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Biboso vs. Victorias Milling

Facts:
The complainants are employed teachers of respondent. They are serving in a year-to-year basis, signing new
contracts each year. There is a stipulation in their contract that the complainants are “temporary as and when required
until…”. This makes them probationary employees. The petitioners contended that they were subjected to unfair
labor practice. On the other hand, the company argues otherwise. NLRC ruled in favor of the teachers. The Office of
the President ruled in favor of the respondent.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners are probationary employees.
Ruling:

YES. The Labor Code does not set the maximum probationary period at six months. Under the Labor Code, the
probationary period is the period required to learn a skill, trade, occupation or profession. In other words, the Labor
Code recognizes the policy of the Bureau of Private Schools settling the maximum probationary period for teachers at
three years.

What is decisive is that petitioners were well aware all the time that their tenure was for a limited duration. Upon its
termination, both parties to the employment relationship were free to renew it or to let it lapse. It was the decision of
private respondent that it should cease.

There is no question here that petitioners did not enjoy a permanent status. During such period they could remain in
their positions and any circumvention of their rights, in accordance with the statutory scheme, subject to inquiry and
thereafter correction by the Department of Labor. Thus there was the safeguard as to the duration of their
employment being respected. To that extent, their tenure was secure. The moment, however, the period expired in
accordance with contracts freely entered into, they could no longer invoke the constitutional protection.

It is difficult to believe the submission of individual petitioners that they were terminated from employment because
they joined petitioner union VICSEA. This is indicated by the fact that petitioners became members of petitioner
union VICSEA only in January 1973. Before this date, individual petitioners were already being closely observed to
gauge their performance for purposes of determining who shall be accorded permanent status. Thus, individual
petitioners knew that they would either be made permanent or will be dropped from the faculty roster at the end of
the school year 1972-73. So they joined the union. That the purpose of individual petitioners in joining the union is to
avert their forthcoming removal from the faculty roster was impliedly admitted by one of the individual petitioners in
her testimony.

ICMC vs. NLRC

Facts:

ICMC, a non-profit organization, hired Bernadette Galang on January 24, 1983 as a probationary cultural orientation
teacher with a monthly salary of P2,000.00.

3 months thereafter Galang was informed, orally and in writing, that her services were being terminated for her
failure to meet the prescribed standards of ICMC as reflected in the performance evaluation of her supervisors during
the teacher evaluation program she underwent along with other newly-hired personnel.

Despite her termination, records show that Galang did not leave the ICMC refugee camp at Morong, Bataan, but
instead stayed thereat for a few days before leaving for Manila, during which time, she was observed by petitioner to

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be allegedly acting strangely. She was hospitalized. She was given benefits. Thereafter, she sued ICMC for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice, unpaid wages and reinstatement. ICMC countered that she failed to qualify as regular
employee.

Issue:

W/N the failure to qualify as a regular employee is a just cause for terminating a probationary employee.

Ruling:

Failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause
for terminating a probationary employee specifically recognized under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor
Code.

The legal basis of public respondent is erroneous. A probationary employee, as understood under Article 282 (now
Article 281) of the Labor Code, is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether
or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment is made to afford the employer an
opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become a proper
and efficient employee. 9 The word "probationary", as used to describe the period of employment, implies the
purpose of the term or period, but not its length.

The right of a laborer to sell his labor to such persons as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an
employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality
of right guaranteed by the Constitution. If the employer can compel the employee to work against the latter's will, this
is servitude. If the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is
oppression.

Ver Bruiser vs. Leogardo

Facts:

Petitioners were employed by General Telephone Directory Company as sales representatives and charged with the
duty of soliciting advertisements for inclusion in a telephone directory. They entered as probationary employees for
18 months. Due to their failure to meet the evaluation and quotas, they were dismissed. The petitioners countered that
they have already met the 6 month requirement. Thus they are considered as regular employees.

Issue:

W/N the petitioners are already considered as regular employees.

Ruling:

NO. The general rule is that the probationary period of employment is limited to 6 months. The exception is when the
parties agree otherwise, such as when it is established by company policy or when it is required by the nature of the
work to be performed by the employee.

Policy Instruction No. 11 of the Minister of Labor and Employment has clarified any and all doubts on the period of
probationary employment. It states as follows:

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Under the Labor Code, six (6) months is the general probationary period ' but the probationary period
is actually the period needed to determine fitness for the job. This period, for lack of a better
measurement is deemed to be the period needed to learn the job.

In the case at bar, it is shown that private respondent Company needs at least eighteen (18) months to determine the
character and selling capabilities of the petitioners as sales representatives. The Company is engaged in advertisement
and publication in the Yellow Pages of the PLDT Telephone Directories. Publication of solicited ads are only made a
year after the sale has been made and only then win the company be able to evaluate the efficiency, conduct, and
selling ability of its sales representatives, the evaluation being based on the published ads. Moreover, an eighteen
month probationary period is recognized by the Labor Union in the private respondent company

The practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed to make the work quota has been recognized in
this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute a
just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. Failure to
observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute
just cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by
failing to complete the same within the alloted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This
management prerogative of requiring standards availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer's interest.

