of scientific activities will
be discussed in the second chapter. In this connection there is a very
complicated problem of defining science itself. But conclusive definition
of science can only be reached only after a careful examination of the tel'm
in different civilizations; an attempt which shall give us the universal
characteristic(s) of science. But an examination of science within its
sociological environment will also give us differences in scientific
activities in different societies, which we show to spring from the different
conceptualizations of science itself, hence, we reach the concepts of
Greek, Islamic and Western sciences. This essay will attempt to do this
task; but in this introduction we shall attempt to reach a provisional and
very broad definition of science that is acceptable within all these
frameworks; the Greek, Islamic and the Western as well.
When those kinds of human activities geared toward acquiring
knowledge is examined in qur three case civilizations, we find that there
are individually organized bodies of knowledge that can be characterized
as disciplines. As a preliminary approach, therefore, we shall refer to any
organized body of knowledge as 'discipline', which i& systematized with a
certain method, geared at the same time towards furthering that knowledge
itself. Each discipline, then, is a body of knowledge which is eventually,
through an uninterrupted process, expressed by the term 'science' and as
such we must distinguish it from the activity of acquiring knmvledge in a
general sense. For science is not possible without scientific activities, but
the other way around is possible in the sense that the adjective 'scientific'
does not refer to a discipline as an organized body of knowledge. This
interpretation assumes that the adjectival usage of the term 'science' may
not always refer to the existence of sciences in a given civilization. For
example, we may, in a history of science book, try to describe in an
ancient society certain activities of learning as 'scientific activities', but this
does not necessarily mean that there were sciences as disciplines in that
5
 society. It merely means that within that civilization there were certain \
learning activities, the outcome of which resembles what we call today
science.
If science is thus taken strictly to refer to disciplines, it cannot but
exist only as the output of scientific activities carried out within a
consciousness that the subject under investigation can be organized into a
body of knowledge. In order to reach at least a preliminary definition of
science, therefore, we must, it seems, examine only the essential
characteristics of disciplines. For other characteristics belonging to these
disciplines individually, and to scientific activities, in a stricter sense, do
not constitute what we ordinarily call 'science'. Individual characteristics
of disciplines are what make each individual science distinct from each
other, and as such they cannot be taken as criteria in the definition of
sciences.
When we examine all disciplines, therefore, we find that they all have,
in the first place, a subject matter; no discipline can thus be called a
science unless it has a well-defined and clearly determined body of
problems, which constitute its subject matter. Secondly, we also observe
that these subject matters in each discipline are examined in a peculiar way,
which constitute what is ordinarily called method. Thirdly, in every
discipline we see that the application of the method to the subject matter at
hand produces some provisional opinions, expressed in peculiar
formulations, which is ordinarily called theories. Finally, when these
three determinations in each discipline are worked out into a process, it
• I

yields an accumulation of knowledge within that discipline. Therefore,

subject matter, method, theory and an accumulated body of knowledge are
the four essential characteristics of a science; without having all these four
characteristics no discipline can epistemologically claim to be a science.
Scientific consciousness is, on the other hand, the epistemological ground
which is a priori in the mind that holds these within a unity. We shall try.
to further elaborate each characteristic.

1. Subject Matter
Logically speaking every human activity has an object, but usually objects
of such general activities are not defined as subject matter. In that case,

6
 only those activities that are 4imed at learning must have objects of study
which can be defined as 'subject matter'. Even this broad characterization
does not qualify any subject of study to be science. For, a subject of study
usually defines its subject matter in such a way that it includes as subject
matter only those objects, entities and phenomena which can be classified
only under that subject matter; it thus excludes all unrelated subjects of
inquiry. It is for this reason that we claim the subject matter of a science to
be well defined.
Though a subject matter is essential for a body of knowledge to be
science, the kind of a subject matter is determined for a specific science by
the convention of the scientists involved in that activity. This means that
even this characteristic of science has two aspects: one, epistemological
and hence, a priori renders it to be absolute; and the other is sociological,
hence conventional, and thus relative to the community of scientists
involved in specifying that subject matter. The fact that our mind requires a
clear cut subject defined for an inquiry constitutes the former aspect; and
the fact that a certain type of topic is chosen for a certain discipline
constitutes the latter. It is because of these epistemological and sociological
nature of this characteristic of science that we sometimes find a science
with different subjects of inquily in different civilizations. But one fact
never changes in all these different civilizations; having a well defined
subject matter delineated for a specific science.
We shall try to show in this essay that the way a group of scientists
carry out their scientific activities constitutes a 'tradition' which will be
termed here 'scientific tradition' in order to distinguish it from other forms
of cultural traditions. We shall clarify further what is meant by a scientific
tradition in the third chapter. The group of scientists involved in scientific
enterprise within a certain scientific tradition are called 'scientific
community', ( 'ulama' in the Islamic scientific terminology) which has
conventions not similar to that of the society in general as their
conventions are of the cognitive nature. Once these concepts are clarified
we should understand that subject matter of a science is deter'mined
through the convention of the scientific community according to the
framework provided within their respective scientific tradition.

7
 If, for example, we take the Islamic scientific tradition, we can see
that any subject that is studied in a speculative manner is identified as the
subject matter of kalam; a similar determination of subject matter is found
in the Greek scientific tradition where study of any subject in a
methodological way is identified as philo-sophia. As the knowledge
accumulated around this extremely broad subject matter increases the need
to cut down the subject matter arises. In this way, different sciences arose
in both scientific traditions. When this happens usually the subject matter
gives its name to the newly emerging science; e. g., physics (meaning
study of nature), psychology (meaning study of soul) and so on.
A subject matter can be well defined if there is a sufficient
accumulation of knowledge around that subject of investigation. The
accumulated knowledge includes not only the discoveries in that learning
activity, if there are any at all, but also the theories developed and the
methodology used in these activities. In fact once the subjetc is defined
and limited by excluding other discussions in the learning activities
through the efforts of the scientific community involved, there usually
arises a method of investigation which is peculiar to that subject matter.
Therefore, a well developed metij.od is also essential for the newly
emerging body of knowledge to be qualified as science.

2. Method
The manner in which a scientific investigation is carried out constitutes the
concept of method as an essential characteristic pertaining to science. Our
definition of method in this context is held broad enough so as to include
the conception of method as understood by all scientific traditions. This
means that an essential characteristic of science does not have to be
conceived in exactly the same way in all traditions. Hence, the concept of
method ma:y be defined differently in the Islamic scientific tradition from
the way it is defined in the Western scientific. tradition, for example. But
the fact that for a body of knowledge to be called 'science' it must have a
method, whatever that method may be and in whatever way it may be
conceived, is a requirement of not only convention but also of the
epistemological construction of our faculties of knowledge. Therefore, it is
not a mere accident that in all traditions of learning in which there emerged

8
 an organized body of knowledge with a specific name of science, only
those knowledge-seeking activities that are carried out with a certain
method are regarded science. This is so clear in our case civilizations that
in all the three scientific traditions the concept of method is investigated
even in a science, defined as methodology, and 'ilm u~ul in the Islamic
case.
If the method applied in each science changes according to the needs
and requirements of the subject matter, then it is possible to divide the
methodological aspects of sciences according to the classification of the
subject matters. In the Islamic perspective, for example, this has a more
significance, because all subjects of inquiry can be divided into three,
based on the Islamic worldview: 1. the absolute ghayb, which will be
called in this essay 'the Transcendent Absolute'; 2. the relative ghayb,
which is called here 'the Experiential Absolute; 3. the shahiidah, which is
the physical universe. We have chosen our terminology from the Qur'anic
verse repeated many times: iilirri al-ghayb wa al-shahiidah (39/al-Zumar,
46; 23/al-Mu'miniin, 92; 6/al-An'am, 63; 59/al-J:Iashr, 22; 9/al-Tawbah,
105; etc.). The .p1ethodology of Islamic science is thus determined through
the worldview inspired by the Qur' an. In order to clarify the concept of
method we need to elucidate this point further. We shall argue that like
many other scientific concepts that we develop in our scientific traditions,
the concept of method also derives largely from the foundational
worldview. We can show this on the basis of the Islamic worldview as
based on its fundament~! source, the Qur' an. As we have shown, since
there are fundamentally three subjects of inquiry derived as a mentality
from the Qur' an, then we may ask: how should we go about inquiring
them?
With regard to the Transcendent Absolute realm, the Qur'an
categorically points out that no one can know the gf?.ayb except Allah: "Say
(0 Mul,lammad): 'I do not tell you that I possess the treasures of God, nor
do I know the ghayb ... I only follow what is revealed'" (6/al-An'am, 50);
"Or that the ghayb is in their hands, so that they can write it down?" (68/
al-Qalam, 47); "To God belongs the ghayb of the heavens and the earth."
(16/al-Nal;ll, 77); "God alone has the keys of the ghayb; none but He

9
 knows them." (6/al-An 'am, 59). 2 If this is the case then the only method
available for the study of this subject matter is to try to understand the
Revelation without any interpretation whatsoever. The evidence for this is
the verse "no one knows what its true meaning is, except Allah; and those
endowed with knowledge say: 'we believe in it, all of it comes from our
Lord'." (3/Ali 'Imran, 7). But in the Experientially Absolute subjects, not
only interpretation, but also rational investigation is also allowed, provided
that again Revelation is taken as the guide. 3 Therefore, our faculties of
knowledge are not left totally independent in these subjects since the
subject matter is still the ghayb, such as the existence of God, the
existence of a life after death and so on. The fact that the Qur' an lays
responsibility on humans concerning these subjects is an evidence that if
there is responsibility it must somehow be :j:>ossible to know these
subjects. Otherwise, how can we be held responsible in believing in
God's existence yet there would be no way of knowing this issue even
rationally? This possibility is expressed as an inner experience based on a
faculty, called 'heart', on the one hand, and as intellect thinking on the
basis of this inner experience on the other hand. For this reason the realm
of knowledge in this sphere is termed 'experiential Absolute' meaning it is
the Absolute with regard to the external faculties, but experiential with
regard to the inner faculties guided by the Revelation as a moral life. Let us
take just one among many QUll'anic encouragement to investigate this
realm rationally: "There is no lack of proportion in the creation of God. So
turn your eyes (and look_around). Do you see any defect? Again, turn
your sight (and examine) a second time. But your eyes will come back to
you dull and frustrated in a state worn out" (67/Mulk, 3-4). The methods
applied in these disciplines will be developed on the basis of the
Revelation; otherwise,- the science will lack the Islamic character. This
point will be elaborated further in the following pages.
2 In this essay the translations of the Qur'an are based on the following works: A.
Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary (Brentwood,
MD: Amana Corp., 1983); A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1976) and T. B. Irving, The Qur'an: Translation and
Commentary (Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1988).
3 See for example 26/ai-Shu'ara', 88-89; 50/Qaf, 37; 7/ai-A'rfif, 179; 13/ai-Ra'd, 28;
22/ai-I:Iajj, 46, etc.
10
 Finally with regard to the sciences dealing with the physical universe,
no restriction is brought by the Qur'an, which means that we can develop
any method that is suitable for studying such subjects. But of course, even
this method will naturally be dominated by the environment of the mental
activity itself, that is the worldview; and as such it will naturally, based on
the epistemological constitution of our faculties of knowledge, carry 'the
characteristic of Islamicity. This is the concept of method that has been
applied in Islamic science. The details of this will be developed further in
the following sections of this essay. But it must be clear that the method of
sciences may thus change from one scientific tradition to another. But the
fact that some method must exist is a necessary characteristic of sciences
and scientific activities as an epistemological requirement.

3. Scientific Theories
When a method is applied to a certain subject matter, usually a provisional
formulation is reached; this formulation has different names in different
scientific traditions. In the early Islamic tradition they were called 'ra 'y'; in
Western and Greek scientific tradition it is called 'theory'. In later Islamic
scientifiC terminology, however, with the influence of the Greek scientific
tradition the concept of ra 'y was restricted to the legal usage, and instead,
na'{.ar was employed. Just as a science cannot be without a m_ethod, in the
same way it cannot be witllout a body of theories. Though this is a
universal characteristic belonging to science, the way a theoty is conceived
and required to be formulated is by no means universal to all the scientific
-traditions.
What ldnd of a formulation qualifies to be called scientific theory? If
we talce into consideration again the Islamic scientific tradition, no the01y
can be entertained in the Transcendent Absolute realm, since we are not in
a position to acquire knowledge in this field except through the Revelation,
in which case the knowledge imparted is also Absolute and thus not a
theory. Consider the /:ladith: "if one interprets the Qur' an on the basis of
his theory, he has committed an error even if he is correct in his
interpretation" (man qiilafi'l-Qur'an bi ra 'yihifa a~aba, fa qad akh,ta')4.

4sunan Abu Diiwud, op. cit., 1036.

11
 It is the same with regard to an interpretation which does not consider the
Revelation in subjects that fall under the Experiential Absolute.
But the theories concerning subjects related to the physical universe
can be determined by the conventions of the scientific community involved
in such investigations. Therefore, their conception may change from one
tradition to another. We do accept, however, that there may be some
universal aspects of such theories springing primarily from the nature of
our faculties of knowledge. The concept of theory is so essential to science
that without theories there can be no science. For, science is basically after
the unknown to be discovered through the known. Our initial knowledge
concerning the unknown is expressed or rather formulated on the basis of
certain criteria determined by the investigators in a scientific tradition.
Therefore, it is not the case that any initial formulation concerning the
unknown is considered a theory. Science in this respect is essentially
theoretical knowledge, and as such if a science, let us suppose, runs out of
theories, that means it has nothing left to investigate and has exhausted its
subject matter; as a result it will cease to be. Therefore, science is not an
accumulation of definite knowledge, but rather of such knowledge as well
as a large body of theories.
If a theory is discovered to be true, then the subject it covers is
excluded from the subject matter of that science. This shows the close
relationship between the subject matter and theories in a science. The
proven theory becomes a scientific discovery and as such is added on the
accumulated body of knowledge to be used for other unsolved problems in
that science.

4. Accumulation of Knowledge
As a necessary characteristic belonging to science, accumulation of
knowledge is not a mere aggregation of data; it is rather ~ systematic
arrangement of scientific knowledge in such a way that it yields an
organized body of knowledge, which includes the methodology of that
science, its theories and scientific discoveries. 'Systematic' in the scientific
sense means that the knowledge accumulated in a discipline is organized
according to certain principles in such a way that this knowledge can be
meaningfully related to other areas of investigation whether already formed

12
 into a discipline or not. If in this way all sciences are related and
constructed together they constitute what we call 'system'. Therefore,. the
term systematic already subsumes under itself an organized knowledge so
that when we say "science is an organized body of knowledge" this
proposition already includes the idea of a system. For this reason, when a
systematic body of knowledge is given a name, it is the result of an
awareness which perceives the subject of inquiry constituting a discipline.
We have entitled this awareness 'scientific consciousness' without which
no subject matter can be formed into a discipline.
Hence, it seems that scientific consciousness is the most essential
characteristic of a body of knowledge which can be called science. It is
through this consciousness that an accumulated body of knowledge in an
uninterrupted chain of investigators comes to be realized as· constituting a
discipline which can also be named, and once it is so named it is perceived
as a science, a name which is also givel). conventionally. Therefore, this
characteristic is already included in the idea of accumulation of knowledge
in a subject of investigation. Otherwise, any kind of gathering information
cannot lead to the emergence of a science. We must also understand that
scientific consciousness is the result of the function of our mental faculties
of knowledge; it is embedded therein a priori. For, as we shall argue in
this essay, it is the nature of ou.r mind to perceive things within a certain
framework which it builds for itself. It is indeed this framework which is
called system if it is constructed philosophically; but if it is formed in our
minds through our physical and social environment, we shall term it
'worldview'. We hope that this will be clarified in the first part of our
essay.
The accumulation of knowledge, therefore, already includes in itself
the methodology of that science, as well as the discoveries made and the
theories constructed in that science, especially the current ones. Then, that
body of knowledge is named. Naming an organized body of knowledge is
forming it into a science, which requires a group of scholars working in a .
specific subject matter for a period of time, which may take centuries.
Therefore, there must be certain unifying principles not only recognized by
the members of that group, but accepted and elaborated by them as well.
In this way a tradition is established by the group, which thus constitutes a

13
 community, which will be called in this essay 'scientific community' a
phrase borrowed from the Western philosophic terininology (as mentioned
above, the term which roughly corresponds to this in the Islamic scientific
tradition is 'ulamii '). If it is such a community to name a science, or in
some cases it may be just one prominent member of that community to
name it, we can argue that naming a science is also a process, which will
be elaborated again in the third chapter of this essay as the sociology of
science.
Organizing thus the accumulated knowledge in a subject of inquiry
into a body of knowledge is done in many ways; in ancient Greek science
this was done in the form of commentaries; a scientific tradition which
continued in the Islamic science as well. It can be done also in the form of
writing text books for a special field. But the most systematic way is the
one Aristotle had done; it is constructing a philosophical system, every
part of which constitutes a specific science. When Aristotle had done this,
he gave a name for each part of his system, clearly also calling them
science. That part, for example, which dealt with physical substances he
called physics, the part which dealt with imperishable substances and in
particular with God he called theology, and so on. He also made it clear
that in his general classification the name theoretical philosophy does not
constitute a science, but rather it includes some sciences that have similar
features. This again shows the systematic approach of a scientific
consciousness.
Since these four characteristics are said to be essential, they are at
once the universal characteristics of scienc.es as well. But we must point
out that some of these characteristics are universal but not absolute, there
are yet others which are both universal and absolute at the same time. First
of all, no human invention can be absolute. For 'absolute' is a term which
we apply only to either that which is outside human beings (i.e. genuinely
objective, that is real) or that which is divine. Therefore, anything that is
established by human beings is conventional. If, on the other hand, there
is in science something that follows from the constitution of our faculties
of knowledge, then that cannot be conventionally universal but rather
absolutely universal. It is this aspect of science that is strikingly similar in
all scientific traditions, as it shall become evident in this essay as well. For

14
 example, no human being will go about inquiring a subject that is
_experimental without any observation or some kind of an experimentation,
though the ways of doing these scientific manners may change from
culture to culture. We, therefore, accept that scientific conventiqns are
established on the basis of the constitution of our faculties of knowledge.
For it is our mental faculties that require a systematic approach in acquiring
knowledge, which in turn leads to the scientific consciousness.
We thus derive three aspects of science from our above analysis:
conventions, developed by the community of scholars involved; m;td the
subject of inquiry, finally, our epistemological constitution which governs
all these activities. Now suppose the subject of inquiry is a mathematical
problem or an issue concerning the atomic structure of material bodies;
since we know that these subjects are investigated in all the three
civilizations, then the subject is the same in all the three scientific
traditions. Obviously the third aspect, namely our epistemological
constitution, will necessarily be the same, since the investigators in all the
three cases are human beings. But if we assume that there was· no
influence taldng place between them, would the first be the same as well in
all the three civilizations? Of course, conventions can be same in different
civilizations but this is only a matter of accident; for they can be different.
Hence, scientific conventions f!lso do not resemble out of a necessity; they
resemble because of mutual cultural exchanges or as a result of chance. ._
We can clarify one more misconception in this regard: it is sometimes
argued that if there is such a thing as Islamic science in the true sense,_ or
Western science, then how can be scientific exchange of ideas between
cultures and civilizations? The answer is simple; considering the above
three aspects, we can say that on the basis of the second and third aspects
we are able to cooperate in our scientific endeavours. But cooperation and
scientific exchange on the basis of conventions is almost impossible
because they involve the worldview of that scientific tradition.
Conventions are heavily dominated by the worldview of its environment
and therefore without entering meaningfully into that environment it is not
possible to grasp the conventions of a scientific tradition. Since in our
century many Muslims go to the West to study, in a general sense they
become aware of the Western worldview and thus are able to assimilate

15
many of their scientific conventions as well. But the fact that when they
return to their country they cannot meaningfully contribute to the
advancement of sciences in their homeland, shows that the scientific
conventions which they try to use do not work within a foreign frame of
mind, i.e. within the environment in which their own worldview is
dominant. Instead, if they try to borrow only those characteristics that
universally belong to us all and then try to develop a scientific convention
based on their own worldview they will be more successful. But this takes
time and patience, because it is a tradition and a tradition does not grow
over the night.
Based on our analysis here we may now attempt to present a worldng
definition of science; since in the scientific convention, as understood
here, any discipline that has a well-defined body of problems, a scholarly
developed method, according to which a well-formulated body of theories
emerge, and as a result an accumulation of knowledge arises is a science,
we have criteria upon which a definition of science can be grounded:

The nam~d awareness of an organized body of knowledge,

which arises as a result of the process in determining a
subject matter, investigated by a certain method yielding
theories, is science.

If we examine the scientific traditions in Islam and the Western

civilizations, we will see that in both civilizations as well as the Greek,
whatever is called science as a discipline conforms to our definition. This
means that our definition is universal because it is based on the natural
process of acquiring knowledge. But still certain thinkers offer that for
something to be called science it must submit knowledge to a "rational
investigation and try to trace causal reiations among its parts". 5 Yet others
maintain that science is commonly used to denote:

1. a set of characteristic methods by means of which knowledge is

certified;
2. a stock of accumulated knowledge stemming from the application of
these methods;

5 See William C. Dampier. A History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1989), xiii.

16
 3. a set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed
scientific;
4. any combination of the foregoing. 6
If science is taken to mean one of the above taken singly or in any
combination of them, then it is definitely misconceived; for science must
be taken above all as a discipline in which a body of knowledge is
organized in accordance with the principles and methodology that emerged
in such an accumulation of knowledge. If this understanding is not
included in the definition of science we cannot accurately describe this
phenomenon of acquiring knowledge. Hence, we argued that scientific
consciousness is an integral part of the concept of science, without which
science cannot be adequately defined.
Although we specify this definition as universal, the application of it
by different scientists can. never be universal. This is because, the
application of a certain concept requires a conceptual environment which
is necessarily different in each case. By the 'conceptual environment' we
mean the worldview of individuals within which science is applied. It is
thus in terms of such an environment that the definition of Islamic science
must be sought. The conceptual environment will be elaborated in the
second as the concept of worldview.
It is clear, therefore, that the concept of science, just like many other
similar concepts, requires a framework. It is thus inevitable to start our
analysis of the concept of science with an epistemology which delineates
how scientific knowledge is acquired. If an epistemology is not developed
in a context in which a discourse concerning the philosophy of science is
carried on it can lead to misunderstanding the ground upon whiCh the
concept of science is based. Thet~efore, the epistemology of science must
exhibit on what kind of a ground theconcept of science is established.
Since our approach in this context is primarily episte-mological, we shall
try to show the epistemological ground of any scientific activity.
Therefore, we need to demonstrate the epistemological ground on which
any scientific activity is necessarily based. This will reql!ire us to outline

6 Robert K. Merton. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical

Investigations, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1978), 268.
17
 first a general theory of knowledge, then the extension of that theory of
knowledge upon which our scientific activities are grounded more
specifically. This will be done in the first chapter. But as we do this, we
must concentrate on a general sketch of a theory of knowledge which will
be sufficient for our purpose in this context; otherwise, we are not in a
position here to develop a comprehensive theory of knowledge.
Once this is understood then we can show how scientific knowledge
emerges in a given society. This has two aspects: epistemological; and
social. The former constitutes what we shall do in the second chapter as
the general framework of science. The latter is what we shall do in the
third chapter as the sociology of science. For, our scientific activities are
governed not only by our faculties of knowledge, but as a human
phenomenon occurring within a certain group of people, called either
'scientists' or '·scholars', it must also be governed by the social
constitution of this society or community of scientists. Hence, scientific
activities emerge out of an epistemological and sociological constitution of
humans. This is the case with the concept of science in Islam, as well as
within Greek and Western civilizations. Without developing these two
grounds of scientific activities we cannot investigate how the term 'ilm,
for example, came to mean science in Islam, and episteme in the ancient
Greece, and finally scientia in the Western case. Therefore, the fourth
chapter will concentrate on the application of these grounds to the Islamic
scientific tradition primarily. As far as the other civilizations are concerned
we shall try to deduce sufficient evidence from them as well, for if we go
into details of the scientific achievements inthese civilizations also, our
essay will turn completely into a 'history of science'.

18
 CHAPTER ONE
A GENERAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Scientific activity is basically an act of knowledge-acquisition which can
be explained on the basis of a process through which we acquire
knowledge. But scientific knowledge is not just any kind of knowledge,
and in fact it has been defined specifically to be a certain kind of
knowledge. Therefore, its acquisition must come about through two
different processes: first is the general knowledge-acquisition process;
second is the specific knowledge-acquisition process through which only
scientific knowledge is acquired. The former is primarily natural, whereas
the latter is mechanical and hence, it depends on the first process to
function. We shall try to explain what we mean by the general and specific
knowledge-acquisition processes.
Since the acquisition of knowledge through education is learning, the
educational process involved in teaching is excluded from the natural
knowledge-acquisition process which we take to mean 'acquiring
knowledge naturally'. By using the word 'naturally', we do not mean that
we acquire knowledge in the same sense as, for example, our stomach
digests food without our deliberate intervention. On the contrary, though
in early life we may acquire knowledge in this way as well, nevertheless a
mature human being does make a conscious effort in attaining know ledge.
What we mean by acquiring knowledge naturally is, then, the fact that the
process itself is governed by faculties with which we are born. We can in
this respect draw an analogy between our faculties of knowledge vis-a-
vis the process of knowledge and a factory vis-a-vis what it produces.
Namely, if a factory is producing flour, then the product is like the
knowledge our mind acquires. In this case, since the factory is alr~ady
built, just like our mind, it has a natural capacity for such a production,
and similarly the raw material given to the factory must have such a
propensity naturally that it can become flour. But since there is available a
variety of raw materials with a nature to become flour there will be
naturally a variety of different flour; such as if rice is given the factory will
produce rice flour, if barley is given, then it will produce barley flour and
so on. Therefore, the human mind functions naturally in this universal
19
 way, but because there is a variety of input given to the mind knowledge
produced also varies. Even if the input, namely to use Kant's term, the
raw material, is always the same the process of our epistemic activity is
still influenced by other factors, such as our own inner psychology and
the environment, whether physical or social; as a result, still there will be
differences in the outcome, though in this case it would be of course less.
One may include, therefore, human psychology into the epistemo-
logical aspect of the mind, which will influence the knowledge acquired.
Moreover, since we are able to intervene in this process we can put our
own mark on it as well. This rrieans that the process of acquiring
knowledge will have aspects that are universally the same in all humans,
and yet some other aspects that are not universally applicable to all
humans. Epistemology is a science that is concerned with only the
universal aspects of the process of knowing; and hence, it is just like the
medical science which tries to explain the phenomenon of sight for all
human.s. Therefore, in epistemology we deal only with the general theory
of the process of knowing; dealing with particular problems pertaining to
the variable aspects of this process does not belong to theory of
knowledge unless it is relevantly brought into context. Otherwise they are
dealt with in other disciplines, such as psychology, education and their
relevant branches. In this case, the general theory of knowledge is a
formulation which attempts to capture this·universally valid aspects of the
mind and all other faculties involved in this process.
The specific knowledge-acquisition is the process of learning,
namely, attaining the scientific knowledge, and as such we are not much
concerned with it; whatever they may be, they are not natural. Since this
process is rather governed by devices which science-teachers and/or
educational theorists develop in the educational system. Their influence on
the conception of science yielded by such a mechanical system is
overwhelming and only in this sense we shall deal with it. If, then, we are
concerned with the process of knowledge-acquisition only in the natural
sense, this means that we must primarily deal with a theory of knowledge.
Therefore, we shall attempt in this context to present a theory of
knowledge as the ground of such activities.

20
 We would like to express in this context an issue which is
significantly related to our framework in this essay; although a science,
such as epistemology, deals with the universal human problems, such as
the process of knowing, yet its theories are interpreted and held within the
mind in a certain framework will influence its perspective to a certain
degree, and once it is held as such it can acquire adjectives such as Greek,
secular, Islamic or Western (epistemology). Of course, the Islamicity of a
theory of knowledge is, for example, provided by the Islamic perspective;
but this suggestion in itself does not solve our problem, since we can
further ask: what is the Islamic perspective? and to that matter continue
questioning the Western and other perspectives as well. To treat the
problem from all these perspectives would involve a project beyond the
capacity of the present author. Therefore, in order to provide at least one
sample case, in the third chapter, we shall offer the Islamic worldview as
the Islamic perspective, and, therefore, we hope that our clarification of
what we mean by worldview will shed light on the problem ofislamicity
and the Islamic perspective. Hence, in this context we can only say that if
an idea or a theory is developed within the framework of the Islamic
worldview, it is Islamic because it is in this sense that it proceeds frorr;t the
Islamic perspective. We, therefore offer worldview as the proper
perspective of epistemology as viewed within different societies.
I

But now referring to our first issue, we can see that it has problems
that are in themselves independent of any worldview. For example, we
shall posit that a theory of knowledge is a formulation which coherently
and adequately explains the process of how we acquire knowledge in the
natural sense. If this is so, then a theory of knowledge is very similar to
the anatomical explanation of, for instance, how the human eye perceives
objects. Since all human eyes perceive objects under certain light in
exactly the same way, one theory of perception is valid for all human
eyes. In the same way, if the human mind functions in exaCtly the same
way in every human being, then there is obviously one theory of
knowledge for all humans. This conclusion may lead to the idea that there
cannot be an Islamic theory of knowledge, just as there cannot be an
Islamic or secular, Western theories of seeing.

21
 This is definitely true so far as the theory in isolation is concerned.
But there are two points to be considered in this juncture: first is the fact
that a theory is never held in isolation from other related conceptions, and
is thus always put into a perspective, or it may itself spring from that
perspective in such a way that it will necessarily have certain implications;
secondly, certain abstract and more problematic theories, such as a theory
of knowledge, present special difficulties in that they necessarily require a
perspective before they can be put into formulation, hence they differ in
this sense from theories of how the human eye perceives objects.
Moreover, since the subject of investigation is elusive, it shuns away from
concrete ways of investigation which can be applied with certain ease in
case of examining how the eye perceives. As a result of these two
reasons, theories of this kind have double aspects: they are universal, and
hence applicable to all humans, and yet they are at the same time particular
in the sense that they meaningful only within the perspective from which
they spring. In the universal aspect, a theory or an idea or a doctrine can
be held to be neutral, hence it cannot be qualified with value terms such as
Islainic, secular or Western. But in the second aspect, since a theory or an
idea is already put into a perspective and is thus situated within a general
framework, it cannot be neutral, and hence must be qualified with the
general perspective within which it has been placed. This does not,
however, mean that a theory cannot be applied to different perspectives in
so far as this second aspect is concerned. On the contrary, no matter how
difficult it is, because the universal aspect is still dominant in such
theorie~. they can still be applied to other environments as well.
In this case, an Islamic theory of know ledge will share certain
common elements with any other theory of knowledge, since the
constitution of the human mind is the same in every human, and yet it will
reflect also its own perspective, which will not only make it different from
other theories of knowledge but also give it a distinct character that makes
it justifiably Islamic. In order to elucidate this point we can give the
following example: Kant's theory of knowledge claims that the human
mind can attain knowledge only through the faculty of sensibility which
provides the raw material for it. The raw material in this case refers to the
human experience. The faculty of sensibility acquires its data through
22
 sense organs and its pure forms, which are space and time. Therefore, lf
the faculty of sensibility does not provide any raw material to the
understanding, no knowledge can be attained. 1 Suppose in this case, we
attempt to understand th,e nature of God, which is known in the Islamic
sense as ma 'rifatullah; some sensible experience of God must be
provided to the mind so that it can grasp His nature. But this is not
possible, since we already know that God cannot be captured by the sense
organs. Thus, concludes Kant, God cannot be an object of human
knowledge in this sense. We may talk about some religious experiences
and the way we feel God in us, but this kind of experiences cannot be
taken to be the raw material to be used in ascientific way. This means that
Kant does not include ma 'r(fatullah (knowledge of God) into the domain
of scientific knowledge. This cannot be done in the Islamic scientific
understanding.
First of all, the history of Islamic science shows that, in the past,
most scholars of Islam have always conceived of theology as a science; in
other words, the science whose subject matter is to understand God
scientifically as well, has been included among the sciences. They,
nevertheless, admit that its method of study is not the same as that of other
sciences. Hence certain rational methods 2 cannot be applied to theology,
but rather it must be based on. the Revelation. This can be taken as. a sign
for the fact that there is a fundamental idea within the Islamic worldview
that leads them to that direction, and that is why they conceive sciences in
a different way. Muslim thinkers conceived sciences as any kind of
knowledge which is arranged systematically and acquired with a certain
method that has a rationality which is compatible with its subject matter,
whereas Kant conceives science to be primarily that theoretical knowledge
which is based upon sensible experience, and thus sciences are classified
accordingly. (What we mean by 'rationality compatible with a subject
matter' will be clarified in Chapter V.)

1 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), trans. by Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965); see the relevant sections and especially B 1-2
(41-2); A 19-20 (65-6); also Book I and the Transcendental Dialectic (page nUll}bers
in parenthesis refer to the Smith translation).
2 That is, if we conceive 'scientific' to mean 'rational'.
23
 Secondly, there is indeed an understanding of knowledge within the
Islamic worldview that requires a scientific conception of ma 'rifatullah as
well. This conception is already contained in the concept of 'ilm, which
will be discussed in our investigation; we hope that this undertaldng will
decisively demonstrate this point.
In this case what we may have to do is to explain what is understood
from science in the Islamic sense. It i~ possible, for example, to say that
for. Kant, in order for a piece of knowledge to be scientific, it must be a
synthetic a priori proposition. 3 An analytic proposition is therefore not a
scienti.fic statement. But science can be defined in the Islamic tradition in
such a way that Kant's conclusions may not be acceptable, in which case
what is scientific in the Islamic tradition may be classified in the Western
tradition as unscienJific and vice versa. What we have to do is to show in
the first place the theory of knowledge upon which a conception of science
is established in general, and in the second place, we must also show what
kind of an epistemology of science follows from such a theory of
knowledge. Therefore, this chapter will deal with a general theory of
knowledge from the Islamic perspective; the second chapter will try to
develop the epistemological ground from the same perspective upon which
scientific activities are based.
Although a theory of knowledge aims primarily at delineating the
general anatomy of knowledge-acquisition process, and does not
necessarily aim at defining knowledge, it may nevertheless lead to such a
definition. On the other hand, since it is knowledge that is the problem
here, it will be helpful to explain what is meant by knowledge in this
context. After this has been done, we may question where the process of
acquiring knowledge begins and ends. This way we shall be able to
a
identify exactly where theory of knowledge must begin so that from this
beginning we shall proceed to outline the general anatomy of knowledge-
acquisition. Moreover, by identifying where that process ends we shall
know where the formulation of a theory of knowledge must stop. In that
case, the second topic to be discussed is the sour<;:es of knowledge, since
any human faculty which leads us to knowledge is held here to be a

3 CPR, A 7-16; B 11-30 (48-62), especially B 73 (90-1).

24
source. This means that the process of acquiring knowledge begins from a
source and ends with another. Once this. has been done, then we can
proceed to sketch the anatomy of this process.

A. WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?

In the history of philosophy many definitions of knowledge are offered.

For instance, Rosenthal has collected some 380 definitions of knowledge
given orily by the Muslims. 4 All these definitions take certain aspects of
knowledge into consideration. Therefore, although we may say that some
of these definitions are wrong, yet we must admit that some of them are
also true. How can there be several definitions of one and the same thing?
If we understand that definitions do not change the nature of what is
defined, then we shall see at the same time that the one and the same thing
can be defined in several different ways. This is because we utilize
definitions for certain purposes, which determine our view of looking at
the thing to be defined. Since definitions are used as means to grasp
provisionally the thing defined,· there is no harm in doing this, provided
that we realize the fact that our definition neither captures the reality of the
thing defined in a precise sense, nor affect this reality. We must
nevertheless admit that a definition must be true to the reality of the thing
to be defined; otherwise, it will lead to the total misconception of the thing
defined.
If this is what we understand from definition, then we must set up
first our purpose for defining knowledge. We are not intending to capture
the actual nature of knowledge in our definition; we are merely aiming at a
certain general feature of knowledge which can be taken as a criterion in a
theory of knowledge. Therefore, we must try to define knowledge in such
a way that it must give us that general feature. Since knowledge has
always been conceived as something in the mind, then this characteristic is
broad enough to be utilized in our definition. We may thus formulate that
'all the contents of human mind is knowledge'. For something to be
considered as knowledge, then, it must satisfy at least this condition,

4 Franz Rosenthal. Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval

Islam (Leiden: E. J. BrJII, 1970).
25
 namely that it must be in the human mind; otherwise it cannot even be
considered knowledge-.
Although we do realize that our definition does not capture the whole
nature of what we call 'knowledge', we must nevertheless accept that the
most fundamental element and characteristic, or whatever it may be, is the
fact that what is called knowledge is something in the human mind.
Hence, whatever has an external reality cannot qualify to be termed
'knowledge'. Therefore, definition of knowledge as "the contents of our
mind" satisfies our purpose. For our purpose is to utilize it in our theory
of knowledge; and we can utilize this definition. For instance, on the basis
of this definition we are able to tell where a theory of knowledge must
end; since such a theory is supposed to analyze the process of acquiring
knowledge it must first be able to know where such a process begins and
ends. If only the contents of the mind can be defined as knowledge, then
clearly this process must end in the mind. Moreover, since everything
outside the mind cim be held to be an object of knowledge, we should be
able to say that wherever the first contact between the mind and the object
of knowledge is established that point will be the beginning of that
process.
There is, however, a problem with regard to the beginning point of
tJ::le process of acquiring knowledge; since. the contents of our mind is
knowledge, we may usually assume the object of knowledge to be outside
the mind, which is not the case. For a content of the mind can also be an
object of knowledge and as such the first contact with the object of
knowledge may begin within the mind itself. One's psychological states
can also be an object of knowledge, but our psychological states are not
external to us, though they can be held to be external to the mind itself. If,
however, psychological states are considered to be mental states, then we
will face crucial problems. Since our aim here is not to discover the nature
of such states, to make it convenient for our purpose here, we shall ~imply
assume that they are external to the mind. Hence, all objects of knowledge
can be divided into two categories: mental objects; external objects. The
former are all the contents of knowledge which are re-subjected to the
process of knowing, and as such whatever is attained as a result of this

26
process, if any, is something like 'the knowledge of the knowledge'. The
latter are everything which are not contained in the mind as knowledge.
The external objects of knowledge may be divided into two categories
as well: external to the mind alone; external to the mind and the knowing
subject. The former are our psychological states, including our feelings
and emotions. The latter are all objects which are around us, no matter
how near or distant they may be. All these divisions can be compiled
under three categories as objects of knowledge: 1. mental; 2.
psychological (which refers to the first category of the second division just
mentioned); 3. external objects.
Now that we have clarified what we mean by knowledge as used in
our theory of knowledge, we may begin to analyze the process through
which such knowledge is acquired. Obviously we must try to do this from
the point where such a process begins. The beginning has just been set at
the point where the mind meets the object of knowledge. This is, then, the
first phenomenon to be explored in our analysis as the object of
knowledge.

B. THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE MIND

An object of knowledge is such that it is transported to the mind not as an

object but as knowledge which can at this stage be regarded as mental
object. Hence, an object of kt1owledge is an object of the mind at the same
time, and as such knowledge must reflect the reality of its object.
Knowledge as mental object has another dimension, which cannot be
discussed in epistemology; meaning. We may argue that the mental object
is the meaning we attach to objects proper, namely before they are
represented in the mind. As we have seen, three objects for knowledge
has just been distinguished: mental; psychological; and the external.
Therefore, the beginning point of the process of knowledge will naturally
be different for each object of knowledge. Yet it is possible to assign a
general phenomenon to all the objects of knowledge, from which the
process of knowing begins. For example, if the object is a mental one,
then it is clear that we will first try to understand that mental object; if it is
an external object then we will still do the same. But in case of the mental

27
 object, we may try to understand it by analyzing it and grasp its true
nature; whereas in the case of an external object, our understanding will
begin by examining the object with our hands or other sense organs; in
other words, in this case observation and experiment, or to put it roughly
examining even by our sense organs may also be possible. We cannot try
to understand the external object by analyzing it in the same way as we
analyzed the mental object. The same is true of a psychological object of
knowledge.
It seems that whatever the object may be, one thing is certain that we
first try to construct some impressions of the object; and these
impressions, whether mental, or psychological, or external, are all of
empirical kind. This conclusion immediately leads us to discover the
beginning of the knovyledge-acquisition process. For if without some
empirical impressions of the object, our mind cannot think any object of
knowledge, it means that acquiring knowledge begins from this empirical
data. This is in fact true; let us try to form knowledge of any object, in
each case we will fail unless we have some empirical impressions of that
object of knowledge. In other words, before the thinking process begins
the object must be present in the mind. But obviously the empirical
impressions of a mental object are not acquired in the same way as the
empirical impressions of our psychological states. In whatever manner
I

these impressions are acquired, since they are all empirical, we shall refer
to them all under one general mime, which is commonly applied in
philosophy for such impressions; expe riencf!.
In our terminology, therefore, 'experiepce' means all the empirical
impressions of an object of knowledge, whether it be mental, or
psychological, or external. Hence, experience is the only beginning for all
knowledge, without which no knowledge of any object is possible. Since
through experience an object of knowledge is represented in the mind, as a
phenomenon, an experience can also be named 'representation'.
If there are three kinds of objects of knowledge, it means that there
are also three types of expertence: mental; psychological; and external. The
first two kinds of objects subjected to the process of knowing are internal;
whereas the last one is external, as the name itself announces. Once the
object of knowledge is present in the mind, we can express that

28
 presentness with a term that is common in philosophy, 'representation'.
A representation cannot take place, unless there is a faculty which captures
the object of knowledge according to its nature. For example, if the object
is an external object it can be captured with its certain characteristics by
our external faculties, which are the so-called five senses. They are called
'external' in the sense that they can be observed externally, namely, they
can be seen either by us or by someone next to us as organs externally
attached to our body. But this does not mean that when they function, they
also function externally. Therefore, though they are external, their
representation of the object of knowledge is internal. But if the object of
knowledge is psychological, then the faculty of representation is internal
in the sense that we cannot externally observe the faculty·, but through
introspection it can be captured by the mind only. In this way two kinds of
functions are discerned: if for a certain epistemological function we can
assign a center, namely point to it, that function is called an 'organ',
otherwise it is distinguished as a 'faculty'.
We cannot experience our internal faculties of knowledge directly. If,
however, the object of knowledge is internal, there is no faculty of repre-
sentation which gives us the experience of that object, except the mind
itself, in which case the mind ftcts as a faculty of experience. But since
such mental experiences are c,ustomarily called 'thinking', we do not refer
to it as experience. Since mental representation is possible through
analysis this is in itself nothing but thinking. Therefore, in our
terminology, the term 'experience' is reserved for representation of only
internal and external objects of knowledge, and it cannot thus be applied
for mental representation in the form of thinking. In the first step of the
process through which we acquire knowledge is experience, a pheno-
menon through which an object of knowledge is somehow represented in
the mind. Therefore, experience is the beginning point of the process of
knowing, as such it is by itself a process in acq\liring knowledge and thus
deserves a detailed treatment. In this essay we are not in a position to
develop a full theory of experience; however, we are in a position to
outline this issue in as much as it is relevant to our theory of knowledge
and the epistemology of science in this context.

29
 C. EXPERIENCE AND THE MENTAL REPRESENTATION
OF THE OBJECT

Before we continue we must point out that the term 'object' will be used in
two different senses in this essay: 1. the ontological sense, in which it
refers to a 'concrete being' that can be experienced by the external senses;
and in this sense, we must distinguish it from the term 'entity' which
refers to beings that can be captured by the internal experience and not by
the external experience; a third kind of object in the ontological sense is
neither an object, nor an entity in the trqe sense, and thus it is not
subjected to any experience at all; 2. the epistemological sense, in which
the term is employed when either an object or an entity is subjected to the
process of acquiring knowledge. Since the two senses in which the term
'object' will be employed is clear from the context we shall not use any
sign to distinguish both senses. But ontologically, we cannot use the term
'entity' for an object, nor the term 'object' for an entity. The term 'Being'
(with an uppercase 'B ') will be used to refer to ariy that which cannot be
subjected to any human experience, and as such it cannot be an object of
knowledge (i.e., the third kind of object in the above ontological sense).
Now, a mental representation is the result of an object's undergoing
through the process of experience. For it is through experience that an
object of knowledge is mentally represented. But since there only two
categories of objects for knowledge, there are also two kinds of
experience, external and ~nternal, both of which take place differently. The
latter depends on the former; therefore, external experience develops in us
first, and thus it is in the first place, the beginning of the process of
experience, and in the second place, the beginning of the whole process of
knowing.
Let us consider a new born baby: we can very safely say that although
potentially he is endowed with faculties for internal experience, yet since
he has just started having external experience, he needs more time to
develop internal experience. In this sense·, internal experience resembles
the mind, which needs the representation of the object of knowledge to
function. Thus, no entity can be perceived by the faculties of internal
experience unless some external representation of objects that can be

30
 related to that entity is provided. In order to clarify this we must further
discuss the nature of both experiences.

1. External or Outer Experience

The awareness of an object of knowledge produced in us is perception. If
this awareness is received through one or more of the five senses, then it
is a sensible perception; this means that whatever is received through the
five senses can be qualified as 'sensible', and everything that is received
in this way can also be termed 'sense datum'. There is a variety of such
awareness; for instance, we may notice by the sight that there is an object
in front of us, but since we do not pay any attention as to what it is, only
an awareness concerning the existence of such an object will be produced
in us, but if, on the other hand, that object attracts our attention so as we
become curious to know what kind of an object it is, then an awareness as
to the fact that it is a cat, for example, will be produced as well. Yet we
may not examine the cat so as to notice for example its color also or its
size and so on, in which case our sensible perception will consist of only
the existence of a cat. However, we may examine the object to such an
extent that we may know that it exists and that it is a cat, and that it is
white and its eyes are brown and so on. All. of these sensations about the
object of knowledge produced in us are awareness, which we have termed
'sensible perception'. All th~ data of the sensible perceptiqn is what we
call 'external' or 'outer experience'.
Can mere awareness be defined as perception? For, let us consider
our cat example once again; the fact that we become aware that something
exists and that it is a cat, and that it is white and its eyes are brown and so
on, involves knowing as well, not just becoming aware of a fact, for
example. To become aware of something as existing as a simple
perception may be just an awareness, but the further information about the
cat involves more· than an awareness. This is true; but in each case,
namely, in just the awareness of existence and knowing its existence
which will lead to a succeeding awareness, we can distinguish an act of
knowing and an act of becoming aware of a fact, which then goes on as a
process to become aware of something, and to act to know that
awareness, and so on. In each case in this continuous process, there

31
 seems to be a chain of awareness connected with a chain of act of
knowing. What we are doing here is to distinguish the awareness from the
act of knowing and it is that awareness which we term here 'perception'.
This objection basically t&kes both phenomena, awareness and act of
knowing, together without analyzing them into their proper functions.
Once this analysis is done we can see that it is the awareness in this
process which philosophers have long termed perception.
Since we have no senses other than the five senses to be in contact
directly with the external reality, 5 the ultimate beginning point of the
process of acquiring knowledge is sensible perception, which originates
from the five senses. Sensible perception is received through a physical
process that takes place in the body of a perceiver, properly called in
epistemology 'subject'; and this process is-completed at the point where an
awareness is produced in us of the object which is in contact with one or
more of the senses. This leads us to posit the existence of a physical
faculty of awareness without which no sensible perception can take place.
We must somehow physically feel the object, which is its awareness,
namely, we are then able to say that we are aware of the object; hence, that
faculty which enables us to have this ldnd of an awareness, is termed
'physical consciousness'. Although the faculty of physical consciousness
can be placed in the brain with a specific location, in our theory of
knowledge we shall try to avoid its discussion, as it is properly discussed
in its proper discipline. We thus assign an abstract location for it. This will
facilitate our discussion to explain the process of acquiring knowledge .
.The process of outer experience, then, begins at one or more sense
organ(s) and ends at the physical consciousness. Since this process as a
whole is totally physical, it needs mental consciousness to be
conceptualized. If a sensible perception, which is yielded at the physical
consciousness, is not conceptualized it cannot be utilized as an object of
knowledge. To illustrate this point with a similar example, we may say

5 We use the term 'external reality' to refer to the concrete objects around us, though
we mtlst admit that there is also an external reality which is not so readily available
to the senses. When the term is used in this sense, we shall prefer to use another
phrase instead; such as 'metaphysical' or 'transcendent' (external) reality; or the
Qur'anic term 'ghayb'.
32
 that the human sensible perception is more or less like the sehsible
perception of a tiger when it sees its cubs, for instance. We are not saying
here that a human and a tiger see in exactly the same manner, we are rather
trying to make a similitude in order to illustrate that the sensible perception
is a general phenomenon with a variety of its kinds among all the animals.
Therefore, such a perception needs to be perceived by the mind as well so
that it can be a proper object of human knowledge. This leads us to posit
the existence of a mental perception on the one hand, <l.nd of a mental
awareness on the other. Since we will discuss the nature of these mental
phenomena below, we shall suffice in this context by simply deducing
their existence.
So far the process of knowledge has been explained to the point of
the faculty of physical consciousness where all sensible perceptions are
produced. These perceptions then are utilized in two ways: they are
directly perceived by the mind and thus are on the way to be
conceptualized; and/or they are taken by the faculties of internal experience
to be utilized, to use Kant's term, as raw material in their functions. This
means that the process of acquiring knowledge after the physical
consciousness will continue to two directions: to the direction of the
internal experience; and/or to the direction of the mind. But since the
product of the internal experience is also utilized by the mind in the
'
process of knowing, we shall first try to first analyze the direction of the
internal experience, then continue to the analysis of the mind.

2. Internal or Inner Experience

The inner perception of an object of knowledge is an epistemic emotion.
Our definition again does not aim at capturing the real nature of emotions;
since we are primarily concerned with the process of knowledge we have
defined emotions from this perspective only. For this reason, we have
qualified it with an adjective, epistemic, though in this context we need
not so qualify it each time we use the term 'emotion'. For, when we
consider emotions as vehicles for knowledge our definition will not be
wrong; in other words, at least one feature of their nature is included in
our definition. The fact that emotions play a role in the process of
acquiring knowledge cannot· be denied. If we show here how they

33
 function and thus are utilized in process of knowing, this will be also th.e
proof of this fact. Therefore, there is no need to qrgue separately to prove
that emotions do play a role in the process of acquiring knowledge. In this
connection we must first show what is meant by the 'inner perception of
an object of knowledge', which we hfl.ve used in our definition of
emotions.
First of all, the terms 'inner' and 'internal' are used to refer to the
internal aspects of the body without any emphasis on the physical spatiai
qualities. Hence, these terms do not mean 'inside' the body; in fact it is
extremely hard to point any specific location with regard to the origin of
inner experiences. Therefore, these terms are used rather to denote that no
external sense organ can be assigned to the faculties ofinternal experience,
whereas we aie able to locate an external organ for the experience acquired
through external experience.
Moreover, whatever undergoes the process of acquiring knowledge is
an object of knowledge. This means that it is possible for an experience
not to be perceived mentally and thus remain as brute experience. The
object of that experience cannot be considered an object of knowledge, it
becomes an object of knowledge when it is perceived mentally and thus
gone through the process of thinking in the mind. Let us suppose that
such an object, say a lion, is perceived through the senses, then a sensible
perception of the lion will be produced in the physical consciousness. If
we possess the knowledge of a lion, we will know that one must protect
himself from such an animal, which means the jdea of danger will be
instantly produced in the mind as a result of this perception. This is
because the sensible impression of the lion is already received by the
mental consciousness and the related concepts are produced in the mind.
But at the same time, this sensible perception will be received internally
as well; which means that the internal faculty of experience also perceives
this sensible impression and produces another kind of awareness, which
we call emotion, which is, in this particular case, 'fear'. The intensity of
this emotion depends on the sensible perception, though in real life we
express it as 'it depends how close the lion is'; i. e., the closer the lion is,
the more fear we have (of course, if the lion is closer the sensible
perception also represents it as such). Our conclusion necessarily leads us

34
 to assume that without some sensible perception no 'emotion is possible,
and hence, without external experience no internal experience is possible
in theory. After this brief and g~neral description of how both experiences
are related, we may now go on to dwell upon the proc~ss through which a
sensible perception is received internally.
We have already used the term 'faculty of internal experience'. We
simply posit the existence of such a faculty on the basis of the fact that we
do have emotions. Philosophers have so far inferred the existence of such
a faculty but for the external experience; e. g., Kant, who calls this faculty
'sensibility'. We have no proof for the existence of this faculty except the
sensible perception; and the same must be true of our internal experiences,
i.e., emotions; given their existence, the existence of an internal faculty of
experience becomes plausible. Even if we do not assume such a faculty,
then we still need to posit some kind of a mechanism for the production of
emotions. Of course, because of the elusive nature of emotions it is
ext;remely hard to explain what they are and how they are exactly
produced. So far we have not even been able to explain sufficiently the
physical process involved in the production of an emotion. In this essay,
fortunately we are not concerned much with these problems, although
some explanation is needed for our discussion, which is primarily
centered around the epistern,ological function of emotions. An emotion
moves us, excites us or makes us feel miserable, but how .can it contribute
to the process of acquiring knowledge? ,
We may answer this question by referring to the example of the lion
again. Suppose we do not have any feeling of fear; would we still run
away from the lion even if we knew that a lion is a formidable animal? I
am not saying that we still have the emotion but we simply do not fear
anything; on the contrary, I mean we have absolutely no such emotion at
all. I think it is the emotion and not the sensible perception of the lion that
is mentally evaluated and then decided whether to run· or not. For
sometimes we think that we have seen a lion, although there is no lion and
we ate immediately activated to find a shelter. Similarly the idea of a lion
by itself is not sufficient to- make us look for a shelter, even if it is
sufficient by itself, it will not prompt us immediately to move. Hence, the
decision to look for a shelter is considerably influenced by fear. We would

35
 like to formulate this conclusion in the epistemological sense as 'the
internal perception of an object of knowledge is given to the mind as raw
material' just like the sensible perception of an object of knowledge. In
other words, our mental faculties of knowledge cannot function without
our faculty of outer experience, nor can they work in isolation from the
faculties of inner experience.
Our discussion of internal experience has concentrated on emotions
though we do not mean by this that our internal experiences consist of
emotions alone. This is not the case; in fact the internal experience which
is nearest to the sensible perception is the sensible intuition which may
perceive an object without physically perceiving it, because no physical
object can directly affect our faculties of internal experience. Therefore, if
an object is intuited as existing this is the result of the function of the
senSible intuition. We call this faculty 'sensible intuition' because it intuits
its object the way our mind intuits the conclusion of a deductive argument,
and yet the intuition of an object is not mental intuition; since, though a
sensible perception is absent, yet it is assumed as mediating between the
faculty and its object, it is apt to call it 'sensible intuition'. We also say
that it is nearest to the sensible perception because it is the only internal
faculty that can provide impressions concerning the physical world around
us which thus gives the idea as if it is a faculty of e~ternal experience.
It is the faculty of sensible intuition that produces our instincts, which
are direct and immediate; and as such they can play a significant role in the
manifestation of an emotion. Because of this function, the sensible
intuition may interfere to mediate between the sensible perception and the
other faculties of inner experience. In a sense, it intuits the data of the
sensible perception and makes it available for the other inner faculties.
When such a sensible intuition of a sensible perception is made available
for an emotional state the corresponding emotion may be yielded. 6

6 It is, I hope, clear from our discussion that the manifestation of an emotion is not an
automatic mechanism, for even if all the physical and mental conditions are available
the resulting emotion of such states may not be yielded. Yet under certain
circumstances none of the usual conditions are present for the manifestation of an
emotion, but It may be such that only one certain mental state or physical condition
will be sufficient for the manifestation of that emotion. This is because of the again
elusive nature of emotions as they are imbedded in human nature In so complicated a
36
 Another important function of the sensible intuition is that it retains the
copies of our emotions through which we instinctively recogni~e such
emotive experiences, becau&e it is the center of our instincts. Otherwise
we would not be able to recognize a certain feeling experienced at two
different times under different circumstances.
The central faculty of our inner experience is heart which assesses
our emotions in the sense that it renders them meaningful for the ethical
life. The function of the hearfin the epistemological process is to provide
our mind with representations of ethical and fundamental concepts of life
and death in an experiential way. This function renders the existence of
pure practical reason meaningless. So far philosophers have assumed that
the moral system is built by the aid of a function of the intellect (or Pure
Reason, in the Kantian philosophy), called practical reason; there is no
such a faculty. Instead there is our intellect which judges and assesses the
experiential data given by the heart and reaches conclusions with the aid of
its higher faculties based on that experiential mood. Hence, heart is not a
physical organ whose function is to determine the blood circulation; of
course, no one can deny the existence of such a physical organ. But the
fact that all humans have similar feelings in similar situations, such as the
emotion which moves us help the poor, the feeling we have for punishing
the thief, feeling sorry·for sorp_eone in distress, loving and hating, proves
that there _is a faculty at the center of all these experiential states. Of
course, all these emotions are psychological states in themselves, but do
they not yield a certain kind of mental contents, which we have identified
as 'knowledge'? Why does the feeling sorry for someone makes us think
that we should help that person? If that feeling did not produce a mental
activity similar to the process of knowing, then emotions would not have
been included in epistemology. But if we accept this conclusion then we
cannot avoid discussing them with respect to the question; what kind of
knowledge do they yield in the mind? Of course heart is not a fa~ulty of

way. This means that there is no one single standard explanation for the origins of
our emotions, but rather many ways in which an emotion can be manifested. In our
discussion 'here, therefore, we cannot exhaust all these ways in which emotions arise.
We must, then, contend by citing only some general features of these ways and how
they are related to the process of acquiring knowledge.
37
 outer experience and as such it cannot perceive external objects, but it Cl:tn
perceive objects of knowledge which transcend our external experience.
According to our classification of objects of knowledge we cannot name
such 'things' objects, but the only way to refer to them in this context is to
use this term figuratively. Depending on the nature of such transcendent
objec~s. they may be termed 'Being', 'entity' or 'phenomenon'. The
sphere of knowledge comprehensive of all things that may be subjected to
the epistemological process, which excludes in this sense learning, may be
identified as the 'Experiential Realm'. This sphere of knowledge is
transcendent to the outer experience; and although the mechanism of
experience in general requires the priority of the outer experience, this is
not an absolute requirement in all cases. This means that in certain cases
without a direct connection wit the outer experience the inner perception of
the heart may still take place.
Another argument for the possibility of knowledge for us of the
experiential realm can be adduced from the perspective of moral (and
indeed religious as well) responsibility: For, responsibility of an act
necessarily requires the knowledge of that very act. Following the logical
implication of our line of argument, we are led to conclude that if we are
held responsible for our certain actions involving the experiential realm,
then a prerequisite knowledge of that realm in as much as it leads to that
act must be granted. In other words, we must be able to acquire sufficient
knowledge of the experiential so as to be held responsible for actions
ensuing upon that knowledge. Hence, it is clear that from the moral
standpoint there is an obligation on the part of man and that he is
accountable for his evil acts. This obligation and accountability, however,
are intelligible only if the knowledge of their related realm is accessible to
us. Their realm is obviously that of the experiential, which is not
accessible to the outer experience. We .conclude from this that the
knowledge of evil is not deduced through a chain of logical arguments in a
speculative fashion; but rather there is in our internal experience an
experiential perception which is evaluated and thought out in the mind
upon which follows the logical sequence of arguments leading to rational
conclusions concerning the good and evil.

