20.

21.

22.

Filamer v. CA
G.R. No. 75112 [October 16, 1990]
Facts:
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased),
was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan,
Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the
accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. At the
time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student
driver’s permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him.
The two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the hospital. The
trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a
non-party. Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court’s
judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower court’s decision became final as to Funtecha.
For failure of the insurance firm to pay the docket fees, its appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1984. On
December 17, 1985, the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court’s decision in toto.
Hence the present recourse by petitioner Filamer.

Issue:
Whether or not the term “employer” as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference
to Funtecha.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary
responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the
accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment.
His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the
wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless
manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. At the
time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed,
but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious
negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused. Furthermore, the Court cited
Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code, under the Labor Code, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as
Funtecha’s employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in
exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to
clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As
admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll.

23.

FEATI University v. Judge Bautista & FEATI University Faculty

G.R. No. L-21278 December 27, 1966

FEATI UNIVERSITY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations and FEATI
UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU, respondents.

Facts:

The private respondent wrote a letter to president of petitioner informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club
into a registered labor union.

President of the Faculty Club sent another letter containing twenty-six demands that have connection with the
employment of the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and requesting an answer within ten days from
receipt thereof. The President of the University answered the two letters, requesting that she be given at least thirty
days to study thoroughly the different phases of the demands.

Meanwhile counsel for the University, to whom the demands were referred, wrote a letter to the President of the
Faculty Club demanding proof of its majority status and designation as a bargaining representative.

President of the Faculty Club filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason therefore the refusal
of the University to bargain collectively.

The parties were called to conferences but efforts to conciliate them failed.
Members of the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, resulting
in the disruption of classes in the University. President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations
the dispute between the management of the University and the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10
of Republic Act No. 875.

The Judge endeavored to reconcile the part and it was agreed upon that the striking faculty members would return to
work and the University would readmit them under a status quo arrangement. On that very same day, however, the
University, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the
case, because (1) the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the University, it being an educational institution, nor to
the members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors; and (2) the presidential certification is violative
of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no
industrial dispute which could be certified to the CIR.

The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. The University filed a motion for reconsideration by the CIRen
banc, without the motion for reconsideration having been acted upon by the CIR en banc, respondent Judge set the
case for hearing but the University moved the cancellation of the said hearing upon the ground that the court en banc
should first hear the motion for reconsideration and resolve the issues raised therein before the case is heard on the
merits but denied.

Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to declare in contempt of court certain parties, alleging that
the University refused to accept back to work the returning strikers, in violation of the return-to-work order.

The University filed its opposition to the petition for contempt by way of special defense that there was still the motion
for reconsideration which had not yet been acted upon by the CIR en banc. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not FEATI is an employer within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Based on RA 875 Section 2(c) The term employer include any person acting
in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when
acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor organization.

In this case, the University is operated for profit hence included in the term of employer. Professors and instructors,
who are under contract to teach particular courses and are paid for their services, are employees under the Industrial
Peace Act.

Professors and instructors are not independent contractors. university controls the work of the members of its faculty;
that a university prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the
professors’ work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated for
their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot substitute
others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if their work is
found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore,
employees and not independent contractors.
24.

G.R. No. L-17620 August 31, 1962

FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS (PACUP) and TOMAS N. AGUIRRE, respondents.

Crispin D. Baizas & Associates for petitioner.

Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Eulogio R. Lerum for the other respondents.

