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Abstract: Two major legal issues make the cross-border supply of online
consumer software in the Philippines problematic: (1) the erroneous
regulatory interpretation that online software contracting is a mass media
activity and therefore is governed by the Constitutional requirement that the
ownership and management of mass media must be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or corporations, cooperative or associations, wholly owned and
managed by such persons; and (2) the failure of the conflict of laws system
to provide any statutory consumer guarantees. Both of these issues must be
addressed to ensure that unrestricted cross-border sale of online consumer
software does not leave local consumers unprotected. This article proposes
that consumer software contracting must be distinguished from traditional
mass media activities based on their functional differences. This article
argues that Philippine law must provide statutory consumer guarantees by
considering the legislative approach in the Australian Consumer Law and the
judicial approach in the Valve decisions.
I. Introduction
3 Reinhard Schu, “The Applicable Law to Consumer Contracts Made over the Internet: Consumer
Protection through Private International Law?” (1997) 5 International Journal of Law and Information
Technology 192, 194.
4 Jane Hsu and Charlene W Shiue, “Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for Non-pirated Software” (2008)
81(4) Journal of Business Ethics 715, 730.
5 Giesela Ruhl, “Consumer Protection in Choice of Law” (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal
569, 600.
6 John Jr Voorhees, “Price Discrimination and Software Licensing: Does the Robinson-Patman Act Fail to
Accommodate Modern Technology?” (1991) 69 Washington University Law Review 336, 317.
7 Section 11(1) Pt.XVI of the Philippine Constitution provides as follows: “The ownership and
management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives
or associations, wholly owned and managed by such citizens.”
solution is to appreciate that the Internet is not a mass media channel and that
Internet-related activities, including contracting for consumer software by foreign
suppliers, should not be considered mass media activities. Section III discusses
another important area relevant to consumer contracts: consumer protection.
Philippine law does not provide sufficient protection to consumers, recognised
as the “weaker” party in such contracts.8 This article proposes a replication of the
Australian law approach of providing minimum consumer statutory guarantees that
cannot be contracted away under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), affirmed
by the reasoning in the Valve decisions, Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission v Valve Corp (No 3)9 and Valve Corp v Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission.10
This section begins with a discussion of the regulatory opinion which regards
online consumer software contracting as an activity of “doing business,” an
opinion which is not inherently objectionable. It then proceeds to consider
regulatory opinions, which erroneously apply the zero foreign control
requirement on mass media to foreign consumer software suppliers. The latter
interpretation is where the problem lies, not only because foreign consumer
software suppliers do not disseminate information as a primary activity in the
way that mass media companies do, but also because mass media and Internet
activities are different in nature.
8 James Healy, “Consumer Protection Choice of Law: European Lessons for the United States” 19 Duke
Journal of Comparative and International Law 535, 553.
9 (2016) 337 ALR 647 (Valve No 3).
10 (2017) 258 FCR 190 (Valve v ACCC).
11 Securities and Regulation Code (Philippines) 19 July 2000, Republic Act No 8799.
12 SEC Opinion No 17-03 (Philippines) 4 April 2017, Securities and Exchange Commission, available
at https://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2017Opinion17-03.pdf (visited 18 December
2018). (Sony opinion).
SEN’s business was within this definition, because the substance of SCEH’s
business, such as the offering and selling of the SEN services, and the
acceptance of online payments in any currency through the online wallet, would
be undertaken in the Philippines.16 Also, because the Internet protocol address
of the SEN account holder identified the precise location of the device in the
Philippines, and the funding of the SEN online wallet was made from this
device, SCEH was considering to be doing business in the Philippines.17 The
SEC also considered the selling products or services to Philippine residents as a
“doing business” activity.18
The SEC concluded that SCEH could not offer the SEN platform to Philippine
residents without obtaining a licence to do business in the Philippines.19 Although
this opinion specifically addressed online platforms such as SEN, the reasoning
and conclusion of the SEC apply to online sellers in general. Foreign consumer
software suppliers, in particular, satisfy all the conditions that the SEC identified in
its opinion: the acceptance of online payments, the sale of the consumer software
products to a Philippine consumer, the delivery of the product on a Philippine-
based device and the use of an active website.
The Sony opinion, in addition to requiring foreign online sellers to obtain a
licence to do business, has broader implications. Because doing business in the
13 Ibid., p.1.
14 Ibid.
15 Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (Philippines) 13 June 1991, Republic Act No 7042 (Foreign Investments
Act).
