Nego

SECTION 16
MANUEL LIM V. CA
251 SCRA 408
FACTS:
Spouses Lim were charged with estafa and violations of BP22 for allegedly purchasing goods from
Linton Commercial Corporation and issuing checks
as payment thereof. The checks when presented to the bank were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds or the payment for the checks has been
stopped.
HELD:
It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of
jurisdiction. It shall be where the crime or offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place. In determining the proper venue for these cases, the
following are material facts—the checks were issued at the place of business of Linton; they were
delivered to Linton at the same place; they were dishonored in Kalookan City; petitioners had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in their account.
Under Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments

Law, issue means the first delivery of the instrument complete in its form to a person who
takes it as holder. The term holder on the other hand refers to the payee or indorsee of a bill or
note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. The important place to consider in the
consummation of a negotiable instrument is the place of
delivery. Delivery is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.
G.R. No. 107898 December 19, 1995
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, spouses, were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Malabon with estafa on three (3) counts under Art. 315, par. 2 (d),
of The Revised Penal Code, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 1696-MN to 1698-MN.
The Informations substantially alleged that Manuel and Rosita, conspiring
together, purchased goods from Linton Commercial Company, Inc. (LINTON),
and with deceit issued seven Consolidated Bank and Trust Company
(SOLIDBANK) checks simultaneously with the delivery as payment therefor.
When presented to the drawee bank for payment the checks were dishonored as
payment on the checks had been stopped and/or for insufficiency of funds to
cover the amounts. Despite repeated notice and demand the Lim spouses failed
and refused to pay the checks or the value of the goods.
On the basis of the same checks, Manuel and Rosita Lim were also charged with
seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 1699-MN to 1705-MN. In substance,
the Informations alleged that the Lims issued the checks with knowledge that
they did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment in
full of such checks upon presentment. When presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from date thereof the checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds. Despite receipt of notices of such dishonor the
Lims failed to pay the amounts of the checks or to make arrangements for full
payment within five (5) banking days.
Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim are the president and treasurer, respectively, of Rigi
Bilt Industries, Inc. (RIGI). RIGI had been transacting business with LINTON for
years, the latter supplying the former with steel plates, steel bars, flat bars and
purlin sticks which it uses in the fabrication, installation and building of steel
structures. As officers of RIGI the Lim spouses were allowed 30, 60 and
sometimes even up to 90 days credit.
On 27 May 1983 the Lims ordered 100 pieces of mild steel plates worth
P51,815.00 from LINTON which were delivered on the same day at their place of
business at 666 7th Avenue, 8th Street, Kalookan City. To pay LINTON for the
delivery the Lims issued SOLIDBANK Check No. 027700 postdated 3 September
1983 in the amount of P51,800.00. 1
On 30 May 1983 the Lims ordered another 65 pieces of mild steel plates worth
P63,455.00 from LINTON which were delivered at their place of business on the same
day. They issued as payment SOLIDBANK Check No. 027699 in the amount of
P63,455.00 postdated 20 August 1983. 2
The Lim spouses also ordered 2,600 "Z" purlins worth P241,800.00 which were delivered
to them on various dates, to wit: 15 and 22 April 1983; 11, 14, 20, 23, 25, 28 and 30 May
1983; and, 2 and 9 June 1983. To pay for the deliveries, they issued seven SOLIDBANK
checks, five of which were —
Check No. Date of Issue Amount
027683 16 July 1983 P27,900.00 3
027684 23 July 1983 P27,900.00 4
027719 6 Aug. 1983 P32,550.00 5
027720 13 Aug. 1983 P27,900.00 6
027721 27 Aug. 1983 P37,200.00 7
William Yu Bin, Vice President and Sales Manager of LINTON, testified that when those
seven (7) checks were deposited with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation they
were dishonored for "insufficiency of funds" with the additional notation "payment
stopped" stamped thereon. Despite demand Manuel and Rosita refused to make good the
checks or pay the value of the deliveries.
Salvador Alfonso, signature verifier of SOLIDBANK, Grace Park Branch, Kalookan City,
where the Lim spouses maintained an account, testified on the following transactions with
respect to the seven (7) checks:
CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR
027683 22 July 1983 Payment Stopped (PS) 8
027684 23 July 1983 PS and Drawn Against

Insufficient Fund (DAIF) 9
027699 24 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 10
027700 5 Sept. 1983 PS and DAIF 11
027719 9 Aug. 1983 DAIF 12
027720 16 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 13
027721 30 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 14
Manuel Lim admitted having issued the seven (7) checks in question to pay for deliveries
made by LINTON but denied that his company's account had insufficient funds to cover
the amounts of the checks. He presented the bank ledger showing a balance of
P65,752.75. Also, he claimed that he ordered SOLIDBANK to stop payment because the
supplies delivered by LINTON were not in accordance with the specifications in the
purchase orders.
Rosita Lim was not presented to testify because her statements would only be
corroborative.
On the basis of the evidence thus presented the trial court held both accused guilty of
estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in its decision dated 25 January 1989. In Crim. Case
No. 1696-MN they were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs. They were also ordered to
indemnify LINTON in the amount of P241,800.00. Similarly sentences were imposed in
Crim. Cases Nos. 1697-MN and 1698-MN except as to the indemnities awarded, which
were P63,455.00 and P51,800.00, respectively.
In Crim. Case No. 1699-MN the trial court sentenced both accused to a straight penalty of
one (1) year imprisonment with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay
the costs. In addition, they were ordered to indemnify LINTON in the amount of
P27,900.00. Again, similar sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1700-MN to
1705-MN except for the indemnities awarded, which were P32,550.00, P27,900.00,
P27,900.00, P63,455.00, P51,800.00 and P37,200.00 respectively. 15
On appeal, the accused assailed the decision as they imputed error to the trial court as
follows: (a) the regional Trial Court of malabon had no jurisdiction over the cases because
the offenses charged ere committed outside its territory; (b) they could not be held liable
for estafa because the seven (7) checks were issued by them several weeks after the
deliveries of the goods; and, (c) neither could they be held liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22
as they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were
not those specified by them, besides they had sufficient funds to pay the checks.
In the decision of 18 September 1992 respondent Court of Appeals acquitted
16
accused-appellants of estafa on the ground that indeed the checks were not made in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time of their issuance. However it affirmed the
finding of the trial court that they were guilty of having violated B.P. Blg. 22. On 6 17
November 1992 their motion for reconsideration was denied. 18
In the case at bench petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of
the essential elements of the crime punishable under B.P. Blg. 22 was committed within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. They claim that what was proved
was that all the elements of the offense were committed in Kalookan City. The checks
were issued at their place of business, received by a collector of LINTON, and dishonored
by the drawee bank, all in Kalookan City. Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever supports
the proposition that they knew that their checks were insufficiently funded. In fact, some of
the checks were funded at the time of presentment but dishonored nonetheless upon their
instruction to the bank to stop payment. In fine, considering that the checks were all
issued, delivered, and dishonored in Kalookan City, the trial court of Malabon exceeded its
jurisdiction when it tried the case and rendered judgment thereon.
The petition has no merit. Section 1, par. 1, of B.P. Blg. 22 punishes "[a]ny person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment . . ." The gravamen of the offense is knowingly issuing a worthless
check. Thus, a fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the
19
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
20
in full upon presentment. Another essential element is subsequent dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment. 21
It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of jurisdiction. Section 14, par.
22
(a), Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in Sec. 15, par.
(a), Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically provides:
Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense
was committed or anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
If all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation
occurred in one municipality or territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the
case. There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes
23
and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in
another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. These 24
are the so-called transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
categorized. In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 25
In determining proper venue in these cases, the following acts material and essential to
each crime and requisite to its consummation must be considered: (a) the seven (7)
checks were issued to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas; b) they were
delivered to LINTON at the same place; (c) they were dishonored in Kalookan City; and,
(d) petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of their funds in SOLIDBANK at the time
the checks were issued. Since there is no dispute that the checks were dishonored in
Kalookan City, it is no longer necessary to discuss where the checks were dishonored.
Under Sec. 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the term "issue" means the first
delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder. On the
other hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in
possession of it or the bearer thereof. In People v. Yabut this Court explained —
26
. . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or
determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the
delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to
its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery,
the contract is revocable. And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to
a person who takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." Delivery of the check signifies transfer of
possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent
to transfer title thereto . . .
Although LINTON sent a collector who received the checks from petitioners at their place
of business in Kalookan City, they were actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its
place of business in Balut, Navotas. The receipt of the checks by the collector of LINTON
is not the issuance and delivery to the payee in contemplation of law. The collector was
not the person who could take the checks as a holder, i.e., as a payee or indorsee thereof,
with the intent to transfer title thereto. Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of
LINTON with respect to the checks because he was a mere employee. As this Court
further explained in People v. Yabut —
27
Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Que Yabut or Geminiano Yabut,
Jr., in Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges, be licitly
taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant Alicia P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix
the venue there. He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as "payee" or
"indorsee." And there appears to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan
so as to bind the latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn
testimony before the investigating fiscal that Yambao is but her "messenger" or "part-time
employee." There was no special fiduciary relationship that permeated their dealings. For
a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential. The principal
consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so
as to act. It must exist as a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person
alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also its
nature and extent . . .
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient

funds as follows —
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the bank
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee.
The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by petitioners in the cases before us
because they did not pay LINTON the amounts due on the checks; neither did they make
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after
receiving notices that the checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. In People
v. Grospe citing People v. Manzanilla we held that ". . . knowledge on the part of the
28 29
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing
eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another."
Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City
or Malabon. Moreover, we ruled in the same Grospe and Manzanilla cases as reiterated
in Lim v. Rodrigo that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
30
Information. The Informations in the cases under consideration allege that the offenses
were committed in the Municipality of Navotas which is controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. 31
We therefore sustain likewise the conviction of petitioners by the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 thus —
Accused-appellants claim that they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped because
the goods delivered were not those specified by them. They maintain that they had
sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks. The records of the bank, however,
reveal otherwise. The two letters (Exhs. 21 and 22) dated July 23, and August 10, 1983
which they claim they sent to Linton Commercial, complaining against the quality of the
goods delivered by the latter, did not refer to the delivery of mild steel plates (6mm x 4 x 8)
and "Z" purlins (16 x 7 x 2-1/2 mts) for which the checks in question were issued. Rather,
the letters referred to B.1. Lally columns (Sch. #20), which were the subject of other
purchase orders.
It is true, as accused-appellants point out, that in a case brought by them against the
complainant in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City (Civil Case No. C-10921) the
complainant was held liable for actual damages because of the delivery of goods of
inferior quality (Exh. 23). But the supplies involved in that case were those of B.I. pipes,
while the purchases made by accused-appellants, for which they issued the checks in
question, were purchases of mild steel plates and "Z" purlins.
Indeed, the only question here is whether accused-appellants maintained funds sufficient
to cover the amounts of their checks at the time of issuance and presentment of such
checks. Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that "notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop
payment, the drawee bank shall state in the notice of dishonor that there were no
sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of the check, if such be
the fact."
The purpose of this provision is precisely to preclude the maker or drawer of a worthless
check from ordering the payment of the check to be stopped as a pretext for the lack of
sufficient funds to cover the check.
In the case at bar, the notice of dishonor issued by the drawee bank, indicates not only
that payment of the check was stopped but also that the reason for such order was that
the maker or drawer did not have sufficient funds with which to cover the checks. . . .
Moreover, the bank ledger of accused-appellants' account in Consolidated Bank shows
that at the time the checks were presented for encashment, the balance of
accused-appellants' account was inadequate to cover the amounts of the checks. . . . 32
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 September 1992 affirming
the conviction of petitioners Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim —
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC
Crim. Case No. 1700-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07279 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1701-MN);
CA-G.R. CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC
Crim. Case No. 1703-MN); CA-G.R. CA No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1704-MN); and
CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim Case No. 1705-MN), the Court finds the
accused-appellants
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 and are hereby sentenced to suffer a STRAIGHT PENALTY OF
ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT in each case, together with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay the costs.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699-MN), both accused-appellants are
hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1700-MN) both accused-appellants are
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN) both accused are hereby
ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P63,455.00.
In CA-G.R CR No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1704-MN) both accused-appellants are
hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P51,800.00, and
hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P37,200.00 —
33
as well as its resolution of 6 November 1992 denying reconsideration thereof, is

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
PEOPLE V. GROSPE
157 SCRA 154
FACTS:
Parolan was an authorized wholesale dealer of SMC. He was charged with violations of BP22 and
estafa for allegedly issuing checks in favor of SMC
but when the check was presented, it was dishonored for having
insufficiency funds. This is even more aggravated by the allegation that Paralan failed to
make good the check to the prejudice of SMC.
HELD:
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a transitory or
continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in
separate places. In this case, it did and jurisdiction may be conferred in any of the two places
wherein the two elements arose.
For while the subject check was issued in Bulacan, it wasn't completely
drawn thereat, but in Pampanga. What is of decisive importance is the delivery
thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to
its consummation as an obligation. For although the check was received
by the SMC Supervisor in Bulacan, that was not delivery in the contemplation of
law. The rule is that the issuancve as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who
takes it as a holder, which means
the payee or indorser of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the
bearer thereof. The said representative had to forward the check to the SMC regional
office, who thereafter forwarded it to the Finance Officer and later on to the depository bank.
G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAN MIGUEL