Mariwasa vs. Leogardo

Facts:

Dequilla was hired by Mariwasa Company as probationary employee. Upon the expiration of the probationary period
of six months, Dequila was informed by his employer of his unsatisfactory performance. To give him a chance to
improve his performance and qualify for regular employment, instead of dispensing with his service, another 3
months will be added to her probationary employment. Dequilla did not improve, hence he was terminated.

Issue:

W/N Dequilla is already a regular employee.

Ruling:

Buiser vs. Leogardo, Jr. recognized agreements stipulating longer probationary periods as constituting lawful
exceptions to the statutory prescription limiting such periods to six months, when it upheld as valid an employment
contract between an employer and two of its employees that provided for an 18-month probation period.

The single difference between Buiser and the present case: that in the former involved an eighteen-month
probationary period stipulated in the original contract of employment, whereas the latter refers to an extension agreed
upon at or prior to the expiration of the statutory six-month period, is hardly such as to warrant or even suggest a
different ruling here. In both cases the parties' agreements in fact resulted in extensions of the period prescribed by
law. That in this case the inability of the probationer to make the grade became apparent only at or about the end of
the six-month period, hence an extension could not have been pre-arranged as was done in Buiser assumes no adverse
significance, given the lack, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, of any indication that the extension to which
Dequila gave his agreement was a mere stratagem of petitioners to avoid the legal consequences of a probationary
period satisfactorily completed.

For aught that appears of record, the extension of Dequila's probation was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part of
his employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth as an

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employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said employer's account to compel it to keep on its
payroll one who could not perform according to its work standards. The law, surely, was never meant to produce such
an inequitable result.

By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to
the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. The Court finds
nothing in the law which by any fair interpretation prohibits such a waiver. And no public policy protecting the
employee and the security of his tenure is served by prescribing voluntary agreements which, by reasonably
extending the period of probation, actually improve and further a probationary employee's prospects of demonstrating
his fitness for regular employment.

Holiday Inn Manila vs. NLRC

Facts:

Elena Honasan was accepted for OJT as telephone operator for 3 weeks in Holiday Inn. Thereafter, she was accepted
as a probationary employee for 6 months. Before the end of her probationary employment, she was dismissed on the
ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the Hotel. She filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, contending that she was already a regular employee.

Issue:

W/N Honasan is already a regular employee.

Ruling:

Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion
in the regular force. In the case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan’s on-the-job training. When
her services were continued after this training, the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and
was qualified to be a regular employee.

Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-the-job training. If her services proved
unsatisfactory then, she could have been dropped as early as during that period. But she was not. On the contrary, her
services were continued, presumably because they were acceptable, although she was formally placed this time on
probation.

Even if it be supposed that the probation did not end with the three-week period of on-the-job training, there is still no
reason why that period should not be included in the stipulated six-month period of probation. Honasan was accepted
for on-the-job training on April 15, 1991. Assuming that her probation could be extended beyond that date, it
nevertheless could continue only up to October 15, 1991, after the end of six months from the earlier date. Under this
more lenient approach, she had become a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of tenure as of
October 15, 1991.

Art. 279. Security of Tenure — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library

The grounds for the removal of a regular employee are enumerated in Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code.

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The procedure for such removal is prescribed in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code. These rules were not observed in the case at bar as Honasan was simply told that her services were being
terminated because they were found to be unsatisfactory. No administrative investigation of any kind was undertaken
to justify this ground.

The policy of the Constitution is to give the utmost protection to the working class when subjected to such maneuvers
as the one attempted by the petitioners. This Court is fully committed to that policy and has always been quick to rise
in defense of the rights of labor, as in this case.

52. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC VS NLRC

Facts:
1. Respondent Priscila Endozo applied to petitioner Sameer Overseas Employment Agency, a local recruitment
placement agency, for overseas employment in Taiwan as a domestic helper.
2. Petitioner told respondent Endozo that she would be finally deployed to Taiwan and required her to pay the
amount of P30,000.00, which she did, but petitioner did not issue any receipt.
3. Respondent Endozo left for Taiwan. She was to be employed as a housemaid of Sung Kui Mei with a monthly
salary of NT$13,380.00 for a period of one year.
4. She stayed in Taiwan only for eleven (11) days as her employer terminated her services, and sent her home on
April 19, 1994 for alleged incompetence.
5. She confronted petitioner agency and Rose Mahinay of said agency told her that she was just unlucky and that
she would be refunded the amount of P50,000.00.
6. Private respondent filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration a complaint against
petitioner for illegal dismissal, payment of salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract,
illegal exaction, violation of the Labor Code, falsification of contract of employment, attorney's fees and costs
7. Labor Arbiter Andres C. Zavalla rendered a decision finding that private respondent was illegally dismissed.
8. The decision of the LA was also affirmed by the NLRC. Hence this appeal.
9. The respondent commented thru the Solicitor General she had been illegally dismissed by her foreign
employer and entitled her to a payment of her salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract.
10. It appears that when the petitioner recruited the respondent, she executed a contract of employment with her
Taiwanese employer under which she was to serve as domestic helper for a period of one year, with six
months probationary period.

ISSUE: WON the employer in Taiwan could unlawfully terminate private respondent's employment as domestic
helper for incompetence during the probationary period of her employment.

HELD: NO, the employer could not unlawfully dismissed the respondent.

