CASE DIGESTS

TORTS AND DAMAGE

CHAPTER 8 – HUMAN RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL TORTS

1. G.R. No. L-8883 July 14, 1959

ALFREDO M. VELAYO, ETC., plaintiff,

vs.
SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, LTD., defendant-appellee.
ALFONSO Z. SYCIP, ET. AL., intervenors-appellants.

Velayo vs. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands

100 Phil. 186
PAGE 85
Facts:
Herein defendant Shell Company of the Philippine Islands is the official
supplier of gasoline of Commercial Airlines, Inc. (CALI). The latter has an existing
debt of P170,162.58 to the former. In 1948, the management of CALI called a
meeting of all its major creditors and announced that it was in a state of
insolvency and will stop its operations. The said creditors all agreed to proceed
with a pro-rata division of the assets of CALI. The defendant then assigned its
credit to the Shell Oil Company in the United States. The latter then filed an
action in a California court for the collection of the credit and for a writ of
attachment, which was granted, of a C-54 plane belonging to CALI. As a result of
the defendant’s action, CALI filed in the Philippines a petition for voluntary
insolvency. During the proceedings of the case, the creditors of CALI
unanimously elected herein plaintiff Alfredo Velayo as assignee. The latter then
filed an action for recovery of damages against the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant acted in bad faith and is therefore liable for
damages?
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. The defendant clearly acted in
bad faith when it schemed and effected the attachment of the C-54 plane of its
debtor CALI by assigning its credit to its sister company in the United States. It
took advantage of its knowledge that insolvency proceedings would most
probably be instituted by CALI if its creditors fail to come up with an
understanding as to the manner of distribution of the assets. According to Article
21 of the New Civil Code, “Any person who willfully causes loss and injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage”. A moral wrong or injury, even if it
does not constitute a violation of a statute or law, should be compensated by
damages. Therefore, the defendant is liable to pay damages in an amount
double the value of the attached aircraft.
2. PAGE 115
G.R. No. L-51832 April 26, 1989
RAFAEL PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE,
JUDGE, CFI CAPIZ, BRANCH II and BIENVENIDO BACALOCOS,
respondents.
FACTS: On 16 May 1976 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while a benefit
dance was on-going in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta,
petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public
auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. Private respondent
Bienvenido Bacalocos who is the President of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a
state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his
companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand
which started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and
asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before petitioner could respond,
private respondent, without provocation, hit petitioner's face with his
bloodied hand. As a consequence, a commotion ensued and private respondent
was brought by the policemen to the municipal building.
As a result of the incident, a criminal complaint for Slander by Deed was
flied by petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court of Pilar, Capiz, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2228, but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, a complaint
for damages was filed by petitioner with the court.
The court ruled in favor of herein petitioner, as complainant, holding
private respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the
physical suffering, moral shock and social humiliation caused by private
respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public.
Petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment, alleging that the
decision had become final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof by private respondent, without any motion for reconsideration or
appeal having been filed. However, said motion was denied by the court a quo on
the ground that there was a pending motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent.
Petitioner further argues that respondent's admission that he slapped
herein petitioner in public causing him physical suffering and social humiliation,
entitles the latter to moral damages. Actual and compensatory damages need not
be proven before an award of moral damages can be granted, so petitioner
contends.
Petitioner filed the petition at bar contending that no copy of the Motion for
consideration was served upon petitioner and no proof of service as well as
notice of hearing were attached to said motion when filed with the court. Thus,
the motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the running of the period to
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of moral damages to petitioner is without basis
for lack of proof of bad faith on the part of private respondent.
HELD:
In the case at bar, a copy of the motion for reconsideration was served
upon petitioner although service was effected through ordinary mail and not by
registered mail as required by the rules. But, petitioner was duly given the full
opportunity to be heard and to argue his case when the court a quo required him to file
a reply or opposition to the motion for reconsideration and subsequently
set the motion for oral argument.
Meritorious. There is no question that moral damages may be recovered
in cases where a defendant's wrongful act or omission has caused the
complainant physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in
slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not
tenable. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud
between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private
respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several
persons.
The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to
morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral
shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Private respondent has to take
full responsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of what he had
done to petitioner because of drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does not
relieve him of his liability to the latter.
The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the
trial court, does not adversely affect petitioner's right to recover moral damages.
In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages
may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction
for the public good. Exemplary damages are required by public policy to
suppress the wanton acts of the offender. They are an antidote so that the poison
of wickedness may not run through the body politic. The amount of exemplary
damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either
moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case may be, although such
award cannot be recovered as a matter of right.
Wherefore, the petition is granted and the order appealed from is
reversed.
3. from PAGE 81 of PDF