38
 The sphere of knowledge which transcends all faculties of experience
is the Transcendent Absolute Realm, the knowledge of which, therefore,
cannot be attained through the process of knowing as described in a theory
of knowledge. We shall refer to this sphere as Transcendent Realm, the
knowledge of which may be given revelationally only. Such a given
knowledge cannot even be interpreted; for any such interpretation
inevitably involves the epistemological process described in a theory of
knowledge, whereas we have already denied such an involvement. This
has already been explained in the following argument: The experiential
realm, has no direct effect upon our sense organs; hence, no direct
sensible perception of this world is available to us. But we know the
external world directly thanks to the fact that it effects our sense organs
upon which the mind adds its own capacity to acquire the knowledge of
nature. Therefore, the raw data of both realms are needed for the faculty of
thinking. As we have seen, in the process of knowing we have
acknowledged the existence of internal faculties through which we receive
the expe~iential representations of the experiential realm; in other
words, every person can experience the experientially existent, provided
that he or she pays sincere attention to his heart in so far as the moral life
is concerned, and to the guidance of the Revelation in so far as the
religious Truth is concerned. For the experiencing of this realm may not
be direct; and hence, not immediate, as it is the case with the objects of
external experience; we need the revelation to mediate between the Realm
Transcendent and the faculties of internal experience, and thus lead to that
experience.
It is clear that we are distinguishing two kinds of objects for Olll"
knowledge in the experiential realm; one moral, the other religious. The
former is clear in the sense that its limits can be quite easily presumed. But
the latter needs further clarification; is our epistemology involved, for
example, in defending the possibility of natural theology? In order to
answer this question, we simply need to make a decisive distinction
between the experiential and the Transcendent realms. In the theological
sense, both realms involve the same subject but different aspects of it;
whereas the experiential realm, for instance, encompasses God as an
existent Being, the Transcendent Realm has God in the Absolute sense,

39
 namely as He is in Himself. Therefore, the experiential representation of
God's existence is an inner experience, but His Essence is an Absolute
behind "seventy thousand veils". Moreover, our mind also needs the
guidance of the Revelation in attaining the theological experiential realm.
For as we shall see, our intellect operates with causality in o'rder to infer a
Maker for the whole existence; it may thus discover a Cause for the
universe, but it still needs another argument to prove that that Cause is
God as defined in the Revealed Texts. Is the experiential perception
provided by the heart sufficient to make such an inference? This is the
greatest dilemma of philosophy and it seems that it is still not sufficient
and therefore we need a guidance, which is provided by the Revelation. It
is for this reason that there is an epistemological need for Revelation not
only for the philosophers, pace al-Farabi, but for all humans.
Morally experiential perceptions, however, are sufficient for the mind
to deduce the morally good or evil. We thus call all the experiences
received in this way through the aid of emotions 'experiential
representation'. The faculty that undertakes this function and thus
becomes the center of all our emotions is called 'heart' also in the Islainic
tradition which is based on Qur'an's usage of the term.? It is, therefore,
possible to interpret this Qur' anic term as the main faculty of the inner
experience. As the center of inner experience, heart, with all its lower
faculties, is the only faculty that can be subject to receive representations
from the experiential realm. Hence, it is rather a center for receiving the
affections of this realm through emotions, such as desire, guilt; fear, love
and hatred. It must be pointed out, however, that the representation of the

7 See, for example: "The day when neither wealth nor sons shall profit, but only the
one who comes to God with a pure heart." (26/ai-Shu'ara', 88-89); and: "Verily in
this Qur'an is a guidance for anyone who has a heart, or who listens and earnestly
experiences (shahid) (what is being given)." (50/Qaf, 37); and: "We have created
many jinn and men for hell. They have hearts that they do not understand with. They
have eyes that they do not see with. They have ears that they do not hear with. They
are like cattle; nay, rather they are further astray." (7/ai-A 'rat', 179); "Those who
believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of God. For without
doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction." (13/ai-Ra'd, 28); also:
'Have they not traveled through the· land so that they have hearts to think with, and
ears to hear with? It is not the (physical) eyes that are blind, but the hearts within the
breasts." (22/al-Hajj, 46).
40
 external world in faculties of external experience is direct and immediate,
. while the representation of the Absolute Realm by faculties of inner
perception, which are held to be represented by heart, is not direct; but
rather through a mediation which is provided by the outer experience
with regard to the morally experiential, but in the religious aspect by the
Revelation. 8 On the other hand, since this mediation is possible only
through some reflection, then there is a reciprocal relationship between the
heart and the mind. Therefore, some reflection upon the sensible intuition
and Revelation is necessary for receiving the experience of this realm.
Since I have interpreted the term 'heart' as the inner faculty of
experience that receives representations of the world experiential through
the guidance of revelation, I can conveniently entitle all areas of learning
that fall under this realm, "experiential subjects", as opposed to the
directly experimental subjects. This distinction is important as far as
philosophy of science is concerned because it yields a significant doctrine
on the basis of which one can classify sciences. In fact such a
classification is cogent only if it rests on an epistemology. But in this
context we are not concerned with this classification, and therefore, we
shall not further discuss it.
Experiential inquiries belong directly to the inquirer, though they are
not perceived directly. What I mean by this is that our inner faculty of
representation needs an awakening by and the mediation of Revelation.
Just as our faculty of outer experience sometimes needs the mediation of a
device to see or hear things afar, though they are perceivable directly; in
the same manner the inner faculty needs a finer and more subtle mediation.
Again this mediation is guidance, which is reflected in the mental states of
the inquirer, and these states represent the terms of the internal experience.
Since as such it is primarily our emotions that yield such a mental state we
would like to call it "subjective mood".

8 See, for example the following verses: "Do they not then earnestly try to understand
the Qur'an, or is it that their hearts are locked up by them?" (47/Mul)ammad, 24); and
"Verily in this Qur' an is a guidance for anyone who has a heart, or who listens and
earnestly experiences (shah/d) (what is being given)." (50/Qaf, 37; also see 6/ai-
An'am, 19; 17/al-Isra', 9; 30/al-Riim, 58; 41/Fu~~ilet, 26, etc.).
41
 As a mental state, the subjective mood is very important for the
faculties of inner experience to perceive the truths of the experiential
realm. Since the. description of the subjective mood explains the way
emotions function in the process of acquiring knowledge we shall try to
show how it functions in order to lead an inquirer to this experientially
mental state. First, we are held with our subjective states that are
intimately connected with the heart. In these states and moods, our whole
existence is brought into sight; crucial questions are asked about life and
death; certain violent and terrifying phenomena of life may be held in
imagination. Second, in this way, we find in us sensible perceptions that
lead to inner experience of the actual situation; thus a road is opened for
the moral life; then we discover the help of Revelation, and thus we are led
to clear our mental states from any prejudice or pre-conceptions about the
object of knowledge; moreover, by doing so, a certain relationship is
established between the inquirer and the subject of discourse. This
relationship liberates the inquirer from a dangerous attitude, that is the
feeling of indifference to the object of knowledge. This way the inquirer
as the student -of Revelation is expected to be sincere and willing to
understand and receive the message projected. Third, by analyzing the
subjective states of the inquirer, he is also invited to analyze his being and
consciousness. This self-analysis, or self-meditation prepares the inquirer
for the message of Revelation. Sometimes, in order to achieve this,
ref~rence is made to moral concepts and ethical consciousness that is so
deeply engraved in man's whole being (fitrah).9 This means that all our
ethical behaviors are also grounded upon the representations provided by
the internal experience. Those experiential representations, which also
reflect our true being (fitrah), are the work of an internal faculty which we·
call 'conscience'. This is based on the heart functioning as.a subsidiary
faculty. 10

9 See the following verses: 2/ai-Baqarah, 6-20; 4/ai-Nisa', 128; 59/al-l,Iashr, 9; 70/al-
Ma'arij, 19-21; .75/al-Qiyamah, 31-40; 76/al-lnsan, 2-8; 83/ai-Mutaffifin, l-6; 91 /a)-
Shams, 9-10 96/al-'Alaq, 1-8.
1Opor a detailed discussion of the points raised in connection to inner experience see the
present author's Islamic Science: Towards A Definition (Kuala Lumpur:
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996), especially
42
 Our analysis of the process of knowledge so far has brought us to the
faculty of ethical feelings, called 'conscience'. When we philosophically
examine this concept we find out that the heart does not represent all our
internal faculties, though it is the most fundamental and central one
because it is through the heart that most of our moral and religious
experiential representation of entities as objects of knowledge originate.
This approach solves an issue that remains inadequately answered in the
Critical philosophy of Kant. For he holds that Pure Reason can speculate
on ethical concepts and reach a rational ethics; in other words, he defends
the possibility of metaphysics of morals, but not metaphysics of the
transcendent realm. We argue, on the other hand, that moral philosophy is
possible because there is in experience a representation of its objects
grounded in the experiential aspect of the sensibility. Therefore, just as
there is a faculty of experience which provides raw materials to the
understanding; in the same way there is a faculty if internal experience,
called in general, heart, that furnishes our mind in the same manner with
raw materials concerning the ethical field. It is on the basis of this
experiential data that ethics is possible, otherwise no metaphysics of
morals is ever possible as a science except in a similar fashion as natural
theology was conceived to be a science (!) in the philosophies prior to
Kant.
The process of knowledge through internal experience converges into
and culminates at a unity which makes us to be aware of our 'sdf', and as
such it functions as a faculty, which we term 'the faculty of
consciousness' or 'faculty of the self'. Through this faculty one
experientially becomes aware of his/her existence which is very much
similar to the external experience through which one becomes aware of an
object around him; just as this external awareness is different from the
mental awareness, in the same way this internal awareness ofthe subject
is different from the mental awareness of the self. Hence, in addition to
the external and internal awareness, we must have a mental awareness; the
first process of consciousness yields the awareness of things and the
world around us, whereas the second one, through the aid of our internal

Chapter II; see also my article, "A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'anlc Context",
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 11:2 (1994).
43
faculties and the experience resulting from them, yields the awareness of
our inner world which revolves around the cbnsciousness of our self
(ego); but the third one, namely the mental awareness, yields a conception
of both the external and internal awareness. Therefore, in order to grasp
these experiences in the way a human conceives them, the mental
awareness is essential. Our analysis logically implies the conclusion that
both the external and internal awareness are physical, but· their mental
counterpart cannot be physical; a result which can further be elaborated in
a context of mind-body problem. But we shall continue analyzing the
process of know-ledge at the mental level.

D. MENTAL COGNITION

Our analysis of inner experience has revealed the heart as the most
significant faculty at this level of the process of knowledge because it is
the center of our emotions which are the main carriers of all our
experiential experiences. Ali inner experience takes place through a ldnd of
an emotion with a degree of intensity. As we have seen, the beginning
process of our emQtions is the level where inner experience begins, and
this is the lowest inner faculty which we have identified as 'sensible
intuition'. Then, comes the heart as the center of our inner experience,
then the faculty of moral insight, which has been identified as 'conscience'
and finally the process ends at the faculty of consciousness. 11 Since
without a mental consciousness, both the external and internal awareness
cannot be meaningful, it is at this level that all our sensible and experiential
representations are handed to the faculty of mental consciousness, where
mental cognition of all representations begin. Although tables can be
misleading in philosophy, yet in order to make it more understandable
even to the eye, we shall take this risk and try to illustrate on a table our

11 Consciousness appears in our analysis as an emotion; this natural conclusion does

not bother us for it seems to me there is no problem in accepting the inner
consciousness as a physical process to be similar to, and in fact, a kind of an
emotion. But again this discussion will take 1:1s to far from our main topic and we
h~pe that we can in future develop this topic in a more detailed theory of knowledge,

44
conclusions concerning the process of knowledge which has been
explicated so far (see Table 1).
In this essay the term 'mind' ( dhihn) is used in general to mean the
'faculty of conceptual experience'. In this sense, then, 'mind' refers to the
totality of our mental activities that are mainly conceptual. Such a
conceptual understanding, as we have seen, begins at the level of mental
consciousness, which is thus the lowest faculty of the mind. In order to
discovered all mental faculties we need to examine functions of our mind:

l FIVE SENSES ....... PHYSICAL CONSCIOUSNESS .

Sensible perception is produced
which can also be called sense data
---...
...
EXTERNAL EXPERIENCE

. INTERNAL EX
SENSIBLE INTUITION
~ER!ENCE MIND

I
I THE SEAT OF EMOTIONS
HEART
I
I
-...
CONSCIENCE
I
INNER CONSCIOUSNESS

Table 1

First, the mind must somehow retain all conceptual activities so that it cajl
utilize them in all its functions and this leads us to the faculty of memory
(l:uifi:?,ah); second, objects of knowledge must be presented to the mind in
a conceptually concrete way, which means the reproduction of
representations as images and this poses a faculty of imagination
(khayiil); third, the mind must think the objects of knowledge, which
leads us to postulate a faculty of thinking which we shall call 'intellect'
( 'aql); fourth, since the mind as a result of thinking must decide in order

45
 to know its objects, and that deciding is actually an act of 'choice', the
mind must need a faculty of judgment, which is already known as 'will'
(iradah); and finally, the mind functions to formulate arguments and reach
conclusions out of these arguments, which means that it must somehow
possess a faculty which enables it to deduce the implications and
entailments of organized propositions, and this is the faculty of inference
which we would like to call '(mental) intuition' ((lads).
All the above mental activities are already known to us; they are not
new discoveries that must be studied now.· In fact, we apply them all in
our daily life without thinking that this process which has been taking
place in our mind can be analyzed in this way. We do not have to know
the process of knowledge in order to acquire knowledge; just as we do not
need to know how our stomach functions in order to digest the food we
eat. For all the functions of the mind are aJready provided for the process
of knowledge which is, therefore, a natural process but we may interfere
at certain levels of this process, which makes it different in this sense from
digestion. Hence, we do not need to know this process in order to acquire
knowledge; but we need to know it for scientific reasons; for instance, if
some one argues that science is a universal and absolute activity which
cannot change from culture to culture, then, in order to show that this is
not the case we must explain how we acquire knowledge in general and
then scientific knowledge
. in
. particular. Hence, in this case we need a
theory which explains how we acquire knowledge. For educational
purposes also a theory of knowledge would be very useful, because if we
know how humans acquire knowledge then we can teach them with more
effective methods, since teaching primarily consists of "making the
student acquire knowledge", i.e., 'to learn'.
In that case, all the above mental faculties are familiar to us and they
have already been discovered and named by previous philosophers
concerned with epistemology. What is new, however, in this essay is the
way we explain their function in relation to each other and to the lower
faculties of experience, namely the external and internal. Before we dwell
.rp.ore deeply upon this problem, let us show the structure of the mind as
depicted here on a table.

46
 As we can see on Table 2, the mind receives all the data of experience
through the mental consciousness, which in turn converts them to mental
entities, which are thus retained in the memory. The imagination is the
faculty that creates mental images for those entities whereupon the intellect
assigns notions, ideas or concepts corresponding to these image~. Our
intellect is then able think these raw materials, though it needs tpe faculty
ot: will to produce a judgment.
THE M I N D

MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS
where an kinds of representations
are received from the external
and internal experience

I
'MEMORY
Faculty of retention
I
IMAGINATION
objects of knowledge are presented
to the m,ind as mental images

I
INTELLECT
Faculty ofthinking

I
WILL
Faculty of judgement

I
INTUITION
Faculty of inference

Table2

47
 The intellect is however able to combine such judgments in such a way
that once organized according to the principles of the intellect a conclusion
can be drawn from them. But the intellect cannot draw a conclusion
without the aid of another faculty, which is called 'intuition' ((lads). Since
through inference and all the lower functions in the process of knowing
that has taken so far, we can derive every knowledge possible for us to
acquire concerning an object of knowledge, the process cannot continue
beyond the intuition. Hence, the process of knowing must end at this
level. By thus concluding we do not mean that the epistemological process
analyzed here follows exactly the order in which we present the mental
faculties. In our presentation we have to follow an order; otherwise it is
not possible to present more than one faculty which is first in the order.
We can say that the order presented hereis merely a logical order with
respect to an epistemological analysis, which means that even the logical
order could be different if it is viewed from another perspective, for
instance, psychological. Therefore, in the actual operation of the process
of knowing there could be infinitely many different routes that the process
actually takes place. This is because once, for example, a piece of
information is restored in the memory, the next process will be operated
without the menta] consciousness, as the sensible and experiential
perceptions are already present .in the mind. Let us then examine each
mental level of this process in a detailed manner.

1. Mental Consciousness
The nature of mental consciousness is such that as a mental faculty it can
perceive objects, entities and phenomena received through the external and
internal faculties of experience and convert them into conceptual data.
Objects of knowledge thus become mental entities. What this means is that
we become mentally aware of objects, entities and phenomena. The
faculty of mental consciousness is thus the emergence of all
consciousness; physical, inner and inentai. Since the nature of
consciousness is to become aware of something, the function of all three
consciousness resemble each other. Without the mental consciousness
objects are perceived only physically and/or internally; but both of these

48
 consciousness are like seeing without noticing. Therefore, in order to
apply a mental activity to these experiences of consciousness they must in
a certain way be converted into a mental consciousness which is nothing
but a conceptual awareness of the representation of an object of
knowledge. Therefore, mental consciousness is where the physical and
inner consciousness also converge.
The nature of consciousness is a crucial problem in philosophy and in
relation to a theory of knowledge it must also be discussed; however, in
this context we shall only point to three levels at which we feel conscious
of objects, entities, facts and phenomena: at the level of sense perception,
which we have called 'physical consciousness'; at the level of experiential
perception, which we have called 'inner consciousness'; and finally, at the
level of mental perception called 'mental consciousness'. The Physical
consciousness can perceive only objects and the physical phenomena,
whereas inner consciousness can perceive only entities and the
transcendent phenomena; how this process takes place has already been
explained in relation to the Qur'anic term ghayb. The mental
consciousness, on the other hand, perceives only the data provided by the
physical and inner consciousness. Without the mental consciousness,
then, an object of knowledge is.perceived only in brute experien.ce; as
such, physical and inner perception of something, namely, the
representation of an object of knowledge in physical and inner
consciousness is merely a blind perception. It is because of this that
sometimes we see an object or hear a noise, but since we do not pay any
attention to ponder on it so as to know what that really is, we do not even
notice what that thing or noise is. If this fact alone is sufficient to
distinguish between the mental and the other lower consciousness, the.n it
will be easy to deduce the conclusion that the mental consciousness cannot
be a physical phenomena, though we cannot explain the nature of it as
such. If the lowest function of the mind seems to be different from all our
bodily actions, considering the higher functions such as retaining,
imagining, thinldng, inferring andintuiting, we can easily arrive at the
existence of an aspect of man which is of a spiritual order, which has been
called 'soul'.

49
 We have arrived at a controversial problem of philosophy; the mind-
body duality. As Professor Fazlur Rahman says, the Qur' an does not
seem to present man with a dual nature. 12 Moreover, according to him,
the duality which became prominent in later Islamic thought is a Greek
influence. Although we do accept this, we must, on the other hand, accept
also the difference between the mental and the physical which need not
lead us to postulate the existence of utterly two different substances, as
done by Descartes and some other philosophers. We may simply pose this
as an aspect of man related to his inner nature which is utterly closed to
us. As a result, as we are not concerned here with the mind body problem,
we must simply point out that our theory of knowledge does not formulate
an utter distinction between the mind and the body, though it clearly
formulates a distinction between what is perceived through experience and
our mind. Therefore, this should not mislead us that the language we use
indicates a duality; e. g., experience and themlnd. Even in this usage we
do not, posit two substances, but rather a thing, i.e., the mind (or even the
body) and a phenomenon, (the process of knowing); hence, this duality
must be allowed in the process of knowledge which requires a known
object and a knowing subject.

2. Memory
Since all the raw material provided by our external and internal faculties
constitute what we called 'experience', so far as the mind is concerned we
can refer to all the external and internal experiences acquired in this way
and converted to mental perception by the mental consciousness as 'mental
data'. Although there is no need for an independent faculty of retention so
far as the data of our experiences are concerned, there is, however, a need
for a faculty to store the mental data. This is because the physical
consciousness can register each experience within the respective cells of.
the concerned organ or the nerves. But the mental phenomena has a more
restricted unity, and therefore, the whole data must be restored in a unified
manner. This means that the faculty of retention stores not only the data of
the mental consciousness but of all the mental faculties.
12See Major Themes of the Qur'an (Minneapolis, Chicago: Biblioteheca Islamica,
1980).
so
 The mental faculties, indeed, function in such a strict unity that it is
possible to conceive each faculty as just a mental power rather than a
faculty. Of course, in our analysis we do not claim these as independent
faculties; hence, each faculty expresses one function of the mind. We are
able, however, to distinguish these functions as mental faculties thanks to
their clear and observable applications in their respective mental activity.
For example, when the mind is involved in perceiving a sensible data, in
this activity we know that a mental consciousness of the object takes place;
but since all mental activity cannot be reduced to just this mental
intellection of the object of knowledge we can distinguish this activity of
the mind from the rest of its activities and assign it to a particular aspect
called 'mental consciousness'. On the other hand, when it restores all the
mental data, this function of itcan thus be assigned to 'memory' as a
faculty since we can distinctly observe that such data are stored in the
mind; and so on we can claim the same for the imagination, intellect, will
and intuition. Therefore, the mind is always engaged in manifesting itself
in all its functions. When we thus say that the imagination, for instance,
produces the images of objects, we simply mean that the mind functions in
this way; but since we would like to emphasize the particular function we
use the corresponding name as a faculty.
If this is the case, then the memory is the faculty that retains all the
data and mental experiences 'manifested in our mind. Hence, the data of
the mental consciousness, imagination, intellect, will and the intuition are
all stored in the memory.
The relation of the memory to other faculties can be on the basis of
one-to-one relationship as well as one-to-many. We meah by this the. fact
that it can take a particular data directly from a faculty and/or through
several other faculties and store it as such; when it recollects a data it can
also produce it spontaneously as well as through the mediation of one or
more faculties. When this also takes place, we are able to produce a mental
image of the object of knowledge, which is the function of the mind
assigned here to its faculty called 'imagination'.

51
 3. The Imagination
When an object of knowledge is abstracted from its physical presence, the
mind wants to grasp it as it looks in reality and it thus produces its abstract
copy, which is called 'image'. The faculty which is assigned for this
function of the mind is called 'imagination'. But if the object of
knowledge is not physical, but rather an entity or a fact or a phenomenon,
then another corresponding process takes place, as a result of which an
abstract notion is produced. This means that the imagination functions
according to the object of knowledge represented in the mind. But this
passive, so to speak, engagement is not the only function of the
imagination; for it can connect and hold together all the mental images and
notions produced by it together in such a way that the intellect is able to
organize them according to its principles so as the mind is able to derive
ideas and mental constructions out of them. In this way it is possible to
refer to passive and active functions of the imagination.
Kant distinguishes between what he calls 'pure' and 'empirical'
imagination13; we argue, on the other hand, that the imagination has two
significant aspects, or rather functions which are not pure and empirical,
as Kant maintains; on the contrary they are passive and active employment
of the mind. In the passive employment th'e imagination produces mental
images and notions; in the active employment, however, the imagination
has two other functions; 'creative' and 'fictitious'. Through the former,
the imagination connects images and notions in a rational and coherent
manner corresponding to the mental data of the mental consciousness as
well as that of the other faculties of the mind; whereas through the latter
the same operation is carried out in such a way that the result produced
cannot be conceived to be real. We think that the active creative
imagination is used in constructing a philosophical system. Whitehead
seems to have this in mind in the following statements:
(The) ideal of speculative philosophy has its rational side and its
empirical side. The rational side is expressed by the terms 'coherent'

13cPR, A J00-103 (132-3); B 150-7 (164-8).

52
 and 'logical'. The empirical side is expressed by the terms 'applicable',
and 'adequate'. 14

What Bacon omitted was the play of a ti"ee imagination, controlled by

the requirements of coherence and logic. The true method of discovery
is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular
observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative
generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute
by rational interpretation. The·reason for the success of this method of
imaginative rationalization is that, when the method of difference fails,
factors which are constantly present may yet be observed under the
influence of imaginative thought. 15

This is called by him 'imaginative rationalization', which is the creative

function of imagination. The fictitious imagination, on the other hand,
lacks the criterion of, to use Whitehead's words, the 'applicability', and
'adequacy'; but it may be 'coherent', and 'logical'. Thus, it has an affinity
to creative imagination but its main role is entertainment, not 'adventure'
in the Whiteheadian sense. Creative imagination is adventuresome;
coherent, logical, applicable and adequate. The hero of creative
imagination is the Muslim_philosopher Ibn 'Arabi. 16 But, unfortunately,
he did not develop any criterion to distinguish it from the fictitious
imagination.

4. The Intellect
That activity of the mind which holds the object of knowledge in
abstraction is called 'thought'; the faculty through which thought is
actualized is the intellect. Thought, or the activity of thinking itself does
not necessarily include judging and inferring, although ordinarily we refer
to all these activities as 'thinking'. In our analysis of the process of

14Alfred North Whitehead. Process and Reality (PR), ed. by David Ray Griffin and
Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 3. (I shall give the
pagination for the Macmillan edition of 1929 In parenthesis, 4.)
15Jbid., 5 (7).
16rn order to see this aspect of his ·system It is sufficient to glance through A. E.
Affifi's The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din-lbnul 'Arabi (Cambridge: At the
University Press, 1939); and for an exposition of his doctrine of imagination see
Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi, trans. by Ralph
Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series, 1969).
53
 acquiring knowledge, we would like to distinguish the thinking activity of
the mind which involves judgment and inference from the kind of thinking
which is a mere reflection on the object of kp.owledge and .as such requires
only ~he activity of the intellect, which can thus be called also
'intellection'.
If thinking in the sense of intellection were the same as judging, for
example, it would not be possible to think without judgment. We would
not be able to accept a judgment without thinking because sometimes by
mere intuition we accept the truth of a judgment, which in turn means that
we do infer without intellection. What all this means is that thought is a
necessary step in the process of knowing although in every knowledge
acquired by the mind it may not be used because the preliminary ground
has already been prepared by previous intellections. In fact, this is true of
all the faculties of knowledge; each faculty is· a necessary element for the
process as a whole, but not necessarily needed in every knowledge-
acquisition process.
The intellect thinks by its inherent principles and operations. The most
fundamental principle of the intellect is 'coherence' out of which three
logical laws are derived: the law of contradiction; the law of excluded
middle; and that of identity. Regularity is another natural principle of the
intellect through which the mind is able to perceive the existing laws in
nature and to institute laws in society. Even wherever there may not be
any apparent regularity the mind will try to organize its concept according
to its principles and/or principles it is able to extract from that
phenomenon. For example, Hegel's presentation ·of the structure of reality
in a strict and systematic regularity of triads is the work of the natural
principle of the intellect. The reality may not necessarily be so strictly
regular, but the mind tries to grasp it as such. The creative imagination
also plays its role in this strict regularizing.
The intellect is also able to develop certain principles. This is done in
two ways: the mind may apply its own natural principles, such as
contradiction and identity to its own content and derive new principles, or
it may use the natural operations of the intellect to derive a principle; such
as the principle of causality. A natural operation of the mind is its inherent
function which cannot be developed artificially; in other words, we do not

54
acquire these mental capacities through experience or tl;le process of
knowledge. They are rather already given. Among the inherent operations
of the intellect we may count the following:

1. Finding a causal link; without this operation of the intellect the

mind cannot but perceive things that occur regularly with one
another, and in this way the intellect perceives one as cause of
the other.

2. Universalizing and abstracting; through this operation of the

intellect the mind is able to abstract certain features of things and
reach universal ideas.

3. Classifying; once universal concepts are produced the mind

naturally classifies things according to the universal concepts it
has produced.

4. Naming; the mind canthink with names naturally, whatever

they may be, whether pure concepts or mere words. Although
the mind can think without giving a name to a concept it cannot
express it without names. We are able to express our thought
with words, thanks to this natural operation of the intellect.

5. Association; the similarity or contradiction enables the mind to

associate things so that they can be compared and contrasted.
Moreover, the association of a word or a concept to an action
can be established by the intellect through a regular us.e. For
example, of the word 'don't' is constantly uttered in relation to
a certain act, the child associates that word automatically to that
action, thanks to the associative operation of the intellect.

6. Arguing; the intellect has a natural tendency to organize its ideas

according to its natural principles. But it is able to know the
conclusion only through intuition. It is the act of intuition that
enables the mind to infer the conclusion, not that of the intellect.

7. Perceiving in unity; throughthis operation of the intellect·the

mind is able to perceive quantity and quality.

8. Perceiving in plurality; this natural operation of the intellect

enables the mind to perceive multiplicity and introduce numbers
in order to be able to think about this multiplicity. Hence,
numbers are nothing but mental constructions made up by the

55
 mind according to its principles and the principles it is able to
extract from multiplicity of objects and the phenomena. There
are no numbers in reality, which the mind discovers; there is
rather a natural tendency in the mind to express the regularity of
multiplicity with numbers, as a result of which the mind reaches
numbers. Therefore, counting is a natural operation of the
intellect. Things in reality are multiple without the numbers, but
since the intellect has regularity as its principle, multiplicity can
be counted naturally and made up into such an abstract system
of numbers that multiplicity itself becomes regular. Out of this
strictly regular abstract system of numbers emerged
mathematical sciences, which are applicable to reality thanks to
the fact that reality has in many cases a corresponding
regularity, and wherever it does not have such a
correspondence, mathematics cannot be applied which in turn
leads us to conclude that mathematics is not a sufficient
language of the reality.

9. Proportioning; when the mind finds two characteristics in

relation to an object it tries to set a proportion between those
two characteristics in relation to the object. Through this
operation of the intellect the mind perceives relations as well.
Therefore, this operation of the intellect can be called also
'relationing'. It is applied in connection to perceiving
multiplicity. For example, when Newton tried to understand
gravity he discovered his formula through this natural operation
of the mind. In fact all the mathematical formulations of
physical laws are based on this operation.

10. Correspondence; the mind uses this natural operation of the

intellect to perceive relationships based on correspondence. This
does not mean that the mind knows correspondence innately;
what it means is that if it does not have a natural capacity for
such relations it cannot perceive them.

5. The Will
The mind cannot bring any mental data to conclusion without judgment
which cannot be an operation of the intellect because the data attained so
far are simply reflected upon by the intellect. Judgment primarily requires
a choice and it can sometimes act upon a choice which contradicts its
principles and violates its natural operations. For this reason we may
sometimes make up excuses in order to show the rationale of our
56
 judgment. There may be .certain psychological and circumstantial
constraints for this kind of a judgment; but whatever it is, it only shows
that the judgment requires will besides thought. We think, on the other
hand, that we decide or judge as a result of our argument or thinking.
Therefore, the faculty which reaches a judgment in thought is called 'will'.
In this context we are concerned with the will in so far as it is a
faculty of knowledge. We do understand that it ,has another significant
function in relation to our actions, that is to chose (whether freely or not
we do not wish to discuss in this context) a certain action which is indeed
an act of judgment also. Wh~n the will functions as such it is no longer
functioning in the same way as it does in the process of knowing. This
does not change its character as a faculty of knowledge. In fact when w-e
say that if the will functions to chose a particular behavior, it is no longer
functioning in the same way as it does in the process of knowing, we do
not meant that both ways of willing, i. e., judging, are utterly different;
we simply meari that the process involved is no longer that of attaining
knowledge and as a matter of fact we see a difference of operation and
interference Of other factors in the process.

6. The Intuition
The intellect thinks and the will enables the mind to judge; then by using
its principle the intellect can combine judgments. Can such combination of
judgments lead to an inference or not? Obviously pure thought cannot see
this inference which is actually a logical connection. However, this logical
connection between judgments, called in logic 'premises', and an
inference, called 'conclusion', is not a natural operatidn of the intellect; it
rather belongs to another faculty of the mind which we term 'mental
intuition', the final stage of the process of acquiring knowledge. It is
through this natural intuition that the mind can see the logical connection
between such intellectually organized judgments and infer a conclusion.
The function of the mental1nference cannot, however, be limited to
inferring conclusions; the mind through intuition can see certain truths
even without any logical argumentation. In other words, the mind can
somehow feel, so to speak, a truth which has already been internalized
through previous knowledge that has already been acquired. This intuitive
57
 truth can, then, be put into a rational argumentative form and shown as if
it was acquired through the regular process of knowledge. For example, a
philosopher may have worked on the problem of Being for so long
without finding any solution to it; but at a certain time, since his mind. is
busy with this problem, suddenly a solution comes to his mind. Now,
whether we accept this solution or not, his mind accepts and as such tries
to reformulate it rationally; he thus begins to produce arguments for his
solution, for which previously he h~d no arguments. This piece of
knowledge is reached through the mental intuition.
The other faculties of the mind, therefore, prepare the ground for the
· intuition. No intuition is possible without some mental groundwork. A
butcher cannot discover the law of gravity with intuition; for this is
possible only after the groundwork carried out by Newton. Mulla :?adra
would not have discovered his doctrine of Being through intuition if he
had not gone through the scholarly work he had and reflect on the problem
for a long time. Perhaps this is also the most crucial distinction between
the sensible and mental intuition; no groundwork is necessary for the
sensible intuition though it may incite an intuition, whereas in case of the
mental intuition it is a necessary condition. This groundwork may not be a
deep reflection in certain sharp minds, the raw material given by the
internal and external experience may spark intuitive knowledge in the
mind.
Since the mental intuition is the last faculty in the process of
knowledge, if we try to show .all the faculties on a table it will also
represent this process. We may thus show our result on Table 3, which
shows the complete process; we must, however, realize that this process
may not always repeat itself in every piece of knowledge acquired. This is
because our faculties of knowledge .can make the use of previously
available data, whether from external or internal experience, or yet from
. the sources of our mind itself..

58
 PHYSICAL THE MI ND
CONSCIOUSNESS

MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS
......
•
Sensible perception represe3tations of objects are
"""': receive from the external
SENSES' is produced 4 and Internal experience

I
EXTERNAL~EXPEruENCE---- MEMORY
Faculty of retention

I
IMAGINATION
IN TERNAL EXPERIENCE objects of knowledge are
presented to the mind as
mental images
SENSIBLE INTUITION
I
HEART (center of emotions)
I
INTELLECT
I Faculty of thinking
CONSCIENCE
I I
INNER CONSCIOUSNESS -
WILL
Faculty ofjudgement

I
INTUITION
Faculty of inference

Table 3

59
 CHAPTER TWO
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE

That mental framework or perspective out of which naturally and/or

actively follows a human activity is henceforth entitled the 'epistemic
ground' of that activity. Knowledge proceeds from a mental framework
naturally, if it arises purely out of the capacities of the faculties.
Therefore, if an activity springs only naturally from the epistemic ground,
then it depends totally on the general process of knowledge which we have
just outlined. But usually, as we have pointed out, humans are not
subjects that acquire knowledge passively; they are rather active agents that
contribute to the process of knowledge. In this way knowledge will
proceed from the knowledge acquired through both our education and
using the natural capacities of the mind. It is this kind of a knowledge
acquisition process that we call 'active'. The epistemology outlined in the
previous chapter has shown that if nothing is given to start with, .man
cannot acquire any,knowledge with his naturally endowed capacity for
learning. Moreover, Aristotle's approach in his logic is also clear; the
process of knowing must start at a point and that it cannot go on ad
infinitum to try to reach a known concept or an axiom from which our
knowledge would begin. We may try to capture the nature of that
previously given, whatever it may be, a concept, knowledge or an axiom.
We can deduce from our theory of knowledge three categories of
knowledge as the contents of our mind at present analysis: factual, which
is based on the external experience, such as the know ledge of all natural
sciences; experiential, which is based primarily on tp_e inner experience as
outlined in the previous chapter, such as moral concepts and the existence
of God, the problems of resurrection and freedom; and absolute, which is
wholly based on the Revelation and thus it can be an object of knowledge
in so far as it is revealed, such as God's nature, the nature of resurrection
and human. freedom. So far as the factual knowledge is concerned we need
only our natural capacity for acquiring knowledge, and the given in this
respect means only our biological constitution. This point will be
explained further when we outline our doctrine of worldview as an

61
 epistemological theory. But the experiential knowledge requires, besides
our natural capacity, a given knowledge which is the Revelation itself. In
the true sense only the former is scientific knowledge, and the latter is an
epistemic ground of the former. On the other hand, so far as the absolute
knowledge is concerned our natural capacity is not sufficient at all to
acquire; hence, it is totally given. In this respect, our theory of knowledge
formulates that no human faculty of knowledge can acquire the absolute·
knowledge naturally, but only in a given way by which we mean the
instruction of the Revelation imparting the absolute knowledge and our
natural mental capacity is such that we are enabled to understand, or
intellect that knowledge. Therefore, just because we cannot naturally
acquire the absolute knowledge it does not mean that it is unintelligible.
Though we admit that it is extremely hard to express this knowledge in
human language which is now molded by our natural faculties of
knowledge. Just as the experiential knowledge is the epistemic ground of
the factual knowledge, in the same way the absolute knowledge is the
revealed ground of the experiential knowledge. We have said that in the
true sense only the factual knowledge is scientific; when the experiential
knowledge is, however, systematized into an organized whole using the
guidance of both Revelation and our inner experience, which provides the
raw material for this possibility, then it can be formed into certain
disciphnes that can be identified as sciences as well; e.g., ethics,
psychology and philosophy of law. This conclusion is true on the basis of
our definition of science as well, given in the Introduction.
The fact that we include inner experience as a faculty of knowledge
puts us apart from the Kantian theory of knowledge. As a result, we need
not "deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." 1 If faith (imiin) is
acquired through our faculties of knowledge, it is easy to see that it is also
a kind of knowledge. Of course, it is not identical with factual knowledge
which is of the order of natural sciences, and thus, it cannot be acquired in
the same way; nor is it a philosophical kind of kilowledge to be acquired in
a philosophical way. It is rather that kind of knowledge which involves

1 See Immanuel Kant, CPR where he states: "I found it necessary to deny knowledge,
in order to make room for faith." B xxx (29).

62
both the experiential and absolute knowledge and as such its acquisition is
very complicated and involves not only our mental-physical and emotional
states, but also our psychological and worldly dealings. Hence, faith
cannot be acquired as though automatically as if one is studying a book of
physics or philosophy whose knowledge can be acquired with a scholarly
study. That is why the Qur' an refers to faith as a gift from God, Who
"guides whomsoever He wishes". This statement is made in order to
encourage us to re-evaluate our whole inner self so that we are p.ot
misguided by our faculties, moods and daily dealings. It is for this reason
that we pointed out in connection to the inner experience that there is a
subjective mood that underlies experiential knowledge, i.e., belief.2
Once this process of acquiring knowledge is well understood, it will
become clear that knowledge acquisition is a process that cannot be
separated and held fast with regard to different kinds of knowledge. This
is because all knowledge will be processed through our system of
knowledge-faculties and thus every kind of knowledge can somehow be
related to the other. We thus conclude, there is a general framework
through which all our knowledge proceeds; a framework that provides an
epistemic ground for our faculties of knowledge to operate. In fact, not
only our mental operations follow from this general framework, but also
our daily activities, and ind~ed all our behavior. Since this general
2 As an illustration of this point the following verse can be examined: "As to those
who reject belief (i.e., the Absolute Truth) it is the same to them whether you warn
them (i.e., explain them the Truth) or not, they will not believe (i.e., they will not
even consider to understand the Truth you are communicating). (Therefore) God has
sealed their hearts and hearing (i. e., their perceptive faculties); ~md on their eyes is a
veii...They would (try to) deceive God and the believers; but they deceive only
themselves and yet do not realize (this). In their hearts is a disease and God has
increased their disease. There is a grievous penalty for them because they cry lies
(even to themselves). When It is said to them: "Do not make corruption on the
earth", they say: "Why, we only wantto establish order". They are truly the ones who
cause corruption, but they do not realize (this) .. Their similitude is that of a man who
kindled a fire, and when it lighted all around him, God took away their light and left
them in utter darkness, unseeing, deaf, dumb and blind; they will not return (to the
Truth). Or (another similitude) is that of a rain-laden cloud ti"om the sky; in it are
zones of darkness, and thunder and lightning. They press their fingers in their ears to
keep out the stunning thunderclap, trembHng from the fear of death. But God is ever
encompassing the rejecters of belief... If God willed He could take away their faculty
. of hearing and seeing. For God has power over all things." (2/al-Baqarah, 6-20).

63
framework is an epistemic ground, it is possible for certain human
activities to emerge not directly but indirectly from the general framework.
But even in such a situation, the mind immediately forms another
framework as an extension of the general ground. This secondary and
somewhat more concrete framework can be termed the 'inner framework'.
If the human activity is a highly cognitive activity, such as scientific
activities, it will require a more specific framework. Therefore, we claim
that every scientific activity emerges out ofthree frameworks: a general, an
inner and a specific framework. We shall now try to explain what is meant
by these frameworks.

A. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK: WORLDVIEW

A framework is an epistemic ground through which we view things, as

such it is a mentality on which our conceptions are based. Many concepts
which are utilized here in order to explain the epistemological function of
worldviews carry the same meaning but emphasizing different aspects of
these identical meanings. These concepts are epistemic ground, framework
and mentality. We hope that the explanation given below for the
emergence of world views in our minds will clarify these concepts further
and display the aspects which they represent in a theory of knowledge.
Let us take a new born human baby; he/she has no knowledge, but
has the complete and sound faculties of knowledge. Until a certain age this
baby has no conceptual knowledge; in fact, if we remember our definition
of knowledge as 'mental content', whatever experiences this baby gains
cannot be entitled knowledge because these experiences have not yet been
internalized as mental awareness, as a result of which, they cannot qualify
to be called knowledge. All the baby knows (if this can be called
'knowing') is his natural instincts; he/she cannot reason in order to cry so
that he/she can get food. What he/she does is to use his/her natural
gestures to communicate. Of course this type of communication is not an
articulate verbal utterance; it is merely a natural act. But as the baby grows
and his/her faculties of knowledge also become more mature, then he/she
is able to mentally internalize his/her experiences, whether external or
internal. In the terminology of our theory of knowledge, this means that

64
 he/she is able to become mentally aware of his/her experiences. As soon as
this process begins the baby becomes active in acquiring knowledge. Up
to this stage all experiences (lre physical. 3 This means that knowledge is
that experience which has become a mental content; if an experience is not
converted to some kind of a mental consciousness, it cannot become a
conceptionally expressed experience which we call 'knowledge'.
It is extremely hard to observe what will be the first experience to be
converted into a piece of knowledge. But we can definitely identify what
kind of knowledge this mental content is; for example, it cannot be an
abstract idea, or a philosophical notion and the like. It will be a kind of
knowledge that pertains to the life of the infant. In other words, since the
infant is naturally inclined to preserve his life, most of his experiences will
be related to the preservation of life, such as finding and choosing certain
food and developing habits of how to attract the attention of others to make
food available and so on. Therefore, the infant will naturally have such
experiences available to the mental consciousness; as a result these are the
first raw materials to be converted into mental awareness and thus become
knowledge. All the knowledge that is available for us in this way and is
primarily related to our natural life makes up that content of our mind
which we call 'life structure'. As such the life structure includes most of
our daily habits related to the ,preservation of our life. This life structure
becomes more refined and sophisticated as we add to it what we learn
from our social environment. In this way it begins to include many of pur
cultural habits as well, such as habits of eating, the ways of daily
behavior, manners and customs.
The life structure is the first piece of knowledge we thus acquire and
it makes up the priormost contents of our minds. We call it structure
because our mind forms it according to its natural rules and principles
explained in the first section of this chapter. For this reason, knowledge
gathered in this structure is not a hodgepodge gathering of experience in
the mental consciousness; it is rather an orderly unity according to certain
rules and principles. For inst~nce, our mind cannot accept contradiction
3 In this context we are not concerned with the age at which the baby reaches this stage.
Psychologists, such as Pi ages, are dealing with this problem experimentally, and
their works must be consulted.

65
 and it can even without any deliberate intent feel, or rather intuit a
contradiction and thus will not allow contradictory ideas to be included in a
mental structure; life structure is also such a coherent mental unity which
makes up the total contents of an infant's mind enriching itself until
adulthood according to the natural rules and principles of the mind through
its social and physical surrounding.
We thus claim that as soon as the child begins to form any mental
conception of a natural experience, which he had from babyhood
onwards, he will begin to act no longer out of his natural instincts alone,
but also out of the mental content that he acquired, and which we have
termed 'life structure'. The more sophisticated the life structure is the more
conceptual becomes the experience and thus the more we act out of our
me~tal frameworks. In such a conceptual life structure we may be able to
distinguish certain elements, which we call 'mentality'. A mentality is
actually understanding or conception of certain things, living types, facts
of life and the world. As the infant grows, these mentalities are developed
according to his/her personality, mental abilities and the kind of education
he/she receives. Each mentality is like a structure and thus can be termed
'sub-structure'. These mentalities are so coherently related to each other
that together they form the totality of the life structure. Then, the person
arranges his life acco~ding to his life structt~re, which is the totality of the
contents of his mind. Since, as a total unity, the mind reflects all the ideas
of the person in question, its contents as the life structure will also reflect
his/her attitude for life and understanding the universe in general; as such
we entitle it 'worldview'. At what stage a life structure can be termed
worldview is an interesting investigation; but we shall not be concerned
with this empirical topic. We rather say that since worldview, as a word,
refers to the way one views the world, we can say that if a life structure is
able to reflect the person's conception of the universe, such as the meaning
of life, the origin of existence, human destiny and so on, it can be termed
'worldview' no matter at what stage of life itemerges as such. Of course,
when we say that a worldview must be able to reveal such conceptions
concerning the universe in which we live, we do not mean that these
a
·problems must be solved in philosophical way. In fact, an everyday

66
 person cannot do this; but he/she can have some notions about these issues
no matter how simple they may be.
It must have become clear that since any person not only acts
according to his/her worldview, but he/she also thinks according to it; in
fact, a worldview is the domain within which our mind operates. If the
mind cannot develop such a domain, it cannot execute its operations within
the process of knowledge. It is clear, therefore, that we take the concept of
worldview only as an epistemological term. Since in this sense the
worldview acts as a general scheme of all our mental and physical
activities, we can term it the 'general framework'. It is also this general
framework out of which our scientific activities also spring. We shall,
then, try to show this on epistemological grounds.
In this context, we are actually claiming that all human conduct is
ultimately traceable to a worldview; a conclusion which is sufficient in
itself to manifest the significance of worldview not only in individual and
social life, but also in our scientific activities. By this conclusion, we
would like to emphasize the crucial role of a worldview in our actions;
otherwise, we do not have any intention of undermining the significance
of other factors in human behavior or performance of an action, such as
psychology of the person and the effect of both physical and so~ial
surroundings. But above all, from the epistemological perspective, a
worldview is far more significant than all the other elements of human
behavior, because. it is the most general framework within which the
human mind can fully operate in order to attain knowledge. We have two
separate issues in this case: on the one hand we must explain the nature of
worldviews and the way they arise in the mind; and on the other hand, we
must try to show their function as the general framework of scientific ·
activities, namely, as the epistemic ground of our scientific activities.

1. The Nature of W orldviews

A worldview is an architectonic whole, which usually arises in the mind
throughout our daily life out of a natural process. We have already pointed
out at the outset of this chapter that knowledge proceeds from a mental
framework naturally, if it arises purely out of the capacities of the
faculties. In other words, this process is called 'natural' because the mind

67

·-
 has a naturally built-in power to form a cohceptual framework for itself
within which it can operate. This feature of forming a coherent framework
belongs to the mind in general, and its emergence requires all the faculties
of our mind functioning in unison with each other; hence, it is not an
epistemological characteristic of a particular faculty of the mind, but of the
mind as a whole. Therefore, the process of worldview-formation itself is
not governed by natural means if by the 'natural' we understand the
'biological' or the 'physical'; on the contrary, as we have argued above, it
is for the most part regulated by the capacities of our epistemological
faculties as well as by our psychology, education and society. Other
factors that are also dominant in the disclosing process of a worldview are
language, natural environment and other social conditions. All these
factors can be determined more specifically under two broad categories as
epistemological and environmental. The latter can be gathered under four
headings: 1. culture, which includes such elements as religion, language,
environment and all social heritage; 2. abstract thought which includes the
scientific activities and heritage one has; 3. one's psychology, and finally;
4. technology, especially in modern times.Since our epistemological and
environmental constitutions are precisely the major factors that lead to the
formation of our worldview, we do not make any conscious effort to
construct a systematically organized mental unity, called worldview.
Therefore, the individual's effort js only to find answers for certain
questions that either come to his mind or he simply comes across these
questions in an accidental manner in his daily life. Hence, a worldview is
formed by the individual as a matter of habit that is dominant in his daily
life, through his culture, religion, technology, scientific, and speculative
ideas that he acquires throughout his education.
A worldview is, therefore, not constructed, but rather formed by the
individual in a casual manner out of his daily dealings as he/she grows up
from infancy to adulthood; a process which never ends until the death of
the person. It is in this sense that we claim its disclosure to be a natural
process, rather than a conscious effort to build an architectonically whole
framework. For a worldview is, in fact, a mental framework through
which the individual views everything. Therefore, no one can evaluate any
question or a problem without first assuming a worldview of a sort. In

68
fact, the human mind works only within the context of such an
architectonic whole. We can find supporting evidence of our conclusion in
this epistemological sense in the views of other philosophers as well.
Kant, for example, points out that "human reason is . by nature
architectonic. That is to say, it regards all our knowledge as belonging to a
possible system." 4 Moreover, he also argues that "systematic unity .. .is
indispensable to reason. " 5 Then, he goes on to explain what he means by
this:
By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As
systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of
science (Wissenschaft), that is, makes a system out of a mere
aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific
in our knowledge ... By a system I understand the unity of the manifold
modes of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided
by reason ... The whole is thus an organized unity, and not an
aggregate. It may grow from within, but not by external addition. It is
thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by ·the addition
of a new member, but by rendering of each member, without change
of proportion, stronger and more effective for its purposes. 6

It is clear, therefore, that on epistemological grounds no science is

possible except from a general perspective which the mind forms for itself,
and which we have identified here as 'worldview'. We can illustrate this
point by simply assuming a worldview in which there is no concept of
science or any other related concepts; obviously no scientific knowledge is
possible within such a conceptual environment. The same conclusion is
valid with regard to the worldview that already has all these concepts, but
that these concepts remain buried under the debris of history without any
clarification whatsoever, which is the case with the kind of worldview
Muslims acquire today, i.e. the contemporary Islamic worldview, if it can
be called as such. Within such an epistemic ground no significant scientific
activity can flourish.
Epistemology of science thus requires naturally and necessarily a
general framework which the mind builds within itself, out of which it can

4 CPR, A474; B 502 (429).

5 Ibid., A 681, B 709 (556).
6 Ibid., A 832-3, B 860-1 (653).
69
use. its operations to reach new knowledge from the existing ones. We
have identified this general framework as 'worldview', which is necessary
for scientific activities as well because a scientific activity is also by its
very nature a knowledge-acquisition process and as such it is primarily a
cognitive activity. Worldview thus becomes an epistemological necessity
for all our activities; but, as we shall see, it is also a functional necessity
for scientific activities. If a worldview is necessary both epistemologically
and functionally for science, then we must further try to investigate, in
more detail, how it can be formed and function in the way to lead to the
rise of scientific activities.

2. The Structural Rise of Worldviews

We have already shown above that the continual combination of our
experiences by the mind according to its rules and principles gradually
forms in the mind a framework which is first identifiable as the life
structure, and then as it further develops to such an extent that it can
manifest certain mentalities, it can be entitled 'worldview'. The worldview
thus becomes the mental environment within which the mind operates,
and without which it cannot function at all. Therefore, our concept of
worldview, in this context, refers to the conceptual totality as an attempt to
grasp the universe, and as such a worldview is an architectonic whole, in
which notions, ideas and beliefs are so interconnected that together they
form a network of organized concepts. This network forms a coherent
mental structure naturally, thanks to the constitution of our faculties of
knowledge. It is primarily the function of our intellect to combine all the
various data collected in the mind and form them into a coherent outlook.
In doing so the intellect uses its inherent principles, such as the principle
of contradiction, argumentation, association and so on, to form 'the
impressions that it receives from the outside world into a coherent unity,
as a result of which arises a. worldview. It is clear, therefore; that a
worldview is not necessarily constructed by the individual, but rather it
• I
arises in the mind of the individual necessarily. It is in this sense that we
have claimed that it arises in the mind is a natural process, rather than a
conscious effort to build an architectonically whole perspective. 7 For a

70
 worldview is, in fact, a perspective from which the individual views
everything. A worldview is, therefore, a coherent network of ideas,
concep-tions, beliefs and aspirations in which all that make it up are
organized in a coherent manner, but not necessarily in a systematically
interconnected network (which is called 'system' in the philosophical
sense). 8
As we have indicated, the major environmental factors leading to the
rise of a worldview in the mind of an individual are mainly culture, which
includes such elements as religion, language, social environment and
customs; abstract thought which includes the scientific activities and
philosophical thought expressed as education; one's psychology; and
technology. Since these are precisely the major factors that form a
worldview, through the natural operations of the mind, the individual does
not have to make a conscious effort to construct a systematically organized
worldview. The individual's effort is only to find answers for certain
questions that either arise in his mind or he simply comes across them in
an accidental manner in his daily life. But we do not mean that the
individual has absolutely no conceptual effort in the process of the
emergence of his worldview. On the contrary, he contributes to this
process in his effort of oqtaining knowledge. What he is not conscious of
is the actual formation, or orgqnization which the worldview takes in the
mind; which is a mental act of reaching an architectonic totality in the
epistemological sense. But this act primarily and naturally belongs to the
mind. In other words, when an individual in a daily life applies, for
instance, the law of contradiction, he is not conscious of the law, but only
of an absurdity which the mind cannot accept. Hence, a worldview is
formed by our mind as a matter of habit that is dominant in our daily life
with regard to the environmental factors, but as a matter of the nature of

7 In fact if there is such an effort to build a framework systemf!tically, that wlll be a

scientific activity which is already e;>dsting in philosophy. Therefore, the counterpart
of the term 'world view' in philosophy is the concept of 'system'. We thus
distinguish these two terms only in this sense. See the following footnote.
8 For an elaboration and comparison of the concept of 'system' in relation to
worldview, see the present author's "A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'anic
Context", The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences", ll: 2 (1994), 170-4.