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga and MANUEL PARULAN, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga, dismissing Criminal Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and Criminal Case No. 2813 for
Estafa, for being "bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases."
Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of

petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan.
In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he was
charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for having
issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC but which was
dishonored for having been drawn against 'insufficient funds and, in spite of
repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make good said check to the
damage and prejudice of SMC.
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was charged
with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for
having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 in favor of
SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, but which check was refused
payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, for having
failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC.
The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and defense
being the same for the two suits.
Based on the facts and the evidence, Respondent Judge arrived at the following
"Findings and Resolution:"
From the welter of evidence adduced in these two , this Court is convinced that
the two checks involved herein were issued and signed by the accused in
connection with the beer purchases made by him on various occasions at the
Guiguinto, sales office of SMC at Guiguinto, Bulacan and which checks he
handed and delivered to the sales Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio, who
holds office in that municipality. The Court finds it rather difficult to believe the
claim and testimony of the accused that these checks which he admittedly
signed and which he delivered to Mr. Cornelio in blank were filled up without his
knowledge particularly the amounts appearing therein which in the case of the
check involved in Criminal Case No. 2800 amounted to P86,071.20, and, in the
case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2813, amounted to Pl1,918.80.
The accused had been engaged in business for some time involving amounts
that are quite considerable, and it is hard to believe that he will agree to this
kind of arrangement which placed or exposed him to too much risks and
uncertainties.
But even as this Court is convinced that the accused had issued these checks to
the representative of SMC on the occasions testified to in these cases by the
witnesses for the prosecution which two checks were subsequently dishonored
due to lack of funds resulting in damage to SMC, the offended party herein, this
Court, after considering the totality of the evidence and the circumstances that
attended the issuance of these two checks until they were both dishonored by
the drawee bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan, has
come to the conclusion that it is bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the
accused on the basis of the merits of these cases.
which he reasoned out, thus:
Deceit and damage are the two essential elements that make up the offenses
involving dishonored checks. And in order that this Court may have jurisdiction
to try these cases, it must be established that both or any one of these elements
composing the offenses charged must occur or take place within the area over
which this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Here, however, it is clear that none
of these elements took place or occurred within the jurisdictional area of this
Court.
As gleaned from the evidence, the two checks involved herein were issued by
the accused at Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were delivered and handed to
Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of San Miguel Corporation in his capacity as the
representative of the company holding office in that municipality where the
transactions of the accused with SMC took place. It was before Supervisor
Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan that false assurances were made by the accused
that the checks issued by him were good and backed by sufficient funds in his
bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan, only to turn out
later on that this was not so.
The other element of damage pertaining to the offenses charged in these cases
was inflicted on the offended party, the SMC, right at the moment the checks
issued by the accused were dishonored by the Planters Development Bank, the
drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan which received them from the BPI, San
Fernando, Pampanga branch for clearing purposes. The argument advanced by
the prosecution in its memorandum filed herein that the two checks were
deposited by SMC at the BPI, San Fernando, Branch, San Fernando, Pampanga,
where it maintained its accounts after receiving these checks from its Guiguinto
Sales Office which bank later on made the corresponding deductions from the
account of SMC in the amounts covered by the dishonored checks upon
receiving information that the checks so issued by the accused had been
dishonored by the drawee bank at Santa Maria, Bulacan, is inconsequential. As
earlier stated, the element of damage was inflicted on the offended party herein
right at the moment and at the place where the checks issued in its favor were
dishonored which is in Santa Maria, Bulacan.
Respondent Judge then decreed:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

dismissing these cases for lack of jurisdiction.
The bail bond posted by the accused in these cases are ordered cancelled.
This Petition for certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two criminal cases on
the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the order
of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and that to
set the order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject
Respondent-accused to double jeopardy.
Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition.
The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the criminal
cases is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements that make up the
offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the territorial
jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where false
assurances were given by Respondent-accused and where the checks he had
issued were dishonored. The People maintain, on the other hand, that
jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
At the outset, it should be pointed out, as the Solicitor General has aptly called
attention to, that there are two dishonored checks involved, each the subject of
different penal laws and with different basic elements: (1) On June 13, 1983,
Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan
Branch) [PDB] Check No. 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of SMC,
which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check
was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, where
it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer, who then deposited
the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch,
which is the SMC depository bank. On July 8,1983, the SMC depository bank
received a notice of dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of funds" from
the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the
subject of the charge of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in
Criminal Case No. 2800 of the lower Court (hereafter, the Bouncing Checks
Case).
(2) On June 18, 1983, Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB Check No.
19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received also
by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot
sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the
SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the
Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn deposited the check with the SMC
depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8,1983, the SMC
depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from
the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the
subject of the prosecution for Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No, 2813
of the lower Court (briefly, the Estafa Case).
In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage
are essential elements of the offense (U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383-390) and
have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.
For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of
deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of that
offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, etc.,
December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323; Dingle vs. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, March 16,
1987,148 SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing Checks Law makes the mere act of
issuing a worthless check a special offense punishable thereunder (Cruz vs. IAC,
No. I,66327, May 28,1984,129 SCRA 490. Malice and intent in issuing the
worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum (Que vs.
People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 21, 1987).
The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not the non-payment of
an obligation (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, supra).
A. With the distinction clarified, the threshold question is whether or not venue
was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in the two
cases.
Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried
over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted —
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in
any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In
transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in
another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being
understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the
others (Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). However,
if an the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its
consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that
municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People vs.
Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing

offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in
separate places (People vs. Yabut, supra). In this case, deceit took place in San
Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the
cheek was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place (See People vs.
Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan
Court or the Pampanga Court.
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not
completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
uttered and delivered. "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat
The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as
an obligation" (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People vs. Yabut, supra).
For although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC.
Said supervisor was not the person who could take the check as a holder, that
is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. The
rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person
who takes it as a holder, which means "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law, cited in People vs. Yabut, supra.) Thus, said representative
had to forward the check to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando,
Pampanga, which was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat who, in turn,
deposited it at the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. The
element of deceit, therefore, took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where the
rubber check was legally issued and delivered so that jurisdiction could properly
be laid upon the Court in that locality.
The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us
appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in
Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were
dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be
entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the subject
checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not
completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were
uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and residence of the payee.
The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix
or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act
essential to its consummation as an obligation (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725).
An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is
revocable (Ogden, Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And the issuance
as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder,
which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of
it, or the bearer thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Delivery of
the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from
one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto (Bailey, Brady on Bank
Checks, 3rd ed. at 57-59; Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Thus, the
penalizing clause of the provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: "By postdating a
check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check," Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the
issuance and delivery of the worthless checks to the complainant took place in
Malolos, Bulacan, conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the
case.
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be

continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of
its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA
186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor
of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing
check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case,
therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor
(in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it is
likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by
itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or
another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987).
Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined

by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo,
81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66
SCRA 235). The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was
committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction
of the Court below.
B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge, predicated

on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctable by Certiorari. The error committed is
one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is
the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a
petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which
are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs. Dept. of Labor, No.
L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error of jurisdiction renders
whatever order of the Trial Court nun and void.
C. The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of
Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for
the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an
adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent Judge's
erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the
cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits,
it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense
(People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 835, 837).
The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may not
be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second
proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy.
Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and void,
the proceedings before the Municipal Court have not been lawfully terminated.
Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no double jeopardy.
A continuation of the proceedings against the accused for serious physical
injuries is in order. (People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 306, 308).
In sum, Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject criminal
case, venue having been properly laid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is hereby

set aside and he is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases
Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or
acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial
of said two cases.
SO ORDERED.
DELA VICTORIA V. BURGOS

