1. VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUEL R. ARAMBULO III,petitioners vs.
EMERENCIANA R. GUNGAB, respondent.
G.R. No. 156581. September 30, 2005.
TOPIC: possession by mere tolerance
FACTS:
This case involves sisters and one of the sister's sons. Emerciana is the registered owner
of the contested parcel of land while petitioners are her sister Victoria and nephew
Miguel.
On October 19, 1998, with the help of her counsel, Emerciana made a formal demand
to petitioners to vacate the subject property on or before November 30, 1998. However,
Victoria and Miguel refused. Then, she sought the assistance of the barangay
authorities. But, still no amicable settlement was reached.
On February 2, 1999, Emerciana filed separate ejectment complaints against the
petitioners before the MeTC of Quezon City. Aside from these, there is also a pending
case for annulment of transfer and reconveyance of title before the RTC of Quezon City,
which Victoria and three of her brothers filed against respondent and her husband.
However, the court ruled in favor of petitioners.
So, Emerciana appealed, but the RTC upheld the MeTC's judgment, in toto. Then, she
filed for a petition for review with the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC judgment.
a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Arambulo, et.al.– lost)
Petitioners contend that CA erred in relying only on respondent's TCT without
considering that respondent was never in possession of the property. They insist that
they were in possession of the subject property and so there was no physical possession
to restore and protect.
b) Respondent’s Argument’s (Gungab - won)
Respondent maintains that the best proof of ownership of a piece of land is the
certificate of title. A pending civil action for annulment of transfer and reconveyance of
title in a separate proceeding is of no moment in an ejectment case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the action for unlawful detainer is proper
2. Whether there is a need for suspension by reason of a prejudicial question
FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court:
The ejectment case is dismissed. In its decision, the court dismissed the ejectment cases
for lack of cause of action. It ruled that summary procedure was not the proper
procedure to resolve the cases on the following grounds:
 respondent's allegation of tolerance was preposterous since she failed to prove
her proper acquisition of the subject property;
 petitioners were entitled to retain possession of the subject property pursuant
to Article 448 of the Civil Code
FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals:
Set aside and reversed RTC ruling and held that respondent had a preferred right to
possess the property because she had a genuine TCT. It rejected petitioners' claim that
Victoria was a co-owner of the subject property.
RULING:
The petition for review is dismissed.
Rule:
1. Yes, the Court held that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them is bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
2. No, in ejectment cases, the court can decide on questions of ownership only as it is
necessary to decide the question of possession. The reason for this rule is to prevent
the defendant from trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.
1

Application:
1. In this case, all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present since Emerciana
alleged that (1) she owns the subject property; (2) she allowed petitioners to occupy
it by tolerance; (3) she withdrew her consent and demanded that petitioners vacate
it, but they refused. Her complaints were also filed within one year from the date
of her last demand. Also, the evidence showed that respondent has a Torrens Title
over the land.
Here, Anastacia Reyes only allowed Victoria and Miguel to use and occupy certain
portions of the subject property. They admitted their "use and possession" of these
portions of the subject property "had been with the knowledge, consent and
tolerance of all the other co-owners."
Consequently, after Emerciana obtained title to the subject property and withdrew
her tolerance later on, Victoria and Miguel' refusal to vacate it rendered their
possession thereof unlawful. Since petitioners' occupation of the subject property
was by mere tolerance, they are not entitled to retain its possession under Article
448 of the Civil Code. They are aware that their tolerated possession may be
terminated any time and they cannot be considered as builders in good faith.
Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in an unlawful detainer
case. It is enough that she has a better right of possession. Unlike in forcible entry
cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property, but
his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his
right to posses. Thus, petitioners' prior physical possession of the property does
not automatically entitle them to continue in said possession and does not give
them a better right to the property.
2. An action for reconveyance of property or accion reivindicatoria has no effect on
ejectment suits regarding the same property and, cannot give rise to a prejudicial
question. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting
property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property.
2. Sps Barnachea v CA
Facts:
Spouses Ignacio (respondents) filed their complaint for ejectment against the Spouses
Narciso and Julita Barnachea (Petitioners) before the MTC in 1998 concerning lots titled
in the name of the respondents which are adjacent to the petitioners. The complaint
was dismissed in 1999, and was revived in 2000. The petitioners received summons and
filed for a Motion for Extension of time to file answer which was denied by the MTC.
Respondents filed for a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution dated May 24,
2000.
On July 21, 2000, the MTC issued an order declaring the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration abandoned because of the Notice of Appeal they previously filed.
Thereafter, the MTC forwarded the entire record of Civil Case No. 818 to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20 (RTC Branch 20), Malolos, Bulacan. On August 24, 2000,
petitioners submitted their Appeal Memorandum to the RTC Branch 20 which affirmed
the MTC decision on September 20, 2000.
On October 5, 2000, the petitioner Julita's sister, Leticia, representing herself to be the
sole owner filed a Petition for Quieting of Title with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19
(RTC Branch 19), Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 694-M-2000. On October
9, 2000, prior to their receipt of the RTC Branch 20's September 20, 2000 decision, the
petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Suspension of Proceedings (referred to for
purposes of this decision as the urgent motion).
RTC Branch 20 denied on October 17, 2000 the petitioners' urgent motion and their
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioners brought the denials to the CA
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the issue of "whether
the pendency of an action involving the issue of ownership is sufficient basis for [the]
suspension of an ejectment proceeding between the same parties and relating to the
same subject matter".
Issues:
1) whether or not the ejectment case filed by the respondents against petitioners with
the MTC of Pulilan is for unlawful detainer or for forcible entry;
2) whether the MTC of Pulilan had validly acquired and exercised jurisdiction over the
ejectment case considering that the complaint was filed beyond one year from the
demand to vacate the subject premises; andcralawlibrary
3) whether or not the ejectment proceedings should be suspended at any stage until
the action on ownership of the disputed portion of the subject property is finally settled
Ruling:
1) The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are similar because they are
both summary actions where the issue is purely physical possession. Other than
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 these commonalities, however, they possess dissimilarities that are clear,
distinct, and well established in law.
In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the property until he was deprived of possession by the defendant;
(2) the defendant secures possession of the disputed property from the plaintiff
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; hence, his
possession is unlawful from the beginning; (3) the law does not require a
previous demand by the plaintiff for the defendant to vacate the premises; and
(4) the action can be brought only within one-year from the date the defendant
actually and illegally entered the property.
Under these standards, we do not hesitate to declare the Court of Appeals in
error when it held that the present case involves forcible entry rather than
unlawful detainer. A plain reading of the complaint shows the respondents'
positions that the petitioners were in prior possession of the disputed property;
that the respondents allowed them to occupy the disputed property by
tolerance; that the respondents eventually made a demand that the petitioners
vacate the property (on August 26, 1998, which demand the petitioners
received on August 31, 1998); and that the petitioners refused to vacate the
property in light of the defenses they presented. Separately from the complaint,
the respondents characterized the action they filed against the petitioners in
the MTC as an unlawful detainer when they stated in their memorandum that
"as alleged in the complaint, what was filed by the respondents [was] an
ejectment suit for unlawful detainer.
2) The one-year period within which to commence an ejectment proceeding is a
prescriptive period as well as a jurisdictional requirement. Hence, Article 1155
of the Civil Code on the manner of reckoning the prescriptive period must
necessarily come into play. Under this Article, the filing of a complaint in court
interrupts the running of prescription of actions. As an action for unlawful
detainer, the one-year prescription period started running after August 31, 1998
- the date of receipt of the respondents' demand letter. The period ran for
almost two months until it was interrupted on October 20, 1998 when the
respondents filed their ejectment complaint. This complaint, however, was
dismissed on December 8, 1999. Upon this dismissal, the prescriptive period
again began to run for about four months when another interruption intervened
- the revival of the complaint on April 5, 2000. Evidently, under these undisputed
facts, the period when the prescriptive period effectively ran does not add up
to the one-year prescriptive period that would jurisdictionally bar the ejectment
case.
3) The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical possession. When a
claim of ownership is used as a basis for de facto possession or to assert a better
possessory right, the court hearing the case may provisionally rule on the issue
of ownership. As a rule, however, a pending civil action involving ownership of
the same property does not justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings.
Only in rare cases has this Court allowed a suspension of the ejectment
proceedings and one of these is in the case of Amagan v. Marayag16 that the
petitioners cite. To quote from Amagan'
[i]ndisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the
demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of
reasoning, considerations of equity require suspension of the ejectment
proceedings. xxx [L]ike Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one of unlawful
detainer and not of forcible entry, and most certainly, the ejectment of
petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to
create "confusion, disturbance, inconvenience and expenses" mentioned in the
said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent
to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the
petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937.
(Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house)
Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and
effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but
the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.17
However, we do not find these same circumstances present in this case for the
reasons we shall discuss in detail below.
