CAYETANO v.

MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991
PARAS, J.:

FACT:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
said nomination. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the Constitutional qualification requirement.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:
(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
It was known to us that Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and having
hurdled the bar, worked in his father’s law office. After then, he worked as operations
officer in the World Bank Group for about two years (1963-1970). Upon returning to the
Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group as a Chief Executive Officer, and
subsequently rendered services to various companies either as legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. He also served as former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Monsod possess the required qualification for the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC.

2. WHETHER OR NOT there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Commission on Appointments regarding the confirmation of nomination of
Monsod.

1
RULING:
1. YES.In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-
177) stated:The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation
in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,

a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.

2. NO.The power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm the nomination of

the COMELEC Chairman by the president is mandated by the Constitution. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretionfor has been clearly
shown.

Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

- December 23, 2012

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993

Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by
herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041

2
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming
that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services
should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen
vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.

Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent
constitute practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of
Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:

3
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's
own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being
offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is
that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice,
contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn
the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics
of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law
is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,

4
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal
by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

CRITERIA FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.

Rule 2.03 | June 17, 1993 | Regalado, J
Nature of Case: Original Petition in the SC
Petitioner: Mauricio Ulep
Respondent: The Legal Clinic, Inc.

SUMMARY: Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of
the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements. Respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice
of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines.

DOCTRINE: The services offered by respondent include various legal

problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good
and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

FACTS:

• Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays for the Court "to order the
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and
`B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law.”

• Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are champertous,

unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements.

• Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its

instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines.

5
• Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.

• The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services

can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been
offering.

• While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation

merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

• It is palpably clear that respondent corporation gives out legal

information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.

• In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,

divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore

• It is clear that services offered by respondent fall within the ambit of the
practice of law. And only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar
and who is in good and regular stading is entitled to practice law.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as

advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether
the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of – YES

The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law and such practice is not
allowed. Respondent is composed mainly of paralegals; the services it offers
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed
by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

RULING: The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this
petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

6
NOTE:
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 15, 1911
G.R. No. L-6513

FAUSTINO LICHAUCO, in his own name and in behalf of his coheirs, Eugenia,
Clara, Luisa, Crisanto, Zacarias, Galo and Timotea Lichauso, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANA ALEJANDRINO and her husband W. WEINMANN, defendant-appellees.

Ramon Salinas, for appellants.

No appearance for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

On the 16th of July, 1908, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants, in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, for the purpose of recovering the sum of
P1,657.75, with interest at 12 per cent from the said 16th of July, 1908.

To this complaint the defendants demurred, which demurrer was, on the 23d of
November, 1908, sustained by the Hon. Julio Llorente, judge. On the same day (the 23d
of November, 1908) the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against the defendants.
The complaint was accompanied by Exhibit A, B, C, and D.

Later the defendants presented a demurrer which was overruled. On the 2d of July,
1909, the defendants presented a general and special answer, in which they prayed to
be relieved from all liability under the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Hon. Julio Llorente,
judge, on the 10th of February, 1901, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants for the sum of P610.22 Philippine currency, with interest at 6 per
cent from the 16th of July, 1908, with the provision that if the defendants failed to pay
the said amount, the plaintiffs were entitled to sell at public auction one-sixth part of the
land mortgaged under and by virtue of a contract between Mariano Alejandrino and
Cornelia Laochangco, dated the 30th of July, 1886. (See Exhibit A.) Mariano
Alejandrino was the father of the defendant, Ana Alejandrino, and Cornelia Laochangco
as the mother of the plaintiffs.

Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco are both dead.

From the judgment of the lower court the plaintiffs appealed.

From an examination of the record, the following facts seem to be true:

First. That on the 30th of July, 1886, the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from the
said Cornelia Laochangco the sum of P6,000 Mex., under certain conditions mentioned
in the said contract. (See Exhibit A.)