245 SCRA 374
FACTS:
Sesbreno filed a case against Mabanto Jr. among other people wherein the
court decided in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to pay
former a definite amount of cash. The decision had become final and executory and a
writ of execution was issued. This was questioned in the
CA by the defendants. In the meanwhile, a notice of garnishment was
issued to petitioner who was then the City Fiscal. She was asked to
withhold any check or whatnot in favor of Mabanto Jr. The CA then
dismissed the defendant’s petition and the garnishment was commenced only to find out
that petitioner didn't follow instructions of sheriff. She is now being held liable.
HELD:
Garnishment is considered as the species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to
the judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger in litigation. Emphasis is laid on the phrase
belonging to the judgment debtor since it is the focal point of resolving the issues raised.
As Assistant City Fiscal, the source of Mabanto’s salary is public funds. Under Section
16 of the NIL, every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of
the instrument for the purpose
of giving effect thereto. As ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the
possession of the instrument by the maker or drawer with
intent to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the holder thereof.
The petitioner is the custodian of the checks. Inasmuch as said checks

were in the custody of the petitioner and not yet delivered to Mabanto, they didn't
belong to him and still had the character of public funds. The
salary check of a government officer or employee doesn't belong to him
before it has been physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the
government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over
it, he cannot assign it without the consent of the government.
*If public funds would be allowed to be garnished, then basic services of the government
may be hampered.
G.R. No. 111190 June 27, 1995
LORETO D. DE LA VICTORIA, as City Fiscal of Mandaue City and in his

personal capacity as garnishee, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XVII, Cebu City, and
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
RAUL H. SESBREÑO filed a complaint for damages against Assistant City Fiscals
Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr., and Dario D. Rama, Jr., before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City. After trial judgment was rendered ordering the defendants
to pay P11,000.00 to the plaintiff, private respondent herein. The decision
having become final and executory, on motion of the latter, the trial court
ordered its execution. This order was questioned by the defendants before the
Court of Appeals. However, on 15 January 1992 a writ of execution was issued.
On 4 February 1992 a notice of garnishment was served on petitioner Loreto D.

de la Victoria as City Fiscal of Mandaue City where defendant Mabanto, Jr., was
then detailed. The notice directed petitioner not to disburse, transfer, release or
convey to any other person except to the deputy sheriff concerned the salary
checks or other checks, monies, or cash due or belonging to Mabanto, Jr., under
penalty of law. On 10 March 1992 private respondent filed a motion before the trial
1
court for examination of the garnishees.
On 25 May 1992 the petition pending before the Court of Appeals was dismissed. Thus
the trial court, finding no more legal obstacle to act on the motion for examination of the
garnishees, directed petitioner on 4 November 1992 to submit his report showing the
amount of the garnished salaries of Mabanto, Jr., within fifteen (15) days from
receipt taking into consideration the provisions of Sec. 12, pars. (f) and (i), Rule 39 of the
2
Rules of Court.
On 24 November 1992 private respondent filed a motion to require petitioner to explain

why he should not be cited in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order of 4
November 1992.
On the other hand, on 19 January 1993 petitioner moved to quash the notice of
garnishment claiming that he was not in possession of any money, funds, credit, property
or anything of value belonging to Mabanto, Jr., except his salary and RATA checks, but
that said checks were not yet properties of Mabanto, Jr., until delivered to him. He further
claimed that, as such, they were still public funds which could not be subject to
garnishment.
On 9 March 1993 the trial court denied both motions and ordered petitioner to immediately
comply with its order of 4 November 1992. It opined that the checks of Mabanto, Jr., had
3
already been released through petitioner by the Department of Justice duly signed by the
officer concerned. Upon service of the writ of garnishment, petitioner as custodian of the
checks was under obligation to hold them for the judgment creditor. Petitioner became a
virtual party to, or a forced intervenor in, the case and the trial court thereby acquired
jurisdiction to bind him to its orders and processes with a view to the complete satisfaction
of the judgment. Additionally, there was no sufficient reason for petitioner to hold the
checks because they were no longer government funds and presumably delivered to the
payee, conformably with the last sentence of Sec. 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
With regard to the contempt charge, the trial court was not morally convinced of
petitioner's guilt. For, while his explanation suffered from procedural infirmities
nevertheless he took pains in enlightening the court by sending a written explanation
dated 22 July 1992 requesting for the lifting of the notice of garnishment on the ground
that the notice should have been sent to the Finance Officer of the Department of Justice.
Petitioner insists that he had no authority to segregate a portion of the salary of Mabanto,
Jr. The explanation however was not submitted to the trial court for action since the
stenographic reporter failed to attach it to the record.
4
On 20 April 1993 the motion for reconsideration was denied. The trial court explained that
it was not the duty of the garnishee to inquire or judge for himself whether the issuance of
the order of execution, writ of execution and notice of garnishment was justified. His only
duty was to turn over the garnished checks to the trial court which issued the order of
execution. 5
Petitioner raises the following relevant issues: (1) whether a check still in the hands of the
maker or its duly authorized representative is owned by the payee before physical delivery
to the latter: and, (2) whether the salary check of a government official or employee
funded with public funds can be subject to garnishment.
Petitioner reiterates his position that the salary checks were not owned by Mabanto, Jr.,
because they were not yet delivered to him, and that petitioner as garnishee has no legal
obligation to hold and deliver them to the trial court to be applied to Mabanto, Jr.'s
judgment debt. The thesis of petitioner is that the salary checks still formed part of public
funds and therefore beyond the reach of garnishment proceedings.
Petitioner has well argued his case.
Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to

the judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. Emphasis is laid on the
6
phrase "belonging to the judgment debtor" since it is the focal point in resolving the issues
raised.
As Assistant City Fiscal, the source of the salary of Mabanto, Jr., is public funds. He
receives his compensation in the form of checks from the Department of Justice through
petitioner as City Fiscal of Mandaue City and head of office. Under Sec. 16 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and
revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As
ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the possession of the instrument by
the maker or drawer with intent to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the
holder thereof.7
According to the trial court, the checks of Mabanto, Jr., were already released by the
Department of Justice duly signed by the officer concerned through petitioner and upon
service of the writ of garnishment by the sheriff petitioner was under obligation to hold
them for the judgment creditor. It recognized the role of petitioner as custodian of the
checks. At the same time however it considered the checks as no longer government
funds and presumed delivered to the payee based on the last sentence of Sec. 16 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law which states: "And where the instrument is no longer in the
possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by
him is presumed." Yet, the presumption is not conclusive because the last portion of the
provision says "until the contrary is proved." However this phrase was deleted by the trial
court for no apparent reason. Proof to the contrary is its own finding that the checks were
in the custody of petitioner. Inasmuch as said checks had not yet been delivered to
Mabanto, Jr., they did not belong to him and still had the character of public funds. In Tiro
v. Hontanosas we ruled that —
8
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong
to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the
government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no
power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government.
As a necessary consequence of being public fund, the checks may not be garnished to
satisfy the judgment. The rationale behind this doctrine is obvious consideration of public
9
policy. The Court succinctly stated in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San

Diego that —
10
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
In denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the trial court expressed the additional
ratiocination that it was not the duty of the garnishee to inquire or judge for himself
whether the issuance of the order of execution, the writ of execution, and the notice of
garnishment was justified, citing our ruling in Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v.
Court of Appeals. Our precise ruling in that case was that "[I]t is not incumbent upon the
11
garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself whether or not the order for the advance
execution of a judgment is valid." But that is invoking only the general rule. We have also
established therein the compelling reasons, as exceptions thereto, which were not taken
into account by the trial court, e.g., a defect on the face of the writ or actual knowledge by
the garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of the garnisher. It is worth to note that the
ruling referred to the validity of advance execution of judgments, but a careful scrutiny of
that case and similar cases reveals that it was applicable to a notice of garnishment as
well. In the case at bench, it was incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into the validity of
the notice of garnishment as he had actual knowledge of the non-entitlement of private
respondent to the checks in question. Consequently, we find no difficulty concluding that
the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the notice of garnishment concerning the
salary checks of Mabanto, Jr., in the possession of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of 9 March 1993 and 20 April 1993
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br. 17, subject of the petition are SET ASIDE.
The notice of garnishment served on petitioner dated 3 February 1992 is ordered
DISCHARGED.
SO ORDERED.
Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

