UFRGS

 Joao kaminski Jr
Kaminski, J (2007) Incertezas na modelagem de torres metálicas
A1 Engineering Structures Kaminski, J, Riera, J D; de Menezes, R C R; Miguel, L F F (2008). Model
uncertainty in the assessment of transmission line towers subjected to cable rupture. ES, 30(10), 2935–2944.

 Rui Menezes
Menezes Bentes (2013) D Análise dinamica da ruptura de cabos em torres autoportantes e estaiadas de linhas
de transmissão
Menezes Carlos (2012) D Análise dinamica de torres estaiadas de linhas de transmissão submetidas a ruptura
de cabo
ELT_245_3 SILVAS, J. B. G. F. ; MENEZES, R. C. R. ; KEMPNER, L. ; MIGUEL, Leandro Fadel .
Influence of the hyperstatic modeling on the behavior of transmission line latice structures. Electra (Paris.
1967), v. 245
ELT_244_3 FUCHS, A. ; GEORGHITA, G. ; KEMPNER, L. ; MENEZES, R. C. R. ; SILVAS, J. B. G. F. .
Comparison of General Industry Practices for Lattice Tower Design and Detailing. Electra (Paris. 1967), v.
244,

 Leandro Fadel Miguel

A1 2013 Civil Engineering and Management Fadel Fadel - Dynamic response of a 190m-high transmission
tower for a large river crossing

 Acir Loredo Souza

Loredo-Souza; Devenport, A G (2003) The influence of the design methodology in the response of a
transmission tower to wind loading
Loredo-Souza, A. ., & Davenport, A. . (1998). The effects of high winds on transmission lines. Journal of
Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics, 74-76, 987–994.
Rippel 2016 D Estudo em túnel de vento do arrasto aerodinâmico sobre torres treliçadas de linhas de
transmissão
SENEV 2010 Loredo-Souza Simulação aeroelásticas de linhas de transmissão em túneis de vento

 Jorge Daniel Rieira

Riera Zampiron (2008) Critérios de Projeto de Torres Auto-portantes de Telecomunicações e Aplicações
  Relatório de saída LION

[1] Variáveis de entrada ambientais [2] Variáveis de entrada da linha de transmissão

o Velocidade máxima do vento: 27 m/s
o Temperatura ambiente em condições
de velocidade máxima do vento: 25ºC
o Temperatura media anual: 25ºC
o Menor temperatura histórica: 7ºC
o Temperatura máxima ambiente: 30ºC
o Temperatura mínima ambiente: 15ºC
o Temperatura coincidente: 30ºC
o Altura média da linha: 25 m
o Comprimento da linha: 1000m
o Vão de vento: 150m
o Vão de peso: 150m
o Vão máximo: 150m
o Vão mínimo: 150m
o Ângulo da estrutura de suspensão: 3º
o Ângulo da ancoragem: 20º
o Angula da estrutura terminal: 30º
o Fator de rotção da cadeia de apoio dos cabos: 0,70
o Carga de montagem dos cabos condutores: 250 kgf
o Carga de montagem dos cabos de aterramento: 200 kgf

[3] Hipóteses simuladas para cada tipo de estrutura

Vento Vento de Alta Desequilíbrio
Estrutura Montagem Cascata
Extremo Intensidade Longitudinal
Suspensão Leve/Pesada x x x x
Ancoragem x x x x
Terminal x x x

[1] Coeficientes de majoração das cargas para cada hipótese

Torre Hipótese considerada Kv Kt1 Kt2 Kl Kvm Kvr Kvr Kv: Coef. de
Vento extremo 90º 1.15 1 1 1 segurança vertical
Vento extremo 75º 1.15 1 1 1
Vento extremo 60º 1.15 1 1 1 Kt1: Coef. de
Vento extremo 45º 1.15 1 1 1 segurança
Vento tormenta 90º 1.15 1 1 1 transversal do vento
Vento tormenta 75º 1.15 1 1 1
Suspensão
Vento tormenta 60º 1.15 1 1 1
Vento tormenta 45º 1.15 1 1 1 Kt2: Coef. de
Ruptura fase 1.15 1 1 1 1.15 segurança
transversal do
Ruptura aterramento 1.15 1 1 1 1.15
ângulo da torre
Construção e montagem 1.15 1 1 1 2 2
Conteção de cascata 1.15 1 1 1
Vento extremo 90º 1.15 1 1 1 Kl: Coef. de
Vento extremo 75º 1.15 1 1 1 segurança
Vento extremo 60º 1.15 1 1 1 longitudinal
Vento extremo 45º 1.15 1 1 1
Vento tormenta 90º 1.15 1 1 1 Kvm: Coef. de
Ancoragem
Vento tormenta 75º 1.15 1 1 1 segurança vertical
Vento tormenta 60º 1.15 1 1 1 em montagem
Vento tormenta 45º 1.15 1 1 1
Construção e montagem 1.15 1 1 1 2 2 Kvr: Coef. de
Desiquilibrio longitudinal 1.50 1 1 1.5 segurança vertical
Vento extremo 90º 1.15 1 1 1 em montagem com
Vento extremo 75º 1.15 1 1 1 roldana
Vento extremo 60º 1.15 1 1 1
Vento extremo 45º 1.15 1 1 1 KvR: Coef. de
Terminal Vento tormenta 90º 1.15 1 1 1 segurança vertical
Vento tormenta 75º 1.15 1 1 1 em situação de cabo
Vento tormenta 60º 1.15 1 1 1 rompido
Vento tormenta 45º 1.15 1 1 1
Construção e montagem 1.15 1 1 1 2 2
A. Torre de suspensão
 Vento extremo transversal 90º
 Hipótese a qual considera o vento extremo atingindo uma torre de suspensão em um
ângulo de 90º com relação a direção longitudinal da linha. Sendo o ângulo da
estrutura de 3º, vento 27 m/s, temperatura de 25ºC, com vão de vento de 150 m e vão
de peso 150 m
 Vento extremo a 75º
 Vento extremo a 60º
 Vento extremo a 45º
 Vento extremo longitudinal 0º

