G.R. No.
181986 December 4, 2013 In light of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of Muñoz’ charges
ELIZALDE S. CO, Petitioner,
vs.
LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us this petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set
aside the decision2 dated January 31, 2007 and
resolution3 dated March 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355. The CA rulings reversed and set
aside the decision4 dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City, Branch 5, in Criminal Case
Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, and acquitted respondent Ludolfo
P. Munoz, Jr. (Munoz) of three counts of libel.
Factual Antecedents
The case springs from the statements made by the respondent
against the petitioner, Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews
with radio stations in Legaspi City. Munoz, a contractor, was
charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a
wealthy businessman, was behind the filing of suit, Munoz made
the following statements:
(a) Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Legaspi City to expedite the issuance of warrant of
arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury
case;
(b) Co manipulated the results of the government
bidding involving the Masarawag-San Francisco
dredging project, and;
(c) Co received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the
condition that Co will sub-contract the project to
Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.5
Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the
filing of three criminal informations for libel before the RTC.6
Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his right to file
a separate civil action arising from Muñoz’s libelous remarks
against him.7
In his defense,8 Muñoz countered that he revealed the
anomalous government bidding as a call of public duty. In fact,
he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the
anomalous dredging project. Although the Ombudsman
dismissed the cases, Muñoz claimed that the dismissal did not
disprove the truth of his statements. He further argued that
Co is a public figure considering his participation in government
projects and his prominence in the business circles. He also
emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters of public
interest and are, thus, privileged.
Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits,
the prosecution has the burden of proving the existence of
actual malice, which, Muñoz claimed, it failed to do.
In its decision, the RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of
libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution established the
elements of libel. In contrast, Muñoz failed to show that the
imputations were true and published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, as required in Article 361 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).9
against Co, the RTC also held that Muñoz’ statements were
baseless accusations which are not protected as privileged
communication.10
In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay
₱5,000,000.00 for each count of libel as moral damages,
₱1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and
₱297,699.00 for litigation expense.11
Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was
impressed with public interest and Muñoz’ statements were
protected as privileged communication under the first
paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC.12
It also declared that Co was a public figure based on the RTC’s
findings that he was a "well-known, highly-regarded and
recognized in business circles."13
As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that
are imbued with public interest.14
Hence, the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz
of the libel charges due to the prosecution’s failure to
establish the existence of actual malice.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer
appeal the criminal aspect of the libel suits because that would
violate Muñoz’ right against double jeopardy. Hence, he claims
damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court (ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil
action is instituted with or separately from the criminal
action.15
He also claims that the civil liability of an accused may be
appealed in case of acquittal.16
Co further makes the following submissions:
First, the CA erred when it disregarded the presumption of
malice under Article 35417 of the RPC. To overcome this
presumption, Muñoz should have presented evidence on good or
justifiable motive for his statements.18
On the contrary, the context of Muñoz’s radio interviews
reflects his evident motive to injure Co’s reputation instead of
a sincere call of public duty.19
Second, the CA erred in declaring Co as a public figure based
on the RTC findings that he is known in his community. He
claims this as a relatively limited community comprising of his
business associates.20
The Respondent’s Arguments
Muñoz argues that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111 of the
ROC because, as its title suggests, the provision presupposes
the filing of a civil action separately from the criminal action.
Thus, when there is no reservation of the right to separately
institute the civil action arising from the offense, the
extinction of the criminal action extinguishes the civil action.
Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil
action arising from the offense, the dismissal of the criminal
action bars him from filing the present petition to enforce the
civil liability.21
Muñoz further posits that Co is not entitled to recover
damages because there is no wrongful act to speak of. Citing
De la Rosa, et al. v. Maristela,22 he argues that if there is no
libel due to the privileged character of the communication and
actual malice is not proved, there should be no award of moral
damages.23
Lastly, Muñoz avers that Co is indirectly challenging the
factual and legal issues which the CA has already settled in
acquitting him. Muñoz explains that this Court may no longer
overturn the CA’s findings as the doctrine of double jeopardy
has set in.24
The Issues
The parties’ arguments, properly joined, present to us the
following issues:
1. whether a private party may appeal the judgment of
acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused’s
civil liability; and
2. whether the respondent is liable for damages
arising from the libelous remarks despite his
acquittal.
The Court's Ruling
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar
as he seeks to enforce the accused’s civil liability.
The parties have conflicting interpretations of the last
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC, which states:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. (Emphasis ours)
Muñoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of
the ROC applies only if the civil liability ex delicto is separately
instituted or when the right to file it separately was properly
reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muñoz’ acquittal of the
crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case
because Muñoz’ utterance of the libelous remarks remains
undisputed. We reject Muñoz’ claim. The last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to claim
civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if
the action is instituted with or filed separately from the
criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC
governs situations when the offended party opts to institute
the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its
title "When separate civil action is suspended." Despite this
wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for
civil liability ex delicto.
This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that
"[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one
criminal and one civil. Reflecting this policy, our procedural
rules provide for two modes by which civil liability ex
delicto may be enforced:
(1) through a civil action that is deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal action;25
(2) through a civil action that is filed separately,
either before the criminal action or after, upon
reservation of the right to file it separately in the
criminal action.26
The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action.27
This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not
affect its nature, as may be apparent from a reading of the
second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC, which
states:
Section 2. Contents of the judgment. – x x x In case the
judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act
or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.(Emphasis ours)
If, as Muñoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action
carries with it the extinction of the civil action that was
instituted with the criminal action, then Section 2, Rule 120 of
the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would be no
need for the judgment of the acquittal to determine whether
"the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist." The Rules precisely require the judgment to declare
if there remains a basis to hold the accused civilly liable
despite acquittal so that the offended party may avail of the
proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil liability ex
delicto.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA,28 the Court ruled that an appeal is
the proper remedy that a party – whether the accused or the
offended party – may avail with respect to the judgment:
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court
renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it
would place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil
aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he,
as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case
notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The
civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action
since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor
did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
(Emphasis ours)
Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a
separate civil action because the latter would only add to our
clogged dockets.29
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not
necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action,
whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil
liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three
instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal, the
offended party may still claim civil liability
ex delicto:
(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) if the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and
(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted.
the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the
libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of
Munoz’ statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is
o longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of
providing that Munoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found
that the prosecution failed in this respect.
Co assails the CA’s ruling by raising arguments that essentially
require a review of the CA’s factual and legal findings.
However, the Court cannot, through the present petition,
review these findings without going against the requirements
of Rule 45 with respect to factual matters, and without
violating Munoz’ right against double jeopardy given that the
acquittal is essentially anchored on question of fact.

In light of the priviledge nature of Munoz’ statements and the

We thus now proceed to determine if Co’s claim falls under any
of these three situations.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was
committed.
failure of the prosectionto prove malice in fact, there was no
libel that was committed by Munoz. Without the crime, no civil
liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co That can be pursued in
the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability
may arise that exists.

The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition. The
privileged communication. In libel, the existence of malice is Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355
essential as it is an element of the crime.30 dated January 31, 2007 is AFFIRMED.

The law presumes that every imputation is malicious;31 this is SO ORDERED.

referred to as malice in law.

The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of

proving that the imputations were made with malice. This
presumption is rebutted if the accused proved that the
imputation is true and published with good intention and
justifiable motive.32

There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is

inapplicable. For instance, Article 354 of the RPC further
states that malice is not presumed when:

(1) a private communication made by any person to

another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty;33 and

(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without

any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.34

Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of

the RPC. In Borjal v. CA,35 we held that in view of the
constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of the
press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged. In Guingguing v. CA,36 we ruled that the remarks
directed against a public figure are likewise privileged. In
order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged
communication, the prosecution must establish that the
libelous statements were made or published with actual malice
or malice in fact – the knowledge that the statement is false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.37

In other words, our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that

privileged communication has the effect of destroying the
presumption of malice or malice in law and consequently
requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in
fact.

In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks

are privileged.1âwphi1 The legal conclusion was arrived at from
G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v.
SUSAN SAYO Y REYES AND ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
Subject of this appeal1 is the Decision2 of June 26, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04914 which
affirmed the Decision3 dated September 23, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 261, convicting
accused-appellants Susan Sayo y Reyes (Sayo) and Alfredo
Roxas y Sagon (Roxas) (collectively referred to as accused-
appellants) for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9208 or
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.4
Facts
On November 16, 2005, accused-appellants were indicted
under the following Information:5
That on November 15, 2005, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused Susan Sayo,
willfully and unlawfully, did then and there, recruit and
transport minors [AAA6 ], 15 years old, [BBB7 ] 16 years old,
together with [CCC8 ], by taking advantage of their
vulnerability, for the purpose of prostitution and sexual
exploitation; while accused Alfredo Roxas, in conspiracy with
accused Sayo, did then and there, willfully, and unlawfully, own,
manage and operate a room in his apartment in Pasig City used
as a prostitution den, receive and harbor said trafficked
persons, also by taking advantage of their vulnerability and for
the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Contrary to law.9
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
The prosecution's and defense's contrasting versions of the
events, as summarized by theCA, are as follows:
The Prosecution's Evidence
The combined testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC known as the
"plaza girls" disclosed that several months prior to November
15, 2005, these "plaza girls" have been under the control and
supervision of SAYO as commercial sex workers. AAA testified
in open court that she was only fifteen (15) years old at the
time she began working for SAYO in December 2004. The
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics
Office showed that she was born on May 2, 1990. Same is true
with BBB who testified that she was born on November 11,
1989 and thus, indeed, a minor during their rescue on
November 15, 2005.
The "plaza girls" were introduced to SAYO on different
occasions in 2004 by other "plaza girls." SAYO then started to
act as a pimp providing them with male customers for a certain
percentage. The "plaza girls" give her a flat rate of Fifty Pesos
(P50.00) for every male customer who will pay them Three
Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00)
for every Seven Hundred Pesos (P700.00) paying customer.
SAYO would regularly furnish AAA, BBB and CCC with male
customers on the average five (5) customers per week.
Whenever they have customers, SAYO would bring them either
to a motel or to ALFREDO ROXAS's house who provides them
a room for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) for thirty (30)
minutes use of the room. ROXAS also provides condom for the
male customers at Thirty Pesos (P30.00).
On November 3, 2005, the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group-Women and Children Complaint Division
(CIDG-WCCD) received a letter from the International Justice
Mission (IJM), an International Non Government Human Rights
Organization, requesting for police assistance on the possible
rescue of three (3) minors exploited for prostitution in Pasig
City.
Acting on said request, PO2 Leonardo So conducted on
November 8, 2005 further surveillance to confirm the veracity
of the report. It was verified and confirmed that there were
rampant offerings of minor prostitutes at the Pasig Plaza,
specifically by a pimp named SUSAN SAYO. Hence, on
November 15, 2005, the CIDG-WCCD headed by
Superintendent Sotera P. Macatangay conceptualized an
entrapment operation called "Oplan Sagip Angel." A team was
organized composed of WCCD operatives, representatives
from IJM and DSWD-NCR for the rescue operation.
During the briefing, PO3 Anthony Ong, PO2 Leonardo So and
an agent from IJM were designated to act as poseur-
costumers. Then, one (1) five hundred peso bill and fifteen (15)
one hundred peso bills amounting to Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) were prepared and sent to PNP-Crime Laboratory
for Ultra Violet Powder dusting. The peso bills would be
utilized during the entrapment operation as payments to the
owner of the apartment/room, for the pimp and for the
services of the "plaza girls".
The "Oplan Sagip Angel" operatives proceeded to the target
area in Pasig City. The three men who were tasked to pretend
as customers stayed in front of the church at the Pasig Plaza.
They were approached by SAYO who bluntly asked if they
wanted women and she further inquired if they wanted 15
year-old girls. The three customers agreed to take the 15
year-old girls offered by SAYO for Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00) each. Thereafter, SAYO informed the three
customers about a room in Baltazar Street which they could
rent for P100.00 for each couple. The customers agreed on the
price.
Meanwhile, SAYO informed the "plaza girls" on November 15,
2005 that they have customers for that night. AAA, BBB and
CCC met SAYO at the Pasig Plaza. There, she introduced them
to the three men. The three male customers were actually the
agents of the ClOG-WCCD and IJM. After the negotiation was
concluded, all of them proceeded to the house of ALFREDO
ROXAS at No. 638 Baltazar Street, Brgy. Sto. Tomas, Pasig
City on board a tricycle. Upon reaching the house, they were
greeted by "FRED" ROXAS who openly discussed with SAYO in
front of the customers and the ["]plaza girls["] regarding the
transaction for the night. ROXAS told that the room rate for
each couple is P100.00. AAA saw the customers gave to
ROXAS the Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00).
The undercover agents, SAYO and ROXAS talked about the
payment for the girls' services outside the house. When the
Nine Hundred Pesos (P900.00) was handed by one of the
customers to SAYO to cover the payment for the services of
AAA, BBB and CCC, the CIDG-WCCO agents announced that it
was a raid. At that point, PO3 Anthony Ong executed the pre-
arranged signal, in reaction to which, the back-up operatives
who were deployed in different strategic locations rushed
towards them and arrested SAYO and ROXAS.
Recovered from the possession of ALFREDO ROXAS was the
marked money amounting to Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00),
the payment for the use of the room for sexual activities while
the Nine Hundred Pesos (P900.00) intended for the sexual
services to be provided by the "plaza girls" was recovered
from SUSAN SAYO. Thereafter, the two [accused-]appellants
and the "plaza girls" were brought to the headquarters of
CIDG-WCCD in Camp Crame Quezon City for investigation,
documentation and medico-legal examination. After staying
there for a day, the "plaza girls" were brought under the care
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in Marilac Hills, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
The [Defense's] Evidence
xxxx
SAYO testified on direct examination that on November 15,
2005, between 9:00 to 9:30 o'clock in the evening, while
barking for jeepney passengers in front of the Pasig Cathedral
Church, she saw CCC, AAA and BBB together with the three
male persons. This group of men and CCC approached her and
arrested her. CCC asked her to accompany them to ALFREDO's
house in exchange for One Hundred Pesos (Pl 00.00). SAYO
agreed and they boarded a tricycle heading towards Sto.
Tomas, Pasig City. Thereat, SAYO was surprised when a man
suddenly grabbed her arm when she alighted from the tricycle.
She was taken to a dark place and hauled immediately to a
vehicle and brought to jail where she met for the first time
her co accused ROXAS.
xxxx
ALFREDO ROXAS, on the other hand, claimed that on the
night of November 15, 2005, he was sleeping in his house in
Baltazar Street, Sto. Tomas. He was awakened by the barks of
the dogs. He went outside to see for himself what was that
commotion all about. He saw CCC and Susan [Sayo] along with
the men[,] AAA and BBB. One of the men asked him if they
could rent his room since it was the birthday of [CCC's]
compadre, but he refused. After rejecting their request for
several times, the male persons forced him to accept the
money which turned out to be dusted with ultra violet powder.
He admitted having known CCC, AAA and BBB for about 6 to 7
months prior to the incident. As for SAYO, he just only met
her on that day of November 15, 2005 in front of the church
in the Pasig Plaza. When asked how he came to know CCC, AAA
and BBB, he said that they were just introduced to him by
someone in their place.10
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC promulgated its Decision11 on September 23, 2010.
The RTC first discussed the procedural infirmity in the
Information as it contained more than one offense. Under
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Information must charge only one offense
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various
offenses.
Sayo was charged with recruiting and transporting AAA and
BBB (minors), as well as CCC (of legal age) for prostitution. In
the same Information, Roxas was separately accused of
managing and operating a room in his apartment to be used for
prostitution. Thus, the Information was duplicitous. Be that as
it may, the RTC held that the accused-appellants had waived
any objection to the Information as they failed to object prior
to their arraignment. Citing Dimayacyac v. Court of
Appeals,12 the RTC held that with the waiver, the accused may
be charged and convicted of as many offenses as those
charged in the Information and proved during trial.13
On the substantive issue, the RTC held that the prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimonies of AAA, BBB, and. CCC were
clear, categorical, and corroborative of each other's
testimony. The testimony of the arresting officer, PO2
Anthony Ong (PO2 Ong), was also categorical and
straightforward regarding the investigation, pre-surveillance,
entrapment procedure, and arrest of the accused-appellants. 14
On the other hand, both accused-appellants merely interposed
the defenses of denial and alibi which are both inherently weak
defenses. For denial to prosper, there must be strong evidence
that the accused was not capable of committing the crime. For
alibi, the accused must prove that he was at some other place
which made it physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of commission. Contrary to the accused's
defenses, the RTC held that in fact, both the accused in this
case were arrested as a result of an entrapment operations.15
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision held:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations,
accused SUSAN SAYO y REYES is hereby found. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
under Section 4 (a,e) and Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208 insofar as
minors AAA and BBB, and is sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos
([P]2,000,000.00) insofar as minors AAA and BBB are
concerned.
Accused ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON is likewise found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
under Section 5 (a) and Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208, insofar as
minors AAA and BBB are concerned, and is sentenced to suffer
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos
([P]2,000,000.00).
As for complainant [CCC] who was no longer a minor at the time
of commission of the offense, accused Susan Sayo is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
trafficking in persons under Section 4 (a, e) of R.A. 9208 and
is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of twenty (20) years and
to pay a fine of One million pesos (P1,000,000.00). Accused
Alfredo Roxas y Sagon is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in persons
under Section S(a) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine
of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
SO ORDERED.16
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with
modification, by adding an award of moral and exemplary
damages, but only to AAA and BBB. There was no discussion on
the omission of CCC in the award of damages.17
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of
the trial court dated September 23, 2010
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified:
(1) SUSAN SAYO Y REYES is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 (a) (e) qualified by
Section 6 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208 insofar as minors AAA
and BBB are concerned and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT without eligibility for parole and
to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). In addition,
she is ordered to pay each AAA and BBB P500,000.00 as moral
damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(2) ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON is likewise
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5
(a) qualified by Section 6 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, insofar as
minors AAA and BBB are concerned, and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT without eligibility for
parole and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
In addition, he is ordered to pay each AAA and BBB
P500,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
(3) As for the complainant CCC, who was no longer a minor at
the time of the commission of the offense, SUSAN SAYO Y
REYES is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4 (a) (e) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON is
likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5 (a) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of Fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
SO ORDERED.18
Accused-appellants filed a Notice of Appeal19 on July 30, 2015,
which was given due course by the CA in its Resolution20 dated
August 20, 2015. Both plaintiff-appellee and accused-
appellants manifested before the Court that they would not be
filing supplemental briefs.21
In a Certification22 issued on May 12, 2017, the Correctional
Institution for Women, Bureau of Corrections, certified that
Sayo had died on November 30, 2011 due to multiple organ
failure, secondary to cervical cancer, attaching thereto the
Certificate of Death23 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar.
Issue
Whether the guilt of Roxas was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Court's Ruling
Sayo's death extinguished her
criminal and civil liability
At the outset, the Court notes that Sayo had already died on
November 30, 2011. Thus, the death of Sayo extinguished her
criminal liability. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
— Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is ·extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment[.]
Likewise, the civil liability of Sayo arising from her criminal
liability is extinguished upon her death. The rules on the
effect of the death of the accused on civil liability pending
appeal are summarized in People v. Bayotas:24
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section I,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.25
Applying these established rules in the instant case, the death
of Sayo extinguished her criminal and civil liability inasmuch as
she is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action is also extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal
action.26
Thus, the Decision of the Court will now solely focus on the
criminal liability of Roxas.
Affirmed factual findings of the RTC
are afforded great respect by the
Court
Upon judicious review of the records of the case, the Court
affirms the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA. The Court upholds the findings of the courts a quo that
Roxas knowingly leased a room in his house for the purpose of
prostitution.
It is an established doctrine in appellate review that factual
findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, probative weight of their testimonies,
as well as of the documentary evidence, are accorded great
weight and respect, especially when these are affirmed by the
CA, as in this case.27
As correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the
testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC were direct,
straightforward, and corroborative of each other's
testimonies. Likewise, the testimony of the arresting officer,
PO2 Ong detailed the conduct of the whole entrapment
procedure. On the other hand, Roxas merely interposed the
weak defenses of denial and alibi. The positive identification
and testimonies of the witnesses greatly outweigh Roxas' bare
denials.
However, the Court deems it fit to modify the legal conclusions
of the courts a quo, with regard to the offense committed and
the appropriate penalty.
Roxas committed Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons as defined
under Section 5(a) of RA 9208
Roxas was convicted of Qualified Trafficking of Persons, under
Section 5(a) in relation to Section 6 of RA 9208 in connection
with minors AAA and BBB and was sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00). With regard to CCC, who was of legal age at
the time of the offense, Roxas was convicted of Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5(a) of RA 9208 and was sentenced to
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
The courts a quo committed serious error in convicting Roxas
for Qualified Trafficking of Persons and Trafficking in Persons
as the offenses proscribed under Section 5 of RA 9208 are
properly denominated as Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons.
Thus, the Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction
and holds that he is guilty of one count of violation of Section
5(a) of RA 9208 for Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons and not Trafficking in Persons, qualified or otherwise.
There are four punishable acts under RA 9208: (1) Acts
ofTrafficking in Persons under Section 4;28 (2) Acts that
Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5;29 (3) Violation
of the Confidentiality Rule under Section 730 in relation to
Section 10(d); and (4) Use of Trafficked Persons under Section
11.31
The offense of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 and
Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 of
RA 9208 are separate and distinct offenses with their own
corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides for qualifying
circumstances of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4, which
when alleged and proved, will merit the imposition of the
maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) under Section 10(c).
The relevant portions of the provisions are quoted below:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful
for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the
following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive
a person by any means, including those done under the pretext
of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;
xxxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or
pornography;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. — The
following acts which promote or facilitate trafficking in
persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any
house, building or establishment for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
xxxx
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Section 10 of RA 9208 provides for the penalties of the above:
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following penalties and
sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated
in this Act:
(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts
enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than
One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (P2,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than
One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under
Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not
more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00)[.]
Thus, Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which
directly involve trafficking in persons, such as recruitment,
transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering,
selling, or trading persons to engage in prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5
refers to those acts that promote or facilitate any of the
aforementioned predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons.
In arriving at its Decision, the RTC reasoned:
As for accused Alfredo Roxas, based on the evidence adduced
during trial, the prosecution was able to establish that Alfredo
Roxas owned a house/apartment; that said house/apartment
had a room; that the room was offered for lease for every
paying customer of the complainants; that accused Roxas, in
consideration of the sum of One Hundred (100) pesos, would
allow the complainants and her (sic) customers to use the room
and engage in sex therein; that Roxas had knowledge of the
fact that the complainants engaged in sex for a fee as he
cleaned the room after the complainant and her customer
finished using it; that, moreover, he sold condoms to
complainant's male customers before using the room. All of
these acts promoted trafficking in persons as defined under
Section 5 of [RA 9208].32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The RTC found that Roxas violated Section 5(a) of RA 9208
for knowingly leasing a room for the purpose of prostitution.
Unfortunately, in spite of this, it still convicted Roxas of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons as regards minors AAA and
BBB and Trafficking in Persons as regards CCC. The CA, for its
part, affirmed the RTC's ruling.
The RTC and the CA thus committed serious error as the
proper denomination of the offense is Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a). In this regard, it
should be noted that the offenses punished under Section 5
cannot be qualified by Section 6 as what the latter seeks to ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of and analogous cases:
trafficking. To be sure, this was clarified in the amendatory
law, RA 1036433 or the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
Act of 2012 where Section 6 was amended accordingly:
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
SEC. 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended
to read as follows: (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations (4) Adultery or concubinage;