This Court may take judicial notice of the fact that checks for salaries of employees of
various Departments all over the country are prepared in Manila not at the end of the
payroll period, but days before it to ensure that they reach the employees concerned not
later than the end of the payroll period. As to the employees in the provinces or cities, the
checks are sent through the heads of the corresponding offices of the Departments. Thus,
in the case of Prosecutors and Assistant Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the
checks are sent through the Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors, as the case may
be, who shall then deliver the checks to the payees.
Involved in the instant case are the salary and RATA checks of then Assistant City Fiscal
Bienvenido Mabanto, Jr., who was detailed in the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutor)
of Mandaue City. Conformably with the aforesaid practice, these checks were sent to
Mabanto thru the petitioner who was then the City Fiscal of Mandaue City.
The ponencia failed to indicate the payroll period covered by the salary check and the
month to which the RATA check corresponds.
I respectfully submit that if these salary and RATA checks corresponded, respectively, to
a payroll period and to a month which had already lapsed at the time the notice of
garnishment was served, the garnishment would be valid, as the checks would then cease
to be property of the Government and would become property of Mabanto. Upon the
expiration of such period and month, the sums indicated therein were deemed
automatically segregated from the budgetary allocations for the Department of Justice
under the General Appropriations Act.
It must be recalled that the public policy against execution, attachment, or garnishment is
directed to public funds.
Thus, in the case of Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry

vs. Concepcion where the core issue was whether or not the salary due from the
1
Government to a public officer or employee can, by garnishment, be seized before being

paid to him and appropriated to the payment of his judgment debts, this Court held:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public
officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of
these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And
still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it.
The United States Supreme Court, in the leading case of Buchanan vs. Alexander ([1846],
4 How., 19), in speaking of the right of creditors of seamen, by process of attachment, to
divert the public money from its legitimate and appropriate object, said:
To state such a principle is to refute it. No government can sanction it. At all times it would
be found embarrassing, and under some circumstances it might be fatal to the public
service. . . . So long as money remains in the hands of a disbursing officer, it is as much
the money of the United States, as if it had not been drawn from the treasury. Until paid
over by the agent of the government to the person entitled to it, the fund cannot, in any
legal sense, be considered a part of his effects." (See, further, 12 R.C.L., p. 841; Keene vs.
Smith [1904], 44 Ore., 525; Wild vs. Ferguson [1871], 23 La. Ann., 752; Bank of
Tennessee vs. Dibrell [1855], 3 Sneed [Tenn.], 379). (emphasis supplied)
The authorities cited in the ponencia are inapplicable. Garnished or levied on therein were
public funds, to wit: (a) the pump irrigation trust fund deposited with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit in Republic vs. Palacio; (b) the
2
deposits of the National Media Production Center in Traders Royal Bank vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court; and (c) the deposits of the Bureau of Public Highways with the PNB
3
under a current account, which may be expended only for their legitimate object as
authorized by the corresponding legislative appropriation in Commissioner of Public
Highways vs. Diego. 4
Neither is Tiro vs. Hontanosas squarely in point. The said case involved the validity of
5
Circular No. 21, series of 1969, issued by the Director of Public Schools which directed
that "henceforth no cashier or disbursing officer shall pay to attorneys-in-fact or other
persons who may be authorized under a power of attorney or other forms of authority to
collect the salary of an employee, except when the persons so designated and authorized
is an immediate member of the family of the employee concerned, and in all other cases
except upon proper authorization of the Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal and
Administrative Matters, with the recommendation of the Financial Assistant." Private
respondent Zafra Financing Enterprise, which had extended loans to public school
teachers in Cebu City and obtained from the latter promissory notes and special powers of
attorney authorizing it to take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in
Cebu City of the Bureau of Public Schools, sought, inter alia, to nullify the Circular. It is
clear that the teachers had in fact assigned to or waived in favor of Zafra their future
salaries which were still public funds. That assignment or waiver was contrary to public
policy.
I would therefore vote to grant the petition only if the salary and RATA checks garnished
corresponds to an unexpired payroll period and RATA month, respectively.
Padilla, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
This Court may take judicial notice of the fact that checks for salaries of employees of
various Departments all over the country are prepared in Manila not at the end of the
payroll period, but days before it to ensure that they reach the employees concerned not
later than the end of the payroll period. As to the employees in the provinces or cities, the
checks are sent through the heads of the corresponding offices of the Departments. Thus,
in the case of Prosecutors and Assistant Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the
checks are sent through the Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors, as the case may
be, who shall then deliver the checks to the payees.
Involved in the instant case are the salary and RATA checks of then Assistant City Fiscal
Bienvenido Mabanto, Jr., who was detailed in the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutor)
of Mandaue City. Conformably with the aforesaid practice, these checks were sent to
Mabanto thru the petitioner who was then the City Fiscal of Mandaue City.
The ponencia failed to indicate the payroll period covered by the salary check and the
month to which the RATA check corresponds.
I respectfully submit that if these salary and RATA checks corresponded, respectively, to
a payroll period and to a month which had already lapsed at the time the notice of
garnishment was served, the garnishment would be valid, as the checks would then cease
to be property of the Government and would become property of Mabanto. Upon the
expiration of such period and month, the sums indicated therein were deemed
automatically segregated from the budgetary allocations for the Department of Justice
under the General Appropriations Act.
It must be recalled that the public policy against execution, attachment, or garnishment is
directed to public funds.
Thus, in the case of Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry

vs. Concepcion where the core issue was whether or not the salary due from the
1
Government to a public officer or employee can, by garnishment, be seized before being

