Republic of the Philippines In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to run for a
SUPREME COURT congressional seat in Leyte. On 23 March 1987, he finally decided to book a flight back to the
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 104960 September 14, 1993
PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD
OF ELECTION INSPECTORS, PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the
MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR COMELEC, TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.
Otilia Dimayuga-Molo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
VITUG, J.:
An event in this decade, which future generations would likely come to know simply as the
"EDSA People's Power Revolution of 1986," has dramatically changed the course of our
nation's history. So, too, not a few of our countrymen have by it been left alone in their own
personal lives. One such case is that of the petitioner in this special civil action for certiorari.
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the
former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his
decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, 1 caused the
construction of his residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served as Barangay
Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan Election and 1986 "snap" Presidential Election,
Romualdez acted as the Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte
where he voted.2
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were about to
come to a close, some relatives and associates of the deposed President, fearing for their
personal safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one,
together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United
States which the United States (U.S.) government granted.3 While abroad, he took special
studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and international business finance.4
Philippines but the flight was somehow aborted.5
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District Director
of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him that he should depart from
the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August 1992, thus:
. . . Failure to depart on or before the specified date may result in the
withdrawal of voluntary departure and action being taken to effect your
deportation. In accordance with a decision made to your case, you are
required to depart from the United States at your expense on or before 23
August 1992.6
Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines, arriving on
December 1991 apparently without any government document.7
When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the Commission on
Election ("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992 for the Synchronized National and Local
Election scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct
No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. The chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors, who had
known Romualdez to be a resident of the place and, in fact, an elected Barangay Chairman
of Malbog in 1982, allowed him to be registered.
Romualdez's registration, however, was not to be unquestioned. On 21 February 1992,
herein private respondent Donato Advincula ("Advincula") filed a petition with the Municipal
Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in
Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166.8 Advincula alleged that
Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was
in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the
required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to
qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. 9
On 25 February 1992, Romualdez filed an answer, contending that he has been a resident of
Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has not abandoned his said residence by
his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the third week of December
1991. 10
After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte rendered a decision 11 on 28 February
1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to
be a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a
voter thereat. Hence, the instant petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez
 from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby
ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Upon receipt of the adverse decision, Advincula appealed the case to the respondent court.
12
On 03 April 1992, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Philip Romualdez disqualified to
register as a voter for the 1992 elections and hereby reverses the decision of
the lower court in toto.
The Municipal Registrar of the Commission on Elections of Tolosa, Leyte, is
hereby ordered to delete and cancel the name of respondent Philip G.
Romualdez from the list of qualified voters registered February 1, 1992, at
Precinct 9, barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse.
On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro Espino to cease and desist from enforcing questioned
decision.13
The petitioner has raised several issues which have been well synthesized by the Solicitor
General into —
(1) Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired jurisdiction over, respectively, Case No. 01-S.
1992 and Case No. 92-03-42, the petition having been filed by one who did not allege to be
himself a registered voter of the municipality concerned; and
(2) Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left
the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails for the first time the jurisdiction of the respondent
Court and the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, in taking cognizance of the case, despite an absence of
any allegation in the petition filed with the MTC that Advincula was himself a registered voter
in Precinct No. 9 of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte conformably with Section 142 of the
Omnibus Election Code. 14
When respondent Advincula filed the petition with the MTC for the exclusion of herein
petitioner Romualdez, the latter countered by filing his answer 15 and praying for the denial of
the petition, without raising the issue of jurisdiction. But what can be telling is that when the
MTC decision, denying the petition for disqualification, went on appeal to the RTC,
Romualdez, in his own appeal-memorandum, explicitly prayed that the MTC decision be
affirmed. This unassailable incident leads us to reiterate that "while lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction." 16 Undoubtedly, the
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent not only by his
active participation in the proceedings thereat but, more importantly, in having sought an
affirmative relief himself when the appeal was made to the latter court whose jurisdiction he,
in effect, invoked. Furthermore, the question is not really as much the jurisdiction of the
courts below as merely the locus standi of the complainant in the proceedings, a matter that,
at this stage, should be considered foreclosed.
In any case, we consider primordial the second issue of whether or not Romualdez voluntarily
left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Here, this time, we
find for the petitioner.
The Solicitor General himself sustains the view of petitioner Romualdez. Expressing surprise
at this stance given by the Solicitor General, respondent Advincula posits non
sequitur argument 17 in his comment assailing instead the person of Solicitor Edgar Chua. If it
would have any value, at all, in disabusing the minds of those concerned, it may well be to
recall what this Court said in Rubio vs. Sto. Tomas: 18
It is also incumbent upon the Office of the Solicitor General to present to the
Court the position that will legally uphold the best interest of the government,
although it may run counter to a client's position.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he
term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention." 19 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. 20 That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980's
to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by
adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. 21 In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual. 22
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly
caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety
and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions
favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden
departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of
residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of
"domicile by choice."

We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us that the
petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established his
domicile elsewhere.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a
bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of
government so as to ensure that the government can truly be said to derive its power solely
from the consent of the governed. 23 We, therefore, must commend respondent Advincula for
spending time and effort even all the way up to this Court, for as the right of suffrage is not to
be abridged, so also must we safeguard and preserve it but only on behalf of those entitled
and bound to exercise it.

WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE; of
the Decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated 03 April 1992 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court dated 28
February 1992 is hereby REINSTATED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court in this case is correspondingly made PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress
the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the election."2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the
1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter,
from an elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March
8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed
that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner
that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing
of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or
before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise
filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of
the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District
of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing
a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme
Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in
the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with
other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district
to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious
that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict
of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a
vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed
word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be
allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in
the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is
Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always
intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned.
Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she
has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that
she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed
when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow
respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in
Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of
origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not
cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is
not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates
about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks
clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent
fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be
made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance
of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly
conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment
cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in the place where
respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the
filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of
the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow
an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical
accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her
certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that
she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by
her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24,
1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List
of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time,
starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only
sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to
believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of
the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in
a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs.
RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to
the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San
Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila
and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First
District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot
hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her
affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959,
after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of
Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office
of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be
re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her
claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on
several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she
spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned
such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the
case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one
acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically
be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to
stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there
by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident
of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she
spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect
that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice
of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her
conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban.
Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had
been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of
the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed
out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No.
18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six
months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it
refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she
was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution
declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte
held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on
May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471
votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat
of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal
issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election
Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion
in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose
of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing
or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One
may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be
to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used
to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place
of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So
settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
 Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time
to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick
to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term
residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied
the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her
residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to
his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa,
Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in
the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's
Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance,
when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her
eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming
that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her
place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she
subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate
would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is
followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks
election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period
of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 —
the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April
24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution
additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be
any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to
the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also
registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she
served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could
not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the
COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if
he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or
semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena
vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever
had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or
with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as
the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other
places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election
is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire
to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his
professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as
he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially
in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his
home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may
be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural
desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in
the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated
from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now
Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in
Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband
lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines,
she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines
and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is
that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades.
None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin
in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there
and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons.
Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers,
petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province,
instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or
consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of
the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the
country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could
not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there
again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect
an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in
1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the
term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where
the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area
explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which
states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de
esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a
pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article,
which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article
clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family
home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase
"cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the
husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family
to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to
refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one
place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family,
a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law
to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring
into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family
unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding
Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
 Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case
of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical
to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be
faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional
or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with
reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of
some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration
of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are
used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence
of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the
place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently,
even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either
allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical
reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De
la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the
husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain
new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife
actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de
Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an
order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to
live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the
courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution
of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts
were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the
delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this
practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883,
Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a
decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be
enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished
the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in
appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a
stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far
as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the
State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a
wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure
to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in
her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the
ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp.
 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences
that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her
property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual
place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no
showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that
Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained
upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code
of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of
the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the
term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit
from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept
of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of
mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar
as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the
term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's
acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but
expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in
Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a
home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992
in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone
straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously
looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of
Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover,
and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the
marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original
domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile
different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up
to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor
of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District
of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that
the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the
election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in
accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities,
this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the
law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting
the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the
mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of
the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the
statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear
and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction

over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say
that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality
of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely,
many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake
perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals,
including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of
principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in
doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921
MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.
Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.
Powell & Hill for appellee.
STREET, J.:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by
marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they
have lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went
away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her
husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume
marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial
home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of
marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by
way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment
on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of
(1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance
for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower
court gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband,
granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay
to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the
case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this
court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that
the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her
furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent
breaking off of marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and weighed every line
of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The
evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in
an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many
miseries that have attended their married life. In view of the decision which we are to
pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the resumption of married
relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the mistakes of the past;
and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the
spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the other
to suspect illicit relations with any person. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband
towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than
highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves
from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid
condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the
abandonment by her of the marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the
defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the
husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly
expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by the
wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor
even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined that
where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband,
she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance
(Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the expenses,
including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation,
(Mercado vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as
well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the
duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition
of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave
danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made
for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of
the husband.
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the eminent
jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action for the support of the wife separate from
the husband will only be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151).
That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained
also appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of South
Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme
court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance, where
it is impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has
more than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where it appeared
that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper
conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597;
Boyd vs. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)
Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English Ecclesiastical
Court in a case where cruelty on the part of the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce
for the wife, made use of the following eloquent words, — which are perhaps even more
applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where, as here, a
divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this, too, after the
conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime. Said he:
That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is
admitted, but the question occurs, What is cruelty? . . .
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they
are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of
temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and
accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily
harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-
state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that
cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the
parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the suffering party
must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must
subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done,
both must suffer in silence. . . .
The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity is the
second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of
humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views merely to the happiness of
the present parties, it would be a question easily decided upon first impressions.
Every body must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each
other, who cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and consequently with
any degree of happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings,
much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said that married persons
shall not be legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit
together. . . .
To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it
were, it would not be difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its
usual wisdom and humanity with that true wisdom, and that real humanity, that
regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular cases the
repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may
operate with great severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered that
the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When
people understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known
to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know
cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of
remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the
duties which it imposes. . . . In this case, as in many others, the happiness of some
individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good.
(Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well
founded and none of the relief sought therein can be granted.
The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively prove
that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society
of his wife and that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common
home and cohabit with him. The only question which here arises is as to the character and
extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights; and it is
supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife
according to the precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in
unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she
should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is raised for
the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and
the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were
found to warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt
bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir
James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that
which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could
not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against
the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment;
though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to live
with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her
husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the
doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21
Cyc., 1148.)

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an
order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital
domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of
certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to
her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it
does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was
sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience
to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is
sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty
to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint
and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from
the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return.
The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs
of either instance. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.


FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, 1 or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.2 Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of
his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge
awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.4 It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over another
person.5
The petition of Erlinda K.Ilusorio6 isto reverse thedecision7 of
the Court of Appeals and its
resolution8 dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband,
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio9 is to annul that portion of the decision
of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin
Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board
and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived
together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in
Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55);
Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and
Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin),
alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of
100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition 10 for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did
not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents11 refused
petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning
to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner’s manifestation,
respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland
Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorio’s staff especially
Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio
and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of
contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein
petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."12
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,13 or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid
has later become arbitrary.14 It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.15 Jksmä â Ó
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. 16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.17 The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral.18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his
liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the
administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from
seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of
sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the
court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case,
the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The
choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which
exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was
not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any
true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be
the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Esä
m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for
habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent
with the finding of subject’s sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall
be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit
a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best
left to the man and woman’s free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No
costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS
RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged
in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after
the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together
for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent
allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused
to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since
that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and
indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just
refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by
word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her
body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to
desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to
leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities
established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the
consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil
Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed
between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a
marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere
contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights,
duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the
public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any
shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this
relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none
other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new
relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy
for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated
by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to
guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under
consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De
la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in
the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883
(Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist
each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph
deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he
charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just
cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a
foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole
extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either
by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own
home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall
cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties
and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each
other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her
husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he
removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his
option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own
home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be
compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code
absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions
dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article
149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension
fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the same,
is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this
right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the
existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the party
enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being thereby
restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was
whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article
149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and
maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as
nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro
Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the
natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to her
maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support until,
owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these
circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it
would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute
an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the
present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with
regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should
be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep.,
576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not
absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of
these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in
the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married a
woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already been
established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases
clearly established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may
not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme
court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of
certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to
administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of
title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in
which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and
being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his
wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore
granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her answer the wife
claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support and that
the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be
canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed
to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor
dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that
high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are
mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the
other provisions of said Code which regulates the family organization and the duties
of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their living
together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the
aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who
has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for
subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance with
law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case,
with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered,
since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's
property and of the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal
partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow
married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of
their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said
article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with the nature and
effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein and disturbing the unity
of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has
established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are not
legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and
support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support
from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it is
his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of
 her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently,
those of his own support without need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment
appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated
the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1
and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the
spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least
there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained
in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and
separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the
supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be
controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by
the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force
him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal,
dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against her
husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause
whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the
ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the
conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the
person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house.
From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the
husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he
therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable
obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56
of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial
court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or
relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the
errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the
duty of affording mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long
as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the court above
described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision
of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in
the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other
outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured
one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily
control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the
same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in
force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties
and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil
Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code,
various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the
part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal
violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife
in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife;
the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the
connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual
chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery.
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was
announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire
subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the
judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or
weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since
the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or
modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted
doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce
or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good
and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks
power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance
must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to
grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the
one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital
obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the
husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied
terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws
will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable
either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but
rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the
purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges
in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate
support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so
sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and
except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public
peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the
marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment,
heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence
of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin,
declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of
plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and
ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner,
without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents
and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in
Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked
as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence
and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice
or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or
gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix;
Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he
maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court
prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6,
1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition
for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order
temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of
this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and
authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably,
petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned
annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin
himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore,
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For
Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for
legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility
of the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used
the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily
restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the
prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

 room,10 while Erlinda Tabancura,11 another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told
her that Cirila was his mistress.12 On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who
could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in
any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse. 13