CONCEPCION, ​J.​:
Appeal by ​certiorari​, taken by the Far Eastern University, hereafter referred to as the University, from resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations sitting ​en banc,​ modifying a decision of one of the Judges of said Court. The main facts
are set forth in said decision, from which we quote:
From the evidence on record, it appears that Tomas N. Aguirre became a faculty member of the respondent in 1948.
He was first employed at the rate of P6.00 per hour and then was contracted to teach in the Boys' High School
Department in the same university at the rate of P30.00 per class, earning an average of P500.00 to P600.00 a
month. Aguirre joined the PACUP, a legitimate labor organization in June 1953. In July or August, 1953, upon orders
of the president of the PACUP, Jose M. Hernandez, Aguirre began to campaign and recruit members for the PACUP.
As a result of his efforts in campaigning for membership, he was able to influence seven members from the faculty of
the university (Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-6", inclusive). In his campaign for membership, he approached practically all of
the faculty members of the respondent's Institute of Education and some from the Arts and Sciences, Business
Administration and Finance, but most of them were afraid to join the union. They were afraid of any retaliation that the
respondent may make because of their joining the union.
In the year 1953, respondent formed a committee to classify all faculty members and determine the rates of their
backpay and assignments. Ninety-six of the more than four hundred faculty members were classified as full time
instructors. Aguirre was one of those who was classified by the said committee as full time instructor in the
respondent's Institute of Education, with a fixed compensation of P450.00 a month, effective September 1, 1953.
During the months of December, 1953 up to May, 1954, for teaching in the Far Eastern University, respondent herein,
Aguirre was paid the following: December, 1953-P210.00; January, 1954 — P302.40; February, 1954 — P313.20;
March, 1954 — P249.00. In June, 1954, respondent stopped giving him teaching assignments.
Aguirre claims that in June, 1954, he was no longer given an assignment because of his union activities while
respondent claims that Aguirre was not given assignment because of decreased enrollment in the university. He
further avers that after recruiting some members, his classification as full time instructor changed to reserved full time
instructor and his teaching load was decreased to two hours a day. Hence, his reduced earnings from December,
1953 to May, 1954 as previously mentioned. His salary as a full time instructor was P5,400.00 per annum or P450.00
per month, irrespective of his teaching load. Respondent, thru its witness, the dean in the Institute of Education where
Aguirre was teaching, testified and admitted that the reason for Aguirre's not receiving any teaching assignment in
June, 1954 was because enrollment in the Institute of Education was going down steadily in the Filipino Language
class where Aguirre was teaching. Among the other Filipino Language instructors are Baldomero de Jesus, Teodoro
Gener, Rosario Bernards, Dolores Gupit, Inigo Regalado, and Flordeliza Mendoza who are older members of the
faculty than Aguirre except Regalado, Bernards and Mendoza. The dean of the Institute of Education, Luz A. Zafra,
admitted also that in the assignment of subjects to faculty members, length of service, experience, preparation and
professional growth as well as student-faculty relation were taken into consideration. Hence if these above-mentioned
factors, particularly length of service and experience, were really taken into consideration, Aguirre a full time
professor should have been given the assignment in stead of Regalado and Mendoza who were only part time
professors and who started teaching after him. The other Tagalo instructors (professors under the classification) who
were given assignments when Aguirre was not, are not members of the PACUP. It should also be noted that since
before the last war, Aguirre had been teaching in the University of the Philippines.
It is true that there were charges brought by respondent against Aguirre but the same had been investigated and
found to be groundless. On the other hand, Aguirre brought charge against the respondent before the Department of
Education when his teaching load was reduced and the Director of Private Schools, in his decision of November 9,
1954, directed the respondent to pay the salary differential which Aguirre fail to earn from December 1, 1953 to 1954
and to give Aguirre assignment in the college department during the first semester of the current school year under
the same condition before his teaching load was reduced. The Secretary of Education, in his decision, dated June 22,
1955, affirmed the decision of the Director of Private Schools and on December 8, 1956, the Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President of the Philippines affirmed the decision of the Director of Private School as well as the
Secretary of Education's decision, previously mentioned. Of course, those proceedings in no way could considered
as controlling or affecting the case at bar. At best, they may serve as a grim reminder of the actions, of the
governmental entity that could do something to bolster the relationship between the university and the faculty
members. The allegation of respondent to the effect that it suffered reduce enrollment in 1953-1954, hence
necessitating the laying off of Aguirre, cannot be taken into consideration after a careful examination of the balance
sheet submitted by the respondent in relation to its motion to dismiss. Said balance sheet shows that in the
1952-1953 fiscal year, respondent made a net profit of P158,035.25 and in 1953-1954, P258,619.98, while in
1954-1955, a net profit of P707,003.70 and in 1955-1956, P999,766.88. The figures show that respondent from 1952
to 1956, has been steadily increasing its income until in 1958-1959 when it made net income of P1,511,293.42. And
even on the assumption the enrollment in the department where Aguirre was teaching reduced, still the Court cannot
validly reconcile the fact that Aguirre who was a full time professor receiving a fixed monthly salary could not any
further be given assignment the time professors and whose length of service in the university cannot compare with
that of Aguirre were given assignment and suffered no reeducating in salary. Undoubtedly, this Court cannot but
conclude that when the respondent changed status of Aguirre from a full time professor at P450.00 a month to that of
a reserved full time professor with a teaching load of two hours and finally got no assignments in June, 1964, it was
motivated other than decreased enrollment, especially in the case of the evidence that Aguirre campaigned for union
membership among the professors, instructors and teachers of the respondent and the further fact, that other full time
instructors similarly situated but are not union members did not suffer the same facts of abrupt reduction in their
teaching load and salary. As indicated, Aguirre was later deprived of any teaching load in the Institute of Education.