 Vento de tormentas transversal 90º

 Ângulo da estrutura de 3º, V=33 m/s, T= 25ºC, Lpeso=150 m e Lvento=150 m
 Vento de tormentas a 75º
 Vento de tormentas 60º
 Vento de tormentas 45º
 Vento de tormentas longitudinal 0º

 Ruptura longitudinal em qualquer fase ou em qualquer para-raios

 Hipótese na qual há ruptura de um dos cabos, escolhidos
aleatoriamente, em uma torres de suspensão. Sendo o ângulo da
estrutura de 3º, V=33 m/s, T= 25ºC, Lpeso=150 m e Lvento=150 m

 Construção e montagem
 Carga longitudinal de construção
atuando simultaneamente em
qualquer combinação possível de
cabos fase e para-raios e peso
próprio da estrutura, em uma torre de
suspensão. Sendo o ângulo da
estrutura de 3º, V=0 m/s, T= 25ºC,
Lpeso=150 m e Lvento=150 m, carga de
montagem dos cabos condutores 250
kgf e carga de montagem para-raios
200 kgf

 Contenção cascata
 Hipótese na qual há uma carga longitudinal atuante em todos os cabos em uma torre
de suspensão, devido ao tombamento de uma torre ao long da linha. Sendo o ângulo
da estrutura de 3º, V=0 m/s, T= 25ºC, Lpeso=150 m e Lvento=150 m.
B. Torre de ancoragem
 Vento extremo transversal 90º
 Hipótese a qual considera o vento extremo atingindo uma torre de suspensão em um
ângulo de 90º com relação a direção longitudinal da linha. Sendo o ângulo da
estrutura de 20º, vento 27 m/s, temperatura de 25ºC, com vão de vento de 150 m e vão
de peso 150 m
 Vento extremo a 75º
 Vento extremo a 60º
 Vento extremo a 45º
 Vento extremo longitudinal 0º

 Vento de tormentas transversal 90º

 Ângulo da estrutura de 20º, V=33 m/s, T= 25ºC, Lpeso=150 m e Lvento=150 m
 Vento de tormentas a 75º
 Vento de tormentas 60º
 Vento de tormentas 45º
 Vento de tormentas longitudinal 0º

 Desequilíbrio longitudinal
 Desequilibrio longitudinal atuando simultaneamente
em qualquer combinação possível de cabos fase e
pára-raios e peso próprio da estrutura, em uma torre de
ancoragem. Sendo o ângulo da estrutura de 20.0º,
ventos de 0,00 m/s, temperatura de 25.0ºC, com vão
de vento de 150.0 m e vão de peso de 150.0m.

 Construção e montagem.
 Carga longitudinal de construção atuando simultaneamente em qualquer combinação
possível de cabos fase e pára-raios e peso próprio da estrutura, em uma torre de
ancoragem. Sendo o ângulo da estrutura de 20.0º, ventos de 0,00 m/s, temperatura de
25.0ºC, com vão de vento de 150.0 m, vão de peso de 150.0m, carga de montagem
dos cabos condutores 250.0 kgf, carga de montagem para-raios 200.0kgf.
C. Torre terminal
 Vento extremo transversal 90º
 Hipótese na qual considera-se que o vento extremo atinge uma torre terminal em um
ângulo de 90º com relação a linha. Sendo o ângulo da estrutura de 30º, ventos de 27
m/s, temperatura de 25.0ºC, com vão de vento de 150.0 m e vão de peso de 150.0m.
 Vento extremo a 75º
 Vento extremo a 60º
 Vento extremo a 45º
 Vento extremo longitudinal 0º