71
 the mind with regard to epistemological factors, either through (1) culture,
technology, scientific, religious and speculative ideas that we acquire
through education and other means, or (2) a conscious effort to acquire
knowledge, or (3) in both of these ways.
In the first case, a worldview is not constructed, but rather it is
formed naturally by the individual in a casual manner; we shall thus refer
to this kind of a worldview as 'natural woddview', because the acquisition
of its major components is regulated by the n;ltural operations of the mind.
But in the second and third cases, the worldview arises in the mind by a
conscious use of the natural operations of the mind. As a result, the basic
· components of the worldview come into existence in the mind through
investigation and search for knowledge. That is why many of the basic
ideas, beliefs, outlooks and conceptions in it are clarified to the person
trying to search for_knowledge. Obviously this kind of a worldview is
completely different from the natural one; we shall thus refer to it as
'transparent worldview'.
A transparent worldview may also arise in two different ways: first, in
an environment in which the dissemination of knowledge within the
spciety takes place quasi-scientifically; second, in a society where
scientific knowledge regulates the dissemination of knowledge. In order to
make this point clear, I would like to elucidate how scientific knowledge
may regulate the dissemination of knowledge, which will shed light on
both cases at the same time. Then, on the basis of that I will attempt to
clarify the first case.
First of all, in order for scientific knowledge to regulate the
dissemination of knowledge, there must be a sophisticated mechanism for
the production of scientific knowledge. This mechanism, above all,
requires a well-equipped scientific conceptual scheme, 9 and a worldview
that is suitable for the development of this scheme, assuming that this
mechanism works well in a given society then some sophisticated
scientific activities begin to exist. Obviously through time there will be an
accumulation of scientific knowledge in that society. Besides this there

9 What we mean by this will be clarified in the following section on the inner
framework.

72
 will be a group of people, called 'scientists' (i.e., the 'ulamii'). But the
knowledge put forward by those scientists utilizes a special language, in
which many of the everyday words are not used anymore in their daily
meaning; a specific scientific meaning is attached to them. Moreover, in
certain disciplines, such as philosophy and theology, the concepts used are
abstract. As a result, the general masses are unable to understand this
knowledge, to which we have referred as 'scientific knowledge'. But the
community of scholars well understand the scientific knowledge and if an
adequate network of communication is established between them,
knowledge disseminates at this level directly and rapidly. Thus is formed
the first stage in the process of the dissemination of knowledge which we
shall call the 'abstract level'. This group of scientists are called 'ulama .J 0
in the Islamic sense.
Secondly, either there will be or there arises, as a result of the
emergence of scientific knowledge, in such a society, a group of people
called 'intellectuals', such as men of literature, artists, architects, teachers
and educators, who are eclucated and are able t~ understand the available
scientific knowledge. The intellectuals are not scientists, nor are they
scholars, but rather illuminated personalities who develop a transparent
worldview within an environment of scientific activities. Therefore, they
are able to express and clearly define terms and concepts that occupy a
prominent place in their worldview; such concepts may be, for example,
God, the universe, knowledge, science, the meaning of life, good, evil,
freedom, justice, and many other moral, religious, political, educational
and social terms. At this level, since the intellectuals are able to understand
the scientific knowledge developed by the 'ulamii ', they will naturally
reflect it in their works, because .their worldview is already shaped within
that knowledge. Hence, we may term this level in the dissemination of
knowledge the 'concretized level'. Since the works of the intellectuals are

10 What we mean by the term 'ulamti' (singular 'tilim) is primarily 'scholars of Islam',
which includes all scholars, such as philosophers, theologians, physicists, chemists
and astronomers, who carry out their scientific activities within the Islamic
worldview. Therefore, we do not mean merely its contemporary usage, which includes
only the traditional Islamic scholars as a class of clergy which is indeed a corrupt
usage.

73
 usually of a concrete nature, the scientific knowledge is concretized and
thus handed down to the general masses who can understand the concrete
ideas more easily.
Finally, at the third stage, the knowledge thus far produced enters into
a massive dissemination through the educational institutions and mass
media. This is possible through the work of scientists and intellectuals,
because all the educational institutions are formed in accordance with the
knowledge put forward by them. When the scientific knowledge thus
disseminates from the top level of abstraction to the bottom level of
concretization, it reaches to the masses and begins shaping their
worldview according to its welf-defined and systematically developed
concepts, ideas and doctrines, namely, according to a system, developed
by the 'ulamii '. When a transparent world view is thus formed in
accordance with the system developed by the 'ulamii ', it is called
'scientific worldview'; and this.way of worldview-formation we calJ
'scientific worldview-formation'. Therefore, by the scientific development
of a worldview, we mean the "inculcation of its major components, i.e.,
its concepts, ideas and beliefs, to the individuals of the society through
clear and transparent definitions and a systematically organized body of
knowledge."
The scientific worldview-formation is not the only way in which
transparent worldviews may be formed in the minds of the individuals.
For there may be other ways for the rise ofsuch worldviews in the minds
of individuals. We shall not discuss all such possible ways here, but only
allude to one of those ways in which historically speaking it occurred in
our civilization. This is the Islamic worldview as established by the
Prophet in Mecca, through the Revelation. Since the Muslim community
as such did not exist at that time, we cannot talk of any scientific
knowledge within the newly emerging society. As a result, the formation
of the transparent Islamic worldview took place differently. This process
of the Islamic worldview-fdrmation was very much similar to the scientific
worldview-formation, and as such can be called 'quasi-scientific
worldview-formation'. As we know from history each time a new
Revelation came, the Prophet explained it to his community and each term
and idea thus revealed found a clear definition and a proper place within

74
 the Islamic worldview. Hence, since the way the Islamic worldview was
established in its original form in the first Muslim community is similar to
scientific worldviews, we may call all worldviews that arise in this way in
the minds of individuals 'quasi-scientific worldviews '.
What distinguishes the transparent worldviews from the natural ones
is the dynamism they induce to the individuals in whose mind they are
formed. This is clear from the historical world phenomenon exhibited by
the early Muslims who once possessed the Islamic worldview they became
world leaders in culture, science and civilization. But the worldviews these
people had before Islam can be defined as natural which lacked the
adequate dynamism to give to the individuals of that society. In such a
mental framework no scientific activity would have ever been possible.
We must also point out that what makes worldviews dynamic,
invigorating and stimulating is the continual renewal through scientific or
quasi-scientific activities of the same kind which established the original
Islamic worldview. If these activities of renewal cease to exist the
transparent worldview can gradually turn into a natural worldview in
which scientific and civilizational activities also cease.
We may try to apply the concept of worldview in the epistemological
sense to our case civilizations as well. The Greek civilization, for example,
exhibits a similar development. When we take the early rise of this
civilization we can see that it is able to begin to develop a transparent
worldview in a quasi-scientific way around 800 B.C. By the time of the
Milesian School and the first Ionian philosophers this transparent
worldview became scientific, which is clear in the art and literature of that
period extant today. It is only that kind of a transparent worldview that
leads to a meaningful scientific progress in a creative way. The same
process can be observed in the Western civilization beginning around the
eighth century. By the Middle Ages, the Western worldview acquired a
transparent characteristic and by the nine-teenth century it became scientific
in the sense described in the process of knowledge-dissemination.
Our exposition shows that some aspects of worldviews are the same
in every civilization and society, though some other aspects may be
different. For example, although the Islamic worldview and the Greek
worldview are utterly different, the way they arise in the mind of an

75
 individual in their respective societies is identical, and the way they
function within their societies is the same. Since we assert this in the
epistemological sense, we may illustrate this point by referring to the way
the human stomach functions in relation to the human body, as this is the
case with the human mind in relation to knowledge. Some of these points,
together with the process of worldview-formation, will become clear as
yve try to demonstrate the function of worldviews.

3. The Function of Worldviews

In the foregoing discussion we have tried to distinguish two kinds of
transparent worldviews: quasi-scientific and scientific, both of which tend
to give a certain dynamism to their society, out of which they flourish.
This dynamism inherent in scientific worldviews is so crucial that even the
mentality dominant in a certain society may emerge out of the worldview
dominant in that society .I I Whitehead expresses this fact so clearly:
" ... the mentality of an epoch springs from the view of the world which is,
in fact, dominant in the educated sections of the communities in
question." 12
The most significant dynamism concerning us here is -that dynamism
channeled towards scientific activities. We may show this fact by pointing
out that in a worldview there are structures, which, once well-defined and
clarified, give a stamina and motivation to the ideals of those structures. In
this sense, the most significant structure that comes to the fore is the
knowledge-structure, which supports, and thus acts within that
worldview, as the ground of scientific activities. In order to show this we
must clarify how structures arise in a worldview and how they function
within it.
We have already pointed out that our worldview is formed not out of
the mental contents in general, but rather out of only those mental contents
that we accept as our own, namely that knowledge which has been
approved by us. Since we would not accept that kind of knowledge

' llFor an exposition of what is meant by the 'dominant worldview' see my "A Concept
of Philosophy in the Qur' anic Context", op. cit., 176.
12Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (SMW) (New York: The
Free Press, 1967), vH.
76
 attained by us without our approval, as our own perspective, it would not
form a part of our worldview. Therefore, every piece of knowledge
accumulated by us in the process of learning does not necessarily form a
part of our worldview. For example, we can study Ibn Sina' s theory of
knowledge and learn it very well without accepting it, which means that
we take it to be a wrong theory. But still this information makes up the
content of our mind, although it does not make up a part of our
worldview, since we believe it to be false. In that case, knowledge
acquired by us without being accepted cannot be included as a structure
within worldviews. Therefore, a structure is the largest unity within a
worldview. As these unities emerge in a coherent relationship with each
other, they form a total mental unity, which is the worldview itself.
Hence, each structure within a worldview is also a unity just like the
worldview to which they belong.
That structure which first emerges in the mind is a natural structure
which has already been termed 'life-structure'. In fact, in our early life our
worldview consists of only the life-structure and as such the life-stru<;ture
is our worldview for a certain early period of our life. As we have
explained above, it develops out of the human biology, and in its later
phases it emerges conceptually as well and thus acquires an abstract
sophistication. It is because, of its biological origin that we may also
identify it as 'natural'.
The life-structure regulates not only the development of related
concepts in this structute, but also our behavior in our daily life. Out of the
life-structure grows our culture within a social context. But we are always
born into such a context, and that is why we find it available for us. Yet
we are always in the process offorrning our culture through alterations.
Therefore; most of our cultural behaviour are regulated by this structure,
such as our ways of eating, drinking, talking, everyday actions and even
professional dealings. But at the same time, as we grow up, our social
environment shapes the life-structure as well; hence, just as there is a
reciprocal influence between a worldview and its social environment, there
is the same kind of relationship between the life-structure, and indeed
between all other structures, and their physico-social environment.

77
 Out of the life-structure from infancy to adulthood gradually develops
certain conceptions concerning the world we live in; first, certain
fundamental questions arise in the mind, such as the meaning of life, from
where we have come and to where we are going. As we try to answer, or
find answers to these fundamental questions, a conception concerning the
world and things around us is formed. As this conception begins to be
more sophisticated, it gradually forms a clearly discernible structure in the
mind, which can be distinguished from the life-structure, and thus can be
termed 'world-structure'. As soon as this new structure is established
within the world view, it begins to function in conjunction with the life-
structure and vice versa. In fact, all the structures of a worldview operate
in relation to each other.. None of them cari operate independently; hence,
our treatment of them independently is. only a logical analysis of a
worldview. Otherwise, it is not intended to establish each structure
independently.
The emergence of other structures as logically discernible
manifestations of a worldview has no fixed order. It may even be possible
for certain worldviews to have the rest of the structures as potential mental
conceptions within the world and life-structures. Hence, they may remain
within them as mere sub-structures. But if the worldview is transparent, it
will be possible to analyze within it, first, a 'knowledge-structure', which
is a direct extension of the world-structure. Then, either the world-
structure or the knowledge-structure, or the cbmbinatio:t:J. of the two plus
the life-structure will eventually lead to a sophisticated concept of morality,
which can be discernible as the 'value-structure'. From the composition of
such a transparent worldview, it is possible to infer a fifth structure as
well, to which we shall refer as the 'man-structure'. In the value-structure
we may find moral concepts and/or ideas, doctrines, and depending on the
kind of worldview, we may also have ourreligious and legal conceptions
in this structure. In the man-structure, on the other hand, we have our
conceptions of ourselves, as well as of the society and the societal
organization.
Let us try to apply our theory concerning the structures of a
worldview to the Islamic world view. I hope that our application will
clarify also what is meant by each structure. Since the life-structure is

78
 grounded in human biology, it will have the most common elements with
all other worldviews, and as such the life-structure of the Islamic
worldview is its aspect that is most dominant in the Islamic cultural
activities. The world-structure is that aspect of the Islamic worldview
which includes the most fundamental elements, such as the idea of God,
prophethood, resurrection and the ideas of religion and the hereafter,
akhirah. We do not mean that these are the only fundamental concepts of
the Islamic worldview because each structure by itself represents a
doctrinal element which includes within itself many other fundamental
Islamic key terminology. But the extensions of these key concepts and
terminology constitute substructures; hence, there lie many substructm~es
within the basic structures of the Islamic worldview which may not be "so
fundamental and as a result differences of opinion in those substructural
elements can be allowed.
As an extension of the world-structure, knowledge-structure is also a
fundamental doctrinal element, which is represented by the umbrella term
'ilm. This structure includes within itself the key scientific terminology of
Islamic science and as such it is extremely important in this context. We
call this network of the key scientific Islamic terminology the 'Islamic
scientific conceptual scheme', which will be dealt with in detail below.
The value-structure in the Islamic worldview, on the other hand,
includes moral, ethical and legal practices. But since the concept of law in
the early Islamic worldview is closely linked with the world'-structure, it
naturally included religious law, which cannot be devoid of moral content.
Hence, law, religion and morality are manifested as an integral part of one
structure. This conceptual understanding of law, religion and morality
never brought about a sharp distinction between the three. As a result,
there has never been a thinker who developed an ethical philosophy
independently of Islam as a religion. In fact there can be no ethical
philosophy within the Islamic world view, since ethics is integrally
combined with religion. If there is a book on ethical philosophy by a
Muslim philosopher, we can very safely identify its alien origin, such as
Miskawayh's Tahdhib al-Akhliiq. The same is true of law and legal
philosophy. The corollary to this fact is thatfiqh cannot be translated into
English simply as 'law', for fiqh includes religion, law and morality so

79
 integrally that the one cannot be without the others. Of course, usually
many concepts of a worldview cannot be translated into the concepts of
another worldview. But there may be concepts in each worldview that can
correspond to their related concepts. In this case the concept of law in
English as represented within the Western worldview, corresponds, not
wholly, but partially, the concept ofjiqh within the Islamic worldview.
Finally, the man-structure is represented within the Islamic worldview
by the concepts of khalifah and ummah. As such this structure manifests
the Islamic understanding of man and society, which is totally grounded in
the world-structure because, again, even these conceptions themselves are
derived from the concepts of taw/:lfd, prophethood, religion and iikhirah.
Since it is not our aim here to expound these conceptions of Islam, we do
not concentrate on their exposition. Only their nature so far as it is related
to the concept of worldview as we explained here is sufficient.
Each structure in a worldview, therefore, has a specific function in life
and in human activities. This point can be explained from another
perspective as well; let us assume a worldviewin which the knowledge-
structure is not discernible as a manifest mentality. In such a case, there
will not ensue any scientific activity from the individual having such a
worldview. There will not be. in that.worldview any scientific concepts that
can form a scientific framework for the mind to work in. As a result, there
will be no scientific attitude, nor any scientific tradition that can support
such activities. In fact, if there is no knowledge-structure within a
worldview, then that world view can only be analyzed into its life and
world-structures. For it is the scientific activity which manifests other
structures as analyzable units of a worldview; if there is no such activity
those structures cannot be developed to such an extent that they become
manifest in their respective worldviews. This does not mean that a
world view without a manifest knowledge-structure lacks a value system,
or a man-structure that acts as the ground of social and political activities;
on the contrary, all these activities will be carried out and regulated by a
world-structure that may acquire a degree of sophistication within its
respec.;tive worldview. But it cannot acquire the level of sophistication
manifested in such scientific worldviews that can adequately be analyzed
into their knowledge, value and man-structures. This is where the

80
 significance of transparent (quasi-scientific and scientific) worldviews lies.
For it is only these worldviews that can clearly be analyzed into their
manifest structures.
Worldviews, therefore, function primarily as general schemes through
which we perceive everything, including ourselves. In this respect, their
function is to put our conception into a unified whole. Whenever we
philosophize, or construct a theory, we inevitably and necessarily, by the
very nature of our mind, presuppose a world view. This function of
worldviews is elaborated here with regard to the nature of our faculty of
knowledge, and hence, it can be designated as the 'epistemological
function'. We shall now try to demonstrate this with an illustration. 13
As we have pointed out, just as the environment of any human activity
is the worldview within which that activity is carried out, since our
scientific activities cannot be without an environment, its environment
within which it takes place is also a part of the worldview. That part of
worldview which acts as the ground for all scientific activities we have
named 'knowledge-structure'. In order to illustrate more clearly the
epistemological function of worldviews, we may argue in this respect that
every human activity emerges out of an observable and non-observable
foundation. We mean by 'foundation', "the reasons and intentions
underlying the act, disposition ofthe agent and whatever justification may
be given for his action". Afoundation of an action is, therefore, "all the
observable and non-observable phenomena assumed to be taking placein
relation to that action in the mind, body and surroundings of the person in
question, either at the time of his performing the action, or at times prior to
its performance".
By observable foundation, on the other hand, we mean "whatever
preceding action, behavior, disposition and events given as either reason
or condition for the action performed". By non-observable foundation,
on the other hand, we mean "all the mental operations and dispositions
leading to that action considered as either justification for or causes of it".

13 This section of our treatment of worldviews is primarily base on our monograph

Islamic Science: Towards A Definition (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), especially
Ch. I.
81
 In order to clarify this, we may give the following analogy: a student
who cheats may be said to be cheating because he is selfish, dishonest,
and because of the circumstances which led him to that undesirable action.
We consider all these and similar motives or circumstances underlying the
act to be the observable foundation, because they can be observed either
directly or indirectly within the action itself. Yet there are also certain other
mental conditions that lead the student in question to his action, such as his
conception of cheating and the placement of that concept within his
worldview. As these are the non-observable foundation for his action,
they can only be inferred by intellectual cognition. Upon analyzing that
acti'on, therefore, it is possible to distinguish three elements constituting
the performance of it:

1. The mental framework within which the action is conceptualized

prior to its performance;
2. Certain physiological and environmental conditions leading to the
action, and we would like to broaden the scope of these elements
by not limiting them just to the environmental and physiological
conditions;
3. The performance of the action itself.
As it is seen in our analogy, the development of these foundations in
the individual's life must take place in different ways, but in relation to
each other. The mental framework, for instance, does not develop
instantly, though the action itself is performed at an instance. Even the
environmental and physiological conditions may develop instantly, yet in
relation to the mental framework and the performance of the action. In
fact, the mental framework is the general framework which includes the
totality of concepts and mentalities developed by the individual throughout
his life, and as such it constitutes what we have called here 'world view'.
Since every related concept. and event is evaluated within a certain
worldview before a decision is taken to perform the action, it must be the
priormost condition of any action.
From the foregoing analysis it is possible to reach a general definition
of worldview:

A worldview is that vision of reality and truth, which,

as an architectonic mental unity, acts as the non-
82
 observable foundation of all human conduct, and as the
general framework out of which follow scientific and
technological activities.
Since we take worldview to be the priormost foundation of any action,
we conclude from this that every human action, including scientific
activities, is ultimately traceable to its worldview; and as such it is
reducible ultimately to that worldview. But unfortunately this foundation
of human conduct cannot be perceived by observation directly and as a
result, it can be over viewed easily; in order to emphasize this fact we
called a worldview the 'non-observable foundation', or to use our other
term, the 'environment' of human actions. It must have become clear by
now that by· the environment we do not mean the physical surrounding.
On the contrary, physical surrounding is only the observable environment;
whereas the worldview is the discernible environment, and as such it can
be t~rmed 'non-obst:.rvable foundation of human activities', including, of
course, the scientific activities as well. Therefore, it can be termed 'the
conceptual environment' as well. Our exposition of the concept of
worldview thus brings us to the conclusion that science arises within
certain worldviews only. This conclusion has other implications as well,
besides clearly pointing to the fact that in certain worldviews no science
can arise.
The proper environment for the rise of sciences means only the
adequate worldvieW within which there is a possibility for the flourishing
of sciences. Such a worldview is the one in which, first of all, a
sophisticated knowledge-structure has emerged. Then, as a result of this, a
sophisticated network of key scientific terms, which we call 'scientific
conceptual scheme' is established by the early scholars of that society in ·
which that worldview predominates. This leads us to conclude that
although our scientific activities ultimately derives from our worldview,
they do not directly follow out of it. For there is a need for another
framework which directly supports such activities. Since this second
framework is within the worldview itself and as an extension of it depends
on the knowledge-structure, we shall term it the 'inner framework of
scientific activities'. We shall now embark upon the exposition of this

83
mental structure and how it functions in the process of acquiring scientific
knowledge.

B." THE INNER FRAMEWORK: THE GENERAL SCIENTIFIC

CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

Before we begin our exposition we must clarify that the epistemology of

science we are developing here is a historical exposition, namely we
analyze the scientific activities which have taken place so far in history and
especially in the history of our case study civilizations, with more
emphasis on Islamic civiliz~:,ttion. Hence, it does not represent an
absolutely universal epistemology of science. In fact, our exposition
should clarify at the same time that there cannot be such a universal
epistemology because science is not a universal human phenomenon
though, as Aristotle also rightly states, man by nature inquires to know.
Such natural and universal aspects of man sometimes confuses us that the
activity resulting from such universal human characteristics is also
universal in the absolute sense. For it can be a universal phenomenon that
man by nature inquires to know but the way humans attempt to know are
diversified; hence, the way we do it is not so naturally and absolutely
universal. As a result, what one calls science in a certain culture and a
worldview may not be so called irt another.
Usually those who argue against this stand try to .exhibit the
similarities between scientific activities in different civilizations, such as
the Islamic and the Western. 14 But they fail to see that since Islamic
science was greatly influenced from the. Greek science, and in turn the
Western science is greatly influence from the Islamic science, they have a
considerable amount of similarities. Of course some of these similarities
cannot come as a result of cultural and 'scientific influences alone; for as
we have shown, the faculties of knowledge function alike in all humans.
For this reason it is not only natural but also inevitable that there should
exist some similarities between scientific activities of different

14Among these the worst representative is Pervez Hoodbhoy's Islam and Science:
Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality (Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul
Majeed & Co., 1992).
84
 civilizations. Once this is understood then we can show how scientific
knowledge emerges in a given society. This has two aspects:
epistemological; and social. The former constitutes what we have been
doing in this chapter as the epistemology of science. The latter is what we
shall do in the next chapter as the sociology of science. For our scientific
activities are governed not only by our faculties of knowledge, but as a
human phenomenon occurring within a certain group of people, called
either 'scientists' or 'scholars', it must also be governed by the social
constitution of this society or community of scientists. Hence, scientific
activities emerge out of an epistemological and sociological constitution of
humans. This is also the case with the concept of science in Islam.
Without developing these two grounds of scientific activities we cannot
investigate how the term 'ilm came to mean science and how scientific
activities began in Islam.
Our epistemology of science suggests that a worldview suitable for
the rise of scientific activities must be established first; then such a
worldview will have a sophisticated concept of knowledge, which lays
down an adequate epistemological ground to carry out such activities.
When this takes place the scientists or scholars involved- will develop a
technical vocabulary and a specific language for such activities. It is the
network of these concepts a~d the vocabulary that we term here 'scientific
conceptual scheme'. Since in this section we are dealing with the general
nature of this scheme we will try to give a sketch of it with very broad
concepts, in order to include every scientific activity of different
civilizations. In fact, the concept of worldview .in the epistemological
sense was also outlined in this general approach so that in the subsequent
chapters we shall attempt to analyze how this took place in the Islamic
civilization. Let us first show the results of our epistemology of science on
a table. (See Table 4 on page 86.)
\ If it is the knowledge-structure in a worldview that priniarily supports
our scientific activities in the epistemological sense, then the first thing that
such a structure will have is a sound definition of knowledge which not
·only puts a great emphasis on this concept but also yields in the minds of
. individuals of a given society a general framework of a theory of know-
ledge. This means that the primary concept that provides a framework for,

85
 \

WORLDVIEW
Table4

and is an epistemic ground of any scientific conceptual scheme is the

cqncept of knowledge. This is because science itself is fundamentally a
knowledge seeking activity; if no solid ground is established for this
knowledge-seeking activity, it will remain. as a mere natural curiosity to

86
 know, and hence, can never emerge as a disciplinary approach that yields
a coherent body of knowledge which we call 'science'.
The concept of know ledge, then is the fundamental doctrinal element
in any scientific scheme. But when we examine the past scientific
activities, we can see that concept of knowledge yields the concept of
truth, for the primary aim is the true knowledge, which in turn leads to the
concept of method because we would like to know how such true
knowledge can be attained. Therefore, knowledge, truth and method are
three essentially interconnected concepts that must be developed first as a
general sketch within the knowledge-structure, and then as a fundamental
scientific theory in the scientific conceptual vocabulary. Moreover, as the
scientific activities continue, scholars will gradually begin to make a
distinction between 'personal opinions' and 'scientific opinions', as a
result of which emerges the concept of theory. It is these four fundamental
concepts that yield in the mind of scholars a consciousness that the activity
they carry out actually. constitutes a disciple because it leads to an
organized and systematic body of knowledge, which eventually yields the
concept of science.
The body of general scientific nomenclature, therefore, developed by
the scientists and scholars constitutes what we call 'scientific con~eptual
scheme', and as such it inclpdes in general five fundamental concepts:
knowledge, truth, method, theory and science. These are the general
concepts that every scientific tradition in history has so far developed; but
besides these fundamental doctrinal scientific concepts, each scientific
tradition developed in its scientific conceptual scheme many other such
concepts. We shall give the following example from the Islamic case,
without discussing them in this context (see Chapter 4 and 5): 'ilm, u~ul,
ra 'y, ijtihiid, qiyii:,", fiqh, 'ctql, qalb, idriik, wahm, tadabbur, .fikr,
na1.ar, (tikmah, yaqin, walJ,y, tafsir, ta 'wil, 'iilam, kaliim, nufq, '{.ann,
fwqq, biitil, ~idq, kidhb, wujud, 'adam, dahr, ~amad, sarmad, azal,
abad, khalq, khulq,firdsah,fi,trah, .tabi'ah, ikhtiyfir, kisb, khayr,
sharr, IJ,aliil, IJ,ardm, wiijib, mumkin, amr, imfin, and iriidah. We shall,
then, discuss in this context only the five doctrinal concept that are found
in the scientific conceptual schemes of all scientific activities that took
place in history. There are at least three civilizations in human history

87
which gave rise to the emergence of sciences: the Ancient Greek, the
Islamic and the Western. We shall try to snow examples from these three
civilizations wherever lt may be convenient to do so.

1. The Concept of Knowledge

"All me~ by nature desire to know." 15 But this natural desire leads us only
to some extent, and when knowing becomes a burden to try to discover
the inner nature of things, it leaves us and another inclination takes over,
whfch is the desire for truth, not just for knowledge in general but rather
for the knowledge that satisfies us in discovering the true nature of things.
In this manner, perhaps the most significant development is the emphasis
laid on knowledge, butno longer in general, rather knowledge as a
concept. This will naturally lead to inquire into the concept of knowledge
itself. This development seems so general that in tQ.e Ancient philosophy
we find this attempt, in Islam, and in the western scientific tradition we
also find it. But among these three traditions it seems Islam that lays a
fundamental emphasis on this concept. For this reason Rosenthal collected
more than a hundred definitions of knowledge all of which he classified
under twelve categories. 16
As we have pointed out, through historical scientific progress the
general concept of knowledge gradually leaves place for a more specific
concept of knowledge; that is knowledge in a more systematic sense. This
conception of knowledge is scientific, of course it need not be identical in
every world view, or civilization. For example the scientific conception of
knowledge in Islam is different from that of the Greek.
If this kind of e development takes place in the scientific activities of a
specific culture or civilization, then the idea of scientific knowledge can
emerge. In this sense, knowledge no longer means the general desire to
know, but rather a systematic attempt to understand ourselves and the
universe in which we live.. Therefore, scientific knowledge is clearly
distinguished from the knowledge in geheral at this stage. Every

IS Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980 a.

I6Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval
Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 46-69.

88
 civilization in which sciences emerged passed through this stage. Let us
take our example from the Hellenic civilization. Initially knowledge meant
for the Greek scholars a general understanding of things without any
qualification. Such is the case with the. Greek mythology, even the
Homeric epics and the poems of Hesiod. In these literary works, we do
find attempts to understand man and his position in the universe; in
particular we find attempts to explain the origin of the world. But as we
come to the time of Thales, knowledge no longer takes this general
characteristic; it is rather understood as 'wisdom', and the attempt to
acquire knowledge already has a name: philo sophia. This means that
there is already a consciousness to grasp these efforts as a systematic
attempt to understand reality. Therefore, in this sense, knowledge is
understood as scientific knowledge. That is why by the time of Aristotle,
the term episteme is already invented for such uses. How this conceptual
scientific development took place in Islam as reflected in .the concept of
'ilm will be investigated in Chapter 4. Therefore, there is no need to
discuss it in this context. But we hope that it is clear how this conceptual
development takes place in the scientific activities of a civilization so tha~ it
leads to the emergence of a technical concept of knowledge which, as an
umbrella concept, makes up a significant aspect of the scientific conceptual
scheme of such scientific activities.

2. The Concept of Truth

By the time a scientific activity n~aches this concept it must have achieved a
considerable scientific progress. For jnstance, in case of the Greek
civilization, when this concept becomes a part of the scientific scheme
Parmenides already appeared in this tradition. It is natural for a scientific
tradition to develop this concept because without it true knowledge cannot
be differentiated from the knowledge in general. In fact, scientific
knowledge takes on the character of true knowledge in almost all the three
traditions cited here; i.e., the Greek, Islamic and the Western. But in the
Greek case, again, by the time of Socrates and the Sophists this debate
intensifies. Plato even devotes a dialogue (Theaetetus) for this purpose.
In Islam also we have a similar attempt but only after the emergence of
\ a scientific tradition towards the end of the second century (A.H.). This is
89
 \
natural because, as we pointed out," a sophisticated conception of
knowledge is needed for such a discourse on truth.
The concept of truth in the scientific conceptual scheme does not mean
what truth means in everyday life; it is as such a scientific term-. Its
meaning as a technical scientific term may change depending on the
conceptual environment of the concept in question. In the Greek and
Western philosophical context, for example, it has a logical connotation
applied to propositions. Of course in the earlier phase of these traditions its
logical connotation is not much emphasized. Parmenides, for instance,
argued that the common man never notices being, because he goes merely
by sense-perception. Sense-perception can acquire only becoming, which
is actually an illusion on the part of the senses. Hence, the information
about becoming is only an opinion not the Truth for the way of the Truth
is Being , which is perceived only by Reason. He thus clearly assigns
truth to our mind and establishes a link between it and Being. It is perhaps
Plato who, as a result of the Parmenidean approach, saw the connection
between truth as a logical property, and the mind. Then, Aristotle
established logic as a specific discipline to study truth as a property of
propositions. In this way, as we can see, the concept of truth became an
integral part of the Greek scientific conceptual scheme. In Islam this
development took place differently, and as a result, l:zaqq came to mean at
once truth and reality. We shall discuss this development in Chapter 4.

3. The Concept of Method

If the term 'knowledge' in the scientific conceptual scheme is released
from its everyday connotation, and means rather 'scientific knowledge',
then this new emerging concept of knowledge requires a different way, or
manner through which scientific knowledge is acquired. Therefore, the
way we acquire knowledge in everyday life is the same as the way we
acquire knowledge ,in the scientific sense in so far as the natural operations
of the mind concerned; in other words, the scientist does not have a
different mind, but he has developed different ways and manners, or
rather techniques to acquire scientific kno-yvledge. For, as we have said,
scientific knowledge is orderly and systematic knowledge; if so, its
acquisition must also be orderly and systematic. This necessarily requires
90
 a new way of going about to acquire knowledge. If a scientific tradition
develops this idea, then it will come up with a new concept, known in the
history of sciences as 'method',
When we examine, again, the three civilizations in their scientific
tradition, then we shall see that in the earlier periods of their history they
developed a concept of method. Of course, in the earlier phases of its
history, the concept of method will be defined in a simple and may be even
primitive way. But later it acquired a considerable sophistication; in fact
the Western tradition has achieved this to a greater extent. In Islamic
scientific conceptual scheme, the term u~ul was developed to undertake
this function, which will be discussed again in Chapter 4.
We must realize, however, the way a certain tradition conceives the
concept of method may not necessarily be the same as another scientific
tradition. This is because, since the concept of method is developed within
a certain scientific conceptual scheme, it is necessarily connected to a
knowledge-structure, which is in turn, necessarily connected to a certain
worldview. Therefore, the concept of method, just like any other scientific
concepts in a scientific conceptual scheme, will necessarily carry the color
of its knowledge-structure and its worldview. Even if this concept is
borrowed from another scientific tradition, it cannot be borrowed without
a. transformation of a kind into its new conceptual environment and
context, i. e., its worldview, knowledge-structure and scientific concep-
tual scheme. Moreover, this concept as a doctrinal ground within the
sciehtific conceptual scheme is quite general and as such does not have to
be the same in every specific science: Hence, as it is applied in theology
may be, and in fact, is necessarily, different from its application in, for
example, philosophy, or chemistry, or mathematics. We must remember
that concepts in this scheme are general and as such they are held as part of
the scientific tradition in the mentalities of the scientists who acquire them
through their scientific training.

4. The Concept of Theory

Closely connected with the concept of truth and method is the concept of
theory in any scientific conceptual scheme. For, if the aim of scientific
knowledge is truth, then there is a need for a scientific method. But
91
suppose that when one applies this method still there are other scientists
who are not satisfied whether the knowledge formulated is true or not. Let
us point out in this connection that, as we can see here, any scientific
conceptual scheme presupposes a community of scholars, which makes
the scientific knowledge as a social phenomenon primarily governed by
the scientists. This brings forth the social character of scientific knowledge
and as such it must be governed by the subjectivity of such a community.
It becomes inevitable in this context to launch the concept of 'provisional
scientific knowledge' which means in the technical vocabulary of almost
all scientific traditions that l):ind of scientific knowledge whose truth has
not yet been established conclusively. That is why scientists prefer not to
call such pieces of formulations 'knowledge', and thus they term it
'theory'.
The way the concept of theory js defined can be different from one
scientific tradition to another. But usually it is understood that a theory is a
provisional formulation of truth reached after applying a certain scientific
method. Again, the concept of theory may be different depending on the
discipline in which it is formulated.

5. The Concept of Science

When the scientific activities in a ~ertain society reaches the stage of clearly
defining the concepts of know ledge in the sense of especially scientific
knowledge, truth, method and theory, usually the scientists in that society
gradually become aware that the subjects they are investigating constitute
specific disciplines. This is required not only by the epistemological
constitution of our mind, but also the practical approach in dividing the
subjects of investigation.
In the first place, as we have indicated, our intellect has a natural
operation to classify things, not only· things but also subjects we
investigate, concepts we develop and so ·on. This is just another way we
can think, namely by classifying things and concepts. Therefore, when
subjects of investigation also diversifies we naturally .tend to classify them.
Once this classification is applied, individual sciences naturally emerge,
and as a result, the concept of science comes fore.

92
 Secondly, when the subjects of investigation diversifies in a
complicated way, we naturally think, for practical purposes, to classify
these subjects. When this is done, again we face the same concept,
science.
Therefore, it is natural for any scientific tradition to come up with
some kind of a concept of science. If the scientific activities in a given
society do not give rise to this concept no scientific tradition can be
established in that society. For this reason, the concept of science is
essential for a scientific conceptual scheme, without which subjects of
investigation cannot be conceived as individual disciplines.

C. THE SPECIFIC FRAMEWORK: THE ~PECIFIC SCIENTIFIC

CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

If scientific activities are examined from an epistemological perspective, as

we have done here, it will be observed that they emerge primarily from the
constitution of our mind which works within three frameworks that it has
built for itself. The first two frameworks have been discussed as the
worldview (the general framework) and the scientific conceptual scheme
(the inner framework). The thirdone is also a scientific conceptual scheme
but one that is used in a specific discipline, and as such in can also be
called 'specific scientific conlceptual scheme'. It is this scheme that is also
identif~ed as 'specific framework'.
The specific scientific conceptual scheme, as the specific framework,
includes in itself the nomenclature of a specific science. Obviously without
such a nomenclature no science can be developed. For example, the
network of the technical terms and scientific concepts used in Aristotle's
physics constitutes its specific framework. The general scientific
conceptual scheme as the inner framework of his physics is the network of
scientific concepts and the waythey are conceptualized within the Greek
scientific tradition of hjs time; the general framework, as his worldview, is
the Aristotelian system. Let us give another general example from the
Islamic scientific tradition: the technical vocabulary and the theological
concepts utilized in kaliim are the specific scientific conceptual scheme of
kaliim; the web of the general scientific vocabulary that is utilized in all

93
 Islamic sciences is the scientific conceptual scheme as the inner framework
of kaliim; and finally the Islamic worldview is the general framework of it.
If we try to compare kaUim with Aristotelian theology, we will see
fundamental differences. These differences come primarily from the
Islamic worldview and the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. When
sciences of difference civilizations are compared and contrasted in this
way~ it is possible to trace the most differences to their respective general
frameworks; the lesser differences will be traced bac_k to their respective
scientific conceptual schemes; and finally the least differences will be
found in their specific scientific conceptual schemes, which means with
respect to their specific schemes they will have the most similarities. This
is because if the worldview~ of both scientific traditions exhibit many
differences, this will be I:clkcted on the scientific work itself; but if the
two respective worldviews are not so much diversified, obviously the
differences in their respective sciences will also be propmtionately less.
It must be clear that by the specific framework we mean the technical
concepts which form a network of conceptual scheme in a specific science.
Since such concepts will he rnu~tly different in every science there is no
need to cite them individually in this context. We must point out, however,
that a concept in one of the sciences can pe used in another science; hence,
there can be a common terminology in different sciences. But as we know,
in most cases, terms used in every science differ. Sometimes the same
concept may mean different in another science.

94
\

CHAPTER THREE
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
There are some sociologists who claim that science is a social institution,
and as such there is an obvious need to study it from this perspective. 1 It
is this study which they term 'sociology of science'. In this sense, they
argue that the sociology of science is concerned with the social structure of
science in order to define the nature of scientific ideas and describe their
relations both to other kinds of ideas, such as philosophical, theological
and aesthetic, and to various institutional and personality factors. 2 This
cannot be acceptable to us; for if science is defined as primarily a body of
organized knowledge, as we _have done in the Introduction, it· cannot be
defined at the same time as a social institution. There are certain social
institutions which make for the emergence and development of science; but
this cannot render science, as discipline, a social institution. If science
cannot be defined as a social institution, then obviously sociology cannot
deal with its nature and structure. The main reason for this is that as a
body of organized knowledge, science is primarily a cognitive activity and
· as such its real nature can be dealt with only in the epistemology of
science, which can be taken as a branch, or even simply a subject, in the
philosophy of science.
Almost all sociologists dealing with science never take into account the
epistemology of science. If we do not consider how we acquire scientific
knowledge how can we deal with its sociology? For even the sociology of
science depends largely on its epistemology; this is because the nature of
the scientific activity is acquiring knowledge which renders it to be a
cognitive activity. Robert K. Merton notes that "the subject-matter of the
sociology of science is the dynamic interdependence between science, as
an ongoing social activity giving rise to cultural and civilizational products,

1 The main proponent of this thesis is Robert K. Merton; see his The Sociology of
Science, ed. by Norman W. Storer (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
· Press, l973).
2 See Bernard Barber, "The Sociology of Science", Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,
q. v., 92.

95
 and the environing social structure." 3 Science, as a discipline, is not a
social activity; if we take every human action performed within a society to
be necessarily a social activity, then actions done without any relation to a
social context must necessarily be considered social as well. Scientific
activities of a community of scientists can be social, but its product, as a
discipline can have only social aspects, because of the fact that such
activities are carried out within a mental framework which is the dominant
worldview of that society. The fact that science is not a social institution
does not mean that it has no social aspect; for no human phenomenon can
escape· the social aspect. Moreover, if we can talk of a scientific tradition
we must at the same time accept that there is a community (of scientists)
who establish such a tradition. In that case sociology of science must
discuss primarily the nature and structure of such a community and how it
can shape science. But at the same time we must state that every sociology
of science must take into account the epistemology involved in scientific
activities. In this sense, we can distinguish primarily three issues that are
fundamental to any sociology of science: the first is to understand,
interpret and disclose the real nature of the process through which a
science comes toemerge within a society as a discipline, which we shall
identify as the scient(fic process; the second issue is to understa_nd the
nature and the social character of the group of scholars who are actively
engaged in scientific activities, to which we shall appropriate the already
existing term scient(fic community; and finally the social process that
shape at least one aspect of science; the nature and emergence of the
scientific tradition.
In the first section of this chapter, therefore, we shall discuss the
process through which sciences emerge, viz., the scientific process. Since
this process may sometimes take years, usually generations of scientists
are involved in its development. As a result, not only a group of scholars
at a particular time, but rather a group of generations of scholars in a
seql:lence of time periods may involve in the scientific process. If there is
no uniformity in the social and epistemological structure of these
scientists, there cannot be a uniformly organized body of knowledge called

3 Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 585.

96
science. If, on the other hand, there is a uniformity between these
scholars, we may, lacking a better one, adopt the term community, since
at least one significant aspect of a community is uniformity; especially if
this uniformity is of a social· character, then we can talk of a community
with some justification. The exact nature of this will make up our topic in
the second section. Then, in the third section, we shall discuss the nature
and emergence of a scientific tradition in a society.

A. THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS

As we have argued above in establishing a science usually there involve

many scholars who form a uniform group that can be called 'scientific
community'. In order to see how this community is formed gradually
through a natural process, we can just imagine the earliest human history
when there is absolutely no science. We do see, however, that at some
point in history there arose those who are simply interested in knowing
certain problems in a way others do not know. There are many modes in
which we can know things; but there is one way of knowing things,
which is not only systematic and organized, but also it questions its own
findings. In other words, this way of knowing is not satisfied by just
having an information about the subject of inquiry, it rather questio~s it
and analyzes its findings, if'any, or else its own mode of handling the
inquiry so that it can actually know the thing as it is. If in this way some
one establishes himself, there usually grows around him a group of
interested disciples who are also interested knowing things the way the
Master knows things. As soon as this happens, then this group of people
have a good chance of establishing a tradition of studying things in order
to know them in a way that is different from the ordinary way of knowing
things.
Let us suppose that this group of people who are interested in knowing
things ·as they really are have established a tradition. Usually, as we have
argued in the second chapter, we name something in order to be able to
communicate about it, as this is also one natural operation of our intellect
to name things in order to produce concepts about them. The tradition thus
established also will be named becau~e as we have said these groups of

97
 people are interested in knowing things in a way that is different from
other types of knovying. In that case they will give a name to it, i. e., they
will produce a concept expressing their activity so that they can distinguish
it from other activities of knowing. We usually choose names, or concepts
from the related activity; since the activity is knowing, the best name for
this tradition is also knowing. That is why in the Greek tradition Aristotle
gave the name episteme for science; in Islam first, as we shall see, the
term fiqh (to grasp, comprehend, which still means 'to know
differently'), then 'ilm is used to name sciences; in the Western scientific
tradition also the Latin term scientia is used for this purpose.
The time that passes in this naming of the activity varies from
civilization to civilization. In the Greek case, for example it took almost
five hundred years until Aristotle finally came up with this name; in the
Islamic case, if we take the date of the first Revelation, 610 A.D., as the
starting point, w_e can say that it took about 150-200 years until the term
.fiqh is used in this technical sense (we shall investigate the history of this
usage in the following chapter). This means that it takes not only a
scientific community to establish sciences, but also the nature of our
faculties of knowledge is required in this process. We may illustrate this
on the basis of our historical account: the first master gathers students
around him, then some of these students also establish themselves as
authorities in knowing. They may begin teaching their learning even when
still th.eir master is alive, and thus carry the characteristics of his circle to
other newly emerging groups of people interested in knowing things as
they are. Then, this process will obviously continue with the same
epistemological background in such a way that always the newly emerging
groups of people interested in knowing will carry the characteristics of
their masters' teachings. Let us assume that after the Ninth Master who
came, say, 350 years after the first one, a tradition of learning emerged
and it was named 'scientific tradition'. Then, all the scholars involved in
this process constitute the scientU'ic community. They do not come
together with the intention of establishing such a community; but rather it
is in our nature that when we see certain common elements between our
fellow human beings we try to be with them, a phenomenon which
naturally leads to the establishment of a community. In this case the most

98
 striking elements are first our epistemological constitution, second our
desire to know which now has been identified as knowing scientifically
and third to help each other in this activity of knowing. The third element
can be identified as social; for one significant factor in forming societies is
the need for help from other fellow human beings. By the first element,
namely our epistemological constitution, on the other hand, we mean the
need for an accumulation of some organized knowledge, so that we can
built new ones on this basis. If there is no such accumulation we can not
produce new knowledge.
We must realize that the subjects investigated are scattered in t~e first
years of a scientific tradition and, therefore, they do not constitute as yet
one specific discipline. But after a long period of time, when these
subjects accumulate in such a way that they cause many problems in
handling them systematically. Since it is the nature of our mind to perceive
things in a unity of a system, the scientists of a scientific community
cannot continue their investigation unless they begin to organize,
systematize and thus to classify the findings of their community. If they
achieve this then they will see that each subject of study constitutes a
specific discipline. If, however;they cannot achieve this, then no science
will be established in that scientific tradition. For by science we
understand primarily a discipline, which is distinctly something other than
a human activity; it is rather the product of an activity. This means that
science cannot be defined as a behavior, as some behaviorists tried to do.
A scientific behavior is, therefore, not science, nor is a scientific activity
science. For science is only a body of knowledge produced by such
activities that it eventually constitutes a discipline.
When a scientific tradition thus produces a classification of its subjects
of investigation, each subject is named in this 'classification and thus is
identified as a specific discipline. This process as it begins from the flrst
master of a tradition seems to exhibit stages which cari be entitled
'scientific stages'. First, as we have seen, the first master lays down
certain scientific principles that make up the initial cultural mores of that
scientific community, which acquire a general acceptance by the
subsequent followers who in turn carry this tradition to their students.
This way the scattered and discrete studies begin to acquire a unity. The

99
 body of collected knowledge thus acquires the status of a discipline. Then,
in this process, a scientist gives a name to that discipline, either according
to its subject matter, or its method. A discipline is, therefore, a study with
a certain method, but not necessarily a well-defined and clear-cut subject
matter, although the purpose of the study does assign it a general and
loosely defined subject matter. But a science is a discipline with a well-
defined subject matter, method, theories and an accumulated body of
scientific knowledge.
When a body of knowledge acquires the status of a discipline, it may
also begin to accumulate theories formulated according to its method, and
thus become a candidate to be called a science. It is this developmental
stages of a body of knowledge into a unified body of knowledge, and then
into a science that we call 'scientific process'. This process can be taken as
a social phenomenon, but not governed primarily by social regulations,
rather by the scientific rules laid down by the community of the scientists
involved. On the other hand, since it is also a process of acquiring
knowledge, it is, in this sense, primarily governed by the human
epistemological constitution. Hence, we distinguish primarily three stages
in the scientific process through which sciences emerge:

1. The stage of problems, where scattered and discrete studies of

various problems are carried out for a period of time;
2. The stage of disCiplinary tradition, where a tradition arises as a
result of conventional consensus among the scholars; general
subject matter and method are determined;
3. The stage of naming this scientific enterprise.
If we qbserve in every society what is customarily called science in \

the scientific convention of the scholars involved, we shall see that what is
called science is what emerges as a result of the third stage of the scientific
process. It is for this reason that a sociology of science must consider the
epistemology through which science emerges, though the process itself
may cover many social phenomena as well, as such it falls within the
proper domain of the subject matter of the sociology of science. It is for
this reason that the scientific process can provide a guideline for the study
of science in relation to society. In order to clarify this we shall now

100
 examine the nature and structure ofthe stages and phases of the scientific
process.

1. The Stage of Problems

Every science must pass through a preliminary stage where only certain
problems are discussed in a scattered manner. This is the initial stage in
which a subject matter has become a candidate to emerge as a discipline. If
the knowledge-seeking activities continue in a uniform manner, then this
subject matter has a greater potentiality in its future to emerge as a science.
Before this subject matter, however, emerges as a science, the knowledge-
seeking activities at the stage of problems cannot be called scientific.
activities. This is because we.have already restricted the usage of the term
'science' to such activities in which there is a consciousness in the minds
of scholars that their activity actually constitutes a discipline. Obviously at
the initial stage of a science this consciousness cannot be found. For this
reason it is more apt to call the scholarly activities at the stage of problems
'knowledge-seeking activities'.
Historians of science have found out that in ancient Egypt and Babylon
there were some scientific activities, such as units and rules of
measurement, simple arithmetic, constructing a calendar of the year and
measuring the periodicity of astronomic events. All these scholarly
activities are named scient~fic, not because these subjects were actually
formed into specific disciplines as we have them now, but rather we find
some similarities between them and the scientific activities that already
, have the consciousness of their subject constituting a specific disGipline.
Moreover, those ancient Egyptians and Babylonians did not name their
activities scientific which means that they definitely lacked such a
consciousness, which we identified as 'scientific consciousness'.
Therefore, we can safely assert that there were no sciences in these earlier
civilizations. Moreover, to claim that there were actually scientific activities
in Indian and Chinese civilizations, one must be able to point to a science
with a specific name; e. g. in the ancient Greece we can say that there was
physics after Aristotle who gave a name to this discipline. This means' that
the Greek civilization had the consciousness that a subject of study can be
formed into· a discipline. What we can say at most with regard to some of

101
 the ancient civilizations is that there were activities of learning, but these
activities did not develop into disciplines to be named with a specific name
to be called science.
·It is thus the ancient Greeks who first in human history became aware
of the fact that subjects of inquiry can be formed into disciplines as
organized body of knowledge in accordance with the principles and
methodology developed in those subjects. They knew that their
knowledge-seeking activities constituted specific disciplines which could
even be named. As a result of this scientific consciousness they named
such activities first philosophia, 'love of wisdom'; an expression which
clearl):' refers to the activity rather than the subject of study as a discipline.
It seems to have been used first by Pythagoras (c. 572-497 B.C.) by
distinguishing the technical· meaning he attached to the term sophia, which
is, for him, knowledge attained by contemplation rather than knowledge
based on practical shrewdness and the one based on skill like that of a
carpenter. What Pythagoras means.is clearly scientific knowledge which
he does not name it so. It is, therefore, apt to demarcate this phase of
Greek scientific development from the subsequent developments by calling
it the 'stage of problems' which extends from the beginning of the Greek
civilization until the time of Pythagoras, i e., 500 B. C. Then, after him
begins the disciplinary stage (c. 500-300 B. C.) when more rigorous
methods were invented and the subject matter of investigation is widened,
as a result there is a tremendous accumulation of knowledge. Scholars
contributed to this development are Panrtenides, Heraclitus, the Sophists
and the Socratic thinkers, until Aristotle. With Aristotle Greek science
entered its naming stage (c. 300 onwards) when many subjects of study
emerged as specific disciplines. We have given this brief sketch to clarify
our terminology, but in connection to the concept of science in Islam they
will be applied in a detailed descriptive manner.

2. The Disciplinary Stage

If the knowledge seeking activities in a society is carried out long enough,
then usually there arises a need to classify and reorganize the subject of
investigation due to a great accumulation of knowledge on that subject
matter. If this is not done it will be hard to handle the subject; therefore,

102
 the human mind tends to classify the accumulated knowledge in such a
way that it will be easy to handle the subject of investigation. This effort of
reorganizing the accumulated knowledge of a subject of investigation
usually leads to the rise of a new methodology; it thus gradually leads to
the scientific consciousness. For if a subject niatter is conceived within a
body of unity (which is the accumulated knowledge in this case) to be
studied systematically in a certain manner (i. e., the method), then it is
inevitable to perceive the subject matter as constituting a specific
discipline. It is for this reason that this stage can be called 'disciplinary
stage' in which the scientific consciousness concerning each discipline
arises.
The length of this stage can change from one scientific tradition to the
next. Usually the disciplinary stage of a scientific process cannot be
distinguished from the stage of problems at its initial level; and from thy
stage of naming at its end. This is because of the uniformity of the
scientific process in a scientit1c tradition: the stage of problems merge with
the disciplinary stage in such a way that they cannot sharply separated
from each other, and the disciplinai·y stage consolidates itself with the
stage of naming in such a way that no clear cut boarder is possible
between them. In fact, sometimes it is possible for any of the two stages to
be merged with each other apd form only one stage. For instance, as we
shall see, the development of scientific tradition is so rapid in Islamic ·
science that in case of kalam andfiqh, for example, the disciplinary stage
and the naming stage emerge more or less as one stage.
The scientific process becomes more palpable at the disciplinary stage
simply because knowledge-seeking activities begin to lead already to the
rise of a scientific consciousness. The scientific community involved in
such activities begin to feel that certain subjects are so different from
certain others that they cannot be studied by the same methodology. This
way certain scholars may begin to classify subjects in such a way that it
will already imply a name for each subject matter. At this level of the
disciplinmy stage we can distinguish it from the stage of naming, which
indeed leads to the emergence of sciences as specific disciplines. We have
already explained the epistemic ground for this naming, which is
expressed at the outset as 'scientific consciousness'.

103

\
 3. The Stage of Naming
It is not actually apt to call. this final phase of the scientific process a stage.
For with this stage the process ends, therefore, it may not appear in some
scientific traditions as an independent stage. In the Greek case, for
example, it appears as the final development in the emergence of sciences,
But even in this case some sciences, such as arithmetic and geometry, tend
to exhibit a scientific process in which the stage of naming is prolonged.
When this happens we should not look for a specific name as the name of
a science in the sense of a discipline. The name given to the science,
however, may be used to refer to such activities, but obviously without
specifying it as a discipline. This is usually the case also with Islamic
science, as we shall see. But let us take history of mathematics with its
branch, geometry, as an example. Both these sciences are still at the stage
of problems when they were borrowed by the Greeks from the Egyptians
and the Babylonians. Dampier, a prominent historian of science, makes
the following observation:
The earliest and most successful of such attempts was the conversion
of the empirical rules for land surveying, mostly derived from Egypt,
into the deductive science of geometry, the beginnings of which are
traditionally assigned to Thales of Miietus and Pythagoras of Samos,
while the final formulation in ancient times was made by Euclid of
Alexandria three hundred years Iater. 4 ·

What he means here by saying "the earliest and most successful of such
attempts" is those activities at the stage of problems that lead to the
emergence of mathematics as a science. On the other hand, all
mathematical studies during Thales and Pythagoras until the time of Euclid
represents the disciplinary stage in which both the term 'mathematics' and
'geometry' were used though these sciences had not yet entered the final
phase of naming, which actually came alo.ng with its proper scientific
consciousness as a result of Euclid's work. Hence the scientific process
· ended for the science of geometry with Euclid and this science entered into
the phase of its normal development. In this case the stage of naming and
the disciplinary stage converge for some time.

4 William C. Dampier. A History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1989), xiv.

104
 Naming a science can be by a person or by a group of scientists, or a
certain concept which is utilized prominently in a specific subject of
inquiry can emerge as the name of a specific science in the course of its
scientific process. The third is the case with such Islamic sciences asfiqh,
kaliim and tafsir. But Aristotle's naming of physics, theology and many
other disciplines is an example of the first case. The emergence of
metaphysics as the later name of theological studies in the Aristotelian
fashion is a case example of the second situation.
It seems clear from this example that the scientific process which we
have tried to put forward here represents only the stages of the emergence
of a subject of investigation as. a science, and as such it does not deal with
its later developments, nor does it deal with the process through which a
branch of science emerges as an independent discipline. Moreover, it must
have become clear that the scien~ific process primarily derives from the
constitution of our mental faculties of knowledge. Yet it is regulated
through the tradition developed by a group of scholars involved in
knowledge-seeking activities. This group of scholars have a certain "set of
cultural values and mores" 5 governing their activities. For this reason they
constitute a community, the structure and nature of which we shall
examine now.

B. THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

Our presentation of the scientific process has shown, but rather indirectly,
that society has a profound influence on science. This can be seen in the
epistemology of science as well, because we have demonstrated that all
scientific activities are carried out within a general mental environment,
called worldview. In our presentation of the scientific process we have
chosen the indirect route for the reason that although the society has a
profound influence on science, it is yet primarily the epistemological
structure of our mind which governs the structural growth of the scientific

5 I borrow this phrase from Robert K. Merton, see The Sociology of Science, op. cit.,
268. Although the use of such phrases may curtail the cognitive character of science,
I must nevertheless adopt it here with caution to emphasize the social aspects of
scientific activities.
105
\
 \

knowledge. Had we not have this epistemological structure, we would not

have science in the sense of an organized body of knowledge, as a
discipline, having a certain subject matter, method and theories. Therefore,
we take the scientific process to be the introductory step of the sociology
of science: for it is in this phenomenon that epistemology intersects with
the sociology of science in so far as science in the sense of discipline is
concerned. In other words, since we maintain that the scientific process is
governed by the epistemology ofour faculties of knowledge, but yet it is
profoundly affected by society, then it must be the phenomenon which
leads us to the social aspects of science. Hence, the sociology of science
we present here has taken its departure primarily from epistemology that is
reflected in the scientific process as well.
If it is the scientific process which enables us to take into account the
epistemologicai structure of our mind, we shall, then, try to deduce also
from this process that social element which furnishes science with its
social aspect. We can indeed infer such an element from the scientific
process, if we take into account the fact that those people involved in the
process do actually form a community. If such a community can be
inferred from the process through which sciences emerge, then this
community as a subsystem within a certain society will carry not only the
soc.ial characteristics of its socie~y but cultural ones as well. Let us, then,
try to demonstrate how such a community necessarily emerges out of the
socially progressing knowledge-acquisition phenomenon, which is
defined here as the 'scientific process'. Our demonstration will try to
Clarify at the same time the nature and the extent of the interplay between
science and society. In this way we shall try to show also the affect of
society on science.
Before we attempt to clarify how profound the affect of society is cin
science, we must draw attention to the point that we must be careful not to
apply social terms to scientific activities. In other words, terms that
express the collective existence of man in everyday life cannot express his
collective existence outside the everyday life. This is the case with
scientific activities; almost all scholars concerned with science state that the
scientific knowledge is different from the everyday knowledge in that
knowledge is submitted to rational scrutiny, it is organized and thus causal

106
 relations among its parts are examined. If this is so it means that the terms
of everyday knowledge are transformed into a different Lechnic:.il
signification; as a result, the sociological terms cannot be used to express
the social aspects of science. It is, therefore, not adequate to refer to
principles that become dominant among the group of scientists by such
social terms as 'culture', 'mores', 'ethos' and 'community' .6 These terms
may cause a lack of understanding in the cognitive nature of the scientific
enterprise. Therefore, one must be careful in using certain sociological
terms to refer to the social aspect of science. We do employ the term
community and in fact sometimes we shall apply these .terms in order to
emphasize the social aspect of science based on the similarities found
between these social phenomena and the scientific activities. For this
reason we feel the need to caution our reader and in fact we shall try to
avoid employing these ter1ns in case of science as much as possible. In
fact, the term 'community' was never employed in the Islamic scientific
tradition; 'ulamii ', as a scientific term, emphasizes the <;:ognitive character
of the activity of a group, and as such it means "those scholars involved in
scientific activities". But it seems that the term implies the idea of a
community, and with some caution, therefore, it can be translated as the
'Islamic scientific community'.
I

1. The Interaction Between Science and Society

It is a mere truism to say that science affects society and society affects
science. Hence, we need not reiterate this truism in this context. We shall
rather show through the scientit1c process, using also the epistemological
structure of our mind, as developed in the first chapter of this essay, that
such an interaction is necessary. In order to do this we must first infer the
' existence of a community of scientists within any scientific process. On
the other hand, in order to show that even the existence of such a
community is required by our epistemological structure, we shall use the
epistemology of science as discussed in the first chapter.

6 For .this kind of usage see ibid.; also Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural
Dynamics, 4 vols. (New York: American Book Co., 1937), and Bernard Barber,
Scienceand the Social Order (New York: The Free Press, 1952).
107
 · We have shown in the first place that all our scientific activities are
carried out within a general frameworkcalled 'worldview'. But not every
worldview is suitable for the rise of science, which is not a mere
knowledge-seeking activity. For in such an activity there is no need to
perceive the subject matter as constituting a discipline; whereas this kind of
a perception is necessary for the unity of a subject matter so that it can be
organized into a discipline. We have used the term 'scientific
cons~iousness' to refer to this perception. In that case the worldview must
have another framework which is able to sustain the scientific
consciousness; as the inner framework of our scientific activities we have
termed it the 'general scientific conceptual scheme'. The third framework,
called 'specific scientific conceptual scheme', which is developed within
this general scheme, is too technical and is related directly to the individual
sciences; for this reason we do not have to mention it here. But
epistemologically speaking, we cannot talk about the scientific conceptual
scheme, whether general or particular, unless we assume the worldview
which sustains it. If the development of worldview assumes a community,
so does the development of the scientific scheme; but a community that is
not organized like the one which contains it. We have already used a
sociological term, though with a caution, to refer to it as the scient(fic
community. For instance, if the general community uses a term in its
everyday meaning the community involved in scientific activities does not
employ it as such, it thus shifts its meaning to a more conceptual
awareness. The aim and organization of the scientific community is also
different from the aims and organization of the society in which it
emerges.
The most important distinction between the scientific community and
its society lies in the distinction between the worldview and the scientific
conceptual scheme of the scientific community of that society, which
emerges within that worldview; hence, what ~he worldview is for its
society, the scientific conceptual scheme is for its scientific community
within that society. In a sense, we can say that the scientific conceptual
scheme is like the worldview of the individual scientists of a scientific
community. Hence, the scientist may share the same dominant worldview
of a society with any other individual within that society, but besides that

108
 the scientist has also two frameworks needed for his scientific activities;
the general and the specific scientific conceptual schemes. Hence, the
scientific community as a society within a society acquires the
characteristic of having a worldview within a worldview. As a result,
mutual interaction between the worldview and its scientific conceptual
scheme becomes necessary. We have already tried to demonstrate this on
the basis of dissemination of know ledge within a society. We may try also
to show this by explaining how w0rldviews function as mentally shared
frameworks.
Usually in a society there :ls one worldview which is dominant; the
worldview to which the majority of the people (i.e., at least 80% of the
people) are attached, we call the 'dominant worldview'. It is inevitable for
a society to have more worldviews besides the dominant one. In fact the
ideal society is one in which the overwhelming majority (which can be
defined as at least 80% of the individuals in a given society) shares a
common worldview and the rest have different worldviews. This way the
unity of the society can be preserved and at the same time the dorninaqt
worldview is checked and corrected accordingly, because there will be
debates and mutual discussions of the ideas and doctrines of these
worldviews.
The dominant worldview. is, therefore, the one that is common to the
majority and in this sense it can also be called 'common worldview'. This
does not mean that a common worldview is identical in all the individuals
who participate in it. On the contrary, it is impossible for two persons to
have an identical worldview. Therefore, by common worldview, we mean
"all the worldviews in which most of the basic notions, assumptions and
ideas are similar"._ Hence, in our terminology 'same', 'common' or
'dominant' worldviews will refer to only those worldviews that are similar
with respect to at least 80% of their contents. Moreover, similarities will
be overwhelming in the world-structure, i.e., in the fundamental notions
and doctrines of worldviews. But in other detailed structures these
similarities will be proportionately less, diminishing until there may be no
similarities.
On the other hand, by different worldviews, we mean worldviews in
which many of the basic notions, assumptions and ideas are either foreign

109
 to each other or cannot he related to each other no matter how similar they
may seem to each other. In this respect different worldviews will have
probably only 20% or less of their contents as similar. Of course, it is not
possible to measure the percentage of a worldview; our purpose here is
only to give an idea ahout the amount of similarities and differences
between worldviews. This means that just as there are no identical
world views, in the same way, there arc no world views that do not share at
least some similar concepts, ideas and maybe e'ven some doctrines. In fact,
as we have shown, since the life-structure of worldviews primarily derive
from the human biology, which is universal among the human race, life-
structures in every worldview, irrespective of culture and society, will
have an overwhelming amount of its contents as similar and indeed in
most cases simply identical.
All that is said about dominant and differing worldviews can be said
about scientific schemes as well; there is usually a dominant scientific
scheme of a scientific community though no two scientists can have
identical schemes in every respect. But since in the construction of a
scientific scheme, a rigorous cognitive process is involved, terms and
concepts of such a scheme are more precisely defined as a result there will
be less differences between scientific schemes than differences that may
exist between worldviews.
As we have pointed out, just as the environment of any human activity
is the worldview within which that activity is carried out, since our
scientific activities cannot be without an environment, its environment
within which it takes place is also a part of the worldview. In fact all
·human activities can be ultimately traced back to a worldview; just as the
doctrines and theories of a scientist can be ultimately traced back to a
scientific conceptual scheme. 7 Therefore, worldview is the most general
framework within which the human mind can operate in order to attain

7 I think it is the general scientific conceptual scheme which Kuhn identifies as

'paradigm', therefore, if it is compared to that notion· it may be helpful to follow
what we are saying in connection to the scientific conceptual scheme, e. g. the
following statement: "a paradigm is an accepted model or pattern, and that aspect of
its meaning has enable me, lacking a better word; to appropriate 'paradigm'". Thomas
S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1970), 23.
]]()
 knowledge, and the scientific conceptual scheme is the next broader
framework within which scientific activities are carried out. As a result,
the scientific scheme will shape the worldview just as it also shapes the
scientific scheme. It is this point that we have tried to prove here. If this is
the case, then we can conclude from this that simply based on the
epistemology of the human mind our society necessarily shapes our
scientific thought through our worldview which is formed within a social
context.
Just as the society necessarily shapes our scientific thought in the
same way science also shapes the society in which it is cultivated. Let us
consider a worldview which is influe~ced by scientific ideasi in such a
case the concepts, views, ideas, and outlook of the worldview ~ill acquire
a certain degree of clarity and distinctness. The individual, in whose mind
this degree of clarity and distinctness of worldview is achieved, is called
"intellectual". This clarity of concepts activates individuals towards its
goals, terms, ideas and insights. These goals, ideas and insights may also
be ethical, political, economic, even developmental; and thus attract
individuals with some dynamism towards the implementation of these
ideals with a certain degree of effectiveness. It is this dynamism that is
. vital for the development of a society, whether in sciences or any other
crucial human affair; and it is this progressive development in the
intellectual life of a society 'that we call the "civilizational function of
worldviews" through the scientific scheme. Usually civilizations arise as a
result of this progressive advancement in the minds of individuals,
because, as Rosenthal acknowledges "civilizations tend to revolve around
meaningful concepts of an abstract nature which more than anything else
give them their distinctive character. Such [scientific] concepts are to be
found at the very b~ginning of a rising civilization". 8 Our conclusion must
point at the same time to the crucial role philosophy as a science may play
in a society, and more particularly if developed within the Qur' anic
context, in the Muslim society as well, because it is philosophy that

8 Franz Rosenthal. Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval

Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970),' I.
11 I
 examines the concept of world view, calling it. 'system'. Whitehead is the
philosopher who resolutely points to this phenomenon:

In all systematic thought, there is a tinge of pedantry. There is a

putting aside of notions, of experiences, and of suggestions, with the
prime excuse that of course we are not thinking of such things.
System is important. It is necessary for the handling, for the
utilization, and for the criticism of the thoughts which throng into our
experience. 9 ... Such a habit of mind is the very essence of
civilization. It is civilization.IO
The common worldview of a given society sometimes has a vague and
unsystematic character which we called 'natural worldviews'. Sometimes
almost no individual of a given society has a specific, clear and systematic
worldview, in which case the society as a whole lacks a transparent
worldview. This is the downfall of that society; it can never establish its
own identity, nor can it ever manifest itself. What is more acute and
devastating is the ambiguity that begins to overwhelm ethical concepts and
judgments. This state of. affairs comes about as the consequence of
intellectual poverty, which is what sociologists and economists call
'underdevelopment'.
This evil state of affairs can be remedied and the society can thus be set
to development, only if a clear and systematic worldview is established for
the society, which has been described in the second chapter a~ the
scientific-world-view-formation. Only then the individual begins to
acquire a clear outline of program and procedure for life. This task is
achieved only by a reflective thinking called 'philosophy'. Since, through
philosophical thinking, the society restores a new scientifically-formed
worldview, while the individuals, having clear and distinct concepts and
ideas within a systematic unity, become morally and intellectually
dynamic, which in turn yields a progressive and knowledge-oriented
society, as it was the case with the early Islamic civilization. If this brief
description tells us how scientific and transparent worldviews lead to
civilizational advancement, then the crucial impact of science on society is
at the same time established. No society is static or stable; there is always

9 Alfred North Whitehead. Modes of Thought (N~w York: The Free Press, 1938), 2.
lOibid., 3.
l12
 some social change which results in the change of individuals. The
worldview of a society must renew itself in parall~lline with the scientific
knowledge; otherwise it will no longer satisfy the individuals of that
society and slow down the process of civilizational advancement bringing
it eventually to a halt.
I have tried to outline only the most significant role of worldviews in a
society in general. When we consider Muslim communities, this
significance does not decrease; on the contrary it becomes the utmost
important task of a Muslim to answer such abstract questions as: what is
science and knowledge in Islam? What is Islam's attitude towards modern
science? What does the Qur'anic terms /:likmah and 'ilm give to the
contemporary man? How does Islam provide solution to the predicament
of modern man? What is life for a Muslim? What is man and his place in
the universe? etc. All these questions must be answered systematically
within a unified Islamic worldview so that the result of civilizational
development can be achieved. Since a worldview endows our ideas with
unity, the unique Islamic goal, identified as taw/:lid, i.e., unity, can be
accomplished as well in the most perfect way as described in the Qur' an.
In order to illustrate our point, we shall in the next chapter examine the
historical development of sciences in Islamic civilization. We may now
concentrate on the way society may shape scientific activities as indicated
1

in the formation of a scientific conceptual scheme within a worldview.

This is exhibited more clearly in the case of the emergence of a scientific
tradition, which will be examined in the next section. Before doing this, let
us examine the general cparacteristics of a scientific community in order to
pinpoint more specifically the relationship between science and society.

2. The Nature and Characteristics of Scientific Communities

It is through the worldview of the group of scholars working under one
scientific tradition that gives science its social character; such a group of
scholars constituting a unity in outlook and scientific conceptual scheme is
called 'scientific community', or 'ulamd' in the Islamic scientific tradition.
Our definition of scienti:lic community, or 'ulamd' leads us to ascribe all
social aspects found in scientific activities to this community rather than
directly to science. We have already shown the reciprocal relationship

113
 between science and society. We now lay down the following
characteristics of a scientific community in general, which lead to that kind
of a mutual relationship: 1. methodological aim; 2. scientific ideals; 3.
formal linkage; 4. marginal ideals. Of course particular scientific
communities will have more characteristics than what we have enumerated
here. For instance, in the Islamic case, the scientific com.munity, called
'ulamii' or formerly fuqahli, has characteristics which other scientific
communities do not have, because of the Islamic worldview and the
worldview of the other scientists. We shall point to some of the
characteristics of the Islamic scientific community that follow from the
Islamic worldview in the next chapter when we out~ine the emergence of
·the Islamic scientific tradition. We shall concentrate in this context on the
nature and characteristics of a scientific colTlffiunity in general, which we
have just enumerated under four headings.

a) The Methodological Aim

A scientific community is a necessary element for the emergence of a
scientific tradition,and hence, prior to it. In fact, for the existence of a
scientific tradition a scientific community is required with a long history.
We have already shown this in our exposition of the scientific process.
When the initial group of scholars begin to work on certain issues, they
attract students who are interested in their knowledge seeking activity in
the way they carry it out. In this way a group is formed as a result of their
knowledge-seeking activity. We may pose a question concerning this new
emerging group vis a vis the larger group within which they live, i. e.,
their society: what is it that distinguishes this group of people from their
fellow commoners? It is possible to cite two characteristics that belong
primarily to the group of scholars which their fellows of the same society
do not have: first is that the group of scholars are those who are interested
in knowledge-seeking; second but more importantly is that their interest in
knowledge-seeking·is in a way that is more systematic and methodical,
which distinguishes them from the same activity that may be manifest by
everyday people; therefore, that which brings scholars together as a group
is the methodological aim of their activity, not the daily needs of life. In

114
 fact, the daily needs of life bring them together with their other fellow
beings into the same society, but not into the scientific community.
It must be clear that the aim and objectives of the scientific community
is different from that of the general society in which it emerges. Its
primary aim is knowledge-seeking, which is an aim that is very broadly
identified here so as to include all scientific traditions. It is possible for the
Islamic tradition, for example, to have other aims as well. To pinpoint all
the characteristics of a scientific tradition requires research within that
tradition. This characteristic of the scientific community is what identifies
science as a cognitive activity which thus necessitates its definition in
terms of discipline. The common objective of the scientific communities is
the search after truth. In fact, it is this derive to truth that attracts most
members of the scientific community, though it may be more idealized in
certain traditions, such as the ancient Greek scientific tradition ..
This aim to pursue knowledge and having the objective of searching
for truth leads the group of scholars to organize their community in
accordance with the needs and requirements of their activity. Once such an
attempt is made a cognitive organization is usually achieved in almost all
scientific communities. For the cognitive organization is required by our
epistemological nature; if all humans acquire knowledge in the same way
then there will necessarily be similarities as a result of their epistemological
I -

nature. Cognitive organization means setting up the necessary means and

the tools needed not only executing their search for knowledge and truth,
but also teaching the knowledge they acquired and the ways in which they
thrived to search for that knowledge. In this way an educational initiation
prepares and thus passes on the scientific tradition developed by the earlier
members of the scientific ·community.
From the fact that the aim and organization of the scientific community
is different from those of the general society, we may infer that the
scientific community acquires another methodological aim in that most
members, if not all, accept the fact that knowledge-seeking activity must
have a method. It is this characteristic together with the scientific
consciousness that conventionally gives rise to identify their activity as
science.

115
 We, therefore, distinguish the scientific community from its society
with respect to their aims and organization; all characteristics that
distinguish both groups of people from each other are expressed here as
'methodological aim', because, as we have shown, they are primarily
related to the cognitive aspects of the activities of the members of the
scientific community which involves their method. But the scientific
community usually idealizes these aims, which do not belong as
characteristics to the society in general. We shall now discuss these
characteristics as scientific ideals that may belong to any scientific
community.

b) Scientific Ideals
There are certain scientific objectives which may change from one
scientific tradition to another, such as the fact that there are impersonal
criteria, impartiality and even certain moral ends that are attached to
scientific inquiries. All such objectives that are idealized in a scientific
tradition can be referred by a general name as 'scientific ideals'. Since the
term science is strictly applied to the product of the activities of a scientific
community in the sense of discipline, scientific ideals cannot be applied to
science, but only to the scientific community and their usual practices, the
product of which is science.
Merton applies the scientific ideals to science as a social institution and
uses the term 'disinterestedness' to refer to them. 11 First of all, there is n6
institution called science; however, there may be in a society an institution
that is governed by the scientific activities and thus can be called 'scientific
institution'. Science has only four characteristic elements; subject matter,
method, a body of theories and accumulated knowledge. Secondly, it is
clear that all these elements are intimately related to our epistemological
constitution and thus are cognitive, not social. Therefore, ideals cannot
belong. to science, but rather to the scientific community as defined here.
We cannot count scientific ideals in a general way because each
scientific community depending on their own scientific tradition has a

1 1Robert K. Merton. The sociology of Knowledge: Theoretical and Empirical

Investigations, ed. by Norman W. Storer (Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1973), 275.
116
 different set of ideals. But the following may be enumerated as scientific
ideals that belong to some scientific traditions with a varying combination;
passion for truth, quest for knowledge, benefit for humanity, disgust for
plagiarism, sincerity for impartiality, request for and high esteem of
originality, scientific objectivity and even commitment for.the scientific
method acquired from the former masters.

c) Formal Linkage
Science, as we see it, is the J?roduct of also a mas~er-student
relationship which is linked in an unbroken chain of successors and
follower to produce a tradition. It is this self-maintained continuity that we
call 'formal linkage' as a characteristic of the scientific community. It is
indeed the scientific community that prepares the ground for such a
scientific continuity which thus enables the establishment of a scientific
tradition at the same time.
The formal linkage as a characteristic of scientific communities is
based like the others upon the epistemological make up of our faculties of
knowledge. For instance, we do science in the way we learn from our
instructors, just as we live in the way as we learn from our environment
including our parents and social surrounding. This learning cannot be
transcended totally, but only minJmally which is what we call 'originality'.
Therefore, originality is a break from the tradition and it cuts of the usual
continuity of a scientific tradition. On the other hand, since originality
itself is the product of the continuity implanted within the formal linkage,
there is a superimposed formal continuity that governs the very process of
originality itself. Therefore,· when such originalities are continually
attached through the formal linkage, a new scientific scheme is produced
in individual sciences; a process that may take hundreds of years. For
example, the Ptolemaic and the Copernican models in astrono·my;
Aristotelian dynamics and the Newtonian mechanics in physics; the
Ash 'arite atomism and the existentialist theory of creation by the ~iifis in
Kalam.
Since formal linkage is also a necessary element in the rise of a
scientific tradition, no scientific community can avoid to dispense with it.
The establishment of such a link requires a well organized teaching system

117
and an educational institution. Such establishments make its product, i. e.,
science, seem as a social institution. But as we have demonstrated, it is
rather the community involved in such activities together with all its
establishments that must assume the social character. It is for this reason
that we assign the formal linkage as a characteristic of the scientific
community.

·d) Marginal Ideals

There is also a set of rudimentary characteristics which appears
peripheral to scientific activities, such as scientific career and education
should be open to talents, scientific activities must be supported not only
financially, but socially and politically as well. All such idealized
·principles of a scientific community we term 'marginal ideals'.
Just like the scientific ideals, marginal ideals also vary from one
scientific tradition to another. But since they are not based on the
epistemological nature of our faculties, they are not necessary
requirements for the emergence of a scientific tradition, but rather they are
complimentary to the necessary ones. They may as such speed up the
process of the emergence of such a tradition. Islamic scientific tradition
has the most marginal ideals than any other scientific tradition; a fact which
contributed to the speedy development of a scientific tradition in Islamic
civilization. We shall now try to show how this tradition emerges in
general.

C. THE SCIENTIFIC .TRADITION

The emergence of a scientific conceptual scheme within a given society

leads to a scientific tradition. Therefore, the very concept of scientific
tradition involves the assumption of a scientific community. Since the rise
of a scientific tradition .necessarily assumes the existence of a society it
also demonstrates the mutual interplay between science and society, and as
such it must make up another significant topic of a sociology of science. In
this sense, the i&~a of scientific tradition which is primarily a cognitive
scheme, includes the achievements of generations of scientists within
which scientific education is carried out and thus supplies a foundation for
their further scientific practices. Sociology of science is concerned with the
118
 emergence of such a cognitive scheme within a culture. We shall,
therefore, attempt here to outline a general theory concerning the
emergence of a scientific tradition in general.
It is sheer truism to say that there must be certain conditions in a
society so that science and learning would flourish in that society. But it is
not so easily available to ascertain these conditions in a society in which
science and learning has already flourished. That is why we deem it
necessary to study them here in :order to show that there must have been
some conditions at the social level, with all its aspects, for the rise of
learning in a given society. Since these conditions are the causes for the
rise of learning within a certain social and cultural context, they can be
called "contextual causes" for the rise of science. It is possible to
distinguish certain contextual causes as more rudimentary and hence,
necessary for the emergence of any kind of scientific activity in any
society; we shall refer to such necessary elements leading to the rise of a
scientific activity as 'nucleus contextual causes'. All other peripheral
elements that help the nucleus contextual causes lead to the emergence of
science and a scientific tradition can be termed 'marginal contextual
\
causes'. We must at once point out that all contextual causes are social and
hence, they have little epistemological import though they may be based on
a certain epistemological natpre possessed by our faculties of knowledge.
We shall now try to explain this theoretical ground and in the next chapter
try to educe specific examples from three civilizations in which science
was cultivated as independent discipline; Greek, Islamic and Western.
A nucleus contextual cause is a dynamism which manifests itself at
two levels: first is at the social level, which causes certain unrest and
stirring within the society as if the whole structure of the society is re-
shaping itself and thus every social institution is affected by this
dynamism; but most importantly, the political and educational institutions
are re-organized as a result of this unrest; second is at the level of learning
and it is this dynamism which causes a lively exchange of ideas on
scientific and intellectual subjects among the learned of the community.
How this dynamism itself as the nucleus contextual cause is produced is a
very complex phenomenon which must be studied more carefully in
relation to each society.

119
 For instance, in case of Islam we explain how it was internally
generated by the thought of the Qur' an through its dissemination within
the first Muslim community. But here what we are trying to look for is
whether there is any universal rule (or rules) governing the generation of
that dynamism. In order to find this out we need some more sample
societies in which this kind of progress had already taken place. Let us
take as our case study the Ancient Greek Society and the Western Society
as well in both of which we witness examples of progress in every field of
learning. In order to avoid confusion and for the sake of convenience, we
shall call this kind of advancement in learning 'intellectual progress' to
mean thereby advancement in every field of study. We shall now try to
show that the 'nucleus contextual causes' of intellectual progress is a
natural phenomenon, and therefore, it is deeply rooted within the human
personality. 12 Moreover, since these causes are related to the human
nature as a social being, they must be social in character as well.
Since we claim that the nucleus contextual causes of any intellectual
progress are natural, we thereby accept that it will be the same universally
in eve.ry society. But the way they are manifested in a given society will \
definitely vary from society to society, due to the fact that cultures,
temperaments and inclinations of societies are different. Moreover, by
"natural" we mean "a characteristic or a trait given by God", referring
thereby to nature as "something that is created by God".

1. The Nucleus Contextual Causes

Our exposition so far has distinguished two phenomena as corres-ponding
to the nucleus contextual causes for the emergence of a scientific tradition: ·
the first is moral dynamism; and the second is intellectual dynamism.
Therefore, there are primarily two nucleus contextual causes: one is moral
in character, the other is intellectual, both of which refer to a dynamism in
a given society. We shall try to show how this takes place in a soCiety as a
soeial phenomenon.

12We may show one concrete example of this in case of Islamic civilization, in which
this idea is expressed in the meaning of the Qur'anic concept, "sunnatullah", e.g.
17/ai-Isra, 77; 33/al-AJ:tzab, 38; 33/ai-AJ:tzab, 62; 35/Fatir, 43; 48/ai-FatJ:!, 23, etc.
120
 a) Moral Dynamism
With respect to moral dynamism it is possible to divide the members of
a given society into three groups: 1. morally sensitive people; 2. the
common mass; 3. the selfish or immorally sensitive people. Among these
three classes only the morally and immorally sensitive are dynamic. For
the former class struggles to restore morality and good order in society,
whereas the selfish remain indifferent to this end by spending their
dynamism to their own ends. The masses, on the other hand, are driven to
either side, which may lead to a struggle on behalf of both sides to defend
their ends that may or may not result with intellectual dynamism. This is
because the nucleus corytextuaL cause is not the only cause of such a
development; for this development can be attained only when all other
conditions are also present. But if the morally sensitive class becomes
victorious and draws the masses towards that end, then intellectual
progress can take place once the second phenornenon of the nucleus
contextual cause, i.e. intellectual dynamism, is present.
Since we empirically know that there are in every society, without
exception, morally sensitive people, the masses and the selfish, we need
not prove that their existence is natural. But the fact that originality and
novelty inherently possess dynamism may not be so easily accessible and
hence we must show that intellectual dynamism is also natural, that is we
find them as given in any society. In order to do this we need only to refer
to our sample cases: In the Greek case, we claim that if there were not in
each case a new and fresh outlook, the intellectual dynamism would have
not flourished and thus the flair of Greek intellectualism would have died
out long before Plato. Moreover, just because there is hardly any original
theory and doctrine after Aristotle, the Greek intellectualism began right
after him to decline. The same is also true for both the Islamic and Western
cases, but the way this intellectual dynamism is manifested in all these
societies vary.

b) Intellectual Dynamism
The 'dynamism inherent within ·originality and novelty' (of ideas and
\
doctrines) is what we call 'intellectual dynamism'. We consider thjs also
as a natural element in human constitution. What we are showing here is

121
 the idea that originality inherently possesses dynamism, and as such it can
contribute essentially to the rise of intellectualism. In fact, originality is
invigorating, fascinating and enlivening, it is just like the re-awakening of \
a land from the demise of winter, and this dynamism is reflected thereby to
the society, which is then set into a process of scientific advancement
provided that there are no impediments in the way of mutual
companionship between science system and its community. Thus without
intellectual dynamism no intellectual development is ever possible. But this
does not mean that, as we have already stated, once there is original
theories and philosophical systems, then such a progress vyill necessarily
take place. The reason for this is the other condition of the society,
namely, moral dynamism, which must conform to the originality of
intellectualism and thus enable it to flourish. Otherwise, intellectual
progress will soon die out, which is the case of Greek intellectualism after
Aristotle who is the most original Greek philosopher. But his originality
was not sufficient to provide a continuity to the apex of Greek thought. In
the history this has somehow been the ill-fate of all civilizations; a
community or nation at the apex of its civilization becomes 'warn-out',
being burdened by the tremendous weight of its history it begins to
decline. Although we do not think that this is a necessary development of a
civilization, viz. born out-progress-apex-decline and fall, this seems to
haye been the course of all past civilizations. If our view here concerning
the course that intellectual progress and a civilization takes at its rise, is
granted then the opposite course will be the natural process of decline,
which means that as long as the contextual causes are kept alive the
, civilization will continue to live and progress.
One should not, therefore, interpret our claim with regard to the
intellectual dynamism that even if there are original and fresh ideas,
theories or doctrines it may still not lead to intellectual progress; for it is
possible that there may be originality without necessarily leading to
intellectual progress, because as we have already pointed out, we are
examining the causes of intellectual progress individually. But within
society these causes produce the desired end only when they are altogether
present. Most importantly, these contextual causes cannot exhaustively be
enumerated for all societies. They may be, for example, ten such causes
122
 needed in case of the Greek civilization, but this number may be eighteen
for another society. Hence, although the number of the nucleus contextual
causes as necessary elements may be precise for all societies, the general
number of contextual causes (i.e., the nucleus and the marginal contextual
causes taken together) cannot so be determined in a decisive manner. In
fact we can give examples from the Western case showing that there were
thinkers with original ideas and even with novel philosophical systems
which did not lead to intellectual progress. Two famous examples an'<
Boethius (d. 524 or 5) and John Scotus Erigena (d. ca. 877). In both of
these cases we do not find any continuity of ideas or doctrines after their
death, although they both put forward with sufficient vigor original
theories. This is because other elements requireP. for intellectual dynamism
were not present and, as a result, we do not see any other individual
furthering their systems to construct new and original doctrines or
systems. Because of this, the origin and the rise of Western philosophy
cannot be searched in their philosophies. They shall remain and be studied
as 'isolated cases' within the history of Western philosophy.
It is possible now for us to elucidate how moral and intellectual
dynamism may take place as social phenomena. The moral unrest within a
particular society demonstrates a struggle mainly between two classes of
people; the morally sensitive, and the selfish class. The masses remain as
the middle class between the two. When the struggle is taking place,
although it is only between the morally sensitive and the selfish, it is
immediately passed on to the masses, which become the battle ground of
the good and evil forces. Some of the masses are thus won to the moral
side, and yet .others to the selfish front. We may apply here a term from
the Islamic civilization, which expresses this social fact: sunn.atullah. 13
This moral struggle is a sunnatullah and thus there is no human society in
which this struggle cannot be found in one form or another. When the
morally sensitive people have the sufficient vigor, dynamism and energy,
they win to their side an adequate number of the masses and thereby
produce intellectual and social dynamism. When the moral stnJggle
between the two groups continue with a victory of the moral class (for this

l3Ibid.
123
struggle never ends with a victory, but always continues in different forms
as long as the society exists), the morally sensitive individuals either
produce intellectuals or are themselves intellectuals who formulate original
ideas, doctrines and systems by introducing fresh and novel definitions of
key concepts that are moral and scientific or otherwise. This way a lively
exchange of ideas and alternative views come into existence within the
society; a phenomenon which is necessary to produce intellectual
dynamism.

2. Marginal Contextual Causes

We have already identified the secondary contextual causes as marginal.
The moral struggle, which is essentially a strife between the good and evil,
may either directly give rise to social dynamism, or to intellectual
dynamism first, which, then, in turn produces social dynamism. Hence,
although in certain cases social dynamism may precede the intellectual one,
it does not mean that social dynamism is a nucleus contextual cause for the
emergence of a scientific tradition. For the activity in question is of· a
cognitive nature, viz., science. Therefore, it is still a secondary contextual
cause with regard to the nature of the activity in question. But the social
dynamism usually leads to an overall activity within the society, which we
call 'institutional dynamism'. Hence, there are primarily two marginal
dynamisms, which we shall now investigate.

a) Social Dynamism
The nucleus contextual causes, i.e. moral and intellectual dynamism,
must necessarily produce social dynamism once they are adequately
successful. But social dynamism is necessarily preceded by the moral
dynamism, which we have described quite simply as a moral struggle
between the morally sensitive and the selfish; but it is not necessarily
preceded by the intellectual dynamism. On the other hand, all these various
dynamisms are required for intellectual progress that eventually lead to the
emergence of sciences. Yet we distinguish only the moral and intellectual
struggles to be the nucleus contextual causes. Since social dynamism is
not found at this foundational level, it cannot be included among the
nucleus causes. But it must be recognized as a marginal contextual cause.

124
All these three dynamisms, either together or one after another will yield
what I shall call 'institutional dynamism'. When the nucleus contextual
forces are at work, a tremendous social mobility and dynamism, as we
have shown, begins. It is the dynamism of individuals working together to
lead the society as a whole to a morally better situation that we call 'social
dynamism', which in turn leads to the re-organization and betterment of
social institutions including the political and economic. ones as well. We
may now examine this social phenomep.on as an institutional dynamism.

b) The Institutional Dynamism

It is this reformative and enlightened efforts at the organizational level
that we call 'institutional dynamism'. When all these contextual causes
come together, then they ·lead the society to intellectual progress. But
besides contextual causes different societies may exhibit some other
different causes of intellectual progress; such is the case with Western
philosophy which has Islamic· influencts also as a cause for the rise of
Western intellectualism. Whereas in the Islamic case, the causes are found
only within the society, although after the development of Islamic
intellectualism in the first century of Islam (i.e. 7th. ceritury A.D.) it came
under foreign influences, especially that of the Greek philosophy and
science, which it did help improve its intellectualism further.
Since institutional dynamism takes place at the level of social
institutions, we must cite them here because of the crucial role they play in
the rise of intellectual progress. The most significant of these is the
educational institutions; a great reform and re-organization in accordance
with the knowledge produced by the intellectual dynamism is required of
all the educational institutions, if the society is to produce intellectual
progress. Usually there seems to be a relation, although not a necessary
one, between the political body and the educational reform. Either the
political body brings about the educational reform at the request and
directions of the intellectuals, or intellectuals th~mselves take the initiative
and produce educational dynamism, which may in turn lead to a re-
organization of the politic;d body and thus produce a great political
mobility within the political institutions. These activities which also
include the legal undertakings can be called 'political dynamism'. Among

125
 these institutional dynamisms we must mention also economic activities.
Similar reformations take place in the economic institutions yielding
thereby to improve the prosperity of that society and this activity can be
called 'economic dynamism'. All these .institutional dynamisms do not
necessarily develop together within the same period of time and thus
helping each other become dynamic reciprocally; or following a different
pattern of sequence in every intellectually progressed society.
The educational, political, which also includes legal activities, and
economic dynamisms include within themselves with a varying degree of
intensity all the nucleus contextual dynamisms explained above, and as
such they are the ones that produce culture. If a culture retains its
dynamisms long enough such that the culture no longer becomes restricted
to one society and region, then it turns into a civilization; ~ phenomenon
which can be observed in all our three sarhple I
cases. Thus, it is
meaningful to talk about Greek, Islamic and Western civilizations.
Therefore, cultures are usually restricted to a certain span of time and
region or society. But civilizations cannot be. so restricted.
If the culture does not retain its dynamism within the sphere of the
contextual causes, then a dynamism to the opposite direction begins to take
place; first, the selfish gains the majority of the masses and intellectuals
become corrupt, then the moral struggle gives in. The culture thus
collapses and the intellectual progress comes to a halt. Of course this can
happen to civilizations as well; a phenomenon which can be observed both
in the Greek and Islamic civilizations.
Our theory of contextual causes claims that without these causes
learning and especially science cannot flourish in a society. Since these
causes furnish the necessary socio-political and cultural setting for
intellectual progress, we shall try to apply it in the next chapter to our three
case studies; Greek, Islamic and Western scientific traditions.

126
\

CHAPTER FOUR.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
AND CASE STUDIES

In this chapter we shall try to apply the framework developed in this essay
to the historical development of the sciences in our three case studies;
Greek, Western and Islamic civilizations. Accordingly, we need to show
in the first place that as a worldview, adequate and satisfactory for the rise
of an intellectual and learning tradition, emerg~d out of the nucleus con-
textual causes in these civilizations, a great sociafmobility began in each of
them; first to reshape their respective societies, then to either establish
afresh (as in the Islamic case), or re-establish (as in the Western case) the
educational and other social institutions. In this way a great dynamism
gra~ually led to the rise of a traditionn of learning. As the atmosphere was
kept congenial by their respective worldviews, in all these three cases a
conceptional scheme emerged, which gradually led to the emergence of
disciplinary studies. Then, these disciplin,ary studies were organized into
specific subjects of study, each one of which was given a specific name
constituting thus a science. As each particular science emerged, this
tradition of learning became, a scientific tradition in which there was the
conceptual scheme, out of which that scientific tradition itself emerged,
and which can now be identified as scientific conceptual scheme. The
group involved in these activities is also given a name in each one of these
civilizations; philosopher, in the Greek case (which may have other
designations as well), 'ulamii' in the Islamic case, and similar ones in the
Western case.
The extensive scope of the project, which tries to apply the above
theoretical epistemology and sociology of science to the three case
civilizations, is clear. We shalt therefore, try not to go into details, and in
fact the details of the proposed project in cases of the Greek and Western
civilizations exceeds the capacity of this author .. For this reason, I shall
present the Islamic case more fully than others, though even this project
itself may take voluminous study to properly demonstrate.

127
 A. ANCIENT GREEK CIVILIZATION

"Greek philosophy was born out of the struggle to understand nature, for
understanding nature proved to be less simple and straightforward than the
earliest Greek scientist had confidently assumed." 1 Is it re~lly true that the
Greek philosophy grew out of just a vague struggle to understand nature?
Why there is even such a struggle to understp.nd nature? Furthermore, why
did the people in this region, namely the Agean civilization suddenly
become interested in such an undertaking, and not any other people around
the same region did not become interested in it? And why did the Agean
people, today known as the Ancient Greeks, become interested in such a
struggle at a particular time but not earlier? It is not possible to answer
these questions so long· as we assume such simple solutions for a complex
phenomenon, i. e. the rise of philosophical and scientific thinking. The
present assumption for the emergence of sciences in the Greek speaking
Agean civilization is, therefore, a myth born out of the existing material
concerning the origins of Greek thought. It simply happens that the
existing material we have concerning the early pre-Socratics concentrate on
their understanding of nature. We do not think, however, that this can
simply be the case.
We can explain, therefore, the process through which Greek scientific
and philosophical thought took its rise, through a theoretical framework
developed here as an epistemology and sociology of science. In this way,
we shall try to apply this theoretical framework to the existing material so
far as it is possible in order at least to answer some of these questions
without so many problems. In this vain, we have shown that sciences and
philosophy emerge out of only a certain kind of environment and a context
which, at the same time, act as the habitat, so to speak, for their progress.
Furthermore, it is possible for sciences to emerge in an environment but
not develop there. In that case, scientific and philosophiCal advancement
must also be conceived not in terms of a temporal duration, but rather ih
terms of its effect and impact upon the culture and civilization within
whi'ch it flourishes. Hence, 'scientific advancement'., means all the

1 W. T. Jones. A history of Western Philosophy: The Classical Mind (San Diego,

New York, etc.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1970), xvii.
128
 scientific activities (including non-physical sciences, such as
philosophy, history, sociology, theology and education) that help in
establishing a civilization. Therefore, those activities that are found in a
comrimnity and characterized as scientific, will not render it a scientifically
advanced society, unless those scientific activities bring the culture of that
society to the level of a civilization. We hope that this point has also
become sufficiently clear from our presentation so far. Therefore, in this
chapter, our application will try to keep in view all these civilizational
points as well. Of course, we need not argue in this context to prove this
sociological, and in some respects, anthropological approach, as we have
sufficiently shown this aspect of sciences. .
Long before the rise of the Hellenic Agean civilization, there were two
great civilizations established in the region. The earliest one of these is the
Minoan civilization, so named after the legendary king of Knossos,
Minos. It was based in the Agean island of Crete with several thriving
cities, among which Knossos was the most splendid. The Minoan
civilization was at its peak from about 2000 to 1500 B.C. The other
·civilization is the Mycenaean civilization established in and around the city
of Mycenae, a few ldlometres south of the Golf of Corinth towards .the
eastern edge, which was the center of the whole Agean world until 1100
B.C. The achievements of th~se civilizations, no dougbt , must have left
their overwhelming influence on the subsequent cultural develop-ments.
First of all, both of these civilizations developed a highly sophisticated
writing techniques. Though not much written document survived from
them, the existing tablets recovered from archeological excavations show
that there must have been some relatively sophisticated form of learning.
Secondly, the spacious palaces built for their ldngs on the island of Crete,
the sanctuaries built on the tops of mountains or in caves for their
goddesses and the tools and weapons made of copper and bronze show
marks of earlier prospering civilizations. 2 ·
As the Minoan and the Mycenaean civilizations were thriving,
however, there occured massive invasions towards the end of the third

2 For a detailed description of these see Chester G. Starr, The Origins of Greek
Civilization, 1100-650 B.C. (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991),
36-64.

129
 millenium B.C. First came the people of Anatolia who settled in the
northern islands and the mainland; but the second wave of invasions came
from the north and the invaders settled this time in the Peloponnese; it is
these invaders that are believed to be the Greeks. As to the language,
Greek, there are two theories; one defending the view that it originated in
Greece itself in earlier times, and the other claiming that it was introduced
. 3
by conquerers at the end of the Bronze Age, in about 1200 B.C.
We shall try to argue in this context that the necessary conditions for
the rise of sciences in the Agean civilization was about to originate before
the Ionian intellectuals, i.e. before 600 B.C. In order to show this we need
to outline a brief history of the Agean civilization prior to the Ionian
philosophers. We shall thus argue that once the epistemeological and
sociological frameworks emerged in this civilization as the necessary
environment for the emergence of sciences, then other contributing
elements were also developed by the intellectuals of that civilization as the
sufficient causes for the rise of sciences, namely for the scientific process.
In that case, we must be clear about the fact that a society may have the
epi'stemological and sociological conditions necessary for this process
without actually yielding any science. This is because the circumstances of
the society may require other factors as the sufficient causes for the rise of
this process. Hence, although it is possible to enumerate quite decisively
the exact number and the nature of the necessary elements for the rise of
sciences, we cannot do the same with regard to the sufficient causes. With
this understanding we may now enibark upon examining the Agean case
forth~ rise of the scientific process.
Around 800 B.C. small settlements began growing into cities, which
later became the main units of political organizations as well and thus city-
states emerged: Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Carinth on the mainland and
Miletus on the shores of Asia Minor. The population of some of these
cities reached 300.000 with a territorial extent of 1000 to 3000 square
miles. We need not further elaborate the moral dynamism which was
prevailant around this time in the city-states which was on the way to turn

3 Geoffrey Barraclough, eel. The Times Atlas of Wo~ld History (London: Book Club
Associates, 1986), 66.

130
 into a comprehensive culture. The historical description gives us sufficient
material just to consider the Greek struggle to maintain their high culture
and sophisticated civilization. The wars, mythology, refined social
organizations, sophisticated techniques of agriculture and arts show the
signs of this dynamism. In the meantime two important developments took
place; revival of trade, and invention of Greek alphabet, which was
influenced by the Phoenician writing system. Earlier writings were based
on symbols representing syllables, now new signs were invented for
' individual sounds. Phoenicians had no symbol for vowels, Greeks
compensated for that defect. As a result literacy became widespread.
Records were kept in writing. Once trading and writing brought more
wealth and prosperity, they began colonizing. We can observe in this way
the intellectual dynamism described in the sociology of science, which will
eventually lead to the rise of a scientific tradition. But this development
came after the 7th century B.C. and reached its peak around the 6th
century B.C., Le. 550's B.C. which means that these contextual ca4ses
must have developed within this civilization between 800-500 B.C. so that
after 600's social dynamism begins to take place. Moreover, as asign of
this social dynamism, a big wave of Greek migration also began around
this time because of population growth in the main Greek city-states.
On the other hand lo~tg before these developments, the main
civilization of the region, Minoan civilization, had already shown signs of
weakness around 1500 B.C. Minoans are believed to be early Greeks as
tablets discovered in their capital city, Knossos, express an early form of
the Ancient Greek language. 4 But after about 1475 B.C. another power
became increasingly dominant in the mainland Greece, the Mycenaeans,
who established their capital in the city of Mycenae, east of Peloponnesus.
The Mycenaeans conquered the Minoan civilization and around 1250 B.C.
they won the legendary war against the Trojans. But sometime after 1200
B.C. they were conquered by the more primitive Greeks of the n01thern
highlands, the Dorians. The period between 1200- 800 B.C. is described
as dark ages. Whatever this may be, the influence and heritage of both

4 William McNeill. The Rise of' the West: A History of the Human Community
(Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), 87.
131
 civilizations on the rise of classical Greek civilization cannot be
underestimated. The fact that even the most important Greek deity, Zeus,
was a Mycenaean god. Many historical facts concerning both civilizations
are retold by Homer.
It is clear from our above outline that the seeds of Greek civilization
and hence of the scientific and philosophical achievements of them must be
searched not only in these civilizations which preceded them, but also in
the social, political and educational dynamism that took place after the
800's B.C. But as far as our theoretical framework is concerned these later
developments are more important for us than the history of earlier
civilizations, because the earlier civilizations provide neither the
epistemological nor the sociological ground for the rise of Greek scientific
tradition. These grounds can develop only within the society itself and that
is what happened in the Greek case also. We have already shown so far
that through the contextual causes, which we have discussed as the
nucleus and the marginal, the general framework suitable for the rise of
sciences, i.e., the Greek worldview, emerged before the first Ionian
philosophers. Then, as Greek mythology developed, gradually a group of
peor>le became interested in learning, who are the fore-runners of
est~blishing a tradition of ]earning in which we can find a theoretical
conceptual scheme that supports these intellectual a·ctivities. The
emergence ·of this conceptual scheme within the Greek worldview became
the environmental context of Greek scientific tradition.
By about the time of Thales, 550 B.C., the activities of learning
gradually shifted to a more disciplinary methodology in such a way that by
the time of Plato, some of the subject matters studied in this tradition of
learning were realized to constitute a specific area of learning which could
be named. It was Aristotie who achieved the naming of these subjects and \
thus completed the scientific process thatbegan the way described above.
Although our description is not as specific as one may anticipate, it is,
however, sufficient to draw a picture which demonstrates the frameworks
developed in this essay. We can thus conclude that it is only after this
naming stage that one can talk of sciences in this civilization. Moreover, it
is again after the emergence of sciences that the conceptual scheme used
thus far in the learning activities can be named 'scientific conceptual

132
 scheme'. Again, it is after the emergence of all these phenomena that the
tradition of learning thus far acted as the conceptual and social
environment of all these intellectual activities can be named 'Greek
scientific tradition'.

B. WESTERN CIVILIZATION

The application of our frameworks to the Western civilization presents

certain difficulties; for example, in applying the epistemological
framework when can we start the whole process? This question itself will
present another more complicated problem, for if we answer this question
by pointing to the beginning of Western civilization, th~n we can ask when
did the Western civilization begin? Can we take a period in history as
presenting signs for the rise of a civilization, and in this case the Western
civilization? For instance, in case of Islamic civilization this is quite easy;
we can take the year in which the first revelation came as the date for the
beginning of t?is civilization. In this vein, the birth of the Prophet even
cannot be taken as ·a sign because it does not give us anything concerning
Islam as the foundation of this civilization. But what about the Western
civilization and scientific tradition?
In this essay if the frameworks presented are taken as processes, then
we can easily see that the beginning will be the history which gives us the
contextual causes for the rise ofsciences in this civilization, and that we
must reach these causes from today moving back in history· in an
uninterrupted process. This view opposes the myth that roots of Western
civilization is to be searched in the Greek, or the Greco-Roman
civilizations. The fact that previous civilizations influence later civilizations
does not mean that the subsequent civilization is a continuation of the
former ones. Of course, history is. continuous and in that sense all
civilizations that follow each. other in history and geography are
continuities of each other. But this would make the whole human history
to be conceived as one civilization, which would not justify us' to
. distinguish civilizations. Our presentation here shows certain processes
which are continuous in themselves but discrete with respect to other
processes that take place in history. For a process cannot be discrete in

133
 itself, namely end at a particular period and then start again at another
period; otherwise it cannot be a process. Once this argument is followed,
then we can try to show that the beginning of Western civilization, and
hence, of Western scientific tradition, must be searched in the great moral
and social dynamism which can be observed around the eighth century
A.D. In this respect, the period covering gth, 10th, and the 11th centuries
is especially crus;ial, since it is in this period that we see the contextual
causes at work for the rise of Western intellectualism which eventually
gave rise to Western civilization.
It must have become clear that what we mean by the contextual causes
of the rise of Western scientific tradition is the socio-political and cultural
upheavals of Europe between the gth and 12th centuries. In that case we
need to examine these three centuries, viz. gth, 1oth and the 11th
centuries, in order to exhibit the contextual causes of the Western scientific
tradition at its very inception. But what about the Greek and in fact, even
Islamic influences? Actually we do not consider any foreign influences to
be among the contextual causes. But the Islamic scientific tradition, as it
arose before its Western counterpart, is a crucial contributing element in
enhancing its contextual causes by posing a great challenge as a civilization
to many Western ideals of the time, more particularly in the religious (i.e.
theological) sphere. But the role of Islamic influences cannot be restricted
to the role of a contributing element of contextual causes; it is above all the
Islamic influences at the philosophic and scientific level that is most felt
after the beginning of the 12th century. Therefore, although at the
beginning stage -i.e. gth_J2th centuries - the Islamic influences can be
reduced to the cultural level as a contributing cause for the rise of
contextual causes of Western scientific activities, at later periods - i.e.
between 12th. and 17th. centuries - it is at the intellectual level as well.
Our treatment of the history of socio-political and cultural conditions,
of Europe in the centuries in which we claimed that Western scientific
tradition emerged, shall concentrate' on the elements that are cited here as
the contextual causes for the rise of a scientific tradition. Accordingly, the
element which can be called the environment of Western science is the
Christian culture. Of course by the ninth century this culture was well
established, but primarily in southern Europe. Especially the conversion

134
 of the Emperor Constantine, and later Justinian's closing all the schools of
ancient Greek philosophy, opened the way for the consolidation of a
uniform Christian culture in the West. As a result, a new mode of
philosophical thinking began to emerge within the framework of the
Christian faith. In order for this new development to be more effective and
take roots within the Christian culture, we have argued above. that there
must have been a suitable socio-political and cultural context which would
prepare the contextual causes for the rise of a scientific tradition, we shall
examine therefore, such conditions, only in this relationship as outlined
thus far.
In the beginning of the 7th century, however, northern Eur~pe was
still largely pagan and totally alien to the Christian culture. The
christianized West thus underwent the pressures of two powers in the
subsequent centuries: one was the continued attack from the northern
pagan gothic tribes; the other was the newly established dynamic political
power, Islam, from the South. Only after the second half of the 3th
century Charlemagne (7 68-814) carried the borders of the Christian
Empire to its farthest limits. In the South, the Franks annexed the Lambard
Kingdom in Italy as well; they were also able to push the Muslims back
beyond Pyrenees. Then, "Frankish swords converted the stubborn
saxons". 5 There was also at this time a tremendous missionary activities
I

among the Frisians, Bavarians and Thuringians; this way the Christian
culture of the Latinate society of the southern Europe assimilated the
Germanic tribes. All these tribes were thus brought within the circle of
Christendom. Finally, on December 25, 800, the Pope crowned
Charlemagne as "Emperor of the Romans".
Charlemagne thus became the undisputed master in all Western
Christendom. After he was crowned, he began a series of reorganization
and reform. In order to achieve this, he brought some scholars from Italy
and Spain. These scholars established a kind of royal academy which
came to be known as the "Palatine School", which existed as a Palace
school prior to Charlemagne; but he laid emphasis on intellectual training
of pupils drawn from a wider circle of people. Besides these, there were

5 William McNeill. op.cit., 445.

135
also some schools attached to certain monasteries, which provided
education for both the members of the religious order and the general
public. Around and within these schools libraries began to flourish.
Therefore, right from the very beginning of the ninth century there was a
great mobility in the Western world which may be summarized mainly to
be in the following areas :

1. moral dynamism, to carry the Christian faith to the pagans;

and to keep the internal integrity of the society;
2. a great social mobility and intellectual dynamism;
3. political dynamism;
4. educational dynamism.
The great social mobility led the Franks to push considerably deeper into
continental Europe, mainly through military conquests and religious
conversion. Therefore, the geographic base and social might of
Christendom were significantly enlarged in the West. There were a few
factors contributing to this mobility: first, the missionary defense of
Christianity against the pagans; second, the holy war against the Muslims
and finally the acute friction between the orthodox and Catholic
Christendom. Of course this was to yield gradually an intellectual
dynamism in the Western society as it is clear from the fact that one cannot
defend one's position based merely on.brute power and that ideas are also
needed for an enduring defense.
In the ninth century, there was another significant development. In
828, Crete fell into Muslim domination from the Spaniard rule. The
prosperous Island of Sicily almost completely ca]lle under the Muslim
control after 878. Muslims thus began controlling the Mediterranean from
the Eastern shores of Antioch and Lebanon to the Iberian peninsula. The
Mediterranean sea became a Muslim lake for the traders, carrying goods
and commodities from India and other Muslim lands to the main sea ports
of Europe. Muslim goods became the most sought-after commodities in
the markets of Western Europe forming the luxuries of the time. The
Christian West was thus freed to find new and spacious ground for its
development in the north in order to compensate for its losses in the south.
Therefore, the littoral of the North Sea and the English channel began to

136
 gradually replace the glory of the Mediterranean region. 6 Hence, new
centers of culture began to emerge in northern Europe as the most active
centers of the Christian West, politically and culturally as well as
intellectually. This northward expansion provided more dynamism for the
newly emerging Western civilization as the economic basis to raise to a
certain level of wealth, prosperity, political and military power parallel to
its intellectual and cultural emergence. It is this dynamic mobility of
Western society in moral, intellectual and then social, political, economic
and educational spheres of culture that led to the search of a more
sophisticated and original thought. It is this search that led also to a
"tremendous excitement among the curious and unfettered minds that
clustered in Paris and other centers of scholastic" learning. 7
It is exactly at this point (namely in the tenth century) that this
intellectual curiosity led the Western mind to discover the sophisticated
learning and richness of Islamic scientific tradition, which far surpassed
that available in the West at this time. Hence, new schools began to
emerge especially in the eleventh century to systematically and regularly
· study and translate the treasures of Islamic learning to Latin. The factors
which gave a speedy momentum to this translation activity were the
beginning of the crusades in 1086 and the gradual expansion of Western
Christendom in the Iberian Peninsula. The capture of Toledo in 1085,
availed the main libraries at the hands of the capturing Christians. Toledo
thus became the principal seat of translations from Arabic into Latin in the
cl<;>sing years of the eleventh century. Then gradually in Salerno,
Sa1amanca, Saragossa, Sicily and in Venice new schools of translation
began to emerge. Thus a new period began in the history of scientific
tradition, which can conveniently be termed 'translation· period'. The
intellectual dynamism thus gave its first fruit. But for the first great
philosophers to appear, of course, there needs time, which took about 200
years in this case, because the intellectuals of the newly emerging scientific
tradition must first assimilate the translated knowledge and bring about
students in these fields. The first able students of the translation period are

6 Ibid., 45!.
7 Ibid., 548.

137
 St. Anselm, Peter Abelard, Fulbert, known as the founder of the School
of Chartres in 990, disciple of Gerlant of Aurillac, Peter Lambard {1100-
1160) and Adelard of Bath.
By the time of these scholars learning activities in the West, as a result
of the contextual causes, led to the emergence of two frameworks outlined
in the epistemology of science (Chapter 2); the worldview, as the general
framework, and the conceptual scheme which is named 'scientific
conceptual scheme' after the emergence of its scientific tradition as the
inner framework of this tradition. Then, after the eleventh century the
Western learning tradition in its scientific. process entered into a more
disciplinary stage and thus completed its cycle without the Naming Stage.
This is because, the Western civilization had already found sciences
named beforehand and there was no need to re-name them. However,
scientific consciousness, as the epistemological ground of perceiving each
discipline of study as constituting an independent branch of learning that
can be named, exists a priori and thus we are not in a_position to show its
emergence. For this reason, apart from newly emerging sciences within
the Western scientific tradition, there is no naming stage for the scientific
process of Western science. We may thus conclude that after the twelfth
century Western science completed its scientific process for its emergence,
entering thus into its normal phase of development.
Our exposition of the emergence of a scientific tradition within the
Western case demonstrates at the same time the shaping of science by
society. We hope that this will become more fully exhibited when in the -
next section we illustrate the emergence of the Islamic scientific tradition.
We shall see that it is primarily the society with its contextual causes that
forms a social aspect for science, as we have seen also in the Greek and
Western cases. What kind of characteristics science acquires from its
social aspects may also be compared from the dominant worldviews of
their respective societies. Since our aim is to investigate this in relation to
the Islamic scientific tradition, we shall try to pinpoint 'Some of these
characteristics as we attempt to outline the emergence of the Islamic
scientific tradition.