paid to him and appropriated to the payment of his judgment debts, this Court held:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public
officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of
these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And
still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it.
The United States Supreme Court, in the leading case of Buchanan vs. Alexander ([1846],
4 How., 19), in speaking of the right of creditors of seamen, by process of attachment, to
divert the public money from its legitimate and appropriate object, said:
To state such a principle is to refute it. No government can sanction it. At all times it would
be found embarrassing, and under some circumstances it might be fatal to the public
service. . . . So long as money remains in the hands of a disbursing officer, it is as much
the money of the United States, as if it had not been drawn from the treasury. Until paid
over by the agent of the government to the person entitled to it, the fund cannot, in any
legal sense, be considered a part of his effects." (See, further, 12 R.C.L., p. 841; Keene vs.
Smith [1904], 44 Ore., 525; Wild vs. Ferguson [1871], 23 La. Ann., 752; Bank of
Tennessee vs. Dibrell [1855], 3 Sneed [Tenn.], 379). (emphasis supplied)
The authorities cited in the ponencia are inapplicable. Garnished or levied on therein were
public funds, to wit: (a) the pump irrigation trust fund deposited with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit in Republic vs. Palacio; (b) the
2
deposits of the National Media Production Center in Traders Royal Bank vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court; and (c) the deposits of the Bureau of Public Highways with the PNB
3
under a current account, which may be expended only for their legitimate object as
authorized by the corresponding legislative appropriation in Commissioner of Public
Highways vs. Diego. 4
Neither is Tiro vs. Hontanosas squarely in point. The said case involved the validity of
5
Circular No. 21, series of 1969, issued by the Director of Public Schools which directed
that "henceforth no cashier or disbursing officer shall pay to attorneys-in-fact or other
persons who may be authorized under a power of attorney or other forms of authority to
collect the salary of an employee, except when the persons so designated and authorized
is an immediate member of the family of the employee concerned, and in all other cases
except upon proper authorization of the Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal and
Administrative Matters, with the recommendation of the Financial Assistant." Private
respondent Zafra Financing Enterprise, which had extended loans to public school
teachers in Cebu City and obtained from the latter promissory notes and special powers of
attorney authorizing it to take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in
Cebu City of the Bureau of Public Schools, sought, inter alia, to nullify the Circular. It is
clear that the teachers had in fact assigned to or waived in favor of Zafra their future
salaries which were still public funds. That assignment or waiver was contrary to public
policy.
I would therefore vote to grant the petition only if the salary and RATA checks garnished
corresponds to an unexpired payroll period and RATA month, respectively.
Padilla, J., concurs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL V. SIMA

WEI
219 SCRA 736
FACTS:
Sima Wei executed a promissory note in consideration of a loan secured from petitioner
bank. She was able to pay partially for the loan but failed
to pay for the balance. She then issued two checks to pay the unpaid balance but for
some unexplainable reason, the checks were not received
by the bank but ended up in the hands of someone else. The bank
instituted actions against Sima Wei and other people. The trial court dismissed the case
and the CA affirmed this decision.
HELD:
A negotiable instrument, of which a check is, is not only a written evidence of a contract right but is
also a species of property. Just as a deed to a piece of land must be delivered in order to convey
title to the grantee, so must a negotiable instrument be delivered to the payee in order to
evidence its existence as a binding contract. Section 16 provides that every contract on
a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose
of giving effect thereto. Thus,
the payee of the negotiable instrument acquires no interest with respect thereto until its
delivery to him. Delivery of an instrument from the drawer to the payee, there can be no liability on
the instrument. Moreover, such delivery must be intended to give effect to the instrument.
G.R. No. 85419 March 9, 1993
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL, plaintiff-petitioner,

vs.
SIMA WEI and/or LEE KIAN HUAT, MARY CHENG UY, SAMSON TUNG,
ASIAN INDUSTRIAL PLASTIC CORPORATION and PRODUCERS BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-respondents.
Yngson & Associates for petitioner.
Henry A. Reyes & Associates for Samso Tung & Asian Industrial Plastic
Corporation.
Eduardo G. Castelo for Sima Wei.
Monsod, Tamargo & Associates for Producers Bank.
Rafael S. Santayana for Mary Cheng Uy.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
On July 6, 1986, the Development Bank of Rizal (petitioner Bank for brevity)
filed a complaint for a sum of money against respondents Sima Wei and/or Lee
Kian Huat, Mary Cheng Uy, Samson Tung, Asian Industrial Plastic Corporation
(Plastic Corporation for short) and the Producers Bank of the Philippines, on two
causes of action:
(1) To enforce payment of the balance of P1,032,450.02 on a promissory note

executed by respondent Sima Wei on June 9, 1983; and
(2) To enforce payment of two checks executed by Sima Wei, payable to