 Vento de tormentas transversal 90º

 Ângulo da estrutura de 30º, V=33 m/s, T= 25ºC, Lpeso=150 m e Lvento=150 m
 Vento de tormentas a 75º
 Vento de tormentas 60º
 Vento de tormentas 45º
 Vento de tormentas longitudinal 0º

 Construção e montagem.
 Carga longitudinal de construção
atuando simultaneamente em
qualquer combinação possível de
cabos fase e pára-raios e peso
próprio da estrutura, em uma torre
terminal. Sendo o ângulo da
estrutura de 30º, ventos de 0,00
m/s, temperatura de 25.0ºC, com
vão de vento de 150.0 m, vão de
peso de 150.0m, carga de
montagem dos cabos condutores
250.0 kgf, carga de montagem
para-raios 200.0kgf.
  CIGRE B2-12(GT-08)10 - TB WGB2-22 Mechanical Security of Overhead Lines - 24 May 2012

Mechanical Security of Overhead Lines

Containing Cascading Failures and
Mitigating Their Effects
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 2010. ASCE Manual 74, Guidelines for Electrical Transmission Line
Structural Loading, Manuals and Reports on Engineering Practice, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston,
Virginia.
CIGRÉ. 2000. “Load Control Devices on Overhead Lines”. Technical Brochure 174.
EN 50341-1,2001 Overhead Electrical Lines exceeding AC 45 kV –Part 1:General Requirements - Common
specifications, CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization , Brussels, Belgium.
International Standard IEC 60826, 3rd Ed. 2003-10. Design criteria of overhead transmission lines.
5 OHL cascade mitigation systems
5.1 General
Prevention of cascades by effective failure containment measures is a critical aspect of line design. Several systems
and strategies have been developed and implemented in the last decades but one should acknowledge that success has
been somewhat limited since OHL systems continue to fail during big storm events. Older lines constructed before
strict longitudinal load requirements started to appear in design guidelines are particularly at risk, considering the
additional uncertainty in component resistance that comes from aging.
The first consideration in OHL cascade mitigation is to assess whether or to what extent the post-elastic reserve of the
supports can be relied upon (Section 5.2). Cascade mitigation devices such as control sliding clamps (Section 5.3) and
load-limiting cross arms (Section 5.4) protect the supports from excessive loads by providing additional slack and
localized dissipation of energy. Another approach implemented by the Bonneville Power Administration in the United
States is to combine the use of clusters of a few stronger suspension towers at regular intervals with regular suspension
towers of nominal strength (Section 5.5). Anti-cascading supports (Section 5.6) are intended to confine longitudinal
failures to line sections within their boundaries. On power grids located in regions prone to atmospheric icing, line
deicing (Section 5.7) provides a non structural solution, keeping in mind that other failure scenarios involving no icing
will require proper mitigation as well. Finally, a few special load control devices are discussed (Section 5.8) which
have been considered by some utilities but have not been implemented.
5.2 Post-elastic reserve of OHL supports
5.3 Control sliding clamps
5.4 Load-limiting cross arms
5.5 Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)’s approach and experience
In the United States, BPA uses a design philosophy where suspension structures are designed with increased
longitudinal capacities (low, medium and high levels) and are strategically used to contain the damage assuming some
limited failure of few towers in a typical line section. The design philosophy is based on the work of Kempner (1997) Commented [V1]: Kempner Jr., L. 1997. Longitudinal
where it is shown that under a cascading failure, the longitudinal load on the survival tower decreases as the number of Impact Loading on Electrical Transmission Line Towers: A
Scale Model Study. Ph.D. Thesis. System Science: Civil
adjacent failed tower increases.
Engineering. Portland State University, Portland, Oregon,
201 p.
BPA tries to prevent the OHL cascade failure using a critical load case that could realistically occur within the limits
of probability that are similar to that used for vertical and transverse loading. The longitudinal loading case Lapointe, M. 2003. Dynamic analysis of a power line
assumptions are (1) only one wire or phase is broken at a time, and (2) the break occurs during the EDT condition subjected to longitudinal loads. M.Eng. Thesis. Department
of Civil Engineering and Applied Mechanics, McGill
which is defined as no ice, no wind, a conductor temperature of 30o Fahrenheit, and initial sag. The conductor tension University, 112 p. Available at:
obtained under these conditions is multiplied by an impact factor based on the full anticipated dynamic loading http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/
occurring under a broken wire condition. Standard suspension towers, 0 to 3 degree line angle, and Heavy suspension
Menezes, R.C.R., Kaminski Jr., J. and Miguel, L.F.F, 2005.
towers, 0 to 6 degrees, are assigned an impact factor of 1.33. The impact factor for Light suspension towers, no line Aspectos relevantes na análise dinâmica de torres de LT