138
 C. ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION

We have already pointed out that certain worldviews cannot lead to the rise
of sciences. In order to show this we must attempt to outline the early
Islamic worldview as established by the Prophet through the guidance of
the Qur' an. The contextual causes for the emergence of Islamic scientific
tradition predominant in this society will also become apparent in our
exposition. We claim in this respect that a rough chronological order of
topics in the Revelation will expose how the early Islamic worldview was
quasi-scientifically constructed, which eventually led to scientific
progress right from the first century of Islam when the new community
faced certain serious challenges. These challenges came in the first place
from the very culture in which Islam was born. From this angle there was
first a moral challenge brought about by the decadent aspects of the
Jiihiliyyah culture; second, there was a literary challenge posed by
Jiihiliyyah poetry; and more importantly, third, with the rapid expansion
of Islam into other civilizations, another challenge was felt from the
scientific and philosophical front which was brought about especially by
the Hellenistic civilization.
All these intellectual challenges could not and cannot be faced without
some kind of efficiently trained scholars, who may be called thinkers in a
scientific sense. Our claim then amounts to saying that the intellectualism
of the first centmy ofislam provided an adequate ground, which are called
the contextual causes for the rise of scientific activities, for the emergence
of a scientific tradition in Islam. Both the speculative challenge of previous
civilizations, more particularly the Jiihiliyyah culture, and the Qur' anic
encouragement for reflection on the nature of man and the universe, must
have led the early generations· of Muslims to speculate upon certain
problems. As they dealt with these questions, the Prophet enlightened
them under the guidance of the Revelation. This is the unfolding process
of the construction of the Islamic worldview.
It is, therefore, not unlikely that the speculative challenges of early
civilizations and the Qur'anic encouragement for reflection were
overlooked by the early generations of Muslims. It is plausible, therefore,
to infer that, from the very beginning, Islamic civilization was based on

139
 rational thinking 8 which was guided by the Qur'anic teaching; and in this
vein the very early Muslim generations began to explain, supplement and
.rethink the speculative allusions of both the Qur' an and (lad'ith. This early
intellectual milieu of Islam was dominated by the Islamic worldview
developed by the Prophet through the guidance of the Revelation.
As we have argued, the fundamental metaphysics of the Islamic
world view had already been constructed by the Qur' an while the Prophet
was still in Mecca. Therefore, a substantial number of the scientific
terminology to be utilized later were contained in the Meccan surahs, for
these terms are mostly contained within the fundamental structures of the
Islamic worldview. Therefore, even if these scientific terms were not used
by the Qur' an and the J:tad'ith in the technical scientific sense, since they
were put into the Islamic worldview as fundamental concepts, this
prepared the way for their scientific employment. Of course, in the
Medinan period terms of different fields, such as most of the terminology
in the fields of law and political philosophy, were developed and thereby
integrated into the composition of the Islamic worldview. But the
fundamental structure of this worldview had already been established in
Mecca. But in this context it is important to show how a body of
knowledge comes to be established as a science because in this way we
shall see the process through which a scientific tradition is established. In
order to do this, we shall first demonstrate from the history of sciences the
process that is involved in this phenomenon.
The epistemology of science developed in the previous chapters claims
that science is established within three mental frameworks: first is the
worldview (of the scientist), called 'the general framework' which is
indeed the conceptual environment within which scientific activities are
cultivated; second is the network of a well-defined body of scientific
concepts, entitled 'context' (of scien~es), or more properly called
'scientific conceptual scheme', and the third is the network of technical
vocabulary and the outlook resulting from such a network of concepts
within a specific science. This is because science is not an activity that is
8 For a detailed discussion of the concept of rationality in the Islamic perspective see the
present author's "Transcendent Rationality, Ibn Rushd and Kant: A Critical
Synthesis", 1\lif 16 (1996).

140
 carried out on a general plane; on the contrary, a scientific activity is
always concerned with a particular problem with almost no relation to
other scientific problems, unless there is a problem pertinent to solving it.
Therefore, the scientific conceptual scheme, together with its environment,
is not sufficient to further scientific progress; there is the need for a more
specific scheme as well in a specific science so that the problems of that
science can be solved within that scheme. Since our epistemology of
science claims that our mind cannot operate without a scheme, we affirm
that this is true not only insofar as the general operations of the mind are
concerned, but also of the specific ones. Hence, if a human being wants to
place even a biological phenomenon such as walking into a conceptual
context, he must have a worldview so that he can situate it into such a
scheme; in the same way, if one were to investigate the phenomenon of
walking scientifically one would have to consider this problem within a
worldview and also within a scientific as well as a biological scheme. The
former is the general scientific· scheme, which is already identified here as
the inner framework of sciences, and the latter is the biological scheme,
which we can identify as the 'specific scientific (conceptual) scheme'.
It is possible to identify the general scientific conceptual scheme as the
'scientific tradition' lf it is manifested within a certain civilization and thus
takes the name of that civilization. This is because a tradition by its very
nature requires a community, identified as the 'scientific community'.
Therefore, the Islamic scientific tradition is the manifestation of the Islamic
scientific conceptual scheme in the Islamic civilization. As such it is
primarily the general scientific conceptual scheme, but since this scheme
cannot be without its environment, the Islamic scientific tradition
necessarily includes the Islamic worldview. Hence, the Islamic scientific
tradition is the Islamic environmental context handed down from one
generation of scientists, i. e., the 'ulamii ', to the next. 9 But since in
sciences we are primarily concerned with the scientific schemes, we may

9 Obviously, the community of scientists involved in the Islamic scientific tradition is

Muslim scientists, but it must also be pointed out that non-Muslim scientists are
also included in this community if.they accept and work within the same tradition,
which was the case, for example, with Zakariyya al-Razi, I:Iunayn ibn lsl)aq, and
Maim on ides.
141
 in this context ignore the worldview ahd thus consider the Islamic
scientific tradition as only the general Islamic scientific conceptual scheme.
Therefore, on this basis we can postulate that the specific scientific
conceptual scheme is developed primarily within a scientific tradition.
Our epistemology of science, as we have seen, assumes that, prior to
the scientific process through which sciences emerge, a worldview that
has a sophisticated knowledge-structure must be established within a
society as a dominant worldview. It is this knowledge-structure that will
spark activities towards the establishment of a scientific tradition, which in
turn will lead to the emergence of specific disciplines as sciences. Hence,
historically we can illustrate that the Islamic worldview was established in
Mecca in its fundamental outlines (of course, later this worldview was
broadened through intellectual and scientific activities). Second, in Medina
with the leadership of the Prophet, the early Muslim community developed
a knowledge-structure within that Islamic worldview. This knowledge-
structure was so sophisticated that it eventually led to the rise of a scientific
tradition towards the end of the first century of Islam. Finally, in the
second century, the accumulation of knowledge in different branches of
learning gradually began to emerge as individual sciences, such as J:tadzth,
tafszr, history, fiqh and kalam. The physical sciences were mostly
borrowed from the Greeks in the third century. Even some of these
branches of learning were subsequently established by the Muslims as
sciences, such as algebra and chemistry.
Our theory of the scientific process, as we have seen in the sociology
of science (Chapter 3), suggests that sciences generally follow _this
framework of development in every civilization, although the specific
course they take is different in every civilization. Therefore, the emergence
of physics in Gr~ece, for example, may be the same as the emergence of
kalam, for instance, in the Islamic civilization. But in one of them the ·
study of nature emerged as a science, whereas in the other, the study of
religion. It is possible that physics would never _have emerged as a science
in Islam; and instead a branch of kaliim may have developed and emerged
as an independent science to replace the Greek physics. If we try to trace,
therefore, the historical route that the Ishunic scientific process took, all
these points will be clarified as well. In order to do this we need to outline

142
 first the emergence of the Islamic worldview as a suitable general
framework for the cultivation of sciences in Islam. Then, we shall try to
show how an Islamic scientific tradition emerged out of this mental
framework.

1. The Worldview of Islam as the Environment

of Islamic Science
How can we decipher the worldview of Islam? In fact we may ask where
to begin to outline it? We shall apply our theory concerning the structures
of a worldview to the Islamic worldview and in this way we shall be able
to outline th~ fundamental elements of it. I hope that our application will
clarify also what is meant by each structure. In this application we cannot
start from the life-structure; for, since the life-structure is grounded in
human biology, it will have the most common elements with all other
worldviews, and as such the life-structure of the Islamic worldview is its
aspect that is most dominant in the Islamic cultural activities, it is thus not
the foundation of it. In that case an outline of any worldview must begin
from its foundation. The foundation of any worldview, as we have seen,
is its world-structure. Hence, our.treatment of the worldview of Islam will
also begin from its world-structure.
The world-structure is that aspect of the Islamic worldview which
includes the most fundamental elements, such as the idea of God,
prophethood, resurrection andthe ideas of religion and the hereafter,
iikhirah. We do not mean that these are the only fundamental concepts of
the Islamic worldview because each structure by itself represents a
doctrinal element which includes within itself many other fundamental
Islamic key terminology. But the extensions of these key concepts and
terminology constitute substructures; hence, there lie many substructures
within the basic structures of the Islamic worldview which may not be so
fundamental and as a result differences in those substructural elements can
be allowed.
As an extension of the world-structure, knowledge-structure, for
instance, is also a fundamental doctrinal element, which is represented by
the umbrella term 'ilm. This structure includes within itself the key
scientific terminology of Islamic science. We call this network of the key

143
 scientific Islamic terminology the 'Islamic scientific conceptual scheme',
which will be explained briefly below.
The value-structure in the Islamic world view, on the other hand,
includes moral, ethical and legal practices. But since the concept of law in
the early Islamic worldview is closely linked with the world-structure, it
naturally included religious law, which cannot be devoid of moral content.
Hence, law, religion and morality are manifested as an integral part of one
structure. This conceptual understanding of law, religion and morality
never brought about a sharp distinction between the three. As a result,
there has· never been a thinker who developed an ethical philosophy
independently of Islam as a religion. In fact there can be no ethical
philosophy within the Islamic worldview, since ethics is integrally
combined with religion. If there is a book on ethical philosophy by a
Muslim philosopher, we can very safely identify its alien origin, such as
Miskawayh's Tahdhib al-Akhliiq. The same is true of law and legal
philosophy. The corollary of this is that fiqh cannot be translated into
English as 'law', forfiqh includes religion, law and morality so integrally
that the one cannot be without the others. Of course, usually many
concepts of a worldview cannot be translated into the concepts of another
worldview, they can at most be represented by terms similar to them.
Finally, the man-structure is represented within the Islamic worldview
by the concepts of khanfah and ummah. As such this structure manifests
the Islamic understanding of man and society, which is totally grounded in
the world-structure because, again, even these conceptions themselves are
derived from the concepts of taw(tid, prophethood, religion and iikhirah.
Since it is not our aim here to expound these conceptions of Islam, we do
not concentrate on their exposition. Only their nature so far as it is related
to the concept of world view as we explained here is sufficient. 10 As we
can see, the systematic exposition of worldviews make it easy to analyze
the islamic worldview into its main components, namely, structures. Let
us exhibit this on the graphic of worldviews, given in the second chapter,

1°For an excellent exposition of these concepts and their place in the Islamic world view
one must consult Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib AI-Attas's Prolegomena to the
Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the
Worldview of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995).
144
and then show how the world-structure arose in the early Islamic culture,
which then became as the environment for the emergence of its
knowledge-structure.

ISLAMIC WORLDVIEW
Table 5

145
 a) The Emergence of the World-Structure (610-622 A.D.)
The world-structure of the Islamic worldview was constructed by the
Qur'an while the Prophet was still in Mecca. This structure within the
worldview of Islam is grounded upon three fundamental ideas; taw/:lid, i.
e., the idea of one God, nubuwwah, namely, the idea of prophethood,
and finally, iikhirah, namely, the idea of a final questioning. In this way a
Muslim conceives of himself or herself responsible only to God.
Therefore, if the idea of God is not properly established in the mind of a
Muslim, the Islamic ethical concepts will not adequately function in his/her
life. 11 Hence, the idea of God as revealed in the Qur' an must be
sufficiently clarified for an Islamic life. Therefore, one may even claim that
all fundamental ideas concerning a Muslim's behavior derive their validity
from One God, who is the creator and sustainer of everything (2/al-
Baqarah, 29; 6/al-An'am, 101; 7/al-A'raf, 185; 16/al-Nal;l.l, 48; 25/al- ·
Furqiin, 2). He did not create all these things in vain (3/A.li 'Imran, 191;
67/al-Mulk, 3-4).
Moreover, God is merciful (6/al-An'am, 12; 7/al-'Araf, 156), so He
forgives (2/al-Baqarah, 173) if we repent from a blunder. The forgiveness
of God is so much emphasized in the Qur' an that it is repeated 100 times
because this aspect of God is extremely important for the moral life of a
human. We may always commit .errors in life. What kind of a mechanism
an eth~cal philosophy must have so that it can revert us back to virtues? It
is not easy to be generous, helping and self-sacrificing, especially at times
when one is in the most needy situation. The Prophet said, on the other
hand, that one cannot be a true believer until he sincerely, which means
actually, wishes for others what he wishes for himself. For this reason, as
the Islamic life is closely linked with the idea of religion, the moral
incentive is also imbedded in the idea of God as described in the Qur'an:
And who other than God created the heavens and the
earth and sent down for you water from the sky,
whereby we cause to grow lush orchards, For it is not
up to you to cause their trees to grow! Is there, then, a
go'd beside God? Yet these are the people who ascribe
partners to Him! And who other than Him made the
earth a t1rm abode (for you), and set rivers traversing

liE. g., see 6/ai-An'am, 91; 22/ai-J:Iajj. 74; 39/ai-Zumar, 67.

146
 through it, and put firm mountains therein and sealed
off one sea from the other? Is there, then, a god beside
God? Indeed, most of them do not know! And who
other than Him responds to the distressed one when he
cal1s Him and relieves him of the distress; and Who has
made you His vicegerents on earth? Is there, then, a god
beside God? Little do you reflect! And who other than
Him guides you in the darkness of the land and the sea?
And who sends forth winds announcing His mercy (i.e.,
rain)? Is there, then, a god beside God? Far exalted be
He above what they associate with Him! And who
other than Him brings forth His creation and then re-
creates it? And who gives you sustenance from the
heaven and the earth? Is there, a god beside God? (27/ai-
N ami, 60-64)

As to those who reject the Truth it is the same to them

whether you warn them. (Therefore) God has sealed
their hearts and hearing (i. e., their perceptive faculties);
and on their eyes is a veii...They would (try to) deceive
God and the believers; but they deceive only themselves
and yet do not realize (this). In their hearts is a disease
and God has increased their disease. There is a grievous
penalty for them because they cry lies (even to
themselves). When it is said to them: "Do not make
corruption on the earth", they say: "why, we only want
to establish order". They are truly the ones who cause
corruption, but they do not realize (this) .. Their
similitude is that of a man who kindled a fire, and when
it lighted all around him, God took away their light and
left them in utter darkness, unseeing, deaf, dumb and
blind; they will not retum (to the Truth). Or (another
similitude) is that of a rain-laden cloud from the sky; in
it are zones of darkness, and thunder and lightning.
They press their fingers in their ears to keep out the
stunning thunderclap, trembling from the fear of death.
But God is ever encompassing the rejecters of Truth!..
If God willed He could take away their faculty of
hearing and seeing. For God has power over all things.
(2/al-Baqarah, 6-20; see also 22/ai-I:Iajj, 46; 45/al-
Hithlyah, 23; 67/ai-Mulk, 3-4; 96/al-' Alaq, 1-8; 3/Aii
'Imrfm, 190)
Hence, just as God is forgiving He is also punishing the wrong-doer;
otherwise, how could it ever be possible for those, who commit the
gravest errors of humanity, to die without any retribution and just go
untouched? Again how could it ever be possible for those who struggle to

147
 achieve justice and good life, leave this world without any reward? The
Qur'an thus introduces the idea of a final judgment, al-iikhirah, into
man's life:
Those before them (also) rejected (the truth), and so the
punishment came to them from directions they did not
perceive. (39/al-Zumar, 25)

Because of their sins they were drow.neo and put into

the Fire. They found, in lieu of God, none to help
themselves. So Noah said: "0 my Lord! Do not leave a
single unbeliever on earth". (71/Niil), 25-26.)

You will not be questioned for other's sins, 12 nor shall

other's be questioned for what you do. Our Lord will
gather us and will "in the end decide the matter between
us in truth and justice. (34/al-Saba', 25-6)

We shall set up scales of justice for the Day of

Judgment, so that not a single person wlll be treated
unjustly; even if (the value of your action) is more than
the weight of a mustard seed, It shall be taken into
account. We are able (to take even such little amounts)
into account. (21/al-Anbiya', 47)

Does man think that We cannot assemble his bones?

No! We are able to put together in perfect otder the very
tips of his fingers. But man still wants to do wrong and
asks: "when is the Day of Resurrection?" It is when the
sight is dazed and the moon is darkened and attached to
the sun. That day man will say: "where is the refuge?"
There is by no means any place secure. That day only
to your Lord will be the safe return. Then, man will be
asked to put forward what he had done (in life) ... So he
gave nothing in charity, nor did he pray! But on the
contrary, he.rejected the Truth and turned away. Then he
returned to his family with arrogance. Woe to you (o
man)! Woe to you!. Does man think that he will be left
uncontrolled (without purpose)? Was he not a drop of
sperm emitted (in lowly forin)? Then he became a
leech-like clot. Then God made and fashioned him in
due proportion. And of him He made two sexes, maJe

12The term 'sin' is the concept of 'vice' used in religion for not only acts that are done
against prohibition by the religion, but also for all actions that are morally wrong.
148
 and female. Does He not then have the power to give
life to the dead? (75/ai-Qiyfunah, 3-13 ... 31-40) 13
The Islamic life system is, therefore, totally based on religion which
develops a moral life based· on the Qur'anic idea of God and the
questioning in the hereafter. Of course, such an ethical system in the
Islamic sense also results with happiness, as the following verse points
out:

Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction

in the remembrance of God. For without doubt in the
remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction. (13/al-
Ra'd, 28)
But happiness in this sense is not emphasized as this worldly happiness;
on the contrary, happiness in the Islamic sense is the one that comes in art
enduring way which is possible only in an eternal life:

[To the righteous person will be said:) "0 you, the

happy soul! Come back to your Lord, well pleased and
well pleasing to Him. Enter you among my devotees.
Enter into My Paradise". (89/al-Fajr, 27-30)

[You] have been commanded no more than to worship

God, offering Him sincere devotion, being true in faith;
to establish daily Prayers and help the poor amongst
you 14 • This is indeed the true religion. Those who
reject (this) ... will be 'in Hellfire, to dwell therein
forever; for they are the worst of creatures. But those
who believe and do good deeds 15 are the best of
creatures. Theil· reward from God is Gardens of eternity,
under which rivers flow. They will dwell therein
forever. God well pleased with them and they are

13 Also see 7/al-A'rii.f, IOO, also I 0 I; and 2/al-Baqarah, 7; 24/al-Nur, 37; 16/ai-Nal)l,
108; 17/al-Isra', 46; 18/al-Kahf,57.
14ptease note that although helping others, especially the ones who are in need, is a
moral duty for us as human beings, it has been established here as a religious duty.
This is the essential characteristic of Islamic ethics, namely, all moral duties are
religious obligations at the same time.
15The oft-repeated expression in the Qur'an, "doing good deeds" refer simultaneously .the
religious and moral duties of a pet·son. In fact, such duties as the prayers, fasting and
helping the poor which are conceived by us as religious obligations are indeecl our
moral duties towards God. Hence, the Arabic word ~tili{liit refers to both religious and
moral duties at once.
149
 pleased with God. All this is for those who obey their
Lord. (98/al-Bayyinah, 5-8)

Of course, in this sense it does not mean that Islam wants its adherents to
be miserable in this world. What it means is that although the true
happiness belong~ to the life to come as an eternal bliss, yet the general
meaning of the term includes in itself the present life as well as the life to
come. 16 '
The Qur' an also indicates that "human soul is certainly prone to evil,
unless (the) Lord saves by His mercy" (12/Yl!suf, 53). How does God
save from the evil? Of course not by forcing man not to do evil; rather by
guidance given in His Revelation, which is the Qur' an. But this Revelation
is given to the Prophets, who are the teachers of this guidance. For the
achievement of the Divine Purpose it is necessary that there mustbe sent
prophets as the instructors of this Divine Purpose. That is why they are
described in the Qur' an as "warners and givers of good tidings" (2/al-
Baqarah, 213; 4/ai:-Nisa', 165; 6/al-An'am, 48; 18/al-Kahf, 56). In this
mission prophets are given Books, which are sent to them by revelation. 17
Thus the Qur'an declares:
Every nation has its messenger. When their messenger comes, the issue will
justly be decided between them. (I 0/Yiinus, 47)

(The Prophet Shu'ayb said to his people): "0 my people! I have delivered to
you the message of my Lord and I have admonished you; how shall I waste
~yself on a disbelieving people?" (7/al-A 'rat', 93)

(This is) the community of your forefather Abraham, who already named you
Muslims before this. So let the Messenger (Muhammad) be a witness over
you in. this regard and let you be the witnesses over mankind. Establish
prayers, then, and pay zakat (i.e., welfare tax) and hold fast to God Who is
your protector; what an excellent protector and what an excellent helper!
(22/ai-J:Iajj, 78)
Every messenger is thus described as a witness to his community.
Their duty is to inform their community of God's message and to instruct

16For a detailed elaboration of the concept of happiness in Islam, see Syed Muhammad
Naquib Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam (Kuala Lumpur:
ISTAC, 1995), 91-1 10·.
I7see26/al-Shu'ara', 19i-195.
150
them in the Divine Message. Since the source of this Divine Message is
one, all the Prophets teach essentially the same Truth. The only difference
that could be found is in the sphere of simple cultural activities because
every Prophet is sent to a different cultural environment. Therefore,
cultural differences are allowed in religion so long as a cultural practice
does not contradict the main tenets of the religion. Fundamental structures
of all revealed religions are the same, as the following verses explain:
The Apostle believes in what it has been revealed to
him from his Lord, as do the people of faith. Every
Prophet believes in God, His angels, His books, His
Messengers (and in resurrection. 2/al-Baqarah, 285; also
see 177; and 3/Aii 'Imran, 114; 4/al-Nisft', 136)

There is a chain of Messengers .that began with the appearance of the first
man in human history. Since then every society and nation is endowed
with a prophet, Muhammad (ASM) being the universal and the last jn this
chain and the Qur' an being the last revelation:

We have revealed to you as We revealed to Noah, and

the prophets after him, and We revealed to Abraham,
Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, Jesus and Job,
Jonah and Aaron and Solomon, and We gave to David
Psalms. There are messengers we have already told you
of before, and messengers we have not told you of. God
spoke directly unto Moses. There are also messengers
bearing good tidings, and. warning so that mankind
might have no argument against God, after the
messengers. God is All-mighty, All-wise. But God
bears witness to what He sent down to you. He sent it
down with his knowledge; and the angels also bear
witness; and God suffipes as a witness. (4/ai-Nisa',
163-164; also 48/ai-FatiJ, 28)

The notion of prophethood includes also the existence of angels. Actually

it presupposes the existence of God anq angels on the one hand, and
revelation on the other. Moreover, every revelation has a proof in itself for
its own truth. For example, the Qur' an makes the following challenge as a·
proof:

If you are in doubt about the revelation to Our servant,

Muhammad, then produce a surah (i.e., chapter) like it.

151
 And call your friends or helpers (in order to prove your
doubts). But if you cannot, and certainly you will not,
then fear God's punishment. (2/ai-Baqarah, 23)

Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but

(he is) the Apostle of God, and the Seal of the
Prophets; for God has the full knowledge of all things.
(33/ai-AI).zab, 40)

This day I have perfected your religion for you,

completed My favor upon you, and have chosen for you
Islam as your religion. (5/ai-Ma'idah,3)

We have thus summarized the world-structure of the Islamic

worldview from which necessarily follows the idea of revealed
knowledge, al- 'ilm. On the basis of this is developed the knowledge-
structure. First of all, the concept of 'ilm is introduced. as a fundamental
element; the significance attached to it proves this point. Now on the basis
of this approach, we can claim that if we carefully examine the early
intellectual history of Islam, we shall see that the seeds of some sciences
are already in existence right at the time of the Prophet, and especially in
Medina, such as, history, law, literature, grammar, philosophy and
theology, which are all at the beginning stage. Towards the end of the first
century of Islam, 8th century A.D., most of the knowledge accumulated in
these disciplines was already on the way to being established as sciences.
In order for this process to take place, we say, on the basis of our
epistemology and sociology of science, that a knowledge-structure must
have developed within the Islamic worldview. We shall now attempt to
trace these developments and to show how this structure emerged.

b) The Emergence of the Islamic Knowledge-Structure within

the Islamic Worldview (0-10 A.H./622-632 A.D.)
The epistemology of science developed here has shown that sciences
cannot develop by being imported. In other words, no science can arise in
a society by importing scientific knowledge from another civilizational
source. This is because sciences emetge from within, and the only way for
this to be realized is through establishing a worldview which will act with
its knowledge-structure as the adequate environmental context for
sciences. The general claim is that Islamic science and philosophy began

152
 after the translation of Greek scientific and philosophical works into
Arabic. On the basis of the nature of the human mind, this claim is
immediately proved to be wrong. For we must see in this respect that
when the Greek philosophical and scientific works began to be translated
into Arabic, there had already been a sophisticated and distinctly expressed
Islamic worldview with a sophisticated knowledge-structure. Moreover,
one must see that even before Islam, all those Greek philosophical and
scientific achievements were present in the region without there having
been any sizable advancement in sciences. The role of the translations
from Greek should ·neither be over exaggerated nor underestimated--these
translations did not play the role of initiating scientific advancement in the
Islamic civilization; they only. helped to further th~ already-started
phenomenon of scientific progress. In this way, some of the sciences
which were not yet built as· independent branches of learning in Islam,
were of course established as new sciences. But above all, the most
important feature of these scientific activities is its reflection of both the
Islamic worldview with its fundamental metaphysics and the Islamic
scientific conceptual scheme. 01,.1r purpose now is to demonstrate that the
early Islamic worldview as it emerged after the three periods outlined
above was already analyzable into its knowledge-structure as well as
value-structure and man-structure. But in this context we are not
I

concerned with the latter two structures; therefore, we shall concentrate on

the first one only.
First of all, the concept of 'ilm is introduced as a fundamental element
within the worldview of Islam; the significance attached to 'ilm proves this
point:
Amongst His servants, only the scholars ['ulamii'] are
God-fearing. (35/ai-Fatir, 28)

Are those who know, to be considered equal to those

who do not know? Only prudent men reflect [on this].
(39/AI-Zumar, 9)

God will raise in rank those of you who believe and

those who are given knowledge. (Al-Mujadalah (58):
II)

153
Many more verses in the Qur'an can be given to this effect; it suffices to
cite the fact that the Prophet was even asked to supplicate "0 my Lord!
increase my knowledge" (l'a Ha (20): 114). The scholars are honored by
being mentioned in rank next to the angels: "God is the witness that there
is no deity except HimseM, and so are the angels and those endued with
knowledge, standing firm on justice" (Ali 'lmran (3): 18). In conjunction
with this, the following a/:t{ldith can be cited:
Among the signs of the Hour ( ashrii{ al-sii 'ah-
Doomsday) are the decreasing of knowledge and the
appearance of ignorance. ( Al-Bukhari, "Kitab a!- 'lim",
71).

God does not take away knowledge by wresting it from

the people, but takes it away by tpe death of the
scholars ('ulamii') until no scholar is left. People begin
to accept the ignorant as leaders. When they are asked,
they furnish information without knowledge. They thus
go astray and lead the people astray. (Al-Bukhari,
"K!Hib al-'Ilm", 86).

He who is asked about something that he knows but

conceals it will have a bridle of fire put on him on the
Day of Resurrection. (Abu Dawud, Sunan, "Bab al-
'IIm", 3650)18

If anyone travels on a road in search of knowledge, God

will cause him to travel on one of the roads of Paradise,
the angels will lower their wings from good pleasure
with one who seeks knowledge, and the inhabitants of
the heavens and the earth and the fish in the depth of
water will ask forgiveness for the scholar ('iilim). The
superiority of a scholar over a pious (zahid) is like that
of the moon on the night when it is full over the rest
of the stars. The scholars are the heirs of the Prophets
who leave neither money nor property behind, but only
knowledge. He who takes it, takes an abundant portion.
(Abu Dawud, Sunan, "Bab al-'ilm", 3634; also in ai-
Tirmidhi, "'Ilm", 19, al-Nasa'I, Taharah, 112, Ibn
Majah, Muqaddimah, 17, Af:lmad ibn I:Ianbal,
Musnad, IV, 239)

18Translations of the af:ziidlth from the Sunan of Abu Dawud are adopted from Ahmad
Hasan's translation Sunan Abu Diiwud (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1984).
154
 An intellectual (faqfh) is more vehement to the Satan
than one thousand devout persons ('iibid). (Ibn Majah,
"Muqaddimah", 222)

If God wants to do good to a person, He makes him an

intellectual (faqfh) in religion. (AI-Bukhari, "KWib ai-
'IIm", chapter 14)

The above afuidith are sufficient to show that the knowledge-structure of

the Islamic worldview begins with an immense emphasis on the concept of
knowledge. Of course in this respect 'ilm is not the only term included in
this emphasis, although we have concentrated on it. It seems that in this
connection, two terms go together in early Islam: 'ilm andfiqh. Both
terms refer to knowledge, although the former express~s exact. precise
and definite knowledge, while the latter signifies scientific, and hence
knowledge of the rationalldnd . .That is why 'ilm is used by both the
Qur'an and J:tadith to refer to revealed knowledge which is definite arid
absolute. 19 It is clear that 'ilm is used to refer to knowledge which is
either revealed or related to that which is revealed. On the other hand, the
same term is used both in the Qur' an and certain a/:liidzth also to refer to
knowledge in general:

We have given them a book (i. e., Revelation) and

explained it with a knowledge as a guidance and mercy
for people who believe. (Al-A 'raJ (7): 52; also see
4/al-Nisa', 157; 6/al-An'am, 119; 27/al-Naml; 15-6;
31/Luqman, 20)

If anyone acquires knowledge of things by which God's

own pleasure is sought, yet acquires it only to get
some worldly advantage, he will not reach the smell of
Paradise. (Abu Dawiid, Sunan, "Bab ai-'IJm", 3656)

When 'ilm is revealed it is absolute and thus is identical with the

Revelation; but when it is attained by man, it cannot be identical with
Revelation. Therefore, tqe general usage of 'ilm by both the Qur' an and
J:tadith refers to the knowledge attained by man. The usage bi ghayri 'ilm-
- without having any knowledge (6/al-An'am, 119; 31/Luqman, 20, and

19For this usage, see the following verses: 2/al-Baqarah, 120; 3/Ali 'Imran, 61; 6/al-
An'am, 119,140, 143; 11/Hiid, 14, 49; 13/al-'Ra'd, 37, 43; 19/Maryam, 43.
155
 so on), then, means "'ilm devoid of revelational content ·when it should
not be so devoid". Hence, the general meaning of 'ilm is intimately linked
in the knowledge-structure of the Islamic worldview with its usage in the
sense of Revelation.
The ones who do wrong follow their own whims
without having any knowledge. Who will guide
someone whom God has Jet go astray? They will have
no supporters. So keep your face set straight to the true
religion, God's natural handiwork along which He has
patterned mankind. There is no way to alter God's
creation. That is the correct religion, though most men
do not know. (30/al-Ra'd, 29-30)

It is clear that the moral dimension is what the Qur' an is developing

here as the knowledge-structure of the Islamic world view. If this moral
dimension is divested of knowledge, it may lead to disastrous results:

Those who have stupidly killed their own children

without having any knowledge and forbidden
something God has pt·ovided them with, have lost out
through inventing things about God; they have gone
astray and not been guided ... Who can be more harmful
than the one who invents a lie about God to mislead
people without having any knowledge. (6/al-An 'am,
l40, 144)

Therefore, the Qur' anic approach qualifies knowledge with a moral

dimension which is provided again by. the revelation; the attitude of
indifference is thereby excluded from the Islamic worldview and its
knowledge-structure. Hence, knowledge is not conceived to be neutral to
values, it is inherently linked with values; and thus it can be harmful or
useful --as the Prophet prayed: "0 God, I seek refuge with You from the
knowledge which is not useful" (Muslim, "Kitab al-Dhikr", 73; AbtJ
Dawud, "Witr", 32, and so on). Moreover, this aspect of knowledge can
be observed in the following verse as weli: "They learn what is harmful
and not useful to them." (2/al-Baqarah, 102).
The knowledge that is useful is understood as either Revelation itself,
as we have seen in the verses mentioned or quoted, or as knowledge
derived directly from Revelation, or as knowledge in the general sense,

156
 namely as acquired by man, but which can be reconciled with Revelation
and thus be based upon it. It is also clear from the verses and a}:tiidith
which use the term 'ilm that whenever 'ilm is used in the sense of
Revelation or in the general meaning of revealed knowledge, it is almost
exclusively used with the definite article ( al- 'ilm). Therefore, the Qur'an
definitely wishes to qualify knowledge; in fact, its aim is to guide
knowledge in general; that is why revelational knowledge is collated with
it at this point. Knowledge in general is no longer left aloof, but it is
suggested to be invested with revelational values. Once general knowledge
is thus invested, it becomes illumined knowledge, which is no longer
knowledge that is not useful. There is no doubt that all these values are
delicately infused into the knowledge-conception of the Islamic worldview
by the Qur'an. First it states that "the true knowledge is with God alone"
(46/al-Al;tkaf, 23), then points out: "above all those who possess
knowledge is an All-knowing" (12/Yiisuf, 76). Moreover, it categorically
declares that "God knows you do not know" (2/al-Baqarah, 216; see also
3/Ali 'Imran, 65-6).
In this way a morality of knowledge is also developed as a part of the
knowledge-structure of the Islamic worldview. Knowledge unqualified is
considered as though it is not knowledge at all; hence, the phrase "without
having any know ledge". For when the Qur' an accuses those people with
this allegation, it cannot obviously mean that those people had no
knowledge at all; in fact, "they knew only the external look of the worldly
life, but they were totally unaware of the life to come ( al-akhirah)" (30/al-
Riim, 7). That is why their knowledge is as if non-existent. Therefore,
unilluminated knowledge is superficial in itself and as such it can be
equated with ignorance. .
As all these conceptions concerning 'ilm,fiqh and other knowledge-
related terms were developed, a doctrinal understanding gradually began to
emerge within the Islamic worldview; it is this comprehensive doctrinal
understanding that we call the 'knowledge-structure' of the Islamic
worldview. As we have seen, this conception emphasizes knowledge with
an utmost care, without even leaving it with a mere emphasis, for it also
states that "seeldng knowledge is an obligation for every Muslim" (Ibn
Majah, "Muqaddimah", 17, 224). Moreover, besides this emphasis, a

157
framework is also given together with the doctrinal understanding of
knowledge. Considering also the Qur'anic encouragement to examine and
understand the universe and the nature of certain related problems, it
becomes inevitable that as a result of all these comprehensive knowledge-
seeking activities, a network of concepts emerges; it is this network which
we have called the scient~fic conceptual scheme. Since this scheme
emerged as a result of and within the Islamic world view, we identify it as
the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. As we have shown, if such a
scheme emerges within a given society or civilization, it is called 'scientific
tradition'. Therefore, the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme is the
ground of the Islamic scientific tradition. We shall now examine briefly the
emergence of this tradition.

2. The Emergence of the Islamic Scientific Tradition (10-200

A.H./632-800 A;D.)
a
The scope of this study does not allow us to give detailed outline of how
this general scheme of Islamic scientific activities developed. But a brief
description of this process is necessary not only to show its history but
also to clarify what is meant by it. Therefore,. we shall attempt to delineate
its most general features as it developed in the early centuries of Islam.
First of all, since a tradition requires a society in which it can unfold
itself, we must try not only to show the existence of a community of
scientists in the early centuries of Islam, but how such a community came
to exist as well. Secondly, the active framework of the Islamic scientific
tradition is the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. Therefore, as its
necessary ground it must have emerged first, or at least simultaneously
with the Islamic scientific tradition, so that a tradition is based on it. In that
case we shall clarify this scheme and also show its emergence, then how it
led to the development ~f a scientific tradition in Islam.

a) The Emergence of the Islamic Scientific Conc~ptual Scheme

As we have pointed out, after the Prophet moved to Medina, the
revelation which he received was more concerned with other structures of
the Islamic worldview, and among these the knowledge-structure is the
one that concerns us here. This means that he began setting up certain

158
 institutions that became the model of education in later Islamic history. The
School of the Bench, known as A~l;lab al-~uffah, or Ahl al-~uffah (i.e.,
the People of the Bench) is only one of these educational establishments
which was founded by the Prophet himself in Medina at the long, covered
portico of the Mosque. Those companions who belonged to this School
were engaged only in study and worship. They did not work and most of
them even did not get married until the Prophet's death. Some of them
kept their pace of life in scholarly work and in the preservation of the
Prophet's traditions throughout their life. The Prophet provided their
livelihood mainly from the booty acquired from expeditions, so that they
would not interrupt their study. Their number is said to have reached at
times up to 400. 20 ~uffah was origfnally set apart for the lodging of
newcomers and those of the local people who were too poor to have a
house of their own. But soon it acquired the character of a regular
residential school where reading, writing, Muslim law, the memorizing of
chapters of the Qur'an, tajwid (how to recite the Qur'an correctly), and
other Islamic sciences were taught under the direct supervision of the
Prophet, who took pains to see to the daily requirements of the boarders.
The Prophet was so much concerned with the education of Muslims
that when some Meccans were taken prisoners by him after the victory of
Badr, he asked those among them who were literate to teach ten children
of Medina how to write. 21 Sometimes this was done in exchange for their
freedom. 'Ubadah ibn al-~amit says that the Prophet appointed him a
teacher in the school of ~uffah for classes in writing and in Qur'anic
studies. 22
Therefore, the School of the Bench cannot be represented just as a
welfare house of the Prophet, as this is the impression left by some
classical sources. 23 The main purpose of establishing the ~uffah was to

20Ibn Sa'd gives the following names as members of this School: Abu i-Iurayrah, Abu
Dharr ai-Ghifari, Wathilah ibn ai-Asqa', Qays ibn Tihfah al-Ghifari, 'Abd al-Ra~man
ibn Ka'b al-Asamm, etc. Al-l;lujwiri mentions 34 names in his Kashf al-Ma(tjub;
trans. R. Nicholson (Leyden and London, 1911), 81.
21Ibn I;Ianbal, Musnad (istanbul: <;agn Yaymlan, 1992), 1(21): 247; Ibn Sa'd,
Tabaqiit al-Kubrii, 2; I: 14.
22sunan Abu Diiwud, trans. Ahmad Hasan, op. cit., 2: 972.
159
 preserve the intellectual heritage of Islam. Studying and memorizing the
Qur'an and (tadith, spending most of their times in meditation and
worship, following the Prophet during the day wherever he went in order
to observe what he did and said so as to record his traditions--in this
sense, the School of the Bench performed the task of the Prophetic
archives, and thus became the first seat of the Islamic scientific tradition.
But in most of their archival activities the members relied mainly upon
their memory. Some of them, such as Abu Hurayrah, and his disciple
J:Iammam ibn Munabbih, wrote on pages which are still extant. Thousands
of (tadith are reported on the authority of the members of the Bench.
Unfortunately, modern scholarship is very inadequate in bringing to
light the historical information about this school. For this reason it may at
first appear strange to call this group of people a "school". Yet the fact that
the Prophet had not only the intention of providing these people with
shelter and livelihood, but that he also aimed at establishing the Bench as a
center of learning justifies calling it at least a place of learning, i.e., a
school. On the other hand, when we see that the life they led is so clearly
distinguishable from that of the other Companions, the plausible
conclusion is that they had also a different conception of the world and
man's role in such a world. This also justifies us to refer to them as a
school of thought in early Islam. But unfortunately, historical material
related to this aspect of the School is extremely scarce. There is still much
need to do research on the School of the Bench as represented by us here.
Moreover, there is sufficient evidence that ~uffah was not the only
school in Medina. Ibn J:Ianbal, for example; records that at a certain time,
"a batch of 70 students attended the lectures of a certain teacher in Medina,
and worked there till morning". 24 In fact, there were at least nine mosques
2 3The members of the Bench were mostly very poor; see 2/ai-Baqarah, 273 which
makes a remark about them revealing their miserable situation; also see the relevant
verse in Mu)Jammad ai-Zamakhshari's al-Kashshiif (Beyrut: Dar al-Kutiib al-
'Ilmiyyah, 1995), I: 313.) The school of $uffah provided instruction not only for
those who lodged there, but also during the day scholars and casual visitors attended it
in large numbers. But there were among them very rich personalities such as AbLi
Lubabah, who donated a balcony to the Masjid ai-:Qirar, see Waqidi, Kitiib al-
Maghiizi, trans. by J. Wellhausen (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von G. Reimer, 1882),
4 t'O.
24Ibid.
160
 in Medina at the time of the Prophet. Professor Hamidullah states that each
one of these mosques served simultaneously as a school, and that "the
people inhabiting the locality sent their children to these local mosques.
Quba is not far from Medina. The Prophet sometimes went there and
personally supervised the school in the mosque of that place. There are
general dicta of the Prophet regarding those who studied in the mosque-
schools. He also enjoined upon people to learn from their neighbors." 25
All these educational activities led to the emergence of a group of
scholars who handed down the Prophetic tradition of teaching and
searching for knowledge to the next generation of scholars who b~came
their students. Of course the early generation of scho~ars were naturally
very simple in their ideas concerning special sciences, although they were
extremely sophisticated in their knowledge of religion and related issues,
primarily because of the guidance of Revelation. But soon, as a new
generation of scholars began to take over this scholarly tradition, the desire
for learning increased; as a result, a group of scholars with a sophisticated
scientific mentality emerged. Among them, we can give the following
names: Qa<;li ShurayQ. (d. 80/699), MuQ.ammad ibn al-l:lanafiyyah· (d.
81/700), Ma'bad al-Juhani (d. 84/703), Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab (d. c.
91/709), 'Urwah ibn al-Zubayr ibn al-'Awwam (d. 941712), Ibrahim
Nakha'I (d. c. 56/717), Aban ibn 'Uthman (d. 100/718), Mujahid ibn
Jabr (d. 100/718), 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 102/720), Wahb ibn
Munabbih (d. 110, 1141719, 723), J:Iasan al-Ba~ri (d. 1101728), 'Ata' ibn
Abi Rahal). (d. 114/732), J:Iammad ibn Abu Sulayman (d. 120/737),
GhayHin al-Dimashql (d. c. 123/740), al-Zuhri (d. 1241742), Wasil ibn
'Ata' (d. 1311748), Ibn Isl:laq (d. 151/768), Ja'far al-$adiq (d. 148/765),
Abu J:Ianifah (d. 150/767), Awza'I (d. 158/774), Hishain ibrl al-J:Iakam
(d. 179/795-6), Malik ibn Anas (d. 1791796), Abu Yusuf (d. 182/799),
Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 1611778); al-Shafi'i (d. 204/819), and so on.
It is primarily through the efforts of these scientists and many others
that a sophisticated technical scientific vocabulary gradually emerged
towards the end of the second century of Islam. This technical vocabulary

2 5M. Hamidullah. "Educational System in the Time of the Prophet", Islamic Culture,
13 (1939), 53-55.
161
included, among others, the following: 'ilm, u~ul, ra'y, Otihiid, qiyas,
fiqh, 'aql, qalb, idrak, wahm, tadabbur,fikr, na:r.ar, /:tikmah, yaqin,
waJ:ty, tafsir, ta 'wil, 'a lam, kaliim, nu.tq, :r.ann, J:taqq, ba_til, ~idq,
kidhb, wujud, 'adam, dahr, ~amad, sarmad, azal, abad, khalq, khulq,
firasah,fi_trah, .tabi'ah, ikhtiyar, kisb, khayr, sharr, J:talal, /:tariim,
wajib, mumkin, amr, iman, iradah, and so on. Who can claim that these
scientific terminology were not contained in the Islamic worldview? For all
these usage's had a basis in the Qur'an as well. In fact, they were available
not only as everyday terms, but also as concepts with sophisticated and ·
rich meanings that made them available for later technical-scientific usage.
The purpose of our exposition is to demonstrate that all these technical
terms formed a sophisticated web of scientific concepts until the end of the
second century of Islam (in approximately the 830s). As we still need to
do more historical research to bring out materials, we cannot go into a
detailed exposition of this. We shall rather concentrate on certain key terms
only, which will sufficiently prove our case in this context, in order to
exhibit the early Islamic scientific tradition.

_b) The Emergence of the Early Islamic Scientific Tradition

As we have already defined the concept of a scientific tradition, we can
say that the Islamic scientific tradition is the menifestation of the Islamic
scientific conceptual scheme within the Islamic milieu. We can show this
by examining the scientific meanings attached to the scientific concepts as
they begin to emerge in the early Muslimcommunity. In order to do this
we shall select only the most fundamental concepts in Islamic science, as
they are situated within the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme.
We are informed, for example, of al-:Zuhri to have said that a sound
theory (al-ra 'y al-J:tasan) is a good piece of knowledge. 26 Ibn 'Abbas
reports from the Prophet that he said: "As though I see the women of Banii
Fahr circumambulating around the Khazraj (tribe) while shaking their
buttocks; they are the polytheists. This is the first polytheism of this
community. By God, their wrong theory (sa' ra 'yihim) shall eventually
lead them to exclude God from predetermining good, just as they had

2 6see Ahmad Hasan, Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad:

Islamic Research Institute, 1986), 8.
162
 already excluded Him from predetermining evil". 27 Of course_ it may not
always be possible to find an equivalent translation of a scientific term of a
scientific conceptual scheme, coined for a specific meaning within a certain
worldview in another scientific conceptual scheme. This is the case with
the concept of ra 'y, which does not have an exact corresponding term in
the Western scientific vocabulary; except that the term 'theory' is used
very much in a meaning close to the term ra'y. This is attested also in the
report of Ibn Sa'd who states that when 'Ata' ibn Abi RabaQ. was ·asked
concerning his judgment whether it was 'ilm or ra 'y, he replied that it was
'ilm, if his judgment is derived from a precedent, i.e., athar; otherwise, it
was implied that the judgment in question was grounded upon ra 'y. 28
This means that 'ilm is understood as a definite piece of knowledge which
is either directly taken from a revealed source, or derived from it on the
basis of a precedent practice of the Prophet. But ra 'y cannot be 'ilm in this
sense because it is the view of an individual on a certain problem. He~ce,
ra'y actually means 'theory' inthe Western scientific terminology. Not
only does a theory, i. e., ra 'y, mean 'provisional opinion', it also
expresses a rational argumentation because a scientific theory is based on
reasoning. This understanding of ra 'y is also clear from the following
usage; "ni 'rna wazir al- 'ilm al-ra 'y al-l:tasan" (what a good minister of
knowledge is the correct theory) 29 . Moreover, since reason is not
authoritative in the absolute thmscendent realm, the Prophet says that "if
one interprets the Qur' an on the basis of his theory, he has committed an
error even if he is correct in his interpretation" (man qr.llafi'l-Qur'iin bi
ra'yihifa a~·iiba,fa qad akhta'y3°, since no knowledge can be based on a
theory. It is also reported that "sometimes Ibn 'Abbas held a theory which
later he abandoned. " 31 .
It is clear therefore, that though our Prophet did not use the term to
mean theory in the scientific sense, he definitely paved the way for such a

27 Al.1mad ibn I;Ianbal, op. cit., 1 (21 ): 330.

28Kitiib Tabaqiit al-Kubrii, ed. by II:Jsan 'Abbas (Beyrut: Dar ~adir, 1968), 5: 469.
29AJ-Darimi, Sunari, "Muqaddimah", 30.
30Sunan Abu Diiwud, op. cit., I 036.
31 Al-Darimi, op. cit., "Muqaddimah", 52.

163
 usage. As a result, gradually the term began to emerge as a significant
concept in the Islamic scientific tradition to mean theory.
The knowledge based on a rational argumentation is reached as a result
of ra 'y, and such a knowledge was actually defined as fiqh in the early
scientific tradition. This is clear in the above quotations of the afttidith in
which fiqh occurs. Since such a knowledge is in fact science per se, in
certain early usage it was used exactly in the same manner, such as the title
of a book written by al-Tha'alibi--Fiqhu'l-Lughah, i.e., the science of
lexicography. Later developments, however, diverted this usage, and
perhaps as an influence of the Greek sCientific tradition this usage was
dropped and thus replaced by the term 'ibn. Moreover, according to Abu
I:Ianifah, fiqh meant "speculative thinking". 32 Al-Dhahabi says of
'Abdullah ibn al-Mubarak that he "recorded knowledge, i.e., ftadith, in
chapters and concerning fiqh" ( dawwana '1- 'ilm fi'1-abwtib wa '1-fiqh). 33
Of course this usage of the term has a basis in the Qur'an (e.g., 9/al-:
Tawbah; 122; Zi yatafaqqahu fi a1-d"in), as well as in the ftadith (see the
ftadith quoted above in relation to the Prophet's prayer for Ibn 'Abbas).
That is why 'ilm was taken by the Traditionists to mean ftadith.
ljtihtid is.also a closely related term in the network of concepts of the
Islamic scientific tradition; it means the effort to search for knowledge
through ra 'y. Hence, ~jtihad is also a scientific effort which is theoretical.
For this reason it is not a definite knowledge, but it must, of course, be
based on revealed knowledge. It must be for this. reason that the Prophet
says: ''fat;llu'1-'tilim 'ala'1-mujtahid mi'atu darajah", namely, the scholar
who bases himself on true knowledge is a hundred times higher in rank
than the theoretical scholar. 34 If we want to show the relation of ra 'y to
ijtihtid, we can say that ra 'y is the theory which is produced in an
ijtihad. This is clear in Mu'ftdh ibn Jabal's interesting usage of (jtihad
and ra 'y together in the famous ftadith of (jtihtid: ajtahidu ra 'yi lti tilu; i.
e., I shall make my best effort to come up with a theory. 35 But (jtihad is

32L. Gardet, "'lim al-Kalam", EP .

33 Tadhkirat al-l:fuffti:r. (Hyderabad: The Dairatu'I-Ma 'arlf-il~Osmania, 1955), I: 275.
34At-Darimi, op. cit., "Muqacldimah", 32.
35AJ:!mad ibn I:Ianbal, Musnad, 5: 230.
164
 necessarily based on the Qur' an and f:tadith, as understood from this
f:tadith as well. It is, therefore, the theoretical knowledge based on the
Qur' an and the f:tadzth.
What about the theoretical knowledge which is primarily derived from
discursive thinking? The early Islamic scientific tradition used the term
kalam to refer to this kind of knowledge. As such kalam meant
'speculative knowledge'. The earliest reference in this regard can be taken
from J:Iasan al-Ba~ri's (d. 728) letter in which he states that "we initiated
the speculative study of qadar; just as people initiated the denial of it"
( af:tdathnii al-kaliim fihi). 36 It is also reported that once our Prophet's
wife, 'A'ishah, heard J:Iasan al-Ba~ri speaking, and asked: "who is this
discoursing with the word of the veracious" (man hadhii alladhf
yatakallam bi kala~ al-~iddiqzn). 31 In this sense, kalam comes very
close to the term 'philosophy' .as it is used today; i.e., speculative
thinking. It is clear why Muslims chose the word '.kaliim' for this kind of
knowledge, for kaliim means 'language' or 'speech' but not in the
ordinary sense. It rather refers to the kind of human language which is
discursive. In this sense, it comes close to the term 'logos' in the Greek
scientific conceptual scheme. It may be translated into English as
'discourse', but in the technical sense of today' s Western scientific
terminology, it means precisely 'philosophy'.
It is clear that all these usage determined the scientific vocabulary of
the early Muslims. Not only is the meaning of each term clarified, but so is
its relation to other terms and the way, v:iz., method, they ought to be used
is also given. For instance, it is possible to think that since .fiqh is a
rational understanding, it may be a kind of knowledge that is to be avoided
by Muslims, as indicated in the above f:tadith that the scholar who bases
himself on true knowledge is a hundred times higher in rank than the
theoretical scholar, i. e., the rationalist. But another f:tadfth clarifies that
·rational understanding may be decisive in certain cases (e.g.,faqfh w(lf:tid

36 Julian Obermann, "Political Theology in Early Islam", Jourttal of the American

Oriental Society, 55 (1935), 145; Arabic text, Helmut Ritter, "Studien zur
Islamischen Fromigkeit I: Hasan al-Basri", Der Islam, 21 (1933), 68, lines 10-11.
37Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-flasan al-Ba,H·l, 8-9; quoted by Mul}ammad 'Abd al-Ral)im, Tajsrr
al-f:lasan al-Ba~rf (Al-Qahirah: Dar al-I:Iaramayn li't-Tiba 'ah, 1992), I: 21.
165
 ashadd 'alii al-shay,tiin min alf 'iibid). 38 Of course, the Islamic
worldview also clarifies in which cases which is to be preferred.
To the concept of knowledge in the Islamic scientific tradition of the
Islamic science, the term /:tikmah also proved indispensable. Mujahid, fo1·
example, explains the term ftikmah in the verse wa man yu'ta al-ftikmah
fa qad utiya khayran kathlrii (2/al-Baqarah, 269) as comprising three
things: 1. al-Qur'an, 2. al- 'ilm, 3. al-fiqh. 39 Here 'ilm refers to the
knowledge of Islamic tradition and the Sunnah,fiqh was held as a rational
understanding on the basis of the revealed sources. flikmah, on the other
hand, was understood as knowledge derived rationally from a revealed
source, as such it is both 'ilm and fiqh at once, but different from
independent speculation, which can be understood as kaliim. That is why
al-Tabari reports that ftikmah was defined by his predecessors as the
Qur' an and its (rational) understanding ( al-/:tikmah hiya al-Qur 'an wa '1-
fiqh bihi). 40 :
In this way every term which was gradually given a specific place in
the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme acquired a technical scientific
meaning, but always in relation to each other. Therefore, the concepts in
this scheme are so related to each other that when they are thus held
together, they yield a vision, an insight, and an outlook in the mind of the
Muslim scientist; and as a framework in the mind of the Muslim scientists
it constitutes what we call here 'Islamic scientific tradition'. No matter in
what field the scientist is working, by the very epistemological constitution
of his mind, he will necessarily reflect this tradition; and it is this outlook
that characterizes a scientific activity as Islamic, since it springs from the
Islamic worldview. And again it is in this sense that a scientific activity
will render itself as a part of the Islamic science.

38Al-Tirmidhi, "'lim", 13; Ibn Majah, "Muqaddimah".

39 AI-Tabari, Jiimi' al-Bayiinfi Tafslr al-Qur'iin (Beyrut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1980), 3:
60.
4°Ibid.

166
 CHAPTER FIVE
THE RISE OF PARTICULAR SCIENCES

We have thus far applied the epistemological and sociological framework

of science as developed here to scientific traditions in general. In this
chapter we shall try to apply this to specific sciences in a given
civilization, in this case, Islamic civilization. We may apply the same
frameworks to other civilizations, and in this case instead of doiryg that, as
this will exceed the scope of this essay, we shall try to point to!the main
differences in the three case traditions chosen for our study here.
We have already indicated in our discussion of the scientific process
that scientific consciousness is necessary for an organized body of
knowledge to be called 'sCience'. In that case, can we talk about a
scientific tradition without there being any sciences, which would indicate
the absence of the scientific consciousness? If we have shown, in the
previous chapter the emergence of an Islamic scientific tradition, this
means that scientific consciousness must have become identifiable together
with it. If, on the other hand, this is the case, it means in turn that there
must have been some sciences at that time as well. Since the application of
both scientific consciousness and thus the emergence of a tradition is a
process, it will cover a long period of time. It will begin with some
knowledge-acquisition activities and eventually lead to both phenomena.
In the previous chapter we have shown this process to have taken place
from the tenth year of the hUrah until the beginning of the third century.
(10-200 A.H./632-800 A.D.) This means that it covered about two
hundred years of a scientific process. At the beginning of this process we
cannot expect to find the scientific consciousness, which brings into the
mind the question of when it came to be applied historically. This chapter
will mainly deal with this problem in order to apply our framework to
specific sciences, and in this case we shall chose Islamic civilization as our
case study.
We need not actually discover an exact date for the historical
application of scientific consciousness, which actually means 'naming
specific sciences', and in facr it is extremely difficult to ascertain an exact

167
 date because the scientific process is taking its course very naturally in the
first century of Islam. Moreover, because sufficient historical material is
not available, it is hard to determine in the early period which scientist,
'iilim, for the first time used the terms discussed in their scientific
technical meanings. We must nevertheless admit that even close to the end
of the second century the scientific consciousness was effectively applied
to specific organized bodies of knowledge. This means that it is possible
to detect the early formations of sciences in Islam right from the end of the
second century (800 A. D.). That is why it is possible to talk about an
Islamic scientific tradition as existent around this time.
What are the characteristics of the early Islamic science? The most
important one is that all subjects under .discussion are regarded as
comprising the subject· matter of one comprehensive science. For this
reason, only one name is given to all the subject matters investigated; al-
fiqh which is thus the mother science in the Islamic scientific tradition. It
is in a way similar to the early Greek usage of the term philosophia which
was in fact a comprehensive term referring to all disciplinary learning
activities. As we have shown, in this comprehensive sense al-fiqh does
not mean 'law'; it rather means just science. 1 In the early Islamic
scientific tradition, therefore, all other subjects of investigation are
considered in one way or another as branches of (-1.1-fiqh. That is why Abi:1
I:Ianifa, for example, uses the term al-fiqh al-akbar to refer to subjects
. I .
related to theology. He seems to be aware that as an umbrella· science it is
possible to classify subjects under al-fiqh, which shows the early traces
of scientific consciousness. But still we do not find in Abii l:fanifa a clear
definition of subject matter and the method that constitutes al-fiqh as a
discipline.
Our exposition shows that the process out of which individual
sciences arose is also important in this respect fdr the clarification of the
epistemological and sociological frameworks of science developed here.
For this reason we shall in this chapter briefly try to demonstrate how

1 In order to distinguish the early sense of the term· al-fiqh from its later meaning In
the sense of law, we shall use it always with the definite article; hence, al-jlqh shall
mean 'science', whereas fiqh will refer in this context to 'the science of Jaw and
jurisprudence' in general. .
168
 such individual sciences emerged within the Islamic scientific tradition.
We shall chose as example cases the most important early sciences; fiqh
and kaliim (i. e., philosophy). Since our model is the scientific process,
we shall apply it now to our example cases.

