LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 101328. April 7, 1993.
EMILIANA CANDIDO AND FRANCISCA CANDIDO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN AND MILA CONTRERAS,
respondents.
Alberto M. Diaz for petitioners.
Luis S. Cuvin for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY (P.D. NO. 1508); SCOPE OF
POWER; RULE. — From the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the
barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between parties who are
actual residents of barangays located in the same city or municipality or adjoining
barangays of different cities or municipalities. The Lupon of the barangay
ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving
parties who actually reside in the same municipality, city or province. Where the
complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or it does not allege
prior availment of said conciliation process, or it does not have a certification that
no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case could be
dismissed on motion. In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and private
respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify
compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-defendants
reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and provinces.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Orders 1 dated July 10,
1991 and August 9, 1991 of the trial court dismissing the complaint of petitioners
Emiliana and Francisca Candido against private respondent Mila Contreras on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction for petitioners' failure to comply with the
mandatory barangay conciliation process required by Presidential Decree No.
1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
It appears on record that petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido are the only
legitimate children of spouses Agapito Candido and Florencia Santos as shown by
the certificates 2 of the latter's Record of Marriage and the petitioners' Record of
Birth.
1| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Corporations, Judge Lloren
XU – College of Law, 2018-2019
OF CASES BATCH 6
However, petitioners' father eventually left his legitimate family and lived with
Sagraria Lozada until his death on May 6, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina
Candido and Eduardo Candido who represented themselves to be the sole heirs
of the late Agapito Candido executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate
with Sale 3 covering parcels of land owned by the latter and sold to private
respondent Mila Contreras in whose name said properties are now registered
under TCT No. T-120656-M.
On November 6, 1990, petitioners instituted an action with the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 against Sagraria Lozada,
Gorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido, Eduardo Candido, Register
of Deeds of Bulacan and private respondent Mila Contreras to annul the Deed of
Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, to cancel TCT No. 120656-M issued
in the name of private respondent and to reinstate TCT No. 223602 in the name
of Agapito Candido married to Sagraria Lozada.
On December 5, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on the
ground that petitioners failed to comply with the mandatory conciliation process
required under P.D. No. 1508 as she resides in the same municipality with the
petitioners.
On July 10, 1991, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, as prayed for, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED in so far
as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned for lack of prior referral of the dispute
before the Katarungang Pambarangay, without prejudice." 5
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 which was denied in
an Order 7 dated August 9, 1991.
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge dismissing private respondent in the complaint instituted by
the petitioners notwithstanding the fact that the other defendants in Civil Case
No. 697-M-90 reside in different municipalities and cities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508 provides:
 LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
"SEC. 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. — The Lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
1. "Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof:
2. "Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates
to the performance of his official functions;
3. "Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exceeding P200.00;
4. "Offenses where there is no private offended party;
5. "Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Local Government."
Further, section 3 of the same law provides:
"SEC. 3. Venue. — Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the
same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent
or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
– COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 6
The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all
types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality,
city or province. Where the complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted
cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or it does
not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by
the parties, the case could be dismissed on motion. 8 In the instant case, the fact
that petitioners and private respondent, reside in the same municipality of
Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508
where the other co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities,
cities and provinces.
Petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It would not serve the purpose
of the law in discouraging litigation among members of the same barangay
through conciliation where the other parties reside in barangays other than the
one where the Lupon is located and where the dispute arose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of the trial court
dated July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 697-M-90 in so
far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned are hereby annulled and set aside.
The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for further
proceedings and to REINSTATE private respondent Mila Contreras as defendant
in Civil Case No. 697-M-90. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

"The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or

municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; . . ."

From the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the barangay court
or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between parties who are actual residents
of barangays located in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays of
different cities or municipalities.

In the instant case, petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are residents
of Barrio Paliwas, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan while defendants' residences
are as follows: Sagraria Lozada and Jorge Candido at Javier Compound, Bo. Sto.
Niño, Taytay, Rizal; Virginia and Maximina Candido at Road 2, Doña Faustina
Village, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City; Eduardo Candido at 388 Barrio
Paliwas, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan; Mila Contreras at San Pascual,
Municipality of Obando, Bulacan; and the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan at his
official address in Bulacan.

2| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Corporations, Judge Lloren
XU – College of Law, 2018-2019
 LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
G.R. No. L-59495-97 June 26, 1987
GREGORIO GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAR EVANGELISTA, LUCIANO and ROSITA
SESE and ESTRELLA BAUTISTA, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petition seeks the review of a judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals, 1
setting aside the decision rendered by the former City Court of Caloocan City, now
Metropolitan Trial Court, in Civil Cases Nos. 13501, 13502, and 13503 thereof, all
actions for unlawful detainer. The challenged decision dismissed the cases for
failure of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, to avail himself of the barangay
conciliation process under Presidential Decree No. 1508, preliminary to judicial
recourse.
There is no controversy as to the facts.
The petitioner is the owner of an apartment located in Caloocan City. Three doors
thereof, Nos. 110-D, 110-B, and 110-C, were leased to the private respondents for
less than P200.00 a month in rentals. 2
On October 1, 1979, the petitioner filed three separate complaints for ejectment
against the private respondents in the City Court of Caloocan City. According to
him, he is in need of the premises for the use of his married children who do not
allegedly have residences of their own, 3 which is a ground for ejectment under
the provisions of Batas Blg. 25. The private respondents duly filed their answers,
after which the cases were consolidated and then heard.
On January 6, 1981, the said City Court rendered judgment ejecting the private
respondents. 4 They appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXII, now Regional Trial Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. 5
Reconsideration having been denied, 6 the private respondents commenced
proceedings in the respondent Court of Appeals. Among others, the private
respondents alleged that the Court of First Instance erred in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the City Court "notwithstanding the admitted fact that there was
no compliance in the cases with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508. 7
On October 31, 1981, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision. 8 On January 5, 1982, it denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 9 As we noted, the respondent Court dismissed the ejectment
cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the City Court for failure of the
parties to undergo a confrontation at the barangay level. Hence, this petition.
3| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Corporations, Judge Lloren
XU – College of Law, 2018-2019
– COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 6
The issue to be resolved here is not one of jurisdiction, as erroneously supposed
by the respondent Court of Appeals and by the parties as well. The question,
rather, is simply one of procedure.
In Ebol v. Amin, 10 we held that the conciliation process under Presidential
Decree No. 1508 is not jurisdictional. Jurisdiction is conferred by Batas Blg. 129
and the Judiciary Act of 1948. 11
Presidential Decree No. 1508 does not vest jurisdiction in the lupong tagapayapa.
Jurisdiction means the power to try and decide a case.12 The lupon does not
decide cases. It is vested only with conciliation functions. 13 It is not a court of
law.
While in Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 we ruled that "non-
compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to
dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity, 15 we held in the
same case that "the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction
from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the
defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their
answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo. 16 There is a similar waiver
in the cases at bar. There is no allegation in the private respondents' answers 17
that the petitioner failed to invoke the authority of the lupon tagapayapa before
going to court. Moreover, they took part in the trial, argued their case, and
adduced their evidence. These amount to a waiver.
Other than these, we find the decision 18 of the hen City Court of Caloocan, now
Metropolitan Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXXII, now Regional Trial Court, in the aforesaid three cases to be in
conformity with the law and evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, and its resolution denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of the
City Court in Civil Cases Nos. 13501, 13502, and 13503, as sustained by the Court
of First Instance, is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
G.R. No. L-65629 November 24, 1986
TERESITA E. AGBAYANI and LUCAS F. AGBAYANI, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. BELEN, in his capacity as Regional Trial
Judge, Branch XXXVIII, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and
SPOUSES SEVERO A. VILLAFUERTE AND ANA P. VILLAFUERTE, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Nullification is sought by petitioners of the Order of respondent Judge 1 dated
September 28, 1983, dismissing the civil action instituted by said petitioners
against private respondents and other persons for quieting of title and damages
involving three (3) parcels of land in Dayomaca (Tobuan), Poblacion, Sual,
Pangasinan. 2 The Court sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss "on the
ground that ... (it had) not yet acquired jurisdiction to try the case" because of the
failure of the petitioners to submit the controversy to conciliation proceedings
pursuant to P.D. No. 1508 before filing their complaint with the Court. The Trial
Court justified its action as follows:
The Court after carefully examining and studying the ground set forth by the
defendants in their motion to dismiss, as well as the arguments advanced by the
plaintiff, together with the pertinent provision of P.D. 1508 cited by the parties,
hereby finds that the instant action falls within the authority of the Lupon
Tagapayapa, and therefore the parties should first appear before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat of the barangay (Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan) where the
properties are located for confrontation as mandated in Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
While it appears in the record that the parties reside in barargays of different cities
or municipalities, the real property subject matter of the case are not however
located in different barangays but in one and the same barangay, that is, Barangay
Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan. Based on these facts obtaining in this case, it is clear
and clean that the present action is within the authority of the Lupon, hence the
provision of P.D. 1508 should first be complied with before the complaint could
be flied in court. 3
The Order is incorrect and win have to be reversed.