of Section 4 of this Act shall be considered as qualified
trafficking: (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
"x x x
(6) Illegal search;

"(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent,

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority over the
trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a
(8) Malicious prosecution;
public officer or employee;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

"x x x

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
"(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law
30, 32, 34, and 35.
enforcement agencies;

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or

"(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in
abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers
moral damages.
mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS);
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the
"(h) When the offender commits one or more violations of
order named. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 over a period of sixty (60) or more days, whether
those days are continuous or not; and

"(i) When the offender directs or through another manages
the trafficking victim in carrying out the exploitative purpose
of trafficking." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As can be gleaned from the above amendment, only violations
of Section 4 on Trafficking in Persons can be qualified. Section
5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons, being separate
and distinct offenses, cannot be qualified as the law does not
expressly provide therefor. The clarificatory amendment,
being beneficial to the accused, must be applied in his favor.34
Accordingly, Roxas' conviction of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons and Trafficking in Persons as well as the sentence of
life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) must be modified.
The denomination of his conviction is corrected to Acts that
Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a) of RA
9208 with the appropriate penalty of imprisonment of fifteen
(15) years and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
Roxas is liable for moral and
exemplary damages to AAA, BBB,
and CCC
The award of damages is likewise modified. Moral damages are
prescribed under Articles 2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
xxxx
In turn, exemplary damages are awarded in addition to moral
damages by way of example of correction for the public good:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part
of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid
to the offended party.
Moral and exemplary damages of P500,000.00 and
P100,000.00, respectively, are ordinarily awarded in cases of
Trafficking in Persons as a prostitute. The ratio for the award
of damages in said cases was explained in People v. Lalli:35
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an
analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or
other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a
prostitute without one's consent and to be sexually violated
four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous
and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in
Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of
exemplary damages is likewise justified.36
In the instant case, while the Information alleged that Roxas
"received and harbored" AAA, BBB, and CCC, it was not proven
during the trial that Roxas directly participated in their
prostitution or solicited or assigned customers for them.
However, his act of renting out a room in his house promoted
and facilitated their prostitution. Roxas profited from the
rental of the room and his actions are just as deplorable.

In Planteras, Jr. v. People,37 the Court set the award of moral

and exemplary; damages at P100,000.00 and 50,000.00 in cases
of Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a)
of RA 9208.

Thus, Roxas is liable to pay moral and exemplary damages to

AAA, BBB, and CCC of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 each. The
monetary awards due to the victims shall earn legal interest of
six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until full
payment.38

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

Court RESOLVES to:

1. DECLARE accused-appellant ALFREDO ROXAS y

SAGON, GUILTY of ACTS THAT PROMOTE
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS under Section 5(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, for which he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
fifteen (15) years and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as provided for under
Section 10(b) of the same law.

2. ORDER accused-appellant ALFREDO ROXAS y

SAGON to PAY AAA, BBB, and CCC, the amounts of
P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 each, as moral and
exemplary damages, subject to legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment
until full payment.

3. DISMISS the case insofar as accused-appellant

SUSAN SAYO y REYES is concerned, in view of her
death.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192912 June 4, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The Court resolves the appeal of the accused-appellant
Democrito Paras from the Decision1 dated February 2, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The
appellate court affirmed the Decision2 dated October 18, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Branch 29, in
Criminal Case No. TCS-2729, which found the accused-
appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
The prosecution charged the accused-appellant of committing
rape against AAA,3 a 17-year old girl, allegedly committed as
follows:
That at noon in March 1996 or for sometime subsequent
thereto, in [XXX] and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with the use of a gun of
unknown caliber, by force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
[AAA] against the latter's will and as a result of which the
latter became pregnant, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party.4
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 In the
trial that ensued, the prosecution presented the testimonies
of AAA,6 Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) Field Officer Ma. Pamela Jusay,7 and Dr. Marcelo
Pilapil,8 the physician who physically examined AAA. The
defense thereafter presented the testimonies of the accused-
appellant9 and his mother, Luisa Paras.10
In their brief before the Court of Appeals, the prosecution
summarized their version of the facts in this wise:
Around noon of March 19, 1996, or subsequent thereto, while
the victim [AAA], a house-helper of spouses Sergio and Heny
Agua, was weeding grass using a bolo at her employer’s farm in
[XXX], appellant Democrito Paras approached her from behind
(TSN, July 15, 1999, pp. 6-7). He pulled [AAA] towards the
lower portion of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her
mouth. While pointing the gun at [AAA], appellant pulled down
her long pants and panties. Appellant also pulled down his pants
and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and
mounted her. He spread [AAA’s] legs with his two hands after
putting down his firearm. He then inserted his penis into
[AAA’s] vagina. [AAA] felt pain (Ibid., p. 8). [AAA] struggled
and tried to kick appellant but all proved futile as appellant was
physically stronger (TSN, Nov. 19, 1999, p. 10)[.]
Since [AAA] was afraid of appellant and that she was also
afraid to kill a person, she did not strike appellant with the
bolo she was holding (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 3). Appellant
told[AAA] not to shout. He made a push and pull movement.
[AAA] felt appellant’s organ inside her while she continued to
struggle. While struggling, [AAA] even threw stones at
appellant (Ibid. p. 4).
After appellant consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up
and fled, while [AAA] went back to the house of her employers
(Ibid.).
Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to the incident. She
gave birth to a child who was more than a year old when [AAA]
testified on January 11, 2000. (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 5)[.]11
The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following
narrative of denial and alibi:
Accused-appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private
complainant because she was the helper at the house of his
elder sister. He vehemently denie[d] having raped AAA. On
March 19, 1996, he was at the Lusaran market to buy dried
fish and other household items to be consumed for the whole
week because he lived in a mountain barangay. He could not
estimate the distance between Lusaran Market and his house
but it would take two (2) hours of travel time by walking only.
It was about 8:00 o’clock in the morning when he went to
Lusaran Market on March 19, 1996 and arrived home at about
4:00 o’clock in the afternoon already. AAA accused him of rape
because of the misunderstanding he had with the husband of
his elder sister regarding the mango trees owned by his
mother. AAA is an employee of his brother-in-law, Sergio
Agua, whose house is about seventy (70) meters away from his
house. Aside from their houses, there are also other houses,
about five (5) of them, located in their locality. The mango
trees were already allocated by his mother to each and every
child. One of his brothers transferred residence to
Compostela abandoning the mango trees allocated to him.
Accused-appellant took over the said mango trees and sprayed
them with chemicals. However, Sergio Agua also sprayed them
and accused-appellant chided him. This made his brother-in-law
angry who pulled out his bolo. Thereafter, he told accused-
appellant to "beware". After that incident, accused-appellant
and Sergio no longer talked about the mango trees. Aside from
this, accused-appellant and Sergio also had a disagreement
regarding the five (5) hectares of land owned by the latter’s
mother. Sergio wanted it divided but accused-appellant
objected since he has other siblings who are still single. Sergio
got mad and again threatened accused-appellant to
"beware"[.]12
The Decision of the RTC
In a Decision dated October 18, 2005, the RTC convicted the
accused-appellant of the crime charged. The trial court gave
credence to the testimony of AAA, finding the same frank,
candid, and straightforward. In contrast, the trial court
rejected the accused-appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi
since the same were not corroborated even by the testimony
of his mother, Luisa Paras. The latter merely testified on an
alleged feud between the accused-appellant and Sergio Agua,
who happened to be the employer of AAA. The RTC sentenced
the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this Court finds
the guilt of the accused DEMOCRITO PARAS to have been
proved beyond peradventure of a reasonable doubt and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the
sum of ₱50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages plus the
amount of ₱100,000.00 as and for moral damages.13
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the
RTC in a Decision dated February 2, 2010. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s appreciation of AAA’s testimony,
which was held to be steadfast and unyielding throughout the
direct and cross-examinations. The testimony of Luisa Paras on
the alleged misunderstanding between the accused-appellant
and Sergio Agua was found to be insufficient to overturn the
candid testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the
accused-appellant as the malefactor. The Court of Appeals also
brushed aside the accused-appellant’s arguments of alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in AAA’s testimony, i.e.,
that AAA could recall the details of the rape but not the birth
date of her child and the name of her neighbor, that AAA did
not seize the opportunities given her to save herself, and that
the supposed date of the rape was not clearly established by
the prosecution evidence. The appellate court ruled that said
inconsistencies were on inconsequential matters that did not
bear upon the essential elements of the crime of rape. The
Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated
October 18, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
Toledo City, in Criminal Case No. TCS-2729 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
As modified, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape as defined and
penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant
the amount of ₱50,000.00 only as moral damages plus
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. The award of
civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 stands.14
The Ruling of the Court
The accused-appellant again appealed his case to this Court,
arguing that the trial court erred in convicting him of the
crime charged even if his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.15
The appeal lacks merit.
As the accused-appellant was charged to have committed the
rape "in March 1996 or for sometime subsequent thereto," the
applicable provision of the law in this case is Article 33516 of
the Revised Penal Code.17 The relevant portions of said
statutory provision read:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
xxxx
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged
the accused-appellant guilty of rape by having carnal knowledge
of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The
courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive
identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of
this case, the Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and
consistent in her testimony that the accused-appellant was the
one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual
intercourse with her. We, thus, see no reason to disturb the
lower courts’ appreciation of the credibility of AAA’s
testimony. People v. De Guzman18 teaches that:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily
on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their
credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the
stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line
between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible
from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing
court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will
affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry
flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer
or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not
show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in
confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing
to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were
shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and
on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and
reasoned verdict.
The Court likewise upholds the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant
in the testimony of AAA, namely, her inability to remember the
birth date of her child and the name of her neighbor, did not
destroy her credibility as a witness. These details had nothing
to do with the essential elements of rape, that is, carnal
knowledge of a person through force or intimidation. As held in
People v. Maglente19:
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are
irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for
acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor
matters, the same do not affect the credibility of witnesses.
Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-
free testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery
of human memory. Inaccuracies may even suggest that the
witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
(Citations omitted.)
Before the Court of Appeals and this Court, the accused-
appellant also capitalized on the findings of Dr. Pilapil that
AAA was already three months pregnant when she was
examined on October 7, 1996. If that were the case, the
accused-appellant argued that AAA could have had sexual
intercourse sometime in June or July 1996 and not in March
1996 when the rape was supposed to have been committed. We
find that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected this
contention. We had occasion to state in People v. Adora20 that
"authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination
of the exact date of fertilization is problematic. The exact
date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining
the actual normal duration of pregnancy." At any rate, we ruled
in People v. Bejic21 that:
Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape.
Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by
the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment.
What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her
consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a
truthful manner. (Citation omitted.)
Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite
having many opportunities to do so, we are not persuaded.
Were iterated in Sison v. People22 that:
[P]eople react differently under emotional stress. There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a
shocking incident, especially if the assailant is physically near.
The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable. In a given situation, some may shout,
others may faint, and still others may be frozen into silence.
Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout
for help at the very first opportunity cannot be construed
consent to the sexual intercourse. (Citations omitted.)

Finally, the accused-appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi also

fail to convince the Court.1âwphi1 Given that the accused-
appellant failed to support the same with strong evidence of
his lack of guilt, said defenses cannot prevail over the positive
identification of AAA.

All told, the accused-appellant failed to show that the RTC and
the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexually abusing AAA.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
In this case, the accused-appellant’s use of a gun in the
commission of the rape against AAA was both specifically
alleged in the information and proven during the trial of the
case. Considering that there was neither any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.23

As to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals properly

imposed the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. On the award of exemplary
damages, the same is increased from ₱25,000.00 to
₱30,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence.24