A. Al-FIQH

As we have argued, the meaning of the term al-fiqh in the early Islamic
scientific tradition meant simply science. In the Greek tradition we see 'cl
similar case with regard to philosophy, which was first understood as
science par excellence, and then it was classified into individual sciences
which came to emerge at a later stage. This was the case with the term al-
fiqh in the Islamic tradition. At a later stage, however, the meaning of this
scientific term became limited to religious-moral-legal studies. This was,
as we have pointed out, the result of the Greek influences. When the
Greek scientific and philosophical works were translated into Arabic, the
translators were the Christian Arabs who knew Greek, and no Muslim
thinker kriew -sufficient Greek to participate in the translation activities.
Since the Christian Arab scholars were not trained in Islamic science, they
did not know the technical vocabulary of the Muslims. They thus
translated, for example, the Greek term episteme as 'ilm, whereas this
was a great mistake, because as we have seen in the Islamic scientific
tradition 'ilm meant 'revealed knowledge'. Based our assessment here,
we can say that if it had been a Muslim translator, he would have
translated episteme asfiqh. If we evaluate this problem,. we qm see that
literally episteme and 'ilm mean knowledge, they are thus synonymous.
A translator who does not mean the technical meaning of the Arabic term
he will naturally translate it in its everyday usage. Muslim philosophers
did not object to this. translation because 'ilm as 'revealed knowledge' was
conceived to be absolute, i.e. true knowledge, it is this meaning that is
conveyed in the Aristotelian episteme. Therefore, in this sense this
translation is not altogether wrong, and in fact this may have bearing upon
Muslim philosophers' conclusion that both philosophy and Revealed
knowledge convey the same Truth.

169
 We can adduce more evidence to this effect; the term syllogism was
trans~ated as qiyiis which meant in the Islamic scientific vocabulary
analogical reasoning. There was as yet no term to correspond to
syllogism. Moreover the term philosophia was also problematic; as the
Christian translators were not trained in the Islamic scientific tradition they
were not well versed in the Islamic scientific terminology. As a result,
they tried to use the term f:zikmah to translate into Arabic. This translation
was obviously based on the everyday meaning of the term which was
known to them. But this caused so much confusion and in fact attracted
reaction from the Muslim scientific community that they preferred to use it
in its Arabized Greek form al-falsafah. As we have shown the term
kaliim came very close at that time to the meaning of philosophia. If these
terms were thus correctly translated into Arabic, I believe that there would
not have been so much reaction against the Aristotelian philosophy from
the early Islamic scientific community.
It is, therefore, a significant error to interpret the early reaction of the
Muslim scientific community to the Aristotelian philosophy as merely a
religious fanaticism against science. The reaction is primarily scientific;
as these scholars are used to the meaning of the term 'ilm as 'absolute
revealed knowledge', they found many wrong doctrines in the Aristotelian
philosophy which would not qualify it to the level of 'ilm. Moreover, how
could such wrong theories be f:zikmah? For f:zikmah meant, as we have
seen, al-Qur'an wa'l-fiqh bihi. 2 This tension between the Islamic
scientific vocabulary and the Aristotelian philosophy led to its rejection by
the Muslim scholars. But eventually, this new vocabulary paved its way
as certain scholars wrote refutations ag'ainst the Aristotelian philosophy by
using these wrongly translated terms. Thus, 'ilm came to mean science
and f:zikmah with some reservations came .to mean philosophia, and so
on. With these considerations, then we shall attempt to show the
emergence of fiqh as an early Islamic science. In doing this, we shall
apply again our theory of scientific process developed in the sociology of
science (Chapter 3).

2 AI-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayiin fi Tafsfr al-Qur'an (Beyrut: Dar al-Ma 'rifah, 1980), 3:
60.
170
 1. The Stage of Scientific Problems (0-80's A.H./622-
700' s)
When the Prophet migrated to Medina a new Muslim community was
established on the basis of the Islamic wofldview through which Muslims
had been educated. This meant that Muslims ought to have lived in
accordance with the new worldview which brought some problems that
needed to be solve. Many of these problems required an intellectual
approach as well. They were all of diverse subjects; theological, moral,
political, legal, and social. Theological and moral subjects coincided, as
we have seen, in the Islamic worldview with religion; hence, their solution
largely came from the Revelation but their explanation and relevance were
elaborated by the Prophet himself. However, still some theological rind
moral issues were left ambiguous, and many political, social, legal and
economic problems were left for the community to solve. The Prophet
was the leader not only in religious issues but in these intellectual issues as
well. He thus stressed the significance of understanding the religion in
order to apply to one's life, which nieant to find intellectual solutions to
these problems ..
This is clear in the early usage of the termfiqh to mean understanding
the religion for the purpose of applying to one's life (that is, to find
{ntellectual solutions to the problems of.their time). Let us consider the
following f:zadith: "May Allah brighten a man who hears our word, gets it
by heart and transmits it to others. Many a bearer of fiqh transmits our
word to one who has more knowledge (fiqh) than him; and many a bearer
of knowledge (fiqh) is not a scholar (faqzh)." 3 Although the termfiqh in
this usage does not yet means sc,ience, it is yet used in a meaning that has
so much affinity to its meaning science that one is tempted here to
translate the term faqlh as 'scientist'. That is. why we preferred to
translate as 'scholar'.
If it is clear that the early Muslim community was trying to find
scholarly solutions for their problems, then it is not difficult to see that the
Islamic science is now at the stage of problems in its scientific process.
Some of these problems may be summarized in this context as legal,

3 Abii Dawiid, Sunan, '"lim", 10; ai-Tirmizi, Sunan, '"lim", 7.

171
 economic, literary, political and social. In short, for example, we know
that the pre-Islamic legal activities were limited to the law of customs
among the Arabs. Tribal organizations was the political body in the pre-
Islamic Arabian society. The tribe was bound by the body of unwritten
rules. No one had a legislative power to interfere with the system;
modifications of the law naturally occurred through a long period of time.
These modifications were mainly introduced by individuals and were
accepted if the whole community consented to it. Hence, no official
institution of law existed. There was only customary law of the Arabs.
Since there was no organized political authority there was also no judicial
system. If a legal disputes was not settled through private channels
recourse to a (lakam (arbitrator) was made. Usually someone believed to
have sup~rnatural powers was chosen as (lakam. Each party had to give
something like a security deposit to guarantee that they would submit the
decision of the arbitrator.
The theological issues did not exist at the time of the Prophet as
problems; the most important problem· at the time was to show the
absurdity of the pagan deities. Muslims were well aware that such
problems cannot be solved by the capacity of our mind; hence, they
accepted the Revelation as the only source for such issues. The only
intellectual effort required of them: was try sincerely to understand what
the Revelation was relatij:lg to them. They only needed to show the
irrationality of the pagan theological outlook. This is also clear in the
Qur' an: "If there were in the heavens and the earth other gods besides
Allah, there would have been confusion in both" (21/al-Anbiyii', 22, and
many other verses to this effect).
When the Muslim community was thus established in Medina, with
the arrival of the Prophet in 622, some kind of a political authority was
established and thereby the foundation of an organized judicial systemwas
also erected. The Prophet was the central authority. But some companions
of the Prophet were drawing conclusions from the Qur' an and the sunnah
of the Prophet on all these issues by independent reasoning, which was
termed ra 'y, as we have seen. Their conclusions were consented by the
other Companions and thereby they became binding on the community. It
seems that from the earliest times two characteristics were exhibited in

172
 every legal deCision to be admitted universally by all Muslims and to
acquire the status of law: 1. independent reasoning based on the Qur' an
and the Sunnah; 2. recognition of an authoritative community, in this case
of those who have the 'ilm namely knowing the conditions from the time
of the Prophet. The termfiqh was thus used very commonly; indeed its
usage was so common that soon after the Prophet's death it already began
to acquire a technical meaning.
Another important scientific activity of the stage of problems is seen in
the form of the scholarly works on (tadith. We know that earlier some
companions made notes for their personal guidance and usually carried
these notes with them, even sometimes for the purpose of instruction and
edification to their scholarly circles. There were even some larger notes
refereed to as Kitab (Book). This attitude of keeping written (tadith
gradually led to bigger compilations; amongst these the following ones are
the most celebrated: 1. Kitab ofAsma bint Umays (d. 38/658-9); 2. K.itdb
of Sa'd ibn 'Ubadah (d. c. 15/636); 3. $a(tifah of 'Amr ibn al-'A~ (d.
65/684-5); 4. $a(tifah of Samura ibn Jundah (d. 60/679-680). In fact,
'Arnr ibn al-'Af ~a(tifah, also called al-$ahifat al-$iidiqah, contained a
few hundred a(tiidith.4
At this stage of compilations we find four significant names of
scholars who tried to deal with certain problems of l;l.adith compilations,
such as how to organize the /:tadlth literature and developing technical
terminology to distinguish authentic and inauthentic J:wdfth: 'Urwah ibn
al-Zubayr (c. 25-93/645-710); Aban ibn 'Uthman (c. 20-105/640-723);
Al-Zuhri; and Ibn Isl;laq.
Al-Tabari records that 'Urwah wrote a series of communication on the
early hi~tory of Islam on the request of 'Abd al-Malik. 5 He is cited also
among the greatfuqahd' of Medina and was highly regarded as a reliable
source of J:tadith in the sources. He is said to have owned an important
library on Islamic history and law. He also wrote one of the earliest Kitdb
al-Maghiizi, but did not keep a systematic record of (tadith. Ibn Isl;laq, al-

4 See Ibn ai-Athir, Usd al-Ghdbah, 3: 233 (Cairo, 1285-7) and M. Mustafa Azami,
Studies in Early f:!adlth Literature (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications,
1978), 30.
5 V. Vacca, E/1.
173
 Tabari and Ibn Sa 'd list many traditions from him. 'Urwah, obviously
belongs to the problematic stage in the process of J:tadith to emerge as a
science. His contribution to the rise of historical consciousness cannot be
denied; he is thus viewed as the initiator of the Medina School of
History. 6 Aban ibn 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, on the other hand, is among the
earliest scholars to compile books on history. He is well known for his
book on the biography of the Prophet. The earliest such works were called
Maghazi by the Muslim historians. Aban (sometimes as Aban) was also
reputed for his knowledge of legal and social issues. Among his students
is the well known historian· al-Zuhri. Aban ibn 'Uthman was a more
systematic historian than his predecessors. His contribution to the Islamic
historiography lies in his effort to generate interest in the Islamic
framework for a world history. Unfortunately none ·of his writings are
extant today. But there are many a/:tiidith reported under his authority. His
sincerity and scholarly meticulousness in historical accuracy rendered him
among the most reliable sources of tradition. Ibn Sa'd reports that his
Kitab al-Maghazi was a source book for the later generations of
historians. 7 We thus consider him to belong to the same stage as that of
'Urwah ibn al-Zubayr in the process for the emergence of al-fiqh as a
science.
Of course, the activities concerning the transmission of (ladith are not
classified under al-fiqh. but as a scholarly activity this will lead in later
periods to the rise of history as a science and a sophisticated methodology
to be utilized in such sciences; an activity concomitant with (ladith studies
but definitely perceived by the early scholars as al-fiqh also. These and
many other activities show that the word which was later chosen to be the
name of legal scientific activities has only Islamic origins. Within this
background the legal system in Islam began to enrich itself by using the
terniinology already developed within the Islamic worldview which was
already established in Mecca. Some concepts of this worldview were
directly related to the legal understanding such as the last judgment, the
concept of al-wa'd wa'l-wa'id, the idea of justice, the doctrine of

6 A. A. Duri. "AI-Zuhri: A Study on the Beginning of History Writing in Islam",

BSOAS, 19 (1957), 1.
7 Ibn Sa'd, 5:. 156; Azami, 60.
174
community ummah, the concept of right action, good deeds; 'amal and so
on. On the· basis of this, first the law prescribed in the Qur'an was
practiced on the authority of the Prophet; the Companions also observed
how the Prophet exercised his own opinion in interpreting the legal verses
of the Qur' an. In this way most of the legal terminology developed by the
Prophet himself either as taken directly from the Qur'an or through the
opinion of the Prophet. This can be clearly seen in the /:ladith collected in
al-Shafi 'i's Risiilah. E.g. 'adZ, 'afw, ahl al-kitiib, ajal, afir, ajr, 'aqd,
'iiqil, 'amal, amiin, 'amd, bay', /:ladd, /:laqq, /:laliil, /:lariim,fiqh,fit;la,
dhimmi, isti/:lsiin, ikhtiyar, ijtihiid, mujtahid, ra 'y, makruh, qiit;li,
shibh, shiihid, shakk (shukuk) written document, wajib, 'uquba, wali,
(legal guardian), J,iihir, ba-fin, etc.
After the death of the Prophet, the Companions continued his tradition
and thus as cases increased, proportionate to that the early thought also
began to acquire more sophistication. Thus·the stage of problems began to
form a body of general knowledge d~ring the first half of the Islamic
century. But about two decades later, i.e. 660's, we encounter more
specialists whose activities can be regarded as putting all these scattered
and discrete discussions under one discipline. This means that the early
scholarly activity which can be classified as al-fiqh passed into its second
stage.

2. The Rise of a Disciplinary Tradition (c. 700-750)

Now the subjects under discussion were broadly recognized, a sufficiently
well-formulated method was invented and as a result al-fiqh caine to have
a more definite meaning; sCience. For the scholars specialized in the
subject, the body of knowledge included in all discussions constituted a
discipline, which still mostly includedfatwas or independent decisions of
the scholars. Thus, these scholars, namely, the fuqahii ', came to realize
that their subject actually constitutes a discipline, which was conceived at.
the beginning of the second century as one mother science, al-fiqh. As
such any study that was considered to be scientific could have been
classified as al-fiqh. If we remember the definition of science, we shall
see that scientific means 'that which is primarily theory ( ra 'y )'. It is for
this reason that we even see some more specialized subjects which were

175
 given names as branches of al-fiqh, such asfiqh al-(ladlth,fiqh al-ra 'y
and fiqh al-lughah. Originally these constructions meant in the literal
sense, but as more views and discussions accumulated on these subjects,
they were gradually perceived as specific sciences. All these developments
took place at the disciplinary stage of the Islamic science which can be
roughly dated to be between the years 80-130 A.H./700-750 A.D.
Prominent thinkers involved in the process of discussions leading to
the emergence of al-fiqh as a science at the stage of disciplinary tradition
are: 'Abdullah ibn al-Mubarak, of whom al-Dhahabi says "dawwana al-
8
'ilm fi'l-abwiib wa'l-fiqh ". He is said to have written books and
/ commentaries on the traditions of the Prophet. 9 Hisham ibn 'Urwa (d.
94/712) and his father were also scholars of this stage; and in fact Ibn
Sa'd reports that 'Urwa's many kutub fiqh were burnt at the battle of
Barra. 10 'Urwa is said to have witnessed also the death of many fuqahii'
in that battle. We must understand that fuqahii' means in this case
'scholars'. But the peculiar usage gives the impression that the scientific
consciousness is about to emerge, if not to have emerged yet.
Al-Zuhri and I:Jasan al-Ba1;>ri (642 -728) are also scholars (fuqahii') of
this stage, about whom Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya says that al-Zuhri's
fa twas were collected in three books and I:Jasan al-Ba~ri' s in seven
books. 11 Wahb ibn Munabbih from Yaman (c. 655- 732/ 39-114 A.H.)
is another scholar of the period;· he wrote many books among which we
---J,.,l.-. can count the most important ones Kitiib al-Mubtada ', Kitiib al-Qadar
and J[ikmat Wahb in which he collected the wise sayings of the earlier
generations. Wahb's contribution to the development of the Islamic
science is tremendous, especially the emergence of history as a science.
He dealt with the history of Arabia and the religions before Islam. His
work Kitiib al-Mubtada' in which he discusses creation can be
considered as an anthropological cosmology. He trained many scholars
and his students became the leading scientists of the next generation.

8 Tadhkiratal-J:luffiif., (Hyderabad: The Dairatu'I-Ma'arif-ii-Osmanla, 1955), 1:275.

9 Ibid.
l 0 Tabaqiit al-Kubrii, 6: 135.
11 1 'liim 1 : 26.
176
 An incident which shows the scholarly activity of this period was the
debate between Maymun ibn Mihran and Ghaylan al-Dimashqi where al-
Awza'i (d. 773) is said to have been present. Caliph Hisharri (105-
1251727-742) is reported to have commissioned Maymun ibn Mihran to
refute Ghaylan al-Dimashql's qadarf opinions. Ghaylan asked Ibn
Mihran: "Does God will that sins should be committed?" Ibn Mihran
replied with the following question: "Are sins committed against God's
will?" Ghaylan was unable to answer and was hence silenced. 12 The
complete form of argumentation is not given, but the two questions
exchanged· seem sufficient to demonstrate the earliest scholarly
argumentation which became a basic characteristic of later kaliim whose
subjects are as yet included under al-fiqh. But at this stage it was not an
independent discipline; it was: ·distinguished from other subjects by
primarily putting a phrase in front of the discussion: "al-kaliim fi ... ",
namely "speculative discourse on ... ".
One of the foremost authorities in tradition, Mul;lammad ibn Muslim
ibn Shihab al-Zuhri (c. 50-129/670-742), belonging to the disciplinary
stage, tried to avoid the political upheavals of his time. His knowledge of
legal matters was equally acknowledged in his time and in fact the Caliph
Yazid II (101-1051719-723) appointed him as the qii(il. Then Yazid's
successor Hisham (105-1251723-792) entrusted him with the education of
his sons. Although he spent most of his later life in Damascus, he made
frequent visits to his native tDWn, Medina, in order to collect T:zadith. His
scholarly activities were not limited to merely transmitting T:zadith: he
developed a method to determine the accurate chronology of the T:zadith,
which he collected. This was necessary for constructing a meaningful
history of early Islam. As he was interested in poetry, just like his
predecessors, he would cite many poems in relation to the events of which
he informed his students. 13 Al-Zuhri is regarded in this respect a good
critic of poetry. Moreover, his works in the early Islamic history led to the
rise of another literary activity known as the sirah books (biography of the

12AJ-Tabar1, Tiirikh, ed. by Goeje "(Leyden, 1873-1901), II: 1733. Cited by W.

Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period. of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: At The
University Press, 1973), 86. ·
I3Aghiinl, 19: 59 quoted by A. A. Duri, op. cit .. 3.
177
 Prophet). It is al-Zuhri who employed the sirah in the technical sense,
although he did not use it as a title for any of his works.
J:Iajji Khalifah attributes a Maghiizi work to al-z'uhri. 14 But
unfortunately none of his works _in tradition are extant today. Some
fragments are, however, preserved in mainly Ibn IsQ.aq's Sirah and in the
historical works of al-Tabari, Waqidi and al-Baladhiiri (Futu/:t al-Buldan).
He thus provided the main framework for the sirah literature. He seems to
have treated his subjects with quite an accurate chronological sequence of
events. His main purpose in this was to acquire 'ilm, which was
employed by the early Muslim scholars to refer to the knowledge of the
Prophetic tradition as it meant 'revealed knowledge' in the early Islamic
scientific tradition. In this regard we must acknowledge his contribution
that the term 'ilm is used in the technical sense. Al-Zuhri, just like his
fellow traditionists and even jurists, used the term 'ilm to refer to the
knowledge required for Islamic legal, social and religious life. Since many
ver~es in the Qur'an made references to the merits of acquiring 'ilm, he
regarded his scholarly activities as falling within the same scope.
Al-Zuhri also introduced a new method of isnii.d by introducing what
is known as the collective tradition, which is a "combination of many
15
traditions into a connected simple narrative." He did not hesitate to refer
to the relevant verses of the Qur'an. He does not limit his historical studies
to the period of the Prophet: concerning the pre-Islamic history and
especially his interest in the history of the past prophets, and even more
important for the caliphal period of Islamic history, al-Zuhri recorded all
his knowledge and scholarly activities. He dealt at length with the reign of
'Uthma,n and tried to give an impartial account of events. This also shows
that al-Zuhri believed in sincerity and religious duty of the historian to
record events as objective as possible. In certain cases, however, he did
not hesitate to give his own interpretation of the events which he regarded
as al-fiqh. Of course, in his lectures he must have provided abundant
personal judgment and cases of his personal interpretation. For instance,
with regard to the political leadership he noted that the Prophet nominated

l4Kashf al-'?unun, Istanbul, 2: 1747; Duri, op. cit.

15 Duri, op. cit., 8.
178
 no one as his successor, nor a successor based on hereditary nomination
was the case as it was later practiced by the Umayyads. Thus, the leader
must be elected by the Muslim community based on the possible
successor's personal merits and skills to lead the community. 16
It is clear that al-ZuHri'sperceives al-fiqh as a general science which
includes all his scholarly activities based on his rational judgn'lent. His
contribution lies in the fact that he represents the passing from the
problematic stage of discussing historical events to the development of a
scientific tradition in al-fiqh in general and in historiography in particular.
He thus belongs to the disciplinary stage of the scientific process in the
history of Islamic science. Although he is also known as a jurist, his
achievement is mainly in the field of history. He helped in developing ·
some new terminology in l:zadfth; especially his attempt to develop a new
method by which the material transinitted could be edited independently of
the various texts which agree in essentials, but are transmitted through
several authorities. Moreover, it is no doubt that through the methodology
of al-Zuhri that (ladith was on the way to become an unchallenged
authority next only to the Qur' an, in all legal, social and theological
disputes.
One of the most authoritative scholars coming from the Medinese
School of history is Muhammad ibn Isl;taq ibn Yasar, known as Ibn Isha.q.
He was born at Medina around 851709. He is another scholar that must be
mentioned in the disciplinary stage of the Islamic scientific process. We
shall, therefore, try to summarize his contributions in the emergence of a
disciplinary tradition in al~f'iqh.
Ibn Ishaq was the pupil of al-Zuhri, who stated that Ibn Isl;taq was
"the most knowledgeable of men in maghiizi". 17 He fell in disagreement
with some prominent figures of the Medinese School, such as Hisham ibn
'Urwah and Malik ibn Anas who did not recognize Ibn lsl}.aq as an
authority in legal matters, although he was well versed in legal (ladith as
well. In fact, Ibn I:Iajar refers to him as the transmitter of 17000 (ladith on

16Jbid., 10.
17Jbn Sayyid ai-Nas, 'Uyun al-Athar fi Funun al-Maghaz"i wa'l-Shama'il wa'l-Siyar
. 2 .
(Cairo, 1356), 1: 1-17, quoted by J. M. B. Jones q.v. El.
179
 leg.al decisions. 18 Finally Ibn Is}:laq settled in Baghdad where he
continued his scholarly activities until his death in 1501767. His most
important work is the Sl.rat Rasulillah (The Biography of God's
Messenger), the first historical treatment of the Prophet's life according to
the chronological sequence of events in written form. Two more works
are attributed to him; Kitab al-Khulafii' and Sunan. 19 The latter of these
works however, is not extant today. Although he was recognized as an
authority in the sfrah-maghiizl.literature, some important Traditionists did
not consider him reliable in transmitting'}:ladith. I think this important so
far as Ibn Is}:laq's career is concerned. For this consideration does not
mean that Ibn Is}:laq was not a careful scholar in collecting historical data;
on the contrary, his authority in historiography was never questioned. But
transmitting (ladt.th required different criteria, such as paying more
attention to literal text and the isniid of the (ladl.th, which was more
impor:tant for the authenticity of the (ladt.th, rather than the particular
historical events which might have been mentioned in the (lad'ith
transmitted. It is clear that as an historiographer, Ibn Isl}.aq tried more
carefully to record the historical facts. This characteristics of him
distinguishes him from the other members of the Traditionist School, who
mostly paid attention to the literal transmission of the }:ladith. As a result
of the scholarly activities of such traditionists as Ibn Is}:laq, and later his
student Ibn Hisham, history was established as an independent science
towards the beginning of the third century/lOth century A.D. Hence either
with Ibn Is}:laq and his contemporaries, such as Malik ibn Arras, or right
after him (ladl.th organizers began to flourish, e.g. al-Bukhari and
Muslim. Again great world-historians such as Waqidi, Ibn Sa'd, al-
Baladhiiri, al- Ya 'qiibi and al-Tabari came after Ibn Is}:laq. One of the most
significant aspects of civilizations is that they are concerned with their
history and more importantly such scientific civilizations perceive their
history as world-history. This is the case with the Islamic civilization, as
world-historians emerged right at the early centuries of its beginning.

18J. M. B. Jones, EP, q.v.; Ibn I:I~ar, Tahdhlb al-Tahdhib (Hyderabad, 1326), 9: 41.
19Hajji Khalifa, Kashf al~'?unun, 2: 1008.
180
 We must thus accept the contribution of the Traditionist School (al-
mul:zaddithun) for the development of the idea of history in Islam, which
eventually led to the development of a philosophy of history. The
philosophical discussions of history and historical methodology revolved
around the l:zadith literature at the beginning stages, but later these
discussions were carried around purely historical studies as well. All these
activities matured by the beginning of the second century of Islam (750's)
when there emerged a disciplinary tradition in the history of Islamic
science. The result of this was the rise of the scientific consciousness
among the Muslim scholars. This in turn m~ans that Muslim scientists
began around this time to be aware that their learning constitutes an
organized body of knowledge with a definite methodology; moreover, this
general body of knowledge knbwn hitherto al-fiqh can be classified into
proper branches according to the subject matter discussed in the respective
disciplines, each of which constitutes an independent science. We shall
now endeavor to trace the footsteps of this new development in Islamic
science.
There were at this time scholars mainly concerned with a central
problem in the legal philosophy; how to legislate law? At the beginning
this problem was not taken in the philosophical sense, but rather the
judges were concerned with how to solve certain legal problems in their
everyday court. Since within the Islamic worldview the law must be based
on a "revealed source", no one thought of deriving law rationally, i.e.
independently of the revelation. Soon' the Prophetic Tradition came to be
regarded as an authority as well, the revealed source was imme~iately
identified as the Qur'an and Sunna, i.e. the Prophetic Tradition. Thus, the
law had only two bases in Islam. But in application these two sources
were not always sufficient for deriving a legal decision. In fact, this point
is acknowledged by the Prophet in the well-known incident of Mu'adh ibn
Jabal who was appointed as the governor of Yaman. When the Prophet
asked him, as we have seen in the previous chapter, how he would
administer the law, he replied that if he did not find a basis in the Book or
in the Sunna, then he would rely on his own opinion (ra 'y). The Prophet
consented this principle of Mu'adh and praised his judgment.

L8 L
 After the Prophet, however, some jurists felt the need to develop more
effective procedure than just the personal judgment of the judge, known as
ra 'y. We must point to the relevance of issues discussed by the early
jurists and contributed not only to the development of legal thought in
Islam, but to the emergence of a science that has more of a speculative
nature, which is called Kalam in the Islamic tradition, but known as
philosophy in certain other traditions. In order to show this with concrete
evidence, we shall thus begin with the earliest schools which emerged a
few decades after the Prophet. The Medinese School of scholars are
among those who contributed to this effect.
As we have seen, the Islamic conceptual scheme of the learning
activities had already been established in Medina, which is thus to be
recognized as the most ancient school of Islamic science. Although it is,
therefore, true that as a school of law, Medinese was established first,
because of its insistence on the preference of sunna over personal
judgment (ra 'y) the speculative nature of their legal activities developed
later than the other legal schools, such as the Kufan School. 20 The most
outstanding members of the early Medinese School are usually referred to
as the seven lawyers of Medina. But the seven names usually differ; the
ones widely mentioned in these lists are; Sa'id ibn Musayyib (d. c.
90/708), 'Urwah ibn Zubayr whom we treated in the stage of problems in
the scientific process of Islamic science, Abu Bakr ibn 'Abdurra~man (d.
941712), 'Ubaydullah ibn 'Abdillah ibn 'Utbah (d. 941712 or 981716),
Kharijah ibn Zayd (d. c. 991717), Sulayman ibn Yasar (d. c. 1001718),
Qasim ibn Mu~ammad (d. 1061724). It is not so clear what ldnd of a legal
doctrine these seven lawyers developed. There are scanty information
about them. This is perhaps because at their time there exists hardly any
serious difference of opinion among the legal schools.

20 cf. Schacht's conclusion that "the development of legal theory and doctrine in
Medina was secondary to and dependent on that in Iraq", must be understood in this
sense. The Origins, 243. Otherwise, it will be mistaken to interpret it to mean that
the Medinese School was established later than the Kufan School; for our conclusion
can be attested by the mere chronology of legal events, being definitely later in Kufa
than In Medina, which became the Sf':tl of Islmn right from the beginning of Islamic
history.
182
 The most prominent name right after the seven qii{lis of the Medinese
School is al-Zuhri, whom we treated above. We have thus already
indicated his qualities as a jurist besides his brilliant career as an historian
and traditionist. Al-Shaybani makes reference to this in his statement that
"(he was) the greatest lawyer and scholar of the Medinese in his time, and
the most knowledgeable among them with regard to traditions from the
21
Prophet. "
Al-Zuhri's younger colleague, Rabi'ah ibn Abi 'Abdirral).man was
nicknamed Rabi'at al-Ra 'y. This means that among the Medinese School
some lawyers approved ra'y as method. We have already pointed out that
this scientific concept in the Islamic sense means "theory" and thus it
represents reasoning over interpretation of a textual injunction and then its
application to a particular legal case in the context of law. In later times,
however, ra'y was developedin the legal methodology and thus employed
more systematically under such concepts as qiyiis (analogy), isti(tsiin and
isti#iih (public interest). We are informed of al-Zuhri to have said that a
sound theory (al-ra'y al-(tasan) is a good piece of knowledge. 22 This
proves that the members of"the Medinese School differed in the way ra 'y
was employed in legal methodology. The school of Medina entered a new
phase with one of the most optstanding of its classical representatives,
Malik ibn Arras who transformed the school into a literary period. 23 As a
result, after him, the Medinese School was transformed into what is
known today the Maliki School.
Kitiib al-Aghiini relates that Abu 'Abdillah Malik ibn Arras (90-97-
1791708-716-796) first wanted to become a singer, but later was
convinced by his mother to study al-fiqh. He is said to have studied under
Rabi'at al-Ra'y. He studied J:tad"ith under al-Zuhri and Hisham ibn
'Urwah. The Caliph al-Mahdi consulted him on structural alterations of
the Ka'ba and, al-Rashid visited him on the way to (tajj. His magnum
opus, Kitiib al-Muwaf.ta' is regarded as the earliest surviving book on al-

21schacht, Origins, 247.

22Ahmad Hasan, Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad: Islamic
Research Center, 1986), 8.
23schacht, Origins, 248.
183
 fiqh. 24 Besides this authoritative work in Islamic law the following titles
are also listed among his works: Kitiib al-Sunan, Kitab al-Manasik,
Kitiib al-Mujiilasat, Risalah fi 'l- 'Aqdiyyah, Risalah fi 'l-Fatwa ',
Tafsir (of the Qur'an), Risalahfi'l-Qadar wa 'l-Radd 'ala 'l-Qadariyyah,
Kitab al-Nujum and Kitab al-Sirr.
Malik's contribution to Islamic science can be summed up in his
definition of the term Sunna upon which alone ra 'y could be based. He
summarizes this view as "the sunna is proof enough, but one also wants
to know the reason". 25 It seems clear enough that Malik's use of the
concept 'sunna' includes both the Prophetic, as well as the current
practices of the Muslim community. Sometimes the current practices of the
community in Medina is referred to as <amal, which is sometimes given
precedence over the Prophetic Tradition, or the general practice of the
companions. 26 But it was made clear by Malik that the practice meant only
the general practice of Medina (al- 'amal al-Madani). For the Medinese
practice does not simply reflect the actual custom, but rather embodies a
theoretical framework which can be used in legal doctrine. Hence, the
practice needs a definition and indeed an identification by the Muslim
scholars so that it can constitute a foundation for the law. Therefore, the
concept of ijmii' (consensus) also plays an important role in Malik's
thought, since he quite frequently uses his concept of 'amal in conjunction
with the same concept, al- 'amal al-mujtama' 'alayh 'indana; (our
general agreed practice). But this concept does not find its sophisticated
definition in Malik's thought. He rather takes it to be merely a practice
against which no objection is raised on textual grounds.
Considering Malik's Mur,wz.~ta', we can say that it is the first attempt
perhaps to establish a system from the legal standpoint. This is very
impmtant for us, if we consider our definition of science as "an organized
systematic body of knowledge". It thus represents the attempt to formulate
an Islamic system of science; although not speculative in the sense as this
term is used in philosophy. It is rather a system geared to provide

24schacht, E/2 , q.v.

25schacht, Origins, 31 I.
26Jbid., 63-65.

184
 theoretical principles, that are legal, moral, social, and educational at once,
for the Muslims to use as guide in their daily lives. It is clear that through
the works of such scholars Islamic science entered the third phase of its
scientific process; the nanling stage which has its own peculiarities. We
shall now discuss how this took place in the early history of Islamic
science.
We shall examine in this respect the Meccan School of scholars who
are also significant in the developm~nt of the disciplinary stage in the
scientific process of Islamic science. Ibn 'Abbas is cited as the founder of
this School. One must acknowledge, therefore, that it is through the
scholarly activities of Ibn 'Abb~s and his students that a legal scientific
tradition gradually developed until around the beginning of the second
century, whenfiqh was about to emerge as an independent science within
the general body of al~fiqh, the early mother Islamic science. The first
representative scholar of the Meccan School is known as 'Ata' ibn Abi
Rabal;l who was born in Y aman around 26/646 but brought up in Mecca,
where he died in 114 or 1151732-733. He is known for his use of ra'y.
He is also known for his application of qiyas and istiftsan
(approbation). On the basis of this, we can say thatfiqh was on the way
to enter into the stage of more technically legal problems at the time of
'AHi'. Abu I:Ianifa states that he attended the lectures of 'Ata' in Mecca,
which shows that the Meccah School continued its tradition of formal
instruction in Islamic sciences that actually began with the School of !;)uffa
during the Prophet and became more technical with the scholarly activities
of Ibn 'Abbas. We may conclude from this that 'Ata' is the first legal
philosopher in.the school of Mecca to raise issues of speculative nature.
There seems to be some reports that 'Ata' was against ra'y, i.e.
speculative discussion concerning the bases of law .. But the evidence of
the historical data, as Schacht also points out, 27 overwhelmingly shows
that he not only approved ra 'y and other rational methods in his
jurisprudence, but actually applied them in his decision as well. 'Ata' was
also a well-known schol~r for his contributions in ftadUh literature. It is,
in the first place, related that he took J:tadith from the well-known

27Ibid., 25 I.
185
 Companions, including 'Ali ibn Abi 'falib: 28 He also encouraged his
students to transcribe f:tadith. 29 Al-Bukhari states that he wrote down
f:tadith and sent out to Yazid ibn Abi I:Iabib (c: 53-128/672-745) who is
known as a reliable transmitter. 30
After 'Ata"s death the Meccan School was weakened and the
scholarly tradition did not continue; as a result it was gradually absorbed
by other schools and especially by the school of Kufa, because many of
his students went to Kufa, some to Basra and other parts of the Muslim
world. Those who went to Kufa predominated the Islamic legal thought,
just as the Medinese School and al-Shafi 'I's School. The Meccan and
Basrian Schools of law gradually disappeared, until eventually they were
completely absorbed by other schools. But the school of Basra, though
lost its significance in law, became the center of speculative thought in
Islam. As we shall see, the most philosophically-minded early thinkers
came from Basra, including the early Mu 'tazilites.
The School of Kiifa is another major scholarly gathering that
contributes to the emergence of the disciplinary stage in the scientific
process of Islamic science. Scholarship in Kufa began when some of the
Companions settled there, after it was founded by Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas in
17/638 as a military camp. When Kiifa grew into a city 'Umar ibn al-
Khagab appointed its first governor in 22/642. According to the
traditional reports, around this time, or probably even before ·a governor
was appointed there, the first qa(li of Kiifa was also appointed by 'Umar;
this qa(li is said to be Shurayl:l who held the judgeship for over a sixty
years of time until his .death between 76-99/695-717. According to
Schacht, Shurayl:l was actually a f:takam "of the old style among the Arab
tribes in the neighborhood of Kiifa ... and his legendary figure reflects the
31
transition from the old to the new form of administration of justice. " It
seems that Schacht's view is correct, especially considering our theory for
the emergence of a body of knowledge as a science. But Shurayl:l's time

28Azami, Op. cit., 48.

29Ibid., 80.
30$ai:L"if:z, Kittib al-Buyu', 112.
31 Schacht, Introduction, 24.
18()
 corresponds to the stage of problems in the process of the emergence of
fiqh as an independent science. On the other hand, he lived a very long
life, and according to what we reached in our previous discussion
concerning again the development of legal thought into a unified science,
the second stage, which we called "the rise of a disciplinary tradition" in
the legal thought began around 700's, which means that Shurayl). actually
continued his legal activities, whether as a judge or as a J:takam, until
about the beginning of this stage. Since at this time many legal
terminology already developed, most probably the reference to Shurayl).
must include some of this terminology, such as the usage of the terms
qar;fi (cf. /:takam), qiyas, isti/:tsan, and some other fatwas of his career
reflect this terminology. In fact, we do have such reports, although some
of them cannot exactly be verified, yet some of them can at least logically
be ascertained merely on the basis of our theory concerning the scientific
process. Hence, Shurayl). must have started his legal career, perhaps as a
J:takam, which may be authorized by 'Umar himself, and later on came to
be called qat;li, which is a later title given to him.
On the basis of this analysis, it is possible to assert that in the Kufan
School, the legal thought, or at least organized legal activities began with
Shurayl).. But it further developed when some companions moved to
Kufa. These companions are Jall).a, al-Zubayr, Abu Mus a al- 'Ash 'ari,
'~bdullah ibn Mas'iid and 'All ibn Abi Talib, all of whom either lived for
a considerable number of years in Kufa or settled down there, which
means that they stayed in Kufa long enough to contribute to the
development of scholarly· activities there. As a result, among these
personalities, especially 'Abdullah ibn Mas 'lid and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib came
to be recognized at least in legal matters as leading authorities. It is for this
· reason that they are regarded as the tutelary founder of the Kufan School.
Ibn Mas'ud (d. 32/652) was actually an authority in many scholarly
activities, such as J:zadith, tafsir which was beginning to take a more
definite character of a discipline, history and law. He had a group of
disciples among whom Shurayl). is also counted. But among the study
circle of Ibn Mas'iid by far the most authoritative thinker of the Kufan
School of law is Ibrahim Nakha'i, who is also the main transmitter of
legal/:tadith from him. Nakha'I was born in c. 50/670 at Kiifa and died c.

187
 561717. As a jurisconsult he was the main figure of the Kufan School and
perhaps the first thinker who tried to defend the use of ra 'y as a legal
methodology on the basis of sunna, but with rational arguments. In this
way a new wave of legal thought began at Kiifa, and influenced all other
schools of thought mainly through Nakha'i's competent pupils like
I:Iammad ibn Abi Sulayman.
I:Iammad was born around 60/679. He studied al-fiqh and (tadith
under competent scholars in Kiifa and soon became an authority drawing
a good number of brilliant students to his circle. Abu I:Ianifa also comes
from this circle. When his master died in 120/737-8 there was already a
considerable amount of technical legal thought available for Abu I:Ianifa to
develop a disciplinary tradition in al-fiqh. The qiir;li of Kufa at this time
was Mu:Qammad ibn 'Abd al-Ra:Qman ibn Abi Layla (74-148/ 693-765)
whose contributions for this effect must also l?e mentioned~ Ibn Abi Layla
studied law under Abu 'Amr 'Amir ibn Sharahil ibn 'Amr al-Sha'bi (d.
100/728) and 'Ata' ibn Abi Raba:Q of the Meccan School. Ibn Abi Lay Hi
opposed some ideas of Abft I:Ianifa, but still continued to use the Kufan
method of ra 'y in basing his judgments. He is said to have written a Kitiib
al-Fariiid. Thus the legal thought in the School of Kufa passed to the
second stage when a dis<?iplinary tradition began to emerge gradually
around the beginning of the 8th century, i.e. the end of the first century of
Islam., through the accumulation of a considerable amount of technical
legal thought by the competent Kufan Scholars such as Ibn Mas'ftd,
Shurayl;t, Nakha'i, I:Iammad, al-Sha'b1 and Ibn Abi Layla. This
development culminated in the thought of Abft I:Ianifa with whom a
specific legal disciplinary tradition emerged. Abu I:Ianifa offers a
sophisticated degree of reasoning in legal thought and offers not only a
creed, a sign of speculative thinking also, but a well-formulated body of
theological ideas as well. He had competent students such as Abu Yiisuf
and al-ShaybanL
Abu Yiisuf Ya'qub ibn Ibrahim, born in 1131731, mainly studied
under Abu I:Ianifa, but also went to Medina to receive instructions of
Malik ibn Anas and al-Layth ibn Sa'd as well. Then, he was appointed as
the qarji of Baghdad, when he lived and exercised his legal knowledge
there until his death in 1821798. Harlin al-Rashid granted him with title of
l8R
 qtit;l"i al-qu9-at, which shows, his prominence not only in legal thought,
but in practice as well. He wrote many books, primarily in Islamic law:
Kittib al-fliyal (The Book of Legal Devices), Kitab al-Khartij which is
written upon the request of Harfm al-Rashid, Kitab al-Athtir (a
collection of legal l)adith, mainly used by the Kufan School), Kittib
Ikhtiltif Ab'i flanifa wa Ibn Abt Laylti, and Kitab al-Radd 'alii Siyar al-
Awzti 'f. His most important disciple was al-Shaybani who also studied
under Abu I:Ianifa.
Abu Yusuf primarily followed Abu I:Ianifa, but in some minor details
he diverged from him; for instance in assigning more prominenc~ to
/:tadith than his master, considering Shafi 'I's method Abu Yusuf's attitude
can be interpreted as representing the usual course of the legal thought in
his time. His main contribution is his consolidation and systematizing of
Abu I:Ianifa' s thought and as a result the gradual replacement of the Kufan
School by, or may be its transformation into, the school of I:Ianafi. In this
process another prominent role is assigned to Abu 'Abdullah Mul)ammad
ibn al-I:Iasan ibn Farqad al-Shaybani who was born at Wa1?it in 1321749-
50, but brought up in Kufa. At the early age of fourteen he was accepted
by Abu I:Ianifa as a pupil. When he was twenty years old, he was
allowed to lecture at the mosque of Kufa. After Abu I:Ianifa's death, he
also studied under Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Awza'I, Imam Malik and Abu
Yusuf. Therefore, he received his legal training mainly in the School of
Kufa, but in l)adith he followed the teachings of al-Thawri and Imam
Malik. He was close to the Mmji 'a in his theological doctrines, which is
the influence of Abu I:Ianifa. During the reign of Harlin al-Rashid, he
served as his qa9-f first at al-Raqqa, then at Khurasan, where he died
while still holding this office in 189/805. Imam Shafi 'i is said to have
studied under him.
Like all the members of the Kufan School, al-Shaybani also used
ra 'y, although he was milder than some of the others. He was also
known for his knowledge of grammar. Through his works, Abu I:Ianifa's
doctrines became the official tendency of the Kufan School which was
then referred under the master's name: al-flanafiyya. Some of his major
books are: Kitab al-A{dji'l-Furu' (known as al-Mab~ut), Kittib al-Jtimi'
al-Kabir, Kittib al-Jtimi' al~Saghlr, Kitiib al-Siyar al-Kabir and Kitdb

189
al-Athar. It is also through his efforts and critical edition of al-Muwa!,ta'
that our knowledge of his J:zadi.th master Malik ibn Anas is secured.
It is possible to take al-Shaybani as the last thinker in the stage of the
disciplinary tradition which came into existence already with Abu I:Iani:fa's
thought. Shafi 'i and his time, therefore, can be taken as the starting point
for the beginning of the naming stage in the scientific process of the
comprehensive Islamic science, al-fiqh.

3. The Emergence of the Stage of Naming in al-Fiqh

( 1 OO's/750's)
It is possible that we may assume this stage to be taking a very short time
and thus its exact date can be settled with accuracy if the historical data is
sufficiently available. This is, on the contrary, not the case with regard to
al-fiqh because for the definite names and independence of individual
sciences we must review a century of scholarly activities beginning from
the time of al-Shafi 'i onwards, namely, between approximately the
beginning· and the end of the second century of Islam (7SO's-8SO's). In
order to show this and the independent emergence of sciences out of al-
fiqh, we must examine the scholarly activities between these years in very
brief treatment, otherwise we may end up writing the early history of
Islamic scientific tradition. Therefore, as we have done in the earlier cases,
we shall take up just exemplary ~ases.
First of all, the first science that is formed independently, as our above
treatment shows is fiqh, of course in this sense, it no longer means the
mother science al-fiqh. Hence, the first science that came to be named as
an individual discipline is jurisprudence, which must have occurred
aro~nd 750's. This can be ascertained from the works of the prominent
members of the Kufan School, as cited. above. In these works it is dear
that the termfiqh is no longer maintained in its original sense. It is rather
used for legal disciplinary studies which not only included at this stage
jurisprudence, but also ethics, politics and theological studies. But as we
shall see below when kallim came to emerge as a rival discipline it took
over some subjects from the subject matter ofjiqh and established itself as
a broader science discussing all speculative problems of Islamic science.
There are events that contribute to this development, the major one being

l90
the political upheavals which led to more rigorous speculative and
theological discussions. Another factor is the onslaught of a new wave of
thought into the mainstream of Islamic science, primarily the Hellenistic
thought.
In grammar, for example, each school developed a different tendency:
the School of KUfa tried to use the Qur' an and the sayings of some Arabic
speaking ancients to elicit or support a grammatical rule. But the members
of the Basran School resorted to logical arguments or even to. certain
philosophical principles. As this attitude of the Basran School continued
with the introduction of the Aristotelian logic; they began introducing
elements of Greek logic as well at later stages. 32 Other sciences as well
began to take a more definite shape after this stage. We shall now attempt
to give as an example only kaliim for its special relation to philosophy and
then in a general way discuss the course of other sciences.

B. KAlAM ·

The definition of kaliim, according to the later mutakallimun, is "the

science which is concerned with firmly establishing religious beliefs by
adducing proofs and with banishing doubts." 33 However, earlier al-Hirabi
defines it as "a science which enables a man to procure the victory of the
I

creed and actions laid down by the Legislator of the religion, and to refute
34
all opinions contradicting them." If, however, we consider the subjects
discussed in kaliim, we find that it mainly discusses system-related
questions. Therefore, although there is no systematic system constructed
by way of the mutakallimun, it is possible to argue that most kaliim
schools do have a system of their own. The Ash' arite, the Maturidite and
the Mu 'tazilite kaliim all correspond to a system in the philosophical
sense. This lead us to conclude that none of the traditional or classical
definitions of kaliim is satisfactory. Kaliim, according to its historical

32See Fadlou Shehadl, Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy (Delmar, New York:

Caravan Books, 1982), 22.
33see, for example, ai-Ijl's Mawiiq(f: written in the 19th. century/sth.century A.H.
34See his Il;z~a· al-'Uliim, ed. 'Othman Amin (Mi~?r: Ma~ba'at ai-I'timad, 1949), 107-8.
191
subject matter, is the study of systems or system-related problems, but
only within the Islamic context. Thus, we can conclude that kaliim is
philosophy peculiar to the worldview of Islam which is its general
framework; and as such it deserves the name 'Islamic philosophy' more
than any other disciplines. Of course its subjects and problems gradually
developed throughout the first three centuries of Islam and thus underwent
the influence of Greek philosophy. Another evidence for the correctness
of our definition is the fact that it underwent the Greek philosophical
influence more than any other branch of learning within the Islamic
science. Since kalam was the philosophical discipline in the Islamic sense,
this was natural, as the Muslim mutakallimun would be interested in the
idea of their colleagues in other civilizations. We conclude from this that
kaliim is the Islamic term for 'philosophy', not 'l:tikmah ', which is the
Arabic term for the Greek 'sophia'.
Under the considerations our survey of the process for the emergence
of kalam as a science is, in a way, an investigation into how philosophy
originated in Islam. We shall try to do this according to the scientific
process that took place within the general body of Islamic scholarly
activities.

1. The Stage of Problems (c. 0-100 A.H./610-700's A.D.)

Since, according to our explanation of 'doing science', the. first
framework within which a scholar works is his world view, the general
framework of scientific activities, we must first specify that the worldview
which provided this framework for the earliest scholars to do kaliim was
the worldview of Islam. We have already pointed out that the Islamic
worldview was established in the Meccan period of Islam and thus began
to provide the most general framework for all the scientific activities
developed in Islamic civilization. It is the same worldview that is most
relevant in the case of kaliim, because it is the science which is concerned
with the subject, as it is intimately connected with worldview. Therefore,
kalam finds much of its subject matter witQ.in the Islamic worldview as its
broadest framework; such as tawftid, prophethood, akhirah, din, man
and his destiny, cosmological issues, causality and so on. All of these
issues are taken from the Revelation and systematically organized into an

192
 architectonic whole in the minds of the early Muslims with the aid of the
Prophet.
In the first place, Muslims were familiar with discussing kalcl.m-
related issues, such as God's existence, the nature of prophethood, human
destiny, the structure of the universe, the status of knowledge, ignorance,
belief and unbelief, the status of a ruler and so on. Hence, the stage of
problems for kalam began with the advent of Islam. Of course, as it is the
case with all other disciplines, these earliest discussions may not have a
scientific character. Since we date the Medinan period as the time for the
construction of an Islamic scientific conceptual scheme, we would like to
claim that later in this period those kalam-related problems must have
begun to acquire a scientific character, which gradually brought these
discussion into a disciplinary tradition, which is the second stage in the
process for the emergence of a science.
In the second place, in Medina, since the Prophet was alive· as an
authority, in the early stage of kalam·problems Muslims were not divided
into camps, i.e., schools. As a result, it easily escapes our notice. But
even with the death of our Prophet, one of the kalarn-problems already
catches our notice; how to choose the next ruler, i.e. the problem of the
political leader. But it is mainly 'Ali-Mu 'awiyah controversy which
divided Muslims for the fist time into political camps; and then into kaliim
schools, as each camp tried to justify their political position from the
perspective of religion, i.e. the Islamic worldview, which is also 'the
broadest framework for all Islamic scientific activities.
In the development of kalam as a science, the stage of problems was,
therefore, mainly articulated by the Prophet and the Companions in the
first place; and then by the political groups which emerged as a result of
political controversies after the Prophet and then turned into schools of
thought. When those early groups thus turned into schools of thought,
they began to have major representatives who are known to us today
mainly through secondary works, not through their own works which are
either destroyed later, or lost because no one was interested in the
simplicity of their ideas to preserve them. Kharijites had, for example,
Abdullah ibn Yazid and al-Yaman ibn Rabab (both lived around 20-100
A.H./the first half of the 8th century). Ibn al-Nadim says that both of

193
 these scholars composed treatises on tawJ:tid and refutations of the
Mu 'tazilite theory of free will. 35 Since Kharijites lost their significance in
later developments, they did not produce any thinker of significance.
Therefore, their relevance to us in this study lies in the fact that they led to
the rise of some new issues to be added to the ones already developed in
the early Islamic world view.
The two Khariji movements, Azraqites (Azariqa), established by Nafi
ibn al-Azraq and the Najdites (Najdiyyah) who supported Abdullah ibn al-
Zubayr in Mecca, but later returned to their native region, Najd, from
which their name derives, led to some theological debates: Azraqites.
argued against the followers of 'Ali that "the decision belongs to God
alone" (la J:tukma ilia Zillah). Hence, any matter must be settled in
accordance with the Qut'an only. On the basis of this they argued that a
gra:ve sinner belongs to the people of hell, which is clearly stated in the
Qur'an. 'Uthman is a grave sinner, because he did not punish the wrong-
doers as prescribed in the Qur' an. 36 Azraqites further argued that even the
existing authorities had also sinned; hence those who did not join them in
fighting against the existing authorities were sinners. A sinner is no longer
a Muslim, hence he can be killed and his wealth confiscated.
The Najdites held similar views as Azraqites, except they were not so
radical. They said that a sinner is a hypocrite (muniifiq) not an unbeliever
(kiifir). They also for the first time entertained the view of taqiyyah. 37
Towards the beginning of the 8th century more Khariji movements
emerged. Among them Waqifites (Waqlfiyya), i.e. those who suspend
judgment, are important in that they led to the rise of another school,
Mmji 'ite. They claimed that they cannot judge a wrongdoer as to whether
he goes to hell or not. But we must punish ~im, though in such matter we
must suspend judgment. In order to show how early kaliim problems
arose, We must enter into a detailed account of these controversies.
The supporters of 'Ali claimed that they support him because a man
like him would not commit any mistakes. But. those who opposed this

3 5Al-Fihrist, 182.
36M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and theology (Edinburgh: At The University Press,
1987), 8.
37Ibid., 9.
194
 group claimed that not only 'Ali can commit mistakes, but he has actually
committed one already, because he does not openly profess his support
for those who killed 'Uthman. According to this group, 'Uthman had
already sinned, because he had not punished a prominent member of his
administration for his crime. This second group who opposed the 'Ali
supporters came to be called 'Kharijites' (Secessors) around 36/657,
because they seceded first from 'Ali as they were with him in the war
against Mu'awiyah, and then from Mu'awiyah as well in the event of the
Arbitration.
Jabir ibn Zayd (d. c. 100 AH./720) was an early Basra Iba<;II leader
who corresponded with Salim ibn Dhakwan. 38 Abdullah ibn lba<;l was the
founder of the lba<;II branch of Kharijites, which was closest to the ahl al-
Sunna among the Kharijites. He wrote two letters to the caliph Abd al-
Malik.39
We must not consider these simple theological speculations apart from
the process of f~qh to emerge as a science. If all the activities geared to
scientific speculation are evaluated as a whole, we see that political
upheavals give another direction to these activities. As we have alteady
established, two frameworks necessary for such scientific activities had
already been founded; one of the frameworks is the Islamic worldview
(established in Mecca, 610-622); .and the other is the general Islamic
scient(fic conceptual scheme, established in Medina and afterward.\~
roughly from the beginning of the first century until its end (622-
720 's ). Both frameworks had already acquired a considerable
sophistication until these controversies began to arise. The first one was at
the time of 'Uthman, when there was an uprising against his
administrative policies. The second controversy was the 'Ali-' Aisha
conflict. The third conflict that occurred between 'Ali and Mu'awiyah as a

38For the details of this see Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma: A Source-Critical
Study (Cambridge: University Press; I 981 ), 3. Unfortunately, the conclusions of this
book are not realiable as the texts are taken in isolation from the frameworks
developed in this essay; for mm'e historical information on this see A. K. Ennami,
"A Description of New Ibadi·Manuscripts ti-om North Africa", JSS 15 ( 1970).
39Both of these letters are in Kasllf atcGhummah of Sirhan ibn 'Umar ibn Sa'ld in the
Ms. British Museum, (Or. 8076); first, tf. 1996-2066; and the second letter ff. 2066-
2122. See Ibid also.
195
 result led for the first time to fractions and as a result more sp~culative
argumentation was needed to support each group's political and legal
stand. But after 'Ali's death, more tragic events took place in the case of
his son al-I:Iusayn; as a result of which the 'Ali supporters also withdrew
themselves, in the development of controversies, from both the Kharijites
and the rest of the Muslims. Thus emerged a second political group in
Islam, which came to be known as Shi 'ites.4° Therefore, although some
group· of people were beginning to identify themselves as Shi 'ites soon
after 'Ali's death in 661, I believe that the attribution of the term Shi' a to
this group of people is only a habit of the later sources; during the time
when these sources were written the term Shi 'a had already acquired a
wide usage. In the earlier texts reference is made to Shi'a, by the epithet
Sab'iyyah. 41
Both the Kharijites and the Shi 'i~es, as a result of their orientation,
which was political in essence, made continuous revolts against the first
dynasty in Islam, the Umayyads. It is possible to include the Umayyads
also as another faction in these developments, for, as we shall see, they
also tried to give some arguments to justify themselves. 42 This is clear
from the following report that two early events occasioned the discussion
concerning the problem of qadar (divine predestination): 1. Mu 'awiyah
tried to justify himself that he used force by the decree of the qadar; 2.
when Yazid (Mu 'awiyah' s son) sieved Mecca in 64/683 the Ka 'ba caught
fire, he also seems to have defended himself by a recourse to the idea of
qadar. 43 The moderate Qadariyya formulated their position as follows:

4 0There was a small group of the Companions who supported 'Ali's succession after
the Prophet; this group is actually identified as the Shi 'at 'Ali, i.e., the party of 'Ali.
But it is not clear if this group actually attributed the name Shi 'a to themselves.
According to the Shi 'a sources Shi 'a existed even during the lifetime of the Prophet
(see al-Nawbakhti, Firaq, 23). This is of course too far-fetched. At least so far as it
concerns us here, Shi 'a becomes important only with al-I:Iusayn as a speculative
movement, i. e., c. 680.
41 See al-Dhahabf, Tiirlkh al-lslclm, 3: 559, 80, reference from J. VanEss "Das Kitab
al-lrja' Des Hasan b. Muhammad ai-I:Ianafiyya", Arabica, XXI, 1974, p. 23, n. 7 in
which the sam.e word, i.e. Sab'iyya occurs on p. 24, para 8. For further details see Efl
q.v. Abdullah ibn Saba'. ·
42 For instance see al-Tabari's report in his Ttirlkh, ed. by de Goeje (Leyden, 1873-
1901), 11: 1733.

