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Name: Hazel C.

Balido
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Section: LLB-1B1

Case:
​Republic of the Philippines vs.​ ​Hon. Amante Purisima
G.R. No. L-36084, August 31, 1977

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza raised
a petition of Certiorari and Prohibition against the respondent Judge Amante P.
Purisima for his failure to apply the Doctrine of non-suability of the state, including its
offices and agencies from suit without its consent.

A private corporation identified as Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. filed a case against
Rice and Corn Administration with a civil suit for an alleged breach of contract. The
latter filed a motion to dismiss before the court of Judge Purisima pursuant to the
Doctrine of non-suability of the state without its consent, however the motion was
dismissed by the responded.

Hence, a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an agreement between Rice and Corn Administration and a Private
corporation Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. operates as a waiver of the National
Government from suit?

Whether or not Judge Purisima’s decision to deny the Rice and Corn Administration’s
motion to dismiss, is valid

HELD:
No. Whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no
binding force on the government. There must be a consent in order to sue the state and
for a consent to be effective, it must come from the state acting through a duly enacted
statute. Thus, making the decision of Judge Purisima to deny the motion of Rice and
Corn Administration to dismiss the case filed by the Private corporation invalid.

The court granted the petition for Certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss was
nullified and the petition for prohibition was granted.
Name: Hazel C. Balido
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Section: LLB-1B1

Case:
Cruz vs DENR,
G.R. No. 135385; December 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Isagani Cruz, filed a motion for Prohibition and Mandamus, ​as citizens and
taxpayers, and ​questioned the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous ​People’s
Rights Act on the grounds that the law amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.

The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous people over ancestral
domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contends that, by providing for
an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law
violate the rights of private landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

These provisions are specified in Section 51 to 53, 59, 63, 65 to 66 of the said Act.

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional

HELD:

​ fter due deliberation the votes were equally divided with separate opinions as to how
A
the Act is constitutional and/or unconstitutional. The justices who voted to dismiss the
petition sustained the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371 and all
challenged provisions of the law with a few exceptions. Justice Puno in particular
contends that the Act should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation
of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. On the other hand,the petition was also voted to be dismissed solely
on the grounds that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not
have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Meanwhile, 7 other members of the Court voted to grant the petition expressing the
view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was redeliberated upon. However, after the second deliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Name: Hazel C. Balido
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Section: LLB-1B1

Case:
Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498 December 03 2009

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for Review on Certiorari after the Court of Appeals
decided against their favor when they approved the petition for the Writ of Amparo of
respondent Mary Jean B. Tagitis, represented by a counsel.
On December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact,
filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against the petitioners in the
Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo
and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.
The Writ of Amparo petition is due to the incident which happened last October 31,
2007 where Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme,
together with Arsimin Kunnong, an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo, Sulu by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City.
They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House where Tagitis asked Kunnong to
buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong
returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and
even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong
to simply wait for Tagitis’ return.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor
of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for
the alleged enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.

HELD:

The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance, rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability , for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address
the disappearance – [The writ of amparo is] a protective remedy against violations or
threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a
remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action
to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It
does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who
are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty
and security are restored.

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