 It is an elementary rule in the law on labor relations that even a probationary employee is entitled to security
of tenure. 9 A probationary employee can not be terminated, except (a) for just cause or (b) when he fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement.(Article 281 of the Labor Code).
 In this case, the employment contract was for a definite period of one (1) year, with six (6) months
probationary period. After only eleven days of work, the employer dismissed private respondent without just
cause.
 However, "the power of the employer to terminate a probationary employment contract is subject to
limitations. First, it must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract. Secondly,
the dissatisfaction of the employer must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract
or the law; and thirdly, there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal.

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 In this case, petitioner was not able to present convincing proof establishing respondent Endozo's alleged
incompetence. "Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the conditions of his
employment and of the terms of advancement therein."
 Precisely, implicit in Article 281 of the Code is the requirement that reasonable standards be previously made
known by the employer to the probationary employee at the time of his engagement." 15 Thus, the termination
of respondent Endozo's employment was not justified 16 and hence, illegal.

53. Dela Cruz vs NLRC (GR# 145417)

FACTS:

1. Shemberg was engaged in the business of manufacturing, trading, distributing and importing various
consumer products.
2. Petitioner Florencio M. de la Cruz, Jr. was hired by private respondent Shemberg Marketing Corporation
(Shemberg) as senior sales manager.
3. The position of senior sales manager was then newly created in line with Shemberg’s objective of product
positioning in the consumer market. Its duties included, among others, the supervision and control of the sales
force of the company
4. Likewise, the senior sales manager was also vested with some discretion to decide on matters within the scope
of his functions, including the appointment of district sales representatives and the reshuffling of salesmen to
achieve sales targets.
5. Ms. Lilybeth Y. Llanto, summoned petitioner and informed him of the management’s decision to terminate
his services.
6. Petitioner asked Llanto for the reason but the latter merely informed him that it had something to do with the
drop in the company’s sales.
7. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
8. Respondents answered that petitioner’s dismissal was due to his failure to meet the required company
standards and for loss of trust and confidence. (unauthorized use if company funds through asking for
refund for the family plane tickets)
9. Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed and this was affirmed by the NLRC.
10. Upon the filing a MR by the respondent, the NLRC partially granted it.
11. Petitioner was hired by respondent Shemberg Marketing Corporation on May 27, 1996 and was terminated on
September 14, 1996.
12. Petitioner vigorously contends that he was not a probationary employee since Shemberg failed to disclose to
him the reasonable standards for qualifying as a regular employee as provided in Article 281 of the Labor Cod

Probationary employment – Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6)

months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who
has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he
fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards, made
known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is a probationary employee during the termination.

HELD: Yes, he is a probationary employee

13. The evidence on record clearly showing that petitioner was well informed of the standards to be met before he
could qualify as a regular employee.

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14. A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is under observation and evaluation to
determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment.
15. During the probationary period, the employer is given the opportunity to observe the skill, competence and
attitude of the employee while the latter seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet
the reasonable standards for permanent employment.
16. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both the employer and the employee
in dealing with each other during said period.
17. There is no dispute that petitioner, as a probationary employee, enjoyed only temporary employment status.
18. In general terms, this meant that he was terminable anytime, permanent employment not having been attained
in the meantime.
19. The employer could well decide he no longer needed the probationary employee’s services or his performance
fell short of expectations, etc.
20. As long as the termination was made before the expiration of the six-month probationary period, the employer
was well within his rights to sever the employer-employee relationship.

54. CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENECO), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

FACTS:

Private respondents are employees of petitioner, an electric cooperative company. They have worked for petitioner
from a high of four and one half (4 1/2) years to a low of ten (10) months. Their work forms an integral part of the
business of petitioner. Their permanent appointment was extended only on June 16, 1988.

Petitioner has a collective bargaining agreement with its employees' union for a duration of three (3) years from April
1, 1987 up to March 31, 1990 granting an across the board increase of P350.00, effective April 1, 1987.

Though they were made permanent in 1988, private respondents demanded payment of the three hundred fifty pesos
(P350.00) wage increase for the year 1987 as provided by the above collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner
denied their demand.

Private respondents then filed their complaint with the Labor Arbiter, however, it was dismissed for lack of merit.

NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and held that private respondents became regular employees six (6) months
after hiring, and hence, entitled to the across-the-board wage increase for the first year of the collective bargaining
agreement starting from April 1, 1987 to March 1988.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the private respondents become a regular employees when CBA was constituted.

HELD: Yes, they are regulars employee.

It cannot be denied that private respondents attained the status of regular employees even before 1988. Firstly, they
perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business of the petitioner as an electric cooperative.

Indeed, their appointments would not have been regularized if their jobs were not indispensable in the daily operation
of the petitioner's business. Secondly, they had worked for petitioner for more than six (6) months before they were
given regular appointments. They had been hired on various dates starting from 1984.

Petitioner's insistence that private respondents became regular employees only when they were extended
appointments on July 13, 1988 is deplorable. Articles 280 and 281 of our Labor Code, supra, put an end to the
pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to

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them probationary appointments, ad infinitum. Thus, Article 281, supra, placed a ceiling on probationary
employment, i.e., not to exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working.

In other words, the graduation of an employee from casual or probationary to regular does not depend on the arbitrary
will of his employer.