It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of
Francisco.14 Cirila testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year
old widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance
at that time;15 and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden.16 Erlinda
SECOND DIVISION Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot
near the public streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001 he provided her family with food and lodging.18

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument
vs. denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A,
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his
BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents. name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful
services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized
by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.19 and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20
MENDOZA, J.:

On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals,
received from Francisco had a market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of
which affirmed with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog
P28,550.00.21
City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter
vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent
resolution3 denying reconsideration. On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents,
who are the decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged
The facts are as follows:
that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by
Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the
registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.4 After the death of Zosima on October
may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of
one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco.5 On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot
in his name with the Registry of Deeds.6 On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the
donation void under this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion
based on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia
one "Cirila Comille." The documents were (1) an application for a business permit to operate
Bellosillo,7 the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, 8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a
as real estate lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature "Cirila
widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. 9
Comille";22 (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate
showing the signature "Cirila Comille" in black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and decedent with the signature "Cirila A. Comille" written in black ink.24 The dispositive portion of
Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same the trial court's decision states:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille
recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial
Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A " to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the
deed unto the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision
subject of this appeal. As already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its
conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of
documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3) a pleading in another
civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4)
the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of
the late Francisco Comille is not correct and is a reversible error because it is based
on a misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances
detailed by the totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally
incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or
possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason,
Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to
defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and
Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.26
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family
Code to the circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the
affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.27 It appearing that the
Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the general rule
should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and
wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the
parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation
is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or
nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.29 In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as
sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties,30 a
conviction of concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and
Francisco resided under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two
consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia
said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that
theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin
to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress,
there are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo
Tabancura presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As
previously stated, these are an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate
lessor,33 a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, 34 and the
death certificate of Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's
common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer
filed by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio
Sy," RTC Civil Case No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the
common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco
a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but
Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the
law.36 It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure
beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's
common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57499 June 22, 1984
MERCEDES CALIMLIM- CANULLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. WILLELMO FORTUN, Judge, Court of First instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, and
CORAZON DAGUINES, respondents.
Fernandez Law Offices for petitioner.
Francisco Pulido for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the Decision, dated October 6, 1980, and the
Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, dated November 27, 1980, of the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 15620 entitled "Corazon DAGUINES
vs. MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas," upholding the sale of a parcel of land in favor of
DAGUINES but not of the conjugal house thereon'
The background facts may be summarized as follows: Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-
Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were married on December 19, 1962. They begot five
children. They lived in a small house on the residential land in question with an area of
approximately 891 square meters, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After
FERNANDO's father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the land.
In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living with private respondent Corazon
DAGUINES. During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage in a
judgment rendered on October 27, 1981 by the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch II, which judgment has become final.
On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property with the house thereon to
DAGUINES for the sum of P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO described the
house as "also inherited by me from my deceased parents."
Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a complaint on June 19,
1980 for quieting of title and damages against MERCEDES. The latter resisted and claimed
that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut
trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; that
the sale of the land together with the house and improvements to DAGUINES was null and
void because they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale,
In its original judgment, respondent Court principally declared DAGUINES "as the lawful
owner of the land in question as well as the one-half () of the house erected on said land."
Upon reconsideration prayed for by MERCEDES, however, respondent Court resolved:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court,
promulgated on October 6, 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
(1) Declaring plaintiff as the true and lawful owner of the land in question and
the 10 coconut trees;
(2) Declaring as null and void the sale of the conjugal house to plaintiff on
April 15, 1980 (Exhibit A) including the 3 coconut trees and other crops
planted during the conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas (vendor)
and his legitimate wife, herein defendant Mercedes Calimlim- Canullas;
xxx xxx xxx
The issues posed for resolution are (1) whether or not the construction of a conjugal house
on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal
property; and (2) whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements
thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to the
second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage
on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but
the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
We hold that pursuant to the foregoing provision both the land and the building belong to the
conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of
the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the
value of the lot, 1 which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. 2
In his commentary on the corresponding provision in the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 1404),
Manresa stated:
 El articulo cambia la doctrine; los edificios construidos durante el matrimonio
en suelo propio de uno de los conjuges son gananciales, abonandose el
valor del suelo al conj uge a quien pertenezca.
It is true that in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, 3 relied upon by respondent Judge, it was
held that the land belonging to one of the spouses, upon which the spouses have built a
house, becomes conjugal property only when the conjugal partnership is liquidated and
indemnity paid to the owner of the land. We believe that the better rule is that enunciated by
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padilla vs. Paterno, 3 SCRA 678, 691 (1961), where the following
was explained:
As to the above properties, their conversion from paraphernal to conjugal
assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were
first constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time immediately before
the death of Narciso A. Padilla that ended the conjugal partnership. They can
not be considered to have become conjugal property only as of the time their
values were paid to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno because by
that time the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire
the ownership of said properties. The acquisition by the partnership of these
properties was, under the 1943 decision, subject to the suspensive condition
that their values would be reimbursed to the widow at the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition
should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art.
1187, New Civil Code) ...
The foregoing premises considered, it follows that FERNANDO could not have alienated the
house and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale. 4
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary
to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he
had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and
from whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the stability of the
family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. 5
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purpose
is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent
from the very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no
effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy."
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other
subject to certain exceptions.6 Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are
prohibited. 7 And this is so because if transfers or con conveyances between spouses were
allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic
policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one
spouse over the other,8 as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the
cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest
and their criterion must be imposed upon the wig of the parties. That was the ruling
in Buenaventura vs. Bautista, also penned by Justice JBL Reyes (CA) 50 O.G. 3679, and
cited in Matabuena vs. Cervantes. 9 We quote hereunder the pertinent dissertation on this
point:
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers
as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy
considerations of the most exigent character as wen as the dictates
of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.
As announced in the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision,
Buenaventura vs. Bautista, 50 OG 3679, interpreting a similar provision of
the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, 'to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue influence and improper pressure upon the donor, a prejudice
deeply rooted in our ancient law, ..., then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife
without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such
irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party
over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased'. Moreover, as pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib 32
ad Sabinum, fr. 1), "It would not be just that such donations — should
subsist, lest the conditions of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better." So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage
should likewise attach to concubinage (Emphasis supplied),
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Judge, dated October 6, 1980, and his Resolution
of November 27, 1980 on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby set aside and
the sale of the lot, house and improvements in question, is hereby declared null and void. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on
the part of either or both parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration
of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No.
Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties
following the joinder of issues, the trial court,1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the
petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-
Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario
shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in
the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within
thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages.2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance
with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained
no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that
the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own
their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial
court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since
Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community of property.4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October
1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
should be held controlling: he argues that:
I the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern
the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of
the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read
consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to
stay.5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases;6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household."8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership
property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-
ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or
still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation9 or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not
live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any
party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner already heretofore expressed. 11

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles
50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family
Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit
terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a
prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that
somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now
requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the
previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of
Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the
termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family
home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force
and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial
court are AFFIRMED. No costs.

Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative
SUPREME COURT facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Manila
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
SECOND DIVISION establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011 respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.

ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner, In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that
vs. respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent. the time of the celebration of the marriage.

DECISION The Decision of the Trial Court

CARPIO, J.: The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s
The Case psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand,
clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found
that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her
March 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned
Civil Case No. LP-01-0149. petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.

The Antecedent Facts The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In
1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA.
were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL
and VOID from the beginning; and
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and
had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office
of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas
summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. City, for their information and guidance.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage
with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V.
Alcantara.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18
October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL
and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for
their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, 8 such as petitioner
and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section
19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of
the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or
absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage
was contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are
governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless
the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into
before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition
and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the
case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x."
It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the
decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s
decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA
MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-
21862, which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner
and respondent, as well as the Resolution 4 dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his
parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment,
the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for
separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of
absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.
With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because
the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus –
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by
either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real
property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute
community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said
real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the
petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house
and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation
of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law
will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary
partition by the parties of the said real property. x x x
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of
Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon,
the Court shall not make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision
modifying the trial court’s Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement
for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him.
It also considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As
regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12,
1996 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to
REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the
amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal,
deducting therefrom the amount respondent spent for the preservation, maintenance and
development of the aforesaid real property including the depreciation cost of the house or in
the alternative to SELL the house and lot in the event respondent does not have the means
to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse
the petitioner of the cost of the land and the house deducting the expenses for its
maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be profit, the same
shall be divided in proportion to the equity each has over the property. The case is
REMANDED to the lower court for reception of evidence as to the amount claimed by the
respondents for the preservation and maintenance of the property.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO
PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH
OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM
ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT’S CAUSE
OF ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP
OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING
REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the
Philippines; that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the
same; and that respondent’s purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain
exclusive possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property
but merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and
that equity demands that respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used
for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose
of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands,
their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural
resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of
public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or
lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess
not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns
and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for
building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation
resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes
that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6.) That
this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. 11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. 12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands
in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is
likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The
latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has
done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.
unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would
be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner
Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000
for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house
in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute
community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property
between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines
equally, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds
is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit
respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16

Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of
course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention
that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over
the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,
vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was
null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial
interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the
property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned.
But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the
considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering
and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he
may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which are chargeable
against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract
entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said
provision?
These are the issues which we will resolve in this petition for review.
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals in
"Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching vs. Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation, et. al.," docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632,1 upholding the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168, which ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains
of respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the
debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is necessary for a clear understanding of the
case at bar.
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan
from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching,
Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and
on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness
to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum of money
against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Pasig), Branch VIII, entitled "Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs.
Philippine Blooming Mills and Alfredo Ching," docketed as Civil Case No. 42228.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching
to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228, upon motion of AIDC, the lower
court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an P8,000,000.00
bond, a writ of execution dated May 12, 1982 was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo
Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case No. 42228, caused
the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20,
1982 on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction
sale of the properties levied.
On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to enjoin the auction sale alleging
that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the
ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said
conjugal partnership. 2 Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,3 questioning the order of the
lower court enjoining the sale. Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining
Order on June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower court4 from enforcing its Order of June 14, 1982,
thus paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal
properties.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a
Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon
expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August
4, 1982 which was registered on August 9, 1983.
In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982, decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404,
in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is granted and the
challenged order of the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1982 in Civil Case
No. 46309 is hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition insofar as it
seeks to enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding with Civil Case No.
46309 is, however, denied. No pronouncement is here made as to costs. . .
.5
On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed before
Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal (Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot and
academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the motion
arguing, among others, that where a third party who claim is ownership of the property
attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that in this case, two (2)
of the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to Civil
Case No. 42228.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial on the merits proceeded. Private
respondents presented several witnesses. On the other hand, petitioners did not present any
evidence.
On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on
execution null and void. Petitioners appealed to the respondent court, which was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 29632.
On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the
decision of the regional trial court. It held that:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement
and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of petitioners-appellees.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the New Civil Code or
Article 1211 of the Family Code-suffice it to say that the two provisions are
substantially the same. Nevertheless, We agree with the trial court that the
Family Code is the applicable law on the matter . . . . . . .
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that "The conjugal partnership shall
be liable for: . . . (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage
by the designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains . . . ." The burden of proof that the debt was contracted
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed
to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the appeal. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in toto.6
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the respondent court in a
Resolution dated November 28, 1994.7
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that the "respondent court erred in ruling
that the conjugal partnership of private respondents is not liable for the obligation by the
respondent-husband."
Specifically, the errors allegedly committed by the respondent court are as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
OBLIGATION INCURRED RESPONDENT HUSBAND DID
NOT REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ACT OF RESPONDENT HUSBAND IN SECURING THE
SUBJECT LOAN IS NOT PART OF HIS INDUSTRY,
BUSINESS OR CAREER FROM WHICH HE SUPPORTS
HIS FAMILY.
Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need to prove that actual benefit
redounded to the benefit of the partnership; all that is necessary, they say, is that the
transaction was entered into for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Thus, petitioners aver
that:
The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear: for the partnership
to be held liable, the husband must have contracted the debt "for the benefit
of the partnership, thus:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1) all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership . . . .
There is a difference between the phrases: "redounded to the benefit of" or
"benefited from" (on the one hand) and "for the benefit of (on the other). The
former require that actual benefit must have been realized; the latter requires
only that the transaction should be one which normally would produce benefit
to the partnership, regardless of whether or not actual benefit accrued. 8
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded to
the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They
mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the
Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other
hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen,
the terms are used interchangeably.
Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the respondent court runs counter to the
pronouncement of this Court in the case of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin,9 that the husband as head
of the family and as administrator of the conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted
obligations for the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of Cobb-Perez is not applicable in the
case at bar. This Court has, on several instances, interpreted the term "for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership."
In the cases of Javier vs. Osmeña, 10 Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger, Inc., 11 Cobb-
Perez vs. Lantin 12 and G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 13 cited by the petitioners, we
held that:
The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage relation, for and in
the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes toward the
support of his family, are not his personal and private debts, and the products
or income from the wife's own property, which, like those of her husband's,
are liable for the payment of the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted
from the payment of such debts. (Javier)
The husband, as the manager of the partnership (Article 1412, Civil Code),
has a right to embark the partnership in an ordinary commercial enterprise
for gain, and the fact that the wife may not approve of a venture does not
make it a private and personal one of the husband. (Abella de Diaz)
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes to the support of the family, cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. (Cobb-Perez).
. . . if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or
profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership
must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately
acted to the prejudice of his family. (G-Tractors)
However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, Fidelity Insurance & Luzon Insurance
Co.,14 Liberty Insurance Corporation vs. Banuelos, 15 and Luzon Surety Inc. vs. De
Garcia, 16 cited by the respondents, we ruled that:
The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses
of the spouses, but not to the payment of the personal obligations (guaranty
agreements) of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were
productive of some benefit to the family." (Ansaldo; parenthetical phrase
ours.)
When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement by
the husband redounded to the benefit of his family, the undertaking is not a
conjugal debt but an obligation personal to him. (Liberty Insurance)
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Article 161 of
the new Civil Code is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted
by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be
the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for
a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate
the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for
the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore,
is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the
financial stability of the conjugal partnership. (Luzon Surety, Inc.)
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following
conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract
falls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time
of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership.
Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that of the three other
companion cases, on the one hand, and that of Ansaldo, Liberty Insurance and Luzon Surety,
is that in the former, the husband contracted the obligation for his own business; while in the
latter, the husband merely acted as a surety for the loan contracted by another for the latter's
business.
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed as
surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. petitioner should have adduced
evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching's acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The reason for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent court:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement
and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of petitioners-appellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of petitioners-appellees —
this despite the fact that the members of the said family happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as
such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the
debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains. What is apparent from the facts of the case is that the
judgment debt was contracted by or in the name of the Corporation
Philippine Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only signed as surety
thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and respondent-appellant's right
of recourse against appellee-husband as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of
gains of the family of petitioners-appellees. . . . . . .17
Petitioners contend that no actual benefit need accrue to the conjugal partnership. To support
this contention, they cite Justice J.B.L. Reyes' authoritative opinion in the Luzon Surety
Company case:
I concur in the result, but would like to make of record that, in my opinion, the
words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership" used in Article 161 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines in describing the charges and obligations for which the conjugal
partnership is liable do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to
the conjugal partnership from the husband's transaction; but it suffices that
the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for
the partnership. This is the ratio behind our ruling in Javier vs. Osmeña, 34
Phil. 336, that obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his
profession are collectible from the conjugal partnership.
The aforequoted concurring opinion agreed with the majority decision that the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the
benefit of a third party. Such opinion merely registered an exception to what may be
construed as a sweeping statement that in all cases actual profit or benefit must accrue to the
conjugal partnership. The opinion merely made it clear that no actual benefits to the family
need be proved in some cases such as in the Javier case. There, the husband was the
principal obligor himself. Thus, said transaction was found to be "one that would normally
produce . . . benefit for the partnership." In the later case of G-Tractors, Inc., the husband
was also the principal obligor — not merely the surety. This latter case, therefore, did not
create any precedent. It did not also supersede the Luzon Surety Company case, nor any of
the previous accommodation contract cases, where this Court ruled that they were for the
benefit of third parties.
But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that even in such kind of contract of
accommodation, a benefit for the family may also result, when the guarantee is in favor of the
husband's employer.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family would reasonably
anticipate were the following:
(a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would
be prolonged and he would be entitled to his monthly salary
of P20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the
loan he guaranteed;
(b) The shares of stock of the members of his family would
appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated through the loan
obtained;
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and
his career would be boosted should PBM survive because of
the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The
benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, 18 we underscored the
requirement that: "there must be the requisite showing . . . of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his family" or "that such obligations are
productive of some benefit to the family." Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof
to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many
months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of
stock appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of the Ching family.
Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and probable increase in the value of stocks)
might have been already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation
agreement was entered into. But would those "benefits" qualify the transaction as one of the
"obligations . . . for the benefit of the conjugal partnership"? Are indirect and remote probable
benefits, the ones referred to in Article 161 of the Civil Code? The Court of Appeals in
denying the motion for reconsideration, disposed of these questions in the following manner:
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit respondents-appellants is
purely a corporate debt granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband
merely signing as surety. While such petitioner-appellee-husband, as such
surety, is solidarily liable with the principal debtor AIDC, such liability under
the Civil Code provisions is specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the
Family Code, so that debts for which the husband is liable may not be
charged against conjugal partnership properties. Article 122 of the Family
Code is explicit — "The payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Respondents-appellants insist that the corporate debt in question falls under
the exception laid down in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not agree. The
loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the sole
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.
. . . appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine
Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation), only because said husband is an
employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits, are not the "benefits"
contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The "benefits"
contemplated by the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that benefit
derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a
corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-
appellee-husband or his family. The alleged benefit, if any, continuously
harped by respondents-appellants, are not only incidental but also
speculative. 19
We agree with the respondent court. Indeed, considering the odds involved in guaranteeing a
large amount (P50,000,000.00) of loan, the probable prolongation of employment in PBM and
increase in value of its stocks, would be too small to qualify the transaction as one "for the
benefit" of the surety's family. Verily, no one could say, with a degree of certainty, that the
said contract is even "productive of some benefits" to the conjugal partnership.
We likewise agree with the respondent court (and this view is not contested by the
petitioners) that the provisions of the Family Code is applicable in this case. These provisions
highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership;
for the husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into
by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the
measure of the partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family is benefited." 20
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code
which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal
property. 21 Thus, when co-respondent Alfredo Ching entered into a surety agreement he,
from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the family
home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.
In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that acting as surety is
part of the business or profession of the respondent-husband.
This theory is new as it is novel.
The respondent court correctly observed that:
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession,
hence the cited cases of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin; Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger
& Galinger; G-Tractors, Inc. vs. CA do not apply in the instant case. Signing
as a surety is not embarking in a business.22
We are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or was persuaded to
act, as a surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby
embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.
This is not to say, however, that we are unaware that executives are often asked to stand as
surety for their company's loan obligations. This is especially true if the corporate officials
have sufficient property of their own; otherwise, their spouses' signatures are required in
order to bind the conjugal partnerships.
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the signature of the
wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that being a surety became part of his
profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted for the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to
the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not
a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession
nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.

On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the assailed decision should be
upheld as we now uphold it. This is, of course, without prejudice to petitioner's right to enforce
the obligation in its favor against the PBM receiver in accordance with the rehabilitation
program and payment schedule approved or to be approved by the Securities & Exchange
Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is hereby, DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented
by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where
children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or
troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and
fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their children.
Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal
separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order 2 dated January 8, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are
asked to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the
decree of legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family
Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC
rendered a Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B.
Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the
marriage bond shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie,
Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is
the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the
remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
[₱]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited
in favor of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees
and litigation expenses of [₱]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for
under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.6
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution7 which the trial court
granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of
execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED."8
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution9 which reads as
follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO
you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with
your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your
lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you
make the said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed
Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.10
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the
amount of ₱46,870.00, representing the following payments:
(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's fees; and
(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation expenses.11
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term
"Net Profits Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order13 dated August
31, 2006, which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and
the debts."14 The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not
have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43,
No. (2) of the Family Code.15 The dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining
properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the
defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 on
September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order18 dated November 8, 2006,
holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it
may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify
the meaning of "net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET
PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is
ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.20
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,21 praying for the
correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8,
2007,22 the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the
Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
I
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL
SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND
WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS
SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF
THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?23
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are
well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed. 24 Thus, we
are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005
and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the
Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided
in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would
be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration."26
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, "The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution."27 In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal
within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day
period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in
question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner
neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or
after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for
execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a
writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on
July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of
the "net profits earned." From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to
question the RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never
raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time
the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s decision has become final and
executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal
lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this
Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment
that became final.28
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the
petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the
issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that "a void
judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor
any obligation."29 But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a
judgment becomes void?
"A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief
or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both."30 In other words, a court,
which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.31
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the
trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369
confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status
and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together. 32 The Rule on Legal
Separation33 provides that "the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court
of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may
be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner."34 In the instant case, herein
respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to
the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's
petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both
parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served
upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his
Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001.35 Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has
rendered the questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the
parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is
clearly not void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction.
Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to
correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. 36 In fact, we have
ruled that for "[as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed
by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal."37 Granting without admitting that the
RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be
an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this.
He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become
immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below
and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October
10, 2005 judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a
woman who is not his wife;38
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita; 39
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; 40
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership;41
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody; 42
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent
spouse by intestate succession;43
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent spouse;44
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of
gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during
the marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved;45
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they
were living together;46
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
foreclosed;47
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and
liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the
administration of these properties;48
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under
Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling ₱503,862.10 shall
be charged to the income generated by these properties;49
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had
separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family;50
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7); 51
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall
therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without
prejudice to the children's legitime;52
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;53 and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of ₱19,000.00
as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00.54
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will
discuss the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property
relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family
Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is
no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the
Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can
deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since
at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains.55 Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of
the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property
relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry."56 The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.57
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage
the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his
Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."58
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the
conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children
pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: "As earlier
adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the
same being owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be
given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share
in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights
acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."59 In other words, the petitioner is saying
that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the
husband and wife."60 Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the
conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after
the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family
Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested
right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals,61 we define and explained "vested right" in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested
right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural
justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future
enjoyment of property.62 (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer
Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63 we also
explained:
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right
has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. 64 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may
lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-
aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
awarded to her.65 In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties.66 Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as "net profits,"
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.67 Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one
founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code.
This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the
conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children
of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property
came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the
fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even
under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be
forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the
petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim
may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited
to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of
the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that,
after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided
between the spouses or their respective heirs.69 (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October
10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code. 70 The
petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner
is now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and
executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from
disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no
longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.71
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present
case since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and
immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate
properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal
partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family
Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines
"net profits" earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the
Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net profits" earned in
the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of "net profits" earned in the
absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property
relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As
earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the
parties. In other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the
provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits,"
we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article
63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution."72 Thus, without any iota of doubt,
Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article
102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under
Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference
lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under
Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime
and the conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And
when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. 73
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared,
listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of
each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties
of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the
separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute
community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and
for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.74
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the market
value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the
market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage,
which then results to the net profits.75
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will
happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no
separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the
absolute community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the
absolute community constitutes the "market value at dissolution."
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all
the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the
community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from the "market value at
dissolution."
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets
of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such
net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the
market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality
constitutes the "net profits."
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would
be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the
"net profits." However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited
the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in
the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since
both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining
"net profit." As earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family
Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as
provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal
Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article
142 of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage."76 From the foregoing provision, each
of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a
mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.77
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article
129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the
conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure
shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the
acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership
of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the
conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
 (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either
spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal
funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the
partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties
of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the
couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. 78 In the instant case, the
trial court found that the couple has no separate properties when they
married.79 Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao,
Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao,
Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City. 80
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during
the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership;81 and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate
properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their
respective owners shall be made.82
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be
paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not
sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable.83
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of
the wife shall be returned to each of them.84 In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties,85 there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the
above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs.86 However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to
any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the
trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8,
2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of
Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the
Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
 If the amount due is not paid on date due, a SURCHARGE of ONE PERCENT of the
principal loan, for every month default, shall be collected.

Remaining balance as of the maturity date shall earn an interest at the rate of ten
percent a month, compounded monthly.

It is finally agreed that the principal and surety in solidum, shall pay attorney’s fees at
the rate of twenty-five percent (25%) of the entire amount to be collected, in case this
note is not paid according to the terms and conditions set forth, and same is referred
THIRD DIVISION to a lawyer for collection.

G.R. No. 146942 April 22, 2003 In computing the interest and surcharge, a fraction of the month shall be considered
one full month.
CORAZON G. RUIZ, petitioner,
vs. In the event of an amicable settlement, the principal and surety in solidum shall
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO TORRES, respondents. reimburse the expenses of the plaintiff.