16 Sony opinion (n.12) p.5.
17 Ibid., p.6.
18 Ibid., p.8.
19 Ibid., p.9.
Philippines means that the entity is bound by Philippine law,20 foreign consumer
software suppliers are covered by the erroneous regulatory interpretation that
online activities must comply with the zero foreign control requirement applicable
to mass media, as discussed in the next section.
20 Corporation Code of the Philippines (Philippines) 1 May 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, s.129.
21 1987 Constitution of the Philippines (Philippines) 2 February 1987, art.XVI, s.11(1) (Constitution).
22 Diane Desierto, “Restriction and Rhetoric: A Critique of the Constitutional Prohibition Against Foreign
Ownership in Philippine Mass Media” (2010) 3 The Journal of Applied Economy 77, 80.
23 SEC Opinion No. 12-16 (Philippines) 13 September 2012, Securities and Exchange Commission,
available at http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Opinion-No.-12-16.pdf (visited 21
December 2018).
24 SEC-OGC Opinion No. 14-06 (Philippines) 8 May 2014, Securities and Exchange Commission, available
at http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Opinion-No.-14-06.pdf (visited 21 December
2018).
25 Ibid., p.3.
26 Ibid.
activity. In its most recent opinion, the SEC said that promotional or advertising
activities on a website constituted a mass media activity.27 The effect of this opinion
is that foreign consumer software suppliers could not even promote their own
products without violating the mass media restriction.
In the “mass media opinions,” the SEC has chosen to set a low threshold of
what constitutes a mass media activity: the dissemination of information. This is
plainly wrong. The SEC should have at least made a distinction between online
activities involving the dissemination of information as a primary activity on
the one hand and the online sale of products and services (including consumer
software) on the other. The latter involves the inevitable supply of information as
an incidental activity. Considering such incidental activity as a mass media activity
would mean that practically all Internet activities would fall under the mass media
definition. After all, any Internet activity would inevitably provide information
in one way or another. Were the mass media restriction under the Constitution to
apply to the Internet, perhaps what it should realistically cover are online news
outlets. This distinction must be made so that foreign consumer software suppliers
can legitimately do business in the Philippines (as the SEC required in the Sony
opinion), without wrongfully being considered as mass media entities and therefore
acting in violation of the mass media restriction. This solution is a soft approach
that would make cross-border consumer software contracting lawful.
Another solution that I propose is a hard approach to examine the flawed
assumption that the Internet is a mass media channel. Because of the fundamental
differences between traditional media and the Internet, applying the constitutional
restriction on mass media to Internet activities does not make sense. Traditional
media channels (print, radio and television) are based on a one-way source–
message–receiver model of mass communication, with the receiver unable to
interact or give feedback to the source, the huge mass media companies.28 Because
of traditional mass media’s one-way communication model, the constitutional ban
against foreign ownership of mass media was meant to prevent foreign influence
and propaganda in setting the Philippine public’s standards, ideals, aims and
opinions.29
Traditional mass media is antithetical to the nature of the Internet. The Internet
is characterised by an open and decentralised environment, allowing people and
enterprises to freely exchange information with minimum transaction costs —
paving the way for innovation and business opportunities.30 It features a bottom-up
27 SEC-OGC Opinion No 18-21 (Philippines) 28 November 2018, Securities and Exchange Commission,
available at http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018OpinionNo18-21.pdf (visited 21
December 2018).
28 Merrill Morris and Christine Ogan, “The Internet as Mass Medium” (1996) 46 Journal of Communication
39, 42.
29 SEC-OGC Opinion No 11-08 (Philippines) 3 March 2011, Securities and Exchange Commission,
available at http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/11-08.pdf (visited 22 December 2018).
30 Joshua Meltzer, The Internet, Cross-Border Data Flows and International Trade (Washington: Center for
Technology Innovation at Brookings, 2013) pp.22–25.
31 Edward S Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass
Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010) p.xv.
32 Lijun Tang and Helen Sampson, “The Interaction between Mass Media and the Internet in Non-
Democratic States: The Case of China” (2012) 34 Media, Culture & Society 457, 468.
33 Benjamin Gaskins and Jennifer Jerit, “Internet News: Is It a Replacement for Traditional Media Outlets?”
(2012) 17(2) The International Journal of Press/Politics 190, 200.