55. MOISES DE LEON vs NLRC (GR#70705)

FACTS:

1. It appears that petitioner was employed by private respondent La Tondeña Inc. on December 11, 1981, at the
Maintenance Section of its Engineering Department in Tondo, Manila.
2. His work consisted mainly of painting company building and equipment, and other odd jobs relating to
maintenance. He was paid on a daily basis through petty cash vouchers.
3. After a service of more than one (1) year, petitioner requested from respondent company that he be included
in the payroll of regular workers, instead of being paid through petty cash vouchers.
4. Private respondent's response to this request was to dismiss petitioner from his employment on January 16,
1983.
5. Having been refused reinstatement despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
6. Private respondent claimed that petitioner was not a regular employee but only a casual worker hired
allegedly only to paint a certain building in the company premises, and that his work as a painter terminated
upon the completion of the painting job.
7. Labor Arbiter held that there was an illegal dismissal.
8. Labor Arbiter Hernandez ruled that petitioner was not a mere casual employee as asserted by private
respondent but a regular employee.
9. NLRC reversed the decision of the LA.
10. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, recommends that the petition be given due course in view of the
evidence on record supporting petitioner's contention that his work was regular in nature.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is a regular employee.

HELD: Yes, he is a regular employee.

 The law on the matter is Article 281 of the Labor Code which defines regular and casual employment as
follows:

Art. 281. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of a written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed
to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined
at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

 That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually exists.

 An employment is deemed regular when the activities performed by the employee are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Not considered regular are the so-called "project
employment" the completion or termination of which is more or less determinable at the time of employment,
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such as those employed in connection with a particular construction project 9 and seasonal employment which
by its nature is only desirable for a limited period of time.
 The primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.
The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer

 During petitioner's period of employment, the records reveal that the tasks assigned to him included not only
painting of company buildings, equipment and tools but also cleaning and oiling machines, even operating a
drilling machine, and other odd jobs assigned to him when he had no painting job. A regular employee of
respondent company, Emiliano Tanque Jr., attested in his affidavit that petitioner worked with him as a
maintenance man when there was no painting job

 The law demands that the nature and entirety of the activities performed by the employee be considered. In
the case of petitioner, the painting and maintenance work given him manifest a treatment consistent with a
maintenance man and not just a painter, for if his job was truly only to paint a building there would have been
no basis for giving him other work assignments In between painting activities.

56. Kimberly Independent Union vs Drilon (GR#L-77629)

FACTS:

1. Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc. (KIMBERLY, for brevity) executed a three-year collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers'
Organization (UKCEU-PTGWO) which expired on June 30, 1986.
2. Within the 60-day freedom period prior to the expiration of and during the negotiations for the renewal of the
aforementioned CBA, some members of the bargaining unit formed another union called "Kimberly
Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Organized Labor Association in Line
Industries and Agriculture (KILUSAN-OLALIA).
3. KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for certification election.
4. KIMBERLY and (UKCEU-PTGWO) did not object to the holding of a certification election but objected to
the inclusion of the so-called contractual workers whose employment with KIMBERLY was coursed through
an independent contractor, (RANK COMPANY)
5. Pending resolution KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a notice of strike for the following allege acts:

(1) dismissal of union members (KILUSAN-OLALIA); (2) non-regularization of casuals/contractuals with

over six months service; (3) non-implementation of appreciation bonus for 1982 and 1983; (4) non-
payment of minimum wages; (5) coercion of employees; and (6) engaging in CBA negotiations despite
the pendency of a petition for certification election

6. MOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute finding that the labor dispute would adversely affect
national interest.
7. Med-Arbiter Bonifacio 1. Marasigan, who was handling the certification election case declared among others
that contractual employees who are allegedly in the employ of an independent contractor and who have also
worked for at least six (6) months as appearing in the payroll.
8. During Pre-election, 64 casual workers were challenged by KIMBERLY and (UKCEU-PTGWO) on the
ground that they are not employees, of KIMBERLY but of RANK.
9. KIMBERLY filed an opposition to the protest and motion, asserting that there is no employer-employee
relationship between the casual workers and the company, and that the med-arbiter has no jurisdiction to rule
on the issue of the status of the challenged workers which is one of the issues covered by the assumption
order.

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10. Minister Sanchez declared that the other casual employees not performing janitorial and yard maintenance
services were deemed labor-only contractual and since labor-only contracting is prohibited, such employees
were held to have attained the status of regular employees, the regularization being effective as of the date of
the decision.
11. KIMBERLY flied a motion for reconsideration with respect to the regularization of contractual workers,
12. In the meantime, KIMBERLY and UKCEU-PTGWO continued with the negotiations on the new collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), no restraining order or junctive writ having been issued, and on December 18,
1986, a new CBA was concluded and ratified by 440 out of 517 members of the bargaining unit.

ISSUE: WON 64 casual employees be considered as a regular employee.