196
 God wills only good; evil stems from men or from iblls. Man chooses
freely between the two but God knows from all eternity what man will
choose (qadar). So, God would lead man astray if man gives an occasion
to Him by committing sin.
Qadariyyah can be ta.ken as the first philosophical movement that
appeared in Islam, (c. 71/690's). The main representative and even
sometimes counted among its founders is Ma'bad al-Juhani (d. 84/703).
The Umayyads argued for the Absolute Will of God to defend themselves
against such scholars, thereby nullifying human freedom, a position
which was defended later by another school known as Jabriyyah.
Qadariyya, however, argued to defend human freedom in a rather
awkward way by not ascribing evil to God. For them, God creates only
good; it is, therefore, man who is responsible for evil. But God knows
from eternity what man will choose. This pre-knowledge is not a
determinant in man's action, which can be only an occasion for God
leading him into error. Some of the Qadarite theses were gradually
consolidated in the teachings of another school of thought known as
Mu 'tazila, which began to emerge soon after the rise of these schools
mentioned thus far (80's/700's). Most of these pre-scientific activities
were later summarized in the books of refutations, such as Kitdb al-Radd
'ala'l-Qadariyyah, by 'Arnr ibn 'Ubayd (d.l43 or 4/760 or 1) who was a
disciple of I:Iasan al-Ba~ri, but later joined Wasil.
Caliph 'Umar ibn Abd al-'Aziz who reigned (88-1011717-730) also
wrote an anti-Qadarite epistle. 44 In fact, he can be counted among the
scholars who contributed to the stage of problems in the scientific process
which eventually led to the rise of kaldm as an independent science. His
position can be summed up in the following statement: God knows that
one will commit sin, although he is still able to refrain from that sin.
Therefore, God's knowledge has only the function of "recording" (/:1-iifi'{.),

43sfrat f:lalabiyyah (C~~iro, 1382/1962), I: 185, 15.

44Published in flilyat al-Awliyit' by Abu Nu'aym, ed. M.A. al-Khanji (Cairo, 1332-
8) in vol. 5: 346-53. Then re-edited by J. van Ess in Anfan.ge muslimischer
Theologie, (Beirut, 1977), 43-54. He also wrote some other epistles printed in Slrat
'Umar ibn 'Abd al- 'Azlz, ed. A. 'Ubayd, (Beirut, 1967).
197
 not that of effecting the action of the sinner. It is, therefore, left to man's
own discretion to do good or evil.
Since the Qadarite movement did not continue, although its view
concerning human freedom vis-d-vis God's pre-knowledge of the act is
defended in one form or another by othet schools of thought, it did not
develop into a living speculative school, just like the Kharijite movement.
But its theory of free will and predestination opened new horizons to the
development of kaliim as a science in Islam.
We have already indicated that Khadjites came to be a political group
out of the 'Ali-Mu'awiyah controversy. When Mu'awiyah proposed 'Ali.
to settle their differences through arbitrators, a group of people opposed
this on the ground that human tribunal is set above the divine decision.
They thus protested this proudly by shouting "judgment belongs to God
alone" (la f:tukma ilia Li.llah). This later came to be known as taf:tkim; i.e.
testifying God's decision; as a result, th~ KharWtes are also called al-
Muf:takkimah, i.e. the party that testifies only God's decision. This way
the first political group in Islam came into existence, the KhtirUites
(37/657). As they tried to justify themselves, the group gradually became
a school of thought. But since it extinguished even as a political group at a
very early date (c. 700's), the Kharijites school did not continue to
become a significant school of thought, only the IbaQ.iyya branch, which
is a milder Kharijites movement continued to live until our time; as but
even this as a religious sect with its own theology,fiqh and creed.
The Kharijites did not have a uniform thought. Hence they defended
their political position by discrete ideas developed by various individual
thinkers who concentrated on the application of these ideas rather than
defending them militarily. Since there are many branches of the Kharijites,
it is ·hard to discuss their doctrines in ·a general manner. We shall,
however, concentrate on the doctrines of the earliest Kh~rijites until the
end of the first century of Islam. This is in fact the period that concerns us
here; for the Kharijites doctrines are among those factors that led to the
emergence of more speculative thought. The following doctrines without
their details comprise the basic doctrines of the Kharijites thought: it is an
obligation (fan;/-) for every believer Muslim to proclaim illegitimate and
therefore try to depose the leader (imam) who has gone astray; every

198
 Muslim who is religiously and morally good (taqwa), is eligible to
become imam by the vote of the community; no faith is valid without the
life carried out in accordance with that faith. Hence, zman is not valid
without deeds. If a Muslim commits a grave sin, he at once becomes
murtadd (apostate); all non-Kharijite Muslims are murtadd. The isti 'rae,!
(religious capital punishment in their terminology) must be applied to all
murtadd, who can never re-enter the faith even with tawbah. A murtadd
is killed along with his family, wives and children; purity of conscience
and mental cleanliness is a prerogative condition for the cleanliness of the
body, which is required for the 'ibiidah, such as ~alah and fasting.
Hence, no ~alah or other forms of the 'ibiidah are valid without the
mental and bodily purity.
Around 76/695 perhaps first by I:Iasan ibn Mu~ammad ibn al-
I:Ianafiyyah, the grandson of 'Ali, the idea of irja' was introduced. Ibn al-
Hanafiya argued in his Kitab al-Irjii' that Abu Bakr and 'Umar's
caliphate can be approved, but postpone ( arja ') the decision concerning
those who involved in civil wars, i.e. 'Uthman and 'Ali. 45 Ibn al-
I:Ianafiyyah is a significant scholar in this respect because his approach is
systematic and speculative which is a mark of kalam. It is at this stage that
we see the emergence of a disciplinary tradition in kalam. The
publications of such books helped in this respect to fasten this
development.
Shi 'ites, on the other hand, were divided into further branches as their
political orientation developed according to the imams they followed. The
Imami, Zaydi and Isma 'III branches established themselves quite early as
well-defined movements by the revolt of Zayd ibn 'Ali, 1221740. The
chief representatives of the early Shi 'a who contributed to the development
of the stage of problem<; in the scientific process of kaliim are Mu~ammad
ibn al-Nu'man (known as Shaytan al-Taq), Zurarah ibn A'yan (d. 150/
767), Hisham ibn al-I:Iakam (d. 179/795-6), Hisham ibn Salim al-
Jawaliqi, and 'Ali ibn Isma'Il al-Mithani al-Tammar, who is identified as
the first imiim"i mutakallim by Ibn al-Nadim.46 The Zaydi branch, on the

45see J. van Ess, op. cit., 20-52.

46At-Fihrist, 175.
199
 other hand, was represented in kaltim at this time mainly by Sulayman ibn
Jarir (d. c.1771793) who is said to have been in the circles of Ja'far al-$
adiq (d. 1481765), who himself contributed to the development of kalc"im
as Islamic philosophy leading to the rise of a disciplinary tradition.
The main problems that were discussed at this stage are human
freedom, God's knowledge and its scope, the relationship between God's
pre-knowledge ( qadar) and human action, whether as such it has room for
free choice (ikhtiyiir), the nature of belief, the relationship between, belief
and action, the status of a grave sinnet and the qualities of a ruler.
Considering our approach, which does not distinguish at this stage the
activities involving these philosophical problems and the legal problems
discussed previously, it is possible to regard all these scientific activities
as leading to the rise of a sophisticated speculative tradition in Islam. But
as problems discussed accumulated, early scholars realized the difference
of terminology and method between these existing body of problems.
These problems that have more of a speculative character, and thus today
they can be classified as philosophical, were beginning to draw nearer to a
technical term under which the discussions began to take place, kaliim.
The earliest reference can be taken from I:Jasan al-Ba::;ri's (d. 728) letter in
which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, he states that "we initiated
the speculative study, i.e. kaliim, of qadar; just as people initiated the
denial of it." 47
It is evident that kaliim meant "speculative discourse on certain
problems". These certain problems were not confused with other
problems discussed, e.g., in.fiqh. No one would say like ibn al-Nadim's
above quoted passage; for the problems related in these subjects are
discussed in fiqh, not in kaliim discussions. In this way through either
written or oral tradition, philosophical problems discussed within the
framework of the Islamic worldview and scientific conceptual scheme,
began to acquire a definitive character, centered around the term kaltim,
which acquired an implicit technical definition thanks to the works of these
early scholars.

4 7Julian Obermann, "Political Theology in Early Islam", Journal of the American

Oriental Society, 55 (1935), 145. Arabic Text, Helmut Ritter. "Studien zur
Islamischen Fromigkeit I: Hasan ai-Basrl", Det Islam, 21 (1933), 68, lines 10-11.
200
 Al-I:Iasan argued that the judgment about the right and wrong in this
conflict should be deferred to God, and Muslims should abstain from
declaring either solidarity with them or dissociation from them. He then
composed an open letter on his doctrine of irja' and had it read in public.
Although some doubt has been cast on the role of al-I:Iasan and the
authenticity of the Kitab al-Irja' attributed to him, there are no cogent
reasons to reject them. The earliest Murji 'ite doctrine, as reflected in
particular in the Kitab al-Irja' attributed to al-I:Iasan ibn al-I:Ianafiyyah
and in the Ibac;ll anti-Murji'ite polemics of the Sirat Salim, affirmed
unconditional solidarity with Abii Bakr and 'Umar and suspension of
judgment with respect to 'Uthman and 'Ali. Suspension on judgment was
obligatmy in regard to the past which could no longer be witnessed. They
held that Muslims would not lose their status of believers by any actions,
but they were prepared to condemn wrongdoers as aberrant believers
(mu 'minim (i.ullal) who might ultimately be punished or forgiven by
God. The identification of faith with true belief to the exclusion of acts,
which later became the essential trait of irja ', was clearly implied, though
not central, in the earliest Murji 'ite teaching.
In his Risalah ila 'Uthman. al-Bat{i, Abii I:Ianifa rejected the name
Murji' a for himself, asserting that it had been given by innovators ( ahl al-
bid'ah) to those who were in fact the People of Justice ('adl) and the
Sunna. The term 'adl must be understood here as implying political justice
and reform and not the Mu 'tazili doctrine of free will. The meaning of
Mmji' a and irja' was henc~forth focused on the definition of faith as
excluding acts, a theological doctrine strongly opposed by both the Ahl
al-Sunnah and the Mu'tazila.
The Murji'a generally did not distinguish between Islam and iman
and considered all Muslims as believers except for those excluded by
Muslim consensus. Those committing forbidden acts were called sinful
believers (mu 'minun fussaq). While the Murji' <uejected the Kharijite and
Mu 'tazili doctrine of wa 'id, the unconditional punishment of the
unrepentant sinner in the hereafter, they generally admitted that God
might either punish or forgive Muslim offenders. While some held that
this punishment of Muslih1s coLilO- be eternal, others affirmed that it would

201
 be temporal and that all would eventually enter paradise through the
intercession ( shafii 'ah) of Mul).ammad.
The theological teachings of the Murji' a, in the broad definition of the
heresiographers, primarily involved the following questions: Faith ('imiin)
was mostly defined as both knowledge (rna 'rifah) and public affirmation
(iqrar) of God, of His prophets and their message in general. Knowledge
of God was moreover often defined as including submission (khurju ') to
Him and love (maf:zabbah) of Him.
Faith was generally described as an indivisible (la yatajazza') whole
of beliefs and affirmation. Partial belief thus cduld not constitute it. On
this basis, the earlier Murji' a, including Abu I:Ianifa, generally held that
faith can neither decrease nor increase. Under the pressure of Qur'anic
passages expressly mentioning an increase of faith among Muslim
believers, the later Mmji 'a of the school of Abii I:Ianifa, the Najjariyyah,
Matiiridiyyah and others, mostly affirmed that faith can increase but not
decrease. This increase was variously explained as an additional
knowledge of details of the shar'i'ah beyond the indispensable minimum,
as an increase of conviction (yaq'in), or more broadly, of the subjective
traits (~iftit) of the believers in relation to the unchangeable essence
( dhat) of faith. Among these mentioned has been made of the fact that
Abii I:Ia·nifa wrote to 'Uthman al-BaW a letter. 48 It is on the basis of this
letter that he is accused of sharing the general views of the Murji' a though
he openly rejects the Mutji 'a. In fact, in his Fiqh Akbar be has ideas
contradicting some of the Murji'I. What is important for us is that Abii
I:Ianifa entered into discussions that can be properly classified under
kaltim. In this way he also contributed to the rise of a disciplinary tradition
in the scientific process of kalam.
Thus the stage of problems acquired a disciplinary character after the
end of the first century of Islam (730's), which can be taken as the
beginning of the second stage in the process of kaltim 's emergence as a
science. In this way the word kaltim also emerged as the b~st suitable
technical candidate to be the name of the science to be emerged, in which
all these problems were later taken as subject matter.

48 Printed by M. Z. al-Kawthari together with Kitiib at- 'A lim wa'l-Muta 'allinz and
Fiqh Absat (Cairo, 1368.
202
 2. The Rise of a Disciplinary Tradition in Kalam (730's-
800's)
Kaliim entered a new phase after the scholarly activities of the above
mentioned thinkers and their schools, and thus through a collective and a
tacit acknowledgment of all those scholars and their written or oral
discourses that the term kaliim began to acquire a technical meaning to
refer to all speculative discussions concerning the philosophical pr~blems
which arose mostly as a result ofpolitical upheavals in both second half of
Islam's first century (l.e. after 650's) and sometimes as a result of the
scholarly discussions in other disCiplines such as fiqh, tafsir, hadith and
history. This is evident in the fact that after 730's scholars began
composing treatises on the subject, thereby giving unity and method to
their discussions of these problems.
It is primarily through the scientific activities of spme prominent
scholars, like Ja 'far al-$adiq, Abu J:Ianifa and al-Shafi '1, that kalam
entered into a disciplinary stage, which was later, however, dominated
mostly ?Y the early adherents of the Mu'tazila, such as Jahm ibn ,Safwan,
Wasil ibn 'Ata', 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, Abu'l-Hudhayl Mul;mmmad al-Allaf,
Hisham ibn al-I:Iakam. Rather·than examining all of these figures here~
whose contributions had already been duly acknowledged by many
researchers of Islamic studies, we rather shall pick out only one of them,
i.e., Jahm ibn $afwan, in order to justify our stance.
Abu Mul;lriz Jahm ibn $afwan al-Tirmidhi was born in Khurasan in
the town of Tirmidh at an unknown date. There is extremely scare
information about his life. All we know is that he joined in a revolt against
the Umayyads with al-J:Iarith ibn Surayj in 116/739. This revolt was from
time to time successful, and ev.en for a few years al-I:Iarith seized the
control of eastern Khurasan. But eventually in 128/746 Jahm was
captured and executed. A few months later al-I:Iarith also shared the same
fate.
Jahm was more like the ideologue or the intellectual propagandist of
this movement. According .to al-Tabari, they demanded that the
government be administered in ·accordance with "the Book of God and the

203
Sunna of the Prophet". 49 Al;lmad ibn I:lanbal informs us that he enjoyed
dialectical argument and discourse on God and His essence. 50
He developed arguments to refute the Indian sect of Sumaniyya and
tried to prove the existence of God by arguing that although we cannot
see, hear, touch or feel God in any way similar to these sense-perception,
He does exist. Even if we cannot see, touch or feel sensually our intellect,
we still infer its existence from its functions; similarly God is also a being
that can in no way be perceived by the senses. In this way, J ahm was
perhaps led to advance a rational theology to prove the Islamic idea of
God. It seems from the accounts of the historians, e.g. al-Tabari, al-
Baghdadi, al-Nawbakhti, and even al-Ash'ari and Al;lmad ibn I:Ianbal that
Jahm believed in his ability to prove the Qur'anic conception of God
rationally. It is clear that he believed in the rationality of the Qur'anic and
the Prophetic prepositions concerning God and His essence. In order to
show this let us try to trace his ideas from the available sources.
Jahm's starting idea is said to be a distinction between God and
'things'. He argues that God cannot be a 'thing'. This idea is backed up
by certain Qur'anic verses: 39/al-Zumar, 63; 42/al-Shudi, 9; and 6/al-
An 'am, 103. Most of the early thinkers attack this speculative idea
concerning the nature of God, and as a result it was held to be a heretical
position. There are basically two reasons for this accusation, both of
which are very important:

1. Muslims knew as a result of the Islamic worldview that the

nature of God is comprehensible only as it was disclosed by the
revelation; and thus it can never be captured independently by
the intellect. Hence, all speculations are not only futile but
dangerous besides revealed idea of God, as rival ideas of God
may emerge as a result of this wild speculation.
2. Perhaps literalist thinkers would regard this statement to amount
to saying that "If God is not a thing", then He may not be said
to exist at all. For these, see the formulation of the J ahmi thesis

49AJ-Tabarl, 2: 157; cf. also 1577, 1583.

50 "K!Uib al-Radd 'ala'l-Zanadiqa wa'l-Jahmiyyah", Darul-Funun /lahiyat Faktiltesi
Mecmu 'ast, 4-6 (I 927), 315. Translations are taken with minor adaptations from R.
M. Frank, "The Neoplatonism of Gahm Ibn $afwan", Le Museon, 78 ( 1965).
204
 by AQ.mad ibn I:Ianbal as "God is an existing thing (shay'un
mawfud)." 51
But Jahm's argument to prove his point clearly shows that he is merely
trying to develop a natural idea of God, in contrast to the literal idea of
God purported by the revelation.
Things are created (mu(1dath) and it is the Creator who makes
the thing be a thing.52
Hence, things are created, but God is not; this very idea sets Him apart
from the things. Jahm is thus reported to have said:
I will not say that God is a thing, since this would be to make
Him similar to things.53
Then Jahm proceeds that God, according to al-Darimi, has no boundary
(J:tadd), no limit (ghiiyah) and no end (nihayah), for a thing is such that it
can exist only if it has these characteristics; whereas God, being not a
thing, must transcend these characteristics as well.
So far two ideas concerning the nature of God have been put forward
by Jahm: 1. God is not a thing, 2. God is limitless. Both propositions can
in fact be inferred from the Qur' an through discursive interpretation. In the
first place, Jahm himself cites some verses; secondly, simply a
philosophical expression of Allah akbar may lead to this conclusion. But
because of similarities, R. M. Frank concludes that J ahm took these ideas
from Neoplatonic sources. 54 Ibn I;Iazm also develops an exact statement
of J ahm's position:
God is not a thing, but neither is He nothing, because He is
the Creator of all things. ·Hence, there is not a thing that is not
a creature. 55
The conclusion of this rational idea of God is attributed by AQ.mad ibn
I;Ianbal to J ahm:

51Frank, 400, citing al-Baghdiidi, 129, 133.

5 2Frank, 398.
53Frank, 933, citing Maqaliit, 280.
54Frank; 400-40 I.
55At-Fa$l fi'l-Milal wa'l-A/:twiil wa'l-Nif:tal, 4: 205, cited ibid., 40 l-2.
205
 God is not described or known by any attribute or act, nor has
He any end, or limit; He is not grasped by mind ... whatever
may occur to your thought that it is a thing defining Him, He
is contrary to it.56

As we have pointed out, Jahm clearly attempts to present a rational

formulation of the Qur'anic idea of God. Once an idea is expressed
rationally, it necessarily becomes abstract, devoid of any physical
characteristic; as such a transcendent idea of God is generated. This is
what J ahm does and thereby he reaches the conclusion that God cannot
have the qualities of physical things. Since the Qur' an describes God with
some anthropomorphic attributes, it causes problems to Jahm's rational
descriptions of God, because an abstract idea of God is at once made
concrete through the attributes. He thus negates all of God's attributes; a
position which is known as ta '.fll. Jahm thus tried to defend an idea of
God devoid of attributes, while at the same time having the functions of
these attributes:
God is totally hearing, sight and knowing (sam!', ba~ar, 'ilm),
and is in His totality in every place. If He knows, He knows in
His entirety and if He hears, He hears in His entirety and if He
sees, He sees in His entirety. God's knowing is in a manner of
beholding and immediate witness, as He does not know the
thing until it is, so that He knows it in a knowing of and
through its coming to be, not In a knowing which is from
eternity present in Himself before its coming to be. On the
contrary, when He makes the thing to be, He is Himself
present to the thing and the thing itself is with Him. If He
desires the thing, He designates the thing from its place. This
is the encompassing of things by God's knowing.· Hence, there
can be no knowledge of any of them in itself prior to its
coming to be. 57

What this argument implies is that God does not know things prior to
their actual existence. But al-Ash'ari argues that this is not what Jahm

56 Rich~rd M. Frank here gives a distorted translation of Ibn I:Janbal's wording, perhaps
in order to make it parallel to the statements of Plotinus. cf. Ibn Hanbal in Dar al-
Funun llahiyat fakiiltesi, 5-6 ( 1927), 315.
57 Gosta Vitestam, Kitab al-Radd 'ala'l-Jahmiyya des Abu Sa'ld 'Uthmtin ibn Sa'id
al-Diiriml (Lund/Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), 59; Frank, op. cit., 411.
206
wants to claim. On the contrary, he claimed that God knows the thing at
the instant of its creation (/:liil f:tuduthihi); for it is impossible to know a
thing when it is non-existent. Moreover, Jahm defines a thing as an
actually existent body; hence, a non-existent can neither be said to be
knowable, nor unknowable. 58
It is clear that for Jahm ibn $afwan, God has no attributes in the actual
sense. The Qur'anic reference to God with certain names such as rabb,
khiiliq, ral:zmiin, ral:z'im and 'allm, can be allowed, because a name is
different from an attribute, which denotes an action (ji'l); whereas a name
denotes a being in terms of that action. But still a name is other than the
thing named. Therefore, we must hold that all names are also created,
including the name Allah. Before the creation of these names Allah had no
names. Hence, attributes can be identified now with God only in a very
transcendent way. A logical conclusion of this is the idea that the Qur' an is
a created discourse.
Jahm in fact argued that the Qur'an is created, for:
God has not spoken, nor will He ever speak. He merely causes
something to be, so that God is made known. He thus created
the sound of a voice and caused it to be heard. Hence, God's
speech cannot take place, except from (jawj) concavity, tongue
and lips. 59 ·
Here there is an importan~ problem as the Qur'anic verse states: kun
fa-yakun. Jahm argues that "God never said to anything at all any
°
utterance or word be after which it comes to be". 6 For God's creation
follows upon His Power (qudrah) which is also created. Thus, argues
J ahm, "God has no power until He has created for Himself an act of
61
power". In the same way, God's knowledge is also created. Hence,
God does not know until He creates for Himself an act of knowing. 62 .Al-
Ash'ar1 gives a full account of Jahm's position regarding the creation of
these divine acts:

58Maqaliit, 454; also see Ahmad ibn Hanbal, al-Radd, 324.

59Ibn Hanbal, al-Radd, 322.
60Frank, 422.
6llbid., 406.
62Ibid., 408; Ibn I;Ianbal, 322.
207
 Jahm said that God's knowledge is created (mu/:ldath). He
creates it and so knows by means of it. Maybe he believed that
God knows all things prior to their actual existence by an act
of knowing which He creates before them. 63

Besides these theological doctrines, Jahm is reported to have denied

man's freedom on the basis of the idea that man has no power naturally.
This means that man's choice, will and his act, are all created in him, just
like his~body, color and other physical characteristics are also created.
Therefore, "a human being has no act at all nor any power to act, but on
the. contrary, God is the omnipotent Agent". 64 Al-Ash' ari summarizes his
views concerning this in the following manner:
Man has power over nothing, nor is it to be described as
having the poWer to act (isti{a 'a); he is entirely constrained
from without in his actions, having no power ( qudrah), no
will (iriidah) and no deliberate freedom of choice (ikhtiyiir).
God alone creates actions in him, just as He created in all other
inert objects actions which ·are attributed to him
rnetaphorically, as they are attributed to inert objects, as for
example it is said that the tree puts forth fruit, that water
flows, that stone moves, the sun rises and sets. 65

Therefore, according to Jahm, God alone is the real agent (fa 'il). Hence,
actions do not belong to things inherently; e.g. fire does not burn
essentially.
In this way, as we have seen, a systematic treatment of what we
would call today, 'philosophical subjects' are discussed. The term used
for referring to such discussions has always been kaliim, as we tried to
show in the previous chapter. But as these discussions accumulated they
showed the same characteristics, and thus becaiJle to be classified under
the umbrella concept kaliim. Although this is the process through which a
disciplinary stage came to arise in kaliim, yet at this stage we do not
ascertain any evidence for the scientific consciousness in kaliim activities.
This development will take place at the stage which we have called 'stage

63Trans. by Frank, 408; Maqaliit, 494.

· 64Frank, 406. -
651bid., 405; Maqaliit, 273.

208
 of naming'. We shall now examine the course of this advancement in the
scientific process through which kaliim emerged as a science.

3. The Emergence of Kaliim as a Science (200's-

350A.H./800's-950's): The Stage of Naming
Naming of a science, as we have seen in our discussion concerning the
scientific process in the chapter on the sociology of science, can be in
various ways. It is possible that just one prominent scholar would name
the newly emerging science, such is the case with the naming of physics
by Aristotle. But in the case of kaliim, the name given to the activity
naturally came to be the name of the science. As a result, it is possible that
the scientific consciousness could have emerged long before the middle of
the third century of the hijrah (950's); but somehow I have not been able
to locate a usage of the kind 'itm al-kaldm, or fiqh al-kaliim
(corresponding to the usage fiqh al-lughah, for example) before al-
Ash'ari, who wrote a treatise to defend the science of kaldm. Later this
phrase is used by such prominent philosophers as 'Abd al-Qahir al-
Baghdadi (d. 429/1037), al-Sh~hrastani (d. 547/1153) and Abii al-Barakat
al-Baghdadi (c. 560/1164). For, this usage would have indicated the
scientific consciousness in kaldm studies. Al-Ash 'ari's treatise Risiilahfi
lstif:tsiin al-Khawrjfi 'ilm al-kaliim contains this phrase. It was written in
defense of kaliim, and, therefore, it clearly indicates the scientific
cc>nsciousness. But I am not sure if he was the first to make use of this
phrase. He lived in the third century (Z60-324/873-935). Assuming that
he wrote this work at a relatively late date, we can safely say that already
at the beginning of the fourth century kaliim had been established as an
independent science detached from al-fiqh. A brief history of this
development can prove this point. We may now attempt this without
discussing the theories of the kaliim scholars.
Wasil ibn 'Ata' is known to be the founder of the Mu 'tazilites, who
contributed most towards the rise of a scientific consciousness in kaliim.
He was born in 80/699 at Medina, and died in 748/131. 66 He is known to
be a disciple of Abu Hashim 'Abdullah ibn Mul)ammad ibn al-I:Janafiyya.

66 Some information on him is found In Kashf al-Ghumma 'an (ftiraq al-Ummah, by

Slddiq Ha">an [Bhopal, India: Matba ·:at Shahjahani, 1304/1886), 19f.
209
 But on the issue of imiimate he opposed his master and joined the circle
of J:Iasan al-Ba~ri. Ibn Khallikan recounts some of his works, among
which the following are mentioned: Kitab al-Manzilah bayn al-
Manzilatayn, Kitab al-Futya and Kitab al-Tawf:zid. None of his works
are known to be extant. J:lasan al-Ba~ri died in 728, when Wasil was yet
29 years old. So Wasil's departure from J:Iasan al-Ba~ri must have
occurred just a few years before his death. This may accordingly lead us
to speculate that the i'tizal incident must have occurred around 1071725.
If this date is taken as the official initiation of the Mu 'tazilite school by
Wasil, its development must have taken some time. Nevertheless, the
doctrinal founder of the Mu'tazila is known to be Abfl'l-Hudhayl
Mul)ammad ibn al-'Allaf, who was born in the year .Wasil died (c.
226/840).
It is reported that Wasil had frequent meetings at the house of a
sumani 67 , Buddhist, in Basra with such friends as 'Abd al-Karim ibn
Abi'l-'Awja', ~ali}) ibn 'Abd al-Quddlls who is known for his dualist, i.e.
thanawi, doctrines, (by which is probably meant the Manichaeism) and
the poet Bashshar ibn Burd. 68 When a serious dispute broke among this
group especially over crucial theological issues the regular meetings were
disrupted. Then Wasil is reported to have composed a treatise to refute
Manachaeism which is not extant today. Then, Bashshar ibn Burd,
perhaps inspired by those meetings, developed a heretical theology based
on what is called the "doctrine of fire". Against Bashsharian theology the
Mu 'tazilites developed a theology based on the natural philosophy of their
time (i.e. physics). The poems of ~afwan al-An~ari demonstrates some of
this theological outlook. 69 It is perhaps this way that philosophy was for
the first time put to the service of theology in Islam.

6 7 Al-Sumaniyyah: a certain sect of idolaters who assert the doctrine of

metempsychosis, and deny that knowledge comes from informations; a certain
people, of the Indians, who hold that the duration of the present world is from
eternity, or that it is everlasting and assert the doctrine of metempsychosis. The word
is said to be an irregular noun from sumanat a town in India. See E. W. Lane,
Arabic-English Lexicon (Cambridge: The Islamjc Text Society, 1984).
68 Cf. al-Shahrastanl, Al-Milal wa al-Ni(u:tl, I: 244; and Kittib al-Aghiinl, 3: 24.
69 AI-JaJ:ti~. Kitiib al-Baytin, I: 16-19.
210
 It is important for us to determine the date of these events, in order to
detect the foreign influence upon speculative tradition in Islam; i.e.
1501750 and 200/800. The first of these dates indicates the penetration of
foreign ideas and doctrines in an unorganized and unsystematic way,
mainly through such discussions as those between Wasil and his circle
and the Manichaeism; the second date indicates or rather marks a more
systematic influence through translations and studies of foreign sources. If
this is also clarified, another problem ·put in front us by mainly the
Orientalists is also solved. For, some of them go even so far as to claim
the origins of fiqh, kalcfm and philosophy in the Greek sources. Our
proposal of the scientific process can settle this problem. In fact, it
proposes that no science can arise in any civilization through foreign
influence which cannot bring about a worldview that is suitable for the
cultivation of sciences. Of course here we are talking about scientific
influence not cultural influence, which must have been there from the
earliest times; i.e. c. 50 A.H. or even earlier. But this cannot lead, as we
have shown, to the rise of a sophisticated scientific tradition in Islam.
The later development of the Mu 'tazila has two schools: 1. The Basran
School, established by Wasil; its later representatives who contributed to
the emergence of kaliim as ari independent science, are Abu'l-Hudhayl al-
, Allaf, Hishiim ibn al-I:Iakam, Mu 'ammar ibn 'Ab bad al-S ulami, al-
Na~~am, al-Jhlji~ (d. 255/869) and al-Ash'arl's master Abu 'Ali al-Jubbai
(d. 303/915); 2. The Baghdad School, founded by Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir
(d. 210/825-6) main representatives are Thumama ibn Ashras (d.
210/825-6), Ibn Abi Dawlld (d. 854-5/240), and the famous heretic Ibn
al-Riiwandi, who left the Baghdad school for the most extreme riifir)a,
'lsa ibn Qubay~ al-Murdar.
Besides the Mu'tazilites, we can count some other names which are
extremely important in the naming stage of kaliim, such as Al;tmad ibn
I:Ianbal (d. 241/855), and the students of Abu I:Ianifa, Nw;;ayr ibn Yal,lyii
al-Balkhi (d. 268/881) and Mul;tammad ibn Muqiitil al-Razl (d. 248/862),
also the Mu'tazilite al-Jubba'i's student Abu I:Iasan al-Ash'~ri (d.
324/935), Abu Manl?llr al-Matu(Idi (d. 333/915) and Dawud ibn 'Ali (d.
270/884). All these scholars developed schools of thought and helped in
establishing kaliim as an independent science. When the stage of naming

211
 came to completion through their works, Muslim philosophers began to
do their scientific activities within the 'scientific kaliim conceptual
scheme'. For, it is clear that by the middle of the fourth century (950's)
the specific scientific conceptual scheme was well established in kaliim.
As our epistemology of science has shown this scheme was established
within the general body of the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme, which
includes in general certain key scientific notions utilized in all scientific
activities, such as the concept of knowledge, truth, method, theory and
science. But when these concepts are worked out into a network of
conceptual scheme it combines many other doctrinal concepts to be
employed in all scientific actiyities within a civilization. For their
importance we shall cite the following selection as the key terms of the
Islamic scientific conceptual scheme, which have been demonstrated
historically as well in our above treatment of the scientific process in the
rise of individual sciences: 'ilm, u~ul~ ra'y, ijtihiid, qiyds,fiqh, 'aql,
qalb, idriik, wahm, tadabbur,fikr, na?,ar, (tikmah, yaqin, wa(ty, tafsir,
ta'wil, 'iilam, kaliim, nu.tq, ?,ann, (taqq, bii{il, ~idq, kidhb, wujud,
'adam, dahr, ~amad, sarmad, azal, abad, khalq, khulq,firiisah,fi{rah,
{abi'ah, ikhtiyiir, kisb, khayr, sharr, (taliil, (tariim, wajib, mumkin,
amr, imiin, and iriidizh. If this is the case, we can briefly now allude to
the rise of some other special sciences in order to demonstrate how these
general concepts were appropriated in other individual sciences.

C. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND OTHER

SCIENCES

The Medinan Period begins by our Prophet's arrival at Quba' in the oasis
of Medina on the 12th of Rabi' al-awwal, 1/September 4, 622. This date
can be taken as the beginning of Prophetic political activities. 70 It is the
Qur'anic worldviewproviding the foundation to establish a socio-political
community based on religio-moral principles of Islam that led also our
Prophet to enter into a new body politic. He achieved this within but ten

70 Watt also accepts this. Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: The University Press,
1987), 4.
212
years of his life in Medina: "the Islamic state had no precisely defined
geographical frontiers, but it was certainly in existence." 71 The first
political activity reported in these years is what is commonly called "the
Constitution of Medina", which is an agreement signed between the
Prophet on behalf of Muslims, and the inhabitants of Medina (including
the Jewish tribes). In this constitution Medina, then Yathrib, is
considered as a state in which its citizens and the nature of the state were
expressed in the following way:

1. The believers and their dependents constitute a single

community ummah;
2. Each clan or sub-division of the community is responsible for
blood-money and ransoms on behalf of its members(articles 2-
77); .
3. The members of the community are to show complete solidarity
against crime and not to support on criminal even when he is a
near kinsman when the crime is against another member of the
community (arts 13, 21);
4. The members of the community are to show complete solidarity
against the unbelievers in peace and war (arts. 14, 17, 19, 44),
and also solidarity in the granting of 'neighborly protection'
(jar, art. 15); .
5. The Jews of various groups belong to the community and are to
retain their own religion; _they and the Muslims are to render
'help' (including military aid) to one another when it is needed
(arts. 24-35, 37, 38, 46)_72

The system of public seclirity in the Arab society of that time was
based on the concept of protection, known as jar (neighborly protection),
client or mawaU or f:tatif, confederate. Then this was backed up by
vengeance system, or biood money and ransoms. All these ~reaccepted
by the constitution, but it brought a new Islamic element which is seen by .
Watt as a "revolution" 73 ; if one member of the community has committed

71Jbid.
72we have given 5 summary points taken from the document transmitted by Ibn Isl)aq
as outlined by Watt, op. cit., 5. See Slrat Rasi:ll A lliih, Ed. by Mu~~afa ai-Saqa,
Ibrahim ai-Abyarl, 'Abd ai-Hafi?- Shalabi (Cairo, 1936); trans. by Alfred Guillaume
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1970).
213
 a crime against his fellow citizen, the ldnsmen of the criminal are to help to
see that he is punished, instead of the pre-Islamic custom of supporting
him. If, however, a person kills another by an accident, then he is to pay a
blood-wit, which the family of the victim is required to accept in which
case the state, [or a judge as in later cases] settle the amount.
As we can see clearly in this document, the Prophet was tacitly
accepted as the head of the State (see arts. 23 and 42). Thus a political
conception in conjunction with its legal and social aspects were about to
develop from this first agreement between the Muslims and other citizens
of Medina. The following terminology clearly emerged in this period;
ummah, state (dar al-Islam), dar al-Jjarb, ul al-'amr(head of the state),
imam, khalifah, solidarity, mutual help of citizens to be security as the
function of police force, inithaq, treaty, oath, shura (consultative
assembly), war policies, jihad, ijma ', (taqq, takl~f. mukallc~f. mulk,
bay 'ah, huquq Allah, huquq al-bashar and so on~
All these terminology were based on the basic terminology of the
Islamic fundamental metaphysics already developed by the Qur' an. Of
course, this foundational outlook included many theological and
philosophical terminology which required a believer to demonstrate certain
kind of conduct in his daily activities, and as such it had a derivative
content as well, which is its ethical corollary. In this way, ethics, politics
and law were intimately related to the concept of religion in Islam. As an
integrated part of the whole worldview of Islam they were all studied
under one general science which was named even by the Prophet himself,
as inspired by the Qur' anic outlook; al-fiqh. This beginning of the early
political activities led to the rise of a sophisticated network of political
concepts. Thus emerged Islamic political thought which gradually went
through the scientific process as outlined above until this thought also
emerged as a specific science, political philosophy.
While all these philosophical, theological, legal and· political
developments were taking place, another science was also on the way to
emerge. There was already a revealed history or rather the story ( qi~~ah)
of some Prophets and their communities in the Qur' an. Of course the

73watt, op. cit., 9.

214
 purpose of the Qur'an is not here to give an historical account as such, but
rather to let its addressees have a lesson, 'ibrah, from their history. What
is important here is that this lesson-giving qi,Ja.J not only awakened an
intense interest among the early community in history but also many
historical terminology were thereby elaborated both within the Qur' an and
the community mainly through the Prophetic Traditions. This way ·the
Qur' an introduced a significant historical principle into the Islamic
philosophy [understanding] of history that study of past generations ought
not to be a simple idle investigation to satisfy human curiosity; it must
rather be an illustration of the past as a set example for us and the coming
generations, for God's law concerning human history (sunnatullah) does
not change. It is for this reason that many of the Companions became
interested to collect materials about past history and present situation so
that they began preserving the sayings of the Prophet. This way the early
Muslims began to pass from oral tradition, which was then the prevalent
method of preserving the cultural heritage among the Arabs to the written
tradition.
We cannot show the whole scientific process which took place in case
of history. But it can briefly be summarized that first books in the form of
.JaMfah then maghiizi came out, which, in turn, led to the rise of sirah
tradition. Sirah is actually history proper; and this can be seen in the fact
that after the s'irah literature Muslim historians became interested in world
history. There were those scholars who were interested in world history
even when maghiizis were written, such as Wahb Ibn Munabbih whose
scientific activities have been outlined above.
We must thus accept the contribution of the Traditionist School
(muftaddithun) for the development of the idea of history in Islam, which
eventuaHy led to the development of a philosophy of history as well. The
philosophical discussions of history and historical methodology revolved
around the ftadith literature at the beginning stages, but later these
discussil;ms were carried around purely historical studies as well. In this
way, the scientific process in the science of history went through the
stages of problems, disciplinary tradition and naming. The term tiirikh
was given as the name of this science, and it might be al-Waqidi (d.
208/823) who used the term in this technical sense for the first time,

215
 which means that it in his time that the third and final stage of the scientific
process took place.
After the 4th century/lOth A.D., a new scientific development began
to take place. Muslim scholars met the Hellenistic' philosophy and science
in the conquered lands. Of course first they began discussing the issues of
this scientific heritage orally with the scholars who knew this scientific
heritage. These scholars were mostly Arab Christians who had debates
and discussions with the Muslim scholars. When some of the Muslim
scientists also became interested in the Hellenistic philosophy and science,
they began studying it under the prominent scholars of that heritage. We
must realize that these Christian Arab scholars who were studying Greek
philosophy and science were not original thinkers; they were merely
commentators who knew especially the Aristotelian philosophy very well.
But the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme was very dynamic at the time
and thus when the Muslim scientists such as al-Kindi (d. 260/873), al-
Farabi (d. 339/950), al-'Amiri (d. 3811992) and al-Sijistani (d. /987-8),
al-Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) met the Hellenistic intellectual heritage, they
began philosophizing and constmcting a system of their own based on the
framework provided by the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme and the
scientific theories of the previous Hellenistic philosophers. In this way,
they introduced Greek science. We mustrealize that Muslims did use
simple knowledge available to them in these new sciences even before
they were introduced into Islam; but these mathematical, astronomical and
medical knowledge was not yet formulated into a discipline to be called
science. Hence, these are "borrowed sciences", if this term_ can be used in
that sense. Once they were established in Islam, Muslims contributed to
the progress of these sciences and in fact they enlarged the accumulated
knowledge in some of these sciences so much thattheir branches came to
emerge as independent disciplines, such as algebra in mathematics and
kiml.yii in physics. We must at the same time realize that a society cannot
contribute mearingfully for the advancement of sciences by simply
borrowing sciences from other civilizations unless the community of
scholars in that science develop the frameworks needed for carrying out
scientific activities, as we tried to expose in this essay. We shall next

216
discuss in our conclusion these issues, namely, how scientific
advancement is possible, and the outcome of our exposition in this essay.

217
 CONCLUSION

This essay has attempted to show that in the first place, science is basically
a cognitive activity, as such it is based on human epistemological make up;
secondly, it shows that, as a cognitive activity, science has a social aspect
which originates primarily from the social make up of its own scientific
community and secondarily from its society at large; finally, the
epistemology and sociology of science, as these two points are named, can
be utilized in a society to cultivate science. In order to demonstrate this
point we have tried to describe the process of the rise of scientific thought
in three civilizations. In this way, we may also argue that there is a need
for an adequate framework through which the history of scientific thought
in civilizations can be disclosed. We have primarily developed two
perspectives, which, if combined, will yield the framework needed for
such a history of scientific thought. The first perspective endeavors to
develop an epistemology on the basis of which alone is scientific activities
are possible; this has been termed 'epistemology of science'. The second
perspective tries to understand the process. through which science emerges
and this process requires a community of scientists which must be
sufficiently grasped in order to show the necessity of that process; this
was called 'sociology of scienc~'.
The combination of epistemology of science and sociology of science
is used as the proper framework for the emergence of sciences in different
societies. This was applied to the history of Islamic science in chapters
four and five. We hope that these points are clear. What may not be so
clear is some implications of this ~ssay. One of them is that it can be used
I
as a theory for the problem of the advancement of sciences in a certain
society. Therefore, we shall try to illustrate this point with some specific
cases.
Today in countries where scientific progress is at a halt or very
minimal, there is the naive idea that they can scientifically progress by
importing science from the West. However, the history of sciences shows
that this cannot be the case. The framework developed in this essay can
prove this not only historically, but conceptually as well. Historically, we

2L9
 have shown that the source of scientific dynqmism had always been within
the civilization itself. Although the scientific progress of one civilization
can influence another in this respect, if the one under that influence does
not accommodate the necessary changes in its conceptual scheme, as we
have shown in case of Islam, it cannot cope with the new problems arising
out of that scientific influence; and as a result, the scope of the influence
will remain limited without any sizable scientific contributions by that
civilization. Therefore, imported scientific knowledge will be useful not in
yielding scientific progress, but in furthering the already existing scientific
activities. Therefore, we can pose· the followidg question; if importing
scientific knowledge does not yield any progress, then what is it that
yields scientific and in fact also technological advancement?
We must, first of all, be clear about what we mean by 'scientific
advancement'. In certain cases we may even find a society that is
developed technologically and may be misled to think that it is also a
~cientifically progressed society, such as Japan. As a result, we would like
to imitate them without knowing what We actually want. We confuse
science with technology; although technology largely derives from
sciences and to some extent it is based on sciences, yet having an
independent characteristic as well, it can be developed independently of
sciences. As we have seen in case of Islam, there was no technology and
even natural sciences at the beginning history of its scientific tradition.
They naturally emerged on the basis of the theoretical scheme provided by
the earlier scientific activity. Hence, we would like to claim that sciences
emerge out of only a certain kind of environment and a context which, at
the same time, act as the habitat, so to speak, for its progress.
Furthermore, it is possible for the sciences to emerge in an environment
but not develop there. In that case, scientific advancement must be
conceived not in terms of a temporal duration, but rather in terms of its
effect and impact upon the culture and civilization within which it
flourishes. Therefore, by 'scientific advancement', we shall mean all the
scientific activities (including non-physical sciences, such as
philosophy, history, sociology, theology and education) that help in
· establishing a civilization. Therefore, those activities that are found in a
comrrtunity and characterized as scientific, will not render it a scientifically

220
advanced·society, unless those scientific activities bring the culture 9f that
society to the level of a civilization. In order to clarify this, we need to
show the conceptual aspect of scientific development based on the
theoretical framework developed in this essay and it is this aspect that we
shall examine as our theoretical background.

A. THE NON-OBSERVABLE FOUNDATION

Every human activity seems to emerge out of an observable and non-

observable foundation. We mean by 'foundation', "the reasons and
intentions underlying the. act, disposition of the agent and whatever
justification may be given for his action". Afoundation of an action is,
therefore, "all the observable and non-observable phenomena assumed to
be taking place in relation to that action. in the mind, body and
surroundings of the person in question, either at the time of his performing
the action, or at times ·prior to its performance". By observable
foundation; we mean "whatever preceding action, behavior, disposition
and events given as either reason or condition for the action performed".
By non-observable foundation, on the other hand, we mean "all the
mental operations and dispositions leading to that action considered as
either justification for it or causes of it" ... ·
In order to clarify this, we may give the following analogy; a person
who steals something may be said to be stealing, because he is selfish,
dishonest and because of the circumstances which led him to that
undesirable action. We consider all these and similar motives or
circumstances underlying the· act to be the observable foundation,
because they can be observed either directly or indirectly within the action
itself. Yet there are also certain other mental conditions that lead the person
in question to his action, such as his conception of. stealing and the
pll:teement of that concept within his worldview. As these are the non-
observable foundation for his action, they can only be inferred by
intellectual cognition. Upon analyzing that action, therefore, it is possible
to distinguish three elements constituting the performance of it: 1. the
mental framework within which the action is conceptualized prior to its

221
 performance; 2. certain physiological and e11vironmental conditions
leading to the action, and we would like to broaden the scope of these
elements by not limiting them just to the environmental and physiological
conditions; 3. whatever they may be, the factors that are involved at the
time of performing the action itself. Clearly, the second and third elements
are observable either directly or indirectly; whereas the first one is
observable only by intellectual cognition. Therefore, within our analysis,
the last two elements are characterized as observable; but the first one as
the non-observable foundation of the action.
As it is seen in our analogy, the development of these observable and
non-observable foundations in the individual's life must take place in
different ways but in relation to each other. The mental framework, for
instance, does not develop instantly, though, the action itself is performed
at an instance. Even the environmental and physiological conditions may
develop instantly, yet in relation to the mental framework and the
performance of the action. In fact, the mental framework is the totality of
concepts and mental attitude developed by the individual throughout his
life, and as such it constitutes his worldview. Since every related concept
and event is evaluated within a certain worldview before a decision is
taken to perform the action, it must be the priormost condition of any
action. We have thus inferred in this essay that a worldview is the non-
observable foundation of all human conduct, including scientific and
technological activities. By 'priormost' we do not mean the immediate,
for in a worldview the immediate foundation of our acts are mentalities that
are situated in the structures of a worldview. We rather mean the most
general framework of an action. Since we take the worldview to be the
priormost foundation of any action, we conclude from this that every
human action is ultimately traceable to its worldview; and as such it is
reducible ultimately to that worldview. That human conduct is ultimately
reducible to a worldview is sufficient in itself to manifest the significance
of worldview in individual and social life, including, of course, scientific
activities. But above all, from the epistemological perspective, we have
shown that a worldview is far more significant than all the other elements
of human behavior, because it is the only framework within which the
. burna~ mind can operate in order to attain.knowledge.

222
 1. The Environment
Using a Kantian argument we can say that we are already in possession of
a certain a priori knowledge. We interpret this to mean: "human mind is
created capable of acquiring the knowledge of the universe in which it· is".
We must further add to this that the world is also created in such a way
that it can be comprehended by the human mind. The first step in acquiring
knowledge is initiated as our mind is furnished with representations of that
.world through sense perception. To revert back to the Kantian
terminology, we are capable of possessing a posteriori knowledge as well.
The continual combination of the a priori with the a posteriori gradually
forms in the mind a framework, which we called 'worldview'. From the
very first inception of a posteriori knowledge, the mind begins to work
within that framework as it enlarges it through various combinations of
knowledge acquired later. The worldview thus becomes the environment
within which the mind operates, and without which it cannot function at
all. Let us think of a worldview in which there is no concept of science or
any other related concepts. We have tried to show that no scientific
knowledge is possible within such an environment. We can now infer
from our premises that the priormost non-observable foundation for the
advancement of sciences is the clarification of the a worldview, which we
have called the 'environment' of any knowledge acquired (or to be
acquired).

2. The Context
The environment by itself, however, is not sufficient to bring about the
possibility of a scientific activity, because for that possibility to be
realized, there needs to be the conceptual scheme within which all
scientific activities are carried out. We termed this conceptual scheme 'the
general [scientific] conceptual scheme' which begins with the most general
concepts, such as knowledge ( 'ilm), [science] and discipline, and goes
down to the most specific theoretical concepts, such as truth, theory,
method, experiment and observation. Without such a conceptual scheme,
no environment can be prepared for the advancement of sciences. Since
this conceptual scheme acts as a closer and thus an immediate environment
to the scientific activities, we shall term it the 'context' of sciences. Any
223
 context must presuppose a worldview; rto context is, therefore, possible
without its environment, viz., worldview. Since the context is intimately
related to the worldview, it must also be regarded as a non-observable
foundation, which is the conceptual scheme in which an action is
supported mentally.

3. The Environmental Context

Since the issue here is the advancement of sciences, we would llke to cut
off only that part of the worldview that concerns us here, and relate it to
the conceptual scheme, which we have called the context of sciences. In
that case, we are in a position to combine the environment with the
context, in order to show how scientific advancement is possible in a
society; with this combination, we come up with the most prerequisite
non-observable foundation for the advancement of sciences, which we
shall term the environmental context for the advancement of sciences. It
is within this theoretical framework that we shall proceed to prove our
point.

B. THE FUNCTION OF WORLDVIEWS IN SCIENTIFIC

ADVANCEMENT

As we have pointed out, human mind is not capable to operate without a

worldview. Therefore, whether we want it or not, a worldview shall
automatically develop as we grow up. What we have suggested in this
essay is that the development of the worldview should not take place
~ haphazardly as it is the case today in the Muslim World. It should rather
develop in a way which we called 'scientific'; only then a worldview may
render itselfadequate for the advancement of sciences. We defined the
scientific development of a worldview as "inculcation if its major
components, i.e., its concepts, ideas and doctrines, to the individuals of
the society through clear and transparent definitions and a systematically
organized body of knowledge". This is achieved at three successive stages
as discussed in our exposition of the epistemology of science: The first
stage, called 'abstract level'' which is the stage of worldview-formation,
and as such, since the worldview is .formed by abstract thinking, it is
224
 called 'system' in the philosophical sense. The second stage may be called
the 'concretized level', which is the level of intellectuals, such as men of
literature, artists, architects, teachers and educators who are able to
understand the abstract worldview developed or constructed by the
scientific community, and will, or indeed, ought to reflect it in their
works. Since the works of the intellectuals are usually of concrete nature,
the worldview is concretized and thus handed down to the general masses
who can understand the concrete ideas more easily. Finally, the third stage
is the level of massive dissemination of the worldview through the
educational institutions and mass media. When the worldview thus
disseminates from the top level of abstraction to the bottom level of
concretization, it reaches to the masses and begins shaping their
worldview according to its well-defined and systematically developed
concepts, ideas and doctrines.' This way at the level of society the
worldview of individuals is formed according to that of the scientific
community; it is this way of worldview-formation that we call scient{fic.
The worldview-formation at the level of society takes place at two planes:
First at the individual plane, where it begins first by experiencing our
surroundings, then continues with learning a language, and as we grow
up, it becomes more abstract through concept-formations and rising of
ideas in the mind. As a result, our mind combines these into larger bo~ies
of knowledge adding thereunto, enlarging the worldview as long as we
live. Second at the social plane, where all these phenomena of worldview-
formation are influenced by whatever ideas or other worldviews
circulating in the society.
As we have shown, just as the environment of any human activity is
the worldview within which that activity is carried out, since our scientific
activities cannot be without an environment, its environment within which
it takes place is also worldview. Hence, 'environment' does not mean the
physical surr6undiiig. On the contrary, physical surrounding is only the
observable environment; whereas the worldview is the discernible
envirom;nent, and as such we have termed it 'non-observable foundation'.
Therefore, proper environment for the advancement of sciences means
only the adequate woddview within which there is a potentiality for the
cultivation of sciences. What this statement entails is that there are some

225
 worldviews within which sciences cannot flourish. A more concrete
example of this state of affairs is the pre-and post-Islamic Arabia. As we
have seen, it was possible only for the Islamic, and therefore, not the pre-
Islamic, worldview to lead to the emergence of a scientific thought.
We may pose here to ask what kind of a worldview provides the
proper environment for scientific progress. In order to answer this
question, we need to examine only the historical development of sciences
in Islamic civilization. What kind of a worldview did Islam give to the
Muslims so that they were able to excel in all the sciences? We tried to
show this historically and argued that the Prophet developed the Islamic
worldview alongside the Revelation as it was disclosed to him. In that
case, it is the early Islamic worldview which led to the scientific progress
right from the first century of Islam. For example in the early Meccan
Period mostly ethico-theological concepts and issues, such as the idea of
one God, the concepts of creation, hereafter and human responsibility,
helping the poor and protecting the orphans; what is good and bad, are
developed; then, later more abstract concepts and doctrines such as the
doctrine of Prophethood, the concept of 'ilm, the meaning of religion and
'ibadah, are developed; and finally in Medina such concepts as law,
jihad, brotherhood, Muslim community (ummah), etc. are all elaborated
together with the earlier topics into a whole unity of ideas, which is what
we have called 'the world view of Islam'. Of course when a new topic
was introduced, the topics developed earlier did not cease to be discussed;
on the contrary, they were further elaborated and clarified.
We have thus shown that the seeds of some sciences are already in
existence right at the time of the Prophet; history, law, literature, grammar,
philosophy and theology are all at the beginning stage. One must notice
that all these sciences are intimately related to worldview-formation. As
we have shown in the fifth chapter, towards the end of the second and
through the third centuries of Islam most of the knowledge accumulated in
these disciplines are formed into sciences. Then, it is only in the Fourth
Century that we see other disciplines, such as physics, astronomy,
mathematics and chemistry, begin to emerge as sciences. The reason for
this is not, and cannot be, translations from Greek scientific and
philosophic works. For there is only one reason for this, and it is the

226
 environmental context which has already been developed by the above
mentioned disciplines based on the Revelation. This very fact can be
explained in a different way as well; sciences cannot develop by being
imported. In other words, we cannot import sciences in order to have
advancement of sciences. They must emerge from within, and the only
way for this to be realized is through establishing a worldview which will
act as the adequate environmental context for sciences. We have thus
shown that when the Greek philosophical and scientific works began to be
translated into Arabic, there had already been a sophisticated and distinctly
expressed Islamic worldview together with its knowledge-structure.
Moreover, one must see that even before Islam, all those Greek
philosophical and scientific achievements were present in the region; why
did they not influence anyone in the direction of advancing these sciences
any further? The role of the translations from Greek should neither be over
exaggerated, nor underestimated: These translations did not play the role
of initiating the scientific advancement in the Islamic civilization; they only
helped to further the already-started phenomenon of scientific progress. In
this way, some of the sciences, which were not yet built as independent
branches of learning in Islam, were of course established as new sciences.
In this way, when we combine our theoretical framework developed
above with its historical proof, we may thus analyze the phenomenon of
scientific advancement in a civilization:

the first, and by far, the priormost condition for the advancement of
sciences is an adequate worldview scientifically developed
as suitable for cultivating sciences;
the second and the next crucial condition for this phenomenon is the
development of a context for sciences which we called
'scientific conceptual scheme';
the third significant condition in order is the totality of ali other
observable circumstances that help the first two conditions to
take place effectively in the society, and it is these conditions
which we can call the 'observable foundation for the
advancement of sciences'.
Since the first two conditions are non-observable foundations of
scientific progress, most policy-makers in the Muslim world are
regretfully unable to see them. As a result, they have been making their

227
 poficy according to the observable foundation of scientific activities,
which continually results with futile attempts to cultivate sciences in their
societies. The proof of this predicament is the present state of sciences in
the Muslim world. If a Muslim scientist ever achieves a rewarding
scientific discovery, it will be out of environmental context; namely, it is
an achievement carried out within the Western worldview and the scientific
conceptual scheme, let alone being carried out within the physical Western
envin:;mment. Muslims have been grappling with this kind of policy-
. making for more than a century; and they have been sending students to
the West for almost a century as well for the sole purpose of importing
scientific advancement. Alas! all these have resulted with a dismay of
failure, because they have been neglecting the most crucial and necessary
condition for their purpose; the environmental context. As this condition
is the non-observable foundation for scientific advancement, it is indeed
elusive; therefore, it is easy to evade. As we have argued thus far, the
solution for this desperate state of affairs lies in the fact that more attention
needs to be paid to the aspect of human behavior which is outlined here as
its ultimate foundation. Now we may add a discussion of the observable
foundations in order to relate our concern to the technical aspect of the
problem.