Even part time professors as Panganiban, Mendoza and Regalado had assignments to the exclusion of Aguirre who
was a full time professor. This eventuality, was apparently, the fear of most of the faculty members who refused to
join the PACUP when Aguirre asked them to become members.
Ordinarily, back wages are granted whenever there is a finding of a commission of unfair labor practices. However, in
this particular case the testimony of Aguirre, himself as well as the documentary evidence on the record show that
since June, 1958, Aguirre began teaching at the Philippine College of Commerce with an income of P100.00 a month
and on November 17, 1955, he began working as a permanent employee in the Central Bank of the Philippines with a
compensation of P3,000.00 per annum. On September 5, 1956, his salary was raised to P3,600.00 per annum. The
permanent employment obtained by Aguirre in the Central Bank of the Philippines as well as in the Philippine College
of Commerce is substantial and under the concept of the Industrial Peace Act, his employment elsewhere in a
permanent capacity is sufficient to bar his reinstatement to his former position in the respondent. While it may be true
that his earnings with the Central Bank may be less than that he was receiving from the Far Eastern University, yet
his status with the Central Bank, is permanent and he could teach as a sideline in any school, as in fact he is
connected with the Philippine College of Commerce, a fact that could not happen if he were still connected with the
Far Eastern University.
At the instance of the Philippine Association of Colleges and University Professors, hereafter referred to as the
PACUP, and/or Tomas N. Aguirre, on September 28, 1954, an Acting Prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the University, which later moved on November 17, 1954, to dismiss
the complaint. Subsequently, or on February 4, 1955, the complainant and/or the offended party, Tomas N. Aguirre
filed a motion to withdraw said complaint upon the ground that there was a decision of the Director of Private Schools
ordering his reinstatement and the payment of back wages, as well as wage differential, and that the University was
"using the pendency" of the case "as a ground for not complying with the said decision". Acting upon this latter
motion, on March 29, 1955, the Court dismissed said complaint. However, on August 30, 1955 the order of dismissal
was, on motion of the complainant dated April 22, 1955, set aside for the reason that the expected amicable
settlement of the case had not materialized. On October 16, 1955, the University filed a "supplemental pleading" to its
motion to dismiss of November 17, 1954 both of which were denied by the Court on June 23, 1956. Later on the
University filed its answer and, the issue having been joined, the case was tried, after which Judge Arsenio L.
Martinez of said Court rendered the aforementioned decision finding the University guilty of unfair labor practice and
sentencing said institution to pay to Aguirre the salary differential due him from December 1, 1953 to May 31, 1954,
based on Aguirre's salary of P450.00 a month, as well as back wages at the same rate, from June 1, 1954 to
November 17, 1955, after deducting therefrom the compensation paid to him by the Philippine College of Commerce
from June 1, 1955 to November 17, 1955, as well as to cease and desist from further committing unfair labor
practices. However, said Judge did not order the reinstatement of Aguirre in the University, upon the ground that his
employment in the Central Bank of the Philippines, is, within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act, a substantial
equivalent of his position as full time instructor in said University.
On motion for reconsideration filed by the complainant, a majority of the judges of said Court sitting ​en banc,​ affirmed
the decision of Judge Martinez, insofar as the commission of unfair labor practice charged and the payment of the
salary differential and back wages are concerned, but held that Aguirre's employment in the Central Bank and the
Philippine College of Commerce are not the substantial equivalent of his aforementioned position as full time
instructor in the University, and, accordingly, modified said decision by, likewise, sentencing the University to
reinstate Tomas N. Aguirre, in addition to paying him the aforementioned wages differential and back wages plus
"other emoluments". Hence this appeal by certiorari taken by the University. The Court of Industrial Relation, as one
of the appellees herein, has filed a motion, which we consider as its answer, to dismiss the appeal for lack of merit
upon the ground that appellant raises no question of law.
Appellant's contention is that the employment of Aguirre in the Central Bank and his teaching load in the Philippine
College of Commerce are substantially equivalent to his former position in the University. Upon the other hand, the
resolution appealed reached the opposite conclusion for the following reasons:
(a) Aguirre's work in the respondent university is that of a professor, ]while his work in the Central Bank is clerical in
nature;
(b) As professor Aguirre's maximum teaching period is five (5) hours daily; while in the bank he works eight (8) hours
a day;
(c) Although his work in the bank allows him to teach part time in the Philippine College of Commerce for one hour,
he could also do the same work even if he were employed in the university; and
(d) Aguirre was receiving from the respondent university P5,400.00 a year, while he receives from the Central Bank
P3,000.00 a year only. This alone fact decides the issue, namely, that Aguirre's position in the Central Bank is not
substantially equivalent to his position in the Far Eastern University. "Any employment at lower wage rate is not
substantially equivalent employment" [Willard, Inc. (1937 2 NLRB 1094, Moorseville Cotton Mills vs. NLRB (CCA-4,
1940), 2. Labor Cases. 18.576; 110 fed. (2d) 79; Puleski Veneer Corn. (1938) 10 NLRB 136; Quidnick Dye Works,
Inc. (1937) 2 NLRB 963].
Although Mr. Aguirre was, not a professor, but a full time instructor in the University, we agree with the opinion of the
lower court, sitting en banc. In addition to the circumstances relied upon by the latter, one important factor, not
mentioned in the resolution appealed from, is decisively in favor of the conclusion therein reached, and that is that Mr.
Aguirre is an instructor in Tagalog, and that, as such, his position as researcher in the Central Bank has no future for
him. The situation would perhaps have been different had his line been economics. Inasmuch, however, as Mr.
Aguirre has especialized in the Tagalog dialect, his work as a researcher in the Central Bank is inferior to his job as
full time instructor in the University, not so much because his salary in the latter is substantially bigger, even if we add
thereto his emoluments in the Philippine College of Commerce, but, specially, because of the future his position as
instructor in the University offers him as a career, which is non-existent in the Central Bank.
WHEREFORE, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner. It is so ordered..1äwp
25.