HELD:

 It will be recalled that in the certification election, UKCEU-PTGWO came out as the winner, by
garnering a majority of the votes cast therein with the exception of 64 ballots which were subject to
challenge.
 In the protest filed for the opening and counting of the challenged ballots, KILUSAN-OLALIA raised
the main and sole question of regularization of the 64 casual workers.
 The law thus provides for two. kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken,
with respect to the activity in which they are employed.
 The individual petitioners herein who have been adjudged to be regular employees fall under the
second category.
 It is not disputed that these workers have been in the employ of KIMBERLY for more than one year at
the time of the filing of the Petition for certification election by KILUSAN-OLALIA.
 Owing to their length of service with the company, these workers became regular employees, by
operation of law, one year after they were employed by KIMBERLY through RANK.
 While the actual regularization of these employees entails the mechanical act of issuing regular
appointment papers and compliance with such other operating procedures as may be adopted by the
employer, it is more in keeping with the intent and spirit of the law to rule that the status of regular
employment attaches to the casual worker on the day immediately after the end of his first year of
service
 The law is explicit. As long as the employee has rendered at least one year of service, he becomes a
regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed. The law does not provide the
qualification that the employee must first be issued a regular appointment or must first be formally
declared as such before he can acquire a regular status.

57. FERROCHROME PHILS. V NLRC

FACTS:

 Private respondent Horst Bartsch was initially employed as a consultant-engineer of the Austrian
company Voest-Alpine. While thus employed, Bartsch was assigned to the Philippines as a consultant-
engineer of petitioner Ferrochrome, a subsidiary of Voest-Alpine. His contract of employment 1
provided that he would be employed at Ferrochrome for a period of three (3) months, i.e., from
February 15, 1988 to May 15, 1988, extendible for a term mutually agreeable to the parties.
 After Bartsch's employment expired on May 15, 1988, his services were still engaged by petitioner
Ferrochrome. However, his continued employment was no longer covered by any written
contract.From July 12-15, 1988, Bartsch was confined at the Capitol College General Hospital in
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Misamis Oriental for treatment of a psychological disorder.

 Thereafter, petitioner granted Bartsch a vacation leave. Bartsch returned to the Philippines on
September 28, 1988. On October 1, 1988, he assumed his former position at Ferrochrome.
 Ferrochrome terminated his services in a letter, in 2 letters which said that, that their discussion with
the plant management, concludes that his services as consultant to the Senior VP-Operations are no
longer needed and it was agreed upon about the discontinuance of his services.
 Thus, on June 5, 1989, Bartsch filed a complaint against petitioners for unpaid salary, non-payment of
vacation leave, separation pay and 13th month pay, plus damages and attorney's fees before the
NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. X, Cagayan de Oro City. 3
 NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter and ruled that Bartsch was illegally dismissed by
Ferrochrome.

ISSUE:
WON Bartsch is a regular employee which is entitled to backwage, severance pay, christmas bonus
and salary bonus.

 RULING:
 Yes, Bartsch is a regular employee. As defined under the law, an employment shall be deemed
regular if the employee performs activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business and
trade of the employer OR if the employee has rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether the
service be continuous or broken.
 Applying these two (2) tests, we find that Bartsch was a regular employee of the petitioner.
 The complainant under the definition of his power and duties has been an ordinary technical staff
employee. The petitioner could have terminated complainant from the service after the lapse of the
three (3) months period stipulated in the Contract of Employment. But management found itself in dire
need of the expertise of complainant that it decided to extend the services of the latter for an indefinite
period which lasted for almost one year.
 Being a regular employee, private respondent is entitled to security of tenure and his services may be
terminated only for causes provided by law. We are confounded as to the real reason why the services
of private respondent were terminated. In the termination letter the petitioner reason for terminating
the private respondent is because his position was no longer needed, however, during the proceedings
petitioner company alleged a new ground for terminating Bartsch's employment is his psychological
illness. As correctly found by the NLRC, petitioner's wavering stance showed its bad faith in
terminating the services of private respondent.
 Under the circumstances, petitioner should have complied with the due process requirements of notice
and hearing before terminating the services of private respondent. An employee should be notified of
his employer's intent to dismiss him and the true reasons therefor. 12 Unfortunately, these basic
requisites were not met. It was not shown that private respondent was informed of the alleged "real"
reason for his dismissal. Neither was he given an opportunity to air his side and defend himself.
 In view of the illegality of private respondent's dismissal from service, the latter is entitled to
the award of Christmas bonus and salary bonus for the year 1988 given by petitioner to all its other
regular employees.


58. SINGER SEWING MACHINE CO. V DRILON, SINGER MACHINE COLLECTORS UNION-BAGUIO
(SIMACUB), et al.

 FACTS:
 The respondent union filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of allcollectors of petitioner company. The company opposed the petition on the
ground that the union members are actually not employees but are independent contractor based on the
collection agency agreement which they signed. The respondent asserted that they perform the
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most desirable and necessary activities for the continuous and effective operations of the business of
the petitioner. They contended that the collectors are employees because the agent shall utilize only
receipt forms authorized and issued by the company. Monthly collection quotaas also required by the
company.
 The Company opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the union members are actually
not employees but are independent contractors as evidenced by the collection agency agreement which
they signed.
 ISSUE:
 W/N ER-EE relationship exists between petitioner and respondent
 HELD:
 Applying the control test, there is no ER-EE relationship exists. Hence, if the union members
are not employees, no right for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as such bargaining agent can
ever be recognized.Not all collecting agents are employees and neither are all collecting agents
independent contractors. The requirement that collection agents utilize only receipt forms and report
forms issued by the company and reports shall be submitted at least once a week is not necessarily an
indication of control over the means by which the job of collection is to be performed. The monthly
collection quota is a normal requirement.
 It is clear that the company and each collecting agent intended that the company take control
only over the amount of collection, which is the result of the job performed. No such words as to hire
and employ are present. Moreover, the agreement did not fix an amount for wages nor the required
working hours. Compensation is earned only on the basis of the tangible results produced such as the
total collections made. There is also nothing in the agreement which implies control by the company
over the means and methods in achieving the end.Since private respondents are not employees of the
company, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for
purposes of collective bargaining.Wherefore, the petition for certification election is dismissed.