PUNO, J.: (Sgd.) Corazon Ruiz __________________

Principal Surety"
On appeal is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56621 dated 25 August
2000, setting aside the decision2 of the trial court dated 19 May 1997 and lifting the
The consolidated loan of P750,000.00 was secured by a real estate mortgage on a 240-
permanent injunction on the foreclosure sale of the subject lot covered by TCT No. RT-
square meter lot in New Haven Village, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by Transfer
96686, as well as its subsequent Resolution3 dated 26 January 2001, denying petitioner’s
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-96686, and registered in the name of petitioner.7 The
Motion for Reconsideration.
mortgage was signed by Corazon Ruiz for herself and as attorney-in-fact of her husband
Rogelio. It was executed on 20 March 1995, or two (2) days before the execution of the
The facts of the case are as follows: subject promissory note.8

Petitioner Corazon G. Ruiz is engaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry. 4 She
obtained loans from private respondent Consuelo Torres on different occasions, in the
following amounts: P100,000.00; P200,000.00; P300,000.00; and P150,000.00.5 Prior to their
maturity, the loans were consolidated under one (1) promissory note dated March 22, 1995,
which reads as follows:6
"P750,000.00 Quezon City, March
22, 1995
PROMISSORY NOTE
For value received, I, CORAZON RUIZ, as principal and ROGELIO RUIZ as surety in
solidum, jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of CONSUELO P.
TORRES the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P750,000.00)
Philippine Currency, to earn an interest at the rate of three per cent (3%) a month, for
thirteen months, payable every _____ of the month, and to start on April 1995 and to
mature on April 1996, subject to renewal.
Thereafter, petitioner obtained three (3) more loans from private respondent, under the
following promissory notes: (1) promissory note dated 21 April 1995, in the amount of
P100,000.00;9 (2) promissory note dated May 23, 1995, in the amount of P100,000.00;10 and
(3) promissory note dated December 21, 1995, in the amount of P100,000.00.11 These
combined loans of P300,000.00 were secured by P571,000.00 worth of jewelry pledged by
petitioner to private respondent.12
From April 1995 to March 1996, petitioner paid the stipulated 3% monthly interest on the
P750,000.00 loan,13 amounting to P270,000.00.14 After March 1996, petitioner was unable to
make interest payments as she had difficulties collecting from her clients in her jewelry
business.15
Due to petitioner’s failure to pay the principal loan of P750,000.00, as well as the interest
payment for April 1996, private respondent demanded payment not only of the P750,000.00
loan, but also of the P300,000.00 loan.16 When petitioner failed to pay, private respondent
sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the aforementioned real estate mortgage.17
On September 5, 1996, Acting Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Perlita V. Ele, Deputy
Sheriff In-Charge Rolando G. Acal and Supervising Sheriff Silverio P. Bernas issued a Notice
of Sheriff’s Sale of subject lot. The public auction was scheduled on October 8, 1996.18
On October 7, 1996, one (1) day before the scheduled auction sale, petitioner filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29024, with a
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the sheriff from
proceeding with the foreclosure sale and to fix her indebtedness to private respondent to
P706,000.00. The computed amount of P706,000.00 was based on the aggregate loan of
P750,000.00, covered by the March 22, 1995 promissory note, plus the other loans of
P300,000.00, covered by separate promissory notes, plus interest, minus P571,000.00
representing the amount of jewelry pledged in favor of private respondent. 19
The trial court granted the prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,20 and
on 29 October 1996, issued a writ of preliminary injunction.21 In its Decision dated May 19,
1997, it ordered the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff to desist with the foreclosure sale of
the subject property, and it made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. It held that the
real estate mortgage is unenforceable because of the lack of the participation and signature
of petitioner’s husband. It noted that although the subject real estate mortgage stated that
petitioner was "attorney-in-fact for herself and her husband," the Special Power of Attorney
was never presented in court during the trial.22
The trial court further held that the promissory note in question is a unilateral contract of
adhesion drafted by private respondent. It struck down the contract as repugnant to public
policy because it was imposed by a dominant bargaining party (private respondent) on a
weaker party (petitioner).23 Nevertheless, it held that petitioner still has an obligation to pay
the private respondent. Private respondent was further barred from imposing on petitioner the
obligation to pay the surcharge of one percent (1%) per month from March 1996 onwards,
and interest of ten percent (10%) a month, compounded monthly from September 1996 to
January 1997. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay the amount of P750,000.00 plus three
percent (3%) interest per month, or a total of P885,000.00, plus legal interest from date of
[receipt of] the decision until the total amount of P885,000.00 is paid. 24
Aside from the foregoing, the trial court took into account petitioner’s proposal to pay her
other obligations to private respondent in the amount of P392,000.00. 25
The trial court also recognized the expenses borne by private respondent with regard the
foreclosure sale and attorney’s fees. As the notice of the foreclosure sale has already been
published, it ordered the petitioner to reimburse private respondent the amount of P15,000.00
plus attorney’s fees of the same amount.26
Thus, the trial court computed petitioner’s obligation to private respondent, as follows:
Principal Loan ……………. P 750,000.00
Interest…………………….. 135,000.00
Other Loans………………. 392,000.00
Publication Fees……………. 15,000.00
Attorney’s Fees …………… 15,000.00
TOTAL…………………… P1,307,000.00
with legal interest from date of receipt of decision until payment of total amount of
P1,307,000.00 has been made.27
Private respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July 21, 1997.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court set aside the
decision of the trial court. It ruled that the real estate mortgage is valid despite the non-
participation of petitioner’s husband in its execution because the land on which it was
constituted is paraphernal property of petitioner-wife. Consequently, she may encumber the
lot without the consent of her husband.28 It allowed its foreclosure since the loan it secured
was not paid.
Nonetheless, the appellate court declared as invalid the 10% compounded monthly
interest29 and the 10% surcharge per month stipulated in the promissory notes dated May 23,
1995 and December 1, 1995,30 and so too the 1% compounded monthly interest stipulated in
the promissory note dated 21 April 1995,31 for being excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable,
and contrary to morals. It held that the legal rate of interest of 12% per annum shall apply
after the maturity dates of the notes until full payment of the entire amount due, and that the
only permissible rate of surcharge is 1% per month, without compounding.32 The appellate
court also granted attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, and not the stipulated 25% of
the amount due, following the ruling in the case of Medel v. Court of Appeals.33
Now, before this Court, petitioner assigns the following errors:
(1) PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE OF P750,000.00 IS NOT A CONTRACT OF
ADHESION DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE SAME IS A READY-
MADE CONTRACT PREPARED BY (THE) RESPONDENT CONSUELO TORRES
AND DID NOT REFLECT THEIR TRUE INTENTIONS AS IT WEIGHED HEAVILY IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AND AGAINST PETITIONER.
(2) PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE PROPERTY COVERED BY THE SUBJECT DEED OF
MORTGAGE OF MARCH 20, 1995 IS A PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF THE
PETITIONER AND NOT CONJUGAL EVEN THOUGH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY IS PARAPHERNAL WAS NEVER
RAISED, NOR DISCUSSED AND ARGUED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
 (3) PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE TRIAL COURT’S COMPUTATION OF THE ACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS OF THE PETITIONER WITH (THE) RESPONDENT TORRES EVEN
THOUGH THE SAME IS BASED ON EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BEFORE IT.
The pertinent issues to be resolved are:
(1) Whether the promissory note of P750,000.00 is a contract of adhesion;
(2) Whether the real property covered by the subject deed of mortgage dated March 20, 1995
is paraphernal property of petitioner; and
(3) Whether the rates of interests and surcharges on the obligation of petitioner to private
respondent are valid.
I To be required is certainly different from being compelled. She could have rejected the
We hold that the promissory note in the case at bar is not a contract of adhesion. In Sweet
Lines, Inc. vs. Teves,34 this Court discussed the nature of a contract of adhesion as follows:
". . . there are certain contracts almost all the provisions of which have been drafted
only by one party, usually a corporation. Such contracts are called contracts of
adhesion, because the only participation of the other party is the signing of his
signature or his ‘adhesion’ thereto. Insurance contracts, bills of lading, contracts of
sale of lots on the installment plan fall into this category. 35
" . . . it is drafted only by one party, usually the corporation, and is sought to be
accepted or adhered to by the other party . . . who cannot change the same and who
are thus made to adhere hereto on the ‘take it or leave it’ basis . . . "36
In said case of Sweet Lines,37 the conditions of the contract on the 4 x 6 inches passenger
ticket are in fine print. Thus we held:
" . . . it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to examine their tickets
received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not during rush hours,
for conditions that may be printed thereon, much less charge them with having
consented to the conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number of such
conditions in fine print, as in this case."38
We further stressed in the said case that the questioned ‘Condition No. 14’ was prepared
solely by one party which was the corporation, and the other party who was then a passenger
had no say in its preparation. The passengers have no opportunity to examine and consider
the terms and conditions of the contract prior to the purchase of their tickets. 39
In the case at bar, the promissory note in question did not contain any fine print provision
which could not have been examined by the petitioner. Petitioner had all the time to go over
and study the stipulations embodied in the promissory note. Aside from the March 22, 1995
promissory note for P750,000.00, three other promissory notes of different dates and
amounts were executed by petitioner in favor of private respondent. These promissory notes
contain similar terms and conditions, with a little variance in the terms of interests and
surcharges. The fact that petitioner and private respondent had entered into not only one but
several loan transactions shows that petitioner was not in any way compelled to accept the
terms allegedly imposed by private respondent. Moreover, petitioner, in her complaint 40 dated
October 7, 1996 filed with the trial court, never claimed that she was forced to sign the
subject note. Paragraph five of her complaint states:
"That on or about March 22, 1995 plaintiff was required by the defendant Torres to
execute a promissory note consolidating her unpaid principal loan and interests
which said defendant computed to be in the sum of P750,000.00 . . ."
conditions made by private respondent. As an experienced business- woman, she ought to
understand all the conditions set forth in the subject promissory note. As held by this Court in
Lee, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,41 it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns.42 Hence, the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without
first informing himself of its contents and consequences. This presumption acquires greater
force in the case at bar where not only one but several documents were executed at different
times by petitioner in favor of private respondent.
II
We also affirm the ruling of the appellate court that the real property covered by the subject
deed of mortgage is paraphernal property. The property subject of the mortgage is registered
in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." Thus, title
is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her
husband is also a registered owner. Furthermore, registration of the property in the name of
"Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz" is not proof that such property was
acquired during the marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have
been acquired by Corazon while she was still single, and registered only after her marriage to
Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. 43 The
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during the
marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. Before such
presumption can apply, it must first be established that the property was in fact acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.44 No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar. Thus, on the basis
alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that said property was acquired during
the marriage and that it is conjugal property. Since there is no showing as to when the
property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is
determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.45 The
only import of the title is that Corazon is the owner of said property, the same having been
registered in her name alone, and that she is married to Rogelio Ruiz.46
III
We now resolve the issue of whether the rates of interests and surcharges on the obligation
of petitioner to private respondent are legal.
The four (4) unpaid promissory notes executed by petitioner in favor of private respondent
are in the following amounts and maturity dates:
(1) P750,000.00, dated March 22, 1995 matured on April 21, 1996;
(2) P100,000.00, dated April 21, 1995 matured on August 21, 1995;
(3) P100,000.00, dated May 23, 1995 matured on November 23, 1995; and
(4) P100,000.00, dated December 21, 1995 matured on March 1, 1996.
The P750,000.00 promissory note dated March 22, 1995 has the following provisions:
(1) 3% monthly interest, from the signing of the note until its maturity date;
(2) 10% compounded monthly interest on the remaining balance at maturity date;
(3) 1% surcharge on the principal loan for every month of default; and
(4) 25% attorney’s fees.
The P100,000.00 promissory note dated April 21, 1995 has the following provisions:
(1) 3% monthly interest, from the signing of the note until its maturity date;
(2) 10% monthly interest on the remaining balance at maturity date;
(3) 1% compounded monthly surcharge on the principal loan for every month of
default; and
(4) 10% attorney’s fees.
The two (2) other P100,000.00 promissory notes dated May 23, 1995 and December 1, 1995
have the following provisions:
(1) 3% monthly interest, from the signing of the note until its maturity date;
(2) 10% compounded monthly interest on the remaining balance at maturity date;
(3) 10% surcharge on the principal loan for every month of default; and
(4) 10% attorney’s fees.
We affirm the ruling of the appellate court, striking down as invalid the 10% compounded
monthly interest, the 10% surcharge per month stipulated in the promissory notes dated May
23, 1995 and December 1, 1995, and the 1% compounded monthly interest stipulated in the
promissory note dated April 21, 1995. The legal rate of interest of 12% per annum shall apply
after the maturity dates of the notes until full payment of the entire amount due. Also, the only
permissible rate of surcharge is 1% per month, without compounding. We also uphold the
award of the appellate court of attorney’s fees, the amount of which having been reasonably
reduced from the stipulated 25% (in the March 22, 1995 promissory note) and 10% (in the
other three promissory notes) of the entire amount due, to a fixed amount of P50,000.00.
However, we equitably reduce the 3% per month or 36% per annum interest present in all
four (4) promissory notes to 1% per month or 12% per annum interest.
The foregoing rates of interests and surcharges are in accord with Medel vs. Court of
Appeals,47 Garcia vs. Court of Appeals,48 Bautista vs. Pilar Development Corporation,49 and
the recent case of Spouses Solangon vs. Salazar.50 This Court invalidated a stipulated 5.5%
per month or 66% per annum interest on a P500,000.00 loan in Medel51 and a 6% per month
or 72% per annum interest on a P60,000.00 loan in Solangon52 for being excessive,
iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In both cases, we reduced the interest rate to 12%
per annum. We held that while the Usury Law has been suspended by Central Bank Circular
No. 905, s. 1982, effective on January 1, 1983, and parties to a loan agreement have been
given wide latitude to agree on any interest rate, still stipulated interest rates are illegal if they
are unconscionable. Nothing in the said circular grants lenders carte blanche authority to
raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets.53 On the other hand, in Bautista vs. Pilar Development
Corp.,54 this Court upheld the validity of a 21% per annum interest on a P142,326.43 loan,
and in Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, sustained the agreement of the parties to a 24% per
annum interest on an P8,649,250.00 loan. It is on the basis of these cases that we reduce the
36% per annum interest to 12%. An interest of 12% per annum is deemed fair and
reasonable. While it is true that this Court invalidated a much higher interest rate of 66% per
annum in Medel55 and 72% in Solangon56 it has sustained the validity of a much lower
interest rate of 21% in Bautista57 and 24% in Garcia.58 We still find the 36% per annum
interest rate in the case at bar to be substantially greater than those upheld by this Court in
the two (2) aforecited cases.
The 1% surcharge on the principal loan for every month of default is valid. This surcharge or
penalty stipulated in a loan agreement in case of default partakes of the nature of liquidated
damages under Art. 2227 of the New Civil Code, and is separate and distinct from interest
payment.59 Also referred to as a penalty clause, it is expressly recognized by law. It is an
b. 1% surcharge per month on principal from April 1996
accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on the part of an obligor in case of breach
until fully paid
of an obligation.60 The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated amount of indemnity
without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by 5. Attorney’s fees P 50,000.00
the breach.61 Although the courts may not at liberty ignore the freedom of the parties to agree
on such terms and conditions as they see fit that contravene neither law nor morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, a stipulated penalty, nevertheless, may be equitably Hence, since the mortgage is valid and the loan it secures remains unpaid, the foreclosure
reduced if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.62 In the instant case, the 10% surcharge per proceedings may now proceed.
month stipulated in the promissory notes dated May 23, 1995 and December 1, 1995 was
properly reduced by the appellate court. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, subject
to the MODIFICATION that the interest rate of 36% per annum is ordered reduced to 12 %
In sum, petitioner shall pay private respondent the following: per annum.