34 Morris and Ogan (n.28) pp.43–48.
35 Eleventh Regular Foreign Investment Negative List (Philippines) 29 October 2018, President of the
Philippines, available at http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2018/10oct/20181029-EO-65-
RRD.pdf (11th FINL) (visited 3 January 2019).
36 Ibid., List A(1).
37 Ben De Vera, “100% Foreign Ownership of Internet Ventures Seen” (3 October 2018), available at https://
business.inquirer.net/258328/100-foreign-ownership-internet-ventures-seen (visited 19 November 2018).
a mass media activity. Moreover, the SEC continues to hold its erroneous view,
despite the corrective regulation.
For one, the 11th FINL does not change — and actually reinforces — the SEC’s
erroneous characterisation of the Internet as a mass media channel. The 11th FINL
appears to recognise the inherent nature of the Internet as a mass media channel
and proceeds to exempt it from the general rule on zero foreign control over mass
media under the Constitution. Certain legislators seem to believe that carving
Internet businesses as an exception by way of a mere administrative regulation (ie
a negative list) can solve this problem.38 However, a basic principle of Philippine
law is that administrative rules such as the 11th FINL cannot contravene any law or
the Constitution.39 The 11th FINL, an administrative rule, makes an exception that
neither exists nor is implied in the Constitution. Indeed, if the Constitution prevents
foreigners from owning or holding a financial interest in mass media entities, then
the rule must apply to all mass media entities. The solution I propose would remove
the Internet from the ambit of mass media and therefore of the constitutional rule.
The exception in the 11th FINL defines Internet businesses as “internet
access providers that merely serve as carriers for transmitting messages rather
than being the creator of messages/information.”40 The 11th FINL appears to have
misunderstood what an Internet business is and erroneously limits it to being an
Internet access provider. In a recently issued opinion, the SEC has already used this
loophole in the definition to insist on its position that an Internet business under the
11th FINL only refers to Internet access providers that provide Internet connection
access and not creators or transmitters of information.41
To conclude, the simple and effective solution would be to remove foreign
consumer software suppliers from the scope of mass media restriction, because
they do not primarily disseminate information and because Internet activities by
their nature are incomparable to mass media. An unconstitutional negative list
issued by the president would not even be required.
Can Philippine consumers purchasing consumer software from a foreign seller rely
on the local consumer protection law in case a dispute arises?42 If the answer is
in the negative, the SEC can easily use the lack of adequate consumer protection
38 Ibid.
39 Cruz v Del Rosario (1963) 9 SCRA 755 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
40 11th FINL (n.35) 3 n.1.
41 SEC-OGC Opinion No 11-08 (n.29).
42 Stephen Corones et al., “Comparative Analysis of Overseas Consumer Policy Frameworks” (2016) 82,
available at http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2016/05/ACL_Comparative-analysis-overseas-consumer-
policy-frameworks-1.pdf (visited 5 January 2019).
43 Lucie Guibault et al., “The Regulation of Digital Content Contracts in the Optional Instrument of Contract
Law” (2011) 19 European Review of Private Law 729, 729.
44 Erin Ann O’Hara, “Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online Consumer
Protection” (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1883, 1883.
45 Competition and Consumer Law Act 2010 (Cth) Sch.2 (Australian Consumer Law or ACL).
46 Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp v Sherman (1989) 176 SCRA 331 (Supreme Court of the
Philippines).
47 Hasegawa v Kitamura [2007] GR No 149177 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
48 Retail Trade Liberalization Act 2000 (Philippines) 7 March 2000, s.3(1), available at https://www.doe.
gov.ph/sites/default/files/pdf/ocsp/ra_8762.pdf (visited 6 January 2019).
49 Marsman & Co, Inc v First Coconut Central Company, In. [1988] GR No L-39841 (Supreme Court of the
Philippines) (emphasis added).
50 SEC-OGC Opinion No 14-06 (n.24) p.4.
51 Consumer Act of the Philippines (Philippines) 13 April 1992, Republic Act No. 7394, art.68(d), available
at https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1992/04/13/republic-act-no-7394-s-1992/ (visited 6 January 2019)
(Consumer Act).