angle is 0.67, which means that these structures will only resist 1/2 the load and should fail, absorbing approximately submetidas à ruptura de cabos, XVIII SNPTEE - XVIII
1/2 energy in the system (Kempner 1997). Seminário Nacional de Produção e Transmissão de Energia
Elétrica, Curitiba, Brasil (in portuguese - Brazilian Seminar
In addition to the above considerations, there is an implemented policy that provides the requirements for mandatory of CIGRE).
use of containment structures at certain intervals. For steel towers (lattice and Engineered Pole) no more than 4-5
miles (5.5 – 7 km) of continuous light tangent suspension towers should be applied between dead-ends, or no more
than 12-15 miles (16 – 21 km) of light tangent suspension towers should be applied between dead-ends with the
inclusion of any combination of three non-light suspension towers (standard or heavy suspension) every 4-5 miles.
Those measures have proven effective, as no full tower cascade failure has been reported by BPA. As a matter of fact,
only one instance of a cascade involving the failure of the top part of eleven 500-kV supports has been experienced by
BPA in Oregon in 2005. The damaged towers were Light Suspension structures, and the typical damage is shown in
Figure 1-2. The weather condition at the time of this event was subfreezing temperatures, fog and little, if any, wind.
The conductor and ground wire had a deposit of rime ice (and possibly a light coating of glaze ice). In this particular
transmission line section the 500 kV Light Suspension towers were between Standard Suspension towers at each end.
The Light Suspension towers have only minimum longitudinal load capacity, where the Standard Suspension towers
were designed as a longitudinal failure containment structure. In this event the system performance was expected, the
cascading tower tops stopped at the stronger Standard Suspension Towers. The consequence of this event is consistent
with BPA’s failure containment philosophy.
5.6 Various experiences with anti-cascading supports
The installation of “anti-cascading” towers at set intervals along a line route can be efficient to limit secondary
failures. The distance between anti-cascading towers can be matched with the utility’s ability to quickly restore in the
event of such failures. For example, in France a distance of ten spans is used as this corresponds with the capability of
their emergency restoration systems.
Anti-cascading supports are recommended as a failure containment measure in IEC 60826 and Appendix C indicates
that several utilities are using them, often in combination with other solutions. Strain structures can also serve as
efficient anti-cascading towers that can stop the dynamic failure shock induced by conductor ruptures. In cold
climates, the efficiency of such towers will vary depending on the iced line conditions at the time of the conductor
rupture.
In Canada, Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie uses anti-cascading towers in suspension, which are strong tangent towers
designed with an overload factor to account for the quasi-static effects of a longitudinal rupture event.
Another interesting structural solution for failure containment of existing lines where the construction of new strain
supports is not possible is to strengthen existing strain supports with the addition of guy wires to resist large load
imbalances without overloading the original supports. The same technique can also be used to provide cascade
confinement to ground wire peaks in suspension structures.
6 Design criteria to prevent OHL cascades
6.1 General
A major concern in the overhead line industry is the confinement of line cascades. Most line cascades are longitudinal
when triggered by failure of a structural element that maintains tension in the conductor. During the last decades
International Standards dealing with Overhead Line design have incorporated knowledge and have provided
guidelines for designing transmission line towers for unbalanced longitudinal loads. These longitudinal loads can
develop from wire breakage, insulator failure, or structural and component failure. However, they should not be
limited to design provisions for accidental loads when the objective is to assure the robustness of the line and provide
resistance to progressive collapse of the line supports. These loading conditions that should be considered in the
structure design to avoid a cascading failure of the transmission line are generally referred as “security loads” or
“security measures” in those standards and they will be discussed in this chapter.
Generally, design criteria for exceptional loads address the impact of severe climatic events that overload line
components whose failure triggers line cascades. Most utilities consider that their current cascading failure design
practice for new lines is providing an adequate level of containment capability but the more critical issue is
management of the risk of cascade failure to the extensive existing overhead line assets. Globally, it is anticipated that