First. In Amagan, the party refusing to vacate the disputed premises (or the
deforciant in the action for unlawful detainer) was the same party seeking to
quiet his title. In the present case, the petitioners are not parties to the civil
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action (for quieting of title) whose result they seek to await; the plaintiff in establish. Thus, the equitable consideration that drove us to rule as we did in
the quieting of title case is Leticia, the petitioner Julita's sister. No proof Amagan does not obtain in the present case.
whatsoever was offered to show that petitioner Julita is asserting her own title
to the property; there is only the allegation that Leticia was appointed as the In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling equitable reasons at least
representative of Julita and the other heirs of Isidro in their various recourses at comparable and under circumstances analogous to Amagan, we cannot
law to vindicate their landowners' rights.18 The respondents in fact actively override the established rule that a pending civil action for ownership shall not
disputed petitioner Julita's identification with the quieting of title case in their ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. Additionally, to allow a suspension
Comment since Leticia claimed to be the sole owner of TCT No. T-188-EP in her on the basis of the reasons the petitioners presented in this case would create
action to quiet title. The respondents also pointed to the document entitled the dangerous precedent of allowing an ejectment suit to be suspended by an
"Kasulatan ng Pagmamana ng Lupa sa Labas ng Hukuman na May Pagtalikod sa action filed in another court by parties who are not involved or affected by the
Bahagi" executed on May 27, 1995, showing that Julita had relinquished her ejectment suit.
share over TCT No. T-188-EP in favor of her sister Leticia. A desperation
argument the petitioners advanced in their Memorandum is that the Kasulatan Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
was only executed "pursuant to the agrarian reform policy proscribing the
3. SPS. RICARDO AND LYDIA LLOBRERA, petitioner vs. JOSEFINA V. FERNANDEZ,
parceling of the awarded landholding into smaller units to preserve its
defendant.
viability".19 In other words, the petitioners are disavowing, for purposes of this
GR NO. 142882, 2006-05-02.
case, the representation they made in completing their submission before the
TOPIC: PROPERTY LAW (Possession by mere Tolerance)
agrarian reform authorities. We cannot of course recognize this line of
FACTS:
argument as justification for the suspension of the ejectment proceedings as
Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.
the petitioners are bound by their representations before the agrarian reform
Respondent Josefina V. Fernandez, as one of the registered co-owners of the land,
authorities and cannot simply turn their back on these representations as their
served a written demand letter upon petitioners Spouses Llobrera, et al., to vacate the
convenience requires. No less decisive against the petitioners' argument for
premises.
suspension is the decision itself of RTC Branch 19 that the respondents attached
Receipt of the demand letter notwithstanding, petitioners refused to vacate,
to their Comment. This decision shows that Civil Case No. 694-M-2000, instead
necessitating the filing by the respondent of a formal complaint against them before
of being a case for quieting of title, is in fact a mere boundary dispute.20
the Barangay Captain.
Upon failure of the parties to reach any settlement, the Barangay Captain issued the
Second. In Amagan, the MCTC decision involved the demolition of the
necessary certification to file action.
petitioners' house - a result that this Court found to be "permanent, unjust and
Respondent then filed a verified Complaint for ejectment and damages against the
probably irreparable"; in the present case, only a portion of the petitioners'
petitioners before the MTCC.
house is apparently affected as the petitioners occupy the lot adjoining the
a) Petitioner’s Arguments
disputed property. Significantly, the height, width and breadth of the portion of
By way of defense, petitioners alleged in their Answer that they had been occupying
the house that would be affected by the execution of the RTC Branch 20 decision
the property in question beginning the year 1945 onwards, when their predecessors-
does not appear anywhere in the records, thus, unavoidably inviting suspicion
in-interest, with the permission of Gualberto de Venecia, one of the other co-owners
that the potential damage to the petitioners is not substantial. More important
of said land, developed and occupied the same on condition that they will pay their
than the fact of omission is its implication; the omission constitutes a missing
monthly rental such payments being duly acknowledged by receipts.
link in the chain of equitable reasons for suspension that the petitioners wish to
Beginning sometime June 1996, however, the representative of Gualberto de Venecia
refused to accept their rentals, prompting them to consign the same to Banco San Juan,
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which bank deposit they continued to maintain and update with their monthly rental
payments.
FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court:
 The MTCC rendered judgment for the respondent as plaintiff; Ordering each of the
defendants to vacate the portion of the land in question they respectively occupy
 The RTC affirmed the foregoing judgment.
FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals:
 The CA affirmed that of the RTC.
ISSUE:
 WON the occupation and possession of the property in question is by mere
tolerance of the respondent.
 WON the consignation made by petitioners in contemplation of article 1256 of the
new civil code is not legally tenable.
 WON petitioners' possession of the subject property is founded on contract or not.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Petitioners failed to present any written memorandum of the alleged lease
arrangements between them and Gualberto De Venecia.
The receipts claimed to have been issued by the owner were not presented on the
excuse that the fire burned the same. Simply put, there is a dearth of evidence to
substantiate the averred lessor-lessee relationship.
From the absence of proof of any contractual basis for petitioners' possession of the
subject premises, the only legal implication is that their possession thereof is by mere
tolerance.
In Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled:
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against him.
The judgment favoring the ejectment of petitioners being consistent with law and
jurisprudence can only be affirmed.
The alleged consignation of the P20.00 monthly rental to a bank account in
respondent's name cannot save the day for the petitioners simply because of the
absence of any contractual basis for their claim to rightful possession of the subject
property. Consignation based on Article 1256 of the Civil Code indispensably requires a
creditor-debtor relationship between the parties, in the absence of which, the legal
effects thereof cannot be availed of.
In the present case, the possession of the property by the petitioners being by mere
tolerance as they failed to establish through competent evidence the existence of any
contractual relations between them and the respondent, the latter has no obligation to
receive any payment from them.
Since respondent is not a creditor to petitioners as far as the alleged P20.00 monthly
rental payment is concerned, respondent cannot be compelled to receive such payment
even through consignation under Article 1256.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
4. SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and AMELIA APOSTOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES EMMANUEL CHUA and EDNA L. CHUA
TOPIC: Possessor vs. Owner
FACTS:
Spouses Emmanuel and Edna Chua filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against the petitioners Spouses Elpidio and Amelia Apostol. The respondents
alleged, inter alia, that they had contracted with the Spouses Paulo and Georgina
Pascua for the purchase of a parcel of land. The petitioners, who were present during
the negotiations, verbally assured the respondents that they would vacate the property
within 10 days from the execution of the sale. The petitioners then acknowledged that
their stay in the property was only upon the tolerance of its former owners. On June 7,
1993, the Spouses Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the
improvements thereon in favor of the respondents for P1,000,000. The respondents
were issued TCT No. 87610 over the property on June 8, 1993. Despite demands,
however, the petitioners refused to vacate the property.
Petitioners’ Arguments: (LOST)
1. Their possession of the property since 1976 preceded the sale of the property
to the private respondents.
2. The respondents were purchasers of the property in bad faith because they
admitted in their complaint before the MeTC that they knew that the petitioners
were in actual possession of the property even before they purchased the same
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 3. In declaring that the petitioners had priority of possession of the property on
the sale thereof by Luz Pascua and Paulo Pascua way back in 1976 and 1977, the
RTC did not thereby collaterally attack the title of the respondents over the
property. According to the petitioners, an inflexible adherence to the
proscription against a collateral attack of a torrens title may result to gross
injustice.
Respondents’ Arguments: (WON)
1. Luz B. Pascua was the owner of the parcel of land located in Quezon City covered
by TCT No. 198936 with an area of 315 square meters. She sold a portion of the
property, an area of 285.32 square meters, to the respondents on July 8, 1976
for P45,548 of which P15,548 was paid. On the same day, the parties executed
a memorandum agreement covering the property, in which the respondents
agreed that the balance of the purchase price would be paid in installments.
Thereafter, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of the respondents
over an unsegregated portion of the property, with an area of 29.68 square
meters, for P7,350 and, later, a deed of confirmation of deed of absolute sale
with waiver over the said property.
2. On June 20, 1979, the respondents executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over
the property, stating, inter alia, that they could not cause the registration of the
said deeds because the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 198936 was in the
possession of Teresita B. Jimenez, a former co-owner of the property.
3. Luz Pascua, in her letter to the Register of Deeds dated August 6, 1979,
confirmed that she failed to turn over the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 198936
because the same was in the possession of Jimenez, who, in turn, gave it to Jose
J. Burgos.
4. Luz Pascua filed a Complaint against the petitioners in the RTC of Quezon City
for rescission and damages but the same was dismissed for lack of interest to
prosecute. Paulo Pascua filed a similar complaint against the petitioners in the
RTC but the same was, likewise, dismissed.
Findings of the Lower Courts:
MeTC – in favor of Sps. Chua
RTC – in favor of Sps. Apostol
CA – reversed the RTC decision, reinstated MeTC
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the complaint is for Forcible Entry or Unlawful
Detainer
2. Who is entitled to the lawful possession of the subject property
3. Whether this case has to be suspended in view of the filing of an
action for Annulment of Title in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City;
and
4. Whether the plaintiffs can lawfully eject the defendants from the
premises
RULING:
PETITION DENIED.
Rule:
It is an accepted rule that a person who has a torrens title over the
property, such as the respondents, is entitled to the possession thereof. The
Court reiterated its ruling in the Pangilinan Case in Javelosa v. Court of
Appeals, and declared that the registered owners are entitled to the possession
of the property covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in
their favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were never in prior physical
possession of the subject land is of no moment, as prior physical possession is
necessary only in forcible entry cases.
The petitioners claim that, as alleged in their answer to the complaint
for unlawful detainer, the respondents' title over the property is a nullity; hence,
the complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners should be dismissed
for lack of merit. Such allegation does not help their present recourse.
Under Section 48 of PD 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of
the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted
6
for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim
ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to
determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
6. G.R. No. 141962 (January 25, 2006)
DANILO DUMO and SUPREMA DUMO, petitioners , vs. ERLINDA ESPINAS, JHEAN
PACIO, PHOL PACIO, MANNY JUBINAL, CARLITO CAMPOS, and SEVERA ESPINAS,
respondents.