59. MAGSALIN V NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKING MEN

FACTS:

 Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., herein petitioner, engaged the services of respondent workers as "sales
route helpers" for a limited period of five months.After five months, respondent workers were
employed by petitioner company on a day-to-day basis. According to petitioner company, respondent
workers were hired to substitute for regular sales route helpers whenever the latter would be
unavailable or when there would be an unexpected shortage of manpower in any of its work places or
an unusually high volume of work. The practice was for the workers to wait every morning outside the
gates of the sales office of petitioner company. If thus hired,the workers would then be paid their
wages at the end of the day.Ultimately, respondent workers asked petitioner company to extend to
them regular appointments.Petitioner company refused. Subsequently, the respondents filed with the
NLRC a complaint for the regularization of their employment with petitioner company. Claiming that
petitioner company meanwhile terminated their services, respondent workers filed a notice of strike
and a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the NLRC.The parties, later on,
agreed to submit the controversy, for voluntary arbitration but the VA dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the respondent workers were not employees of Coca-cola.CA reversed VA. Hence, appeal.
ISSUE WON the nature of work is deemed necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner that
could qualify them to be regular employees.

RULING

 YES.The SC ruled that The argument of petitioner that its usual business or trade is softdrink
manufacturing and that the work assigned to respondent workers as sales route helpers so involves
merely “postproduction activities,” one which is not indispensable in the manufacture of its products,
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scarcely can be persuasive. If, as so argued by petitioner company, only those whose work are directly
involved in the production of softdrinks may be held performing functions necessary and desirable in
its usual business or trade, there would have then been no need for it to even maintain regular truck
sales route helpers. The nature of the work performed must be viewed from a perspective of the
business or trade in its entirety and not on a confined scope.
 The repeated hiring of the respondent workers and continuing need of their daily services
clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the
business/trade of petitioner. In determining whether employment is regular or not, the applicable test is
the reasonable connection between a particular activity performed in relation to the usual business or
trade of the employer. The nature of work must be viewed from the perspective of the business in its
entirety and not confined scope.
 The pernicious practice of having employees, workers and laborers, engaged for a fixed period
of few months, short of the normal six-month probationary period of employment, and, thereafter, to
be hired on a day-to-day basis, mocks the law. Any obvious circumvention of the law cannot be
countenanced. The fact that respondent workers have agreed to be employed on such basis and to
forego the protection given to them on their security of tenure, demonstrate nothing more than the
serious problem of impoverishment of so many of our people and the resulting unevenness between
labor and capital. A contract of employment is impressed with public interest.

60. BRENT SCHOOL V ZAMORA

FACTS:

 Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner Brent
School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for its
existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17,
1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14,
1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the
original contract of July 18, 1971.
 On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the
Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated
ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of
employment." Although protesting the announced termination stating that his services were necessary
and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore
he had acquired the status of regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed
a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17,
1976 as full payment of contract."
 The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to
terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor
Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a
"permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back
wages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have an athematized "fixed period
employment" or employment for a term.

RULING:

 Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated
with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to
reinstatement.

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 The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at
a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. At that time,
the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as
amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed
employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment
with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and
became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No prohibition
against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible
therefrom.
 It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and
Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof
Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.
 The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the
Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code contained explicit
references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless,
obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment began to take place at about this time.
 Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary employees
and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of
Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could terminate
"an employment without a definite period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without
a fixed period" in the following manner: …where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

 Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and "regular"
employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December 16, 1975.
 Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by eliminating the
reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered (becoming Article 271).

As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to
exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but
would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with
his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be
eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its
application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of
freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from
obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache
by lopping off the head.
 Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of employment
as still good rule—a rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No.
57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of
termination following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the
Court held:
 Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her employment was
probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the expiration of the period
stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-
renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the
employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to
expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination.
 Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the
 expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The
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advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of
the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to
terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services
effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.

61. PAKISTAN AIR LINES V OPLE

FACTS

 On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign

corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of
employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with private respondent Ma.
M.C. Mamasig.
 Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they began discharging
their job functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying assignments to different parts
of the Middle East and Europe.
 On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the contracts of
employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent
separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that
their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause
6 (b) of the employment agreement [they had) executed with [PIA]."
 On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment ("MOLE").
 In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella ordered the reinstatement
of private respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts
equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of their employment contracts; the
payment to private respondent Mamasig of an amount equivalent to the value of a round trip ticket Manila-
USA Manila; and payment of a bonus to each of the private respondents equivalent to their one-month
salary. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had
rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment
contract to three (3) years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been
carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to
reinstatement with full backwages.