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS

219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the RTC on the
ground of breach of promise to marry against petitioner. Private respondent
alleged that petitioner courted and proposed to marry her. Because of such
promise, petitioner made private respondent surrender her virginity to him and to
live with him. They agreed to get married after the end of the school semester.
Petitioner already secured the approval of private respondent’s parents to the
marriage. The parents of private respondent, by reason of petitioner’s promise to
marry their daughter, made some preparations for the wedding including giving of
invitations to friends and relatives. However, before the wedding and during their
cohabitation, petitioner’s attitude towards private respondent started to change.
He maltreated and threatened her. Petitioner, despite his promise, did not marry
private respondent because according to him he was already married to other
woman.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondent which was affirmed by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the basis of Article 21 of the New Civil Code
HELD:
Yes
RATIO:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. However, where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because
of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
Submitted by: Gatioan, Edison
4.

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of
Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for
damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby
of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back.
According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse
for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart
agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at
the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud
voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party
and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart
ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister,
Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr.
Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart
since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked
Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be
intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the
plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly
kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay
the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing
everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave
the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who
did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in
requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the
hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters.
Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code.
5. Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino G.R.No. L-48250, December 28, 1979
Facts:
Jose J. Espino a civil engineer and an executive at Proctor and Gamble was shopping at South
Supermarket in Makati on the morning of August 22, 1970. He had picked up a “rat tail” file from
one of the shelves, placed it in his shirt pocket, with a good part of it exposed, and forgot to pay
for it when he got to the cashier. As he and his wife and daughters were leaving the supermarket
with their shopping bags, a security guard of the store approached Espino and informed him that
he had an item in his pocket which he did not pay for. Espino immediately apologised and started
to walk towards the cashier to pay for the item. He was then stopped by the guard and asked to
go to the back of the supermarket to write an incident report as this was supposedly the
procedure of the establishment.
Espino stated on the report that he put the item in his pocket as he was talking with his helper
while in the store and that he merely forgot to present it to the cashier. Espino was then lead
into the Supermarket and the report was given to Nelia Santos-Fandino who was seated at a desk
beside the first checkout counter. Nelia after reading the report remarked that this was another
case of theft, to which Espino explained that he merely forgot the “”rat tail” in his pocket and
that he had the intention to pay for it. Neilia then replied to the effect that that was the same
thing all shoplifters say when they are caught. This was done while people were lining up and
paying for the items they shopped. Espino was then made to pay a fine of 5 pesos, which Nelia
reasoned was a prize for the guard who apprehended him. Espino then paid the fine and was
made to line up at the cashier to pay for the item. As he waited in line he was stared at and
people were talking about him. Extremely humiliated by the incident he immediately left the
premises after paying. Espino filed a complaint on October 8, 1970 founded on article 21 in
relation to article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prayed for damages. The CFI of Pasig, Rizal
dismissed the complaint; but the Court of Appeals reversed such. Espino was granted moral
damages at P 75,000, exemplary damages of P 25,000 Pesos, attorney’s fees at P 5,000 and the
return of the P 5 fine. Grand Union Supermarket now appeals said decision citing that Espino was
guilty of theft and that their action of apprehending and fining him was merely an exercise of
their right to protect their property as enunciated in article 429 of the New Civil Code. They also
stated that there was probable cause for his apprehension, that it was not done with malice or
bad faith and the proximate cause for such was Espino’s own actions. They also argued that even
if damages were in order, the amounts awarded were unconscionable.