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS

the Decision dated February 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The accused-appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one count of rape
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015
PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD
G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ,
EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B.
SANTOS, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
accused petitioner Paz T. Bernardo (Bernardo) under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
August 31, 2007 decision1 and the March 14, 2008
resolution2 in CA-G.R. CR 28721, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Paz T. Bernardo." The appellate court affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56,
Makati City, finding Bernardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of five (5) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
22).
The Factual Antecedents
In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private
complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag (Bumanglag) in the
amount of P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on
November 30, 1991. That loan was evidenced by a promissory
note3 Bernardo and her husband had executed, whereby the
couple solidarity bound themselves to pay the loan with
corresponding interest at 12% per annum payable upon
default.4 As additional security, Bernardo gave Bumanglag the
owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-
1034) 151841.
Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from
Bumanglag to use as a collateral in another transaction. In
place of the title, Bernardo issued to Bumanglag the following
five (5) Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC)
checks,5 posted on different dates in June 1992, covering the
loan's aggregate amount:cralawlawlibrary
Check No. Amount Date
FEBTC No. 391033 Php 100,000.00 June 1, 1992
FEBTC No. 391034 Php 100,000.00 June 8, 1992
FEBTC No. 391035 Php 100,000.00 June 15, 1992
FEBTC No. 391036 Php 100,000.00 June 22, 1992
FEBTC No. 391037 Php 60,000.00 June 29, 1992
In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to
Bernardo's account but they were dishonored; the reason given
was "Account Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice
informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The demand went
unheeded, prompting Bumanglag to initiate a criminal complaint
against Bernardo with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati for five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City found probable cause to indict
Bernardo for the offenses charged. Bernardo entered a not
guilty plea on arraignment.
The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994.
Bernardo took the witness stand only on May 9, 1996, to
present her defense evidence.
In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could not be held
liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the questioned checks
were presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the
law. She also denied having received any notice of dishonor,
which she insisted was essential to prove the material element
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
In any case, she maintained that the checks were never meant
to be presented as she had always paid her loans in cash, which
she claimed to have done in the aggregate amount of
P717,000.00. According to Bernardo, although Bumanglag
returned to her the title to the property after payment,
Bumanglag never bothered to issue her receipts. Bumanglag did
not return the checks either.
Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the RTC reset the
hearing for redirect examination to September 4, 1996.6 That
hearing, however, was again reset to April 3, 1997, in view of
the absence of Bernardo's counsel. When Bernardo and her
counsel again failed to appear during the April 3, 1997 hearing,
and in view of the numerous previous postponements the
defense had asked for, the RTC considered her right to
present additional evidence waived.
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied her
motion. The RTC, however, gave her ten (10) days within which
to submit her formal offer of evidence, which she failed to do.
As a result, the RTC declared that Bernardo had waived her
right to submit her formal offer of evidence.
RTC Ruling
On May 28, 2003, the RTC issued its ruling finding Bernardo
guilty of five counts of violation of B.P. 22.7 The RTC held that
Bernardo failed to substantiate her claim of payment. The RTC
further ruled that it is not the nonpayment of the obligation
but the issuance of a worthless check that B.P. 22 punishes.
The RTC sentenced Bernardo to one (1) year imprisonment for
each count of the offense charged and ordered her to
indemnify Bumanglag the amount of P460,000.00, plus 12%
interest and 5% penalty charges, from December 1, 1991, until
full payment.8
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted
the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, imposed a
P460,000.00 fine.9 The CA also retained the civil indemnity of
P460,000.00 that the lower court imposed, plus 12% interest
from the time of the institution of the criminal charges until
full payment.10
In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that Bernardo
failed to adduce sufficient evidence of payment. The CA
further held that the 90-day period within which to present a
check under B.P. 22 is not an element of the crime.
The CA also did not recognize any merit in Bernardo's claim
that she had been denied due process, in view of the RTC's
order waiving her right to present additional evidence.11 To the
CA, Bernardo had sufficient opportunity to present her
defense but did not avail of these opportunities. Instead, she
and her counsel moved for postponement at least nine (9)
times, not to mention their subsequent failure to appear four
(4) times despite due notice of the scheduled hearings. These
developments led the RTC to consider Bernardo's right to
present additional evidence waived.12
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her
motion;13 hence, the present petition.14
The Petition and Comment
Bernardo insists in her present petition15 that the CA erred in
finding that she had been accorded due process; she was
denied the full opportunity to present her defense and was
thus deprived of the chance to prove her innocence of the
crime charged.
She likewise avers that the CA erred in affirming her criminal
and civil liabilities because the prosecution failed to prove her
knowledge of insufficiency of funds. According to Bernardo,
there was no violation of B.P. 22 because the checks were
presented beyond the mandatory 90-day period. Moreover,
Bernardo claimed that these subject checks were issued
without consideration as she had already paid the loan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits in its
Comment that Bernardo was given the opportunity to present
her defense evidence.16 Citing Wong v. CA,17 the OSG further
points out that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an
element of the offense;18 it is simply one of the conditions to
establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of
funds.19
The OSG also claims that Bumanglag failed to substantiate her
claim that she had settled the obligation.20 In any event, the
OSG asserted B.P. 22 penalizes the act of making and issuing a
worthless check, not the nonpayment of the obligation.21
Subsequent Developments
On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of
the petitioner's death on February 3, 2011, and provided, as
well, the names of her heirs (her widower, Mapalad Bernardo,
and children: Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T.
Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos), and their address (26
Magdiwang St., Real Village 2, Tandang Sora, Quezon City). In
due course, in our March 7, 2012 Resolution,22 we required
Bernardo's heirs to appear as substitutes for the deceased
Bernardo in the present petition for purposes of Bernardo's
civil liability.
Bernardo's heirs moved to reconsider our March 7, 2012
resolution. They argued that Bernardo's death extinguished
her civil liability. In the alternative, they contended that any
civil liability should be settled in a separate civil case.
We denied the heirs' motion in our June 27, 2012 resolution.
We explained that Bernardo's civil liability survived her death
as it is based on contract. Moreover, we observed that it would
be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming to dismiss the
present case and require the Bumanglags to file a separate civil
action.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit. Preliminary Matters
Classes of Civil Liabilities
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to
several distinct civil liabilities on the part of the offender.23 If
the conduct constitutes a felony, the accused may be held
civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (ex
delicto).24 This particular civil liability due the offended party
is rooted on facts that constitute a crime.25 Otherwise
stated, civil liability arises from the offense charged.26 It is
not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled to
civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts constituting
the offense charged are established by preponderance of
evidence, civil liability may be awarded.27 Moreover, the civil
liability based on delict is deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.28
The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to
independent civil liabilities based on other sources of
obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law (b)
contracts; (c) quasi-contracts, and (d) quasi-delicts. Among
these are the civil liabilities for intentional torts under
Articles 3229 and 3430 of the Civil Code and for quasi-
delicts under Article 2176 of Civil Code.31 For conduct
constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil
Code likewise grants the offended party the right to institute
a civil action independently of the criminal action under
Article-33 of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability
directly arising from a violation of the penal law and to still be
liable civilly based on contract or by laws other than the
criminal law.32 Such civil actions may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
criminal action,33 subject however, to the caveat that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission.34
Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case
despite her death.
As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal
extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil
liability based solely on the offense (delict). The death
amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the
constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her
favor, which can be overcome only by a finding of guilt -
something that death prevents the court from making.35 In a
sense, death absolves the accused from any earthly
responsibility arising from the offense — a divine act that no
human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard.36 The
intervention of death of the accused in any case is an
injunction by fate itself so that no criminal liability and the
corresponding civil liability arising from the offense should be
imposed on him.37
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an
action for recovery therefore may be generally pursued but
only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.38 This
separate civil action may be enforced against the estate of the
accused.39
In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried.40 This rule
was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been
packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as
collectors. As we observed in Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corp.:41cralawlawlibrary
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for
actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a
criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon
being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The
inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts
for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected
to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another
for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be
stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage
the separate filing of the civil action.chanrobleslaw
As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil
liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are
deemed instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22; the death
of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action. The
independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed
instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be
enforced against her estate in the present case. We thus rule
on the present action to determine Bumanglag's civil liability.
Substantive Aspect
Bernardo was not denied due process.
We meticulously went over the entire record, and confirmed
that Bernardo had not at all been deprived of her day in court.
She was afforded ample opportunity to present evidence in her
defense but she did not give this case the serious attention it
deserved. For good reason - i.e., the repeated absences of
Bernardo and her counsel - the trial court eventually
considered her right to present defense evidence waived.
To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow
the presentation of evidence is a matter that lies with the
discretion of the trial court; but it is a discretion that must be
exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances of
each case and with a view to doing substantial justice.42 In the
present case, the records show that the RTC took all the steps
necessary to safeguard Bernardo's rights and to accord her
the opportunity to present whatever evidence she had in her
defense.
In particular, the prosecution formally rested its case on
September 21, 1994. Bernardo, through counsel, thereupon
moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence prompting the
RTC to reset the hearing for initial presentation of defense
evidence to December 15 and 20, 1994.43 Bernardo filed her
demurrer to evidence on November 10, 1994,44 after previously
requesting the RTC for a 10-day extension.
The pendency of the demurrer to evidence prompted several
resettings until the RTC finally denied it on March 30,
1995.45 The RTC then set the initial presentation of defense
evidence on April 11, 18, and 25, 1995,46 but these were reset
to May 9, 18, and 25, 1995,47 at the motion of Bernardo's
counsel who expressed his desire to seek relief from the CA
for the denial of the demurrer.
Despite the RTC's accommodation, Bernardo's counsel failed
to appear during the May 9, 1995 hearing as he was busy
attending to the canvassing of votes in Quezon
City.48 Eventually, the initial presentation of defense evidence
was reset to July 20, 1995, and August 3, 1995.49
Notably, during the July 20, 1995 hearing, Bernardo's counsel
again moved for another resetting as he was not prepared to
conduct a direct examination.50 Despite this flimsy ground,
the RTC granted the request and allowed Bernardo to testify
on August 3, 1995.
Bernardo and her counsel, however, failed to appear during
the August 3, 1995 hearing despite due notice, prompting the
RTC to waive their right to present defense
evidence.51 Bernardo moved for reconsideration and the RTC
granted her motion in the interest of substantial
justice.52 Thus, the hearing for the presentation of defense
evidence was reset to November 28,
1995.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the
November 28, 1995 hearing, despite due notice, prompting
the RTC again to consider that Bernardo had waived her right
to present defense evidence.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo again moved for reconsideration on the ground
that it was the first time she and her counsel were absent
at the same time.55 Despite this hollow excuse, the RTC
granted the motion in the spirit of compassionate justice and
gave Bernardo the final opportunity to present her defense
evidence.56 The parties mutually agreed to set the hearing for
initial presentation of defense evidence on April 18,
1996.57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo again failed to appear during the scheduled April
18, 1996 hearing.58 Although Bernardo did not offer any
excuse for this absence,59 RTC exercised compassion and
permitted Bernardo to testify, as she did in fact testify, on
May 9, 1996,60 - one (1) year and eight (8) months after the
prosecution had rested its case. At the conclusion of the
cross-examination, the parties mutually agreed to adjourn the
hearing for September 4, 1996, for redirect examination.61
Bernardo's counsel, however, failed to appear during the
scheduled September 4, 1996 hearing, prompting the RTC to
consider her failure as a waiver on her part to present
additional evidence.62 Bernardo moved for reconsideration; she
claimed that her counsel had to attend another hearing in a
different sala. Why Bernardo's counsel accepted another
engagement on the same day, which was in conflict with the
RTC's hearing dates, was never properly explained.
Nonetheless, the RTC granted the motion to give her
the last chance to complete the presentation of evidence on
April 3, 17, and 22, 1997.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Despite the RTC's warning, Bernardo and her counsel again
failed to appear at the April 3,1997 hearing.64 Instead, they
filed a motion to reset because Bernardo's counsel was to
attend a wedding in the United States of America.65 This time,
the RTC, mindful that there should be a limit to
postponements, ordered the case submitted for decision sans
the presentation of evidence from the defense.66
Under these facts, the RTC was clearly driven by Bernardo and
her counsel's repeated failure, without justifiable reason, to
appear at the scheduled hearing dates.67 The order considering
Bernardo's right to present evidence waived, followed as a
necessary and unavoidable consequence. As we held in People v.
Angco:68cralawlawlibrary
His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing
of the case, notwithstanding repeated postponements and
warnings that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver to
present evidence in his defense, and that the case would be
deemed submitted for judgment upon the evidence presented
by the prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for the
trial court to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence
before it.chanrobleslaw
The records show that the RTC leniently granted repeated
continuances to safeguard Bernardo's rights as an accused. But
Bernardo obviously did not recognize the need for expeditious
handling of her case and was already trifling with judicial
process.69
Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient
evidence of payment; thus she is civilly
liable.
Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the present action
to purely an enforcement of the civil liability incurred. In
particular, the focal issue in the present petition is no
longer Bernardo's criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22
but her civil liability, which is principally based on contract
and the corresponding damage Bumanglag suffered due to
Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these circumstances,
Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense (that the checks were presented
beyond the 90-day period and that she never received a notice
of dishonor) were no longer relevant.

Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment carries the
burden of proving it.70 Indeed, once the existence of an
indebtedness is established by evidence, the burden of showing
with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by
payment rests with the debtor.71 After the debtor introduces
evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the
evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - again
shifts to the creditor, who then labors under a duty to produce
evidence to show nonpayment.72
In the present case, the existence of the obligation to pay has
sufficiently been established through the promissory
note73 and the checks74 submitted in evidence. Notably,
Bernardo even confirmed due execution of these instruments
during her testimony. During the offer of Bernardo's
testimony, her counsel stated:cralawlawlibrary
ATTY. MIRAVITE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With the court's permission. Your Honor, we are presenting
the witness for the following purposes: to x x x show that she
borrowed money from [Bumanglag] x x x and that in 1991 her
total obligation reached Php460,000.000; x x x that all the
checks issued by the accused were only as proof of her
obligation to the private complainant x x x.75 [emphasis
supplied]chanrobleslaw
In the course of Bernardo's testimony, she even confirmed the
issuance of the checks and promissory note. In particular, she
stated:cralawlawlibrary
ATTY. MIRAVITE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: I am showing to you this promissory note marked as Exhibit
H for the prosecution and Exhibit 2 for the defense. There
appears a signature over the name Paz T. Bernardo at the
middle portion thereof, do you know whose signature is that?
A: It is mine sir.
xxxx
Q: This document, Madame Witness, mentions of your loan
obligations of Php 460,000.00. Can you tell us, Madame
Witness, what is covered by this promissory note?
xxxx
transaction, which was submitted by the prosecution in
evidence, states that:
10/28/91
Received original copy of Title No. T-151841 in the name of
Mapalad Bernardo for loan purposes to pay Mrs. Carmencita
Bumanglag
Sgd
Paz T. Bernardo
10/28/91
The document evidencing this transaction strongly suggests
that she asked for the title from Bumanglag to obtain another
loan whose proceeds she would use to pay Bumanglag. Notably,
the defense even admitted the genuineness of Bernardo's
signature in this document.79 When Bernardo therefore failed
to fulfill her promise to pay, Bumanglag had to request for
checks to secure the obligation, which checks were eventually
dishonored upon presentment.
Under the circumstances, we find that Bernardo's claim of
payment was nothing more than an allegation unsupported by
adequate proof. If indeed there had been payment, she should
have redeemed or taken back the checks and the promissory
note, in the ordinary course of business.80 Instead, the checks
and the promissory note remained in the possession of
Bumanglag, who had to demand the satisfaction of Bernardo's
obligation when the checks became due and were subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank. Bumanglag's possession of the
promissory note, coupled with the dishonored checks, strongly
buttresses her claim that Bernardo's obligation had not been
extinguished.81
We thus find that the weight of evidence preponderates in
favor of Bumanglag's position that Bernardo has not yet
settled her obligation.82chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 31, 2007
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.' CR No. 28721
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The heirs of Paz T.
Bernardo are ordered to pay the amount of P460,000.00, with
interest at 12% per annum from the time of the institution of
criminal charges in court.

A: The promissory note covers the principal loan, plus interest
and penalties, sir.
Q: So, are you saying that this promissory note of Php
460,000.00 was your total obligation as of June 1991 and
includes all other charges?
A: Yes, sir.
The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of
6% per annum on the balance and interest due, from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The fine in the amount of P460,000.00 is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

x xxx

Q: Madam Witness, can you remember when you issued the

checks subject of these cases?

A: It was on June 20, 1991, sir.76chanrobleslaw

Bernardo's principal defense rests on the supposition that she

had settled the obligation, which settlement led Bumanglag to
return to her the title to the property.77 A meticulous review,
of the records, however, firmly dissuades us from believing
Bernardo's bare allegation.

At the outset, the handwritten note78 evidencing that

G.R. No. 211564
BENJAMIN EVANGELISTA, Petitioner vs.
SCREENEX,1 INC., represented by ALEXANDER G, YU,
Respondent
D E C I S I O N SERENO, CJ.:
This is a Petition2 for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside
the Decision3 and Resolution4 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) Manila, Fifth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 110680.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The facts as summarized by the CA are as follows:
Sometime in 1991, [Evangelista] obtained a loan from
respondent Screenex, Inc. which issued two (2) checks to
[Evangelista]. The first check was UCPB Check No. 275345 for
₱l,000,000 and the other one is China Banking Corporation
Check No. BDO 8159110 for ₱500,000. There were also
vouchers of Screenex that were signed by the accused
evidencing that he received the 2 checks in acceptance of the
loan granted to him.
As security for the payment of the loan, [Evangelista] gave two
(2) open-dated checks: UCPB Check Nos. 616656 and 616657,
both pay to the order of Screenex, Inc. From the time the
checks were issued by [Evangelista], they were held in safe
keeping together with the other documents and papers of the
company by Philip Gotuaco, Sr., father-in-law of respondent
Alexander Yu, until the former's death on 19 November 2004.
Before the checks were deposited, there was a personal
demand from the family for [Evangelista] to settle the loan and
likewise a demand letter sent by the family lawyer.5
On 25 August 2005, petitioner was charged with violation of
Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 343615-16
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City,
Branch 61.6 The Information reads:
That sometime in 1991, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw, and issue to
SCREENEX INC., herein represented by ALEXANDER G. YU,
to apply on account or for value the checks described below:
Check No. Date Amount
United AGR
12-22-04 ₱l ,000,000.00
Coconut 616656
Planters AGR
12-22-04 500,000.00
Bank 616657
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof,
said accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of
such check upon its presentment which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the
face amount of said checks or to make arrangement for full
payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Petitioner pleaded not guilty when arraigned, and trial
proceeded.8
THE RULING OF THE METC
The MeTC found that the prosecution had indeed proved the
first two elements of cases involving violation of BP 22: i.e. the
accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account
or for value, and the check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit; or the check
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment. The trial court pointed out, though, that the
prosecution failed to prove the third element; i.e. at the time
of the issuance of the check to the payee, the latter did not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for
payment of the check in full upon its presentment.9 In the
instant case, the court held that while prosecution witness
Alexander G. Yu declared that the lawyer had sent a demand
letter to Evangelista, Yu failed to prove that the letter had
actually been received by addressee. Because there was no way
to determine when the five-day period should start to toll,
there was a failure to establish prima facie evidence of
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds on the part of
Evangelista.10 Hence, the court acquitted him of the criminal
charges.
Ruling on the civil aspect of the cases, the court held that
while Evangelista admitted to having issued and delivered the
checks to Gotuaco and to having fully paid the amounts
indicated therein, no evidence of payment was presented.11 It
further held that the creditor's possession of the instrument
of credit was sufficient evidence that the debt claimed had
not yet been paid.12 In the end, Evangelista was declared liable
for the corresponding civil obligation.13
The dispositive portion of the Decision14 reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the accused
BENJAMIN EVANGELISTA for failure of the prosecution to
establish all the elements constituting the offense of Violation
of B.P. 22 for two (2) counts. However, accused is hereby
ordered to pay his civil obligation to the private complainant in
the total amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱l,500,000) plus twelve (12%) percent
interest per annum from the date of the filing of the two sets
of Information until fully paid and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.15
THE RULING OF THE RTC
Evangelista filed a timely Notice of Appeal16 and raised two
errors of the MeTC before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 147. Docketed therein as Criminal Case
Nos. 08-1723 and 08-1724, the appeal posed the following
issues: (1) the lower court erred in not appreciating the fact
that the prosecution failed to prove the civil liability of
Evangelista to private complainant; and (2) any civil liability
attributable to Evangelista had been extinguished and/or was
barred by prescription.17
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda,18 the
R TC ruled that the checks should be taken as evidence of
Evangelista's indebtedness to Gotuaco, such that even if the
criminal aspect of the charge had not been established, the
obligation subsisted.19 Also, the alleged payment by Evangelista
was an affirmative defense that he had the burden of proving,
but that he failed to discharge.20 With respect to the defense
of prescription, the RTC ruled in this wise:
As to the defense of prescription, the same cannot be
successfully invoked in this appeal. The 10-year prescriptive
period of the action under Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code is
computed from the time the right of action accrues. The terms
and conditions of the loan obligation have not been shown, as
only the checks evidence the same. It has not been shown when
the loan obligation was to mature such that there is no basis to
show or from which to infer, when the cause of action (non-
payment of the loan) which would give the obligee the right to
seek redress for the non-payment of the obligation, accrued.
In other words, the reckoning point of prescription has not
been established.
Prosecution witness Alexander G. Yu was not competent to
state that the loan was contracted in 1991 as in fact, Yu
admitted that it was a few months before his father-in-law
(Philip Gotuaco) died when the latter told him about accused's
failure to pay his obligation. That was a few months before
November 19, 2004, date of death of his father-in-law.
At any rate, the right of action in this case is not upon a
written contract, for which reason, Art. 1144, New Civil Code,
on prescription does not apply.21
In a Decision22 dated 18 December 2008, the R TC dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the MeTC decision in toto.23 The
Motion for Reconsideration24 was likewise denied in an
Order25 dated 19 August 2009.
THE RULING OF THE CA
Evangelista filed a petition for review26 before the CA insisting
that the lower court erred in finding him liable to pay the sum
with interest at 12% per annum from the date of filing until
full payment. He further alleged that witness Yu was not
competent to testify on the loan transaction; that the
insertion of the date on the checks without the knowledge of
the accused was an alteration that avoided the checks; and
that the obligation had been extinguished by prescription.27
Screenex, Inc., represented by Yu, filed its Comment.28 Yu
claimed that he had testified on the basis of his personal
dealings with his father-in-law, whom Evangelista dealt with in
obtaining the loan. He further claimed that during the trial,
petitioner never raised the competence of the witness as an
issue.29 Moreover, Yu argued that prescription set in from the
accrual of the obligation; hence, while the loan was transacted
in 1991, the demand was made in February 2005, which was
within the 10-year prescriptive period.30 Yu also argued that
while Evangelista claimed under oath that the loan had been
paid in 1992, he was not able to present any proof of
payment.31 Meanwhile, Yu insisted that the material alteration
invoked by Evangelista was unavailing, since the checks were
undated; hence, nothing had been altered.32 Finally, Yu argued
that Evangelista should not be allowed to invoke prescription,
which he was raising for the first time on appeal, and for which
no evidence was adduced in the court of origin.33
The CA denied the petition.34 It held that (1) the reckoning
time for the prescriptive period began when the instrument
was issued and the corresponding check returned by the bank
to its depositor;35 (2) the issue of prescription was raised for
the first time on appeal with the RTC;36 (3) the writing of the
date on the check cannot be considered as an alteration, as the
checks were undated, so there was nothing to change to begin
with;37 (4) the loan obligation was never denied by petitioner,
who claimed that it was settled in 1992, but failed to show any
proof of payment.38 Quoting the MeTC Decision, the CA
declared:
[t]he mere possession of a document evidencing an obligation
by the person in whose favor it was executed, merely raises a
presumption of nonpayment which may be overcome by proof of
payment, or by satisfactory explanation of the fact that the
instrument is found in the hands of the original creditor not
inconsistent with the fact of payment.39
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed August 19, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 147, Makati City, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's December 18, 2008 Decision in
Crim. Case Nos. 08-1723 and 08- 1724 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.40
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,41 which was
similarly denied in a Resolution42 dated 27 February 2014.
Hence, this Petition,43 in which petitioner contends that the
lower court erred in ordering the accused to pay his alleged
civil obligation to private complainant. In particular, he argues
that the court did not consider the prosecution's failure to
prove his civil liability to respondent, and that any civil liability
there might have been was already extinguished and/or barred
by prescription.44
Meanwhile, respondent filed its Comment,45 arguing that the
date of prescription was reckoned from the date of the check,
22 December 2004. So when the complaint was filed on 25
August 2005, it was supposedly well within the prescriptive
period of ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code.46
OUR RULING
With petitioner's acquittal of the criminal charges for
violation of BP 22, the only issue to be resolved in this petition
is whether the CA committed a reversible error in holding that
petitioner is still liable for the total amount of ₱l.5 million
indicated in the two checks.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
A check is discharged by any other
act which will discharge a simple
contract for the payment of money.
In BP 22 cases, the action for the corresponding civil
obligation is deemed instituted with the criminal action.47 The
criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized.48
The rationale for this rule has been elucidated in this wise:
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but
because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for
violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket
fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to
help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as
creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because
ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual
damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal
charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes. upon being
paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion
of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts
for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected
to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another
for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be
stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage
the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit
the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one
can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead
of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously
observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of
recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only
prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
parties and would further delay the final disposition of the
case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.49 (Citations
omitted)
This notwithstanding, the civil action deemed instituted with
the criminal action is treated as an "independent civil liability
based on contract."50
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank
'payable on demand.51 It is a negotiable instrument - written
and signed by a drawer containing an unconditional order to pay
on demand a sum certain in money.52 It is an undertaking that
the drawer will pay the amount indicated thereon. Section 119
of the NIL, however, states that a negotiable instrument like a
check may be discharged by any other act which will discharge
a simple contract for the payment of money, to wit:
Sec. 119. Instrument; how discharged. - A negotiable
instrument is discharged:
(a) By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal
debtor;
(b) By payment in due course by the party accommodated,
where the instrument is made or accepted for his
accommodation;
(c) By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder;
(d) By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for
the payment of money;
(e) When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the
instrument at or after maturity in his own right. (Emphasis
supplied)
A check therefore is subject to prescription of actions upon a
written contract. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
1) Upon a written contract;
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
Barring any extrajudicial or judicial demand that may toll the
10-year prescription period and any evidence which may
indicate any other time when the obligation to pay is due, the
cause of action based on a check is reckoned from the date
indicated on the check.
If the check is undated, however, as in the present petition,
the cause of action is reckoned from the date of the issuance
of the check. This is so because regardless of the omission of
the date indicated on the check, Section 1753 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law instructs that an undated check is
presumed dated as of the time of its issuance.
While the space for the date on a check may also be filled, it
must, however, be filled up strictly in accordance with the
authority given and within a reasonable time.54 Assuming that
Yu had authority to insert the dates in the checks, the fact
that he did so after a lapse of more than 10 years from their
issuance certainly cannot qualify as changes made within a
reasonable time.
Given the foregoing, the cause of action on the checks has
become stale, hence, time-barred. No written extrajudicial or
judicial demand was shown to have been made within 10 years
which could have tolled the period. Prescription has indeed set
in.
Prescription allows the court to
dismiss the case motu proprio.
We therefore have no other recourse but to grant the instant
petition on the ground of prescription. Even if that defense
was belatedly raised before the RTC for the first time on
appeal from the ruling of the Me TC, we nonetheless dismiss
the complaint, seeking to enforce the civil liability of
Evangelista based on the undated checks, by applying Section 1
of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute
of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
While it was on appeal before the RTC that petitioner invoked
the defense of prescription, we find that the pleadings and the
evidence on record indubitably establish that the action to
hold petitioner liable for the two checks has already
prescribed.
The delivery of the check produces
the effect of payment when through
the fault of the creditor they have
been impaired
It is a settled rule that the creditor's possession of the
evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been
discharged by payment.55 It is likewise an established tenet
that a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and
not money, and the delivery of such an instrument does not, by
itself, operate as payment.56 Thus, in BPI v. Spouses
Royeca,57 we ruled that despite the lapse of three years from
the time the checks were issued, the obligation still subsisted
and was merely suspended until the payment by commercial
document could actually be realized.58
However, payment is deemed effected and the obligation for
which the check was given as conditional payment is treated
discharged, if a period of 10 years or more has elapsed from
the date indicated on the check until the date of encashment
or presentment for payment. The failure to encash the checks
within a reasonable time after issue, or more than 10 years in
this instance, not only results in the checks becoming stale but
also in the obligation to pay being deemed fulfilled by operation
of law.
Art. 1249 of the Civil Code specifically provides that checks in CA-G.R. SP No. 110680 are SET ASIDE. The Complaint
should be presented for payment within a reasonable period against petitioner is hereby DISMISSED.
after their issuance, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money shall be made in the
currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such
currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the
Philippines.