1. Principal of loan under promissory note dated March 22, P750,000.00 SO ORDERED.
1995

a. 1% interest per month on principal from March 22,

1995 until fully paid, less P270,000.00 paid by
petitioner as interest from April 1995 to March 1996

b. 1% surcharge per month on principal from May 1996

until fully paid

2. Principal of loan under promissory note dated April 21, P100,000.00

1995

a. 1% interest per month on principal from April 21,

1995 until fully paid

b. 1% surcharge per month on principal from

September 1995 until fully paid

3. Principal of loan under promissory note dated May 23, P100,000.00

1995

a. 1% interest per month on principal from May 23,

1995 until fully paid

b. 1% surcharge per month on principal from

December 1995 until fully paid

4. Principal of loan under promissory note dated December 1, P100,000.00

1995

a. 1% interest per month on principal from December 1,

1995 until fully paid
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June
3, 2002, which affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San
Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was declared
for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802. The
Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.3
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in
San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of
₱300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a
Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.4
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president,
consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.5
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the
subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan
Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed
a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18, 1997. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the allegations
of the Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed before Notary
Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register entered as Doc. No. 212; Page No. 44, Book
No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on April 20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant over the
residential lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City, covered by ARP No. 95-091-
1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, Book No. III, Series of 1996 of Notary Public
Octavio M. Zayas.
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱40,000.00 representing the value of the car
which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff ₱25,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the
marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership. 7 The appellate court
declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the
knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code.
Thus, it upheld the trial court’s order to reconvey the subject property to respondent.8 With
respect to the damage to respondent’s car, the appellate court found petitioner to be liable
therefor because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of the
person it hired to accomplish the assigned task.9 All told, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorney’s fees for lack of basis.10
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO
HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT
OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING
REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.11
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this
case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article
493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the
other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not have
intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership.12 Thus, petitioner
would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr.’s share in the conjugal partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,13 it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the
consent of both the husband and wife.14 In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court
declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the
sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be
discussed next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an
exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence
of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband.15 With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the
Civil Code or other laws.16
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund
the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired
by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.17 Unlike the absolute community
of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner,18 the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or
by the spouses in their marriage settlements.19 Thus, the property relations of respondent
and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code.
In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply
only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent
of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that
the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in
the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to
do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process.25 A party may change his legal theory on appeal
only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by
the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. 26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish.20 Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the
nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent.

Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the
benefit of the family.21

Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3)
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held
liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and
frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.22

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.23 Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non
qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).24 Petitioner’s sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction
of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is
nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of
 Republic of the Philippines nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a
SUPREME COURT Deed of Sale5 dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign
Manila on top of her name.

SECOND DIVISION On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school,
Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit
G.R. No. 160708 October 16, 2009 (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners 6 began transferring all their belongings
from the house to an apartment.
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners,
vs. When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from
ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a
AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, Respondents. family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her
children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her
children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and
DECISION
Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction 7 against Pedro and herein petitioners
(the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner
For review are the Decision1 dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated October 7, Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560. The appellate court modified the husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.
Decision3 dated September 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch
15.
On September 26, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary Ann P. Villa
Abrille as follows:
Simply stated, the facts as found by the Court of Appeals 4 are as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They
have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their
1. The sale of lot 8 covered by TCT No. 26471 by defendant Pedro Abrille appearing
mother, Mary Ann.
in the Deed of Sale marked as Exh. "E" is void as to one half or 277.5 square meters
representing the share of plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7,
located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer
2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by TCT No. [88674] by defendant Pedro Villa Abrille in
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land
the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as to one half or 277.5 square meters of the 555
which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name
square meters as one half belongs to defendant Pedro Abrille but it is void as to the
under TCT No. T-26471.
other half or 277.5 square meters as it belongs to plaintiff Mary Abrille who did not
sell her share nor give her consent to the sale.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was
3. That sale of the house mentioned in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as far as
finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a
the one half of the house representing the share of defendant Pedro Abrille is
poultry house and an annex.
concerned but void as to the other half which is the share of plaintiff Mary Abrille
because she did not give her consent/sign the said sale.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or
mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself,
4. The defendants shall jointly pay the plaintiffs.
Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo
Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro
 4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos (₱17,000.00) representing the value of the
movables and belonging[s] that were lost when unknown men
unceremoniously and without their knowledge and consent removed their
movables from their house and brought them to an apartment.
4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Abrille
as moral damages.
4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to each of the four children as
moral damages, namely:
a) Ingrid Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), b) Ingremark Villa
Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille – Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and d) Ingrelyn Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00).
5. Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example and
correction for the public good.
6. The costs of suit.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in favor of defendants spouses Wilfredo
and Patrocinia Ravina is declared valid.
2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of said defendants spouses
Ravina, together with the house thereon, is declared null and void.
3. Defendant Pedro Abrille is ordered to return the value of the consideration for the
lot covered by TCT No. 88674 and the house thereon to co-defendants spouses
Ravina.
4. Defendants spouses Ravina [a]re ordered to reconvey the lot and house covered
by TCT No. 88674 in favor of spouses Pedro and Mary Villa Abrille and to deliver
possession to them.
5. Plaintiffs are given the option to exercise their rights under Article [450] of the New
Civil Code with respect to the improvements introduced by defendant spouses
Ravina.
6. Defendants Pedro Villa Abrille and spouses Ravina are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs as follows:
a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille
as moral damages.
b) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages to each of the four
children, namely: Ingrid Villa Abrille, Ingremark Villa Abrille, Ingresoll Villa
Abrille and Ingrelyn Villa Abrille.
c) Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example
and correction for the public good.
SO ORDERED.9
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this petition.
Petitioners argue that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x THE SALE OF LOT
COVERED BY TCT NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES RAVINA, TOGETHER WITH THE
HOUSE THEREON, AS NULL AND VOID SINCE IT IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW
AND EVIDENCE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A
RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE,
THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A
RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING
CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.10
In essence, petitioners assail the appellate court’s declaration that the sale to them by Pedro
of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and void. However, in addressing this issue, it
is imperative to determine: (1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is
an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its sale by Pedro was
valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.
Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive
property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange. 11 They allege
that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his
exclusive properties. Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange
their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-26472, respectively. Later,
however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting and
purchased the property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-
88674, was issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an
exclusive property of Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or
money of the latter.
We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive
property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However,
the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and
Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through
exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to
prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.12 Petitioners’ bare assertion
would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the
marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal
property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even
obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.1avvphi1
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats
such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife,
or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family
Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that
alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge
and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such
sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the
contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.13
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years
from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale
pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No.
T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely
without Mary Ann’s consent.
On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good
faith.14 Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot was purchased by money
exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses and may rely on the
certificates of title.
The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in
good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has
a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property.15 To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with
land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on
the face of the seller’s certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the
name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles
166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he
inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in
good faith.161avvphi1
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann.
Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was
married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Ann’s conformity did not appear in the deed. Even
assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive
property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale and
yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Ann’s written consent.
Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of the
property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners
knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to SO ORDERED.
obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection
accorded to purchasers in good faith.

Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The
relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always
be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.17 Hence, in consonance with
justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, we
sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of
the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.

However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they
introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the
time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing improvements
during the pendency of the action.18

Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, "(h)e who builds, plants
or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right
to indemnity."19

On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents is not
supported by the evidence on record.20

The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children
were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while
respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance
with the petitioners21 surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place.
The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite
their impassioned pleas.

Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."22 When a right is exercised in a manner that does not
conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused.23 It is patent in this case
that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision dated February
21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 54560 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR
MALCAMPO, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a challenged
affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to
declare nullity of sale, and prescription.
The Facts and the Case
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October
11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute
sale.1 But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D.
Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement
to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared2 dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated
that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of
₱60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to
clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional
₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the
house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes
spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips
to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.3 As soon as Tarciano met the other
conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11,
1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale4 in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then
paid him the additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in
the name of the spouses5 who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28,
1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano’s
sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the
Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the
Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case
4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife,
Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been
forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the
price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.6
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that
he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September
15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four
months later on January 11, 1989.7 All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the
claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year
prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial.
Comparing Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with those on various documents
she signed, the Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same
person. Making the same comparison, the spouses’ expert concluded that they were. 8
On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that the action
had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or
fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery. In
this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of
sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was issued. Here, the Rocas
filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses
on January 18, 1989.9
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere
variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery. 10 The RTC ruled
that, although the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court could not be bound by
his opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagata’s
testimony remained technically unrebutted.11
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the affidavit of consent did
not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to
be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent. She personally signed the
affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found sufficient
evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw
Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing the
questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance
between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958
also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property
relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on the
ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10
years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in
1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely
voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they
paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment.
Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article
448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot.
The CA did not award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of attorney’s
fees to the Fuentes spouses.13
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for
review.14
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband
Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the
action to annul that sale.
The Court’s Rulings
First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her
consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely
academic.
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked
difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent15 and her specimen
signatures.16 The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign
the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the
jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes on the affidavit
appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are
consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written is
also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed the
supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for comparison. The
Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease
that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent.
Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she
resided so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her
signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff
price for it.
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat
declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga City on January
11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier
at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will
merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that
falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such
document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses
honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The
sale is still void without an authentic consent.
Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal
partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617 prohibited him from selling commonly
owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s
consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have
the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in
that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the
property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on
Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.18 Further, the Family Code provisions were
also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested
rights.19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws,
as provided in Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11,
1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a
period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real
property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order
allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has
no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are
declared void by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. 21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside,
when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary
to allow restitution of what has been given under it.22 This action, according to Article 1410 of
the Civil Code does not prescribe. Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s)
written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA
held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the
ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction.
Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the
January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based on fraud
and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which applies to
fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may
be deemed given to the Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989,
their right of action already prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in that
they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that Rosario’s
written consent to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the time they learned
that her signature had been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale and get
back their money plus damages. They never exercised the right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a false
representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it turned out
that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time she discovered the
fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here.
Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not obtained
at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her written consent was void. Ultimately, the
Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their mother to
the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not
obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale of
conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the
right to have the sale declared void is forever lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the
land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died,
they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. 23 As lawful
owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person
from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to
recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal
interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and
building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing
and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on the affidavit
of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his
commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not come to
Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a premonition that the
requirement of consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent
down payment on the selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in favor
of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer
Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in
the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer
Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel;
3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and
Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes the ₱200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest
from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate;

Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that
everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their
favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the
documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the
names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses
entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526
of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their
stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. 24 What is
more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced
SO ORDERED.
into the property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:
4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and
Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner
spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful
improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have
acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of
retention of the land until the indemnity is made; and
5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to
receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner spouses
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof. (361a)