petitioner, and drawn against the China Banking Corporation, to pay the
balance due on the promissory note.
Except for Lee Kian Huat, defendants filed their separate Motions to Dismiss
alleging a common ground that the complaint states no cause of action. The trial
court granted the defendants' Motions to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision, * to which the petitioner Bank, represented by its Legal Liquidator,
filed this Petition for Review by Certiorari, assigning the following as the alleged
errors of the Court of Appeals: 1
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS HEREIN.
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 13, RULE 3 OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT ON ALTERNATIVE DEFENDANTS IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO HEREIN DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
In consideration for a loan extended by petitioner Bank to respondent Sima Wei, the latter
executed and delivered to the former a promissory note, engaging to pay the petitioner
Bank or order the amount of P1,820,000.00 on or before June 24, 1983 with interest at
32% per annum. Sima Wei made partial payments on the note, leaving a balance of
P1,032,450.02. On November 18, 1983, Sima Wei issued two crossed checks payable to
petitioner Bank drawn against China Banking Corporation, bearing respectively the serial
numbers 384934, for the amount of P550,000.00 and 384935, for the amount of
P500,000.00. The said checks were allegedly issued in full settlement of the drawer's
account evidenced by the promissory note. These two checks were not delivered to the
petitioner-payee or to any of its authorized representatives. For reasons not shown, these
checks came into the possession of respondent Lee Kian Huat, who deposited the checks
without the petitioner-payee's indorsement (forged or otherwise) to the account of
respondent Plastic Corporation, at the Balintawak branch, Caloocan City, of the
Producers Bank. Cheng Uy, Branch Manager of the Balintawak branch of Producers Bank,
relying on the assurance of respondent Samson Tung, President of Plastic Corporation,
that the transaction was legal and regular, instructed the cashier of Producers Bank to
accept the checks for deposit and to credit them to the account of said Plastic Corporation,
inspite of the fact that the checks were crossed and payable to petitioner Bank and bore
no indorsement of the latter. Hence, petitioner filed the complaint as aforestated.
The main issue before Us is whether petitioner Bank has a cause of action against any or
all of the defendants, in the alternative or otherwise.
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
or rights of another. The essential elements are: (1) legal right of the plaintiff; (2)
correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right.
2
The normal parties to a check are the drawer, the payee and the drawee bank. Courts
have long recognized the business custom of using printed checks where blanks are
provided for the date of issuance, the name of the payee, the amount payable and the
drawer's signature. All the drawer has to do when he wishes to issue a check is to
properly fill up the blanks and sign it. However, the mere fact that he has done these does
not give rise to any liability on his part, until and unless the check is delivered to the payee
or his representative. A negotiable instrument, of which a check is, is not only a written
evidence of a contract right but is also a species of property. Just as a deed to a piece of
land must be delivered in order to convey title to the grantee, so must a negotiable
instrument be delivered to the payee in order to evidence its existence as a binding
contract. Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which governs checks, provides
in part:
Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. . . .
Thus, the payee of a negotiable instrument acquires no interest with respect thereto until
its delivery to him. Delivery of an instrument means transfer of possession, actual or
3
constructive, from one person to another. Without the initial delivery of the instrument
4
from the drawer to the payee, there can be no liability on the instrument. Moreover, such
delivery must be intended to give effect to the instrument.
The allegations of the petitioner in the original complaint show that the two (2) China Bank
checks, numbered 384934 and 384935, were not delivered to the payee, the petitioner
herein. Without the delivery of said checks to petitioner-payee, the former did not acquire
any right or interest therein and cannot therefore assert any cause of action, founded on
said checks, whether against the drawer Sima Wei or against the Producers Bank or any
of the other respondents.
In the original complaint, petitioner Bank, as plaintiff, sued respondent Sima Wei on the
promissory note, and the alternative defendants, including Sima Wei, on the two checks.
On appeal from the orders of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court, petitioner Bank alleged
that its cause of action was not based on collecting the sum of money evidenced by the
negotiable instruments stated but on quasi-delict — a claim for damages on the ground of
fraudulent acts and evident bad faith of the alternative respondents. This was clearly an
attempt by the petitioner Bank to change not only the theory of its case but the basis of his
cause of action. It is well-settled that a party cannot change his theory on appeal, as this
would in effect deprive the other party of his day in court.5
Notwithstanding the above, it does not necessarily follow that the drawer Sima Wei is
freed from liability to petitioner Bank under the loan evidenced by the promissory note
agreed to by her. Her allegation that she has paid the balance of her loan with the two
checks payable to petitioner Bank has no merit for, as We have earlier explained, these
checks were never delivered to petitioner Bank. And even granting, without admitting, that
there was delivery to petitioner Bank, the delivery of checks in payment of an obligation
does not constitute payment unless they are cashed or their value is impaired through the
fault of the creditor. None of these exceptions were alleged by respondent Sima Wei.
6
Therefore, unless respondent Sima Wei proves that she has been relieved from liability on
the promissory note by some other cause, petitioner Bank has a right of action against her
for the balance due thereon.
However, insofar as the other respondents are concerned, petitioner Bank has no privity
with them. Since petitioner Bank never received the checks on which it based its action
against said respondents, it never owned them (the checks) nor did it acquire any interest
therein. Thus, anything which the respondents may have done with respect to said checks
could not have prejudiced petitioner Bank. It had no right or interest in the checks which
could have been violated by said respondents. Petitioner Bank has therefore no cause of
action against said respondents, in the alternative or otherwise. If at all, it is Sima Wei, the
drawer, who would have a cause of action against her
co-respondents, if the allegations in the complaint are found to be true.
With respect to the second assignment of error raised by petitioner Bank regarding the
applicability of Section 13, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, We find it unnecessary to discuss
the same in view of Our finding that the petitioner Bank did not acquire any right or interest
in the checks due to lack of delivery. It therefore has no cause of action against the
respondents, in the alternative or otherwise.
In the light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
petitioner's complaint is AFFIRMED insofar as the second cause of action is concerned.
On the first cause of action, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for a trial on the
merits, consistent with this decision, in order to determine whether respondent Sima Wei
is liable to the Development Bank of Rizal for any amount under the promissory note
allegedly signed by her.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 167567 : September 22, 2010
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. BARTOLOME PUZON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This petition for review assails the December 21, 2004 Decision 1 and March 28, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of
cralaw cralaw
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83905, which dismissed the petition before it and denied reconsideration,
respectively.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Bartolome V. Puzon, Jr., (Puzon) owner of Bartenmyk Enterprises, was a dealer of beer products of
petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for Parañaque City. Puzon purchased SMC products on credit. To
ensure payment and as a business practice, SMC required him to issue postdated checks equivalent to the value of
the products purchased on credit before the same were released to him. Said checks were returned to Puzon when
the transactions covered by these checks were paid or settled in full.
On December 31, 2000, Puzon purchased products on credit amounting to P11,820,327 for which he issued, and
gave to SMC, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check Nos. 27904 (for P309,500.00) and 27903
(for P11,510,827.00) to cover the said transaction.
On January 23, 2001, Puzon, together with his accountant, visited the SMC Sales Office in Parañaque City to
reconcile his account with SMC. During that visit Puzon allegedly requested to see BPI Check No. 17657.
However, when he got hold of BPI Check No. 27903 which was attached to a bond paper together with BPI Check
No. 17657 he allegedly immediately left the office with his accountant, bringing the checks with them.
SMC sent a letter to Puzon on March 6, 2001 demanding the return of the said checks. Puzon ignored the demand
hence SMC filed a complaint against him for theft with the City Prosecutor's Office of Parañaque City.
Rulings of the Prosecutor and the Secretary of Department of Justice (DOJ)
The investigating prosecutor, Elizabeth Yu Guray found that the "relationship between [SMC] and [Puzon]
appears to be one of credit or creditor-debtor relationship. The problem lies in the reconciliation of accounts and
the non-payment of beer empties which cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for theft."3 Thus, in her July 31,
cralaw
2001 Resolution,4 she recommended the dismissal of

cralaw
the case for lack of evidence. SMC appealed.

On June 4, 2003, the DOJ issued its resolution5 affirming the prosecutor's Resolution dismissing the case. Its
cralaw
motion for reconsideration having been denied in the April 23, 2004 DOJ Resolution, 6 SMC filed a petition
cralaw
for certiorari with the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA found that the postdated checks were issued by Puzon merely as a security for the payment of his
purchases and that these were not intended to be encashed. It thus concluded that SMC did not acquire ownership
of the checks as it was duty bound to return the same checks to Puzon after the transactions covering them were
settled. The CA agreed with the prosecutor that there was no theft, considering that a person cannot be charged
with theft for taking personal property that belongs to himself. It disposed of the appeal as follows:chanroblesvirtualla wlibrar
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public respondent, dated 04 June 2003 and 23 April 2004,
are AFFIRMED. No costs at this instance.
SO ORDERED.7 cralaw
The motion for reconsideration of SMC was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issues
Petitioner now raises the following issues: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
WHETHER X X X PUZON HAD STOLEN FROM SMC ON JANUARY 23, 2001, AMONG
OTHERS BPI CHECK NO. 27903 DATED MARCH 30, 2001 IN THE AMOUNT OF
PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
TWENTY SEVEN (Php11,510,827.00)
II
WHETHER X X X THE POSTDATED CHECKS ISSUED BY PUZON, PARTICULARLY

BPI CHECK NO. 27903 DATED MARCH 30, 2001 IN THE AMOUNT OF PESOS:
ELEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY
SEVEN (Php11,510,827.00), WERE ISSUED IN PAYMENT OF HIS BEER PURCHASES
OR WERE USED MERELY AS SECURITY TO ENSURE PAYMENT OF PUZON'S
OBLIGATION.
III
WHETHER X X X THE PRACTICE OF SMC IN RETURNING THE POSTDATED

CHECKS ISSUED IN PAYMENT OF BEER PRODUCTS PURCHASED ON CREDIT
SHOULD THE TRANSACTIONS COVERED BY THESE CHECKS [BE] SETTLED ON
[THE] MATURITY DATES THEREOF COULD BE LIKENED TO A CONTRACT OF
PLEDGE.
IV
WHETHER X X X SMC HAD ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE TO JUSTIFY THE