The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of

exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the
effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when
through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.

In the meantime, the action derived from the original

obligation shall be held in the abeyance. (Emphasis supplied)

This rule is similarly stated in the Negotiable Instruments Law

as follows:

Sec. 186. Within what time a check must be presented. - A

check must be presented for p:iyment within a reasonable time
after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
(Emphasis supplied)

These provisions were the very same ones we cited when we

discharged a check by reason of the creditor's unreasonable or
unexplained delay in encashing it. In Papa v. Valencia,59 the
respondents supposedly paid the petitioner the purchase price
of the lots in cash and in check. The latter disputed this claim
and argued that he had never encashed the checks, and that he
could no longer recall the transaction that happened 10 years
earlier. This Court ruled:

Granting that petitioner had never encashed the check, his

failure to do so for more than ten (10) years undoubtedly
resulted in the impairment of the check through his
unreasonable and unexplained delay.

While it is true that the delivery of a check produces the

effect of payment only when it is cashed, pursuant to Art.
1249 of the Civil Code, the rule is otherwise if the debtor is
prejudiced by the creditor's unreasonable delay in
presentment. The acceptance of a check implies an undertaking
of due diligence in presenting it for payment, and if he from
whom it is received sustains loss by want of such diligence, it
will be held to operate as actual payment of the debt or
obligation for which it was given. It has, likewise, been held
that if no presentment is made at all, the drawer cannot be
held liable irrespective of loss or injury unless presentment is
otherwise excused. This is in harmony with Article 1249 of the
Civil Code under which payment by way of check or other
negotiable instrument is conditioned on its being cashed,
except when through the fault of the creditor, the instrument
is impaired. The payee of a check would be a creditor under
this provision and if its no-payment is caused by his negligence,
payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which
the check was given as conditional payment will be
discharged.60 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

Similarly in this case, we find that the delivery of the checks,

despite the subsequent failure to encash them within a period
of 10 years or more, had the effect of payment. Petitioner is
considered discharged from his obligation to pay and can no
longer be pronounced civilly liable for the amounts indicated
thereon.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated 1 October 2013 and Resolution dated 27 February 2014
[G.R. No. L-18719. October 31, 1964.]
PILAR JOAQUIN, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FELIX
ANICETO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Arturo B. Atienza & F. B. del Rosario, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
D. A. Karganilla for Defendants-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE; CHOICE OF
REMEDIES OF INJURED PARTY. — In cases of negligence,
the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action
to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict
under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR QUASI DELICT. — If the
injured party chooses an action for quasi delict, he may hold an
employer liable for the negligent act of the employee, subject,
however, to the employer’s defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION UNDER PENAL CODE; SEPARATE
CIVIL ACTION FOR SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY OF
EMPLOYER NOT MAINTAINABLE WHILE CRIMINAL CASE
PENDING. — Should the injured party choose to prosecute his
action under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, he can hold
the employer subsidiarily liable only upon prior conviction of
the employee. While a separate and independent civil action for
damages may be brought against the employee under Article
33 of the Civil Code, no such action may be filed against the
employer on the latter’s subsidiary civil liability because such
liability is governed not by the Civil Code but by the Penal
Code, under which conviction of the employee is a condition
sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability.
D E C I S I O N
REGALA, J.:
This case comes to Us for review directly from the Court of
First Instance of Manila. The facts are not in dispute. They
are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
While Pilar Joaquin was on the sidewalk of Aviles Street,
Manila, on April 27, 1960, a taxicab driven by Felix Aniceto and
owned by Ruperto Rodelas bumped her. As a result, she
suffered physical injuries.
Aniceto was charged with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Municipal Court (now the City
Court) of Manila. He was subsequently found guilty and
sentenced to imprisonment. However, no ruling was made on his
civil liability to the offended party in view of the latter’s
reservation to file a separate civil action for damages for the
injuries suffered by her.
Aniceto appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
First Instance of Manila. While the criminal case was thus
pending appeal, Pilar Joaquin, the injured party, filed this case
or damages in the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
accordance with the reservation which she had earlier made.
Felix Aniceto and Ruperto Rodelas, driver and owner,
respectively, of the taxicab were made party defendants.
At the trial of this case, the plaintiff blocked all attempts of
Rodelas to prove that, as employer, he had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, on
the ground that such a defense is not available in a civil action
brought under the Penal Code to recover the subsidiary civil
liability arising from the crime. The lower court sustained
plaintiff’s objection. However, it dismissed the case on the
ground that, in the absence of a final judgment of conviction
against the driver in the criminal case, any action to enforce
the employer’s subsidiary civil liability would be premature.
Such liability, the trial court added, may only be enforced on
proof of the insolvency of the employee. Hence, this appeal.
The issue in the case is: May an employee’s primary civil
liability for crime and his employer’s subsidiary liability
therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the
criminal case against the employee is still pending?
To begin with, obligation arise from law, contract, quasi
contract, crime and quasi-delict. 1 According to appellant, her
action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crime.
With respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161
of the New Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article
2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary
Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book,
regulating damages." (Italics supplied)
The Revised Penal Code provides in turn that "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable" 2 and that in
default of the persons criminally liable, employers, teachers,
persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry shall
be civilly liable for felonies committed by their servants,
pupils, workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge of
their duties. 3
As this Court held in City of Manila v. Manila Electric Co., 52
Phil. 586:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The Penal Code authorizes the determination of subsidiary
liability. The Civil Code negatives its applicability by providing
that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall
be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. In other
words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil
Code negatives its jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable,
the following requisites must be present: (1) That an employee
has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that
said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil
liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794
[1964])
Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot
be subsidiary liable.
Now, it is no reason to bring such action against the employer
on the ground that in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries, Article 33 of the Civil Code authorizes a civil action
that is "entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action," (Carandang v. Santiago, 94; 51 O.G. 2878; Reyes v. De
la Rosa, 52 O.G. 6548; Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, January
22, 1957).
Can Article 33 above cited be made applicable to an employer
in a civil action for subsidiary liability? The answer to this
question is undoubtedly in the negative.
What this article 33 authorizes is an action against the
employee on his primary civil liability. It cannot apply to an
action against the employer to enforce his subsidiary civil
liability as stated above, because, such liability arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. Any
action brought against him before the conviction of his
employee is premature.

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the

choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil
Code. (See Barredo v. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Parker
v. Panlilio, Et Al., 91 Phil. 1)

If he chooses an action for quasi delict, be may hold an

employer liable for the negligent act of the employee, subject,
however, to the employer’s defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family. (Art. 2180, Civil Code)

On the other hand, should he choose to prosecute his action

under Article 100 of the Penal Code, he can hold the employer
subsidiarily liable only upon prior conviction of the employee.
While a separate and independent civil action for damages may
be brought against the employee under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, no such action may be filed against the employer on the
latter’s subsidiary civil liability because such liability is
governed not by the Civil Code but by the Penal Code, under
which conviction of the employee is a condition sine qua non for
the employer’s subsidiary liability. If the court trying the
employee’s liability adjudges the employee liable, but the court
trying the criminal action acquits the employee, the subsequent
insolvency of the employee cannot make the employer
subsidiarily liable to the offended party or to the latter’s
heirs.

WHEREFORE, decision appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the
criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and
ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, Petitioners, adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.3
vs. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, Respondent.
On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor
D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.: of petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

The Case WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [Spouses Alfredo P. Pacis
and Cleopatra D. Pacis] and against the defendant [Jerome
This petition for review1 assails the 11 May 2005 Decision2 and
Jovanne Morales] ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs —
the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 60669.
(1) ₱30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Alfred
Pacis;
The Facts
(2) ₱29,437.65 as actual damages for the
hospitalization and burial expenses incurred by the
On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra
plaintiffs;
D. Pacis (petitioners) filed with the trial court a civil case for
(3) ₱100,000.00 as compensatory damages;
damages against respondent Jerome Jovanne Morales
(4) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;
(respondent). Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Dennis
(5) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in a shooting
incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store
SO ORDERED.4
(gun store) in Baguio City. Respondent is the owner of the gun
store.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its
Decision5 dated 11 May 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.6
On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and
a first year student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation taking
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
up BS Computer Science, died due to a gunshot wound in the
of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 August 2005.
head which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun
Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini
Hence, this petition.
Street, Baguio City. The gun store was owned and operated by
defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes
Matibag and Jason Herbolario. They were sales agents of the The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the death of
defendant, and at that particular time, the caretakers of the Alfred under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
gun store. Civil Code.7 The trial court held that the accidental shooting of
Alfred which caused his death was partly due to the negligence
of respondent’s employee Aristedes Matibag (Matibag).
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a
Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario) were employees of
gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair.
respondent even if they were only paid on a commission basis.
Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages
The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum with
caused by Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his
Serial No. SN-H34194 (Exhibit "Q"), was left by defendant
duties, unless respondent proved that he observed the
Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
The trial court held that respondent failed to observe the
Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee required diligence when he left the key to the drawer
Armando Jarnague, who was the regular caretaker of the gun containing the loaded defective gun without instructing his
store was also not around. He left earlier and requested sales employees to be careful in handling the loaded gun.
agents Matibag and Herbolario to look after the gun store
while he and defendant Morales were away. Jarnague
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in
the gun store which included the key to the drawer where the
The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held
fatal gun was kept.
civilly liable since there was no employer-employee relationship
between respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found
It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the
that Matibag was not under the control of respondent with
gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the table.
respect to the means and methods in the performance of his
Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred Dennis
work. There can be no employer-employee relationship where
Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis
the element of control is absent. Thus, Article 2180 of the
to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to
Civil Code does not apply in this case and respondent cannot be
Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the
held liable.
head.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before
respondent is considered an employer of Matibag, still
branch VII of this Court. Matibag, however, was acquitted of
respondent cannot be held liable since no negligence can be
the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance
attributed to him. As explained by the Court of Appeals:
of "accident" under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
Granting arguendo that an employer-employee relationship
existed between Aristedes Matibag and the defendant-
appellant, we find that no negligence can be attributed to him.
Negligence is best exemplified in the case of Picart vs. Smith
(37 Phil. 809). The test of negligence is this:
"x x x. Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or take precaution against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. x x x."
Defendant-appellant maintains that he is not guilty of
negligence and lack of due care as he did not fail to observe
the diligence of a good father of a family. He submits that he
kept the firearm in one of his table drawers, which he locked
and such is already an indication that he took the necessary
diligence and care that the said gun would not be accessible to
anyone. He puts [sic] that his store is engaged in selling
firearms and ammunitions. Such items which are per se
dangerous are kept in a place which is properly secured in
order that the persons coming into the gun store would not be
able to take hold of it unless it is done intentionally, such as
when a customer is interested to purchase any of the firearms,
ammunitions and other related items, in which case, he may be
allowed to handle the same.
We agree. Much as We sympathize with the family of the
deceased, defendant-appellant is not to be blamed. He
exercised due diligence in keeping his loaded gun while he was
on a business trip in Manila. He placed it inside the drawer and
locked it. It was taken away without his knowledge and
authority. Whatever happened to the deceased was purely
accidental.8
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN
QUESTION IN DISREGARD OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
BY REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO CITY
NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR, AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND
TESTIMONIES PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL WHICH
NEGATE AND CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE,
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION IN QUESTION BY DEPARTING FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS THEREBY IGNORING THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 59)
OF BAGUIO CITY SHOWING PETITIONER’S CLEAR RIGHTS
TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.9
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition meritorious.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of
petitioners’ son. Under Article 116110 of the Civil Code,
petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the
civil liability arising from the crime under Article 10011 of the
Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an independent civil
action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead
of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed
against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil
action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was
Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article
10312 of the Revised Penal Code,13 the liability of the employer,
or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence.
Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside
a gun store.1avvphi1 Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the
"Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair," a
person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of
firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and
safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to
Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.14
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who
has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons
or substances. Such person in possession or control of
dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby.15 Unlike
the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or
no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the
exercise of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has
the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use.16 With more reason, guns accepted by the store
for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are
defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what
happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when
he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first
place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault.
Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent
should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any
untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a
firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is
open and he has personally checked that the weapon is
completely unloaded.17 For failing to insure that the gun was
not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it
was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License
to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to
restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade
firearms.18
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and
diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the
degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous
weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 11
May 2005 Decision and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. We REINSTATE
the trial court’s Decision dated 8 April 1998. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120639 September 25, 1998
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and RICARDO J. MARASIGAN, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The question before this Court is whether private respondent
can recover moral damages arising from the cancellation of his
credit card by petitioner credit card corporation.
The facts of the case are as stated in the decision of the
respondent court, 1 to wit:
The case arose from the dishonor of the credit card of the
plaintiff Atty. Ricardo J. Marasigan by Café Adriatico, a
business establishment accredited with the defendant-
appellate BPI Express Card Corporation (BECC for brevity),
on December 8, 1989 when the plaintiff entertained some
guests thereat.
The records of this case show that plaintiff, who is a lawyer
by profession, was a complimentary member of BECC from
February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued Credit Card
No. 100-012-5534 with a credit limit of P3,000.00 and with a
monthly billing every 27th of the month (Exh. N), subject to
the terms and conditions stipulated in the contract (Exh. 1-
b). His membership was renewed for another year or until
February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to
P5,000.00 (Exh. A). The plaintiffs oftentimes exceeded his
credit limits (Exhs. I, I-1 to I-12) but this was never taken
against him by the defendant and even his mode of paying his
monthly bills in check was tolerated. Their contractual
relations went on smoothly until his statement of account for
October 1989 amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due
time. The plaintiff admitted having inadvertently failed to
pay his account for the said month because he was in Quezon
province attending to some professional and personal
commitments. He was informed by his secretary that
defendant was demanding immediate payment of his
outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a check for
P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was
threatening to suspend his credit card. Plaintiff issued Far
East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 494675 in the amount of
P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989 which was
received on November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an
employee of the defendant (Exhs. J and J-1), who in turn
gave the said check to Jeng Angeles, a co-employee who
handles the account of the plaintiff. The check remained in
the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of
the collection department of defendant was formally
informed of the postdated check about a week later. On
November 28, 2989, defendant served plaintiff a letter by
ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of
the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his
account number in their Caution List. He was also told to
refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any
inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his
outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from
receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently
cancelled (Exh. 3). There is no showing that the plaintiff
received this letter before December 8, 1989. Confidential
that he had settled his account with the issuance of the
postdated check, plaintiff invited some guests on December
8, 1989 and entertained them at Café Adriatico. When he
presented his credit card to Café Adriatico for the bill
amounting to P735.32, said card was dishonored. One of his
guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own
credit card a Unibankard (Exhs. M, M-1 and M-2).
In a letter addressed to the defendant dated December 12,
1989, plaintiff requested that he be sent the exact billing
due him as of December 15, 1989, to withhold the deposit of
his postdated check and that said check be returned to him
because he had already instructed his bank to stop the
payment thereof as the defendant violated their agreement
that the plaintiff issue the check to the defendant to cover
his account amounting to only P8,987.84 on the condition
that the defendant will not suspend the effectivity of the
card (Exh. D). A letter dated December 16, 1989 was sent by
the plaintiff to the manager of FEBTC, Ramada Branch,
Manila requesting the bank to stop the payment of the check
(Exhs. E, E-1). No reply was received by plaintiff from the
defendant to his letter dated December 12, 1989. Plaintiff
sent defendant another letter dated March 12, 1990
reminding the latter that he had long rescinded and
cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with
defendant and requesting for his correct billing, less the
improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation within
five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was
dishonored on December 8, 1989 despite assurance to the
contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge, otherwise the
necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant
responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered
by him (Exh. F). Plaintiff alleged further that after a few
days, a certain Atty. Albano, representing himself to be
working with the office of Atty. Lopez, called him inquiring
as to how the matter can be threshed out extrajudicially but
the latter said that such is a serious matter cannot be
discussed over the phone. The defendant served its final
demand to the plaintiff dated March 21, 1990 requiring him
to pay in full his overdue account, including stipulated fees
and charges, within 5 days from receipt thereof or face
court action and also to replace the postdated check with
cash within the same period or face criminal suit for
violation of Bouncing Check Law (Exh. G/Exh. 13). The
plaintiff in a reply letter dated April 5, 1990 (Exh. H),
demanded defendant's compliance with his request in his
first letter dated March 12, 1990 within three (3) days from
receipt, otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them,
. . . .2
Thus, on May 7, 1990 private respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1174.
After trial the trial court ruled for private respondent, finding
that herein petitioner abused its right in contravention of
Article 19 of the Civil Code. 3 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff the following:
1. P 100,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
3. P 20,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
On the other hand, plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant its
outstanding obligation in the amount of P14,439.41, amount
due as of December 15, 1989.4
The trial court's ruling was based on its findings and
conclusions, to wit:
There is no question that plaintiff had been in default in the
payment of his billings for more than two months, prompting
defendant to call him and reminded him of his obligation.
Unable to personally talk with him, this Court is convinced
that somehow one or another employee of defendant called
him up more that once.
However, while it is true that as indicated in the terms and
conditions of the application for BPI credit card upon failure
of the cardholder to pay his outstanding obligation for more
that thirty (30) days, the defendant can automatically
suspend or cancel the credit card, that reserved right
should not have been abused as it was in fact abused, in
plaintiff's case. What is more peculiar here is that there
have been admitted communications between plaintiff and
defendant prior to the suspension or cancellation of
plaintiff's credit card and his inclusion in the cautions list.
However, nowhere in any of these communications was there
ever a hint given to plaintiff that his card had already been
suspended or cancelled. In fact, the Court observed that
while defendant was trying its best to persuade plaintiff to
update its account and pay its obligation, it had already
taken steps to suspend/cancel plaintiff's card and include
him in the caution list. While the Court admires defendant's
diplomacy in dealing with its clients, it cannot help but frown
upon the backhanded way defendant deal with plaintiff's
case. For despite Tess Lorenzo's denial, there is reason to
believe that plaintiff was indeed assured by defendant of
the continued honoring of his credit card so long as he pays
his obligation of P15,000.00. Worst, upon receipt of the
postdated check, defendant kept the same until a few days
before it became due and said check was presented to the
head of the collection department, Mr. Maniquiz, to take
steps thereon, resulting to the embarrassing situations
plaintiff found himself in on December 8, 1989. Moreover,
Mr. Maniquiz himself admitted that his request for plaintiff
to replace the check with cash was not because it was a
postdated check but merely to tally the payment with the
account due.
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by the sweeping denials
made by Tess Lorenzo and her claim that her only
participation was to receive the subject check. Her
immediate superior, Mr. Maniquiz testified that he had
instructed Lorenzo to communicate with plaintiff once or
twice to request the latter to replace the questioned check
with cash, thus giving support to the testimony of plaintiff's
witness, Dolores Quizon, that it was one Tess Lorenzo whom
she had talked over the phone regarding plaintiff's account
and plaintiff's own statement that it was this woman who
assured him that his card has not yet been and will not be
cancelled/suspended if he would pay defendant the sum of
P15,000.00.
6. And that the postdated check was deposited on December
20, 1989.
In view of the foregoing observations, it is needless to say
that there was indeed an arrangement between plaintiff and
the defendant, as can be inferred from the acts of the
defendant's employees, that the subject credit card is still
good and could still be used by the plaintiff as it would be
honored by the duly accredited establishment of defendant.
Not satisfied with the Regional Trial Court's decision,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in a decision
promulgated on March 9, 1995 ruled in its dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the defendant-appellant shall pay the plaintiff-
appellee the following: P50,000.00 as moral damages:
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P10,000.00 by way
of attorney's fees.
6
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THERE WAS INDEED AN AGREEMENT OR
ARRANGEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE
PARTIES WHEREIN THE DEFENDANT REQUIRED THE
PLAINTIFF TO ISSUE A POSTDATED CHECK IN ITS
FAVOR IN THE AMOUNT OF P15,000.00 AS PAYMENT
FOR HIS OVERDUE ACCOUNTS, WITH THE
CONDITION THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S CREDIT CARD
WILL NOT BE SUSPENDED OR CANCELLED.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES ARISING OUT FROM THE DISHONOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S CREDIT CARD. 7
We find the petition meritorious.
The first issue to be resolved is whether petitioner had the
right to suspend the credit card of the private respondent.