Issue: Whether the act of apprehending Espino in such a manner would render the
supermarket liable?
Held: Yes, such actions do render the supermarket liable. The court believes Espino committed
an honest mistake when he forgot to pay for his item. This was proven by the fact that he put it
in his pocket while he was preoccupied and that he apologised and immediately moved to pay
for such at the instance the guard alerted him. The fact that he was an engineer, an executive
of Proctor and Gamble, an esteemed member of society and a regular customer of the
supermarket also belies motive to steal an item of an insignificant amount, which he was more
than capable of paying for. Further, he was also in the company of his family, a deterrent from
criminal activity.
6.
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. vs. QUIÑONES
G.R. No. 175822 (October 23, 2013)
A. Legal Facts

Respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones, a ticketing agent of Cebu Pacific Air, bought a pair of black jeans
worth P2,098.00 from Guess USA Boutique. While she was on her way to Mercury Drug Store, a Guess
employee approached her and said that she failed to pay for the black jeans. Nevertheless, she presented
an official receipt and suggested that they should talk about the matter in the Cebu Pacific Office located
within the mall. While they were in the office, the Guess employees allegedly humiliated her in front of the
clients of Cebu Pacific, repeatedly demanded payment and even searched the respondent’s wallet to check
how much money she had. Another argument ensued and after that, respondent went home. The Guess
employees submitted two letters to the Director of Cebu Pacific narrating the incident but the said letters
were not received.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners, California Clothing, Inc., Excelsis
Villagonzalo, Imelda Hawayon and Michelle S. Ybañez, alleging that due to the incident, she suffered
physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation,
moral shock and humiliation. She demanded payment for moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioners stated that they approached the respondent to clarify whether or not payment was made
and that they approached and talked to the respondent in a gentle and polite manner. They sought payment
for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses as counterclaim.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim stating that the petitioners
acted in good faith and the respondent was the one who put herself in that situation by inviting the Guess
employees to the Cebu Pacific Office to discuss about the issue of payment. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court decision stating that there was preponderance of evidence
showing the petitioners acted in bad faith but, Hawayon and Villagonzalo were absolved from liability due
to good faith. Since petitioners acted in bad faith, respondent was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
B. Legal Issue

Whether or not petitioners acted in bad faith which resulted to the Court of Appeals awarding moral
damages and attorney’s fees to respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones.
C. Ruling

Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and the award for moral damages and attorney’s fees to
respondent was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The principle of abuse
of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code is present in the case. Respondent complained when petitioners
embarrassed her and insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans despite the issuance of an official
receipt in her favor.
The court cited the case of Carpio vs. Valmonte in which the elements of abuse of rights were
enumerated. “The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.” The elements stated are
complete in the present case. First, petitioners continued to insist that there was no payment made when
respondent already presented the black jeans with the original receipt. Second, they accused the
respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally stole it and quickly left
the shop. Third, the letters sent to the respondent’s employer was not only intended to ask for assistance
in collection of the payment but also to ruin the respondent’s reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus, it must be in accordance with the purpose of
its establishment and not abused.
Respondent was awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
7.
G.R. Nos. L-51171-72 June 4, 1990

MARIA G. FORD, Substituted by PATRICK G. FORD, petitioner,**

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SULPICIA FABRIGAR, respondents.

G.R. No. L-51273 June 4, 1990

VICENTE F. UY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SULPICIA FABRIGAR, respondents.

Quiason, Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for petitioner in 51171-72.

Charlito F. Fantilanan for petitioner in 51273.

Ricardo C. Castro, Jr. and Teodulfo L.C. Castro for private respondents.

MARIA FORD VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: There are two sides in the incident of the case. First is Sulpicia
Fabrigar’s, she claims that on our about July 27, 1973 at around 3:00 to
3:30 P.M., being a head teacher at a public school of Barrio Sta. Dumalag,
Capiz by reason of the deputization of the of all public school teachers to
assist the COMELEC in the conduct of national referendum, was humiliated
by Barrio Captain Vicente Uy because she was telling Vicente Uy’s son,
Elmo Uy, in writing remarks on the voting sheets. She claims that she was
humiliated publicly by Vicente Uy and that she would be reported to Maria
Ford, owner of a sugar central. She further claims that Maria ford also
humiliated her by slapping her in the face publicly.

