35.

Pardon and Amnesty

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with
the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the
private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court . .
. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is
not complete without acceptance.
DOES NOT IPSO FACTO RESTORE RIGHT OF CONVICT TO HOLD PUBLIC
OFFICE. — Notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of
the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that
pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. The rationale
is plainly evident. Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised
to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a
mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa
would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude
the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.
Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is
not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. (Monsanto v.
Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 78239, [February 9, 1989], 252 PHIL 192-210)
36. Foreign Loans
Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year,
submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans
to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign
debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
37 Treaties; the president as the sole organ of foreign relation
The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and
judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or
question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by
writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a
certain manner. (Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, [August 12, 2014])
38. Administrative Supervision by SC over courts
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter
to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the
Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the
independence of the judiciary. (Maceda v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, [April 22,
1993])
39. Career and non career positions; power to discipline; security of tenure
CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE; CLOSE INTIMACY, PREDOMINANT REASON IN
EXTENDING APPOINTMENT. — The occupant of a particular position could be
considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen
by the appointing authority was to repeat, the latter's belief that he can share a
close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of
discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of
personal trust or confidential matters of state. Withal, where the position
occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust
between them is no longer predominant.||| (Civil Service Commission v. Salas,
G.R. No. 123708, [June 19, 1997], 340 PHIL 526-544)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE LAW; RIGHT TO SECURITY OF
TENURE; REASSIGNMENT OF JOB WITH NO DEFINITE DURATION, A
VIOLATION THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — After a careful study, the Court
upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner
to MIST "appears to be indefinite." The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that
the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and
experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus
be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private
respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in
the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the
reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a
permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent
with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question
is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. (Gloria
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, [August 15, 2000], 392 PHIL 536-543)
40. Power of the Comelec over interparty issue
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It
does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving
political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities
without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes
internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has
already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled
in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections 16 that the COMELEC's powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another case 17 that
the COMELEC's power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus,
the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case
brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. (Atienza
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188920, [February 16, 2010], 626 PHIL
654-674)
41. Automatic release of IRA
ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF LGUs IRA. — Section 4 of AO
372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This
is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government
Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU
concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government
for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that
must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998,
of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in
the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdbacks which means "something
held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the
retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is
prohibited.||| (Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, [July 19, 2000], 391
PHIL 84-121)
42. Initiation of Impeachment proceeding
There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of the
impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee
on Justice. The Court ruled that once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period||| (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, [February 15, 2011], 658 PHIL 322-533)
43. Ancestral land vs. Domain
NCESTRAL DOMAINS AND ANCESTRAL LAND ARE PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
DO NOT CONSTITUTE PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN. — Ancestral domains and
ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not
constitute part of the land of the public domain. The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a
distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The
private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public
Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral
land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The
necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be
first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration
purposes. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to
avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral
land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,
from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition. The option to register
land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless
a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from
October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA
ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP BY ICCs/IPs OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN LIMITED AND
DOES NOT INCLUDE RIGHT TO ALIENATE. — The right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/lPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. Ownership of
ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but
to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes
the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral
domain. The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept
maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain.
But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by
the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are
merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations,
"benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate
the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring
ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." Simply
stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship.||| (Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. 135385 (Resolution), [December 6, 2000], 400 PHIL 904-1115)
44. Public Utilities
The Gamboa Decision already held, in no uncertain terms, that what
the Constitution requires is "full and legal beneficial ownership of 60 percent of
the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights x x x
must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals And, precisely that is what SEC-
MC No. 8 provides, For purposes of determining compliance [with the
constitutional or statutory ownership], the required percentage of Filipino
ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares
of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote||| (Roy III v.
Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246 (Resolution), [April 18, 2017], 808 PHIL 838-888)
45. Due process in student disciplinary proceeding
POLITICAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; REQUIREMENTS; MINIMUM STANDARD TO
BE SATISFIED IN IMPOSING DISCIPLINARY SANCTION BY AN ACADEMIC
INSTITUTION. — Corollary to respondent students' contention of denial of due
process is their argument that it is the Ang Tibay case [69 Phil. 635 (1940)] and
not the Guzman case [142 SCRA 699], which is applicable in the case at bar.
Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process,
the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals
specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university
herein, thus: "(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall
be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case. (Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong, G.R. No.
99327, [May 27, 1993])
46. Amendments to the Constitution
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change
in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the]
basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances.|||
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch
from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So
would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because
of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution||| (Lambino
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 174153 & 174299, [October 25, 2006], 536
PHIL 1-364)