C. THE OBSERVABLE FOUNDATION

As we have argued the elements to be included as observable foundation

0f scientific advancement are easy to detect, as they are the formal
conditions of the scientific development. But their application is not
possible without the non-observable foundation. It is not possible to
enumerate all of these elements; hence, we shall try to cite the most
essential ones in this respect.

1. The Effects of Environmental Context

When the non-observable foundation of the scientific activities are
effectively developed, it will begin to work in the society naturally. As we
have shown in our discussion of the sociology of science, as a result of
the environmental context, certain nucleus contextual causes will be
228
effective within the society. This will bring about some dynamisms which
are very effective in the scientific advancement. For example, an
institutional re-organization will begin if certain institutions in the society
do not conform to the newly emerging scientific outlook, as this was the
case with the early Islamic world view which brought about such changes
within the early Muslim economic and educational life.
Therefore, if such development takes place the society must be ready
for the effects of the environmental context. Especially political authorities
should try to help such an advancement by providing policies that are
congenial for the scientific progress. The most impmtant policy that can be
designed by the policy makers is to provide financial opportunities, which
can be summarized briefly now.

2. Material Opportunities
Unfortunately those who try to offer a solution for the scientific
backwardness of contemporary Muslim societies always revert to the
financial availability of the sources. It is possible to have such financial
opportunities without the scientific advancement, which means that such
material availability cannot lead to the scientific progress. It may,
however, help speed up the process if it has afready put into its right
course by the environmep.tal context.
Some of these financial opportunities are to provide a social comfort
for not only the scientists but also for the able students who struggle to be
active in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. Freedom from the
burdens of life is another financial opportunity that can be provided; such
as funding generously the scholarly projects, establishing award contests,
providing larger amounts of scholarships and even allocating the largest
possible salary and wage schemes for the scholars so that their profession
draws attention and prestige from the general public so that bright students
willingly choose these careers.
The education of the scientists can also be considered as a material
opportunity that helps for the advancement of sciences in a society.
Everyone must have a chance for this kind of an education. All the
necessary tools needed for such· an education must generously be
provided. Once all these are met, then, hoping that the environmental

229
context is also effectively practiced by the scientific community, scientific
advancement will be grounded on sound foundations.

230
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

List of Rbbreuiations
RJISS The Rmerican Journal of Islamic Social Sciences
RUIFD Rnkara liniuersitesi ilahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi
BFREU Bulletin of the Faculty of Rrts of the Egyptian
Uniuersity
BJRL Bulletin of the John Rylands Library
BSORS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Rfrican
Studies
DOP Dumborton Oaks Papers
DTCFD Rnkara Uniuersitesi Oil ue Tarih Cografya
Fakliltesi Dergisi
El 2 Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition
HI Hamdard I slamicus
IC Islamic Culture
IJMES International Journal of Middle East Studies
IQ The Islamic Quarterly
IS I damic Studies
IDS Israel Oriental Studies
JROS Journal of the Rmerican Oriental Society
JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy
JHS Journal of Hellenistic Studies
JIS Journal of ,Islamic Studies
JNES Journal of Near Eastern Studies
JPHS Journal of Pakistan Historical Society
JRRS Journal of the Royal Rsiatic Society
JSS Journal of Semitic Studies
MIDEO Melanges I nstitut Dominicain D'etudes
Orientales du. Caire
MW The Muslim World
MS Medieual Studies
MUSJ Melanges De L'Uniuersite Saint-Joseph
PF Philosophical Forum
RDSO Riuista Degli Studi Urientali
SI Studia I slamica
ZDMli Zeitschrift Der Deutschen MorgenHindischen
liesellschaft

231
 Abdullah, S. M., ed. Professor Mul:tammad Sha.fi'i Presentation
Volume (Lahore: The Majlis-e-Armughan-e-'Ilmi, 1955).
Abu Dawud. Sunan in Al-Kutub al-Sittah wa Shuru/:luha (Istanbul: c;agn
Yaymlan and Dar Sal;tnun, 1992). ·
_ _ _ _ _ _. Sunan Abu Dawud, trans, Ahmad Hasan (Lahore: Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf, 1984).
Abu Hanlfah, al-N u 'man ibn Thabit. Al- 'A lim wa '1-Muta' allim, ed.
· Mul;tammad Zahid al-Kawtharl in imam-z ..~-zamzn Bey
Eseri with a Turkish translation by Osman Oz (Istanbul:
Kalem Yaymcl11k A. $., 1981).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . AZ-Fiqh al-Absat in imam-z Azapzn Be~ Eseri with a
Turkish translation by Osman Oz (Istanbul: Kalem
Yaymcl11k A. $., 1981).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Al-Fiqh al-Akbar in imam-z Aza!(lzn Be~ Eseri with a
Turkish translation by Osman Oz (Istanbul: Kalem
Yaymc1hk A. $., 1981).
_ _ _ _ _ _. Risalat Abi flanifah ilii. 'Uthmii.n al-Batti in iman!.-l
Azamzn Bey Eseri with a Turkish translation by Osman Oz
(Istanbul: Kalem Yaymcll1k A.$., 1981).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Kitiib Wat\'iyyat al-Jmam Abi flan~fah in ima111:.-z
Azamm Be~\· Eseri with a Turkish translation by Osman Oz
(Istanbul: Kalem Yaymc1h:k A.$., 1981).
Abu Nu'aym. Hilyat al-Awliya', ed. by M.A. Khanji (Cairo, 1932-38).
Ac;tkgenc;, Alparslan. Bilgi Felsefesi: islam Baglar~Jmda Bilgiden,
Bilimden, Sistem Felsefesirie (Istanbul: Insan Yaymlan,
1992).
_ _ _ _ _ _. "A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'anic Context",
AJISS 11: 2 (1994). -
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Islamic Science: Towards A Definition (Kuala Lumpur:
ISTAC, 1996).
-----'-----· "Transcendent Rationality, Ibn Rushd and Kant: A
Critical Synthesis", Al~f 16 (1996).
Affifi, A. E. The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din-Ibnul 'Arabi
(Cambridge: At the University Press, 1939).
Ahmed, Ziauddin. "A Survey of the Development ofTheologyin Islam",
IS 11 (1972), 93f.
Al-'Ajlunl, Isma'H ibn Mul;tammad. Kashf al-Khafii' wa Muzll al-Ilbas
(Beyrut: Mu'assasat al-Risalah, 1985). ·

232
 Ali, A. Yusuf. The Holy Qur'izn: Text, Translation and Commentary
(Brentwood, MD: Amana Corp., 1983).
'AlHima Shibli Nu'man1, Shams a1-'U1ama' . Omar the Great (The
Second Caliph of Islam), trans. by Maulana Zafar Ali
Khan ( Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1975).
Al-A1ousi, Husum Muhi Eldin. The Problem of Creation in Islamic
Thought: Qur'an, Hadith, Commentaries and Kalam
(Baghdad: The National Printing and Publishing Co.,
1965).
Arberry, A. J. The Koran Interpreted (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Co., 1976). ·
Al-Ash'ari, Abu'1-I;Iasan 'Ali ibn Isma'il. Al-Ibiina 'an U~ul al-Diyanah
(Al-Madinat al-Munawwarah: Al-Jami 'at al-Islamiyyah,
1975). .
_ _ _ _ _ _. Al-Ibanah 'an U~ul al-Diyiinah (The Elucidation of
Islam's Foundation), trans. Walter C. Klein (New Haven:
American Oriental Society, 1940).
_ _ _ _ _ _. Kitiib al-Luma', ed. and trans. R. J. McCarthy in The
Theology of At-Ash 'ari (Beyrouth: lmprimerie Catholique,
1953).
_ _ _ _ _ _. Kitdb Maqalat al-Islamiyyin wa Ikhtillif al-Muslimzn,
ed. Helmut Ritter (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag
BMBH, 1980).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Risalat lstihsan al-Khawd fi 'Ilm al-Kalam ed. and
trans. R. J. McCarthy in The Theology of Al-Ash 'ari
(Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953).
Al-Ashqar, 'Umar Sulayman. Tdrzkh al-Fiqh al-Isldmz (Al-Kuwayt:
Maktabat al-FallaJ:t, 1982).
Al-'Asqalani, Ibn I;Iajar. Nuzhat al-Na:r.ar fi Taw~lll:t Nuftbat al-Fikar,
trans. into Turkish by Talat Ko<;yigit in Hadis Jst~lahlan
Hakkinda Nu!Jbetu'l-Fiker $erhi (Ankara: A. U. Ilahiyat
Faki.iltesi Yaylnlan, 1971).
---~-· Tahdhfb al-Tahdhlb (Hyderabad, 1326).
Al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib. Islam and Secularism (Kuala
Lumpur: IST AC, second impression, 1993).
_______. The Positive ·Aspects of Tasawwuf (Kuala Lumpur:
Islamic Academy of Science, 1981).

233
 _ _ _ _ _ _ .Prolegomena to the Islamic Metaphysics of Islam: An
Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the
Worldview of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995).
Azami, Muammad Mustafa. On Schact's Origins of Muhammadan
Jurisprudence (Riyadh and New York: King Saud
University and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Studies in Early Hadith Literature (Indianapolis:
American Trust Publications, 1978).
_ _ _ _ _ _ .Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature (Kuala
Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, n. d.).
Badawi, Abdurrahman. Histoire de Ia Philosophie en Islam, 2 vols.
(Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1972).
Al-Baghdadi, 'Abd al-Latif. Kalam fi Mahd al-Khayr, see Richard C.
Taylor. ·
Al-Baghdadi, Abl1 Man~ur Abd al-Qahir ibn Tahir. Al-Farq bayn al-
Fzraq, ed. by M. Badr (Cairo, 1328/1910). For the
English translation seeK. Chambers Seelye (Part 1); and
A. S. Halkirl (Part 2).
Al-Baghdadi, al-Khatib. Tarikh Baghdad, 14 vols. (Cairo, 1349/1931).
Barber, Bernard. Science and the Social Order (New York: The Free
Press, 1952).
_ _ _ _ _ _. "The Sociology of Science", Encyclopedia of Social
Sciences.
Al-Ba~ri, al-I:Jasan. See J:Iasan &1-Ba~ri.
Al-Bayhaqi, Abu Bakr A}:lniad ibn Musa. Ta'rikh Hukama' al-Islam, ed.
Muhammad Kurd Ali (Damascus: Al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-
Arabi, 1946).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Kitab al-Asma' wa'l-$~fat (Beyrut: Dar al-Kutub al-
'Ilmiyyah, n. d.).
Birkeland, Harris. The Legend of the Opening of Muhammed"s Breast
(Oslo: I Kommisjon Hos Jacob Dybwad, 1955).
Boer T. J. De.The History of Philosophy in Islam, trans. Edward R.
Jones (New York: Dover Publications, 1967).
Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. The Islamic Dynasties (Edinburgh: At The
University Press, 1980).
Braybrooke, David. Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987).
Al-BukharL $a/:tf/:l in Al-Kutub al-Sittah wa Shuru/:luhli (Istanbul: <;agn
Yaymlan and Dar Sa}:lnCm, 1992).

234
 Burton, John. The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of
Abrogation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1990).
Cerrahoglu, isl!,lail. "Ali ibl). Abi Talha'nm Tefsir Sahifesi", Ankara
Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi, XVII (1969),
55 f.
_ _ _ _ _ _. Kur'an Teh:ir~nin Dogu§U ve Buna Hlz Verim Amiller
(Ankara: A. U. Ilahiyat Faki.iltesi Yaymlan, 1968). ·
- - - - - - _ : Yahya ibn Sallam ve Tefsirdeki Metodu (Ankara: A. D.
Ilahiyat Faki.iltesi Yaymlan, 1970).
Cook, Michael A. "The Origins of Kalam", BSOAS 43 (1980), 32f.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Early Muslim Dogma: A Source Critical Study
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Corbin, Henry. Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi,
trans. by Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, Bollingen Series, 1969).
Coulson, N. J. A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: At The University
Press, 1978).
Craig, Wm. Lane. The Kalam Cosmological Argument (London:
Macmillan, 1979).
Daiber, Hans. Wasil ibn 'Ata Als Prediger Und Theologe (Leiden, New
York: E. J. Brill, 1988).
Dampier, William C. A His,tory of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989).
Al-Darimi, Sunan in Al-Kutub al-Sittah wa Shuru/:tuha (Istanbul: <;agn
Yaymlan and Dar Sal,lniin, 1992).
Al-Darimi, Abii Sa'id 'Uthman ibn Sa'id. Kitab al-Radd 'ala'l-Jahmiyya
des Abu Sa 'id 'Uthman ibn Sa 'id al-Darimi, ed. Gosta
Vitestam (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup and Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1960).
Al-Dhahabi, Abii 'Abdullah Shams al-Din Mul;lammad. Tadhkirat al-
fluffa:r., (Hyderabad: The Dairatu '1-Ma 'arif-il-Osmania,
1955). -
Dhanani, Alnoor. The Physical Theory of Kalam: Atoms, Space, and
Void in Basrian.Mu 'taziti Cosmology (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1994).
Dunlop, D. M. "Biographical Material From the Siwan al-Hikma", JRAS
(1957).

235
 ------.·"The Translations of al-Bitr!q and Yahia (Yuhanna) b. al-
Bitdq", JRAS (1959) 140f.
_ _ _ _ _ _. "The Nichomachean Ethics in Arabic, Books I-VI",
BSOAS 17 (1955), lf.
Duri, A. A. "Al-Zuhri: A Study on the Beginnings of History Writing in
Islam", BSOAS 19 ( 1957), lf.
Dutton, Yasin. "Sunna, I:Iadith and Madi:nan 'Amal", liS 4:1 (1993), lf.
Elder, Earl. Edgar, trans. A Commentary on the Creed of/slam: Sa'd al-
Din al-Taftazani on the Creed of Najm al-Din al-Nasafi
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950)
Ennami, A. K. "A Description of New Ibadi Manuscripts from North
Africa", JSS 15 (1970).
van Ess, Joseph. "Abii'l-Hudhayl in Contact: The Genesis of an
Anecdote" in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies
in Honour of George F. Hourani ed. Marmura, Michael
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).
_ _ _ _ _ _. Anfii.nge muslimischer Theologie (Beirut, 1977).
-------'---· "The Beginnings of Islamic Theology", The Cultural
Context o.f"Medieval Learning, ed. by J. E. Murdoch and
E. D. Sylla (Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel Publish~ng
Company, 1975).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "Das Kitab al-'Irja' des Hasan b. Muhammad b. al-
I:Ianafiyya", Arabica, XXI (1974), 20f.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Das Kitab an-Nq.kt des Nazzam (Gottingen, 1972)
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Une Lecture a rebours de l'histoire du Mu'tazilisme
(Paris, 1984). ·
_ _ _ _ _ _."The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology" in Logic in
Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassovitz, 1970).
-..,.-----· "Mu 'tazilism" in The Encyclopedia of Religion.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert
Hidschra (Berlin, 1991).'
_ _ _ _ _ _. "Umar II and his Epistle Against the Qadariya", Abr-
Nahrain 12 (1971-2), 19f.
_ _ _ _ _ _ ,. "Ein unbekantes Fragment de Nazzam" in Der Orient in
der Forschung, ed. by W. Hohnerbach; 197f.
-------:·Zwischen Hadit und Teologie (Berlin, 1975)
Fakhri, Majid. Ethical Theories in Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991).
236
 -----____,· A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983).
Frank, Richard MacDonough. "Abu Hashim's Theory of States: Its
Structure and Function", Aetas do IV Congresso de
Estudoes Arabes. e Islamicos, Coimbra-Lisboa 1 a 8 de
Setembro de 1968 (Leiden, 1971).
------'---~· . Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the
Basrian School of the Mu 'tazila in the Classical Period
(Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1978).
_ _ _ _ _ _."Bodies and Atoms: The Ash'arite Analysis" in Islamic
Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of George
F. Hourani ed. Marmura, Michael (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1984).
- - - - - - - , · "The Kalam, an Art of Contradiction-Making' or
Theological Science? Some Remarks on the
Question"Journal of the American Oriental Society, 88
(1968).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "Kalam and Philosophy: A Perspective from One
Problem" in Islamic Philosophical Theology, .ed. Parviz
Morewedge (Albany: State University ofNew York Press,
1979).
_ _ _ _ _ _ .The Metaphysics of Created Being According to Abu
L-Hudhayl Al~ 'Allaf (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-
Archaeologisch lnstitut, 1966).
_ _ _ _ _ _ ."The Neoplatonism of Gahm ibn Safwan", Le Museon
78 (1965), 395f.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term anniya",
Cahiers de Byrsa (1956), 181f.
_ _ _ _ _ _."Remarks on the Early Development of Kalam", Atti del
terzo Congresso di Studi arabe e islamici, Ravello, 1-6
Settembre; 1966 (Napoli, 1967).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "Some Fragments of Ishaq's Translation of the De
Anima", Cahiers de Byrsa 8 (1958-9), 231f.
. Friedlaender, Israel. "The Heterodoxies of the Shi<eites by Ibn Hazm",
lAOS 28 (1907), 1-80; 29 (1908), 1-183.
Fyzee, Asaf A. A. "Materials for an Isma'ili J3ibliography: 1920-1934)",
Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society, II ( 1935), 59f.
Flick, J. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq (Frankfurt a.M., 1925).

237
 Fuller, Steve. Philosophy of Science and its Discontents (New York,
London: The Guilford Press, 1993).
Giere, Ronald N. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (Chicago,
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).
Gjertsen, Derek. Science and Philosophy: Past and Present (London:
Penguin Books, 1989).
Goldziher, Ignaz. Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trans.
Andras and Ruth Hamori (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1981).
Greene, John C. Science, Ideology and World View: Essays in the
History of Evolutionary Ideas (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1981).
Grunebaum, G. E. von. "The Concept of Plagiarism in Arabic Theory",
JNES 3 (1944), 234f. ·
Guillaume, Alfred. "Some Remarks on Free Will and Predestination in
Islam, together with a translation of the Kittib u-1 Qadar
from the Sahih of al-Bukhari", Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society, (1924)
Gutas, Dimitri. Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation: A
Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia (New Haven,
Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 1975).
Ijajji Khalifah (Katib <;elebi). Kashf al-'?uniin. Eds. ~erafettin Yaltkaya
and Kilisli Rifat Bilge. 2 vols. Istanbul: Ma'arif Matbaast,
1941-43. .
Halkin, A. S., trans. Moslem Schisms and Sects (Al-Fark Bain al-
Firak), part II (Tel Aviv: N. p., 1935). See K. Chambers
Seelye for part I.
Hallaq, Wael B. "Was al-Shafi'i the Master Architect of Islamic
Jurisprudence", IJMES 25 (1993), 587f.
----------=-=-=--=--· "U~iil al-Fiqh Beyond Tradition", JIS 3:2 (1992),
172f.
Hamidullah, Muhammad. Majallat al-Majma' al- 'ilmi al- 'Arabi
(1953).
_ _ _ _ _ _ ."Educational System in the Time of the Prophet", IC 13
(1939), 48f.
Hasan:, Ahmad. Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence
(Islamabad: Islamic Research Center, 1986).
Ijasan al-Ba~ri. Tafsir al-flasan al-Ba~ri, ed. Muhammad 'Abd al-
Rahim, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar·al-Hadith, 1992).
238
 Hasan, Siddiq. Kashfal-Ghumma 'an Iftiriiq al-'Ulamii' (Bhapol, India:
Matba'a Shahjahani, 1304/1886).
Hoodbhoy, Pervez. Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the
Battle for Rationality (Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed
& Co., 1992).
Horovitz, Josef. "The Earliest Biographies of the Prophet and Theit
Authors", IC 1 (1927), 535f; and II (1928), 22-50; 164-
182; 495-526.
Hourani, George F. "The Early Growth of the Secular Sciences in
Andalusia", Sf 32 (1970).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Ed. Essay,\' on Islamic Philosophy and Science
(Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press,
1975).
_ _ _ _ _ _ .Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
Ibn 'Abbas, 'AbdAllah. Tafsir'Abdullah ibn 'Abbas, ed. Rashid 'Abd
al-Mun'im al-Rijal (Istanbul: Eda Nesriyat, 1994).
Ibn Abi Usaybi'a. Kitiib _'Uyun al-Anbii' fi Tabaqiit al-Atibbii' (Beirut:
Dar al-Maktabat al-Hayat, 1965).
Ibn Anas. See Imam Malik Ibn Anas.
Ibn al-Athir. Al-Kiimilfi al-Ta'rikh, ed. C.J. Tornberg (Leiden,.1851-
1874).
_ _ _ _ _ _. Usd al-Ghab(lh (Cairo, 1285-7).
Ibn I:Iajar. See al-Asqalani, Ibn I:Iajar.
Ibn I:Ianbal, AQ.mad. Musnad in Al-Kutub al-Sittah wa Shurtl/:luha
(Istanbul: <;agn Yaymlan and Dar SaQ.niin, 1992).
_ _ _ _ _ _ _. "Kitab al-Radd 'ala'l-Zanadiqa wa'l-Jahmiyyah",
Diirul~Funun 1lahiyat Fakii.ltesi Mecmu 'a,n, 4-6
(1927), 315.
Ibn I:Iazm. Al-Kitab al-Fi\wll · fi al-Milal· wa 'l-A/:lwii' wa 'l-Ni/:lal. 5
vo1s. Cairo, 1964.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Al-U~iU wa'l-Furu' (Beyrut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah,
1984).
Ibn IsQ.aq. Sirat Rasulillah, ed. by Mu~tafa al-Saqa, Ibrahim al-Abyari,
'Abd al-Hafi~ Shalabi (Cairo: 1936); trans. together with
Ibn Hisham's Sirah by Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985).
Ibn Juljul. Tabaqiit al-Atibba' (Cairo, 1955).
239
 Ibn al-Kalbi, Hisham. Kitlib al-Asnlim, trans. by Nabih Amin Faris
(Princeton University Press, 1952).
Ibn Kathir, Abu'l-Fada 'Imad al-Din Isma 'il ibn 'Umar. Qisas al-
Anbiya', ed. Muhammad ~mad 'Abd al-'Aziz (Cairo: Dar
al-Hadith, n.d.). · ·
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Bidliyat at-Khalq, ed. Ibrahim Muhammad al-Jamal
(Beyrut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1988).
Ibn Khallikan. Wafayat al-A 'yan, 8 vols., ed. Ihsan Abbas (Beirut: Dar
al-Thaqafa, 1968-72).
_ _ _ _ _ _ .Ibn Khallikan's Biographical Dictionary, trans. Mac
Guckin De Slane (New York and London: Johnson Reprint
Corporation, 1961).
Ibn al-Nadim. Al-Fihrist. Ed. Ric;la Tajaddud. Tehran, 1391/1350/1971.
Ibn al-Qifti. Tlirikh al-Hukama ', ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903).
Ibn Sa'd. Kitab Tabaqat al-Kubrii, ed. by Il;lsan 'Abbas (Beyrut: Dar
$adir, 1968).
Ibn Sayyid al-Nas. 'Uyun al-Athlir fi Fun{m al-Maghlizi wa 'l-Shamti 'il
wa'l-Siyar (Cairo, 1356).:
Ibn Taymiya. Majmu' min al-Rasail wa'l-Masiiil al-Qayyima (Cairo,
1349/1930).
Al-'Iji, 'Ac;lud al-Din. al-Mawiiqiffi 'Ilm al-Kaliim. 8 vols. Cairo,
1325/1907.
Imam Malik Ibn Anas. Al-Muwatta of Imam Malik Ibn Anas: The First
Formulation of Islamic Law, trans. Aisha Abdurrahman
Bewley (London and New York: Kegan Paul International,
1989).
Irving, T. B. The Qur'an: Translation and Commentary (Brattleboro,
Vermont: Amana Books, 1988).
lvanow, W. Two Early Ismii 'iii Treatises (Bombay, 1933)
_ _ _ _ _ _. "Early Shi'ite Movements", Journal of the Bombay
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Studies, 17 (1941), lf.
------
. "Ismailis and Qarmatians", Journal of the Bombay
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Studies, 16 (1940), 43f.
Jafri, S. Husain M. Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam
(London, New York: Longman and Librairie du Liban,
1979).

240
 Al-Hil).i~,Kitdb Kitdb al-Baydn wa al-Tabyin. Ed. 'Abd al-SaHim
Mul).ammad Harlin. 4 vols. in 2. Cairo: lajnat al-Ta'lif,
1946-50.
Jeffry, Arthur. "The Qur'an as Scripture", MW 40 (1950), 41-55; Part II
106-1134; and part III 184-275.
Jones, J. M. B. "The Chronology of the Maghazf: A Textual Survey",
. BSOAS XIX ( 1957), 245f.
Juynboll, G. H. A. MuslimTradition: Studies in Chronology,
Provinance and Authorship of Early Hadith (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "The Date of the Great Fitna", Arabica 20 (1973), 142f.
Kafafi, M. "The Rise of Kharijism According to Abu Sa 'id Mul).ammad
ibn Sa'id al-Azdi al-Qalhati", BFAEU 14 (1952), 29f.
Kamali, Mohammad Hashlin. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence
(Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1989).
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965).
Karaman, Hayreddin. islam Hukukunda jctihad (Ankara: Diyanet i§leri
Ba§kanhg1 Yaymlan, 1975).
Kaya, Mahmut. islam Kaynaklan I§zgmda Aristoteles ve Felsefesi
(Istanbul: Ekin Yaymlan, 1983).
Khadduri, Majid and Herbert J. Liebesny, ed. Law in the Middle East
(Washington, P. C.: TheMiddleEastlnstitute, 1955).
KhaUaf, 'Abd al-Wahhab . .'Ilm U~ul al-Fiqh: Khula~at Tiirikh al-Tashri'
al-Isldmi (Istanbul: Al-Maktabat al-IsHimiyyah, 1984).
Al-Khayyat, Abii'l-Husayn 'Abd al-Rahman. Kitab al-Intisar wa al-
Radd 'ala .Ibn al-Rawandi al-Mul(tid, ed. by H. S.
Nyberg (Cairo:· Maktabat al-Dar al-'Arabiyyah li'l-Kitab ,
1993) [This work is re-edited and translated by A. Nader
as LeLivre de Triomphe (Beyrut, 1957)].
Koc;yigit, Talat. Hadis Ist,zlqhlan Hakkznda Nu[Jbetu 'l-Fiker Serhi
(Ankara: A. U. IlahiyatFaki.iltesi Yaymlan, 1971).
Kohlberg, E. "The Development of the Imam! Shi 'I Doctrine of Jihad" in
ZDMG 126 (1976), 64f.
Koren, J. and Y. D. Nevo. "Methodological Approaches to Islamic
Studies", Der Islam 68 (1991), 87f.
Kraemer, Joel L. Humanism in the Renilissance of Islam (Leiden, New
. York, Koln: E. J. -Brill,' 1992). ·

241
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: A Preliminary
Study", JAOS 104 (1984), 135f.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam: Abu
Sulaymiin al-SUistani and his Circle (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1986).
Kragh, Helge. An Introduction to the Historiography of Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Kucukkalay, Huseyin. Abdullah ibn Mes'ud ve Tefsir Ilmindeki Yeri
(Konya: Deniz Kuslari Matbaasi, 1971). ·
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1970).
Lane, E. W. Arabic-English Lexicon (Cambridge: The Islamic Text
Society, 1984).
Laudan, Larry. Science and Values: The Aiins of Science and their Role
in Scient(f'ic Debate (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984).
Leaman, Oliver. An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Lerner, R. and Muhsin Mahdi. Medieval Political Philosophy: A
Sourcebook (Glencoe: Agora, 1963).
Lewinstein, Keith. "The Azariqa in Islamic Heresiography", BSOAS 54
(1991).
Lewis, Bernard. The Origins of Isma 'ilism (Cambridge: W. Heffer &
Sons Ltd., 1940).
Longino, Helen E. Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1990).
Macdonald, Duncan B. "The Development of the Idea of Spirit in Islam-I
& II", The Moslem World, 22 (1932), 25-42 and 153-
168 ..
Madelung, Wilferd, ed. The "Sfra" of Imiim A(lmad b. Yahya Al-Nllsir
li-Dfn Allah (Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990).
_ _ _ _ _ _. "The Shiite and Kharijite Contribution to Pre-Ash'arite
Kalam ", Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. by Parviz
Morewedge (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1979)
_ _ _ _ _ _. Der Imiim al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim, Berlin, 1965.

242
_ _ _ _ _ _ ."Early SunniDoctrine Conerning Faith as reflected in the
Kitab al-Iman of Abu 'Ubayd al-Qasim ibn Sallam", SI
32 (1970).
_ _ _ _ _ _ ."The Early Murji'a in Khurasan and Transaxiona and the
Spread of Hanafism", Der Islam 59 (1982).
Mahdi, Muhsin. Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: 1964).
Mahmasani, Sub hi. Al-Awza 'i wa Ta 'alimuhu al-Insaniyyah wa 'l-
Qanuniyyah (Beyrut: Dar al-'Ilm li'l-Malayin, 1978).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Falsafat al-Tashri' al-Islam: The Philosophy of
Jurisprudence in Islam, trans. Farhat J. Ziadeh (Shah
Alam, Malaysia: Penerbitan Hizbi, 1987).
Makdisi, George. "The Juridical Theology of Shafi'i: Origins and
Significance of U~ul al-Fiqh", SI LIX (1984), Sf.
_ _ _ _ _ _ , ed. Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton
A. R. Gibb. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965).
Malik Ibn Anas. See Imam Malik Ibn Anas.
Maquet, Jacques. The Sociology of Knowledge: Its Structure and its
Relation to the Philosophy of Knowledge, trans. John F.
Locke (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
Publishers, 1977).
Marmura, Michael, ed. Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in
Honour of George F. Hourani (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1984).
Al-Mas'iidl. Muruj al-Dhahab (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1966).
------'----· Al-Tanbih wa 'l-Ishraf (Leyden, 1893).
Ma'sumi, Muhammad Saghir Hasan. "Disagreement of the Sahaba and
Early Jurists", HI 2 (1987), 15f.
Al-Matiiridi, Abu Mansur Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Mahmud.
Kitab al;Tawhid, Fathalla Kho1eif (Beyrouth: Dar El-
Meshreq Editeurs Sari, 1982).
McCarthy, Richard J. The Theology of Al-Ash 'ari (Beyrouth: lmprimerie
Catholique, 1953).
McNeill, William. The Rise of the West : A History of the Human
Community (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1963). ·
Merton, Robert K. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical
Investigations, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978).

243
 _ _ _ _ _ _ .Social Theory and Social Structure, second enlarged
edition (New York: The Free Press, 1968).
Meyendorff, John. "Byzantine Views on Islam", DOP 18 (1964), 115f.
Meyerhof, Max. "New Light on Hunain ibn Ishaq and his Period", Isis 8
- (1926). .
Mez,' Adam. The Renaissance of Islam, trans. by S. K. Bukhsh and D.
S. Margoliouth (London: 1937).
Mingana, Alphonse. "The Apology of Timothy, the Partriarch, before the
Caliph Mahdi", BJRL, XII (1928), 137f.
Miskawayh. Kitiib Tajiirib al-Umam, ed. H. F. Amedroz (Baghdad: Al-
Muthanna, n.d.).
Moosa, M. "Al-Kindi's Role in the Transmition of Greek Knowledge to
the Arabs", JPHS 15:1 (1967).
Morewedge, Parviz. ''Contemporary Scholarship on Near Eastern
Philosophy", PF 2 (1970-71), 122f.
_ _ _ _ _ _. ed. Islamic Philosophy arid Mysticism (Delmar, NY:
Caravan Books, 1981).
- - - - - - - - , ' ed. Islamic Philosophical Theology (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1979).
Motzki, Harold. "The Mu~annaf of 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Sam'ani as a Source
of Authentic A/:tiidith of the First Century A. H.", JNES
50 (1991), If.
Muhammad, Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman. Al-Madkhal ila Fiqh at-
Imam 'Ali R.A. (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 1979).
Muir, William. The Caliphate: Its Rise,· Decline and Fall (Edinburgh:
John Grant, 1915).
Musallam al-J_,ahji, Abu'l-Ghimar ibn MuQ.ammad ibn Ja 'far. Sirat al-
Imiim AJ:tmad ibn. YaJ:tyii al-Nii.Jir li Din Allah, ed.
Wilfred Madelung (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1990).
Myers, Eugene A. Arabic Thought and the Western World in the Golden
Age of Islam (New York: F. Ungar Publishing Co.,
1964).
Nader, Albert N. Le Systeme Philosophique des Mu 'tazila (Beirut, Dar
El-Machreq Sarl, 1956). '
Al-Nasafi, Abu'l-Mu 'in Maymun ibn Mul;lammad. Tabsirat al-Adillah,
ed. Claude Salame (Damascus: Institut Frangais de Damas,
1990). .

244
 Al-Naysaburi, Al-Hakim. An Introduction to the Science of Tradition,
trans. by James Robson [al-Madkhal fi U~ul al-HadUh]
(London, 1953). ·
Al-Nawbakhti, Kitdb Firaq al-Shi'a, ed. H. Ritter (Leipzig, 1931).
Al-Nimlah, 'Ali Ibrahim. Marakiz al-Tarjamah al-Qadimah 'inda'l-
Muslimin (Riyad: Maktabat al-Malik Fahd al-Wataniyyah,
1412/1992).
'Nu'mani, Shams al-'Ulama'. See'Allama Shibll Nu'mani, Shams al-
'Ulama'.
Obermann, Julian. "Political Theology in Early Islam", JAOS 55 (1935), ·
.138f.
O'Leary, De Lacy. Arabic Thought and its Place in Hi~tory (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922; 2nd ed. 1962).
------.·History of Arabia Before Muhammad (Lahore: Alliance
Publishers, 1989). ·
- - - - - - . · How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul Limited, 1948).
O'Shaughnessy, Thomas. The Development of the Meaning of Spirit in
the Koran (Roma: Pontificio Institutum Orientilium
Studiorum, 1953).
Oz, Osman. imam-z Azamm Be~ Eseri (Istanbul: Kalem Yaymcthk A.
s., 1981).
Patton, Walter M. Af:tmad ibn, Hanbal and the Mil:ma (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1897).
Pessagno, J. Meric. "The Uses of Evil in Maturidian Thought", SI 60
(1984), 59f.
Peters, J. R. T. M. God's Created Speech: A Study in the Speculative
Theology of the Mu 'tazili Qd(ii'l-Qu(idt Abu 'l-"flasan
'Abd al-Jabbdr ibn A/:tmad al-Hamadani (Leiden, 1976).
Pines, Shlomo. "A Note on an Early Meaning of the Term Mutakallim",
lOS 1 (1971), 224f.
Rippin, Andrew and Jan Knappert, ed and trans. Textual Sources fdr the
Study of Islam (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble
Books, 1986).
Ritter, Helmut. "Studien zur Geschichte der islamischen Frommigkeit: I.
Hasan al-Basri", Der Islam 21 (1933).
Robson, J. "Ibn Ishaq's Use of the Isnad", BJRL 38 (1956), 449f.

245
Rosenthal, Franz. "From Arabic Books and Manuscripts VI: Istanbul
Materials for Al-Kindi and Sarahsi", lAOS 76 (1956).
_ _ _ _ _ _. Knowledge Truimphant: The Concept of Knowledge in
Medieval Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970).
_ _ _ _ _ _. The Study of Muslim Intellectual and Social Studies:
Approaches and Methods, monograph of the third annual
United Arab Emirates Lecture in Islamic Studies, The
University of Michigan Ann Arbor, October 9,1980.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . The Technique and Approach of Muslim Scholarship
(Rome, 1947).
_ _ _ _ _ _. Aftmad ibn al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsi (New Haven:
American Oriental Series, 1943).
Ross, E. C. "Annals of 'Oman from Early Tome~ to the Year 1728 A. D.,
from an Arabic MS by Sheykh Sirha'n ... " Journal and
the Proceedings of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal
43 (1874). Illf.
Salem, Elie Adib. Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956).
Salisbury, Edward E. "Contributions From Original Sources to Our
Knowledge of the Science of Muslim Tradition", lAOS
VII (1862), 60f.
Salqini, 'Abd Allah Muhammad. Habr al- Ummah: 'Abd Allah . ibn
'Abbas wa Madrasatuhu ft al-Tafszr (Beyrut: Dar al-
Salam, 1976).
Schacht, Joseph. "An Early Murci 'ite Treatise: The Kitiib al-Alim Wal-
Muta'allim", Oriens 17 (1964), 96f.
- - - - - - . · An Inroduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986).
_ _ _ _ _ _. "On Abu Mus'ab and his Mukhtasar", Andalus 30
(1965), lf. .
_ _ _ _ _ _. "On Musa ibn 'Uqba's Kitiib al-Maghazi", Acta
Orientalia 21:4 (1953), 288f.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "On Shafi'i's Life and Pesonality", Studia Orientalia
Ioanni Pedersen: Septuagenario A. D. VII Nov. Anno
MCMLII A Collegis Discipulis Amicis Dicata (Hauniae,
Kopenhagen: Einar Munksgaard, 1953).
_ _ _ _ _ _."On Some Manuscripts in Kairouan and Tunis", Arabica
14 (1967), 225f. .

246
 _ _ _ _ _ _ . The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence (Oxford: At The
Clarendon Press, 1950).
_ _ _ _ _ _and C. E. Bosworth, ed. The Legacy of I slam, 2nd. ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
Schwarz, Michael. "The Letter of Hasan al-Basri", Oriens 20 (1967), 15f.
Seale, Morris S. Muslim Theology (London: Luzac and Comp'any
Limited, 1964).
Seelye, K. Chambers. Moslem Schisms and Sects (New York: Columbia
University Oriental Series, 1919); translation of 'Abd al-
Qahir al-Baghdadi's Al-Farq Bayn al-Firdq, part 1. See
also A. S. Halkin.
Shehadi, Fadlou. Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy (Delmar, New
York: Caravan Books, 1982)
Al-ShahrasHini, M. b. 'Abd al-Karim. Kitdb al-Milal wa al-Nihal. Ed.
W. Cureton. 3 vols. Cairo, 1948. ·
Shahrazuri. Nuzhat al-Arw(i/:t wa Rawdat al-Afrd/:t fi Ta 'rikh al-
J;Iukamah wa'l-Faliisifah, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (India,
1976).
Sharif, Muhammad M., ed. A-History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols.
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963).
Shehadi, Fadlou. Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy (Delmar, NY:
Caravan Books, 1982).
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. "faith as Tasdiq" in Islamic Philosophical
Theology, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1979).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "The Concept of Shari 'a Among Some Mutakallimfm" in
Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R.
Gibb, ed. George Makdisi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965).
Somogyi, Joseph De. "A Qasida on the Destruction of Baghdad by the
Mongols", BSOAS 7 41f.
--~---· A Short History of Oriental Trade (Hildesheim: Georg
Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968).
_ _ _ _ _ _. "A Treatise on the Qarmatians in the Kitdb al-Munta'{.am
oflbn al-Jauzi", RDSO 13 (1931-2), 248f.
Sorokin, Pitirim A. Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 vols. (New York:
· American Book Co., 1937).

247
 Sprenger, A. ·"On the Origin and Progress of Writing down Historical
Records Among the Musulmans", Journal of the Asiatic
Society ofBangal, 25 (1856), 303-29; and 375-81.
Shibli Nu 'mani, Shams al- 'Ulama'. Omar the Great, 2 vols., trans.
· Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (Lahore: Sh. Muhammmad
Ashraf, 1975).
Stern, S.M., A. Hourani and V. Brown, ed. Islamic Philosophy and the
Classical Tradition: Essays presented by his Friends
and Pupils to Richard Walzer on his Ceventieth
Birthday (London: 1972).
Strothmann, R. "On the History of Islamic Heresiography", IS 12 (1938),
Sf.
Subhan, Abdus. "Al-Jahm ibn Safwan and his Philosophy", IS 11
(1937), 221f.
AI-Tabar!, Abii Ja'far.Al-Tabari, Jtimi' al-Bayiin fi Tafs"ir al-Qur'iin
(Beyrut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1980). ·
_ _ _ _ _ _. Tiir"ikh al-Rusul wa '1-Muluk. Ed. M. J. de Goeje. In 3
series of 6, 3 and 4 vols. respectively. Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1879-1901.
Al-Taftazani, Sa'd al-Din. A Commentary on the Creed of Islam: Sa'd
al-D"in al-Taftazani on the Creed of Najm al-D"in al-
Nasafi, trans. Earl Edgar Elder, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1950) ·
AI-Tarifi, Nasir ibn 'Aq:n ibn .Hisir. Al-Qat;lii fi 'Ahdi 'Umar ibn al-
Khattiib, 2 vols. (Jiddah: Dar al-Makan, 1986).
Taylor, Richard C. "'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi's Kalamfi Ma/:tt;l al-Khayr
(Liber de Causis)" in Islamic Theology and Philosophy:
Studies in Honour of George F. Hourani ed. Michael
Marmura (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1984).
Thomson, William. "Kharijism and the Kharijites" in Macdonald
Presentation Volume (Princeton, 1933).
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. "The Sects of Islam", MW 39 ( 1949), 208f.
--------===--=-=· "Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam I &
II", MW 40 (1950); 207-216 and 276-287.
al-Tirmizi, Sunan in Al-Kutub al-Sittah wa Shuru/:tuhii (Istanbul: <_;::agn
Yaymlan and Dar Sal:mun, 1992).
Tritton, A. S. "Man, Nafs, Ru~, 'Aql", BSOAS 34 (1971).
_ _ _ _ _ _ . Muslim Theology (London; 1947).
248
_ _ _ _ _ ."Theology in the Making", JRAS (1945), 82f.
Unal, ismail Hakk1. imam Ebu Hanife'nin Hadis Anlayz~·z ve H_anefi
Mezhebinin. Hadis Metodu (Ankara: Diyanet I~leri
Ba~kanllg1 Yaymlan, 1994).
Vitestam, Gosta, ed. Kitiib al-Radd 'ala 'l-Jahmiyya des Abu Sa 'id
Uthman ibn Sa 'id al-Diirimi (Lund and Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1960).
Walzer, Richard. Greek into Arabic (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1962).
_ _ _ _ _ _ ."The Rise of Islamic Philosophy", Oriens 3 (1950).
_ _ _ _ _ _. "New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle",
Oriens 6 (1953), 9lf.
Al-Waqidi, Kitiib al-Maghiizi, trans. by J. Wellhausen (Berlin: Druck
und Verlag vonG. Reimer, 1882).
Watt, Montgomary. Bell's Introduction to the Qur'an (Edinburgh: At the
University Press, 1970).
_ _ _ _ _ _. "Early Discussions About the Qur'an", MW 40 (1950),
27f.
-~----·The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh:
At The University Press, 1973).
-----__,·Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam (London:
Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1948).
_ _ _ _ _ _. Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: At the
University Press, 1987)
- - - - - - . · Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: At the University
Press, 1987)
_ _ _ _ _ _. "Kharijite Thought in the Umayyad Period", Der Islam,
36 (1961), 15f.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . "The Logical Basis ofEarlyKalam", IQ 6 (1962), 3f. ·
Weiss, Bernard. "The Primacy of Revelation in Classical _Islamic Legal
Theory as Expanded by Sayf al-Din al- 'Amidi", Sf 59
(1984), 79f.
Wellhausen, Julius. The Religio-Political Factions in Early Islam,
trans. by R. C. Ostle (Amsterdam, Oxford: North Holland
Publishing Company, 1975).
_ _ _ _ _ _ .The Arab Kingdom and its Fall (Calcutta, 1927).

249
Wensinck, A. J. The Muslim Creed~' Its Genesis and Historical
Development (Cambridge: At The University Press,
1932).
Whitehead, Alfred North. Modes of Thought (New York: The Free
Press, 1938). ·
_ _ _ _ _ _ .Process and Reality, ed. by David Ray Griffin and
Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1979).
_ _ _ _ _ _ .Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free
Press, 1967).
Whitley, Richard. The Intellectual and Social Organization of the
Sciences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
Wolfson, Harry Austryn. The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
_ _ _ _ _ _. "The Terms Tasawwur and Tasdiq in Arabic Philosophy
and their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents", MW 33
(1943), 114f.
Yavuz, Yunus.Vehbi. Hane,fi Mezhebinde ictihad Felsefesi (Istanbul:
I~aret Yaymlan, 1981).
Al-Zamakhshari, Mul)ammad. Al-Kashshiif (Beyrut: Dar al-Kutiib al-
'Ilmiyyah, 1995).
Zaman, Iftikhar. "The Science of Rijal as a Method in the Study of
Hadiths", JIS 5:1 (1994), 5f.
Zaydan, 'Abd al-Karim. Al-Wajiz fi U~ul al-Fiqh (Istanbul: Dersaadet
Kitabevi, n. d.). '

250
 INDEH
A ban ibn 'Uthman (c. 20-105/640-
723), 161, 175, 176
'Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, 189, 190
'Abdullah ibn al-Mubarak, 178
Absolute, 38, 40, 62, 155, 156, 171,
172: activity, 46; k,now-ledge
('illn), 62, 63; realm, 8, 9, 39, 40,
62, 63; science, 1, 7; will of God,
199
Abu I;Ianifah (d. 1501767), 162, 164,
191, 192, 203, 204, 205, 213
Abu'l-Hudhayl a!- 'A!Uif (d. c. 226/840);
205, 212, 213
Abu Yiisuf Ya'qiib ibn Ibrahim,
(1131731-182./798), 162, 190-191
Accumulation of knowledge, 8, 12-14,
72, 102, 142, 190
Adelard of Bath, 138
Ai:Jmad ibn I;I~mbal (d. 241/855), 212
'AU ibn Abi 'falib, 187, 189, 196
Al-'Amiri (d. 381/992), 218
'Amr ibn al-'A:;;, 175
Ancient Greek Civilization, see urider
Greek
St. Anselm, 138
Aristotle, 14! 98, 102, 105, 121, 122,
132, 211
Aristotelian: (episteme), 171;
(logic), 193; (philosophy),
172,218
Al-Ash'ari, Abii'l-I;Iasan (d. 324/935),
212
'Ata' ibn Abi·Rabai:J (d. 1141732), 161-
2 external, 31-33; internal, 33-44;
Awza'i (a. 1581774), 162, 179, 191
Al-Baghdadi, Abd ai-Qahir (d.
42911 037), 211
AI-Baghdadi, Abu al-Barakat (c.
560/1164), 211
251
AI-Baladhuri, 180
Bashshar ibn Burd, 212
Bashshariyan theology, 212
Bavarians, 135
Being, 30, 38, 39, 42, 58
Body of knowledge, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
12, 13, 14
Charlemagne (768-8 14), 135
Conceptual environment, 17
Constitution Medina, 215
Context, 225
Contextual causes, 131, 132, 133-135,
138, 139: nucleus, 120-124;
marginal, 124-126
Copernican, I I 7
Correspondence, 56
Dawiid ibn 'Ali al-Z:ahiri (d. 270/884),
212
Al-Dhahabi, 178
Dorians, 13 I
Dynamism: institutional, 125-126;
intellectual, 121-123; moral, 121;
social, 124-125
Entity, 30, 3 I, 38, 52
Environment, 224
Environmental context, 226, 230-231
Epistemology, 20, 27, 32, 37, 39, 41,
46: Islamic, 21: of science, 24, 29,
61-94; Western, 21
Experience, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30-44;
sensible, 23 see also sensible
perception
Experiential(ly), 10,37, 38, 41
(morally), 42, 61: absolute, 9, 10,
12; aspect of sensibility, 43; data,
38, 43; existent, 39; experience(s),
 44; faculties, 40; inquiries, 41; Heraclitus, 102
knowledge, 61, 62, 63; mental /:fikmah, 172; 194, 214
state, 42; mood, 38; perception(s), Hisham ibn ai-I:lakam (d. 17.91795-6),
38, 40, 48, 49; realm, 38, 39, 40, 162, 205
42; representation(s), 39, 40, 41, Historicist, I
42, 44; states, 38; subjects, 41 Homer, 89

Faqlh, (as scientist) 173 Ibn 'Abbas, 162, 164, 187

AI-Farabi (d. 339/950), 40, 193, 218 Ibn IsJ:taq (d. 1511768), 162, 175, 180,
al-Fiqh, 170, 171-193 181, 182
fiqh, 79, 80, 87, 98, 103, 105, Ibn Sa'd, 163, 176, 178, 182
142, 144, 155, 157, 164, 166, Ibn Sina, 77
170, 171, 173, 178, 192, 197, Ibrahim Nakha'i (d. c. 56/717), 161
202,204,205,211,213,214 Intellect, 37, 40, 45, 47, 48, 52, 53-
Formal linkage, 116-117 56, 57
Foundation: non-observable, 222-230; Intuition, 57-59
observable, 230 Imagination, 52-53
Frisians, 135 Islamic: civilization, 2, 4, 16, 84, 88,
Fulbert, 138, see also the School of 112, 118, 123, 138-167;
Chartres epistemology (theory of
knowledge), 21, 22; scientific
Gerfant of AurHiac, 138 conceptual scheme, 79, 91, 141,
Ghayb, 9, 10, 49 142, 153, 159-162, 166, 195, 197,
Ghaylan al-Dimashqi (d. c. 123/740), 202, 214, 218; scientific
162, 179 community, I 14; scientific
Greek: civilization, 16, 75, 88, 89, tradition, 7, 8, II, 14, 18, 89, 93,
101, 123, 126, 127, 127-133; 107,113,118,126,134,137,139,
epistemology (theory of 141, 158, 162-167; world-view, 4,
knowledge), 21; mythology, 89; 5, 9, 21' 23, 24, 75, 78, 79, 80,
science, 84, I 02; scientific 94, 113
conceptual scheme, 90, 165; Islamicity, 3, 13, 21
scientific tradition, 8, -1 I, 89, 93,
115, 131-133, 164; worldview, 75 Ja'far al-~adiq (d. 1481765), 162
Jiihiliyyah, 139
I:Iammiid ibn Abu Sulaymiin (d. AI-JaJ:ti~ (d. 255/869), 212
120/737), 162 Jahm ibn ~afwiin, 205, 206-210
I:Iammam ibn Munabbih, 160
I:Iasan al-Bal?ri, (642-728), 162, 165, Kalam, 87, 93, 94, 103, 105, 117,
178, 199,202,211-2 142, 162, 165, 166, 179, 184, 192,
Heart, I 0, 40, 41 , 43 193-214

252
 Kant: Immanuel, 19, 22, 23, 24, 33,
35, 37, 43, 52, 62, 69
Al-Kindi (d. 260/873), 218
Knossos, 131
Knowledge: concept of, 88-89;
definition of, 25-27; theory of, 19,
2~ 21, 2~ 23, 2~ 27, 29, 32, 39,
46, 49, 50; Islamic, 24
Ma'bad al-Juhani (d. 841703), 161
Malik ibn Anas (d. 1791796), 162,
181, 182, 185, 186, 191, 192
Marginal ideals, 118
Ma 'rifatullah, 23, 24.
Material opportunities, 231
A1-Maturidi, Abu Man1?ur (d. 333/915),
212
Maymiin ibn Mihran, 179
Meccan ·school, see the School of
Mecca
Medinese School, 181, 184, 185, 188
Medina School of History, 176, 185,
see also Medinese School
Mediterranean, 136
Memory, 50-51
Mental consciousness, 48-50
Method, concept of 8-11, 23, 46, 53,
90-91
Methodological aim, 114-1.16
Minoan civilization, 129, 131
A-Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), 218
MuJ:!ammad ibn al-J:Ianafiyyah (d.
81/700), 161
Mujahid ibn Jabr (d. 1001718), 161
Mycenae, 131
Mycenaean civilization, 129, 131, 132 .
Naming, 13, 14, 55; the stage of, 104-
105
253
Palatine School, 135
Parmenides, I 02
Peter Abelard, 138
Peter Lam bard (1100- 1160), 13 8
Phoenician(s), 131
Positivist(s), l
Proportioning, 56
Ptolemaic, 117
Pyrenees, 135
Pythagoras of Samos, I 02, I 04
Rosenthal: Franz, 25
Qac;li Shurayl~ (d. 80/699), 161
Sa'Id ibn al-Musayyab (d. c. 911709),
161
Salamanca, 137
Saragossa, 137
School of Chartres, 138
School of Mecca (the), 187, 188, 190
Science: . concept of, 92-93;
epistemology of, see episte-
mology; sociology of, 95-126
Scientific: activities, 129, 134, 139,
140, 141, 153, 167; advancement
(progress), 128, 139, 153;
community, 7, 8, 12, 14, 96, 97,
98, l 04, I 05-118, 141; conceptual
scheme: (see also under Islamic,
Greek and Western scientific
conceptual scheme), 108, 113, 127,
132, 138; general, 84-93, 141, 144,
158, 163; specific, 93-94, 108,
141, 142, 214; consciousness, I, 2,
6, 13, 14 15, 17, 102, 103, 104,
108, 119, 1.38, 169, 170, 178, 183,
211; ideals, 116-1 17; institution,
116; knowledge, 152; mentality,
161; process, 97-105, 130, 132,
138, 142; terminology (see also
scientific voca-bulary), 140, 144,
 162, 165, 166; theories, I 1-12;
thinking (thought), 128; tradition
(see also under Islamic, Greek and
Western scientific tradition), 7, 8,
24. 118-126, 127, 140, 141, 142,
143, 158; vocabu-lary, 162, 163
Sense datum, 31
Sensible: experience, 23; intuition, 36,
37, 41, 44, 58; perception, 31-36,
39,42,48
AI-Shiifi'i (d. 204/819), 177, 191, 192,
205: school, 188
Al-Shahrastiini (d. 547/1153), 211
AI-Shaybiini, Abu 'Abdullah
MuJ:!ammad ibn al-I;Iasan ibn
Farqad, 185, 190, 191, 192
Siciliy, 135
Al-Sijistani (d. 987-8), 218
Sophist(s), 89, 102
Stage (the): disciplinary, 102-103; of
naming, see naming; of problems,
101-102;
Subject matter, of science 6-8, 23
Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 161/778), 162
System: educational, 20; mechanical,
20; moral, 37; philosophical, 4,
l3, 14, 52
AI-Tabari, 175, 176, 180, 182, 205,
206
Tafsir, 87, 105, 142, 162, 186, 205,
214
Al-Tha'alibi, 164
Thales, 104, 132
Theory: concept of, 91-92
Thuringians, 135
Toledo, 137
Transcendent, 38, 209: absolute, 9, 38;
idea of God, 208; objects, 38;
phenomenon, 49; realm(s), I I 38,
39, 43, 163
Truth, 89-90
254
'Ulama', 7, 14, 72-74, 107, 113, 114,
127, 141' 153, 154
'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 102/720),
161
Urwah ibn ai-Zubayr (c. 25-93/645-
710), 161, 175, 176, 181, 184, 185
Wahb ibn Munabbih (d. l 10, 114/719,
723), 161, 178,217
Waqidi, I 80, 182, 217
Wasil ibn 'AW (d. 131/748), 162, 199,
205; 211-3
Western: civilization, 1, 16, 18, 75,
84, 88, 126, 127, 133-138;
epistemology (theory of
knowledge), 21; perspective, 22;
science, 84; scientific conceptual
scheme, 118-1 26; scientific
terminology, I 63; scientific
tradition, 8, 88, 98, 126, 133, 134-
138; world-view, 16, 75, 80
Whitehead, 52, 53,76
Will, 56
Worldview: conceptual environment, 4;
general framework, 64-84; Greek,
see Greek worldview; Islamic, see
Islar;nic worldview; its definition,
82-'83; its effects on scientific
advancement, 226-230; its
functions, 76-83; its nature, 67-70;
its structures, 76-79; mental
environment, 4; rise of, 70-76;
Western, see Western worldview
zeus, 132
AI-Zuhri (d. 124/742), 175, 176, 178,
179, 180, 181, 184, 185