not many new high voltage overhead lines will be constructed over the next decade, and the focus should be on future
industry needs, particularly on improving reliability and availability of existing lines. The reader is reminded that the
experiences of other utilities reviewed in Chapter 5 and some additional strategies discussed in Chapter 7 are
applicable to both new and existing lines.
6.2 IEC 60826
IEC 60826 Standard provides design criteria for overhead lines based on reliability concepts. The reliability of lines is
achieved by providing strength requirements of line components larger than the specified design loads, which can be
determined on the basis of significant meteorological data in conjunction with probabilistic and semi-probabilistic
methods. However, other loading conditions, not dealt with in the design process, can occur and lead to line failure
such as impact of objects, defects of material, sabotage, etc. Line security, defined as the ability of a line to be
protected from major collapse if a failure is triggered in a given component, is a deterministic concept that is also
addressed in that standard.
In IEC 60826, Clause 6.6.3 security measures are provided in order to prevent uncontrollable propagation of failures,
should they occur at load levels significantly lower than the design loads. Torsional effects are addressed in Clause
6.6.3.1 and longitudinal effects in Clause 6.6.3.2. The security measures comprise, as a minimum, of several scenarios
of unbalanced longitudinal loads applied to structures, plus optional requirements presented in Clause 6.6.3.3 as
additional security measures such as the insertion of anti-cascading towers. A reduction of the prescribed longitudinal
security loads is allowed if effective load limiting devices are used. For example, as covered in Section 5 of this
technical brochure, this reduction would apply to lines using sliding clamps on suspension towers that are supposed to
allow the conductor to slip when longitudinal loads exceed a specified threshold value that may be of the order of 30
to 50% of the initial conductor tension prior to breakage.
Torsional loads
The minimum prescribed security loads in IEC 60826 for suspension structures consist of the residual static load
(RSL) of one phase or ground wire calculated for average spans and at sagging tensions, allowance being made for the
relaxation of the load resulting from any swing of the insulator strings assemblies, deflection or rotation of the
structure, foundations, articulated cross arms or articulated supports, and the interaction with other phases conductors
or wires that may influence this load.
Longitudinal loads
There is also another security load requirement in IEC 60826 that applies simultaneously to all structure attachment
points. It is equal to the unbalanced loads produced by the tension of bare conductors and ground wires in all spans in
one direction from the structure and with a fictitious overload equal to the weight, w, of the conductors and GW in all
spans in the other direction. Average spans shall be considered with bare conductors at sagging tension and any
appropriate relaxation effects mentioned in the previous paragraph. This load case is called longitudinal conductor
weight; for example, for a conductor weighing 20 N/m, this load case consists of loading the left spans of a suspension
tower with bare conductors, while the right spans are loaded with a simulated ice load equal to 20 N/m (see Figure 6-
1).
6.3 CENELEC EN 50341-1:2001
Security Loads in CENELEC EN 50341-1 are specified to give minimum requirements on torsional and longitudinal
resistance of the supports by defining containment loads. The loads considered are one-sided release of static tension
in a conductor and conventional unbalanced overloads, respectively.
Similar to IEC 60826, torsional loads consist of a residual static load (RSL) of one phase conductor or one sub-
conductor or a ground wire at normal ambient temperature without wind load or ice load. Tension release in several
sub-conductors or conductors may also be considered for more stringent conditions.
The other security load requirement in CENELEC EN 50341-1 is the longitudinal loads applied simultaneously in all
attachment support points. They are equal to the unbalanced loads produced by the tension of a bare conductor in one
direction from the support when a fictitious overload equal to the self-weight of the conductor (multiplied by a factor,
if required) is considered in all spans in the other direction. Alternatively the loads may be determined as one-sided
release of tension in the conductor as mentioned in the previous paragraph. According to EN 50341-1 more severe
climatic conditions may be specified in the National Normative Aspects (NNAs) or Project Specifications for both
cases: torsional or longitudinal loads.
The security load cases above, for suspension supports, may be calculated taking into account the relaxation of the
loading resulting from any swing of the insulator sets and the elastic deflection and rotation of the support. The
security load values may also be limited by devices designed for this purpose (slipping clamps, for instance).