However, Vicente Uy presented his version that at around 2:00 PM, upon
knowledge that his son was being embarrassed by Sulpicia Fabrigar,
approached the latter talked calmly but the Fabrigar refused to do so and
would most likely hit Elmo Uy. Vicente Uy referred the matter to Maria Ford
and that the latter tried to approach Fabrigar but to no avail. Maria Ford
slapped Fabrigar claiming that she was already hysterical in order for her to
calm down. Trial Court’s decision: Statements of Vicente Uy which did not
call for any comment from Sulpicia Fabrigar, her silence should be deemed
to be an admission of their truth and truth can not hurt or insult. Hence, he
complaint filed by Sulpicia Fabrigar is dismissed.
Court of Appeals decision: The facts obtaining in this case indicate that
appellee Ford in performing the act of slapping the school teacher in front
of the people was motivated by personal animosity we believe that Maria
Ford has by deed slandered plaintiff Sulpicia Fabrigar which would entitle
the latter to damages. There can be no circumstance more humiliating for a
headteacher of a barrio school than to be seen by the barrio folks being
slapped in her face. Hence, the court ordered that Vicente Uy and Maria
Ford be held accountable for the damage done to Sulpicia Fabrigar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Maria Ford is liable for damages by slapping Sulpicia
Fabrigar?

HELD:
We are satisfied with private respondent's explanation. Her initiative in
promptly instituting her complaint clearly manifests her honest intention to
vindicate the wrong committed against her. She explained that shortly after
the incident between her and petitioner Uy, petitioner Ford came and
slapped her. Thus, when the report was made by private respondent to the
police authorities of Dumalag Capiz, the immediate hurt and humiliation
being felt by her was not only the slander committed by petitioner Uy but,
primarily and foremost, the slapping by petitioner Ford. Hence, the police
report of private respondent which focused on her being slapped by
petitioner Ford, although inadvertently omitting the incident with petitioner
Uy in view of her emotional state then, should not be construed to mean that private
respondent was not slandered by petitioner Uy.
8.

G.R. No. 107019 March 20, 1997

FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, GREGORIO A. ARIZALA, CESAR M. SOLIS and

FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GEORGE C. MACLI-ING, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and HOMOBONO ADAZA, respondents.

128. DRILON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In a letter-complaint to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon dated
March 20, 1990, General Renato de Villa, who was then the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, requested the Department of Justice to order the
investigation of several individuals named therein, including herein private
respondent Homobono Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed
December 1989 coup d’etat. Gen. de Villa’s letter-complaint with its annexes was
referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors.
Petitioner then Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe, the Team Leader,
finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry, issued a subpoena to the individuals
named in the letter-complaint, Adaza included, and assigned the case for
preliminary investigation to a panel of investigators composed of prosecutors
George Arizala, as Chairman, and Ferdinand Abesamis and Cesar Solis as members.
The panel then found that there is probable cause to hold herein respondents for
trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER hence
recommended the filing of the corresponding information against them in court.
Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him, private
respondent Adaza filed a complaint for damages, ]before Branch 100 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In his complaint, Adaza charged petitioners
with engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing
against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder
when petitioners, according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of
such crime in the statute books. The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Adaza’s
complaint on the ground that said complaint states no actionable wrong
constituting a valid cause of action against petitioners but was denied.

On appeal, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and ordered
respondent Judge to proceed with the trial of Civil Case. Hence, this petition, dated
October 9, 1992, pleading this Court to exercise its power of review under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may collect damages arising from the alleged
malicious prosecution of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder to him.

RULING: The term malicious prosecution has been defined in various ways. In
American jurisdiction, it is defined as: “One begun in malice without probable cause
to believe the charges can be sustained (Eustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706,83
P. 2d. 525). Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable
cause, and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an
action on the case lies, called the action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley,
29 S.E. 459, 102 Ga. 264; Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119 Wis. 625).” In Philippine
jurisdiction, it has been defined as: “An action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of
the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose
of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956).” The
statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in
the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages
particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To constitute
malicious prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Thus, in order for
a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3) elements:
(1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself
the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister
motive. All these requisites must concur.
9.
[G.R. No. 105819. March 15, 1996.]