PD 1508 declares that generally, disputes involving parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality, or in adjoining barangays of different cities or
municipalities, should first be brought before the appropriate Barangay Lupon
which shall have the authority to bring together the parties for amicable
settlement." 4 The proceedings before the Lupon are a "precondition" to the filing
of any action or proceeding in court or other "government office," PD 1508
further declaring that "No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any
4| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Corporations, Judge Lloren
XU – College of Law, 2018-2019
– COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 6
matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudiration unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the
Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat
Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated." 5
A complaint or petition filed in court or other government office without
compliance with the precondition may be dismissed on motion of any interested
party on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. 6 The defect
may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to
dismiss or answer, 7 the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court. 8
The venue of these pre-requisite proceedings for conciliation is the Lupon of the
barangay: (1) in which the parties to the dispute are actually residing, or (2)
where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, if the parties
are actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality,or
(3) where the real property or any part thereof is situated, if the dispute affects
real property or any interest therein. 9
But the "precondition" does not apply to disputes over which the Lupon has no
authority, namely: those —
1) where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
2) where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;
3) involving "offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days or a
fine exceeding P200.00," or "where there is no private offended party;
4) which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine, upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local
Government; 10
5) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and
6) involving real property located in different municipalities.11
The question presented in this case is whether the "precondition," i.e., the prior
submission of the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation, should apply to
actions affecting real property situated in one city or municipality al-though the
parties actually reside in barangays which are located in different cities or
municipalities and do not adjoin each other.
The question has already been passed upon and answered by thisCourt. In Tavora
vs. Veloso, et al., 12 the Court en banc held that the "precondition" had no
application to cases over which the Lupon had no authority. Specifically, the
 LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS – COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 6
Court ruled that by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall
have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of
the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually
reside adjoin each other." 13 In such a situation, where the Lupon is without
jurisdiction of the controversy because the parties are not actual residents of the
same city or municipality or of adjoining' barangays, the nature of the
controversy is of no moment-whether or not affecting real property or interest
therein, located in the same city or municipality. And the principle is not at an
altered by the proviso of Section 3 of PD 1508(governing venue) that "disputes
which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated." The "quoted
proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed
in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3;" 14 but obviously, the
rule on venue is utterly in-consequential as regards a case over which the
Barangay Lupon does not, in the first place, have any jurisdiction.
Since the dispute between the parties in this case was never within the authority
or jurisdiction of the Barangay Lupon because the parties admittedly reside in
different cities and municipalities (and not in adjoining barangays), there was no
occasion or reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue governing disputes
concerning real property. Petitioners were there-fore under no obligation to
comply with the "precondition" of first referring their dispute with private
respondents to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement
before instituting their suit in court. Hence, it was incorrect for the Trial Court to
ascribe this obligation to them, and to dismiss their action for omission to fulfill
it.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Trial Court dated September 28, 1983 is hereby
annulled and set aside, and the case is remanded to that Court for further
proceedings, with costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

5| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Corporations, Judge Lloren
XU – College of Law, 2018-2019
 LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
G.R. No. L-48112 February 29, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
MARIANO B. MONTON, defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Mariano Monton was then the Barrio Captain of Bacao, General Trias, Cavite,
when on the morning of October 29, 1966 a PC team led by Sgt. Cagalpin raided
his house and found one automatic carbine with one long magazine containing
several rounds of ammunition hidden under a pillow covered with a mat. Thus he
was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in an information that
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. After arraignment and trial on
the merits a decision was rendered on September 26, 1968 finding him guilty of
the offense charged and imposing on him the penalty of imprisonment of five (5)
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and magazine and 27 rounds of
ammunitions were confiscated in favor of the government.1
The accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. However, in a decision
of January 12, 1978 the records of the case were elevated to this Court as the legal
issue determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused of whether a barrio
captain is a peace officer within the purview of Section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code exempting certain peace officers from securing a firearm
license, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Sections 878 and 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides —
Sec. 878. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in acquisition, disposition, or
possession of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or
instruments or implements used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of firearms or ammunition. — Save as allowable under this article it shall
be unlawful for any person to import, manufacture, deal in, receive,
acquire, buy, sell, dispose of, or possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition.
See. 879. Exemption as to firearms and ammunition used by military and
naval forces or by peace officers. This article shall not apply to firearms
and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors,
or marines of the United States Army and Navy, the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails, when such firearms are in possession of
6| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Corporations, Judge Lloren
XU – College of Law, 2018-2019
– COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 6
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties.