FACTS
In a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction led by spouses Danilo and Suprema Dumo
(petitioners) against Erlinda Espinas, Jhean Pacio, Phol Pacio, Manny Jubinal, Carlito
Campos and Severa Espinas (respondents) with the MTC of Bauang, La Union, the
petitioners alleged:
1. That plaintiffs are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy land with all the
improvements standing thereon, located in Paringao, Bauang, La Union;
2. That on November 17, 1995, defendant Severa J. Espinas filed a civil complaint
before this same court (civil case no. 857), subject matter of the case being the same
real property mentioned above, where a decision has been rendered against the
defendants (so Severa Espinas won in this previous case), but the same was not
enforced;
3. That on October 30, 1996, at about 1:45 P .M., all defendants acting for the
interest of Severa Espinas, apparently disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put
them in possession over the questioned real property, and in open defiance with the
official action taken by the sheriff, took it upon themselves, employing force,
intimidation, and threat, to enter the said question real property, and despite
protestations made by plaintiffs, who were there then present and visibly outnumbered
by defendants and their agents who were armed with sticks, bolos, hammers, and other
deadly weapons, successfully drove out plaintiffs, and took over the premises; that
arrogantly, the defendants were boasting aloud that they were under instructions by
the "judge" to do just that — to forcibly enter and take over the premises; that
defendants while inside the premises, demolished and totally tore down all the
improvements standing thereon, consisting of, but not limited to shed structures
intended for rent to the public;
4. That defendants are still in the premises to date, and have even started putting
and continuously putting up structures thereon;
5. That the plaintiff being the rightful owner of the disputed property and not
being a party in civil case no. 857, can never be bound by the proceedings thereon; that
the acts of defendants in forcibly entering the property of plaintiff, and taking over the
same without no lawful basis is patently a violation of her proprietary rights, the
commission and the continuance of the unlawful acts aforementioned of defendants
verily works injustice to plaintiffs.
Petitioners prayed for the payment of actual damages, lost earnings, moral damages
and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, respondents contended as part of their Special and Affirmative
Defenses:
1. That Sps. Marcelino and Severa Espinas purchased the questioned parcel of land
from Carlos Calica in 1943;
2. That said parcel of land has been declared for taxation purposes under their
name and the real estate taxes have been religiously paid;
3. That said parcel of land has been surveyed, which Plan Psu-202273 is duly
approved by the Director of Land, with an area of 1,065 sq. m. more or less;
4. That to remove and clear all doubts and cloud over the ownership of said parcel
of land, Civil Case No. 857 was filed and after hearing, decision was rendered declaring
herein defendants the lawful owners of said parcel of land;
5. That under and by virtue of said Decision, defendants entered, occupied and
possessed said land, and in the exercise of their right of ownership, cleaned the same
of illegally constructed structures which were done without the knowledge and consent
of herein defendants.
MTC: Petitioners (plaintiffs Danilo and Suprema Dumo) were able to prove their right
of possession over the subject property. The defendants were ordered to pay jointly
and severally the plaintiffs actual damages, lost earning of the premises, moral damages,
exemplary damages; and attorney's fee and to pay double cost.
RTC: reversed and set aside the Decision of the MTC and dismissed the case filed by the
petitioners
CA: set aside the judgment of the RTC and reinstating with modification the decision of
the MTC, by deleting the awards for actual, moral and exemplary damages
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in deleting the awards of actual,
moral and exemplary damages made by the MTC, considering that the said awards are
already res judicata because: (a) the decision which included the deletion of the said
7
damages is null and void, and did not affect the MTC decision, and, (b) the herein
respondents did not question the amounts of said award in their appeal from the
decision of the municipal trial court to the regional trial court thereby rendering said
awards, final and res judicata
RULING: The instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA is affirmed.
(1 and 2 are additional concepts to completely answer the issue. You can focus on 3.)
1. We have consistently held that an unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned, or upon which a determination of the question raised by the error
properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error. Petitioners admit in the present
petition that herein respondents, in their appeal with the RTC, raised the question of
whether or not the prevailing party may be awarded damages. Since this issue had been
seasonably raised, it became open to further evaluation. It was only logical and natural
for the RTC to deal with the question of whether petitioners are indeed entitled to the
damages awarded by the MTC.
2. It would be the height of inconsistency if the RTC sustained the award of
damages in favor of herein petitioners when, in the same decision, it reversed the MTC
judgment and dismissed the complaint of petitioners.
3. We agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award
actual, moral and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases,
the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only
issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or
those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the
damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of
material possession. Although the MTC's order for the reimbursement to petitioners of
their alleged lost earnings over the subject premises, which is a beach resort, could have
been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the
property while it was in the possession of the respondents, records do not show any
evidence to sustain the same. Thus, we find no error in the ruling of the RTC that the
award for lost earnings has no evidentiary or factual basis; and in the decision of the CA
affirming the same.
7. CGR Corporation vs Treyes
Topic: Remedies of a person deprived of possession
Facts:
Whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for
damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred.
CGR Corporation claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in
Bulanon, Sagay City, Negro Occidental even before the notarised separate Fishpond
Lease Agreement 5674, 5694, 5695 were a approved October 2000 in their favour by
the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of 25 years in
On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and
unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to
the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners' fishponds,
and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners. On
succeeding days, defendant's men continued their forage on the fishponds of the
plaintiffs by carting and taking away the remaining full grown milk fish, fry and
fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even the
chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the
materials taken away by defendant's men. Religious icons were also stolen and as an
extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons;
On November 22, petitioner filed with the MTC separate complaints for Forible
Entry with Temporary Restraining Order against the respondent.
In a separate move, petitioners filed with the RTC Bacolod a complaint for
damages against respondent alleging that as lessee and in possession of the fishpond,
they had continuously occupied, cultivated, and developed the fishpond and since then
they had been regularly harvesting milkfish, shrimps, mud crabs and other produce,
that a yearly income of the fishpond is at least Php 300,000.00, Php 100,000.00 and Php
100,000,00o respectively with the petitioners and with such they are praying for reliefs
8
of the actual damages, and moral damages, exemplary damages (100,000.00 each).
Respondent filed a motion to Dismiss petitioner’s complain on grounds of limits
pendentia, res judicator and forum shopping,
RTC: Dismissed the complain on the ground of prematurity holding that a complaint for
damages may only be maintained after a final determination on the forcible entry cases
has been made.
CA: sustained the RTC order denying the motion to dismiss
ISSUE: whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry,
petitioners can independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they
claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the
premises. cAaDHT
Ruling: Petition impressed with merit.
Principle:
Sec 17 Rule 70 of Rules of Court states that If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff
for the restitution of the premises,the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs.
The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or
"the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair
rental value of the property" and attorney's fees and costs.
Dumo v. Espinas reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of damages that
may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Other damages must be
claimed in an ordinary action
The Respondents cites Progressive Development Corporation Inc vs Court of
Appeals.the Court ruled that "all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be
filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for
restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs therefrom." In other
words, this Court held that "no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for
restoration of possession.
This Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the therein two complaints, thus:
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against
petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res
judicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is
concerned, but also that the claim for damages-moral and exemplary in addition to
actual and compensatory-constitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs
counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action
becomes imperative.
It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the
complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct
relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with respondent's
alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milk fish and other marine products
in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR
Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the heads of some of
them, after the act of dispossession had occurred.
Application:
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia — that the identity between the pending
actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that
any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration — is not present, hence, it may not be
invoked to dismiss petitioners' complaint for damages
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction
over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and
attorney's fees.
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the
elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible
entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.
Petitioners' ling of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a
result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of
their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.
8. Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v CA
G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992
9
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of Possession
FACTS:
Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or Ramon Que), Iloilo, Multi Parts Supply
Corporation (or Ramon Que), VirgilioAng, Henry Tan, Southern Sales Corporation, and
Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas standing on
registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin,
Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L. Jarantilla. After the expiration of the
period in the lease agreement, lessor executed an Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of
Star Group Resources and Development.
In the Deed of Sale, it was stated that vendee shall henceforth deal with the lessees
and occupants of the properties herein sold without any further warranty or
obligation on the part of the Vendors.
Being the vendee, Star Group then filed an action of unlawful detainer against Wilmon
Auto Supply.
Petitioner refused to concede invoking that the lessors violated their leasehold rights
because they were not accorded with: 1) rights of pre-emption; 2) buyer is not
required to honor leases; 3) the lessees were denied the option to renew their
leases upon the expiration thereof.
These same propositions were also raised in the case it filed with the RTC. In the
unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should proceed
against some of the lessees but not with the others. The lessees filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari and the RTC held
in the end that the pendency of the case in the RTC did not warrant suspension of the
unlawful detainer case with the MTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful detainer suits in MTC against petitioner, lessees,
for the reason that their lease had expired, should be abated by the action filed in RTC
by lessees based on the contention that they are entitled to a right of pre-
emption/prior purchase of the leased premises.
RULING: No, an ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC
based on a tenant’s claim of his right of pre-emption being violated.
The Court gave relevant precedents such as:
1. injunction suits do not abate ejectment
2. accion publiciana does not suspend an ejectment suit
3. writ of possession does not bar execution of judgment
4. action for quieting title does not bar an ejectment suit.
The reason for the above rulings of the precedence were that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and on not a few
occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily
be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved.
SC said that the cases cited by the petitioners were exceptions such as in Vda. De
Legazpi v. Avendano case, it was based on strong reasons of equity not found in the
present petition. In Vda. De Murga v. Chan, the essential requisite of an unequivocal
demand to vacate and surrender the premises had not been fulfilled.
SC stressed that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises
the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, MeTC and MCTC have the
competence to resolve “the issue of ownership....only to determine the issue of
possession.”