The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, 25 of
indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase
in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007 as follows:
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying reconsideration2 reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch
323 and declaring void the special proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize
petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of
co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the ostensible purpose of "financial need in
the personal, business and medical expenses of her ‘incapacitated’ husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand,
against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy
and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as
a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him
comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the
father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent
Gilda Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was
about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex "A")
before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
4689, in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred
therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent
him from competently administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and
dissipation of the Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-
appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein that Letters of
Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons,
particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive,
Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition
docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City,
regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers
of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same (Annex "B").
Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her
husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo
Doctor’s Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husband’s medical
treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred
thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property,
specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the
court to sell said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued an Order
(Annex "C") finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in form and
substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June 20, 1991. The scheduled hearing of the
petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two
children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla,
one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s attending physicians.
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered its Decision
(Annex "D"), finding that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No.
4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses for
treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition
filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under
Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June 13, 1991, the
Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioner’s husband, to be incapacitated and unable to
participate in the administration of conjugal properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of administration of their
conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo,
situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the
proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware
and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case by public
respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for consolidation of the two cases (Annex
"F"). He propounded the argument that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption
of sole powers of administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially
a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it
cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in
Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the
Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due process, particularly the need for notice
and a hearing on the merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardeleza’s petition can be
prosecuted by summary proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective one. He
further alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested
rights as a conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without
his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the conjugal properties through mere
summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be
consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before Branch
25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the
improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations arising from
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s hospitalization. He alleged that the market value of the property
would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would
be sold for much less. He also pointed out that the building thereon which houses the
Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s industry, labor and service to his
fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental value to his family. Besides,
argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all
financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned
stocks of Iloilo Doctors’ Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of medical and hospital
bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which
allows him to pay on installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s attending
physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for their professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement to his
motion for reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated his contention that summary
proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted that the provisions on summary
proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on "Separation
in Fact Between Husband and Wife" which contemplates of a situation where both spouses
are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is "comatose without motor and
mental faculties," the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute
sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for
Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8,
1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza
filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the
deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely filed and should be held in
abeyance until the final resolution of the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the
justifications for the sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
been competent, he would have given his consent to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court, who had
penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself
from further acting in this case (Annex "I"). The case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the
said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and approving respondent Jardeleza’s motion for
approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said court ruled that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by "oppositor", Teodoro L. Jardeleza,
through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, including its
supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds,
that her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this
Court, has properly observed the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to Article
124, of the Family Code, in rendering her decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor" Teodor L. Jardeleza
does not have the personality to oppose the instant petition considering that the property or
properties, subject of the petition, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto
and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is
hereby denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among others,
authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and
Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is
hereby granted and the deed of absolute sale, executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by
and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby
approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register the sale and issue
the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee.
"SO ORDERED."4
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the appealed
decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed
of sale, which was also declared void.5
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,6 however, on March 29,
1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to
disturb the decision.7
Hence, this appeal.8
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor
and mental faculties, and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume
sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code
and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos,
with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own
daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural
rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not
applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the
conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the
appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under
Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a
petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern
the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one
where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is
withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting
spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that
the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a
victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct.9 In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may
apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who
assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under
the Rules of Court.10
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the
conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of
judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules
of Court.1âwphi1 Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve
notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why
the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the
decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently
adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act
taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.11 A decision rendered
without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.12 "A decision
is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being
heard."13 "A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or
collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked."14
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely: LEONOR,
SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA,
CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by
LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without
the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said
portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the
deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested
rights.
Antecedents
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140
square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three
years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and
Waiver,1 whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio,
Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother
of the petitioners.2 On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by
Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to
Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00.3 On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property,4 but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After
barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute,5 they sued Servacio and Rito in the
Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of
the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became
conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of
the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.6
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because
he had purchased it with his own money.7
On October 3, 2002,8 the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of
Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three
vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation
of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that
under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all
property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof
that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that
Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption. 9
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that: "xxx As
long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the other heirs in the
final partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the portion sold does not
encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid." 10 Quoting Tolentino’s
commentary on the matter as authority,11 the RTC opined:
In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino, says" [sic]
"Alienation by the survivor. — After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to
sell any portion of the community property in order to pay outstanding obligation of the
partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the formalities established by
the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of the deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property affected without said formalities shall be null and
void, except as regards the portion that belongs to the vendor as determined in the liquidation
and partition. Pending the liquidation, the disposition must be considered as limited only to
the contingent share or interest of the vendor in the particular property involved, but not to the
corpus of the property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or disposal
of the conjugal property without the required formality, is not however, null ab initio, for the
law recognizes their validity so long as they do not exceed the portion which, after liquidation
and partition, should pertain to the surviving spouse who made the contract." [underlining
supplied]
It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on the provisions of the New
Civil Code and the Family Code on the alienation by the surviving spouse of the community
property that jurisprudence remains the same - that the alienation made by the surviving
spouse of a portion of the community property is not wholly void ab initio despite Article 103
of the Family Code, and shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final
partition, to the vendor. And rightly so, because why invalidate the sale by the surviving
spouse of a portion of the community property that will eventually be his/her share in the final
partition? Practically there is no reason for that view and it would be absurd.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the 17,140 square-meter
conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than what vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito B. Go
will eventually get as their share in the final partition of the property. So the sale is still valid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to cost and damages.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC’s denial of their motion for reconsideration13 prompted the petitioners to appeal
directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
Issue
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and that the
sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation.
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito both argue that
Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the
sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion
that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice
any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within
the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs. 14
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property
shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death
of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern
the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the
provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article
256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of
Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any
disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be
made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and
Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their
property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the
Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to
Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,15 and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the
conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. 16 The ensuing implied
ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,17 to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
(399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in
the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s
share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s
share.18 Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the
right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-
owners.19 Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent
of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s
share.20 This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest).21
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on
dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This provision gives another reason not to
declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio
who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the
sale.
In their separate comments,22 the respondents aver that each of the heirs had already
received "a certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold
only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did not present any
public document on the allocation among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares
in Marta’s estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties had already been
liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the
efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the property sold adversely affected the
interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly decided with finality. The appropriate
recourse to bring that about is to commence an action for judicial partition, as instructed
in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,23 to wit:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share
of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be,
after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and
void.1âwphi1 But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs
to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of
the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other
is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows
logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been
held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the
legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of
course as to that portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving spouse).
The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for
the benefit of the husband’s other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be
barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-11764, Jan.31,
1959.)25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the decision of the
Regional Trial Court.
The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one

co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-
owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as
if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered
it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].1avvphi1

Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the
undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court. xxx24

In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in
respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of
Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156125 August 25, 2010
FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA RAMIREZ and ELISEO CARLOS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Francisco Muñoz,
Jr. (petitioner) to challenge the decision2 and the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 57126.4 The CA decision set aside the decision5 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 166, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 63665. The CA resolution denied the
petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.
Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter residential house and lot
located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong City (subject property), covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name
of the petitioner.6
The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in the
name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). 7
On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427,
with Erlinda’s consent, to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a
₱136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly salary
deductions of ₱1,687.66.8 The respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter,
two-story residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of
a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as
attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of ₱602,000.00.9
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification
of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction,
and the documents transferring the title to the petitioner’s name were falsified.
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a ₱600,000.00 loan,
to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the petitioner gave Erlinda a
₱200,000.0010 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, and made her sign a document
purporting to be the mortgage contract; the petitioner promised to give the ₱402,000.00
balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and
submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject
property; with the ₱200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS ₱176,445.2711 to cancel the
GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427;12 in May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the
clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseo’s affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseo’s affidavit was
unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the ₱402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage,
and demanded that Erlinda return the ₱200,000.00 advance; since Erlinda could not return
the ₱200,000.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept
the title; and in 1993, they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioner’s
name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their name.
The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged that the
respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage the
subject property because they lacked paying capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental
charges; the sale was with the implied promise to repurchase within one year, 13 during which
period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease the subject
property for a monthly rental of ₱500.00;14 when the respondents failed to repurchase the
subject property within the one-year period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in
his name on July 14, 1993;15 when the respondents failed to pay the monthly rentals despite
demand, he filed an ejectment case16 against them with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, on September 8, 1993, or sixteen days before the filing of the
RTC case for annulment of the deed of absolute sale.
During the pendency of the RTC case, or on March 29, 1995, the MeTC decided the
ejectment case. It ordered Erlinda and her family to vacate the subject property, to surrender
its possession to the petitioner, and to pay the overdue rentals.17
In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of the scientific examination18 conducted
by the National Bureau of Investigation of Eliseo’s purported signatures in the Special Power
of Attorney19 dated April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of waiver of rights dated April 29,
1992,20 showing that they were forgeries.
The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the
subject property since it was registered in Erlinda’s name; the residential lot was part of a
large parcel of land owned by Pedro Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla, Erlinda’s parents; it was
the subject of Civil Case No. 50141, a complaint for annulment of sale, before the RTC,
Branch 158, Pasig City, filed by the surviving heirs of Pedro against another heir, Amado
Ramirez, Erlinda’s brother; and, as a result of a compromise agreement, Amado agreed to
transfer to the other compulsory heirs of Pedro, including Erlinda, their rightful shares of the
land.21
THE RTC RULING
In a Decision dated January 23, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the
subject property was Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property that was inherited from her
father. It also upheld the sale to the petitioner, even without Eliseo’s consent as the deed of
absolute sale bore the genuine signatures of Erlinda and the petitioner as vendor and
vendee, respectively. It concluded that the NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special
power of attorney and in the affidavit were forgeries was immaterial because Eliseo’s consent
to the sale was not necessary.22
The respondents elevated the case to the CA via an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
THE CA RULING
The CA decided the appeal on June 25, 2002. Applying the second paragraph of Article
15823 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun,24 the CA held that the subject
property, originally Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when
it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds – Eliseo’s
monthly salary deductions; the subject property, therefore, cannot be validly sold or
mortgaged without Eliseo’s consent, pursuant to Article 12425 of the Family Code. Thus, the
CA declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision.
When the CA denied26 the subsequent motion for reconsideration,27 the petitioner filed the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA misapplied the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil
Code and Calimlim-Canullas28 because the respondents admitted in the complaint that it was
the petitioner who gave the money used to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427;
Article 12029 of the Family Code is the applicable rule, and since the value of the house is
less than the value of the lot, then Erlinda retained ownership of the subject property. He also
argues that the contract between the parties was a sale, not a mortgage, because (a) Erlinda
did not deny her signature in the document;30 (b) Erlinda agreed to sign a contract of lease
over the subject property;31 and, (c) Erlinda executed a letter, dated April 30, 1992,
confirming the conversion of the loan application to a deed of sale.32
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents submit that it is unnecessary to compare the respective values of the house
and of the lot to determine ownership of the subject property; it was acquired during their
marriage and, therefore, considered conjugal property. They also submit that the transaction
between the parties was not a sale, but an equitable mortgage because (a) they remained in
possession of the subject property even after the execution of the deed of absolute sale, (b)
they paid the 1993 real property taxes due on the subject property, and (c) they received
₱200,000.00 only of the total stated price of ₱602,000.00.
THE ISSUE
The issues in the present case boil down to (1) whether the subject property is paraphernal or
conjugal; and, (2) whether the contract between the parties was a sale or an equitable
mortgage.
OUR RULING
We deny the present Petition but for reasons other than those advanced by the CA.
This Court is not a trier of facts. However, if the inference, drawn by the CA, from the facts is
manifestly mistaken, as in the present case, we can review the evidence to allow us to arrive
at the correct factual conclusions based on the record.33
First Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.34
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father
has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.35 Pursuant to Articles
9236 and 10937 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse,
during the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive
property of each spouse.38 The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal
property.
The CA, however, held that the residential lot became conjugal when the house was built
thereon through conjugal funds, applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil
Code and Calimlim-Canullas.39 Under the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code,
a land that originally belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction of
improvements thereon at the expense of the partnership. We applied this provision in
Calimlim-Canullas,40 where we held that when the conjugal house is constructed on land
belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the husband
is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
The CA misapplied Article 158 of the
Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas
We cannot subscribe to the CA’s misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and
Calimlim-Canullas.
As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on
conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property
relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code
provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by
those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states:
xxxx
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of
this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the
Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the
solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the
time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.41
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly
salary deductions. From April 6, 198942 to April 30, 1992,43 Eliseo paid about
₱60,755.76,44 not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the
petitioner advanced the ₱176,445.2745 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992.
Considering the ₱136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to
assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the ₱60,755.76 amount
paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time
she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not
necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and
affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real nature of the contract
between the parties.
Second Issue:
Sale or Equitable Mortgage?
Jurisprudence has defined an equitable mortgage "as one which although lacking in some
formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals
the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, there being no
impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this intent." 46
Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when a contract, regardless of its
nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage: (a) when the price of a sale
with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) when the vendor remains in
possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) when upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period
is executed; (d) when the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase
price; (e) when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in
any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation. These instances apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. 47
For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602 of the Civil Code,
two (2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a
contract of sale; and, (b) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a
mortgage. Any of the circumstances laid out in Article 1602 of the Civil Code, not the
concurrence nor an overwhelming number of the enumerated circumstances, is sufficient to
support the conclusion that a contract of sale is in fact an equitable mortgage. 48
Contract is an equitable mortgage
In the present case, there are four (4) telling circumstances pointing to the existence of an
equitable mortgage.
First, the respondents remained in possession as lessees of the subject property; the parties,
in fact, executed a one-year contract of lease, effective May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993. 49
Second, the petitioner retained part of the "purchase price," the petitioner gave a
₱200,000.00 advance to settle the GSIS housing loan, but refused to give the ₱402,000.00
balance when Erlinda failed to submit Eliseo’s signed affidavit of waiver of rights.
Third, respondents paid the real property taxes on July 8, 1993, despite the alleged sale on
April 30, 1992;50 payment of real property taxes is a usual burden attaching to ownership and
when, as here, such payment is coupled with continuous possession of the property, it
constitutes evidence of great weight that the person under whose name the realty taxes were
declared has a valid and rightful claim over the land.51

Fourth, Erlinda secured the payment of the principal debt owed to the petitioner with the
subject property. The records show that the petitioner, in fact, sent Erlinda a Statement of
Account showing that as of February 20, 1993, she owed ₱384,660.00, and the daily interest,
starting February 21, 1993, was ₱641.10.52 Thus, the parties clearly intended an equitable
mortgage and not a contract of sale.

That the petitioner advanced the sum of ₱200,000.00 to Erlinda is undisputed. This advance,
in fact, prompted the latter to transfer the subject property to the petitioner. Thus, before the
respondents can recover the subject property, they must first return the amount of
₱200,000.00 to the petitioner, plus legal interest of 12% per annum, computed from April 30,
1992.