7
Second. That on the 15th of August, 1895, the said Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia
Laochangco liquidated the amount due under the said contract, Exhibit A, and it was
found on the date that there was still due under the said contract the sum of P4,115.75.
On the same day (August 15, 1895) the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from
Cornelia Laochangco the additional sum of P234.25, making a total amount due of
4,350 pesos Mex. (Exhibit B.)

Third. That on the 15th of December, 1906, all of the children of the said Mariano
Alejandrino, except the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, entered into a contract, by
the terms of which they obligated themselves to pay to the plaintiffs the balance due
from their father, Mariano Alejandrino. (See Exhibit D.)
Fifth. That on the 23d of April, 1898, the amount due on the said contract of July 30,
1886, was again liquidated and it was found that there was remaining due and unpaid
on the said contract, the sum of P4,465. (See Exhibit C.)

Under the provisions of Exhibit D (the contract which was entered into by all of the heirs
of Mariano Alejandrino, except the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino), they obligated
themselves to pay their proportional amount of the indebtedness of their father, together
with 12 per cent interest. The plaintiffs claim that the amount due on the contract of July
30, 1886, at the time of the commencement of the present action (the 15th of July,
1908), together with the interest amounted to the sum of P9,946.50, and that the
defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, was liable for one-sixth part of said sum, or the sum
of P1,657.75.

The defendant, Ana Alejandrino, was not a party to the contract represented by Exhibit
D. she did not agree to pay 12 per cent interest on the amount remaining due on the
23rd of April, 1898, of the debt between her father and the plaintiffs herein. There is no
proof in the record that any demand was ever made upon her for the payment of her
aliquot part of the balance found to be due on the 23rd of April, 1898, either judicially or
extrajudicially. She was, therefore, not liable to pay interest or her aliquot part of the
said amount. The lower court correctly held, however, that she was liable for the
payment of one-sixth part of said amount by virtue of her having accepted her
proportional part of the property involved and covered by the original contract between
her father and the mother of the plaintiffs, bearing date of July 30, 1886, or for the sum
of 744.16 pesos Mex., which, reduced to conant, amounted to P610.22, the amount for
which the lower court rendered judgment, with 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908.

While we have not discussed the assignments of error in detail, we believe that we have
answered each of them in effect. We have discussed the question upon their merits as
they are presented in the record. There is a question of parties, however, which has not
been presented, which we can not overlook.
It will be noted that Faustino Lichauco has brought this action for himself and in
representation of his co-heirs. So far as the record shows, the co-heirs have no
knowledge of the pendency of the action.

It will be noted that Faustino Lichauco has brought this action for himself and in
representation of his co-heirs. So far as the record shows, the co-heirs have no
knowledge of the pendency of the action. Faustino Lichauco shows no authority for
representing his co-heirs except the mere allegation in the title of his complaint. He
speaks of himself as the plaintiff. The attorney signs himself as attorney for the plaintiff
— not for the plaintiffs. Faustino Lichauco represents himself and his co-heirs, and the
attorney-at-law, who signs the complaint, represents as he alleges "the plaintiff." There
is nothing in the record which shows that the co-heirs are not capable of representing
themselves. There is nothing in the record which shows that they ever gave their
consent to the commencement of the present action. It may be assumed that they did,
but this not sufficient. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that in Courts of
First Instance a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and

8
his appearance must be either personal or by the aid of a duly authorized member of
the bar. (Sec. 34, Act No. 190.) In the present case the co-heirs are neither in court
personally nor by the a duly authorized member of the bar. Therefore they are not in
court at all, and any judgment which we might render in the present case, with reference
to the heirs, either pro or con, would in no way be binding upon them. (Espiritu vs.
Crossfield and Vicente Guasch, No. 5313)

Therefore they are not in court at all, and any judgment which we might render in the
present case, with reference to the heirs, either pro or con, would in no way be binding
upon them. (Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Vicente Guasch, No. 5313).[[1]]

The present case seems to have been tried in the lower court upon the theory that all of
the interested parties were present, and for that reason we have discussed the case
upon its merits, believing that the parties would deem further litigation unnecessary,
once being informed of the views of this court upon the facts presented. This
assumption, however, is based upon the ground that even though the co-heirs had been
represented in the trial of the cause, in accordance with law, no other or different
evidence would have been adduced.