Hence, Petition was dismisse
9. De Luna, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals et.al, defendant.
G.R. No. 94490. August 6, 1992.
TOPIC: Remedies of person deprived of Possession
FACTS:
This case revolved in a forcible entry case filed by the petitioner against several persons
including herein respondents,
a) Petitioner’s Arguments (De Luna– Won)
10
Petitioner alleged that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of
30 856 square meters. That respondent entered the land and began plowing it then
fenced the land with barbed wire. Despite his objections, they began planting sugar
cane. Petitioner also prayed that the respondents be ordered to vacate the land and
pay him the amount of 45Php monthly per hectare until possession thereof would be
transfered
b) Respondent’s Argument’s (Dimaano Jr. - Lost)
the defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint. The respondent raised
as his special and affirmative defense that the petitioner was not the owner of the
property instead it was Agustin Dequiña Jr. who succeed from Agustin Dequiña Sr. and
was leased to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ejectment case is a proper remedy for the petitioner who was
deprived of the subject parcel of land.
FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals:
Reversed the ruling of the RTC.
RULING: (of the Supreme Court)
The petition impressed with merit.
Rule:
Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only issue to be resolved therein
is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, or
possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership that either party may set
forth in their pleadings. 2 If petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he may
recover such possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may be the character
of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority time, he has the security that
entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by either accion publiciana or accion reindivicatoria. ||
Application:
In this case, petitioner has shown that he had prior possession of the property. The
prior possession of petitioner was established by the testimony of his witnesses,
notably that of his tenant Epigenio Dilag and Victor dela Cruz. While petitioner admitted
that he declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1957, he had possessed the
property beginning 1953 at the very latest, when he leased the same to Epigenio Dilag,
who in turn possessed the same until respondent Dimaano, Jr. entered upon the
property in 1972. The possession of the property by Dilag since 1953 redounds to the
benefit of petitioner, since possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that
of another.
On the other hand, respondent Dimaano, Jr. had failed to prove that Agustin Dequiña,
Jr. possessed the property prior to his possession, much less the ownership of the latter
over said property. |||
Conclusion:
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. was the owner
of the disputed property since there is no evidence whatsoever to support such a
conclusion.|||
10. Semira V CA and Buenaventura An
TOPIC: Remedies of person deprived of possession
FACTS:
Juana Gutierez sold to Respondent Buenaventura An an estimated area of 822.5 square
meters lot specifically designated by boundaries. Respondent then proceeded to
occupy said lot within the boundaries.
Buenaventura, subsequently purchased the adjacent eastern lot with the size of 8,606
and another of 11,000 sqm from the spouses Pascual Hornilla and Gliceria Ilao, and
Santiago Asi, respectively.
11
Not much later on, he then sold the original 822sqm lot to his nephew, Cipriano
Ramirez. The Deed indicated the same boundaries designated in the original sale from
Gutierez to Buenaventura. Ramirez proceeded to occupy the lot according to the
boundaries stated.
Seven years after, Ramirez sold the 822 sqm lot to Miguel Semira (petitioner) according
to the stated boundaries for a lump sum of P20,000. However, Semira discovered that
the actual size delimited by the boundaries was not 822sqm, but rather, 2200sqm as
evidenced by the Taysan Cadastral MappingSurvey. Semira entered the lot according to
its stated boundaries and built a rice mill.
However, in 1979, Buenaventura filed forcible entry, claiming that Semira forcibly
occupied an additional 1,377 sqm. He posited that Semira purchased an 822sqm lot,
not a 2200sqm lot. During the pendancy of proceedings,Buenaventura obtained an OCT
for the two lots surrounding that of Semira.
Petitioner’s Contention:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) in upholding this ejectment from the disputed area despite the absence of clear and
indubitable proof that private respondent had prior physical possession and that he
was deprived of the same by force, intimidation, strategy or stealth; and,
(2) in not holding that the question of ownership is so necessarily involved that it would
be impossible to decide the question of bare possession without first setting that of
ownership
MTC Ruling:
the municipal court of ruled that since the issue of prior physical possession could not
be resolved without first deciding on the ownership, dismissal was proper since forcible
entry cases involve the sole issue of prior physical possession.
RTC Ruling:
The RTC reversed and ruled for Buenaventura.
CA Ruling:
CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
WON the forcible entry case would prosper?
Or
WON Semira is entitled to the more or less 1000sqm discrepancy in the land area?
Ruling:
No. Forcible entry case will not prosper, Semira is entitled to 2200sqm designated by
the boundary.
It is not difficult to sustain petitioner over private respondent when the latter failed
even to prove prior possession in his favor. Absent such element, it cannot be said that
he was forcibly deprived of the disputed portion. Hence, his action for forcible entry
must fail.
It is clear that the original “822sqm” lot was once owned by respondent Buenaventura;
and that he sold same to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, in 1972 for the lump sum of
P2,500.00. The "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" incorporated both the estimated area
and the definite boundaries of the land; and, that private respondent's nephew in turn
sold the lot to petitioner in 1979 with the very same boundaries mentioned in the deed
of sale executed in his favor by his uncle Buenaventura An.
The fact that the area turned out to be 2,200 square meters; instead of only 822.5
square meters, is of no moment and does not entitle private respondent to the
difference because the definite object sold was Lot 4221 in its entirety and not just any
unit of measure or number. That the sale resulted in a disadvantage to private
respondent does not confer on him any cause of action against petitioner.
The court is hardly convinced that Buenaventura An entered into the sale unaware that
Lot 4221 actually had a much bigger area than it purported to be. Even as early as the
sale between him and his nephew, private respondent was already aware of the
difference between the stated area of Lot 4221 and its actual size. His nephew Cipriano
Ramirez testi􏰁ed, and private respondent did not dispute, that when asked why the
area of Lot 4221 stated in their deed of sale was much smaller than the actual size,
private respondent explained that it was to minimize taxes.
The SC sustained Mr. Semira as well as the MCTC’s decision. When land is sold for a
lump sum and not on a per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land
stated in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the area thereof.
Hence, the Vendor Ramirez is obligated to deliver all the land included within the
boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that
recited in the deed. The court stressed the point especially when the area is described
in the vernacular as "humigit kumulang," that is, more or less.
11. REYNANTE, petitioner vs. CA, defendant
G.R. No. 95907. April 8, 1992
12

Topic: Effects of Possession
Facts:
The late Don Cosme Carlos (respondent’s father-in-law) owned a lot over a
fishpond located in Bulacan which was covered by a TCT.
In his lifetime, he took in Jose Reynante (petitioner) as tenant, who constructed
a nipa hut on lots 1 and 2 which was between the fishpond covered by the TCT and the
Liputan River.
In the surrounding area, Reynante also planted nipa palms, harvested, and sold
them without any interference and prohibition from anyone. Neither did the late Don
Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest
and appropriate them as his own. This has been going on for more than 50 years.
After Don Carlos’ death, his heirs entered into a written agreement with
Reynante whereby the latter was paid of P200,000.00 to turn over the fishpond he was
tenanting to them and to surrender all his rights therein as caretaker.
As agreed, Reynante surrendered the fishpond and the two huts located therein
to the heirs, but he continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2
and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted.
However, the heirs demanded that Reynante vacate, claiming that he had
already been indemnified to surrender his rights as tenant. They subsequently filed a
complaint for forcible entry after having been ignored.
Hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Reynante had prior physical possession of lots 1 and 2
2. Whether or not the disputed lots belong to private respondents as a result
of accretion
RTC RULING: In favor of Reynante, dismissing the complaint and finding that petitioner
was
CA RULING: Affirmed RTC ruling in toto.
SC RULING:
1. Reynante has clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2. Even the
written agreement entered into by the parties bolstered this fact because disinterested
third parties testified the same to be true. To add to this contention, the RTC conducted
an ocular inspection which found that the TCT did not even cover lots 1 and 2, the said
lots being formed by accretion.
Respondents who based their claim of possession on the written agreement was
found wanting due to the fact that the agreement gave the impression that the nipa
hut and the nipa palms were not included, it was agreed upon that Reynante would
only give up the fishpond.
2. The TCT relied upon by the respondents did not cover the disputed lots, the same
being formed through accretion as was found in the ocular inspection conducted by the
RTC.
The respondents’ failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years
subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than
fifty (50) years and unless private respondent can show a better title over the subject
lots, petitioner's possession over the property must be respected.
12. BAÑES vs. LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On August 16, 1990, certain members of the Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP)
filed an action against its President, before the SEC, for accounting and damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction.
This resulted in the division of the LCP into two factions, namely: the Batong/ Saguilayan
group which includes herein petitioners and the Ladlad/Almazan group which includes
herein respondents Almazan, et al.
The SEC issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners however refused to leave the same. Almost a month thereafter petitioners
Manuel G. Del Rosario and Elmer J. Bañes wrote letters addressed the LCP President.
Petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario eventually left the premises.
On December 3, 1993, petitioners filed an action for forcible entry.
MeTC: DISMISSED the case. The dispossession does not constitute forcible entry. It
was effected without the required attendant circumstances of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC.
RTC: REVERSED and ordered the defendants to vacate, surrender and restore
possession of the questioned premises to the plaintiffs.
Respondents thereafter went to the CA.
CA: REVERSED. Adopted decision of MeTC.
13
Petitioners now come before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners were removed from the premises by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth.
SC: Affirmed the RTC and ordered the defendants to vacate, surrender and restore
possession of the questioned premises to the petitioners Del Rosario and San Ramon,
but not to Banes. .