G.R. No. L-32245 May 25, 1979

DY KEH BENG, petitioner,

vs.
INTERNATIONAL LABOR and MARINE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
respondents.

Facts:

A charge of unfair labor practice was filed against Dy Keh Beng, proprietor of a basket factory, for discriminatory acts
within the meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraph (1) and (4). Republic Act No. 875, by dismissing on September 28
and 29, 1960, respectively, Carlos N. Solano and Ricardo Tudla for their union activities.

After preliminary investigation was conducted, a case was filed in the Court of Industrial Relations for in behalf of the
International Labor and Marine Union of the Philippines and two of its members, Solano and Tudla In his answer, Dy
Keh Beng contended that he did not know Tudla and that Solano was not his employee because the latter came to
the establishment only when there was work which he did on pakiaw basis, each piece of work being done under a
separate contract. Moreover, Dy Keh Beng countered with a special defense of simple extortion committed by the
head of the labor union, Bienvenido Onayan.

According to Dy Keh Beng, however, Solano was not his employee for the following reasons:

(1) Solano never stayed long enought at Dy's establishment;

(2) Solano had to leave as soon as he was through with the
(3) order given him by Dy;
(4) When there were no orders needing his services there was nothing for him to do;
(5) When orders came to the shop that his regular workers could not fill it was then that Dy went to his address in
Caloocan and fetched him for these orders; and
(6) Solano's work with Dy's establishment was not continuous.

Issue:

Whether there existed an employee-employer relation between petitioner Dy Keh Beng and the respondents Solano
and Tudla.

Ruling:

The Hearing Examiner prepared a report which was subsequently adopted in toto by the Court of Industrial Relations.
An employee-employer relationship was found to have existed between Dy Keh Beng and complainants Tudla and
Solano, although Solano was admitted to have worked on piece basis. According to the Hearing Examiner, the
evidence for the complainant Union tended to show that Solano and Tudla became employees of Dy Keh Beng from
May 2, 1953 and July 15, 1955, respectively, and that except in the event of illness, their work with the establishment
was continuous although their services were compensated on piece basis. Evidence likewise showed that at times
the establishment had eight (8) workers and never less than five (5); including the complainants, and that
complainants used to receive P5.00 a day. Sometimes less.
The award of backwages granted by the Court of Industrial Relations is herein modified to an award of backwages for
three years without qualification and deduction at the respective rates of compensation the employees concerned
were receiving at the time of dismissal. The execution of this award is entrusted to the National Labor Relations
Commission. Costs against petitioner.

26.
27.

ALIPIO R. RUGA vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and DE GUZMAN

FISHING ENTERPRISES G.R. No. L-72654-61, 22 January 1990

FACTS:
Petitioners were the fishermen-crew members of 7/B Sandyman II, one of several fishing vessels owned and
operated by private respondent De Guzman Fishing Enterprises which is primarily engaged in the fishing
business.They were paid in percentage commission basis in cash by one Mrs. Pilar de Guzman, cashier of private
respondent, 13% of the proceeds of the sale of the fish-catch if the total proceeds exceeded the cost of crude oil
consumed during the fishing trip, otherwise, 10% of the total proceeds of the sale. After some time, they were
dismissed alleging that they sold some of their fish-catch at midsea to the prejudice of private respondent.
Consequently, they filed illegal dismissal case to the DOLE Arbitration Branch. De Guzman said that there was no
employer-employee relationship between them; rather it was a joint venture. After the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter heard the case and dismissed the cases filed by the petitioners on finding that
it was really a joint venture. NLRC affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the fishermen-crew members of the trawl fishing vessel 7/B Sandyman II are employees of its
owner-operator, De Guzman Fishing Enterprises, and if so, whether or not they were illegally dismissed from their
employment.

RULING:

Yes. From the four (4) elements of employer-employee relationship, the Court has generally relied on the so-called
right-of-control test where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end
to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. According to the testimony of Alipio Ruga, they
are under the control and supervision of private respondent’s operations manager. Matters dealing on the fixing of the
schedule of the fishing trip and the time to return to the fishing port were shown to be the prerogative of private
respondent. While performing the fishing operations, petitioners received instructions via a single-side band radio
from private respondent’s operations manager who called the patron/pilot in the morning. Even on the assumption
that petitioners indeed sold the fish-catch at midsea the act of private respondent virtually resulting in their dismissal
evidently contradicts private respondent’s theory of “joint fishing venture” between the parties herein. A joint venture,
including partnership, presupposes generally a parity of standing between the joint co-venturers or partners, in which
each party has an equal proprietary interest in the capital or property contributed and where each party exercises
equal lights in the conduct of the business. It would be inconsistent with the principle of parity of standing between the
joint co-venturers as regards the conduct of business, if private respondent would outrightly exclude petitioners from
the conduct of the business without first resorting to other measures consistent with the nature of a joint venture
undertaking, Instead of arbitrary unilateral action, private respondent should have discussed with an open mind the
advantages and disadvantages of petitioners’ action with its joint co-venturers if indeed there is a “joint fishing
venture” between the parties.

28.

[ GR No. L-21696, Feb 25, 1967 ]

VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANSPORTA​TION COMPANY v. CIR ​+

DECISION
125 Phil. 817

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal by certiorari, taken by the Visayan Stevedoring Transportation Co. hereinafter re​ferred to as the Company
and Rafael Xaudaro, from an order of the Court of Industrial Relations, the dispositive part of which reads:

"The Court, finding respondents guilty of un​fair labor practice as charged, directs them to cease and desist from such
unfair labor practice and to re​instate the complainants, with back wages from the date they were laid off until
reinstated."

The Company is engaged in the loading and unloading of vessels, with a branch office in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, under the manage​ment of said Rafael Xaudaro. Its workers are supplied by the United Workers and
Farmers Association, a labor organization hereinafter referred to as UWFA whose men (affiliated to various labor
unions) have regularly worked as laborers of the Company during every milling season since immediately after World
War II up to the milling season immediately preceding November 11, 1955, when the Company refused to engage the
services of Venancio Dano-og, Buenaventura Agarcio and 137 other persons named in the complaint filed in case
No. 62-ULP-Cebu of the Court of Industrial Relations and hereinafter referred to as the Complainants owing, they
claim, to their union activities. At the be​hest of the UWFA and the Complainants, a complaint for unfair labor practice
was, accordingly, filed against the Company and Xaudaro with the Court of Industrial Relations hereinafter referred to
as the CIR in which it was docketed as Case No. 62-ULP-Cebu. In due course, its Presiding Judge issued the order
appealed from, which was affirmed by the CIR sitting ​en​ ​banc​. Hence this petition for review by certiorari.