Now, on the issue of whether or not upon receipt of the

Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by
subject check defendant had agreed that the card shall
the private respondent, any card with outstanding balances
remain effective the Court takes note of the following:
after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall
automatically be suspended, thus:
1. An employee of defendant corporation unconditionally
accepted the subject check upon its delivery despite its
PAYMENT OF CHARGES — BECC shall furnish the
being a postdated one; and the amount did not tally with
Cardholder a monthly statement of account made through
plaintiff's obligation;
the use of the CARD and the Cardholder agrees that all
2. Defendant did not deny nor controvert plaintiff's claim
charges made through the use of the CARD shall be paid
that all of his payments were made in checks;
by the Cardholder on or before the last day for payment,
3. Defendant's main witness, Mr. Maniquiz, categorically
which is twenty (20) days from the date of the said
stated that the request for plaintiff to replace his
statement of account; and such payment due date may be
postdated check with a cash was merely for the purpose of
changed to an earlier date if the Cardholder's account is
tallying plaintiff's outstanding obligation with his payment
considered overdue and/or with balances in excess of the
and not to question the postdated check;
approved credit limit; or to such other date as may be
4. That the card was suspended almost a week after receipt
deemed proper by the CARD issuer with notice to the
of the postdated check;
Cardholder on the same monthly statement of account. If
5. That despite the many instances that defendant could
the last day for payment falls on a Saturday, Sunday or
have informed plaintiff over the phone of the cancellation or
Holiday, the last day for payment automatically becomes
suspension of his credit card, it did not do so, which could
the last working day prior to the said payment date.
have prevented the incident of December 8, 1989, the notice
However, notwithstanding the absence or lack of proof of
allegedly sent thru ordinary mail is not only unreliable but
service of the statement of charges to the Cardholder,
takes a long time. Such action as suspension of credit card
the latter shall pay any or all charges made through the
must be immediately relayed to the person affected so as to
use of the CARD within thirty (30) days from the date or
avoid embarrassing situations.
 dates thereof. Failure of Cardholder to pay any and all
charges made through the CARD within the payment
period as stated in the statement of charges or with in
thirty (30) days from actual date or dates whichever
occur earlier, shall render him in default without the
necessity of demand from BECC, which the Cardholder
expressly waives. These charges or balance thereof
remaining unpaid after the payment due date indicated on
the monthly statement of account shall bear interest of
3% per month and an additional penalty fee equivalent to
another 3% of the amount due for every month or a
fraction of a month's delay. PROVIDED, that if there
occurs any changes on the prevailing market rates BECC
shall have the option to adjust the rate of interest and/or
penalty fee due on the outstanding obligation with prior
notice to the Cardholder.
xxx xxx xxx
Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty
(30) days from original billing/statement date shall
automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid
after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement
date shall automatically be cancelled without prejudice to
BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and
for whatever reason. In case of default in his obligation as
provided for in the preceding paragraph, Cardholder shall
surrender his CARD to BECC and shall in addition to the
interest and penalty charges aforementioned, pay the
following liquidated damages and/or fees (a) a collection
fee of 25% of the amount due if the account is referred
to a collection agency or attorney; (b) a service fee of
P100 for every dishonored check issued by the
Cardholder's in payment of his account, without prejudice;
however to BECC's right of considering Cardholder's
obligation unpaid; cable cost for demanding payment or
advising cancellation of membership shall also be for
Cardholder's account; and (c) a final fee equivalent to 25%
of the unpaid balance, exclusive of litigation expenses and
judicial costs, if the payment of the account is enforced
through court action. 8
The aforequoted provision of the card cannot be any clearer.
By his own admission private respondent no payment within
thirty days for his billing/statement dated 27 September
1989. Neither did he make payment for his original
billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Consequently as
early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of
his billing dated 27 September 1989, petitioner corporation
could automatically suspend his credit card.
The next issue is whether prior to the suspension of private
respondent's credit card on 28 November 1989 the parties
entered into an agreement whereby the card could still be used
and would be duly honored by duly accredited establishments.
We agree with the findings of the respondent court, that
there was an arrangement between the parties, wherein the
petitioner required the private respondent to issue a check
worth P15,000.00 as payment for the latter's billings. However
we find that the private respondent was not able to comply
with this obligation.
As the testimony of private respondent himself bears out, the
agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding
account:
Q In said statement of account that you are supposed to pay
the P8,974.84 the charge of interest and penalties, did you
note that?
A Yes, sir I noted the date.
Q When?
A When I returned from the Quezon province, sir
Q When?
A I think November 22, sir.
Q So that before you used again the credit card you were
not able to pay immediately this P8,987.84 in cash?
A I paid P15,000.00, sir.
Q My question Mr. witness is, did you pay this P8,987.84 in
charge of interest and penalties immediately in cash?
A In cash no, but in check, sir.
Q You said that you noted the word "immediately" in bold
letters in your statement of accounts, why did not pay
immediately?
A Because I received that late, sir.
Q Yes, on November 22 when you received from the
secretary of the defendant telling you to pay the principal
amount of P8,987.84, why did you not pay?
A There was a communication between me and the
defendant, I was required to pay P8,000.00 but I paid in
check for P15,000.00, sir.
Q Do you have any evidence to show that the defendant
required you to pay in check for P15,000.00?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is it?
A It was telecommunication, sir.
Q So there is no written communication between you and the
defendant?
A There was none, sir.
Q There is no written agreement which says that P8,987.84
should be paid for P15,000.00 in check, there is none?
A Yes, no written agreement, sir.
Q And you as a lawyer you know that a check is not
considered as cash specially when it is postdated sent to the
defendant?
A That is correct, sir.
Clearly the purpose of the arrangement between the parties on
November 22, 1989, was for the immediate payment of the
private respondent's outstanding account, in order that his
credit card would not be suspended.
As agreed upon by the parties, on the following day, private
respondent did issue a check for P15,000.00. However, the
check was postdated 15 December 1989. Settled is the
doctrine that a check is only a substitute for money and not
money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself
operate as payment. 9 This is especially true in the case of a
postdated check.
Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the postdated
check was not effective payment. It did not comply with his
obligation under the arrangement with Miss Lorenzo. Petitioner
corporation was therefore justified in suspending his credit
card.
Finally, we find no legal and factual basis for private
respondent's assertion that in canceling the credit card of the
private respondent, petitioner abused its right under the
terms and conditions of the contract.
To find the existence of an abuse of right Article 19 the
following elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another. 10
Time and again this Court has held that good faith is presumed
and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging
it. 11 This private respondent failed to do. In fact, the action
of the petitioner belies the existence of bad faith. As early as
28 October 1989, petitioner could have suspended private
respondent's card outright. Instead, petitioner allowed private
respondent to use his card for several weeks. Petitioner had
even notified private respondent of the impending suspension
of his credit card and made special accommodations for him
for setting his outstanding account. As such, petitioner cannot
be said to have capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the
private respondent's credit card.
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private
respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of
his credit card. However, there is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the results of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the
law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are
often called damnum absque
injuria. 12
A There was none, sir. I received a cancellation notice but
that was after November 27. 17
As it was private respondent's own negligence which was the
proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating
experience, we find the award of damages by the respondent
court clearly unjustified. We take note of the fact that
private respondent has not yet paid his outstanding account
with petitioner.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
P100,000.00 as moral damages P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, is SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is DIRECTED to pay his outstanding
obligation with the petitioner in the amount of P14,439.41.
SO ORDERED.

In other words, in order that the plaintiff may maintain an

action for the injuries of which he complaints, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages
is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; 13 and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.

We therefore disagree with the ruling of the respondent court

that the dishonor of the credit card of the private respondent
by Café Adriatico is attributable to petitioner for its willful or
gross neglect to inform the private respondent of the
suspension of his credit card, the unfortunate consequence of
which brought social humiliation and embarrassment to the
private respondent. 14

It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused

the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at
Café Adriatico. He can not now pass the blame to the
petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card.
As quoted earlier, the application contained the stipulation
that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose
billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere is
it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that
there is a need of notice before suspension may be affected as
private respondent claims. 15

This notwithstanding on November 28, 1989, the day of the

suspension of private respondent's card, petitioner sent a
letter by ordinary mail notifying private respondent that his
card had been temporarily suspended. Under the Rules on
Evidence, there is a disputable presumption that letters duly
directed and mailed were received on the regular course of
mail. 16 Aside from the private respondent's bare denial he
failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption that he
received said notice. In fact upon cross examination private
respondent admitted that he did receive the letter notifying
him of the cancellation:

Q Now you were saying that there was a first letter sent to
you by the defendant?
A Your letter, sir.
Q Was that the first letter that you received?
A Yes, sir.
Q It is that there was a communication first between you
and the defendant?
G.R. No. 206709, February 06, 2019
VDM TRADING, INC. AND SPOUSES LUIS AND NENA
DOMINGO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, ATTY. F. WILLIAM L. VILLAREAL, PETITIONERS,
v. LEONITA CARUNGCONG AND WACK WACK TWIN
TOWERS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioners VDM Trading, Inc. (petitioner VDM) and
Spouses Luis and Nena Domingo (collectively referred to as the
petitioners Sps. Domingo), assailing the Decision2 dated July
13, 2012 (assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated March 20,
2013 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Eleventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 89479.
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
As narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision and as culled
from the records of the instant case, the essential facts and
antecedent proceedings of the case are as follows:
personal clothing, articles of personal use, and important
documents inside the cabinet; and (7) miscellaneous damages.
For this reason, on behalf of the petitioners Sps. Domingo,
Atty. Villareal sent a letter5 dated December 16, 1998,
demanding that respondents Wack Wack and Carungcong make
restoration works and/or pay for the damages caused upon the
Unit.
When no action was taken by respondents Wack Wack and
Carungcong after the lapse of a considerable length of time,
Atty. Villareal allegedly sent another letter6 dated September
1, 1999 to respondents Wack Wack, Carungcong, and Tan, as
well as Golden Dragon Real Estate Corporation (Golden Dragon),
the developer of the Condominium, demanding that repairs be
made on the Unit.
Subsequently, repair works on the Unit were referred to M.
Laher Construction (M. Laher) for a quotation. In its
letter7 dated September 1, 2000 addressed to petitioner Luis,
M. Laher stated that the estimated cost in repairing the Unit's
balcony, master bedroom, dining and living room, and the
children's room amounted to P490,635.00. Afterwards, several
demand letters8 were sent by the counsel of the petitioners
Sps. Domingo to respondents Wack Wack, Carungcong, Tan, and
Golden Dragon for the payment of the amount quoted by M.
Laher, but to no avail.

On August 21, 2002, petitioner VDM and the petitioners Sps.

Hence, the petitioners Sps. Domingo were constrained to file
Domingo filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
their Complaint. As stated in the Complaint, the cause of action
City, Branch 213 (RTC) a Complaint for Damages4 (Complaint)
against Tan is based on the supposed "unauthorized installation
against respondents Leonita Carungcong (respondent
of plumbing in the balcony of Unit 2308-B1 and x x x
Carungcong), Wack Wack Twin Towers Condominium
unauthorized conversion of said balcony into a laundry/wash
Association, Inc. (respondent Wack Wack), and Hak Yek Tan
area"9 undertaken by Tan. As regards, respondent Carungcong,
(Tan).
she was being held solidarity liable with respondent Tan as the
registered owner of Unit 2308-B1, allegedly failing in her
In the said Complaint, it was alleged that petitioner VDM is the
responsibility of ensuring that Tan is complying with all of the
owner of Unit 2208B-1 (the Unit) located at Wack Wack Twin
rules and regulations of respondent Wack Wack.10 With
Towers Condominium (the Condominium) at Wack Wack Road,
respect to respondent Wack Wack, the cause of action was
Mandaluyong City. Petitioner Nena Domingo (petitioner Nena),
based on the latter's alleged act of being "utterly negligent in
the majority stockholder of petitioner VDM, and her husband,
failing to enforce and implement the Association's Rules and
petitioner Luis Domingo (petitioner Luis), are the actual
Regulations prohibiting illegal or unauthorized constructions,
occupants of the Unit.
additions, or alteration by tenants to their units."11

Sometime in December 1998, while the petitioners Sps.