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land
or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases,
the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has
the prior possession de facto.
Two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction:
1. Prior Physical Possession, and
2. Undue Deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
What is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the
property. Any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any
claim of ownership.
The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude
another, who has had prior possession therefrom.
In this case, the very testimony mentions the presence of guards at the premises which
prevented the ingress and egress of petitioners from the premises.
Clearly, the presence of such men in the subject property restricting petitioners’
mobility constitutes force.
The MeTC, ratiocinated that since petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario wrote the LCP
expressing that they are willing to vacate the premises upon finding another place to
live in, no force was employed by the respondents, thus there was no forcible entry.
We do not agree.
It is true that petitioners expressed their willingness to voluntarily vacate the premises,
however, this is after respondents had padlocked the premises and used armed men to
prevent their coming to and from the premises.
Otherwise stated, said letters do not negate the initial use of force by respondents
which constituted forcible entry. Though respondents owned the property, their use of
force in evicting petitioners therefrom was unjustified.
However, while we find that there was forcible entry in this case, we cannot grant the
prayer of petitioners-spouses Bañes that they be restored to the subject premises.
It is established that the spouses Bañes are now staying in another property owned by
the LCP in Caloocan City without paying rent.
The situation is different insofar as petitioners spouses Del Rosario and spouses San
Ramon are concerned. Evidence do not disclose that they asked for or were given by
LCP another place to stay in.
13. Balatero v. IAC | G.R 73889 | Sept. 30, 1987 | 1 – Possession as Basis for Acquiring
Ownership
Facts
 The case began when the Director of Lands started proceedings to settle the 1419
lots to rightful claimants in the Iligan Cadastral.
o Claimants in this case include Petitioner and Private Respondent who
purchased their respective portions of the lot from Josefa Badelles.
 The facts as summarized by the RTC states that the property was owned by the
Parents of Josefa Iglupas (Mother in law of Petitioner) and her brother, after the
death of their parents, the lot was given to Alejo Iglupas and his wife. When he died
the land was sold by his son Severo to Josefa Iglupas and her husband Juan Badelles
for a consideration of 111.00
 On July 1930, Josefa Iglupas mortgaged the property to secure a loan of 68.00 to
Private Respondent Juan Veloso in a public document named as a Pacto De Retro
Sale. The loan was eventually paid.
o Thereafter, Josefa Iglupas and her children sold a portion of the lot to
Petitioner as shown by the Deed of Sale presented during the trial of the
case.
 The land was later on subdivided, the plan was approved by the Director of Lands.
Pertaining to the respective claimants of the land.
 Thereafter, Josefa reoccupied the property up until her death. Her heirs succeeded
her possession of the lot and was declared under her name and taxes were paid in
her name.
o However, this was opposed by Anacleto Iglupas who claimed that what was
sold to Josefa is only a house and not the lot.
o The facts of the case also show that Juan Veloso was never in possession of
the property and never asserted his right to possess the same. On the other
14
 hand, the Heirs of Iglupas have been in possession of the property since
1918.
 On the other hand, the State also claims a small portion of the lot which was
provided for the purposes for the widening of a national street.
CFI
o Due to this, the RTC found decided in favor of Petitioner who has a registerable title
over the lot and the Heirs of Josefa for the other lot, with the other lot declared as
property of the State due to the fact that it was provided for the widening of the
national road.
IAC
o The IAC reversed the RTC Judgment and awarded the land in favor of Private
Respondent. Lot 817 was declared as property of the state for being used as the
widening of the national road.
o with a total area of 74,343 sq.m. However, the possessory information title covers only
Issue
o Whether the document denominated as sale was really a contract of sale.
Ruling
o The Court states that while the contract would hsow that the disputed parcel of
land was transferred to Private Respondent by way of sale with Pacto De Retro. The
circumstances indicate that the contract should be treated as an equitable
mortgage.
o The subject land remained undisturbed in the possession of the vendor even
after the execution of the contract.
o The consideration of the said sale was inadequate due to the fact that the
land was bought for 111.00 and then she sold it for half the price.
o The Court states that the IAC’s finding that the contract was a pact de retro sale
constitutes reversible error.
o Furthermore, the Court states that the constructive possession of Private
Respondent by executing an affidavit to consolidate his ownership of the land
cannot ripen into ownership.
o The rule is that only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of
owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion
 The Constructive Possession over the parcel of land mentioned by
the appellate court did not ripen into ownership. It must be in the
concept of an owner to so that possession can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion.
o From the facts of the case, Private Respondent never owned the parcel of land
because the contract was actually an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.
Petition is granted
14. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. HEIRS OF ISABEL TESALONA
The subject property is alleged to have been originally acquired by Maria Rosita Lorenzo
under possessory information of title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. The
property was inherited by her son Laureano and was later on inherited by his daughter
Magdalena.
The daughters of Magdalena filed an application for registration of 5 parcels of land
an area of 10,481 sq.m.
The Director of Lands filed his opposition alleging that neither the applicants nor their
PII had sufficient title to the land nor had been in possession for a period of at least 30
years immediately prior filing and that it is a public land. Applicants replied that the
property is private and covered by a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896.
Both Directors of Forestry and Land withdrew their opposition and were granted but
later discovered to be unauthorized so the court reinstated it.
RTC adjudicated Lots 3, 4, and 5 in favor of respondent, and Lot 1 and 2 as owned by
the government. The applicant appealed to the CA seeking confirmation of title over
Lots 1 and 2 and was granted.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in awarding Lots 1 and 2 on the basis of a mere blue
print copy of the plan and based in the possessory information which covers only 1.0481
hectares.
DECISION:
The original tracing cloth plan (OTCP) of the land applied for was not submitted in
evidence and such omission is fatal to their application as the submission of the OTCP
15
is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. The blue print of survey plan falls
short of the mandatory requirement of law. Given the mandatory character of the
requirement for the submission of the OTCP of the land applied for, said requirement
cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly.
The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona is a possessory information title but they
did not submit the original of the possessory information title. Moreover, proof of
unavailability of the original document was not established thus, rendering admissibility
of the secondary evidence questionable and dubious. In fact, Presidential Decree No.
892 outlawed all Spanish titles, including possessory information titles, unless they
were authenticated in appropriate registration proceedings before August 16, 1976.
Another point is the fact of the irreconcilable discrepancy between the area
covered by the title and the actual area applied for. Law and jurisprudence dictate
that applicants have the burden of proving that the title justifies the considerable
increase in land area, failure in which results in the resolution of the conflict in favor
of the government and against them. Land grants are always construed in favor of
the government and strictly against the grantee.
Finally, Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy area and were as early as 1955, filled
with mangrove trees. Moreover, possession of forest lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be
issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens System, nullifies the title.
15. Resurreccion Bartolome et al, petitioners vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court CA)
and Heirs of Sps. Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid, respondents
GR No. 76792 March 12, 1990
FACTS:
Lot 11165 is a vast tract of land owned by different individuals. Records show that 725
sq m portion of it was owned by Epitsacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales. Before
he left to settle in Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin Doroteo Bartolome.
When Sps. Epitacio and Maria died, their grandchildren, Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto,
Resurreccion and Ruperta (children of Catalina), constructed a bamboo fence over the
land on their own.
On 1993, the Director of Lands instituted a cadastral proceeding, respondent Ursula Cid
filed an answer claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660 sq m. The
land was allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid through inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome,
the father of Ursula’s deceased husband, Bernabe. Her sister-in-law, Maria Bartolome
filed a motion to intervene alleging that she is a co owner of the property and she was
excluded in Cid’s petition. Thereafter, Cid filed a motion to amend petition, alleging that
the lands were acquired not through inheritance, but by purchase. Exhibit 4 was
presented which is a document of sale between Maria Gonzales (petitioner’s
grandmother) and Ursula Cid of the portion of land in dispute. RTC ruled that petitioner
Resurrecion et al were the owners of the772 sq m portion, the remaining are owned by
the heirs of Doroteo Bartlome. However, the CA ruled that the entire lot no. 11165 was
owned by respondent relying on the Exhibit 4 because it is ancient document.
ISSUE: WON the deed of sale presented (Exhibit 4) is an ancient document, thus no
other evidence of its execution and authenticity need to be given.
RULING:
No, exhibit 4 is not an ancient document.
Rule 132 of ROC provides 3 elements under Sec 22: 1. Where a private writing is more
than 30 years old; 2. Produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine; 3. Unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion. Therefore no
the evidence of execution and authenticity must be given.
The Supreme Court ruled that the first two requirement are met by Exhibit 4. It
appearing that it was executed in 1817, Exhivit 4 was more than 30 years old when it
was offered in evidence in 1983. It was present in court by the proper custodian who is
an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. On the 3rd element, the CA failed to
dicuss that there was no alterations or suspicion considering the circumstances.
According to Dominador Bartolome, he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession of his
mother, Ursula Cid, when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the document
had a fourth page containing the signature of Maria Gonzales and that all four pages
were sewn together. However, when the document was entrusted to him by his mother
in 1947 as he was then representing the family in litigation concerning the land, the
document's fourth page was already missing. He stated that his mother told him that
the fourth page was lost during the Japanese occupation while they were evacuating
from Davao City.
The SC ruled that the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration however the missing
page has nonethless affected its authenticity. The signatire of the vendor (Maria
Gonzales) in question contains the vital proof of voluntary transimission of rights over
the subject of the sale. Without the signature, the document is incomplete. Hence it
altered the contents of the document.