The issues raised in this appeal, are (1) whether there is employer-employee relationship between the Company and
the Com​plainants; (2) whether the Company has been guilty of unfair labor practice; and (3) whether the order of
reinstatement of Complainants, with backpay, is a reversible error.

With respect to the first question, the Company maintains that it had never had an employer-employee relationship
with the Complainants, the latter's services having allegedly been engaged by the UWFA, not by the Company, and
that, in any event, whatever contractual relation there may have been between the Company and the Complainants
had ceased at the end of each milling season, so that the Company can not be guilty of unfair labor practice in
refusing to renew said relation at the beginning of the milling season in November, 1955.

This pretense is untenable. Although Complainants, through the labor union to which they belong, form part of
UWFA, there was no in​dependent contract between the latter, as an organization, and the Com​pany. After the first
milling season subsequently to the liberation of the Philippines, Complainants merely reported for work, at the
beginning of each succeeding milling season, and their services were invariably avail​ed of by the Company, although
an officer of the UWFA or union concern​ed determined the laborers who would work at a given time, following a
rotation system arranged therefor.

In the performance of their duties, Complainants worked, however, ​under the direction and control of the officers of
the Company​, whose paymaster, or disbursing officer paid the corresponding compen​sation ​directly to said
Complainants, who, in turn, acknowledged receipt in payrolls of the Company. We have already held that laborers
working under these conditions are employees of the Company, in the same manner as watchmen or security guards
furnished, under similar circumstances, by watchmen or security agencies, inasmuch as the agencies and/or labor
organizations involved therein merely performed the role of a representative or agent of the employer in the
recruitment of men needed for the operation of the latter's business.

As regards the alleged termination of employer-employee relationship between the Company and the Complainants
at the conclusion of each milling season, it is, likewise, settled that the workers concerned are considered, ​not
separated from the service, but, merely ​on leave of absence​, without pay, during the off-season, their
employer-employee relationship being merely deemed suspended, not severed, in the mean​while.

Referring to the unfair labor practice charge against the Company, we find, with the CIR, that said charge is
substantially borne out by the evidence of record, it appearing that the workers not admitted to work beginning from
November, 1955, were precisely those belonging to the UWFA, and that Xaudaro, the Company branch Manager,
had told them point blank that severance of their connection with the UWFA was the remedy, if they wanted to
continue working with the Company.

As to the payment of back wages, the law explicitly vests in the CIR discretion to order the reinstatement with back
pay of laborers dismissed due to union activities, and the record does not disclose any cogent reason to warrant
interference with the action taken by said Court.

WHEREFORE, the order and resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanches, and Castro, JJ., concur.

29.
30.

Philam v Arnaldo G.R. No. 76452 July 26, 1994

J. Quiason

Facts:
One Ramon Paterno complained about the unfair practices committed by the company against its agents, employees
and consumers. The Commissioner called for a hearing where Paterno was required to specify which acts were
illegal. Paterno then specified that the fees and charges stated in the Contract of Agency between Philam and its
agents be declared void. Philam, on the other hand, averred that there Paterno must submit a verified formal
complaint and that his letter didn’t contain information Philam was seeking from him. Philam then questioned the
Insurance Commission’s jurisdiction over the matter and submitted a motion to quash. The commissioner denied this.
Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency falls within the jurisdiction of the Insurance
Commissioner.
Held:
No. Petition granted.

Ratio:
According to the Insurance code, the Insurance Commissioner was authorized to suspend, directors, officers, and
agents of insurance companies. In general, he was tasked to regulate the insurance business, which includes:
(2) The term "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an insurance business," within the meaning of this
Code, shall include
(a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract;
(b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental to
any other legitimate business or activity of the surety; (c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance
business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of this Code;
(d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to
evade the provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2[2])
The contract of agency between Philamlife and its agents wasn’t included with the Commissoner’s power to regulate
the business. Hence, the Insurance commissioner wasn’t vested with jurisidiction under the rule “expresio unius est
exclusion alterius”.
The respondent contended that the commissioner had the quasi-judicial power to adjudicate under Section 416 of the
Code. It stated:

The Commissioner shall have the power to adjudicate claims and complaints involving any loss, damage or liability
for which an insurer may be answerable under any kind of policy or contract of insurance, or for which such insurer
may be liable under a contract of suretyship, or for which a reinsurer may be used under any contract or reinsurance
it may have entered into, or for which a mutual benefit association may be held liable under the membership
certificates it has issued to its members, where the amount of any such loss, damage or liability, excluding interest,
costs and attorney's fees, being claimed or sued upon any kind of insurance, bond, reinsurance contract, or
membership certificate does not exceed in any single claim one hundred thousand pesos.

This was, however, regarding complaints filed by the insured against the Insurance company.

Also, the insurance code only discusses the licensing requirements for agents and brokers. The Insurance Code
does not have provisions governing the relations between insurance companies and their agents.

Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines v. Social Security Commission- “that an insurance company may
have two classes of agents who sell its insurance policies: (1) salaried employees who keep definite hours and work
under the control and supervision of the company; and (2) registered representatives, who work on commission
basis.”

The agents under the 2​nd sentence are governed by the Civil Code laws on agency. This means that the regular
courts have jurisdiction over this category.
31.