From the aforecited provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, it is clear that
the peace officers covered by the exemption as to firearms regularly and lawfully
issued are the "Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau
of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails." Barrio captains are not included in the
enumeration. Hence what is not included is and should be deemed excluded. 2
There can be no question therefor that at the time of apprehension of the
appellant in the possession of the firearm and ammunitions the act was
punishable under Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code.
However, under Section 88(3) of the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337 which was approved on February 10, 1983 it is specifically provided as
follows:
In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay
shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearms within his
territorial jurisdiction subject to existing rules and regulations on the
possession and carrying of firearms.
From the foregoing it is clear that a barrio captain or punong barangay is now
entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearms within his territorial
jurisdiction without incurring any criminal liability thereby. what before was
penalized by the old law is no longer punishable under the present law.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that when the new law repeals the existing law so
that the act which was penalized under the old law is no longer punishable, the
crime is obliterated. A new statute dealing with crimes which establishes
conditions more lenient or favorable to the accused can be given a retroactive
effect. 3
In the present case, appellant presented Barrio Resolution No. 6 4 showing that
the firearm and ammunitions were bought by the barrio out of barrio funds
because of the rampant cattle rustling and robbery in the area. No doubt the same
was issued to appellant by the people of the barrio as their barrio captain to be
utilized in the performance of his peace and order functions.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Reversed and set aside and another
judgment is hereby rendered Acquitting accused-appellant of the offense charged
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
G.R. No. L-56011 October 31, 1984
ELMER PEREGRINA, ADELAIDA PEREGRINA and CECILIA PEREGRINA,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III, PROCOPIO SANCHEZ and
CARMELITA SANCHEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Respondent Court's assumption of jurisdiction, without prior conciliation
proceedings between the parties in the Lupon Tagapayapa, is questioned in this
Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction. We issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Judge from taking further
action in the case pending resolution of the controversy.
The Complaint filed below by the SPOUSES Procopio and Carmelita Sanchez
against PETITIONERS Elmer, Adelaida and Cecilia, all surnamed Peregrina, is a
civil action for damages for alleged disrespect for the dignity, privacy and peace
of mind of the SPOUSES under Article 26 of the Civil Code, and for alleged
defamation under Article 33 of the same Code.
Admittedly, the parties are actual residents of the same barangay in Olongapo
City. In fact, they are neighbors. Unquestionably, too, no conciliation proceedings
were filed before the Lupon. It is not surprising then that the Complaint is silent
regarding compliance with the mandatory requirement, nor does it allege that
the dispute falls within the excepted cases. 1
PETITIONERS, as defendants below, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint.
Before firing an Opposition, the SPOUSES applied for a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment. Thereafter, the SPOUSES presented their Opposition claiming that,
under Section 6(3) of P.D. No. 1508, the parties may go directly to the Courts if
the action is coupled with a provisional remedy such as preliminary attachment.
In resolving the Motion to Dismiss, respondent Judge at first, dismissed the
Complaint for failure of the SPOUSES to comply with the pre-condition for
amicable settlement under P.D. No. 1508, stating that the application for a
provisional remedy was merely an afterthought. On motion for reconsideration
by the SPOUSES, however, respondent Judge denied PETITIONERS' Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that under Rule 57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the
application for attachment can be made at the commencement of the action or
any time thereafter. PETITIONERS now assail that Order of denial before us.
7| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Corporations, Judge Lloren
XU – College of Law, 2018-2019
– COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 6
We uphold PETITIONERS. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 specifically provides:
têñ.£îhqwâ£
Disputes between or among persons actually respectively in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. ...
It is also mandated by Section 6 of the same law: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided. in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman
or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
...
Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1,,983), and Vda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126
SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at
the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court.
Non-compliance with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. 2 The condition is analogous to
exhaustion of administrative remedies, 3 or the lack of earnest efforts to
compromise suits between family members, 4 lacking which the case can be
dismissed. 5
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are actual
residents in the same barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the
excepted cases. 6
It will have to be held, therefore, that respondent Judge erred in reconsidering his
previous Order of dismissal on the ground that the provisional remedy of attachment
was seasonably filed. Not only was the application for that remedy merely an
afterthought to circumvent the law, but also, fundamentally, a Writ of Attachment is
not available in a suit for damages where the amount, including moral damages, is
contingent or unliquidated. 7 Prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings,
therefore, was indubitably called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge's Order, dated November 17, 1980, is SET ASIDE, and
the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2946-0 for damages is DISMISSED, without prejudice.
The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
costs.