MARILYN L. BERNARDO, Petitioner, v. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION), HON. JOSE G. DE VERA, in his capacity as
Labor Arbiter, UNIVET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, INC., and CONRADO S.
BAYLON, Respondents.
127. MARILYN L. BERNARDO vs. NLRC

FACTS:
Petitioner Marilyn Bernardo was employed at the Univet Agricultural
Products, Inc., a division of United Laboratories. On January 1989, the
Manufacturing Department of the Univet Agricultural asked for two filing
cabinets. Accordingly, petitioner prepared the Capital Appropriations
Request (CAR) for the purchase of two filing cabinets. The request was
signed by Dr. Salvador P. Cajilog, department head, and later approved by
five other officers of Univet Agricultural. Before the CAR was transmitted to
the purchasing department for the procurement of the office equipment, it
was discovered that petitioner had included in the order the acquisition of
one executive swivel chair. On February 18, 1989, a memorandum was
issued to petitioner, requiring her to explain within 48 hours why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her. Petitioner admitted making
the insertion in the Capital Appropriations Request but explained that she
had done so in good faith. Apparently, petitioner’s explanation was
considered not satisfactory, because on March 18, 1989, she was given
notice of the termination of her employment. Petitioner wrote Dr. Delfin
Samson, president of United Laboratories, Inc., asking for a “fair
investigation.” Getting no favorable response, she filed on April 7, 1989 a
complaint for illegal dismissal against Univet Agricultural Products, Inc.
Petitioner alleged that she made the intercalation in the CAR in good faith,
without any intention of defrauding the company, because she intended the
chair for the manager of her department. She claimed that what she did was
made with the knowledge of Dr. Cajilog. Petitioner alleged that she was
dismissed because she had exposed the involvement of two company
officers, Conrado Baylon and Dr. Benedicto Santiago, in the rival company,
Biomass Corp. of the Philippines. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found
petitioner guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct, warranting dismissal
from the service. On appeal the NLRC, while finding petitioner liable to
disciplinary action, thought that the penalty imposed by the company was too
severe. Accordingly, it set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered
the petitioner reinstated and paid backwages.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied on May 20,
1992. Hence, this petition alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion. Hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Moral damages and the

payment of attorney’s fees under Art. 2208.

RULING: Petitioner’s claim for moral damages is without merit. Not only was
she guilty of misconduct, there is no showing that the company acted in bad
faith or fraud or in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, in dismissing petitioner. Univet Agricultural was acting in the
legitimate protection of its interest in seeing to it that its employees were
performing their jobs with honesty, integrity and fidelity. For the same reason
there is no basis for an award of attorney’s fees. Under Art. 2208(2) of the
Civil Code, the award of such fees is to be justified if the claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest by reason of an unjustified act of the party against whom it is sought.

10.

120. ARTURO P. VALENZUELA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Arturo P. Valenzuela (Valenzuela) is a General Agent of private respondent Philippine American
General Insurance Company, Inc. (Philamgen) since 1965. As such, he was authorized to solicit
and sell in behalf of Philamgen all kinds of non-life insurance, and in consideration of services
rendered was entitled to receive the full agent's commission of 32.5% from Philamgen under the
scheduled commission rates. From 1973 to 1975, Valenzuela solicited marine insurance from one
of his clients, the Delta Motors, Inc. (Division of Electronics Airconditioning and Refrigeration) in
the amount of P4.4 Million from which he was entitled to a commission of 32%. However,
Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6 Million from the P4.4
Million insurance coverage of the Delta Motors. During the period 1976 to 1978, premium
payments amounting to P1,946,886.00 were paid directly to Philamgen and Valenzuela's
commission to which he is entitled amounted to P632,737.00. In 1977, Philamgen started to
become interested in and expressed its intent to share in the commission due Valenzuela on a
fifty-fifty basis. Valenzuela refused. On February 8, 1978 Philamgen and its President, Bienvenido
M. Aragon insisted on the sharing of the commission with Valenzuela. Because of the refusal of
Valenzuela, Philamgen and its officers, namely: Bienvenido Aragon, Carlos Catolico and Robert E.
Parnell took drastic action against Valenzuela. They: (a) reversed the commission due him by not
crediting in his account the commission earned from the Delta Motors, Inc. insurance \ (b) placed
agency transactions on a cash and carry basis; (c) threatened the cancellation of policies issued
by his agency ; and (d) started to leak out news that Valenzuela has a substantial account with
Philamgen. All of these acts resulted in the decline of his business as insurance agent Then on
December 27, 1978, Philamgen terminated the General Agency Agreement of Valenzuela. After
due proceedings, the trial court found that since defendants are not justified in the termination
of Arturo P. Valenzuela as one of their General Agents, defendants shall be liable for the resulting
damage and loss of business of Arturo P. Valenzuela. On January 29, 1988, respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision in the appealed case.