MAFINCO TRADING CORPORATION vs. OPLE 1976 March 25 2nd Division G.R. No.
L-37790 Independent Contractor, Employer- Employee Relationship

FACTS:
A labor union called FOITAF (in behalf of Repomanta and Moralde) lodged a complaint against Mafinco Trading,
alleging that Mafinco unlawfully dismissed both individuals. Repomanta and Mafinco executed a peddling contract
whereby Repomanta agreed to “buy and sell” Cosmos soft drinks. Rey Moralde entered into a similar contract. The
contracts were to remain in force for one year unless sooner terminated by either party upon five days’ notice to the
other. Based on this stipulation, Mafinco terminated its contracts with Repomanta and Moralde.

Mafinco argued that Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees but were independent contractors and
employers in their own right. The old NLRC ruled in favor of Mafinco, but Labor Sec. Ople reversed the decision,
asserting that both Repomanta and Moralde are employees of Mafinco.
Ople’s decision highlighted that these peddling contracts were pseudo contracts devised to evade coverage under
the labor laws.
According to Mafinco, the relationship between them is not of employee-employer, but that of buyer and seller.

ISSUE:
Are Repomanta and Moralde employees of Mafinco?

RULING:
1. They are independent contractors.​[1]
Repomanta and Moralde voluntarily executed with Mafinco formal peddling contracts which indicate the manner in
which they would sell Cosmos softdrinks. Such signifies that they were acting as independent businessmen. Using
the contract itself as the sole criterion, the termination should be characterized as simply the exercise of a right freely
stipulated upon by the parties.

Further, the tests for determining the existence of employer-employee relationship is not met: (1) Selection and
Engagement of Employee; (2) Payment of Wages; (3) Power of Dismissal; (4) Power of Control.

(1) Selection and Engagement of Employee

Nothing in the Agreement to Peddle Soft Drinks in the case of Cosmos and in the Peddling Contract in the case of
Mafinco, will reveal and we cannot logically infer therefrom, that the Peddlers were engaged as employees of
Cosmos or Mafinco.
(2) Payment of Wages
On the basis of the clear terms of the Agreement or Contract, no mention is made of the wages of the Peddlers;
neither can an inference be made that any salary or wage is given to Peddlers.
(3) Power of Dismissal
A search of the alleged dismissal however shows that the identical letters both dated December 7, 1972 addressed to
the said complainants were not actually what complainants pictured them to be, but the termination of the peddling
contract in accordance with paragraph 9 of said Contract.
(4) Power of Control.
As to the aspect of employer-employee relation, therefore, between Cosmos or Mafinco and the Peddlers, your
Committee does not have sufficient basis to reasonably sustain the stand of the Peddlers that there is such power of
control.
[1]​ INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR: ‘An independent contractor is one who exercises independent employment and
contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to control of his employer
except as to the result of the work.

Factors to determine existence of independent contract: (a) independent business; (b) work is part of employee’s
general business; (c) nature and extent of work; (d) skill required; (e) term and duration of relationship, etc. . .

32.

MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
237 SCRA 207

Facts: This is originally filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) via petition of 17 persons who
styled themselves as “ Caddies of Manila Golf and Country Club-PTCCEA” for the coverage and availment of
benefits of the Social Security Act as amended, PTCCEA (Philippine Technical, Clerical, Commercial
Employees Association) a labor organization where which they claim for membership.

The same time two other proceedings were filed and pending. These are certification election case filed by
PTCCEA on behalf of the same caddies of Manila Golf and Country club which was in favor of the caddies
and compulsory arbitration case involving PTCCEA and Manila Golf and Country Club which was dismissed
and ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the caddies and the club.

Issue: Whether or not rendering caddying services for members of golf clubs and their guests in said clubs’
courses or premises are the employees of such clubs and therefore within the compulsory coverage of the
Social Security System (SSS).

Ruling: The Court does not agree that the facts logically point to the employer-employee relationship.

In the very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their conduct while enjoying the
privilege of pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of whatever club they do work in.
They work for the club to which they attach themselves on sufferance but, on the other hand, also without
having to observe any working hours, free to leave anytime they please, to stay away for as long they like.

These considerations clash frontally with the concept of employment. It can happen that a caddy who has
rendered services to a player on one day may still find sufficient time to work elsewhere. Under such
circumstances, the caddy may leave the premises and to go to such other place of work that he wishes.
These are things beyond the control of the petitioner.

The caddy (LLamar) is not an employee of petitioner Manila Golf and Country Club and the petitioner is
under no obligation to report him for compulsory coverage of SSS.
33.

EDDIE DOMASIG v. NLRC, GR No. 118101, 1996-09-16

Facts:

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify and set aside the Resolution[1] of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

"The complaint was instituted by Eddie Domasig against respondents Cata Garments Corporation, a
company engaged in garments business and its owner/manager Otto Ong and Catalina Co for illegal
dismissal, unpaid commission and other monetary claim[s].

he was dismissed when respondent learned that he was being pirated by a rival corporation which offer he
refused.

Respondent denied complainant's claim that he is a regular employee contending that he is a mere
commission agent who receives a commission of P5.00 per piece of article sold at regular price and P2.50
per piece sold in [sic] bargain price; that in addition to commission,... complainant received a fixed
allowance of P1,500.00 a month; that he had no regular time schedule; and that the

List of Sales Collections, Computation of Commission due, expenses incurred, cash advances received for
the month

Labor Arbiter held that complainant was illegally dismissed and entitled to reinstatement and backwages as
well as underpayment of salary; 13th month pay

Private respondents appealed the decision of the labor arbiter to public respondent. As aforesaid, the NLRC
resolved to remand the case to the labor arbiter for further proceeding.