The petitioners Sps. Domingo prayed for the award of
Domingo were in the United States, petitioner Nena's sister,
P490,635.00 as actual damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary
Nancy Lagman-Castillo (Lagman-Castillo), discovered that soapy
damages, and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees, litigation
water was heavily penetrating through the ceiling of the Unit.
expenses, and costs of suit.
With the leak persisting for several days, Lagman-Castillo
reported the matter with the petitioners Sps. Domingo's
Summonses were served upon all the respondents, except Tan
counsel and attorney-in-fact, Atty. William Villareal (Atty.
who was no longer residing at the given address.
Villareal), as well as respondent Wack Wack's building
administrator.
Subsequently, respondent Wack Wack filed an Answer with
Counterclaim and Crossclaim12 against respondent Carungcong
On December 10, 1998, Atty. Villareal allegedly met with
and Tan. It was respondent Wack Wack's contention that the
respondent Wack Wack's Acting Property Manager, Arlene
responsibility of enforcing and monitoring the policies on the
Cruz (Cruz), who supposedly revealed that she previously
use and occupancy of condominium units lied solely with Golden
conducted an inspection on the Unit and found that the strong
Dragon, as embodied in the Amended Master Deed with
leak apparently came from Unit 2308B-1, which is located
Declaration of Restrictions of Wack Wack Twin Towers
directly above the Unit. Unit 2308B-1 is owned by respondent
(Amended Master Deed).13 As stipulated therein, Golden
Carungcong, but was being leased by Tan at that time. Cruz
Dragon had the duty to orient the unit owners of the
allegedly explained that Unit 2308B-1's balcony, which was
Condominium on the prohibitions and restrictions regarding the
being utilized as a laundry area, had unauthorized piping and
construction, repair, or alteration of any structure within the
plumbing works installed therein, which were in violation of
units. On the other hand, respondent Wack Wack's obligation
respondent Wack Wack's rules and regulations, as well as the
was limited to the implementation of the house rules and
building's original plans.
regulations affecting only the common and limited areas of the
Condominium.
Atty. Villareal conducted his own inspection of the Unit in the
presence of Lagman-Castillo and Cruz, and noted damages on
In its crossclaim, respondent Wack Wack alleged that if there
the following: (1) ceilings and walls, including the wall paper and
was indeed any damage caused on the Unit, it would have been
panel board; (2) cabinets and other improvements on the wall;
due to Tan's wrongdoing and the failure of respondent
(3) narra flooring, which showed warping and permanent
Carungcong to diligently and regularly monitor the former's
discoloration; (4) bed, mattress, sheets, and covers; (5)
activities.
curtains, which showed signs of shrinking and deterioration; (6)

For her part, respondent Carungcong filed her Answer with
Third Party Complaint14 against Golden Dragon and its specialty
contractor, Stalwart Builders Corporation (Stalwart).
Respondent Carungcong argued that the soapy water which
seeped through the ceiling of the Unit did not come from the
balcony of her unit, Unit 2308B-1. Also, the installation of
piping and plumbing works done by Stalwart was done with the
permission and approval of Golden Dragon. She countered that
if there was any defect in the plumbing works, the damages on
the Unit should be assessed against Golden Dragon and
Stalwart.
Summonses were not served upon Golden Dragon and Stalwart
as they were no longer holding office in the addresses supplied
by respondent Carungcong.15 As such, the RTC did not tackle
anymore the Third Party Complaint.
The Ruling of the RTC
On December 19, 2006, the RTC rendered its
Decision16 granting the Complaint against respondent
Carungcong, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing[,] judgment is hereby
rendered granting the [C]omplaint against [respondent]
Carungcong, and ordering the said [respondent] to pay
[petitioner] the following amounts:
(1) Php 490,635.00 as actual damages;
(2) Php 100,000.00 as legal fees.
SO ORDERED.17
The petitioners VDM and Sps. Domingo filed their Motion for
Partial Reconsideration18 dated January 10, 2007, praying that
respondent Wack Wack be held solidarity liable with
respondent Carungcong pursuant to the provisions of the
Amended Master Deed. Respondent Carungcong likewise moved
for a reconsideration19 of the RTC's Decision, maintaining that
the petitioners VDM and Sps. Domingo's causes of action
should be directed and litigated against Golden Dragon instead.
In its Order20 dated July 18, 2007, the RTC modified its
Decision and held that respondent Wack Wack is solidarity
liable with respondent Carungcong for the award of damages
granted to the petitioners. Meanwhile, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent Carungcong was denied for
lack of merit.
Hence, respondents Carungcong and Wack Wack appealed the
RTC's Decision and Order before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision, the CA granted the appeal of
respondents Carungcong and Wack Wack, reversing the RTC's
Decision dated December 19, 2006 and Order dated July
18,2007. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
appealed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint for damages is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21
In sum, the CA found that the records are bereft of any
evidence showing that the damage to the petitioners' Unit was
caused by the plumbing works done on the balcony of Unit
2308B-1. Further, the CA took cognizance of an already
settled case previously initiated by the petitioners before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) concerning
the Unit. The said case decided by the HLURB found that
water leakage in the Unit was caused by the defective and
substandard construction of the Unit by Golden Dragon, and
not the plumbing works on the balcony of Unit 2308B-1.
The petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the
assailed Decision on August 17, 2012, which was denied by the
CA in the assailed Resolution.
Hence, this appeal via Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.22
On October 30, 2013, respondent Carungcong filed her
Comments [To The Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45]23 dated October 24, 2013. In response, on November 29,
2013, the petitioners filed their Omnibus Motion and Reply Ad
Cautelam (To Respondent Leonita
Carungcong's Comments)24 dated November 28, 2013. In their
Omnibus Motion, the petitioners prayed that the counsel of
respondent Carungcong, i.e., Atty. Adriano I. Gaddi, be ordered
to show cause for the late filling of respondent Carungcong's
Comment. In a Resolution25 dated January 27, 2014, the Court
denied the petitioners' Omnibus Motion.
After having been fined a sum of P1,000.00 by the Court in its
Resolution26 dated February 16, 2015 for failing to file a
comment on the instant Petition within the required period, on
May 13, 2015, respondent Wack Wack filed its Comment27 [on
the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 28 May 2013]
dated May 11, 2015.
Issue
Stripped to its core, the central issued to be decided by the
Court is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC's Decision
dated December 19, 2006 and Order dated July 18, 2007, thus
dismissing the petitioners' Complaint for Damages against
respondents Carungcong and Wack Wack.
The Court's Ruling
The instant Petition is denied for lack of merit.
First and foremost, it must be stressed that the instant
Petition centers on the petitioners' contention that the CA's
assailed Decision and Resolution "are based on a
misapprehension of facts."28 The instant Petition then
proceeds to reiterate the contents of the testimony of their
sole witness, Atty. Villareal, and the various documents he
produced, arguing that the evidence on record allegedly
establish the fact that the proximate cause of the damage to
the Unit is the plumbing works made on the balcony of Unit
2308B-1 owned by respondent Carungcong.
Simply stated, the instant Petition raises pure questions of
fact.
A question of facts exists when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.29 That is precisely what the petitioners are asking
the Court to do - to reassess, reexamine, and recalibrate the
evidence on record.
A catena of cases has consistently held that questions of fact
cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Court
and are not proper for its consideration.30 The Court is not a
trier of facts. It is not the Court's function to examine and
weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings
below.31
For this reason alone, the instant Petition warrants dismissal.

Nonetheless, after a careful review of the records of the
instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the
CA's holding that the petitioners' Complaint for Damages
against the respondents should be dismissed.
By alleging that damage was caused to their property by virtue
of the respondents' individual and collective fault and/or
negligence, the petitioners' cause of action is anchored on
quasi-delict.
According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
A quasi-delict has the following elements: a)
the damage suffered by the plaintiff; b) the act or omission of
the defendant supposedly constituting fault or negligence; and
c) the causal connection between the act and the damage
sustained by the plaintiff, or proximate cause.32
A perusal of the evidence on record shows that the foregoing
elements of a quasi-delict are absent insofar as respondents
Carungcong and Wack Wack are concerned.
The full extent of the damage caused to the petitioners' Unit
was not sufficiently proven.
Aside from the purely self-serving testimony of Atty. Villareal,
the sole witness of the petitioners who is also the petitioners'
counsel, there was no sufficient evidence presented to show
the extent of the damage caused to the Unit.
As correctly found by the CA, the photographs offered into
evidence by the petitioners merely depict a wet bed, wet floor,
and wet cabinet apparently taken from one room only, i.e., the
master bedroom. The CA was correct in its assessment that
"[n]o photographs were presented to prove that the other
rooms of Unit 2208B-1 were also damaged by the leak."33
The petitioners maintain that the letter-quotation from M.
Laher, a private document, proves the foil extent of the
damage caused to the Unit.
Such contention is erroneous.
As a prerequisite to its admission in evidence, the identity and
authenticity of a private document must be properly laid and
reasonably established. According to Section 20, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, the identification and authentication of a
private document may only be proven by either: (1) a person
who saw the execution of the document, or (2) a person who
has knowledge and can testify as to the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
In the instant case, with Atty. Villareal having not seen the
execution of the document, and having no personal knowledge
whatsoever as regards the execution of the document, the
letter-quotation from M. Laher was not deemed to have been
properly identified and authenticated, thus making it
inadmissible in evidence. The petitioners should have instead
presented a witness from M. Laher who actually executed the
letter-quotation, or any other witness who saw the actual
execution of the document or can testify as to the signatures
and handwritings found on the document. Therefore, the
petitioners cannot rely on M. Laher's letter-quotation to prove
their claims for damages.
The petitioners also heavily rely on the handwritten report of
the petitioners' sister, Lagman-Castillo, which purportedly
show the extent and location of the damage caused to the
Unit.
Atty. Villareal's testimony on the observations contained in the
handwritten report of Lagman-Castillo is inadmissible. Atty.
Villareal is not competent to testify on the veracity of the
observations contained in the said handwritten report because
he may only testify to those facts which he has personal
knowledge, and derived from his own perception. Simply stated,
as to the contents of the handwritten report of Lagman-
Castillo, Atty. Villareal's testimony is hearsay. The petitioners
should have instead presented Lagman-Castillo herself to
testify on her own observations, which was not done.
The petitioners argue that the presentation of Lagman-Castillo
was not needed anymore due to certain stipulations made by
the respondents. But it must be stressed that the stipulations
of the respondents regarding the handwritten report of
Lagman-Castillo were merely limited to: (1) the authorship of
the said report, (2) the fact that the photographs attached in
the said report were taken by Lagman-Castillo, and (3) the fact
that Lagman-Castillo is the sister of petitioner Nena. There
was no stipulation made as to the accuracy and veracity of the
contents of the handwritten report. Hence, it was still
incumbent upon the petitioners to present Lagman-Castillo to
prove the truthfulness of the contents of her handwritten
report.
The petitioners also argue that the principle of admission of
silence applies vis-a-vis Lagman-Castillo's handwritten report
because the respondents supposedly failed to issue a response
to the said report. The argument is not convincing. As
correctly cited by respondent Wack Wack in its Comment,
jurisprudence holds that the rule on admission by silence
applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was
carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant.
However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule
is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have
immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally
made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not
be expected if the party still has to resort to a written
reply.34
In the case at hand, it is not disputed that Lagman-Castillo's
handwritten report was not addressed to the respondents.
Instead, the report was addressed to Atty. Villareal. Hence,
the rule on admission on silence is negated.
Aside from the foregoing, the petitioners likewise rely on the
supposed statements made by Cruz, the Acting Property
Manager of respondent Wack Wack, who supposedly intimated
that the strong leak apparently came from Unit 2308B-1, which
is located directly above the Unit. However, it must be
emphasized that Cruz herself was not presented as a witness.
Atty. Villareal was not competent to testify as to the truth of
Cruz's supposed observations and findings because, to
reiterate, Atty. Villareal may only testify to those facts which
he has personal knowledge, and derived from his own
perception. Hearsay evidence such as this, whether objected
to or not, cannot be given credence for it has no probative
value.35
Lastly, the petitioners cite the various demand letters as
evidence of the supposed damage caused to their Unit. It goes
without saying that these letters are self-serving documents
that deserve scant consideration in the determination of
damages. As previously held by the Court, one cannot make
evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the
statements that he wishes to prove. He does not make the
letter evidence by sending it to the party against whom he
wishes to prove the facts stated therein.36
Fault or negligence on the part of respondents Carungcong and
Wack Wack was not proven.
As regards the second element of a quasi-delict, a careful
perusal of the evidence on record shows that the petitioners
failed to present even a shred of evidence that there was fault
or negligence on the part of the respondents Carungcong and
Wack Wack.
The Court has held that in a cause of action based on quasi-
delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established as
it is the basis of the action. The burden of proof is thus placed
on the plaintiff, as it is the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Therefore,
if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged
because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the
burden of proving such negligence.37
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the burden of
proving fault or negligence was clearly not discharged by the
petitioners.
As to the supposed fault or negligence of respondent
Carungcong, while it is undisputed that plumbing works were
done on the balcony of the unit owned by respondent
Carungcong, there is no evidence presented that suggests that
such plumbing works were illegally or negligently made. The
petitioners could not even point out what specific rule or
regulation was supposedly violated by respondent Carungcong
or her lessee, Tan, in undertaking the plumbing works. There
was no proof offered showing that such plumbing works were
even prohibited, disallowed, or undertaken in a negligent
manner.
The closest piece of evidence presented that remotely
suggests some negligence or wrongdoing on the part of
respondent Carungcong or her lessee, Tan, was the supposed
statements made by respondent Wack Wack's Acting Property
Manager, Cruz. However, as already explained, as Atty.
Villareal's testimony on Cruz's statements is pure hearsay, the
veracity of Cruz's findings was not sufficiently proven.
With respect to the supposed negligence on the part of
respondent Wack Wack, the petitioners do not even dispute
that under the Amended Master Deed, respondent Wack Wack
holds title over and exercises maintenance and supervision only
with respect to the common areas. It is also not disputed that
the maintenance and repair of the condominium units shall be
made solely on the account of the unit owners, with each unit
owner being "responsible for all the damages to any other
Units and/or to any portion of the Projects resulting from his
failure to effect the required maintenance and repairs of his
unit."38
Proximate cause between the supposed damage caused and the
plumbing works undertaken was not established.
To constitute quasi-delict, the alleged fault or negligence
committed by the defendant must be the proximate cause of
the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate
cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred.39
Stated in simple terms, it must be proven that the supposed
fault or negligence committed by the respondents, i.e., the
undertaking of plumbing works on Unit 2308B-1, was the cause
of the damage to the Unit.
Such was not proven by the petitioners.
First, as correctly observed by the CA, the claim that a
supposed leak in the plumbing works located in the balcony of
Unit 2308B-1 caused the leakage of soapy water in various
parts of the Unit, including the various bedrooms inside the
Unit, is highly doubtful and illogical. As noted by the CA, the
subject plumbing works are isolated in the balcony area of Unit
2308B-1. The petitioners do not dispute that the said area is
separated from the other areas of the unit and sealed off by a
wall and beam. Hence, if a leakage in the plumbing works on the
balcony of Unit 2308B-1 indeed occurred, it is highly
improbable that such leak would spread to a wide area of the
Unit.
Second, aside from the unsubstantiated self-serving testimony
of Atty. Villareal, there was no evidence presented to show
that the supposed widespread leak of soapy water in the
various parts of the Unit was caused by plumbing works on the
balcony of Unit 2308B-1. No witness or document establishing
a causal link between the plumbing works and the damage to
the Unit was offered. The petitioners could have utilized
assessors or technical experts on building and plumbing works
to personally examine and assess the damage caused to the
Unit to provide some substantiation to the claim of proximate
cause. However, no such witness was presented. The
petitioners relied solely on the testimony of their own counsel,
Atty. Villareal. Proximate cause cannot be established by the
mere say-so of a self-serving witness.
Lastly, the fact that the plumbing works done in Unit 2308B-1
was not the cause of the damage suffered by the petitioners'
Unit is further supported by the factual finding of the CA that
a case before the HLURB was previously filed by the
petitioners against Golden Dragon. In this complaint, which was
offered in evidence by the petitioners themselves, the latter
alleged that in 1996, way before the installation of the subject
plumbing works in Unit 2308B-1, they had already discovered
water leaks in the Unit which damaged the interiors thereof.
It was the petitioners' allegation that the water leakage in the
Unit was made possible due to Golden Dragon's delivery of a
"defective and/or substandard unit."40 In fact, the CA noted
that the HLURB issued a Decision dated July 9, 2009 holding
Golden Dragon liable for the water leakage suffered by the
petitioners. It is of no coincidence that the award for actual
damages granted to the petitioners is similar to the award for
actual damages sought by the petitioners in the instant case.41
The petitioners attempt to downplay the aforesaid complaint
that was lodged and subsequently settled by the HLURB by
arguing that the said complaint was offered for a different
purpose, i.e., to prove that Golden Dragon previously refused to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the Unit. Such
argument fails to convince. As correctly held by the CA, as the
said HLURB complaint was formally offered by the petitioners,
thus forming part of the records of the case, "this Court shall
not close its eyes" to the contents of the said
document.42 Section 24, Rule 132 merely states that the court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered,
and that the purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified. There is nothing in the Rules of Court which
limits the appreciation of the court to the specified purpose
for which the evidence was offered.
All in all, with the petitioners failing to prove the existence of
the elements of a quasi-delict in the instant case, the CA
committed no reversible error that warrants the Court's
exercise of its discretionary appellate power.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated July 13, 2012 and Resolution dated March 20, 2013
rendered by the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division in CA-G.R.
CV No. 89479 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 219649
AL DELA CRUZ, Petitioner vs. CAPT. RENATO OCTA
VIANO and WILMA OCTA VIANO, Respondents
D E C I S I O N PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
August 12, 2015, of petitioner Al Dela Cruz that seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated January 30, 2014
and Resolution2 dated June 22, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversing the: Decision dated February 24, 2009
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Piñas City in
a civil case for damages.
The facts follow.
about to relieve himself, he saw an oncoming vehicle with
bright lights and also saw a tricycle which was not moving fast
and after the latter passed him by, it collided with the vehicle.
He then saw someone fell down near him and when he saw that
the car was about to move, he told his companions to stop the
car from leaving. Thereafter, he noticed that the person who
landed in front of him was already unconscious so he helped
him and called one of his companions to carry the injured man
to the car. He told the driver of the car "lsakay mo ito,
nabangga mo ito," and then proceeded to board the injured man
in front of the car, while he told the other passengers of the
tricycle to board at the back of the car. His companions
forcibly took (''pinilas") the license plate of the car and he
also noticed that the driver of the car was
drunk ("nakainom"). After the car left, he and his companions
stayed in the area wherein a policeman later arrived and towed
the tricycle.

Witness Antonio Fernandez, one of S/Sgt. Lacuesta's

Around 9:00 p.m. on April 1, 1999, respondent Captain Renato companions, corroborated the latter's testimony.
Octaviano, a military dentist assigned at the Office of the
Chief Dental Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp
Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that on April 1, 1999,
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, respondent Wilma Octaviano, Renato's
he borrowed the car of Dr. Isagani Cirilo, a Honda Civic
mother and Janet Octaviano, Renato's sister, rode a tricycle
registered under the name of the latter, to bring his mother
driven by Eduardo Y. Padilla. Respondent Wilma and Janet were
to church. Thus, he then brought his mother to the Jehovah's
inside the sidecar of the vehicle, while Renato rode at the back
Witness church in Greenview which was about 20 to 25 minute
of the tricycle driver. They then proceeded to Naga Road
drive from their house in Naga Road, Pulanlupa. Around 6:25
towards the direction of CAA and BF Homes. Renato was asking
p.m., he went home directly from the church and waited for
his mother for a change to complete his ₱l0.00 bill when he
the call of his mother. Thereafter, he left the house around
looked at the road and saw a light from an oncoming car which
8:30 p.m. and went to pick up fish food that he previously
was going too fast. The car, driven by petitioner, hit the back
ordered before fetching his mother. When he was along Naga
portion of the tricycle where Renato was riding. The force of
Road, he noticed a tricycle from a distance of about 100 to 120
the impact caused the tricycle to tum around and land on the
meters away and was going the opposite direction. He also
pavement near the gutter. Thus, Renato was thrown from the
noticed an Elf van parked along the road on the opposite side.
tricycle and landed on the gutter about two meters away.
He flashed his low beam and high beam light to signal the
Renato felt severe pain in his lower extremities and went
tricycle. The tricycle then slowed down and stopped a bit,
momentarily unconscious and when he regained consciousness,
hence, he also slowed down. Suddenly, the tricycle picked up
he heard his sister shouting for help. A man came followed by
speed from its stop position and the two vehicles collided. He
other people. The first man who answered Janet's call for help
then stopped his car a few meters away from the collision site
shouted to another man at a distance saying: "Ikaw, dalhin mo
and made a u-turn to confront the driver of the tricycle. He
yung sasakyan mo dito. Jkaw ang nakabangga sa kanila. Dalhin
also noticed that there were already about a dozen people
mo sila sa ospital." They pulled Renato out of the gutter and
around the site of the collision. He saw a man sitting on the
carried him to the car. Petitioner brought them to his house
gutter and proceeded to move the car towards the former and
and alighted thereat for two to three minutes and then he
asked him and his companions to help board the injured man
brought the passengers to a clinic. Renato insisted on being
and the latter's co-passengers of the tricycle in the car he
brought to a hospital because he realized the severity of his
was driving. Thereafter, he drove them to Perpetual Help
injuries. Thus, Renato, hb mother, and Janet were brought to
Hospital where the man was treated for his injuries.
Perpetual Help Medical Center where Renato's leg was
amputated from below the knee on that same night. After his
The testimony of Imelda Cirilo, the wife of the owner of the
treatment at Perpetual Help Medical Center, Renato was
car, was also presented. She testified, among others, that on
brought to the AFP Medical Center at V. Luna General Hospital
the night of the accident, petitioner borrowed their car to
and stayed there for nine months for rehabilitation. Shortly
bring the latter's mother to the church and that upon learning
before his discharge at V. Luna, he suffered bone infection. He
of the incident, she went to Perpetual Help Hospital and signed
was brought to Fort Bonifacio Hospital where he was operated
on thrice for bone infection. Thereafter, he was treated at on the Admission Slip so that respondent Renato could be
operated on without the former admitting any liability. She
the same hospital for six months. In the year 2000, he had a
also testified that she offered to help the victims, but the
prosthesics attached to his leg at V. Luna at his own expense.
latter refused and that she admitted that she did not give any
Renato spent a total of ₱623,268.00 for his medical bills and
financial assistance for the hospital bills nor for medicines.
prosthetics.