ISSUES: Whether or not Philamgen and/or its officers can be held liable for damages due to the
termination of the General Agency Agreement it entered into with the petitioners.

RULING: Rescinding from the foregoing, and considering that the private respondents terminated
Valenzuela with evident mala fide it necessarily follows that the former are liable in damages.
Respondent Philamgen has been appropriating for itself all these years the gross billings and
income that it unceremoniously took away from the petitioners. The preponderance of the
authorities sustain the preposition that a principal can be held liable for damages in cases of
unjust termination of agency. In Danon v. Brimo, 42 Phil. 133 [1921]), this Court ruled that where
no time for the continuance of the contract is fixed by its terms, either party is at liberty to
terminate it at will, subject only to the ordinary requirements of good faith. The right of the
principal to terminate his authority is absolute and unrestricted, except only that he may not do
so in bad faith. The trial court in its decision awarded to Valenzuela the amount of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000,00) per month as compensatory damages from June 1980 until its
decision becomes final and executory. This award is justified in the light of the evidence extant
on record showing that the average gross premium collection monthly of Valenzuela over a
period of four (4) months from December 1978 to February 1979, amounted to over P300,000.00
from which he is entitled to a commission of P100,000.00 more or less per month. Moreover, his
annual sales production amounted to P2,500,000.00 from where he was given 32.5%
commissions. Under Article 2200 of the new Civil Code, "indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee
failed to obtain." The circumstances of the case, however, require that the contractual
relationship between the parties shall be terminated upon the satisfaction of the judgment. No
more claims arising from or as a result of the agency shall be entertained by the courts after that
date.
BONUSES:
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
FACTS:

Restituto M. Tobias was terminated by petitioner GLOBE MACKAY due to the discovery
of fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of
pesos. Private respondent, then, sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company
(RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the
latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a
civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. The RTC and CA both ruled in favor of Tobias.
ISSUE:
WON Tobias is entitled to damages?
RULING:
YES. Petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were
merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury"
should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes"
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO
sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a
result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further
damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.

FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid
and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.”
Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson
made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his.
Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had
son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform
Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or
enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on
accusing Baltao of BP 22.

Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:
 SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
 Bank said signature belonged to EB
 EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:
 the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and
 that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:

1. there is a legal right or duty, exercised in bad faith, for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores: there is an act which is legal, but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order or public policy, it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him.
It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence
of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result
of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated
May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
G.R. No. 151866 September 9, 2004

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,

vs.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.

CARPIO v. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 151866; September 9, 2004; Tinga, J.

FACTS: Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged
her services for their church wedding. On that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel to where the
bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at the Suite, several persons were already
there including the petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for
the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding
rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the
reception was to be held.
She went back to the suite after, and found several people staring at her when she entered. . It was at
this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas
ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang
kumuha.”
Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag.
It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the
pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of
apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds ’relatives and guests to redeem her
smeared reputation as a result of petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the
letter. Thus, on 20February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages
RULING: Valmonte is entitled to damages. In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she
brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. True, petitioner had the right o ascertain
the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one
who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible.
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good
customs. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind
but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 for which she should be held accountable