ISSUE: WON private respondets Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed.
RULING :YES

 Examining the provisions of the employment agreement between petitioner PIA and private
respondents, paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period
ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative one at the option of
the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to shorten that term, at any time and for
any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or even less by simply paying the employee a
month's salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to
render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the
pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any
security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited period of three
(3) years, and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.

 We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed and that public
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respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor any act
without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their reinstatement with backwages. Private
respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction. Should their
reinstatement to their former or other substantially equivalent positions not be feasible in view of the
length of time which has gone by since their services were unlawfully terminated, petitioner should be
required to pay separation pay to private respondents amounting to one (1) month's salary for every
year of service rendered by them, including the three (3) years service putatively rendered.

G.R. No. 106090 February 28, 1994

RICARDO FERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs. NLRC
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was hired as a laborer at the D.M. Consunji, Inc., a construction firm, on November 5, 1974. He
became a skilled welder and worked for private respondent until March 23, 1986 when his employment was
terminated on the ground that the project petitioner had been assigned to was already completed and there was
no more work for him to do.
2. Petitioner brought his plight before the Labor Arbiter who consolidated the same with three (3) other separate
complaints for illegal dismissal and various money claims against private respondent.
3. Labor Arbiter held that complainants worked continuously in various projects ranging from five (5) to twenty
(20) years and belonged to a work pool. (regular employee)
4. Private respondent questioned on appeal the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the
complainants were all project employees who were hired on a project-to-project basis, depending on the
availability of projects that the former was able to close with its clients.
5. Commission concluded that complainants-appellees were project employees.
ISSUE: WON the labourer may be considered as regular employee?
HELD: No, he is not a regular employee.

 Petitioner relies on Policy Instruction No. 20 which was issued by then Secretary Blas F. Ople to stabilize
employer-employee relations in the construction industry to support his contention that workers in the
construction industry may now be considered regular employees after their long years of service with
private respondent. The pertinent provision of Policy Instruction No. 20 reads:

Members of a work pool from which a construction company draws its project
employees, if considered employees of the construction company while in the
work pool, are non-project employees or employees for an indefinite period. If
they are employed in a particular project, the completion of the project or of any
phase thereof will not mean severance of employer-employee relationship.

 Respondent Commission correctly observed in its decision that complainants, one of

whom petitioner, failed to consider the requirement in Policy Instruction No. 20 that to
qualify as member of a work pool, the worker must still be considered an employee of
the construction company while in the work pool.
 In other words, there must be proof to the effect that petitioner was under an obligation
to be always available on call of private respondent and that he was not free to offer his
services to other employees.
 As held by the jurisprudence, the failure of the employer to report to the nearest employment office the
termination of workers everytime a project is completed proves that the employees are not project
employees. Contrariwise, the faithful and regular effort of private respondent in reporting every
completion of its project and submitting the lay-off list of its employees proves the nature of employment
of the workers involved therein as project employees.
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 Given this added circumstance behind petitioner's employment, it is clear that he does not belong
to the work pool from which the private respondent would draw workers for assignment to other
projects at its discretion.

G.R. No. 109902 August 2, 1994

ALU-TUCP, Representing Members: ALAN BARINQUE, with 13 others, namely: ENGR. ALAN G.
BARINQUE, ENGR. DARRELL LEE ELTAGONDE, EDUARD H. FOOKSON, JR., ROMEO R. SARONA,
RUSSELL GACUS, JERRY BONTILAO, EUSEBIO MARIN, JR., LEONIDO ECHAVEZ, BONIFACIO
MEJOS, EDGAR S. BONTUYAN, JOSE G. GARGUENA, JR., OSIAS B. DANDASAN, and GERRY I.
FETALVERO, petitioners,

vs NLRC

FACTS:

1. Petitioners filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the
NLRC.
2. Labor Arbiter declared petitioners "regular project employees who shall continue their employment as such
for as long as such [project] activity exists," but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement.
3. Petitioners argued that they were regular, not project, employees.
4. Private respondent, on the other hand, claimed that petitioners are project employees as they were employed
to undertake a specific project.
5. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to
perform work in a specific undertaking.
6. Petitioners argue that they are "regular" employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are "necessary, desirable
and work-related to private respondent's main business, steel-making"; and (ii) they have rendered service for
six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are properly characterized as "project employees" rather than "regular employees"
of NSC.

 Yes they are PROJECT EMPLOYEES

 We believe this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project
employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project
employees.
 The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has
served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to
project employees
 This issue relates, of course, to an important consequence: the services of project employees are co-terminous
with the project and may be terminated upon the end or completion of the project for which they were hired.
 Regular employees, in contract, are legally entitled to remain in the service of their employer until that service
is terminated by one or another of the recognized modes of termination of service under the Labor Code..
 In this latter case, the determination of the scope and parameters of the "project" becomes fairly easy. It is
unusual (but still conceivable) for a company to undertake a project which has absolutely no relationship to
the usual business of the company; thus, for instance, it would be an unusual steel-making company which
would undertake the breeding and production of fish or the cultivation of vegetables.
 For, as is evident from the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted earlier, the principal test for
determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as distinguished
from "regular employees," is whether or not the "project employees" were assigned to carry out a "specific

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project or undertaking," the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time the employees were
engaged for that project.
 we note that "project" could refer to one or the other of at least two (2) distinguishable types of activities.
Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of
the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other
undertakings of the company.