We cannot sustain the ballooned obligation of ₱384,660.00, claimed in the Statement of

Account sent by the petitioner,53 sans any evidence of how this amount was arrived at.
Additionally, a daily interest of ₱641.10 or ₱19,233.00 per month for a ₱200,000.00 loan is
patently unconscionable. While parties are free to stipulate on the interest to be imposed on
monetary obligations, we can step in to temper the interest rates if they are unconscionable. 54

In Lustan v. CA,55 where we established the reciprocal obligations of the parties under an
equitable mortgage, we ordered the reconveyance of the property to the rightful owner
therein upon the payment of the loan within ninety (90) days from the finality of the decision. 56

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the present petition. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57126 are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 30, 1992 is hereby declared an equitable
mortgage; and

2. The petitioner is obligated to RECONVEY to the respondents the property covered

by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7650 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City, UPON THE PAYMENT OF ₱200,000.00, with 12% legal interest from April 30,
1992, by respondents within NINETY DAYS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS
DECISION.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012
EFREN PANA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where one of
the spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the
victims' heirs.
The Facts and the Case
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of
murder before the. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City in Criminal Cases 4232 and
4233.1
On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision2 acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and
sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of
the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each
as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24, 2001 the conviction of both accused but
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court
also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for
actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court made an award
of P15,000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded
P50,000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. 3 The decision
became final and executory on October 1, 2001.4
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered
the issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of
Efren and Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of levy7 and a notice of sale on execution8 were
issued.
On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of
Melecia.9 On September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the motion.10 The spouses moved for
reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on March 6, 2003.11
Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged orders, Efren
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 29, 2004 the CA
dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing its assailed orders.12 It also denied Efren’s motion for
reconsideration,13 prompting him to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the
conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
Ruling of the Court
To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable
against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses’ property
relations.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they
did not execute any prenuptial agreement.14 Although the heirs of the deceased victims do
not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage,
they insist that it was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and
Melecia. The reasoning goes:
Admittedly, the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. But that fact
does not prevent the application of [A]rt. 94, last paragraph, of the Family Code because their
property regime is precisely governed by the law on absolute community. This finds support
in Art. 256 of the Family Code which states:
"This code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired by each over
the properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the accused-spouse may
properly be charged against the community as heretofore discussed.15
The RTC applied the same reasoning as above.16 Efren and Melecia’s property relation was
admittedly conjugal under the Civil Code but, since the transitory provision of the Family
Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that
property relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in 1988.
The latter code now prescribes in Article 75 absolute community of property for all marriages
unless the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement. As it happens, Efren and Melecia had
no prenuptial agreement. The CA agreed with this position.17
Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of
each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired
vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not
intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation
all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with
prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified
except prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be
made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128,
135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between
Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the
celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal
separation;18 (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive
their former property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground
that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to
the family;20 (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses
jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains.21 None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil
Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes
from their work or industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over
their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of
couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988
when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such
separate properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses’ loose admission that absolute community of
property governed their property relation since the record shows that they had been insistent
that their property regime is one of conjugal partnership of gains.22 No evidence of a
prenuptial agreement between them has been presented.
What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the
operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that
they were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the
Civil Code thus provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that
supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of
the Family Code states:
"x x x x
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of
this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256."23
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not
the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities
imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own,24 the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on
her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.25 Those responsibilities are as follows:
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.1âwphi1
Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated.
Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered."[26] No prior
liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states
that "at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of
either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the
provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both
spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198 dated January 29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial
Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution
on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the
indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and
4233, the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
SO ORDERED.

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the
conjugal partnership property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either spouse;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional,

vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;

(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit
of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a
professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and

(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be
groundless.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG (with aliases JOSE JO and
CONSING), respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and
fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his legal
wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other women and their respective offspring
are not parties of these case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property,
docketed as Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against him
and docketed as Civil Case No. 36, in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35.
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 29, 1983, Judge German G.
Lee, Jr. rendered an extensive decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing arguments and considerations,
this court hereby holds that the plaintiff Prima Partosa was legally married to
Jose Jo alias Ho Hang, alias Consing, and, therefore, is entitled to support as
the lawfully wedded wife and the defendant is hereby ordered to give a
monthly support of P500.00 to the plaintiff Prima Partosa, to be paid on or
before the 5th day of every month, and to give to the plaintiff the amount of
P40,000.00 for the construction of the house in Zamboanguita, Negros
Oriental where she may live separately from the defendant being entitled
under the law to separate maintenance being the innocent spouse and to pay
the amount of P19,200.00 to the plaintiff by way of support in arrears and to
pay the plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 in the concept of attorney's fees.
As will be noticed, there was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of the
complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property.
Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court in
the complaint for support. 1 The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was
dismissed for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was
not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to this Court for relief.
The private respondent's petition for review on certiorari was dismissed for tardiness in our
resolution dated February 17, 1988, where we also affirmed the legality of the marriage
between Jose and Prima and the obligation of the former to support her and her daughter.
This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property.
It is here submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: a) the judicial separation
of conjugal property sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil
Code; and b) no such separation was decreed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its
decision.
The private respondent contends that the decision of the trial court can longer be reviewed at
this time because it has a long since become final and executory. As the decretal portion
clearly made no disposition of Civil Case No. 51, that case should be considered impliedly
dismissed. The petitioner should have called the attention of the trial court to the omission so
that the proper rectification could be made on time. Not having done so, she is now
concluded by the said decision, which can no longer be corrected at this late hour.
We deal first with the second ground.
While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No. 51 in the dispositive portion of
the decision of the trial court, the petitioner argues that a disposition of the case was
nonetheless made in the penultimate paragraph of the decision reading as follows:
It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered
properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of
property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code, which is subject
of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
The petitioner says she believed this to be disposition enough and so did not feel it was
necessary for her to appeal, particularly since the order embodied in that paragraph was in
her favor. It was only when the respondent court observed that there was no dispositive
portion regarding that case and so ordered its dismissal that she found it necessary to come
to this Court for relief.
The petitioner has a point.
The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as it carried no
ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it was extensively
discussed in the body of the decision. The drafting of the decision was indeed not exactly
careful. The petitioner's counsel, noting this, should have taken immediate steps for the
rectification for the omission so that the ruling expressed in the text of the decision could
have been embodied in the decretal portion. Such alertness could have avoided this litigation
on a purely technical issue.
Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to prevail over
considerations of substantive justive. After all, the technical defect is not insuperable. We
have said time and again that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or a
mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, this Court may clarify such an ambiguity by
an amendment even after the judgment have become final. 2 In doing so, the Court may
resort to the pleading filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the conclusions of law
expressed in the text or body of the decision. 3
The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property, holding that the petitioner and the private respondent were legally married and that
the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although
they were registered in the name of the apparent dummy.
There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial court
was a ruling based upon such findings and so should have been embodied in the dispositive
portion. The respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of
dismissing Civil Case No. 51 and thus upholding mere form over substance.
In the interest of substantive justice, and to expedite these proceedings, we hereby make
such modification.
And now to the merits of Civil Case No. 51.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the
parties was due to their agreement and not because of abondonment. The respondent court
relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left
Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together "because that was our agreement." It
held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the
Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its
conclusion was that the only remedy availabe to the petitioner was legal separation under
Article 175 of the Civil Code, 4 by virtue of which the conjugal partnership of property would
be terminated.
The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and
191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the agreement between her and the private
respondent was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently.
And even if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942, when she returned
to him at Dumaguete City and he refused to accept her.
The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial
approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one
year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of
the conjugal partnership property or separation of property.
The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code, which
states:
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply
with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition
the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, of for authority to
be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to
martial, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abondoned the other when he or she has left
the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has
left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the
same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall
be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.
Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of
these grounds:
1. Abondonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family
without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return,
followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in
the least for one's family although able to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of
marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6 This idea is
clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to
have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention
of returning."
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she
returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning
1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private
respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the
fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as
husband or parent. Apart form refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many
children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that
prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later for separation of the
conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even denied being married to her. The
private respondent has not established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his
obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.
originally rendered where, by statute, there has been an intermediate change
in the law which renders such judgement erroneous at the time the case was
finally disposed of on appeal.
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of both
the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is indeed their real owner. It is
these properties that should now be divided between him and the petitioner, on the
assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and
half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties
properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of
other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital flings and a
succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the
properties he denied her despite his promise to their of his eternal love and care.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent court is
MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor the plaintiff, the petitioner herein,
and the conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered
divided between them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial
court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership,
including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
SO ORDERED.

Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as
follows:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case before us
although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we held in Ramirez v. Court of
Appeals: 7

The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court,
in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to
the law prevailing at the term of such disposition, and not according to the
law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgement. The court
will therefore reverse a judgement which was correct at the time it was
 Republic of the Philippines 1. In partial settlement of the conjugal partnership of gains, the parties agree to the following:
SUPREME COURT
Manila a. ₱500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall
be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with
THIRD DIVISION the deposit in the joint account of the parties.

G.R. NO. 155409 June 8, 2007 The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at ₱1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn
and divided equally by the parties;
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner,
vs. b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent. bodega shall be for the defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of ₱50,000.00 as his
share in the stocks of the store in full settlement thereof.
DECISION
The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the time the owner of the lot on which
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: it stands shall construct a building thereon;

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court c. The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by
assailing the Decision1 dated August 30, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant;
CA-G.R. SP No. 69689, which affirmed the Judgment on Compromise Agreement dated
January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of
Valley, and the RTC Orders dated January 21, 2002 and February 7, 2002 (ORDERS) in Civil ₱75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof;
Case No. 656.
e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without prejudice to the litigation of other conjugal
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married properties that have not been mentioned;
life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance
turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair xxxx
with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against
private respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in
her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated January
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as
2, 2002.2
minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of
prision correccional as maximum penalty.
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002, praying for the
repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on
not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise
June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley,
Agreement.
docketed as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner.
The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated January 21, 2002, denied the
aforementioned Omnibus Motion.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in the following terms, to wit:
Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the same
was denied in the assailed Order dated February 7, 2002.3 (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court claiming that the RTC committed grave error and abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (1) in upholding the validity of the Compromise
Agreement dated January 11, 2002; (2) when it held in its Order dated February 7, 2002 that
the Compromise Agreement was made within the cooling-off period; (3) when it denied
petitioner’s Motion to Repudiate Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on
Compromise Agreement; and (4) when it conducted the proceedings without the appearance
and participation of the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Provincial Prosecutor. 4
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The CA held that the
conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from
sharing in the conjugal property, especially considering that she had only been sentenced
with the penalty of prision correccional, a penalty that does not carry the accessory penalty of
civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to
dispose of such property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which pertain
to the effects of a nullified marriage and the effects of legal separation, respectively, do not
apply, considering, too, that the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by
the respondent invoking Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be decided, and, hence, it is
premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code; that, although adultery is a ground
for legal separation, nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application in the instant case since no
petition to that effect was filed by the petitioner against the respondent; that the spouses
voluntarily separated their property through their Compromise Agreement with court approval
under Article 134 of the Family Code; that the Compromise Agreement, which embodies the
voluntary separation of property, is valid and binding in all respects because it had been
voluntarily entered into by the parties; that, furthermore, even if it were true that the petitioner
was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the Compromise
Agreement, this point is untenable since the mistake or negligence of the lawyer binds his
client, unless such mistake or negligence amounts to gross negligence or deprivation of due
process on the part of his client; that these exceptions are not present in the instant case;
that the Compromise Agreement was plainly worded and written in simple language, which a
person of ordinary intelligence can discern the consequences thereof, hence, petitioner’s
claim that his consent was vitiated is highly incredible; that the Compromise Agreement was
made during the existence of the marriage of the parties since it was submitted during the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; that the application of Article
2035 of the Civil Code is misplaced; that the cooling-off period under Article 58 of the Family
Code has no bearing on the validity of the Compromise Agreement; that the Compromise
Agreement is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy; that
this agreement may not be later disowned simply because of a change of mind; that the
presence of the Solicitor General or his deputy is not indispensable to the execution and
validity of the Compromise Agreement, since the purpose of his presence is to curtail any
collusion between the parties and to see to it that evidence is not fabricated, and, with this in
mind, nothing in the Compromise Agreement touches on the very merits of the case of
declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion; and,
finally, that the Compromise Agreement is merely an agreement between the parties to
separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending
case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR
ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE
OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A
SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL SEPARATION IS A
PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR
ADULTERY, BE DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE OF
ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL
INTERDICTION.5
The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should not have been given judicial
imprimatur since it is against law and public policy; that the proceedings where it was
approved is null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the Solicitor
General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that the respondent,
having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
property.
The Petition must fail.
The essential question is whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the
spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
First. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents
the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage,
from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the
petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under
Articles 43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of
adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is
void, it never became final and executory.
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 20358 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is
a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void.
These arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the
instant case.
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article 9 shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.
where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent
spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present
case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under
the ground of psychological capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and
does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are
expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention
of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced.
Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement
which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law.
This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage
was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is
subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons
with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
Second. Petitioner’s claim that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the
absence of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation
made during the pendency of the case is also void. The proceedings pertaining to the
Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the spouses. The settlement had
no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their marriage. Nor did the settlement
amount to a collusion between the parties.
Article 48 of the Family Code states:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x
xxxx
(e) Where no defaults allowed.— If the defending party in action for annulment or declaration
of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
Truly, the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General
is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties,
or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.10 While the appearances of the Solicitor
General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their
appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs with
the findings of the CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the presence of the
Solicitor General and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of
collusion between the parties and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not
fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General
and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the subject compromise
agreement touched into the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the
court to be wary of any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being repetiti[ve],
the compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement between the petitioner and the
private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the
outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.11
Third. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the rights of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the
the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: conjugal partnership of gains.

Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. – Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his SO ORDERED.
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right
to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code.
The latter provides:

Art. 43. Prision correccional – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of prision correccional
shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration
of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry
the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage
her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

Fourth. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously
informed of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis,
he may repudiate the Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was
not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement
is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioner as his
basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of
Appeals,12 this Court held:

[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that
any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded
as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may
result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.

Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application
"results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality." x x x x 13

None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement is VALID without prejudice to
 Republic of the Philippines located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
SUPREME COURT
Manila A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00 3

located at Sabang Baler, Aurora

SECOND DIVISION 3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria ₱750,000.00
Aurora, Aurora
G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
USA
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent. House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly
City, California
DECISION $550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
PEREZ, J.:
Furniture and furnishings $3,000
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008Decision 1
of the Court of Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96. 2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00
Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
The factual antecedents are as follow:
Bank of America Cash Deposit
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA)
where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00 4

Jerome T.
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. loan from a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Francisco, California.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA: December 2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell
the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003,
PHILIPPINES David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia
claimed that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million
proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2)
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00
that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the
located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce
Manila (Sampaloc property)
and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. ₱400,000.00 Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property,
located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.