16
Moreover, there is a circumstance which bothers the Court and makes the genuineness
of the document suspect. If it is really true that the document was executed in 1917,
Ursula Cid would have had it in her possession when she filed her answer in Cadastral
Case No. 53 in 1933. Accordingly, she could have stated therein that she acquired the
portion in question by purchase from Maria Gonzales. But as it turned out, she only
claimed purchase as a mode of acquisition of Lot No. 11165 after her sister-in-law,
Maria J. Bartolome and the other descendants of Doroteo Bartolome sought
intervention in the case and demanded their rightful shares over the property.
All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that Exhibit 4 is an ancient document.
Necessarily, proofs of its due execution and authenticity are vital. Under Section 21 of
Rule 132, the due execution and authenticity of a private writing must be proved either
by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness. The testimony of Dominador
Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and Ursula Cid's sworn statement in 1937 do not fall within the
purview of Section 21. The signature of Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of
Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document if it is proven to be genuine.
But as there can be no such proof arising from the signature of Maria Gonzales in the
deed of sale, the same must be excluded.
16. FRANCISCO M. ALONSO, substituted by his heirs, petitioners, vs. CEBU COUNTRY
CLUB, INC., respondent.
GR 130876 January 21, 2002
TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his legal
heirs, was the only son and sole heir of the late Tomas Alonso and Asuncion Medalle.
Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records showing that his
father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government of
the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance with the Friar Lands Act
(Act No. 1120). The documents showed that the original vendee of the subject lot
assigned his sales certificate to petitioner's father, who completed the required
installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and was consequently issued a
patent. The Director of Lands executed a final deed of sale in favor of petitioner's father.
However, the deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of
technical requirements as required by law.
Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out that the title of Lot
No. 727 had been administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate under a
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc.,
predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. Upon order of the court, the name of the
registered owner in the said TCT was changed to Cebu Country Club, Inc.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for declaration of nullity and
non-existence of deed/title, cancellation of certificates of title and recovery of property
against defendant Cebu Country Club, Inc. which the trial court decided in favor of the
defendant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether Francisco Alonso is owner of the land?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that neither Tomas Alonso nor his son petitioner
Francisco Alonso, or the latter's heirs, are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute.
The most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of Lands issued a sales
patent in the name of Tomas N. Alonso. The sales patent, however, and even the
corresponding deed of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds and no title
was ever issued in the name of the latter. The petitioner was not able to secure a
Torrens title, in fact the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources declined their
application. Approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable
for the validity of the sale. Petitioner Francisco's father did not have any registerable
title to the land in question. Having none, he could not transmit anything to his sole
heir, petitioner Francisco Alonso or the latter's heirs.
Application:
Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in possession of the land since 1931, and had been paying
the real estate taxes thereon based on tax declarations in its name with the title number
indicated thereon. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
strong evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that although tax declarations or
realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind will be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.
17
Conclusion:
Neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the latter's heirs are the
lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club,
Inc. been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of
a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form
and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by
itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
17. Republic v CA & heirs of Democrito Plaza July 12, 1996
Topic: indicia of ownership or possession
FACTS:
1. According to respondent (democrito plaza), the subject property was first
owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared the same in his name under Tax
Declaration for the years 1913, 1917 and 1921;
2. Subsequently, the subject property was successively bought or acquired by
Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To
evidence their respective acquisition of the property in question, Tax
Declaration were presented for the year 1923, 1927, 1934 and another tax dec
that did not indicate a year.
3. After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extra-judicially partitioned the subject
property and declared it in their names under Tax Declaration for the year 1960.
4. On 5 July 1966, they executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the
subject property to respondent for P231,340.00 payable in three (3)
installments, the payment of which was secured by a mortgage on the property.
5. Upon receipt of the full payment, they executed a "Release of Mortgage" on 1
August 1968. After the sale, petitioner-appellee took possession of the subject
property and paid the taxes due thereon for the years 1966 up to 1986, and in
1985 declared it in his name under Tax declarations.
6. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator and
caretaker thereof, respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was
cultivated only for a while. Five (5) years according to Mauricio Plaza, and from
1966, up to 1978 according to Jesus Magcanlas.
7. On 14 November 1986, respondent filed a petition, which was amended on 17
July 1987, for the registration and confirmation of his title over the subject
property alleging among others, that:
1. by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the owner thereof;
2. he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property prior
to, and since 12 June 1945;
3. other than himself, there is no other person occupying, or having any
interest over the property; and,
4. there are no tenants or agricultural lessees thereon.
8. On 13 March 1990, (CENRO-WEST) requested the lower court to furnish it
photocopies of the records of the petition as the property in question was the subject
of a request for a Presidential Proclamation reserving the land in question for Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Site (SIR) of the National Housing Authority.
9. On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of the Republic
of the Philippines withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement and reserve
(the same) for slum improvement and sites and services program under the
administration and disposition of the National Housing Authority in coordination with
the National Capital Region, Department of Environment and Natural Resources subject
to actual survey and private rights if any there be, . . .
Petitioner’s arguments: (republic – lost) note: there are other intervenors in this case
Petitioner argues that he burden rests on the applicant to show by convincing evidence
that he has a registrable title over the property sought to be titled, which the latter
failed to do.
According to petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of which are of recent
vintage, private respondent has not established actual possession of the property in
question in the manner required by law (Section 14, P.D. 1529) and settled
jurisprudence on the matter. Thus, no evidence was adduced that private respondent
cultivated much less, fenced the subject property if only to prove actual possession.
The actual fencing of the property was done only starting 1988 when the actual
occupants were forcibly ejected and driven out from their respective abodes and that
its witnesses namely: Elascio Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette Aguinaldo and
Virginia Franco, who were all actual residents of the questioned area, categorically
testified on this score, summarized as follows:
18
 1. In their long stay in the area, the longest staying occupant being
Domitita who had been in the premises for more than thirty (30) years
nobody ever claimed ownership over the subject property;
2. It was only in 1988 that they learned that private respondent had filed
a petition to have the property titled in his name;
3. Private respondent had not introduced any improvement nor was
there a caretaker assigned by him to look after the property; and,
4. Aside from them, there were about 200 more families residing in the
area but through force, intimidation and illegal demolitions, were driven
out by private respondent from the premises.
Aside from the Republic, there were others who opposed the petition and filed their
opposition.
(a) Arsenio Medina who withdraw his opposition on 29 May 1989;
(b) Emilio, Leopoldo and Abraham, all surnamed Borbon; Heirs of Andres Reyes;
Maximo Lopez; and, Marilou Castanares who prayed that the lower court direct
petitioner-appellee to see to it that their respective property, which adjoins the land in
question, are not included in the petition;
The Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their predecessor-in-interest, Santos de
la Cruz, is the "primitive owner" of the subject lot; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their
tolerance, some other persons have been in open, peaceful, notorious and continuous
possession of the land in question since time immemorial until the present.
The Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its Titulo de Propiedad de
Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree 01-4, with approved plans registered under the Torrens
System in compliance with, and as a consequence of, P.D. 872, it is the owner of the
subject property; and, (2) petitioner-appellee or his predecessors-in-interest have not
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
(d) the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez. They allege, among others, that by reason of
a Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891; Royal Decree No. 01-4, Protocol of 1891;
Decree No. 659, approved Plan of the Bureau of Lands No. 12298 dated 10 September
1963, their predecessor-in-interest is the owner of the subject property.
ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION,
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW, THE EVIDENCE AND EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
RTC AND CA: Approved land registration of respondents
SC RULING: AFFIRMED DECISION OF LOWER COURTS
RULE:
1. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property
and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.
2. At any rate, registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title.
Our land Registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he
actually has. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor
of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The Torrens system
was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, as it
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
APPLICATION:
The evidence on record reveals that: (1) the predecessors-in-interest of petitioner-
appellee have been declaring the property in question in their names in the years 1923,
19
1927, 1934 and 1960; and, (2) in 1966, petitioner-appellee purchased the same from
the Heirs of Gil Alhambra and since then paid the taxes due thereon and declared the
property in his name in 1985.
Considering the dates of the tax declarations and the realty tax payments, they can
hardly be said to be of recent vintage indicating petitioner-appellee's pretended
possession of the property. On the contrary, they are wrong evidence of possession in
the concept of owner by petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest.
Moreover, the realty tax payment receipts show that petitioner-appellee has been very
religious in paying the taxes due on the property. This is indicative of his honest belief
that he is the owner of the subject property. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
petitioner-appellee has proved that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property in the
concept of owner for a period of 30 years since 12 June 1945 and earlier. By operation
of law, the property in question has become private property.
Respondent had introduced some improvements on the subject property from the time
he purchased it. His witnesses testified that petitioner-appellee developed the subject
property into a ricefield and planted it with rice, but only for about five years because
the return on investment was not enough to sustain the continued operation of the
riceland. Though not in the category of permanent structures, the preparation of the
land into a ricefield and planting it with rice are considered "improvements" thereon
ADDITIONAL INFO: (in re: issuance of presidential proclamation withdrawing the
property from alienable lands of public domain)
Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been withdrawn from the alienable
portion of the public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679 entitled
"Reserving for Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Sites and Services of the
National Housing Authority, A Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated in
the Municipality of Las Pinas, Metro Manila," which was issued on January 7, 1991 or
almost 6 months prior to the issuance of the trial court's decision.
Ruling: The Court of Appeals opined that "the issuance of the proclamation did not have
any effect on the subject property as the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or
settlement and reserved the same for slum improvement and sites and services
program, but subject to actual survey and existing private rights. The proclamation did
not prohibit the registration of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the owner
thereof.
18. G.R. No. 137944 FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RUPERTA MENDOZA
LIRIO, petitioners,
vs.vHONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent.