Annexes "B" and "B-1" (Rollo pp. 22-27) in support of its allegation as regard[s] the nature of complainant's
employment.

whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in vacating and setting aside the decision of the labor
arbiter and remanding the case to the arbitration branch of origin for further proceedings

Issues:

whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in vacating and setting aside the decision of the labor
arbiter and remanding the case to the arbitration branch of origin for further proceedings.

Ruling:

an identification card is usually provided not only as a security measure but mainly to identify the holder
thereof as a bona fide employee of the firm that issues it. Together with the cash vouchers covering
petitioner's salaries for the... months stated therein, we agree with the labor arbiter that these matters
constitute substantial evidence adequate to support a conclusion that petitioner was indeed an employee of
private respondent.

In the case at bar, we do not believe that the labor arbiter acted arbitrarily. Contrary to the finding of the
NLRC, her decision at least on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between private
respondents and petitioner, is supported by substantial evidence... on record.

The list of sales collection including computation of commissions due, expenses incurred and cash
advances received (Exhibits "B" and "B-1") which, according to public respondent, the labor arbiter failed to
appreciate in support of private respondents' allegation as regards the... nature of petitioner's employment
as a commission agent, cannot overcome the evidence of the ID card and salary vouchers presented by
petitioner which private respondents have not denied.

Having been in the employ of private respondents continuously for more than one year, under the law,
petitioner is considered a regular employee.

Petitioner's contention that private respondents terminated his employment due to their suspicion that he
was being enticed by another firm to work for... it was not refuted by private respondents. The labor arbiter's
conclusion that petitioner's dismissal is therefore illegal, is not necessarily arbitrary or erroneous. It is
entitled to great weight and respect.

The decision of the labor arbiter dated 19 May 1993 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED subject to the
modification

Principles:

Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion,... After all, Article 218 of the Labor Code grants the Commission and the
labor arbiter broad powers, including issuance of subpoena, requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of such documentary evidence as may be material to a just determination of
the... matter under investigation.

34.

CEBU METAL CORPORATION vs SALILING

[G. R. No. 154463 September 5, 2006]

CEBU METAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - GREGORIO ROBERT SALILING, ELIAS BOLIDO,
MANUEL ALQUIZA, and BENJIE AMPARADO, Respondents.

FACTS: Respondent Cebu Metal is a corporation engaged in buying and selling of scrap iron. In the Bacolod
Branch, it has three regular (3) employees holding such positions as Officer-in-Charge, a scaler and a
yardman, whose salaries are paid directly by its main office in Cebu while others are undertaking pakiao
work in the unloading of scrap iron for stockpiling. Among those workers who presented for work in the
unloading of scrap iron in the area are the unemployed persons or trisicad drivers standing by in the vicinity
some of whom are the herein. llera, Eliseo Torralba or any other persons who wanted to augment their
income aside from their regular jobs. They were hired around 1995-1996.

As compensation for their services, these workers including the herein complainants are paid at the rate of
P15.00 per ton for which each person can unload at least two (2) to three (3) tons per hour or can earn at
least P240.00 to P360.00 in eight (8) hours if work is only available which payment necessarily includes cost
of living allowance (COLA) and 13th-month pay.
On 10 January 1997, respondent complainants filed a Complaint before the Regional for underpayment of
wages and non-payment of the following benefits: 1) 13th month pay; 2) holiday pay; and 3) service incentive
leave pay.

On 6 March 1998, respondent complainants manifested that they were including in their complaint against
petitioner company, the claim for illegal dismissal. Such belated filing was alleged to have been due to the
fact that they were only dismissed after the filing of their complaint.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered petitioner to reinstate them
plus backwages. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. The NLRC rationalized that with the
irregular nature of the work involved, the stoppage and resumption of which depended solely on the
availability or supply of scrap metal, it necessarily follows that after the job of unloading was completed and
“unloaders” were paid the contract price, the latter’s working relationship with petitioner company legally
ended. They were then free to offer their services to others. The CA, on the other hand, reversed the NLRC’s
decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are regular employees of petitioner company.

HELD: The SC held that the respondents were not regular employees of petitioner as held by the NLRC.

The petty cash vouchers show that complainants are not paid on hourly or daily basis but on “pakiao” or
task basis at P15.00 per metric ton. There is no basis then for complainants to claim that they are underpaid
since there is no minimum wage in this type of work. Complainants’ earnings depend upon their own
diligence and speed in unloading and stockpiling scrap iron. More importantly, it depends upon the
availability of scrap iron to be unloaded and stockpiled.”

The above findings validate respondent’s position as to the nature of complainants’ work. Their services are
needed only when scrap metals are delivered which occurs only one or twice a week or sometimes no
delivery at all in a given week. The irregular nature of work, stoppage of work and then work again depending
on the supply of scrap metal has not been denied by complainants. Indeed, it would be unjust to require
respondent to maintain complainants in the payroll even if there is no more work to be done. To do so would
make complainants privileged retainers who collect payment from their employer for work not done. This is
extremely unfair and amount to cuddling of labor at the expense of management.