Therefore, following the decision of this court in the case of Lichauco vs. Limjuco (19
Phil. Rep., 12), the judgment of the lower court is hereby set aside, unless the coheirs of
Faustino Lichauco, within a period of ten days from notification of this decision, shall
appear personally or by attorney in the Court of First Instance of the Province or
Pampanga, either as plaintiffs or defendants, and in writing indicate their full
conformance with the proceedings had in the present cause. In which case, the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Pampanga is hereby directed to enter a judgment
confirming the judgment heretofore rendered by said court on the 10th day of February,
1910.
Mapa, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

NATURE OF PRACTICE OF LAW

Tan v Sabandal
B.M. No. 44, Feb 24 1992
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.

I. Code of Professional Responsibility provision used:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services

II. Reliefs Sought

Motion for Reconsideration to deny petitioner's petition to be allowed to take the oath
as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys

III. Facts
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending
administrative complaints filed against him regarding instances when he called himself “attorney”
knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar, he was not allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

He then filed a petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is
domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.

9
In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts
committed by the respondent as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. However, he added
that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in
which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured
a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to
be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged
to the bank.

IV. Issue/s and Held

1. W/N Sabandal shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar

No. The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to have concealed the civil
case brought against him in the course of his series of petitions to be allowed to take oath together with
the testimonies attesting to his good moral character without any mention of the pending case against
him. The court finds this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on the part of the respondent.

The practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. It has also been held that
no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

**FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ART. 11-12 OF THE CIVIL CODE

In The Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name
“Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon…” etc.
92 SCRA 1
July 30, 1979

Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:

The surviving parters of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a petition praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the name of their firm, the names of their partner who
passed away. One of the petitioners’ arguments stated that no local custom prohibits
the
continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name in so far as
Greater Manila Area is concerned. No custom exists which recognizes that the name of
a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm. They also stated that
the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries in the world.

Issue:
Whether or not the law firm “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes” is allowed to
sustain the name of their deceased partner, Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, in the name of their
firm.

Held:
NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association stated the following:
“The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.”
No local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner’s
name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under Philippine custom,
identify the more active or senior partners in a firm. Firm names in the Philippines

10
change and evolve when partners die, leave or a new one is added. It is questionable to
add the new name of a partner and sustain the name of the deceased one since they
have
never been, technically, partners in the first place. When it comes to the arguments of
the
petitioners stating that U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the deceased partner’s
name, this is so because in the U.S., it is a sanctioned custom as stated in the case of
Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not apply
in the Philippines. The petition filed herein is denied and petitioner is advised to drop the
name “OZAETA” from the firm name.

Adez Realty Incorporated vs. CA, December 12, 1995 Case Digest

BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to
this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with
the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment.
Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.[1]

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer
Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18
November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the
President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme
Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the
petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was
found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the
President for appointment as regional trial judge.[2] But the Court on 3 December 1992
denied the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the
questioned resolution.[3]

On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that
he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry
for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would
live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion
certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish
of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San
Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for
Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College
of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge,
RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P.
Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon
City.[4] However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion.[5]

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging
among others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic,
religious and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of
extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound
regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and
ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has
done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart."[6]

His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that

11
while she did not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish
that the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire
family had been traumatized by his disbarment.[7]

On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December
1994. Thus -

I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for
it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was
merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly
punished for it.

Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a
wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from
me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief x x x x

Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law
profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me
back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons x x x x[8]

On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.

On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement -

It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been
struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please
give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do
nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession.[9]

On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter.[10]

On 17 November 1995 movant once more wrote the Court -

I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly
punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.