INDICTMENT OF PUZON FOR THE CRIME OF THEFT PURSUANT TO ART. 308 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.8 cralaw
Petitioner's Arguments
SMC contends that Puzon was positively identified by its employees to have taken the subject postdated checks. It
also contends that ownership of the checks was transferred to it because these were issued, not merely as security
but were, in payment of Puzon's purchases. SMC points out that it has established more than sufficient probable
cause to justify the indictment of Puzon for the crime of Theft.
Respondent's Arguments
On the other hand, Puzon contends that SMC raises questions of fact that are beyond the province of an appeal
on certiorari . He also insists that there is no probable cause to charge him with theft because the subject checks
were issued only as security and he therefore retained ownership of the same.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
At the outset we find that as pointed out by Puzon, SMC raises questions of fact. The resolution of the first issue
raised by SMC of whether respondent stole the subject check, which calls for the Court to determine whether
respondent is guilty of a felony, first requires that the facts be duly established in the proper forum and in accord
with the proper procedure. This issue cannot be resolved based on mere allegations of facts and affidavits. The
same is true with the second issue raised by petitioner, to wit: whether the checks issued by Puzon were payments
for his purchases or were intended merely as security to ensure payment. These issues cannot be properly resolved
in the present petition for review on certiorari which is rooted merely on the resolution of the prosecutor finding no
probable cause for the filing of an information for theft.
The third issue raised by petitioner, on the other hand, would entail venturing into constitutional matters for a
complete resolution. This route is unnecessary in the present case considering that the main matter for resolution
here only concerns grave abuse of discretion and the existence of probable cause for theft, which at this point is
more properly resolved through another more clear cut route.
Probable Cause for Theft
"Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial."9 On the fine
cralaw
points of the determination of probable cause, Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.10 comprehensively elaborated
cralaw
that:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
The determination of [the existence or absence of probable cause] lies within the discretion of the prosecuting
officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party. Thus, the decision
whether to dismiss a complaint or not is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal. He may
dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance or without any ground. Or
he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form. To emphasize,
the determination of probable cause for the filing of information in court is an executive function, one that properly
pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the
filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case. Ultimately, whether or not a
complaint will be dismissed is dependent on the sound discretion of the Secretary of Justice. And unless made with
grave abuse of discretion, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review.
For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of
preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination
of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.
Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the matter
of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
In the present case, we are also not sufficiently convinced to deviate from the general rule of non-interference.
Indeed the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari before it, absent grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the DOJ Secretary in not finding probable cause against Puzon for theft.
The Revised Penal Code provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
cralaw
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latter's consent.
xxx
"[T]he essential elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things."11 cralaw
Considering that the second element is that the thing taken belongs to another, it is relevant to determine whether
ownership of the subject check was transferred to petitioner. On this point the Negotiable Instruments Law
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
Sec. 12. Antedated and postdated - The instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is antedated or
postdated, provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so
dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery. (Underscoring supplied.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Note however that delivery as the term is used in the aforementioned provision means that the party delivering did
so for the purpose of giving effect thereto.12 Otherwise, it cannot be said that there has been delivery of the
cralaw
negotiable instrument. Once there is delivery, the person to whom the instrument is delivered gets the title to the
instrument completely and irrevocably.
If the subject check was given by Puzon to SMC in payment of the obligation, the purpose of giving effect to the
instrument is evident thus title to or ownership of the check was transferred upon delivery. However, if the check
was not given as payment, there being no intent to give effect to the instrument, then ownership of the check was
not transferred to SMC.
The evidence of SMC failed to establish that the check was given in payment of the obligation of Puzon. There
was no provisional receipt or official receipt issued for the amount of the check. What was issued was a receipt for
the document, a"POSTDATED CHECK SLIP."13 cralaw
Furthermore, the petitioner's demand letter sent to respondent states "As per company policies on receivables, all
issuances are to be covered by post-dated checks. However, you have deviated from this policy by forcibly taking
away the check you have issued to us to cover the December issuance."14 Notably, the term "payment" was not
cralaw
used instead the terms "covered" and "cover" were used.
Although the petitioner's witness, Gregorio L. Joven III, states in paragraph 6 of his affidavit that the check was
given in payment of the obligation of Puzon, the same is contradicted by his statements in paragraph 4, where he
states that "As a standard company operating procedure, all beer purchases by dealers on credit shall be covered by
postdated checks equivalent to the value of the beer products purchased"; in paragraph 9 where he states that "the
transaction covered by the said check had not yet been paid for," and in paragraph 8 which clearly shows that
partial payment is expected to be made by the return of beer empties, and not by the deposit or encashment of the
check. Clearly the term "cover" was not meant to be used interchangeably with "payment."
When taken in conjunction with the counter-affidavit of Puzon - where he states that "As the [liquid beer] contents
are paid for, SMC return[s] to me the corresponding PDCs or request[s] me to replace them with whatever was the
unpaid balance."15 - it becomes clear that both parties did not intend for the check to pay for the beer products.
cralaw
The evidence proves that the check was accepted, not as payment, but in accordance with the long-standing policy
of SMC to require its dealers to issue postdated checks to cover its receivables. The check was only meant
to cover the transaction and in the meantime Puzon was to pay for the transaction by some other means other than
the check. This being so, title to the check did not transfer to SMC; it remained with Puzon. The second element of
the felony of theft was therefore not established. Petitioner was not able to show that Puzon took a check
that belonged to another. Hence, the prosecutor and the DOJ were correct in finding no probable cause for theft.
Consequently, the CA did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ in sustaining the
dismissal of the case for theft for lack of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The December 21, 2004 Decision and March 28, 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83905 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES* PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

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SECTION 16

Under Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments

G.R. No. 107898 December 19, 1995

MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, petitioners,

Check No. Date of Issue Amount

027683 16 July 1983 P27,900.00 3

027684 23 July 1983 P27,900.00 4

027719 6 Aug. 1983 P32,550.00 5

027720 13 Aug. 1983 P27,900.00 6

027721 27 Aug. 1983 P37,200.00 7

CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR

027683 22 July 1983 Payment Stopped (PS) 8

027684 23 July 1983 PS and Drawn Against

027699 24 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 10

027700 5 Sept. 1983 PS and DAIF 11

027719 9 Aug. 1983 DAIF 12

027720 16 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 13

027721 30 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 14

November 1992 their motion for reconsideration was denied. 18

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient

as well as its resolution of 6 November 1992 denying reconsideration thereof, is

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAN MIGUEL

Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of

which he reasoned out, thus:

Respondent Judge then decreed:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition.

SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted —

Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing

In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be

And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined

B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge, predicated

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is hereby

DELA VICTORIA V. BURGOS

The petitioner is the custodian of the checks. Inasmuch as said checks

G.R. No. 111190 June 27, 1995

LORETO D. DE LA VICTORIA, as City Fiscal of Mandaue City and in his

On 4 February 1992 a notice of garnishment was served on petitioner Loreto D.

court for examination of the garnishees.

On 24 November 1992 private respondent filed a motion to require petitioner to explain

Petitioner has well argued his case.

Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to

policy. The Court succinctly stated in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San

Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

Thus, in the case of Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry

Government to a public officer or employee can, by garnishment, be seized before being

Padilla, J., concurs.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

Thus, in the case of Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry

Government to a public officer or employee can, by garnishment, be seized before being

Padilla, J., concurs.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL V. SIMA

G.R. No. 85419 March 9, 1993

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL, plaintiff-petitioner,

Yngson & Associates for petitioner.

Eduardo G. Castelo for Sima Wei.

Monsod, Tamargo & Associates for Producers Bank.

Rafael S. Santayana for Mary Cheng Uy.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

(1) To enforce payment of the balance of P1,032,450.02 on a promissory note

(2) To enforce payment of two checks executed by Sima Wei, payable to