A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares ₱490,000.00

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the
divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California
court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties
in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before
the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s
failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to
administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and
desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal
properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as
share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00
and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered
on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded
that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated
and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged
against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and
marital infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of
the petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A.
and the same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras
and respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s
property rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the
₱2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of
the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including
interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were
chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and
presumptive legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared
DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the
Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only,
with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree
issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, United States of
America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles
presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the
name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the
preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children
with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes
and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their
share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the
respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner
Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome
and Jena, her two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the said properties. Their share in the income from these properties, if any,
shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of
each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David
A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their
income from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take
care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody
in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the
future as the needs of the children require and his financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc
property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent
David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent
may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall be deposited with a
 local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names,
withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their representative duly
authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made
withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the
passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of
this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of
Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be
shouldered by them individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal
and personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are
divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court
of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage
had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as
one for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the
legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of
conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as
absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before
the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial
court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law
should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did
not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does
not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the
absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children.
Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with
preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying
for considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the
principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to
the payment of the children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89
of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the
Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal
division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the
common children’s presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each
pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the
assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in
Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph
2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually
within the first half of January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each
ordered to pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as
their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the
receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora,
under a joint account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit shall be made within
a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the
corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin
the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana
(sic) the amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry
of Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times
Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the
California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment
was part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David
argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties
by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own
properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the
USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for
judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond
of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must
beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on
certification where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is
no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different
matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still
legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the
celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification
isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and
136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on
paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the
court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with
his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements
has abused that power; and
 (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment
against the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial
separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to
necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family
Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a
valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie
presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or
her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there
after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit
her and their children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said
respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter
of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of
their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for
the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not
tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living
separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. 20 Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically
dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe
Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to
138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute
community regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of
the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its
net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles
43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Article 51.
 (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious,
we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the
SO ORDERED.
modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect
to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over
the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly
states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the
spouses in the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of
their children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras
property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed
to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of
half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election
expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the
Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his
personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and
David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in
the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children
and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net
assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering
the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner,
vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
24199 entitled "Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz"
dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the
cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private respondent
Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in
Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii.
Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the
entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in
Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957,
Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii.1 When he returned for good in 1972, he
refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with
nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner.2 Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973,
Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 square
meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was
issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975,
allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later
issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter.3 The parties therein
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia Palang.4
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December
6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's
complaint.5 Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein
private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents sought to get back the riceland
and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by TCT No.
101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of
the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot covered by
TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the same with her own money. Erlinda
added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had
already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989 dismissing the
complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties
pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to
provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher Palang, Miguel's
illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered —
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot
located at Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot
290-B including the old house standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land
situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square
meters and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
 4. Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father,
Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel
Palang, provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this
decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to
annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of
her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975,
otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another
separate action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals
rendered its decision on July 22, 1994 with the following dispositive portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision in hereby
REVERSED and another one entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to
herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in
the name of plaintiffs-appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs.7
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of
absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel Palang
and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone. Second, petitioner
contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as
Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate. Third,
respondent court erred, according to petitioner, "in not finding that there is sufficient pleading
and evidence that Kristopher A. Palang or Christopher A. Palang should be considered as
party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.8
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent provisions of law and
jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this
action. Petitioner assails the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of
land. There is no dispute that the transfer of ownership from the original owners of the
riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes, respectively,
were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union
was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and
unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of
the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of
the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.9
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store10 but failed to persuade us that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel
Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share
in the purchase price of subject property,11 there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda
actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to
exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise
date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we
cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living
together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would
still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel
over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, grave error has been discussed in the preceding paragraph where the need for probate
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional rights
Carlina Palang. has been pointed out.

Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court
conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
that the decision adopting their compromise agreement "in effect partakes the nature of
judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the termination of the SO ORDERED.
conjugal partnership."12 Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements.13 The judgment which resulted from the parties'
compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be
so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty.
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price
and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. 14

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against
donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage,15 for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.16

The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and
heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that
the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation
"inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should
be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose
and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of
ownership and possession."17

As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered
as party-defendant in the case at bar following the trial court's decision which expressly found
that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party defendant but theorized that he had
submitted to the court's jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad litem.18 The trial court
erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case
at bar. His mother, Erlinda cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in
the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to
prove that he is illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. 19 Petitioner's
 Republic of the Philippines Manila, covered by TCT No. 243373 (collectively, "Discovered Properties"). The registered
SUPREME COURT owner of the Discovered Properties is "Juan S.Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The
Manila manifestation was set for hearing on 21 September 2007. However, Salas’ notice of hearing
was returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused To Receive."
SECOND DIVISION
On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance10 requesting for
G.R. No. 202370 September 23, 2013 an Entry of Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was
filed and no conjugal property was involved.
JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., Petitioner,
vs. On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguila’s manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her
EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, Respondent. counsel and the state prosecutor present. During the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 April
2007 someone informed her of the existence of the Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she
DECISION verified the information and secured copies of TCTs of the Discovered Properties. When
asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas’ common-law wife.11
CARPIO, J.:
On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation12 alleging that there is no
conjugal property to be partitioned based on Aguila’s petition. According to Salas, Aguila’s
The Case statement was a judicial admission and was not made through palpable mistake. Salas
claimed that Aguila waived her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated
This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the 16 March 2012 Decision2 and the 28 June properties he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, to wit:(1) parcels of land with improvements
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. The CA affirmed located in Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. 176 Brias Street,
the 26 September 2008 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Samaniego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and Batangas City,
(RTC), in Civil Case No. 787. financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting to ₱200,000.00; and (3) motor vehicles, specifically
Honda City and Toyota Tamaraw FX(collectively, "Waived Properties"). Thus, Salas
The Facts contended that the conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.

On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Aguila (Aguila) were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan
Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive portion of
communicated with Aguila or their daughter. the Order reads:

On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition)
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that
they "have no conjugal properties whatsoever."5 In the Return of Summons dated 13 October
2003, the sheriff narrated that Salas instructed his mother Luisa Salas to receive the copy of
summons and the petition.6
On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision7 declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas
and Aguila (RTC Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains, if any."8
On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion9 stating that she discovered:
(a) two 200-square-meter parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome,
Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-
255497; and (b) a 108-square-meter parcel of land with improvement located in Tondo,
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are
hereby directed to partition between themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, the
following properties, without prejudice to the legitime of their legitimate child, Joan Jisselle
Aguila Salas:
(1) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina C.
Salas located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-259299-A
marked as Exhibit "A" and its improvements;
(2) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina C.
Salas located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-255497
marked as Exhibit "B" and its improvements;
 (3) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina Cortez
Salas located in Tondo and covered by TCT No. 243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D"
and its improvements.
Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon bythe parties, and such
partition, together with the Order of the Court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the
Registry of Deeds of the place in which the property is situated.
SO ORDERED.13
The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,14 even upon entry of judgment granting the
annulment of marriage, the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case.
The RTC found that the Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be
partitioned and distributed between Salas and Aguila. However, the RTC held that Salas
failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties.
On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is
Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her
paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not contribute money to purchase the Discovered
Properties as he had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
her as she was not a party in the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to purchase the
Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed with legal documentation, he
registered the properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas."
In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Salas. The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the
Waived Properties to third persons. The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs,
which state that Salas is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC further
held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not
married as they claimed.
Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.15 The CA ruled that Aguila’s
statement in her petition is not a judicial admission. The CA pointed out that the petition was
filed on 7 October 2003, but Aguila found the Discovered Properties only on 17 April 2007 or
before the promulgation of the RTC decision. Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was
palpably mistaken in her petition and it would be unfair to punish her over a matter that she
had no knowledge of at the time she made the admission. The CA also ruled that Salas was
not deprived of the opportunity to refute Aguila’s allegations in her manifestation, even though
he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held that Rubina cannot collaterally attack
a certificate of title.
In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012,16 the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration17 filed
by Salas. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision ordering the
partition of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-259299-A and N-255497 in
Quezon City and as well as the property in Manila covered by TCT No. 243373
between petitioner and respondent.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision in not allowing
Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in this case18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division
of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-
ownership.19 Thus, the settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action.20
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it
by a preponderance of evidence.21 Salas alleged that contrary to Aguila’s petition stating that
they had no conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during their
marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the
existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties during their marriage:
A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the properties
allegedly registered in the name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not certified true
copies, hence, this Court cannot admit the same as part of the records of this case. These
are the following:
(1) TCT No. T-65876 – a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas,
registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan Salas Jr. which is cancelled
by TCT No. T-105443 in the name of Joan Jiselle A. Salas, single;
(2) TCT No. T-68066 – a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Landing, Nasugbu,
Batangas, registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan S. Salas Jr.
Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal,
Municipal Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land
and improvement) listed in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes, as of September 17,
2008.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption of regularity. x x
x.
Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and registered in the name of [Aguila],
certified true copies thereof should have been the ones submitted to this Court. Moreover,
there is also a presumption that properties registered in the Registry of Deeds are also
declared in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes.22
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas
during their marriage.1âwphi1 Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered
Properties registered in Salas’ name were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The
TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or
during the validity of Salas and Aguila’s marriage. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,23 we
held that the question of whether the properties were acquired during the marriage is a
factual issue. Factual findings of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA, are binding on
us, except under compelling circumstances not present in this case.24
On Salas’ allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend the hearing of
Aguila’s manifestation, we find the allegation untenable. The essence of due process is
opportunity to be heard. We hold that Salas was given such opportunity when he filed his
opposition to the manifestation, submitted evidence and filed his appeal.
On both Salas and Rubina’s contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we
likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is
generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a
strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued.25 The phrase "married to" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 26 Furthermore, Salas did not initially
dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation. It
was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubina’s statement that she owns the
Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered
Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action."27
In Diño v. Diño,28 we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this
case. Article147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-
ownership.29 In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case
where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the
properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA,
would be governed by co-ownership.30 Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties
as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership
and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated16 March 2012 and the
Resolution dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision1 dated 9 March 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and the Resolution2 dated 3 August 2012
denying the motion for reconsideration. The Decision and Resolution dismissed the Appeal
dated 23 October 2009 and affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated 24 November
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 (RTC-Manila).
The Facts
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980.
Although Socorro and Esteban never had common children, both of them had children from
prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and
Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner
in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when
she married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not
annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban.
Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in
1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot
situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The
remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf sometime in
1970.4 The Vitas property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11
December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro
Torres."5
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business
establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property). 6
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino).7 According to Edilberto:
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the
Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on
the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street. The amortizations, together with the amount
of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance
payment, were considered part of the purchase price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline
likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas
properties and she shouldered his medical expenses.8
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale.
Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale
before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent
because Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other
hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to
Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest
over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.9
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the
beginning.10 Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was the governing law at the time Esteban
and Socorro were married, provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person shall be illegal and void from its performance unless:
1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
 time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void.
During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of Socorro’s daughter-in-law Conchita Ventura
(Conchita). In her first affidavit, Conchita claimed that Crispin, who was a seaman, had been
missing and unheard from for 35 years. However, Conchita recanted her earlier testimony
and executed an Affidavit of Retraction.11
The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity does not affect the status of
the union. It applied our ruling in Niñal v. Badayog:12
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. x x x
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring
of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which [the] fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will
be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.13
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are
governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be
void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proved.
The RTC-Manila then determined the respective shares of Socorro and Esteban in the
properties. It found that:
with respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St. Vitas, Tondo, Manila
covered by TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos Road, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila,
[Evangeline] declared that part of it was first acquired by her father Esteban Abletes
sometime in 1968 when he purchased the right of Ampiano Caballegan. Then, in 1970, she x
x x bought the right to one-half of the remaining property occupied by Ampiano Caballegan.
However, during the survey of the National Housing Authority, she allowed the whole lot to be
registered in her father’s name. As proof thereof, she presented Exhibits "8" to "11" x x x.
These documents prove that that she has been an occupant of the said property in Vitas,
Tondo even before her father and Socorro Torres got married in June, 1980.14
Anent the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo,
Manila, x x x Evangeline professed that in 1978, before her father met Socorro Torres and
before the construction of the BLISS Project thereat, her father [already had] a bodega of
canvas (lona) and a sewing machine to sew the canvas being sold at 903 Del Pan Street,
Tondo Manila. In 1978, she was also operating Vangie’s Canvas Store at 905 Del Pan Street,
Tondo, Manila, which was evidenced by Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued
in her favor on 09 November 1998 x x x. When the BLISS project was constructed in 1980,
the property became known as Units D-9 and D-10. At first, her father [paid] for the
amortizations for these two (2) parcels of land but when he got sick with colon cancer in
1993, he asked respondents to continue paying for the amortizations x x x. [Evangeline] paid
a total of ₱195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces of receipts x x x and the
aggregate amount of ₱188,596.09 for Unit D-10, as evidenced by 36 receipts x x x.15
The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition of the
properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any
rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.16
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged Decision of the court a quo
STANDS.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Article 148 of the Family
Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of the Family Code states
that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court of Appeals,19 and held that the foregoing
provision applies "even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code."20 The CA found that Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro
contributed to the purchase of the Vitas and Delpan properties. Edilberto was unable to
provide any documentation evidencing Socorro’s alleged contribution.21
On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,22 which was denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated 3 August 2012.23
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition.
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to
marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that
relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties. He even quoted our
ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar24 in his petition:
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-
ownership and equal contribution do not apply. 25
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other],
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2)
there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel
of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title
to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."26
We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban
alone.1âwphi1 The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status,
and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.27 The evidence on record also shows
that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro,
even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration
under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title. This was admitted by
Edilberto on page 9 of his petition wherein he quotes an excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo:
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of
its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of
title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,
and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions
to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the
subject properties for a valuable consideration.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property
was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. 28 Thus,
the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del
pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.29 Furthermore, even if
payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such
payment was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the
debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is
in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.

During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations
for the Delpan property.1âwphi1 On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence
showing Socorro s alleged monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x
x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which
undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.