6.4 ASCE Manual 74

ASCE Manual 74 is widely used in many other countries than the United States. Its section 3 on additional load
considerations recommends three methods to reduce the risk of a cascading failure. The method selected is governed
primarily by the characteristics of the line, the nature of the wire system, and the design of the structures.
Method 1 is to design all structures for a static residual longitudinal load. The ASCE Manual provides residual static
load (RSL) factors as a function of the span/sag ratio and the span/insulator ratio (S/I). A wire tension multiplied by
the RSL longitudinal load factors predicts the final residual static tension in the wire after all dynamic effects from the
wire break have vanished. However, these RSL loads are not considered on all tower attachment points as prescribed
in IEC 60826. Alternatively, several loading scenarios are recommended depending on
the line configuration. For a single circuit line, the unbalanced loads are applied to any conductor phase or at one or
both ground wire attachment points, whereas for a double circuit line, the unbalanced loads are applied to any two
conductor phases, one or two ground wire attachment points, or one conductor phase and ground wire support. These
recommendations are valid for both suspension and strain towers, while the loading on the intact phases and ground
wire spans should correspond to the climatic event assumed to trigger the failure, although Appendix J of the Manual
states that wind effects are typically ignored, which suggests that they were intended to account for normal operational
conditions and iced conditions. Such general guidelines will necessarily lead to a very large variance on the static
residual strength of supports, hence the need to accept structural failures in heavy climatic load conditions as long as
the line is protected from cascading. In effect, this means that this approach cannot be used alone and requires
consideration of Methods 2 and/or 3.
The ASCE Manual also provides procedures to calculate dynamic impact load factors as a function of the span/sag and
insulator ratios and the stiffness of the support structures. This method was developed from the research works
completed by EPRI (Ostendorp 1997a to d), see Section 4.3 of this Brochure. Wire tensions multiplied by the
longitudinal load factors provide approximate design loads that include dynamic effects, structural stiffness, and
insulator lengths. The span/sag ratio is the ratio of the average span length within a given tension section to the sag of
the average span for a given conductor or ground wire tension. Longitudinal load factors are provided for ‘Rigid’
structures such as guyed or lattice structures of great stiffness as well as for ‘Flexible’ structures such as single poles
capable of enduring large elastic deformations.
Method 2 of ASCE Manual 74 is to install failure containment structures at specified intervals. It is considered
prudent design practice to employ methods to limit the length of a cascade especially for existing lines with limited
longitudinal strength. Generally, the cost of strengthening such structures to resist cascading at each support is likely
to be cost prohibitive. One option would be to insert failure containment structures (e.g. stop structures, anchor
structures, anti-cascading structures) at prescribed intervals along the line to limit the extent of the damage caused by a
component, structure, or foundation failure. The Manual does not provide any recommendations of how to implement
this method. It does state that intervals up to ten miles are common. Section 5.3 gives one example of how a utility has
implemented this approach in combination of the design of an anti-cascading tower series. The specified interval is the
responsibility of the transmission line designer and is based on the number of factors. These can include, but are not
limited to, the importance of the line and/or the number of emergency towers the utility has in stock.
Finally, Method 3 prescribes the installation of load release mechanisms. Protection from cascading has been achieved
by using slip- or release-type suspension clamps that limit the extreme event longitudinal loads that can be transferred
to the structures.
Manual 74 states that it is not always economical for a utility to design or maintain a transmission line in a manner that
provides sufficient strength to withstand the high dynamic loads at each structure. A successful anti-cascading
transmission line design requires that the failure is limited to an acceptable number of structures if the overall system
is to be protected. The acceptable number of structural failures should be determined based on the utility’s design
philosophy and targeted reliability levels. Additional explanations are provided in Appendix J of the Manual dealing
with special loads.

6.5 Summary of CEATI and internal WGB2.22 survey results

CEA Technologies International is the Centre for Energy Advancement through Technological Innovation
(http://www.ceati.com/) which brings electrical utility industry professionals together, through focused interest groups
and collaborative projects. In 2001, under the leadership of the late engineer Paul Meyère who then was chairing a
special interest group on “Wind and Ice Storm Mitigation (WISMIG)”, CEATI sponsored a survey on design
approaches used by its utility members for overhead transmission lines under severe climatic loads due to wind and
atmospheric icing effects. The survey questionnaire and collected responses, reproduced with CEATI’s permission in
Appendix B of this Technical Brochure, pertained to new lines as well as for lines to be upgraded. The respondents to
the questionnaire represented 13 utilities from North America, Japan and some European countries. Given their origin,
the utilities have reported that the National or International design standards mostly used for designing and upgrading
their transmission lines/structures were ASCE 10 (formerly ASCE Manual 52), ASCE Manual 74, NESC ANSI C2-
1997, CSA C22.3 No.1-1987, CSA O15-1990 and IEC 60826.