I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my
wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent,
they bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment.[11]

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite
apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his
professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice
law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of
guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once
more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its
practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay.
However he should be sternly warned that

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to

12
practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a
right, but a bounden duty as well x x x x That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members x x x x[12]

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is

LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the
required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA

AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002

FACTS:

On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent petitioner Dominador

Burbe in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of
contract. In consequence to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared the
demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services he was accordingly paid
and an amount of P25,000.00 for the required filing fee. A week later, petitioner was
informed by the respondent that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that
he should receive notice of its progress. The petitioner waited for several months for
the notice from the court but there was no progress in the case, he was also inquired
repeatedly in the respondent’s Law Office, however he was told to just wait.

The petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty.
Magulta’s complaint to personally verify the progress of the case, and there told that
there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf, copy
of the Certification dated May 27, 1999. As such, the petitioner confronted the latter.
The respondent admitted that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had
spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose he offered to reimburse him by
issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P8,000.00.

The petitioner filed a case against Atty. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and
oppressive conduct. The respondent denied the allegations and alleged that he was
never been paid by complainant for his acceptance and legal fees and that the amount
he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for misrepresentation of funds
given to him for the filing fee.
HELD:
YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall
hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their
possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of

13
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. It may be true that they have a lien upon the client’s funds, documents and
other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them
until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such
funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these
considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys
they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In any event,
they must still exert all effort to protect their client’s interest within the bounds of law.
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the
filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly.
The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach
of duty.

REGULATION OF PRACTICE OF LAW

CONST. ART. VIII, SEC. 5, PAR (5)
IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75%
in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

14
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar
flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing,
thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while

that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was
stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine
who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying
admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the
practice of law.

PERSONS ENTITLED TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW

RULES OF COURT, RULE 138, SEC.1

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADMISSION IN THE BAR

Lawyer’s Oath

1.) Ong vs Delos Santos A.C. No. 10179 March 04, 2014

Facts: In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty.
William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila. After several calls and personal interactions between them, Ong and Atty. Delos
Santos became friends.

In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check
inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be

15
funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his
good paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong handed to
Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the
latter’s Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.

However, the check was dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account
was closed. Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and
demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him. When efforts to collect
remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos. Ong also brought this disbarment
complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.

Issue: By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling:
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain
his good moral character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition
precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing
imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar. The Court
unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual
in whom the public may repose confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral
character in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community
at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.

lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.

That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer
invested him – whether he was acting as such or in a non-professional capacity – with
the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others.
There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his
profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity.
His being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral
and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others.

16
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO
v. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ
A.C. No. 244
March 29, 1963
FACTS:
Two years following his admission to the Philippine Bar, lawyer Telesforo A. Diao was
charged by private complainant Severino G. Martinez for allegedly falsifying his application
to take the Bar Examinations specifically his scholastic qualifications. The Solicitor General,
having established in the course of its investigation that at the time Diao filed his application
to take the Bar Examinations did not complete the required pre-legal education prescribed
by the Department of Private Education, recommended the omission of his name from the
roll of attorneys. Diao averred that he had entered military service, took and passed the
General Classification Test which is equivalent to a high school diploma, and that he
completed his Associate in Arts degree at the Arellano University in 1949 and due to
confusion, was erroneously certified in his school records as a graduate of Quisumbing
College.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of law.
HELD:
Yes, Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of law. His
application disclosed that he began his law studies six months before he obtained his pre-
law degree thereby disqualifying him from taking the bar tests under the rules, but with the
aid of false pretenses, was allowed to take it, passed it and thereafter admitted to the bar.
The fact that he hurdled the bar examinations is immaterial. The High Tribunal, through Chief
Justice Bengzon, enunciated that passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential.

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

17
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day,
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends
to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin
M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule
138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected

with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court)
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership
in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by
a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that
an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
18
years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law
in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is
a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen

of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although
he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal

education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also
renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

19
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,

subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of
the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

20