52 Ibid., s.72.
53 Civil Code of the Philippines (Philippines) 18 June 1949, Republic Act No 386, art.1547 (Civil Code).
54 Ibid., art.1562(2).
The Civil Code, which is the basis of the conflict of laws system of the
Philippines, does not have a specific provision regarding choice-of-law clauses.55
Philippine law generally respects party autonomy under the freedom of the parties
to contract.56 As a general rule, local courts defer to the parties’ choice-of-law
provision in their contract.57 Under the rule of comity, Philippine courts are required
to apply foreign law if properly pleaded and proved.58 This choice may only be
limited if the foreign law: (1) is contrary to public interest or good morals, (2) is
penal or administrative in character, (3) is applied to a case involving personal or
real property, (4) would result in injustice to people in the Philippines and (5) might
endanger foreign relations.59
Whilst Philippine courts recognise contractual choice-of-law provisions
based on the principle of party autonomy,60 public interest may counterbalance
this principle and “parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law
especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with
public interest.”61 The exception was applied to employment contracts that purport
to have a foreign governing law,62 but has so far not been applied to consumer
contracts. A possible way of applying the public interest exception to consumer
software contracts is to use the policy declaration in the Philippine Consumer Act
that “it is the policy of the State to protect the interest of the consumer, promote his
general welfare and to establish standards of conduct for business and industry.”63
Although relying on the public interest exception to provide statutory consumer
guarantees is possible, public interest eludes precise definition under Philippine
law and may not be a reliable standard. The Philippine Supreme Court has had to
constantly grapple with the meaning of public interest.64
Philippine law also recognises the principle of adhesion contracts: contracts
where individuals enter into ready-made contracts unilaterally drafted by the
dominant party with a stronger bargaining power. In such cases, the law recognises
that the weaker party may not even be aware of the significance of governing
law clauses65 and where the contract was drafted by one party, such as insurance
contracts, airline tickets or bills of lading, Philippine courts may choose not to give
55 Weizuo Chen and Gerald Goldstein, “The Asian Principles of Private International Law: Objectives,
Contents, Structure and Selected Topics on Choice of Law” (2017) 13 Journal of Private International
Law 411, 412–413.
56 Jorge R Coquia, “A Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Private International Law) for the Philippines”
(1992) 67 Philippine Law Journal 121, 131.
57 Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v Rebesencio [2015] GR No 198587 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
58 Collector of Internal Revenue v Fisher (1961) 110 Phil 656 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
59 Coquia (n.56) p.125.
60 Civil Code (n.53), art.1306.
61 Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v Ople (1990) 268 Phil 92 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
62 Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v Rebesencio (n.57).
63 Consumer Act of the Philippines, Republic Act No 7394, art.2.
64 Valmonte v Belmonte, Jr [1989] GR No 74930 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
65 Coquia (n.56) p.133.
effect to such provisions.66 However, the Philippine Supreme Court has not always
construed adhesion contracts against the stronger party (eg the consumer software
seller), as long as the signatory is not deprived of the opportunity to examine and
read them.67 Besides, the weaker party (eg the Filipino consumer) is free to reject
the adhesion contract (along with the foreign choice-of-law provision) entirely.68
In determining whether to set aside contracts of adhesion, as in the public interest
exception, the courts appropriately decide on a case-to-case basis.69
Thus, whilst the application of statutory consumer guarantees under an
interpretation of the current laws is theoretically possible, these solutions rely
too much on postulation. Another obvious limitation is that the viability of these
solutions remains guesswork, until the Philippine Supreme Court is faced with this
actual legal question. Statutory reform is a more focused and effective solution, and
this is discussed in the next section.
66 Sweet Lines v Teves (1978) 83 SCRA 368 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
67 Spouses dela Cruz v Planters Products, Inc [2013] GR No 158649 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
68 Polotan, Sr v Court of Appeals [1998] GR No 119379 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
69 Spouses Poltan v BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc [2007] GR No 164307 (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
70 ACL (n.45).
71 Ibid., s.54.
72 Ibid., s.55.
73 Ibid., s.54(2).
74 Valve No 3 (n.9), [1].
relation to the acceptable quality guarantee under s.54 of the ACL, which could not
be modified or excluded. ACCC argued that Valve made misleading representations
by telling its customers that they were not entitled to a refund and by misrepresenting
to them that the consumer guarantees could be excluded, restricted or modified.75
Valve, on the other hand, argued that the statutory consumer guarantees under the
ACL did not apply, because the law that had the closest and most real connection to
the Steam Subscriber Agreement (the consumer software contract in this case) was
the law of Washington State.76
To solve the question of whether the statutory consumer guarantees under the
ACL apply to the consumer software contract, Edelman J discussed the twofold
process of identifying the “proper law of the contract”: first, by considering the
express or inferred choice of law in the contract; second, by considering the system
of law with which the contract has the closest and most real connection.77 In this
case, the explicit choice of law was the law of Washington State, and Edelman J
further accepted that the law of Washington State had the closest and most real
connection to the transaction.78 However, despite his conclusion, his Honour
concluded that the conflict of laws provision of the ACL, s.67, prevented Valve
from relying upon Washington State law with regard to consumer protection.