 The term "project" could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular
business of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the
ordinary or regular business operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at
determined or determinable times. The case at bar presents what appears to our mind as a typical example of
this kind of "project."


G.R. No. 79869 September 5, 1991

FORTUNATO MERCADO, SR., ROSA MERCADO, FORTUNATO MERCADO, JR., ANTONIO

MERCADO, JOSE CABRAL, LUCIA MERCADO, ASUNCION GUEVARA, ANITA MERCADO, MARINA
MERCADO, JULIANA CABRAL, GUADALUPE PAGUIO, BRIGIDA ALCANTARA, EMERLITA
MERCADO, ROMEO GUEVARA, ROMEO MERCADO and LEON SANTILLAN, petitioners, vs.
NLRC

FACTS:

1. Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers utilized by private respondents in all
the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of ace land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the
latter from 1949 up to April 1979.
2. Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied that said petitioners were her
regular employees and instead averred that she engaged their services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado,
Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their "mandarols", that is, persons who take charge in supplying the number of
workers needed by owners of various farms, but only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary
in rice production and/or sugar cane production, after which they would be free to render services to other
farm owners who need their services.
3. The other private respondents denied having any relationship whatsoever with the petitioners and state that
they were merely registered owners of the land in question included as correspondents in this case.

4. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondents and held that petitioners were not regular and permanent
workers of the private respondents, for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they
were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their services
would be available to any other farm owner.

5. Labor Arbiter was also of the opinion that the real cause was the filing of a criminal complaint for theft
against Reynaldo Mercado, son of spouses Fortunate Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado

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6. In his affidavit, Jesus David stated under oath that petitioners were never regularly employed by private
respondent Aurora Cruz but were, on-and-off hired to work and render services.
7. NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents affirming the decision of the respondent Labor Arbiter
8. Petitioner argued that the policy was based on PD 830 has defined the concept of regular and casual
employment. What determines regularity or casualness is not the employment contract, written or otherwise,
but the nature of the job. If the job is usually necessary or desirable to the main business of the employer, then
employment is regular. If not, then the employment is casual. Employment for a definite period which
exceeds one (1) year shall be considered re for the duration of the definite period.
9. This concept of re and casual employment is designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs
which has been abused by many employers to prevent so-called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular
employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions.
10. This new concept should be strictly enforced to give meaning to the constitutional guarantee of employment
tenure

ISSUE: WON petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and therefore entitled to the benefits which they
pray for.

HELD:

The first paragraph of Art. 280, answers the question of who are employees. It states that, regardless of any written or
oral agreement to the contrary, an employee is deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable
activities in the usual business or trade of the employer, except for project employees.

A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee, or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration
of the season as in the present case.

The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as "casual" employees, all other employees who do not fan under the
definition of the preceding paragraph. The proviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regular employees those
"casual" employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be
continuous or broken.

Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment discloses that the concept of regular and
casual employees was designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused by many
employers to prevent called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent casuals from
joining unions.

Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their
employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. The termination of their employment cannot
and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.

G.R. No. 149440 January 28, 2003

HACIENDA FATIMA and/or PATRICIO VILLEGAS, ALFONSO VILLEGAS and CRISTINE

SEGURA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE, respondents

FACTS:

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1. Labor Arbiter that complainants [herein respondents] refused to work and/or were choosy in the kind of jobs
they wanted to perform, the records is replete with complainants' persistence and dogged determination in
going back to work.
2. It would appear that respondents did not look with favor workers' having organized themselves into a union.
3. Thus, when complainant union was certified as the collective bargaining representative in the certification
elections, respondents under the pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit down with the union for the
purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement.
4. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein were not given work for more than one month.
5. In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the signing of a Memorandum of
Agreement.
6. Alleging that complainants failed to load the fifteen wagons, respondents reneged on its commitment to sit
down and bargain collectively. Instead, respondent employed all means including the use of private armed
guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises.
7. Starting September 1991, respondents did not any more give work assignments to the complainants forcing the
union to stage a strike on January 2, 1992.
8. "But for all their persistence, the risk they had to undergo in conducting a strike in the face of overwhelming
odds, complainants in an ironic twist of fate now find themselves being accused of 'refusing to work and being
choosy in the kind of work they have to perform.
9. CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were considered to be merely on
leave during the off-season and were therefore still employed by petitioners.
10. Moreover, the workers enjoyed security of tenure.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents, admittedly seasonal workers, were regular
employees.

HELD: NO, the CA is correct with it held that respondents were regular employees.

1. Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, states:

"Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of
the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.

"An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That,
any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exist." (Italics supplied)

2. For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that they perform
work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have also been employed only for the duration of one
season. The evidence proves the existence of the first, but not of the second, condition.
3. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore, the general rule of regular
employment is applicable.

4. "The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer.
The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer.

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The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the
scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.

[T]he fact that [respondents] do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the . . .
season does not detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has
already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off
during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but merely considered on leave until re-
employed."

5. The Court finds no reason to disturb the CA's dismissal of what petitioners claim was their valid exercise of a
management prerogative. The sudden changes in work assignments reeked of bad faith. These changes were
implemented immediately after respondents had organized themselves into a union and started demanding
collective bargaining. Those who were union members were effectively deprived of their jobs. Petitioners'
move actually amounted to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor Code.

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