FACTS:
The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad, Binangonan,
Province of Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 26-0027.
Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso
died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of
an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot
was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the land.
Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of
[petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the] ownership of the
land.1âwphi1.nêt
The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now declared in the name of Margarito
Mendoza.
[Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the [respondent] is the
only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza
During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was already a
dispute between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of [petitioners].
Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
ISSUE:
WON The Petitioners has a better right over the property than the Respondents.
RULING:
ADMISSABILITY OF THE AFFIDAVIT
20
Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit was not the best evidence of their
father's ownership of the disputed land, because the "affiant was not placed on the
witness stand." They contend that it was unnecessary to present a witness to establish
the authenticity of the affidavit because it was a declaration against respondent's
interest and was an ancient document. As a declaration against interest, it was an
exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and trustworthy document, it was
admissible in evidence. And because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was a self-
authenticating ancient document.
The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as
authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved first. 8And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead,
insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the
declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same
was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the
existence of any motive to falsify.
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who
testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest
is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. 10 Such declarant
should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent
statement.
The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document
is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. 11 It must on its face
appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how the
purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject affidavit
if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal
schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an
affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a
notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership
of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By
itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
PREFERENCE OF POSSESSION
The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the
Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of
the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she came into
possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
Despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal possession
because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. 12To all intents and
purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal
possessor.13 Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character,
may recover such possession. 14
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the
respondent.1âwphi1 Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the
latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners' father and
brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse
possession of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father
(Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 26425. 15 When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of
the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her
mother continued residing on the lot.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-
1948. 16 Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 17 and paid its realty
taxes beginning 1952. 18 When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found
by the CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being
tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent. 19
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor
because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she
has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners'
father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
POSSESSION OF BETTER RIGHT
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical coupled with
the exclusive and continuous possession [by respondent] of the land since 1985"
21
proved her ownership of the disputed land. The respondent argues that she was legally
presumed to possess the subject land with a just title since she possessed it in the
concept of owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged to show or
prove such title.
The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil
Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. 20 That is, one who is
disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the
means established by law. 21 Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and
possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in
one of the ways provided by law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has
proven acquisitive prescription. 22
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession for ten years.23 Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed
through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten
years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her
mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the
disputed lot for their livelihood. 24
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father
claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner —
public, peaceful, and uninterrupted 25 — had already ripened into ownership.
Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for
the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for
ownership through prescription. 26
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not
acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere
occupation. 27 Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true
owner, 28 occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or
adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably
acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse
possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), 29 this supposed ownership cannot extend
to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land
was established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts
issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has
a claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title
thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and other
interested parties. 30
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. 31 At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or
possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. 32 In the absence of actual
public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership.33 In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel
has no legal basis.1âwphi1.nêt
19. Serina vs Caballero
Topic: Indicia of Ownership or Possession
Facts: Dr. Seriña and his wife filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of
possession, and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against respondents Caballero and his tenants. When Dr. Serina died, he was
substituted by his four children (The petitioners in this case).
Petitioners’ Arguments:
The petitioners alleged that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual and
constructive possession for 35 years of a certain parcel of land.
That sometime in 1982, they discovered that Caballero was claiming over the land and
offering it for sale or mortgage to third parties and there were people occupying the
land as tenants and caretakers.
Petitioners further claim that their father bought the land. They presented a Deed of
Absolute Sale showing that Dr. Serina bought 5 ha of ricefield. Dr. Serina was issued Tax
Declaration allegedly for the said property. They were issued for Cadastral Lot No 3533
and covered a 2.5- hectare ricefield. They also averred that they regularly paid taxes
thereon since 1947 up to present.
22
 Second. Petitioners state that the property they are claiming has an area of 2.5
Respondent’s arguments: ha. On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides that the subject property
Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner and had been in actual physical has an area of 5 ha.
possession of the disputed land since time immemorial and that it was originally owned Third. The complaint alleged that the property is located in “Mantadiao, Opol,
by his grandfather. Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for tax purposes even Misamis Oriental” while the Deed of Sale shows that the property
before the war. Tax declaration was issued in lieu of the records that were destroyed purchased is located in “Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan Or. Misamis.”
during the war. Fourth. The land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2442 is different from that
Caballero’s sister testified that when their grandfather died, the land was divided covered by Tax Declaration 4029 because the boundary owners as indicated
among his three children. One of the children is Caballero’s father. in Tax declaration No 4029 differ from that covered by Tax declaration No
4029.
Issues: Fifth: Tax Declaration No. 2442 covers an area of 119,490 square meters while
Tax Declaration No. 4029 covers only 25,000 square meters or 2.5 hectares.
1. Whether the petitioners were able to establish the identity of the land being
(Issue #2) The claim of acquisitive prescription is untenable.
claimed by them; and
Since the property has not been clearly identified by the petitioners, their claim of
2. Whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor of the
acquisitive prescription cannot be considered. Insufficient identification of the portion
petitioners.
of land claimed in absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as a
Rule: means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.
(Issue #1)The court find no reason to reverse the findings of the CA. The CA was correct Assuming, however, that the disputed land has been clearly identified, acquisitive
in concluding that the petitioners failed to establish that the parcel of land in the prescription will still not lie in favor of the petitioners because they were not able to
possession of the respondents is the same as that subject of their complaint. prove that they have been in possession of the property for the requisite number of
years. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of
The land subject of the complaint has boundaries different from the land in the property in the concept of an owner for ten years, in case the possession is in good
possession of the respondents. The land described in the complaint appears to faith and with just title.
be different from the land described in the Deed of Sale which the petitioners Aside from the testimony of Leonardo Vacalares that certain tenants of the petitioners
invoke as the basis of their ownership. cultivated the land for a total of seven years, the petitioners did not present any other
First. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that the boundaries of their property evidence to show that they have been in actual possession of the property for at least
are as follows: ten years.
North - Alejo Seriña The petitioners' argument that the payment of taxes on the property since May 31,
South - T. Sabornido 1948 constitutes proof of their possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is
East - A. Seriña & T. Sabornido untenable. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
West - F. Caballero most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership of the property for which
On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides that the property sold to them has the taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the
following boundaries: declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
North - Raymundo Seriña
South - Obdullo Caballero
East - Teofilo Saburnido
West - Obdullo Caballero

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20. LAURENCIO C. RAMEL, SOCORRO B. RAMEL and RENE LEMAR B. RAMEL,
petitioners, vs. DANIEL AQUINO and GUADALUPE ABALAHIN, respondents.
BENJAMIN AQUINO and VIRGINIA AQUINO, respondents-Intervenors.
G.R. No. 133208 July 31, 2006
FACTS: Daniel Aquino is a registered owner of a land which he mortgaged to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As the property was in danger of being
foreclosed, respondents sold to petitioners a portion of the land with the agreement
that petitioners would assume the remaining mortgage obligation of respondents with
the DBP and the balance shall be paid to respondents.
Petitioners were allowed by respondents to take possession of the land. Subsequently,
petitioners applied for a re-structuring of the mortgage loan win the DBP for a period
of ten years. Petitioners then went to DBP to pay for the amortization but they found
out that respondents had paid the bank and the latter told the former that they would
return whatever the petitioners paid for the land and threatened to withdraw the title
from the bank.
Petitioners filed with the trial court for Specific Performance with Preliminary
Injunction and Damages and three days later, respondents withdrew the amount which
they had paid to the bank. During the pendency of the case, petitioners were able to
fully settle the loan with the DBP.
The trial court rendered a decision assailed by herein petitioners on the ground, among
others, that the offsetting the claim of improvements by petitioners and the claim of
the fruits derived from the land by respondents is erroneous citing Articles 546 and 547
of the Civil Code.
Petitioners argue:
that as possessors in good faith and in the concept of an owner,
they are entitled to the fruits received before possession was legally interrupted and
they must be reimbursed for their expenses or for the increase in the value the subject
property may have acquired by reason thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal ground to order the offsetting of the claim of
improvements by petitioners to the claim of fruits derived from the land by
respondents
RULING: YES. The records show that both parties failed to prove their claims through
any receipt or document. Despite the lack of proof, the trial court ordered that
whatever improvements spent on the land shall be offset from the fruits derived
therefrom.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were able to improve the land after possession was
given to them. No receipts were shown to guide the court as to how much were the
costs of the improvements. Likewise the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were
able to cultivate the land and harvest palay although their testimonies to this effect are
based on their presumptions and calculations not on actual harvest such that the court
also cannot make determination of the real fruits derived from the land.
This being so, the court shall just offset the claim of improvements to the claim of
fruits derived from the land and then place the parties in their previous positions
before the agreement. Whatever improvements spent on the land shall be
compensated from the fruits derived therefrom
21. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE CITY OF DAGUPAN, respondents. [G.R. No. L-54526.
August 25, 1986.]
Facts:
The City of Dagupan (CITY) filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS), for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan
Waterworks System.
MWSS argument:
NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the
ownership, possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the
Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had
incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00.
RTC:
Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis of a
stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and
hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it.
CA: Affirmed the RTC
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*court overlooked issues on procedural defect and ruled on the main issue raised on
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MWSS has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced
by NAWASA to the Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that
NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith?
*wala sa full text gi explain na why sya na bad faith and even unsa ang improvements
HELD: No.
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds, plants or
sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without
right to indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Moreover, under Article 546 of
said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the
right of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in
good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the
principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the
option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to
remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure,
provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer
to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession
(Article 549).