Renato Martinez, a traffic enforcer, was also presented and

Thus, Renato and his mother Wilma filed with the RTC a civil
case for damages against petitioner and the owner of the
vehicle.
Aside from their testimonies, the complainants, herein
respondents presented the testimonies of S/Sgt. Joselito
Lacuesta (S/Sgt. Lacuesta) and Antonio Fernandez.
According to S/Sgt. Lacuesta, he was somewhere along Naga
Road around 9:00 p.m. when the incident occurred. He was
talking with his three friends when he felt like urinating, so he
moved a few paces away from his companions. When he was
testified that he received a call through radio about an
incident along Naga Road, Pulanlupa, Las Piñas City around 8:30
p.m. so he proceeded to the area and arrived there around
9:00 p.m. When he arrived at the scene, nobody was there and
that the vehicles involved in the collision were no longer there.
At the scene of the accident, he saw splinters of glass on the
road but there was no blood and he also saw an Elf van parked
along the street fronting CAA. He then proceeded to Perpetual
Help Hospital after he received a call on his radio that the
people involved in the accident were already at the said
hospital. At the hospital, he was able to talk with petitioner.
Thereafter, he called up his base and informed the base that
the driver of the Honda Civic was at the hospital. Later on,
Sgt. Soriano, the investigator-on-duty arrived at the hospital
and instructed Sgt. Martinez to accompany petitioner to the
headquarters because some relatives of respondents were
asking that petitioner be brought to Fort Bonifacio. Thus, Sgt.
Martinez and petitioner boarded the Honda Civic involved in
the accident and proceeded to the headquarters.
The RTC, in its Decision dated February 24, 2009, dismissed
the claim of respondents. According to the RTC, petitioner's
version of the incident was more believable because it was
corroborated by Sgt. Martinez who testified that he saw an
Elf van parked along the street. The R TC also ruled that
petitioner did everything that was expected of a cautious
driver. The court further ruled that the owner of the Honda
Civic, Isagani Cirilo could not be held liable because petitioner
was a family friend who merely borrowed the car and not his
driver nor his employee. It was also ruled that the liability
rests on the tricycle driver who drove without license and
petitioner's contributory negligence in riding at the back of
the driver in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 35-88 that
limits the passengers of a tricycle to three persons including
the driver.
Respondents appealed the R TC decision to the CA.
In its Decision dated January 30, 2014, the CA reversed the
RTC's decision. According to the CA, petitioner was negligent
as shown in the police report. It also found that petitioner was
positive for alcoholic breath, thus, he violated Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 4136 that prohibits any person from driving a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or narcotic
drug. It also ruled that the owner of the vehicle is equally
responsible and liable for the accident and the resulting
injuries that the victims sustained. As such, the CA disposed
of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants are
held solidarily liable to plaintiffs and ordered to pay the
plaintiffs in the following manner:
1. pay plaintiff Wilma Octaviano the following: medical
expenses, ₱l,500.00, hospital expenses, ₱l,450.00 and
transportation expenses, ₱6,000.00;
2. pay plaintiff Renato Octaviano the following: hospital
expenses, ₱369,354.00, medical expenses, ₱60,462.23, loss of
income, ₱90,000.00;
3. pay [plaintiff] Wilma Octaviano ₱50,000.00 as and by way of
moral damages;
4. pay plaintiff Renato Octaviano ₱l00,000.00 as and by way of
moral damages;
5. pay plaintiffs ₱20,000.00 each as and by way of exemplary
damages; and
6. pay plaintiffs ₱100,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.3
Thus, the present petition after the CA denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner relies upon the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT WHILE
DRIVING HIS CAR.
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
INCIDENT WAS THE FAULT OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF
THE TRICYCLE DRIVER.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED
CERTAIN FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND
WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.4
Petitioner insists that he was not negligent and that the driver
of the tricycle was the one at fault. He also argues that the
investigation report relied upon by the CA should not have been
used in determining what actually transpired because the
traffic investigator was not presented as a witness and
petitioner was not able to confront or cross-examine him
regarding the report. Petitioner further denies that he was
drunk when the incident happened and that the CA erred in
appreciating the mere opinions of the witnesses that he
appeared drunk at that time.
In their Comment, respondents contend that the issues raised
by petitioner are factual in nature and are not the proper
subjects of a petition for review under Rule 45. They also
contend that the CA did not err in their finding that petitioner
was negligent at the time of the incident.
A close reading of the present petition would show that the
issues raised are factual in nature. This Court has recognized
exceptions to the rule that the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding in the following instances: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.5 Inasmuch as the R TC and the CA
arrived at conflicting findings of fact on who was the negligent
party, the Court holds that an examination of the evidence of
the parties needs to be undertaken to properly determine the
issue.6
The concept of negligence has been thoroughly discussed by
this Court in Romulo Abrogar, et al. v. Cosmos Bottling
Company, et al.,7 thus:
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.8 Under Article 1173 of the
Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the
place."9 The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear
under Article 2176,10 and Article 20.11
To determine the existence of negligence, the following time-
honored test has been set in Picart v. Smith:12
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability.20
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the By preponderance of evidence, according
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would to Raymundo v. Lunaria:21
be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
x x x is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one
side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight,
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation evidence." It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the thereto.
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They
are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. In addition, according to United Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Hence, they can be expected to take care only when there is Appeals,22 the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's.
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as
a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty
After reviewing the records of the case, this Court affirms
of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
the findings of the CA. In ruling that petitioner was negligent,
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
the CA correctly appreciated the pieces of evidence presented
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
by the respondents, thus:
negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in
a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a First, with regard to the damage or injury, there is no question
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have that the plaintiffs suffered damage due to the incident on
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently April 1, 1999. Plaintiff Renato Octaviano's right leg was
probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding crushed by the impact of the Honda Civic driven by defendant
against its consequences.13 Dela Cruz against the tricycle where the Octavianos were
riding and as a result thereof, Renato's right leg was
amputated. Plaintiff Wilma Octaviano suffered traumatic
xxxx
injuries/hematoma on different parts of her body as borne by
the evidence submitted to the trial court. The damages or
In order for liability from negligence to arise, there must be
injuries were duly proved by preponderant evidence.
not only proof of damage and negligence, but also proof that
the damage was the consequence of the negligence. The Court
Second, with regard to the wrongful act or omission imputable
has said in Vda. de Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing:14
to the negligence of defendant Al Dela Cruz, We hold that the
trial court missed the glaring fact that defendant Dela Cruz
x x x Negligence as a source of obligation both under the civil
was guilty of negligence.
law and in American cases was carefully considered and it was
held:
The police report prepared by the traffic investigator SPO2
Vicente Soriano detailed what happened on the night of April 1,
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code,
1999, to wit:
as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States,
the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in
xxxx
order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by
competent evidence:
On the Spot Investigation conducted by the undersigned,
showed that Vehicle 2 while moving ahead and upon arriving in
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
front of said motor shop, Vehicle 2 avoided hitting another
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
tricycle which vehicle (Tricycle) was standing while waiting for
personally or some person for whose acts it must respond, was
a would-be passenger. Said Veh-2 driver swerved the car to
guilty.
the left and it was at this instance when said Veh-1 was
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence
sideswiped by said Veh-2.
and the damage."
In this case, the RTC found no reason to conclude that
petitioner was negligent. The CA, however, found the contrary. xxx
This Court must then ascertain whose evidence was
preponderant, for Section 1,15 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court Weather Condition: Fair
mandates that in civil cases, like this one, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of Road condition: Concrete and Dry
evidence. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim Driver's Condition: Veh-1, Normal; Veh-2 Positive for Alcoholic
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.16 It is Breath (AB)"
basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
because a mere allegation is not evidence.17 Generally, the
For a clearer understanding of the said police report, Vehicle-I
party who denies has no burden to prove.18 In civil cases, the
referred to by Soriano is the tricycle where plaintiffs were
burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
riding, and Vehicle-2 is the Honda Civic driven by Dela Cruz.
evidence is given on either side.19 The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the
Was the statement in the police report that Al Dela Cruz was
complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court, but it
may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly positive for alcoholic breath substantiated/corroborated?
Yes. Two witnesses testified that Dela Cruz appeared to be
drunk on that fateful night. Joey Lacuesta and Antonio
Fernandez were there on the spot when the incident happened.
They were the first ones to assist the victim Renato Octaviano
who was slumped unconscious in the gutter. Lacuesta was the
one who boarded the injured Renato into the front seat of the
car and he noticed that the driver was drunk:
Q: You said that you placed the injured person in front of the
Honda Civic, the driver was there in the car, what, if anything
did you notice about the condition of the driver of the car?
A: Nakainom, I noticed that because when I boarded the
injured person into the front passenger seat, I noticed that he
is drunk.
Antonio Fernandez heard his friend Aries Sy shout at the
driver of the car to stop when it appeared to by continuously
moving. Fernandez also noted that the driver appeared to be
drunk, thus:
Q: Now you said that the driver of the car was drunk. Did you
say that when you testified?
A: Yes, sir. Lasing yung driver.
Q: What made you think that this driver of the car was drunk?
A: Because of his actions and he was also mad.
Q: Because he was mad, then you thought that he was drunk. x
x x?
A: No, Sir. You can see or you can observe the actions of a
person if he is drunk.
xxxx
More importantly, the law prohibits drunk driving. Republic Act
No. 4136, Chapter IV, Article V, Section 53 known as Land
Transportation and Traffic Code provides that no person shall
drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or
narcotic drug. It is established by plaintiffs evidence that
defendant Dela Cruz drove the Honda Civic while under the
influence of alcohol thus proving his negligence.
With regard to the third requisite, that there be a direct
relation of cause and effect between the damage or injury and
the fault or negligence is clearly present in the case at bar.
Had defendant Dela Cruz exercised caution, his Honda Civic
would not have collided with the tricycle and plaintiffs leg
would not be crushed necessitating its amputation. The cause
of the injury or damage to the plaintiff’s leg is the negligent
act of defendant Dela Cruz.
The last requisite is that there be no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties. It is undeniable that defendant
and plaintiffs had no prior contractual relation, that they were
strangers to each other before the incident happened. Thus,
the four requisites that must concur under Article 2176 are
clearly established in the present case. Plaintiffs are entitled
to claim damages.23
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the police
report without petitioner having the chance to cross-examine
the police officer who prepared the same. Be that as it may,
the contents of the said police report are corroborated by the
testimonies of the other witnesses presented before the
court. The said contents of the police report are more
believable than the version of petitioner of what transpired.
As correctly observed by the CA:
Dela Cruz narrated in his testimony that he saw a parked Elf
van on the opposite road and the tricycle also on the opposite
road going to the opposite direction. He claims that he flashed
his low beam and high beam to warn the tricycle, the tricycle
stopped momentarily and then picked up
speed "umarangkada" and that was why the two vehicles
collided. However, he admitted that the point of impact of the
two vehicles was "lagpas fang konti" from the front of the
parked Elf. He could not stop. He did not know what to do. He
slowed down. He did not stop but continued driving. If it were
true that as far as about 100-120 meters away he already saw
the parked Elf van and the tricycle, he could have slowed down
or stopped to give way to the tricycle to avoid collision. In
fact, if the collision point was right ahead of the front of the
parked Elf van, it means that the tricycle was already past the
parked Elf and it was Dela Cruz who forced his way into the
two-way road. More evident is that the tricycle was hit at the
back portion meaning it was already turning after passing the
parked Elf. Had Dela Cruz slowed down or stopped a short
while to let the tricycle pass clear of the van, then the
incident would not have happened. The reasonable foresight
required of a cautious driver was not exercised by defendant
Dela Cruz.24
As to the denial of petitioner that he was drunk at the time of
the accident, whether or not he was in a state of inebriation is
inconsequential given the above findings.1âwphi1 His being
sober does not and will not erase the fact that he was still
negligent and that the proximate cause of the collision was due
to his said negligence. Proximate cause is "that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause,
produces an event, and without which the event would not have
occurred."25 As such, petitioner is wrong when he claims that
the proximate cause of the accident was the fault of the
tricycle driver.
Neither is it correct to impute contributory negligence on the
part of the tricycle driver and respondent Renato when the
latter had violated a municipal ordinance that limits the
number of passengers for each tricycle for hire to three
persons including the driver. Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.26 To hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of
an impending danger to health and body.27 To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a
causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of
the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately
to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.28 In this case, the causal link between the alleged
negligence of the tricycle driver and respondent Renato was
not established. This court has appreciated that negligence per
se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need
not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for
damages.29 Also, noteworthy is the ruling of the CA as to the
matter, thus:
The trial court absolved defendants of liability because of the
failure of the plaintiffs to present the tricycle driver and thus
concluding that plaintiffs suppressed evidence adverse to
them. This is error on the part of the trial court. The non-
presentation of the tricycle driver as a witness does not
affect the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants against herein
defendants-appellees. Even granting that the tricycle driver
was presented in court and was proved negligent, his negligence
cannot cancel out the negligence of defendant Dela Cruz,
because their liabilities arose from different sources. The
obligation or liability of the tricycle driver arose out of the
contract of carriage between him and petitioners whereas
defendant Dela Cruz is liable under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code or under quasi-delicts. There is ample evidence to show
that defendant Dela Cruz was negligent within the purview of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, hence, he cannot escape
liability.30
This Court further agrees with the CA that the respondents (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
are entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. laborers and skilled workers;
Moral damages, x x x, may be awarded to compensate one for (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and
manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, employer's liability laws;
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in from a crime;
the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the should be recovered.
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, In this case, since exemplary damages are awarded, the award
it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been of attorney's fees is necessary.
suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung
from any of the cases expressed in Article 221931 and Article WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
222032 of the Civil Code, x x x33 Also known as "punitive" or 45 of the Rules of Court, dated August 12, 2015, of petitioner
"vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are Al Dela Cruz is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and Decision dated January 30, 2014 and Resolution dated June 22,
as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 93399
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of are AFFIRMED.
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always,
used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in
SO ORDERED.
the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account
for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that
has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,34 the theory being
that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the
highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice,
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or
gross fraud35 - that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive
or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species
of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.36

In awarding the above, the CA correctly ruled that:

It is extant in the records that defendants did not overturn or

disprove the plaintiffs' claim for actual damages such as the
hospital bills/expenses which were duly supported by
documentary evidence (receipts). It was also duly proven that
defendant Al Dela Cruz acted with gross disregard for the
suffering of his victims when he refused to board them in his
car and only did so when forced by the by-standers who
assisted the victims, when he drove to his house first before
driving to a clinic then to [the] hospital when it was obvious
that Renato Octaviano's wound was severe and needed
immediate professional attention. These insensitivity of
defendant caused suffering to the plaintiffs that must be
compensated.37

As to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the New

Civil Code provides the following:

ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and

expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith
in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
G.R. No. 190022 February 15, 2012 train. When the train was only fifty (50) meters away from the
intersection, respondent Estranas noticed that all vehicles on
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION, both sides of the track were already at a full stop. Thus, he
JAPHET ESTRANAS and BEN SAGA, Petitioners, carefully proceeded at a speed of twenty-five (25) kilometers
vs. per hour, still blowing the train’s horn. However, when the train
PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA, was already ten (10) meters away from the intersection, the
CRESENCIA A. NATIVIDAD, HECTOR VIZCARA, JOEL passenger jeepney being driven by Reynaldo suddenly crossed
VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO, Respondents. the tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes to
avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the
train, it did not instantly come to a complete stop until the
DECISION
jeepney was dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of
collision.7
REYES, J.:

The Ruling of the Trial Court

Nature of the Petition

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision8 dated
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
March 20, 2007, ruling in favor of the respondents, the
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul
dispositive portion of which reads:
and set aside the Decision1 dated July 21, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021, which affirmed with
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
modification the Decision2 dated March 20, 2007 of the
rendered ordering defendants Philippine National Railways
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Palayan City, and
Corporation (PNR), Japhet Estranas and Ben Saga to, jointly
Resolution3 dated October 26, 2009, which denied the
and severally pay the following amounts to:
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