It should be remembered that The Philippine Constitution, while inexorably committed towards the
protection of the working class from exploitation and unfair treatment, nevertheless mandates the policy of
social justice so as to strike a balance between an avowed predilection for labor, on the one hand, and the
maintenance of the legal rights of capital, the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg, on the other. Indeed,
we should not be unmindful of the legal norm that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed
with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.

Under the circumstances abovestated, there can be no illegal dismissal to speak of. Besides, complainants
cannot claim regularity in the hiring every time a truck comes loaded with scrap metal. This is confirmed in
the Petty cash Vouchers which are in the names of different leaders who apportion the amount earned
among his members. And, quite telling is the fact that not every truck delivery of scrap metal requires the
services of respondent complainants when a particular truck is accompanied by its own “unloader.” And
whenever required, respondent complainants were not always the ones contracted to undertake the
unloading of the trucks since the work was offered to whomever were available at a given time.

Petition is granted.

35.

Francisco v. NLRC (G.R. No. 170087)

Facts:

Petitioner Angelina Francisco was hired by respondent Kasei Corporation during its incorporation stage as
Accountant and Corporate Secretary and later as Liaison Officer. Subsequently she was also designated
Acting Manager until replaced, but was assured by the company that she was still connected as Technical
Consultant. Thereafter, Kasei Corporation reduced petitioner’s salary until it was later withheld despite
repeated follow-ups. Petitioner once again asked for her salary but was informed that she is no longer
connected with the company. Petitioner thus filed an action for constructive dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter. Respondent Kasei Corporation averred that petitioner is not their employee as she performed her
work at her own discretion without their control and supervision. Both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC tribunal
found for petitioner. CA reversed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Ruling:​ YES.

In certain cases the control test is not sufficient to give a complete picture of the relationship between the
parties, owing to the complexity of such a relationship where several positions have been held by the
worker. The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative
employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be
accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship.

By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because
she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporation’s Technical Consultant.
She reported for work regularly and served in various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical
Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is,
rendering accounting and tax services to the company and performing functions necessary and desirable for
the proper operation of the corporation such as securing business permits and other licenses over an
indefinite period of engagement.

Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of respondent
corporation because she had served the company for six years before her dismissal, receiving check
vouchers indicating her salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as
deductions and Social Security contributions. Petitioner’s membership in the SSS as manifested by a copy
of the SSS specimen signature card which was signed by the President of Kasei Corporation and the
inclusion of her name in the on-line inquiry system of the SSS evinces the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent corporation. It is therefore apparent that
petitioner is economically dependent on respondent corporation for her continued employment in the latter’s
line of business.

36.

Sevilla vs CA
G..R. No. L-41182-3
April 16, 1988

Employer-Employee Relationship
Facts:

The petitioners invoke the provisions on human relations of the Civil Code in this appeal by certiorari.

Mrs. Segundina Noguera, party of the first part; the Tourist World Service, Inc., represented by Mr. Eliseo Canilao as
party of the second part, and hereinafter referred to as appellants, the Tourist World Service, Inc. leased the
premises belonging to the party of the first part at Mabini St., Manila for the former-s use as a branch office. In the
said contract the party of the third part held herself solidarily liable with the party of the part for the prompt payment of
the monthly rental agreed on. When the branch office was opened, the same was run by the herein appellant Una 0.
Sevilla payable to Tourist World Service Inc. by any airline for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Lina Sevilla,
4% was to go to Lina Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the Tourist World Service, Inc.

On November 24, 1961 the Tourist World Service, Inc. appears to have been informed that Lina Sevilla was
connected with a rival firm, the Philippine Travel Bureau, and, since the branch office was anyhow losing, the Tourist
World Service considered closing down its office.

On June 17,1963, appellant Lina Sevilla refiled her case against the herein appellees and after the issues were
joined, the reinstated counterclaim of Segundina Noguera and the new complaint of appellant Lina Sevilla were jointly
heard following which the court ordered both cases dismiss for lack of merit.

In her appeal, Lina Sevilla claims that a joint bussiness venture was entered into by and between her and appellee
TWS with offices at the Ermita branch office and that she was not an employee of the TWS to the end that her
relationship with TWS was one of a joint business venture appellant made declarations.

Issue:

Whether or not the padlocking of the premises by the Tourist World Service, Inc. without the knowledge and consent
of the appellant Lina Sevilla entitled the latter to the relief of damages prayed for and whether or not the evidence for
the said appellant supports the contention that the appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. unilaterally and without the
consent of the appellant disconnected the telephone lines of the Ermita branch office of the appellee Tourist World
Service, Inc.?

Held:

The trial court held for the private respondent on the premise that the private respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc.,
being the true lessee, it was within its prerogative to terminate the lease and padlock the premises. It likewise found
the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to be a mere employee of said Tourist World Service, Inc. and as such, she was bound by
the acts of her employer. The respondent Court of Appeal rendered an affirmance.

In this jurisdiction, there has been no uniform test to determine the evidence of an employer-employee relation. In
general, we have relied on the so-called right of control test, "where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end."
Subsequently, however, we have considered, in addition to the standard of right-of control, the existing economic
conditions prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.

the Decision promulgated on January 23, 1975 as well as the Resolution issued on July 31, 1975, by the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc., and
Eliseo Canilao, are ORDERED jointly and severally to indemnify the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, the sum of 25,00.00 as
and for moral damages, the sum of P10,000.00, as and for exemplary damages, and the sum of P5,000.00, as and
for nominal and/or temperate damages.