It is noteworthy that 12 of the 13 respondents stated that they make containment provisions to limit damage in case of
weather exceeding the design loads. Eight utilities reported that they consider a broken iced conductor load (any
conductor or ground wire, one at a time) for suspension tower design case, although none of the respondents has
reported to consider any dynamic load effect on the tower either under bare or partial iced conditions. Regarding the
criteria used for determining the longitudinal load on suspension towers due to unbalanced ice, 5 of 8 respondents
have reported using differential loads based on glaze ice thickness.
To complement the results of the CEATI survey with more participation from other utilities members of CIGRÉ,
WGB2.22 has conducted an internal survey (among the WG members and their affiliates) on current design practices
used for preventing OHL cascade failures. Both the survey questionnaire and a summary table reporting the salient
results are reproduced in Appendix C of this Technical Brochure.
The results of the internal WGB2.22 survey indicate that most National Transmission Line Standards used in
European and North American countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland, Serbia, Spain, France, United States and
Canada) and in other countries around the world (Australia, Brazil, Japan, South Africa) prescribe some design load
criteria for preventing or mitigating the effects of OHL tower cascading failures. In general the specified failure
containment load cases involve the application of an unbalanced longitudinal load at one random phase or ground wire
(torsional load) in case of ordinary suspension towers, at EDT condition without ice, using a Residual Static Load
(RSL) varying from 0.50 to 0.70 of EDT. It is also usual practice in those countries with severe icing conditions, to
install reinforcing stop structures or anti-cascading supports with an average interval of 10 spans (4 to 5 km). It is
unclear how this particular interval was selected considering the wide variety in OHL design parameters among the
utilities. For most utilities, a stop structure is a strain tower, whereas for some others anti-cascading towers are
suspension supports designed to resist large quasi-static unbalanced longitudinal loads. The design of those reinforcing
supports (strain or suspension) takes into account load cases with simultaneous full longitudinal loads at phase and
ground-wire attachment points in adverse weather conditions, including icing when applicable. The utilities which are
using stop structures and anti-cascading towers have reported their satisfaction with this approach. Stop structures
have proven effective to contain cascading failures of various modes (longitudinal and transverse) while anti-
cascading supports in suspension are aimed at stopping longitudinal cascades after the failure shock has been
dissipated.
Brazil has reported the successful use of an alternative containment load case that consists of the simultaneous
application of 50% of the everyday longitudinal load on all phase attachment points and full everyday tension at
ground-wire on all suspension type supports. This practice provides a more continuous distribution of mechanical
robustness along the line and therefore does not require a limitation on the number of spans in a line section between
anchor towers. None of the transmission lines designed with this failure containment criterion has suffered any
cascading failure to date.
The failure containment philosophy of Bonneville Power Administration in the United States has already been
presented in some detail in Section 5.5. It is seen that BPA’s approach is an intermediate design between the discrete
robustness provided by stop structures or anti-cascading suspension towers, and the continuous robustness concept
adopted by Brazil.
Finally, the reader is reminded that additional information and detailed results of both the CEATI survey and the
internal WG-B2.22 survey are provided in Appendices B and C.

Recent advances in OHL cascading analysis

4.1. Numerical simulations of residual loads
Calculation of residual static loads is an important step to assess the ability of a line section to resist progressive
collapse. A classical accidental load considered in line design is the residual load following conductor breakage.
However, geometrically nonlinear static analysis software allows to calculate residual static loads (RSL) due to a wide
variety of component failure, such as the drop of a suspension insulator string, the rupture of a ground wire peak or
cross arm, any partial or complete collapse of the tower in any direction (longitudinal or transverse).
A comprehensive study was undertaken by the CEATI WISMIG (Ghannoum, 2007) to compare the unbalanced ice
loads and broken conductor loads with those obtained from the reference climatic loads on five different types of
structures. In order to perform the necessary calculations of this study, five different lines/structures were modeled in
PLS-CADD, TOWER, and PLS-POLE. These lines were:
61 kV single circuit wood H frame
230 kV single circuit wood H frame
230 kV double circuit steel pole structure
230 kV double circuit lattice steel structure
735 kV single circuit lattice steel structure
In the first phase of the study, five different standards were considered in comparing the residual loads on these
structures. These standards were: IEC 60826, EN 50341, ASCE Manual 74, CSA C22.3, and NESC standards. The
member utilities practices were also studied in a limited way. A parametric study was also performed in order to assess
the variation of the resulting loads with respect to the structural flexibility, insulator string length, number of spans
next : to the dead end structure and the magnitude of the design ice thickness. It was shown that the residual loads
under ice shedding and broken conductor scenarios will be reduced considerably and this should be included in the
structural design of overhead lines. The number of spans to the next dead-end structure, and the length of the insulator
strings were also found to affect unbalanced loads significantly, as summarized in Table 3-1.

4.2. Numerical simulations of cascading events

his work was pioneered by Peyrot and his collaborators at the University of Wisconsin in Madison in the early 1980s.
The first finite element simulation model o be reported was by Thomas (née Baenziger) in her PhD thesis (Thomas,
981) supervised by Peyrot (Thomas and Peyrot, 2002). Her simulations were run on an in-house program and had to
include several simplifying assumptions o circumvent numerical difficulties. This study inspired McClure (McClure
and inawi, 1987, McClure 1989) to tackle broken wire simulations using commercial software (ADINA) with
efficient algorithms to handle highly nonlinear dynamics problems: the methodology has been refined and presented in
detail in McClure and Lapointe (2003) and McClure (2006 a). With a view of achieving knowledge transfer to
industry, it was also published in a CEATI report (McClure, 2006 b). As indicated in the References section, numerous
similar studies have been reported since then using the same approach and various finite element analysis software. A
few of these studies are summarized below which were conducted to explain actual line failures.