Cases discussed in the case:
Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap
This case does not support the stand of the petitioner it was ruled that "if the defendant
constructed a new building, as he alleges, he cannot recover its value because the
construction was done after the ling of the action for annulment, thus rendering him a
builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right of reimbursement." The court
allowed fixtures and equipment to be removed because they were outside the cope of
the judgment and may be retained by him.
Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals
The case does not establish a precedent since only four members concurred that the
respondents were possessors in bad faith and two members ruled that they were in
good faith. The equitable presentation present in said case are not present in the case
at bar.
22.PELICULA SABIDO and MAXIMO RANCES, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DOMINADOR STA.
ANA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 73418. September 20, 1988.]
FACTS:
This case originated from an action for quieting of title which was filed by the
spouses Victor Dasal and Maria Pecunio against petitioners, Maximo Rances and
Pelicula Sabido on the question of ownership over two parcels of land otherwise known
as Lots "B" and "D".
On October 7, 1969, the trial court presided by Judge Delfin Sunga declared the
petitioners as owners of Lots "B" and "D". The decision became final. However, when
the decision was being carried out to put the petitioners in possession of Lot "B", the
Provincial Sheriff found three (3) persons occupying portions of Lot "B". One of them
was private respondent Dominador Sta. Ana.
The petitioners filed a motion to require the private respondent to show cause why
he should not be ejected from the portion of Lot "B". In his answer, Sta. Ana claimed
ownership by purchase from one, Prudencio Lagarto, of a bigger area of which Lot "B"
is a part. He stated that the two other persons occupying the disputed portion are his
tenants.
Subsequently, an order of demolition was issued by the trial court against the
private respondent. This order was challenged by the private respondent and upon his
filing of certiorari proceedings, the Court on November 26, 1973, set aside the order of
the trial court and remanded the case.
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On December 12, 1974, after conducting an ocular inspection and hearing, Judge
Sunga issued an order for the private respondent to vacate Lot "B" upon finding that
there is no proof that what the respondent allegedly purchased from Lagarto covers a
portion of Lot "B" but on the contrary, the deed of sale and tax declaration show that
what was sold to the respondent was bounded on the south by Tigman river and
therefore, the respondent's ownership could not have extended to Lot "B" which was
separated by Tigman river and mangrove swamps from the portion he purchased.
On May 16, 1983, Judge Palma issued a resolution finding that there was privity
between the private respondent and the spouses Victor Dasal and Maria Pecunio as to
the ownership of Lot "C" and as to the possession over the western portion of the
private road and the disputed Lot "B"; and that Lot "B" and the private road are not
included in the land purchased by the respondent from Lagarto.
According to the trial court, the private respondent was in the company of Dasal
(from whom he was renting Lot "C" and who was also the brother-in-law of Lagarto)
and was present when Commissioner Tubianosa inspected the land in question in 1953
supporting the claim that the respondent knew that the land was already in dispute
between Dasal and the petitioners; and if the respondent really believed that he owns
the entire Lot "B" and the private road, he should have raised his claim of ownership
when Tubianosa inspected the land. The respondent also failed to include the land in
dispute in the survey of his purchased lot with the flimsy excuse that the surveyor failed
to return to finish the survey and include the disputed land.
ISSUES:
WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the private respondent
the option of exercising the alternative choice of staying in the disputed land;
WON the demolition of the private respondent's construction on Lot "B" and on the
private road is a logical consequence of the finding that he was privy to the losing
parties who were also the adversaries of the petitioners in the original case.
RULING:
We agree.
When this Court ordered the remand of the case between the petitioners and the
private respondent in our decision of November 26, 1973 (see Sta. Ana v. Sunga, supra),
it was precisely to determine whether herein respondent was privy to the spouses
Dasals as to make the decision against the latter and in favor of the petitioners over Lot
"B" binding upon him.
And this fact was clearly pointed out by Judge Palma in her resolution of May 16, 1983
stating that if there is privity between the private respondent and the spouses Dasals,
then the former is bound by the final decision in CC No. R-396 (2040) which is the case
between the Dasals and the petitioners.
However, an apparent confusion was brought about by the dispositive portion of the
aforementioned resolution when it recommended to this Court either to order the
respondent to remove all his constructions over Lot "B" or to require said respondent
to pay the petitioners the value of the disputed area which was already enclosed by a
wall constructed by the respondent.
This, nevertheless, was rectified when we issued the series of resolutions denying the
respondent's petition and motions for reconsideration before this Court wherein we
stated that the resolution of May 16, 1983 was in accord, among others, with the order
of December 12, 1974 "which ordered the petitioner (private respondent) to vacate the
premises (which is presumably final)."
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Hence, it is clear that the private respondent has to remove all his constructions over
Lot "B" and vacate the premises. This is his only option. Being adjudged in privy with
the spouses Dasals, he cannot avail himself of the rights granted to a builder in good
faith. He, therefore, must remove all his useful improvements over Lot "B" at his own
expense and if the same have already been removed, he cannot be entitled to the right
of retention or to any reimbursement.
Thus, in the case of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of
Appeals, (143 SCRA 623, 629), we ruled:
"Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that 'he who builds, plants or
sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without
right to indemnity.' As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity (Santos v. Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969,
26 SCRA 703).
"Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be
refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under
Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if
this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers
the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The
right given a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies only to
improvement for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury
thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value
they have at the time he enters into possession (Article 549, Id.)."
We, therefore, find that the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that
the private respondent is entitled to exercise the option to pay the value of the disputed
area of Lot "B" and to reimbursement for the value of the demolished portion of his
building.
23. Edu, petitioner vs. Gomez, defendant.
G.R. No. L-33397. June 22, 1984.
TOPIC: Possession over Movables
FACTS:
A 1968 model Volkswagen, allegedly owned by Lt. Walter A. Bala, was stolen on June
29, 1970 from the residence of Lt. Bala. Petitioners Eduardo Domingo, Carlos Rodriguez,
and Patricio Yambao, agents of Anti-Carnapping Unit (ANCAR) of the Philippine
Constabulary recognized subject car in the possession of herein private respondent
Lucila Abello and immediately seized and impounded the car as stolen property.
Respondent Lucila Abello led a complaint for replevin with damages in respondent
court, impleading herein petitioners, praying for judgment, among others, to order the
sheriff or other proper officer of the court to take the said property (motor vehicle) into
his custody and to dispose of it in accordance with law.
a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Edu – Lost)
Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation, seized the car pursuant to
Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle for
delinquent registration aside from his implicit power deducible from Sec. 4(5), Sec. 5
and 31 of said Code, "to seize motor vehicles fraudulently or otherwise not properly
registered."
Submits that the car in question legally belongs to Lt. Walter A. Bala under whose name
it is originally registered at Angeles City Land Transportation Commission Agency; that
it was stolen from him and, upon receipt by the Land Transportation Commissioner of
the report on the theft case and that the car upon being recognized by the agents of
the ANCAR in the possession of private respondent Lucila Abello, said agents seized the
car and impounded it as stolen vehicle.
b) Respondent’s Argument’s (Lucilla Abello – WON)
She purchased the vehicle from a certain Marcelino Guansing. She has been in
possession thereof since then until February 3, 1971 when the car was seized from her
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by the petitioners who acted in the belief that it is the car which was originally
registered in the name of Lt. Walter A. Bala and from whom it was allegedly stolen
sometime in June 1970.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the vehicle was proper.
FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court:
Respondent judge of the then Court of First Instance of Manila issued the order for the
seizure of the personal property. With respect to the replevin led by private respondent
Lucila Abello, respondent Court of First Instance Judge found that the car in question
was acquired by Lucila Abello by purchase for P9,000 from its registered owner,
Marcelino Guansing
RULING: (of the Supreme Court)
There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the purchaser in good
faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to be respected and protected in
his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules
otherwise. In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot
be compelled to surrender possession nor to be required to institute an action for
the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor.
The ling of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through
estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona de possessor does not
warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor.
Finally, the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize and impound
the car under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which reads:
"Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. — Any balance of fees for registration, re-
registration or delinquent registration of a motor vehicle, remaining unpaid and all
nes imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall constitute a rst lien upon the motor
vehicle concerned." is untenable. It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of
Republic Act 4136 that the Commissioner's right to seize and impound subject
property is only good for the proper enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The
Land Transportation Commission may issue a warrant of constructive or actual
distraint against motor vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-
registration or delinquent registration of vehicles.
Application:
The acquirer or purchaser in good faith of a chattel or movable property is entitled to
be respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until
a competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor
in good faith can not be compelled to surrender possession nor to be required to
institute an action for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is
issued in his favor. The filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally
obtained through estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona de possessor
does not warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the
possessor.
24. EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner, vs. THE SPOUSES LEONOR
and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style of "SANTOS
BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GR 80298 April 26, 1990
Topic: Possession Over Movables
FACTS: A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone
with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the
corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a
personal check covering the purchase price. On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the
books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership
from the invoice he showed her, paid him.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even
before clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he
had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ.
Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the
Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. EDCA then
went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz. Investigation disclosed his real
name as Tomas de la Peña.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
RULING: Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of
the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that
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such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to
criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above
noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who
can in turn transfer it to another.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not
against the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently
caused all this trouble.
In the case, Sta. Ana being a possessor in bad faith has no option but to vacate the lot.

ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is

equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the
same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain
its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not
impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. It bears repeating
that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books
belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed
her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was
less than cautious — in fact, too trusting — in dealing with the impostor. Although it
had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered
(by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify
his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of
this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the
printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting
ownership in the buyer.

Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself
that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the
title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these
being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before
deciding to buy them.

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