1. a) PURIFICACION VIZCARA:
The Antecedent Facts
1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the
death of Reynaldo Vizcara;
On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning,
2) P35,000.00, for funeral
Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a passenger jeepney
expenses;
headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his
3) P5,000.00 for re-embalming
companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio), Crispin
expenses;
Natividad (Crispin), Samuel Natividad (Samuel), Dominador
4) P40,000.00 for wake/interment
Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While crossing
expenses;
the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National
5) P300,000.00 as reimbursement
Railways (PNR) train, then being operated by respondent
for the value of the jeepney with
Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and rammed
license plate no. DTW-387;
the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the
6) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and
7) P100,000.00 as exemplary
Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained
damages; and
serious physical injuries.4
8) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
b) MARIVIC VIZCARA:
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing 1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the
installed at the railroad crossing. Additionally, the "Stop, Look death of Cresencio Vizcara;
and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop" signage 2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly 3) P100,000.00 as exemplary
blocked by another signboard.5 damages; and
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, Joel and c) HECTOR VIZCARA:
Dominador, together with the heirs of the deceased victims, 1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
namely, Purificacion Vizcara, Marivic Vizcara, Cresencia death of Samuel Vizcara;
Natividad and Hector Vizcara, filed an action for damages 2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate driver of 3) P100,000.00 as exemplary
the train, before the RTC of Palayan City. The case was raffled damages; and
to Branch 40 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 0365-P. In 4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
their complaint, the respondents alleged that the proximate d) CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD:
cause of the fatalities and serious physical injuries sustained 1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
by the victims of the accident was the petitioners’ gross death of Crispin Natividad;
negligence in not providing adequate safety measures to 2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
prevent injury to persons and properties. They pointed out 3) P100,000.00 as exemplary
that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon where the damages; and
accident happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting 4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the existence e) JOEL VIZCARA
of the track and of the approaching train. They concluded 1) P9,870.00 as reimbursement for
their complaint with a prayer for actual, moral and his actual expenses;
compensatory damages, as well as attorney’s fees.6 2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P25,000.00 as exemplary
For their part, the petitioners claimed that they exercised due damages; and
diligence in operating the train and monitoring its 4) P10,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
roadworthiness. They asseverate that right before the f) DOMINADOR ANTONIO
collision, Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed. 1) P63,427.00 as reimbursement for
Four hundred (400) meters away from the railroad crossing, he his actual expenses;
started blowing his horn to warn motorists of the approaching 2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
 3) P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and
4) P10,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
And 2. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
The Ruling of the CA
Unyielding, the petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the
CA. Subsequently, on July 21, 2009, the CA rendered the
assailed decision, affirming the RTC decision with modification
with respect to the amount of damages awarded to the
respondents. The CA disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, as
follows:
(1) The award of P5,000.00 for re-embalming
expenses and P40,000.00 for wake/interment
expenses to PURIFICACION VIZCARA is deleted. In
lieu thereof, P25,000.00 as temperate damages is
awarded;
(2) The award of moral damages to PURIFICACION
VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA
and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is hereby reduced
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 each while moral
damages awarded to JOEL VIZCARA and
DOMINADOR ANTONIO are likewise reduced from
P50,000.00 to P25,000.00;
(3) The award of exemplary damages to
PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA,
HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is
hereby reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 each
while exemplary damages awarded to JOEL VIZCARA
and DOMINADOR ANTONIO are likewise reduced
from P25,000.00 to P12,500.00; and
(4) The award for attorney’s fees in favor of the
Appellees as well as the award of P300,000.00 to
Appellee PURIFICACION as reimbursement for the
value of the jeepney is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.10
In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding of
negligence on the part of the petitioners. It concurred with
the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's failure to
install sufficient safety devices in the area, such as flagbars
or safety railroad bars and signage, was the proximate cause
of the accident. Nonetheless, in order to conform with
established jurisprudence, it modified the monetary awards to
the victims and the heirs of those who perished due to the
collision.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the
decision of the CA. However, in a Resolution12 dated October
26, 2009, the CA denied the same.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present petition for
review on certiorari, raising the following grounds:
I person suffers injury.18 To determine the existence of
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE PETITIONERS;
II
THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE
OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE FINDS NO APPLICATION
IN THE INSTANT CASE;
III
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING NEGLIGENCE ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONERS OR ERRED IN NOT
FINDING AT THE LEAST, CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE
RESPONDENTS.13
The petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of the
collision was the negligence and recklessness of the driver of
the jeepney. They argue that as a professional driver, Reynaldo
is presumed to be familiar with traffic rules and regulations,
including the right of way accorded to trains at railroad
crossing and the precautionary measures to observe in
traversing the same. However, in utter disregard of the right
of way enjoyed by PNR trains, he failed to bring his jeepney to
a full stop before crossing the railroad track and thoughtlessly
followed the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them. His failure to
maintain a safe distance between the jeepney he was driving
and the truck ahead of the same prevented him from seeing
the PNR signage displayed along the crossing.14
In their Comment,15 the respondents reiterate the findings of
the RTC and the CA that the petitioners' negligence in
maintaining adequate and necessary public safety devices in
the area of the accident was the proximate cause of the
mishap. They asseverate that if there was only a level crossing
bar, warning light or sound, or flagman in the intersection, the
accident would not have happened. Thus, there is no other
party to blame but the petitioners for their failure to ensure
that adequate warning devices are installed along the railroad
crossing.16
This Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability
for damages caused by a person's act or omission constituting
fault or negligence. It states:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
In Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,17 negligence was
defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
negligence, the time-honored test was: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would
be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.19
In the instant petition, this Court is called upon to determine
whose negligence occasioned the ill-fated incident. The records
however reveal that this issue had been rigorously discussed
by both the RTC and the CA. To emphasize, the RTC ruled that
it was the petitioners’ failure to install adequate safety
devices at the railroad crossing which proximately caused the
collision. This finding was affirmed by the CA in its July 21,
2009 Decision. It is a well-established rule that factual
findings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court. They are entitled to great weight and
respect, even finality, especially when, as in this case, the CA
affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial court.20
Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only
questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact
cannot be entertained.21 To distinguish one from the other,
a question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers
on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of
fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.22 Certainly, the finding of
negligence by the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, is a
question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon as this
would entail going into the factual matters on which the
negligence was based.23 Moreover, it was not shown that the
present case falls under any of the recognized exceptions24 to
the oft repeated principle according great weight and respect
to the factual findings of the trial court and the CA.
At any rate, the records bear out that the factual
circumstances of the case were meticulously scrutinized by
both the RTC and the CA before arriving at the same finding
of negligence on the part of the petitioners, and we found no
compelling reason to disturb the same. Both courts ruled that
the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it,
taking into consideration the nature of its business, to
forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the petitioners
failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from
crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching
train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the "Stop,
Look and Listen" signage installed in the area was poorly
maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the
impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition,
not just a dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen" signage, is
needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of
the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal
devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication
of negligence.25 Having established the fact of negligence on
the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for
damages.
There was no contributory negligence on the part of the
respondents.
As to whether there was contributory negligence on the part
of the respondents, this court rule in the negative.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required
to conform for his own protection. It is an act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person
injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury.26 Here, we cannot see how
the respondents could have contributed to their injury when
they were not even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was
established during the trial that the jeepney carrying the
respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only
about three to five meters ahead. When the truck proceeded
to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the driver of the
jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the
impression that it was safe to proceed. It bears noting that
the prevailing circumstances immediately before the collision
did not manifest even the slightest indication of an imminent
harm. To begin with, the truck they were trailing was able to
safely cross the track. Likewise, there was no crossing bar to
prevent them from proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or
signage to forewarn them of the approaching peril. Thus,
relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no
reason to anticipate the impending danger.27 He proceeded to
cross the track and, all of a sudden, his jeepney was rammed
by the train being operated by the petitioners. Even then, the
circumstances before the collision negate the imputation of
contributory negligence on the part of the respondents. What
clearly appears is that the accident would not have happened
had the petitioners installed reliable and adequate safety
devices along the crossing to ensure the safety of all those
who may utilize the same.
At this age of modern transportation, it behooves the PNR to
exert serious efforts to catch up with the trend, including the
contemporary standards in railroad safety. As an institution
established to alleviate public transportation, it is the duty of
the PNR to promote the safety and security of the general
riding public and provide for their convenience, which to a
considerable degree may be accomplished by the installation of
precautionary warning devices. Every railroad crossing must be
installed with barriers on each side of the track to block the
full width of the road until after the train runs past the
crossing. To even draw closer attention, the railroad crossing
may be equipped with a device which rings a bell or turns on a
signal light to signify the danger or risk of crossing. It is
similarly beneficial to mount advance warning signs at the
railroad crossing, such as a reflectorized crossbuck sign to
inform motorists of the existence of the track, and a stop,
look and listen signage to prompt the public to take caution.
These warning signs must be erected in a place where they will
have ample lighting and unobstructed visibility both day and
night. If only these safety devices were installed at the Tiaong
railroad crossing and the accident nevertheless occurred, we
could have reached a different disposition in the extent of the
petitioner’s liability.
The exacting nature of the responsibility of railroad companies
to secure public safety by the installation of warning devices
was emphasized in Philippine National Railways v. Court of
Appeals,28 thus:
[I]t may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the
public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to
avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings,
which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the
maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation
constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at
all points where such railway crosses any public road, good,
sufficient, and safe crossings, and erect at such points, at
sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage
of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters
placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway,
and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.
The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light,
flagman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence
and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no
law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands
that said device or equipment be installed.29
The responsibility of the PNR to secure public safety does not
end with the installation of safety equipment and signages but,
with equal measure of accountability, with the upkeep and
repair of the same. Thus, in Cusi v. Philippine National
Railways,30 we held:

Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed

in railroad crossings, the travelling public has the right to rely
on such warning devices to put them on their guard and take
the necessary precautions before crossing the tracks. A need,
therefore, exists for the railroad company to use reasonable
care to keep such devices in good condition and in working
order, or to give notice that they are not operating, since if
such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace. Thus, it has been
held that if a railroad company maintains a signalling device at
a crossing to give warning of the approach of a train, the
failure of the device to operate is generally held to be
evidence of negligence, which maybe considered with all the
circumstances of the case in determining whether the railroad
company was negligent as a matter of fact. 31

The maintenance of safety equipment and warning signals at

railroad crossings is equally important as their installation
since poorly maintained safety warning devices court as much
danger as when none was installed at all. The presence of
safety warning signals at railroad crossing carries with it the
presumption that they are in good working condition and that
the public may depend on them for assistance. If they happen
to be neglected and inoperative, the public may be misled into
relying on the impression of safety they normally convey and
eventually bring injury to themselves in doing so.

The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.

Finally, the CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear

chance is not applicable in the instant case. The doctrine of
last clear chance provides that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible
to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated
differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.32 To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision
was the petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and
pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The
unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have
any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident
which befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act
manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent
preceding negligence on the part of the respondents, the
doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2009 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90021 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175256 August 23, 2012
LILY LIM, Petitioner, vs. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE
CO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 179160
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner, vs. LILY
LIM, Respondent. D E C I S I O N DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil
complaint for specific performance and damages, while
appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case
for estafa?
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review
assailing the separate Decisions of the Second and
Seventeenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) on the
above issue.
Lily Lim’s (Lim) Petition for Review1 assails the October 20,
2005 Resolution2 of the Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138, which ruled on the above issue in the affirmative:
Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No.
5112396), Charlie Co filed the instant motion to dismiss [Lily
Lim’s] appeal, alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim
violated the rule against forum shopping as the elements
of litis pendentia are present.
This Court agrees.3
xxxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
On the other hand, Charlie Co’s (Co) Petition for Review5 assails
the April 10, 2007 Decision6 of the Seventeenth Division in CA-
G.R. SP No. 93395 for ruling on the same issue in the negative:
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
judge. The elements of litis pendentia and forum-shopping
were not met in this case.7
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.8
Factual Antecedents
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC),
owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued
several withdrawal authorities9 for the account of cement
dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These
withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the
dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each
withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for
six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC
Marketing Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative
manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities
covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of ₱ 3.15
million or ₱ 63.00 per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold
these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of ₱
64.00 per bag or a total of ₱ 3.2 million.11
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement
bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully
withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the
withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw
the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal
authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who
explained that the plant implemented a price increase and
would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price
difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement.
Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities
she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought
legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the
problem with the plant or for the return of her money had
failed.
The criminal case
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or
Conversion was filed against Co before Branch 154 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory
portion thereof reads:
On or about between the months of February and April 1999,
in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim,
with grave abuse of confidence, with unfaithfulness, received
in trust from Lily Lim cash money in the amount of ₱
2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement,
under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to said
Lily Lim, but far from complying with his obligation,
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal
use and benefit the said amount of ₱ 2,300,800.00 [sic] and
despite demands, the accused failed and refused to return said
amount, to the damage and prejudice of Lily Lim in the amount
of ₱ 2,380,800.00.
Contrary to Law.12
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal
proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return
her money amounting to ₱ 2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and
legal interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees.13
On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154,
rendered its Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for
insufficiency of evidence. The criminal court’s Order reads:
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with
abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for
which the accused is being charged and prosecuted were not
established by the prosecution’s evidence.
xxxx
In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime
of estafa for which the accused is being charged and
prosecuted, as above discussed, the Court has no alternative
but to dismiss the case against the accused for insufficiency
of evidence.15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against
him under the present information for insufficiency of
evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned,
however, set this case for the reception of his evidence on the
matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the
morning.
SO ORDERED.16
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its
December 1, 2004 Order.17 The dispositive portion of the
Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered holding the accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable to
the private complainant Lily Lim.
SO ORDERED.18
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that
she has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed
estafa against her.19
The trial court denied the motion in its Order20 dated
February 21, 2005.
21
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the
CA.
The civil action for specific performance
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of
Manila. The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other
parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement
Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge
Corporation. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-
112396, asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and
abuse of rights. Her allegations read:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
xxxx
23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000
bags of cement of ₱ 64.00 per bag on an x-plant basis within 3
months from the date of their transaction, i.e. February 15,
1999. Pursuant to said agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co ₱ 3.2
Million while Charlie Co delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement
Withdrawal Authorities representing 50,000 bags of cement.
24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp.
allowed the assignee or holder thereof to withdraw within a
six-month period from date a certain amount of cement
indicated therein. The Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily Lim
were dated either 3 February 1999 or 23 February 1999. The
Withdrawal Authorities were first issued to Tigerbilt and Fil-
Cement Center which in turn assigned them to Charlie Co.
Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal Authorities to Lily
Lim on February 15, 1999. Through these series of
assignments, Lily Lim acquired all the rights (rights to
withdraw cement) granted in said Withdrawal Authorities.
25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established
by the fact that FR Cement earlier allowed Lily Lim to
withdraw 2,800 bags of cement on the basis thereof.
26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-
month period agreed upon by Charlie Co and Lily Lim and
certainly within the six (6)-month period indicated in the
Withdrawal Authorities issued by FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim
attempted but failed to withdraw the remaining bags of
cement on account of FR Cement’s unjustified refusal to honor
the Withdrawal Authorities. x x x
xxxx
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to
Lily Lim 37,200 bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay
her the current fair market value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim
the amount of cement as indicated in the Withdrawal
Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right
to impose price adjustments as a qualification for honoring the
Withdrawal Authorities.
32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original
holders/ assignees of the Withdrawal Authorities repeatedly
assured Lily Lim that the same were valid and would be
honored. They are liable to make good on their assurances.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Charlie Co’s acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that
she may be able to withdraw the cement from FR Cement Corp.
caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was
made without justice, without giving Lily Lim what is due her
and without observing honesty and good faith, all violative of
the law, more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Such willful act was also made by Charlie Co in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, in violation
of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
34. FR Cement Corporation’s unjust refusal to honor the
Withdrawal Authorities they issued also caused damage to Lily
Lim. Further, FR Cement Corporation’s act of withholding the
37,200 bags of cement despite earning income therefor
constitutes as an unjust enrichment because FR Cement
Corporation acquired income through an act or performance by
another or any other means at the expense of another without
just or legal ground in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja’s false
assurances that Lily Lim would be able to withdraw the
remaining 37,200 bags of cement caused Lily Lim to incur
expenses and losses. x x x Moreover, Fil-Cement Center
admitted receiving payment for said amount of cement, thus
they are deemed to have come into possession of money at the
expense of Lily Lim without just or legal ground, in violation of
Article 22 of the Civil Code.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT22
Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either
by delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements
with FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for
their value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held
solidarily liable to her for the damages she incurred in her
failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for the damages
they inflicted on her as a result of their abuse of their
rights.23
Motions to dismiss both actions
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific
performance and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said
civil case24 and Lim’s appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa
case or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138.25 He maintained that the two
actions raise the same issue, which is Co’s liability to Lim for
her inability to withdraw the bags of cement,26 and should be
dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R
CV No. 85138
The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Co’s
motion and dismissed Lim’s appeal from the civil aspect of the
estafa case. In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA
Second Division held that the parties, causes of action, and
reliefs prayed for in Lim’s appeal and in her civil complaint are
identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the
payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement.27 Thus,
the CA Second Division dismissed Lim’s appeal for forum
shopping.28 The CA denied29 Lim’s motion for reconsideration.30
Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
05-112396
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Co’s Motion to Dismiss in an
Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that
there was no forum shopping because the causes of action
invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that the
civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from
contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in
the appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari,32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
93395, before the appellate court. He prayed for the
nullification of the Manila RTC’s Order in Civil Case No. 05-
112396 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.33
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-
G.R. SP No. 93395
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Co’s petition and
remanded the civil complaint to the trial court for further
proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the
Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and forum
shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do
not share the same cause of action.34
The CA denied35 Co’s motion for reconsideration.36
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 179160.
Upon Co’s motion,37 the Court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions.38
Kou Co Ping’s arguments
Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she
is asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138
(the appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377)
and in Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for Co’s violation of
her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the
reliefs sought in both cases are the same, that is, for Co to
deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim. That Lim
utilized different methods of presenting her case – a criminal
action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific performance
and damages – should not detract from the fact that she is
attempting to litigate the same cause of action twice.39
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex
contractu and ex delicto. According to him, granting that the
two civil liabilities are independent of each other,
nevertheless, the two cases arising from them would have to
be decided using the same evidence and going over the same
set of facts. Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these
cases will constitute res judicata on the other.40
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA
Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a
declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396.41
In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lim’s appeal
from the trial court’s decision in Criminal Case No. 116377).42
Lily Lim’s arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the
same set of facts because they arose from only one
transaction.43 She is quick to add, however, that a single act or
omission does not always make a single cause of action.44 It can
possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender – (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from
crimes, and (2) independent civil liabilities or those arising
from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat provided in
Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission.45 Because the law allows her two independent causes
of action, Lim contends that it is not forum shopping to pursue
them.46
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action
involved in the two cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No.
85138 is based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lim’s right
to be protected against swindling. He represented to Lim that
she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the authorities
she bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation
because Co knew, at the time that they entered into the
contract, that he could not deliver what he promised.47 On the
other hand, Lim’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is
based on contract. Co violated Lim’s rights as a buyer in a
contract of sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags of
cement but did not deliver the goods that were the subject of
the sale.48
In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Co’s
petition.49 In G.R. No. 175256, she prays for the reversal of
the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration
that she is not guilty of forum shopping, and for the
reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the
CA.50
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for
specific performance and damages during the pendency of her
appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended
party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part
of the offender51 - (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil
liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code,52 and (2) independent civil liability,
that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be
based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil
Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort53 ). It may
also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony
but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in
cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is
based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal
offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the
criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.54 If the action
for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings
are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal
action.55 The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when
the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."56
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are
separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil
Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two
kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended
party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities
simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on
forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.57 As explained
in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:58
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of
action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action
filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains
separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on
the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal
action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the
offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action
based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the
dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did not
amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is
the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the
offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the
offender], they are, however, based on different causes of
action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa
criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa
contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal action.59
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising
from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to
proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the
present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve
different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having
been instituted together with the criminal action.60
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the
allegations contained in the complaint,61 is a civil action arising
from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse
of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she
entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms:
that she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of ₱ 64.00
per bag from Co; that, after full payment, Co delivered to her
the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to
these bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will
be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written
thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached
their contractual obligations to her under the sale contract
and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-
defendants wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement,
contrary to their agreement to fix the price at ₱ 64.00 per
bag and to the wording of the withdrawal authorities; that
FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it
issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the
sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim.
From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to
enforce the defendants’ contractual obligations, given that she
has already performed her obligations. She prays that the
defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for
the damages that their breach has caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants
were committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim
without regard for morals, good customs and public policy.
These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct
(abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the
Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations
arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the
estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from
the offense charged. They present different causes of action,
which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent"62 from each other. Both cases can proceed to
their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double
recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lim’s Petition in G.R.
No. 175256 is GRANTED. The assailed October 20, 2005
Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily
Lim’s appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is
ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals
is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE
DISPATCH.
Charlie Co’s Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed
April 10, 2007 Decision of the Seventeenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in
toto. SO ORDERED.