Gupta et al., (1994) presented a finite element model of a 345 kV tubular H-pole transmission line to simulate the
actual sequence of events leading to the failure of the line during a severe ice storm in 1990. It was reported that 69 H-
frame tubular steel pole structures failed covering a distance of 30.6km (19 miles section of a line). The primary
objective of the analysis model was to quantify the potential loading leading to different failure possibilities. A six-
span model (see Figure 4-1) with five transmission structures was analyzed. Both material nonlinearities and
geometric nonlinearities were considered in the analysis of the line. The structural analysis considered several load
cases including the static uniform ice loads on conductors and shield wires, dynamic analysis under broken insulator
scenario and conductor galloping.

Figure 4-1 A 6-span model used in failure analysis. (Gupta et al., 1994)
Lapointe (2003) reported the results of dynamic nonlinear analyses of a Hydro-Québec 230-kV line section subjected
to sudden component failures. The modeled section included five suspension structures and two dead end structures
for a total of six spans as shown in Figure 4-2. This line section had actually experienced two conductor failures and
ensuing collapse of two suspension supports during an ice storm in 1997. The numerical study included the
simultaneous rupture of two conductors that initiated the failure of two suspension towers in torsion. The study
included the impact of support failures as well as the insulator string failure. The ADINA software was used to
simulate the nonlinear response under three primary load cases (1) bare conductor, (2) 20mm radial ice and (3) 25mm
radial ice on the conductor.

Figure 4-2 Two-dimensional model of a typical section of a 230-kV line. (Lapointe, 2003)
Both two-dimensional and three-dimensional models of the line section were considered in the study. In the two-
dimensional models, support flexibility was ignored by attaching the insulator strings and the conductor extremities to
fixed points (Figure 4-2). However, the three-dimensional model considered a double-circuit arrangement with six
conductors and the shield wire and the insulator strings at the suspension points (Figure 4-3). Although the supports
are only shown schematically in Figure 4-3, all members of the suspension lattice structures were modeled whereas the
dead end structures were assumed to be fixed points. The towers were considered on rigid foundations. The study
reported the cable tension at the suspension points and the time history of the load at the dead end structure location. It
was shown that the latter was significant. A typical response time history comparison is shown in Figure 4- 4, where it
is seen that the two-dimensional model overestimates the resulting peak load amplitudes compared to the detailed
three-dimensional model.

Figure 4-3 Three-dimensional model layout. (Mirshafiei, 2010)

Figure 4-4 Horizontal force at cross arm next to breakage point. (Lapointe, 2003)
EDF Research and Development have worked on the simulation of tower failures and cascading events using
Code_Aster, the EDF R&D finite element general thermo-mechanics software, public-domain free software available
on the internet at www.code_aster.org.)This in-house code provides an interface in French and essentially contains the
same features as those available in commercial finite element codes. An interesting feature of this software is the
availability of equivalent beam models with properties that reproduce the elastic stiffness of the tower in flexure
(longitudinal and transverse) and in torsion. The global equivalent mass distribution is also determined to represent the
lowest natural frequencies of the tower in flexure and torsion. Conductors and ground wires are represented with
Code_Aster cable elements which have similar characteristics as other commercial software suited for cable dynamics
of slack cables: no bending rigidity, a large kinematics formulation, Hookean tensile behavior, and Hookean
compressive behavior, with a very small axial rigidity compared to the tension properties. It is possible to take into
account the plastic behavior of cables if the elastic limit is exceeded using a secant stiffness approach.
In 2004, EDF R&D has performed a conductor breakage dynamic simulation corresponding to the tests and
simulations performed by Hydro-Québec on the Saint Luc de Vincennes experimental line. Note that such simulations
had also previously been carried out by Hydro-Québec using ADINA, as reported in Chapter 3. The results obtained
from Code_Aster considering the loading of the towers and the conductor tension were very similar to the test results.
Overall, EDF R&D simulations have confirmed the results obtained by others in several similar studies. More
discussion of the Code_Aster features and numerical studies carried by EDF R&D will be presented in the upcoming
Technical Brochure “Qualification of HV and UHV overhead line supports under static and dynamic loads” (under
preparation by WGB2.24).
Other computational studies published by Peabody and McClure (2010), Tucker and Haldar (2007), Xia et al. (2008),
Kaminski et al. (2008), and Menezes et al. (2005) lead to the conclusion that computational modelling provides a
realistic simulation tool of the dynamic response of line sections under accidental loads. Note that it is also possible to
use similar models to simulate the dynamic effects of ice shedding (Kálmán et al. 2007, Mirshafiei 2010). All these
computational studies have confirmed that dynamic interactions between the supports and the line conductors are
important. Intact conductors (and ground wires in particular) have a major influence on the deformation modes of the
supports. This coupling is particularly important in terms of inertia effects since the mass of conductors contributes
largely to the total mass of the line section. Geometric nonlinearities are important and must always be included in the
analysis. The relative importance of geometric nonlinearities in towers varies according to tower flexibility and type.