At this juncture, an examination of s.67 (Conflict of Laws) is necessary:
“If:
(a) the proper law of a contract for the supply of goods or services to a
consumer would be the law of any part of Australia but for a term of the
contract that provides otherwise; or
(b) a contract for the supply of goods or services to a consumer contains a term
that purports to substitute, or has the effect of substituting, the following
provisions for all or any of the provisions of [Div 1 of Pt 3-2 (Ch 3) of the
Australian Consumer Law]:
the provisions of this Division apply in relation to the supply under the
contract despite that term.”79
Because the proper law of the contract was Washington State law (and therefore
s.67(a) is not relevant), the decision turned on the interpretation of s.67(b).
Interpreting s.67(b), ACCC argued that the clause choosing Washington State law
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., [5].
77 Ibid., [62]–[64].
78 Ibid., [72]–[84].
79 ACL (n.45) s.67.
In summary, the history and purpose of s.67 show that it was included in
the Australian Consumer Law as part of an amendment process designed,
in part, to make consumers’ rights simpler and more transparent. The
consumer guarantees no longer had to be implied into a contract. They
applied generally to a supply of goods to a consumer. And s.67 was
explained [in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Australian Consumer
law] as part of a scheme, together with s.64, to ensure that it was not
possible to exclude the consumer guarantees by contract. That scheme was
further strengthened in the Australian Consumer Law by the addition of
s.276 which makes a term of a contract void to the extent that it attempts to
modify or exclude a remedy for breach of a consumer guarantee.84
The Federal Court of Australia affirmed Valve No 3 and held that nothing in the
ACL limits the operation of the consumer guarantees to a contract which had the
closest and most real connection to the law of Australia and that there is no basis
for such implication.85 The Federal Court also discussed whether the relevant
representations were made in Australia and whether Valve carried on business
in Australia, on the basis that establishing this was necessary for the conflict of
laws provision of the ACL to apply.86 The Federal Court affirmed the finding
of Edelman J that Valve was carrying on business in Australia for the purpose of
s.5(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act for six reasons including that Valve
had a direct relationship with Australian consumers, earned significant revenue
from its Australian customers on an ongoing basis, had a significant number of
content servers in Australia and relied on relationships with third-party service
providers based in Australia.87
The reasoning and conclusion of the Full Court that Valve made the
representations in Australia and was carrying on business in Australia are in line
with the approach of the SEC in the Sony opinion. This is a key element in my
(1) the proper law of a contract for the supply of goods or services to a
consumer would be Philippine law but for a stipulation of the contract that
provides otherwise or
(2) a contract for the supply of goods or services to a consumer contains a
stipulation that purports to substitute or has the effect of substituting, the
provisions of law other than Philippine law for all or any of the consumer
guarantees under the Consumer Act and the implied warranties under the
Civil Code;
the consumer guarantees under the Consumer Act and the implied
warranties under the Civil Code apply in relation to the supply under the
contract despite that stipulation.89
IV. Conclusion
The goal of this article is to address the two major legal issues in cross-border
consumer software contracting: (1) the erroneous regulatory interpretation extending
the foreign limitation on mass media in the Philippine Constitution to cross-border
software contracting and (2) the lack of mandatory consumer guarantees for the
buyer under Philippine private international law. These issues strike at the core of
information technology contracting law: solutions must be found to make software
contracting acceptable to both contracting parties. Foreign sellers will not be
able to reach the Philippine market if the constitutional restrictions persist, and
Philippine-based buyers may be discouraged from purchasing consumer software
for the lack of consumer protection. The solution proposed in the first issue, a
proper interpretation of the mass media limitation, may only work in conjunction
with the statutory reform proposed in the second issue.
The solutions proposed in this article are direct. For the first issue, the SEC
must examine its interpretation based on a well-founded and realistic understanding
of how the Internet works — appreciating the distinction between the Internet
and traditional mass media (ie television, radio and newspaper). For one, online