Você está na página 1de 15

Intro

 O tema de segurança sempre foi de grande relevância para os atores internacionais.


Isso porque, essencialmente, a sobrevivência é o fator mais importante para os
Estados. Deste modo, este tema é um dos principais pilares, se não o principal, do
estudo das Relações Internacionais.
 Mais especificamente, é largamente questionado se as guerras podem ser evitadas
através da dissuasão, ou quais são as condições para que esse fenômeno tenha
sucesso ou não ao evitar conflitos. Além disso, é feito o questionamento quanto às
possibilidades de eclosão de guerra quando adicionado o fator nuclear na equação.
 Este arcabouço teórico será utilizado para fundamentar a análise proposta sobre as
tensões existentes entre dois países detentores de armamentos nucleares, que se
antagonizam em regime de governo e interesses no Sistema Internacional: Coreia do
Norte e Estados Unidos, trata de uma crise recente que tem implicações no mundo e
nas relações internacionais do presente e futuro.

Estudo histórico relações Coreia do Norte/ Eua

 Há muitos anos que os Estados Unidos e a Coreia do Norte se encontram numa


relação tensa e em desacordo, sendo que o governo norte-americano vem
empregando grandes esforços para convencer a Coreia do Norte a acabar com o seu
programa de desenvolvimento nuclear, como sanções e controlo de exportações. Em
1992 as Coreias foram signatárias de uma declaração conjunta de desnuclearização.
Entretanto a Coreia do Norte a partir de então não colaborou plenamente com as
inspeções realizadas pela Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica (AIEA), agência
que observou que as informações fornecidas pelo país não correspondiam à realidade,
dessa forma desrespeitando suas obrigações segundo o Tratado de Não Proliferação
Nuclear (TNP).
 O ano de 1994 foi marcado pelo falecimento do até então líder norte-coreano Kim Il
Sung. Seu filho, Kim Jong-Il passou a ser o governante, dando continuidade ao
processo de negociação com Washington. Em outubro foi assinado o Agreed
Framework, acordo bilateral no qual Pyongyang se dispõe a desmantelar as suas
instalações nucleares e a interromper seu programa nuclear gradualmente, e
permitir novamente que a AIEA realize inspeções em suas instalações nucleares. Em
troca, os EUA oferecem um consórcio com a finalidade de financiar a construção de
dois reatores de água leve (um tipo de reator nuclear, neste caso para fins
energéticos) e carregamentos de petróleo .
 No início da década de 2000 o relacionamento continuou difícil, sendo marcado por
provocações, como quando após o ataque às torres gemeas, os Estados Unidos
declararam que a Coreia do Norte, juntamente com o Irão e o Iraque formavam o
“Eixo do Mal” por apoiar a proliferação de armas de destruição em massa. Por outro
lado, Pyongyang conseguiu estabelecer diálogo e negociação com outros países como
a Rússia e a Coreia do Sul
 Em 2002, os dois países abriram mão do Agreed Framework. Para completar o
rompimento das responsabilidades de desnuclearização, em janeiro de 2003 a Coreia
do norte desvinculou se de todas as tentativas de desnuclearização com as quais tinha
previamente concordado em participar . Nesse momento Pyongyang ameaçou
responder à qualquer avanço contra suas instalações nucleares por parte do Japão, da
Coreia do Sul, e dos Estados Unidos, com ataques nucleares. Também foram
realizadas demonstrações de poder e ataques preventivos à movimentações
militares na região.
 No ano de 2006, a Coreia do Norte realizou uma série de testes com seus mísseis,
sendo que um dos mísseis teria capacidade para alcançar o território dos EUA. Foram
realizados varios acordos em que os prazos nao eram cumpridos ou pelos EUA ou pela
coreia do norte. No ano de 2009 as demonstrações de poder continuaram, e
Pyongyang realizou mais um teste de míssil, e como resposta o Conselho de Segurança
(CSNU) emitiu uma declaração em repúdio ao teste, argumentando que este foi contra
a resolução 1718 (emitida após o primeiro teste nuclear norte-coreano, reafirmando
que a proliferação de armas nucleares impõem uma ameaça à paz e segurança
internacional) e que o país deve ser punido conforme o documento prevê . Em
resposta a atitude do CSNU, a Coreia do Norte sai do Six Party Talk, renunciando os
acordos feitos neste âmbito, causando grande tensão marcada por novas sanções.
Com isso, podemos perceber também a pouca importância que o governo norte-
coreano dá a tais apelos da ONU, já que praticamente todas as resoluções foram
descumpridas pelo país, pois nesse memso ano realizaram outro teste
 Em 2015 após trocas de ameaças e desacordos diplomáticos, os EUA reforçaram as
suas sanções sobre a Coreia do Norte, que por sua vez continuou a realizar testes de
mísseis durante o ano. Não diferente, no ano seguinte foram realizados mais de 20
testes no ano de 2016, sempre recebendo críticas por parte da ONU e pelos países que
se esforçam para alcançar a desnuclearização norte-coreana
 Em novembro de 2016 Donald Trump foi eleito o novo presidente dos EUA. Desde a
sua posse em janeiro de 2017, a situação se agravou. Kim Jong-un seguiu realizando
testes de mísseis, além de mais demonstrações de poderio bélico. Enquanto isso, em
abril, alguns meses após assumir a presidência, Trump se posiciona juntamente com a
China em esforços para a desnuclearização norte-coreana, e reforçando as sanções ao
país . O líder estadunidense e o líder norte-coreano discutiram e trocaram ameaças ao
longo do ano de 2017, sendo que desde a posse de Trump, as contas do presidente nas
redes sociais vem dizendo muito sobre o posicionamento do país, já que Trump
publicou uma série de ameaças e comentários sobre seu adversário, que foram tão
seriamente consideradas pelo governo norte-coreano quanto as declarações oficiais.
Em resposta ao discurso realizado pelo Ministro de Relações Exteriores da Coreia do
Norte, Ri Yong Ho, na Assembleia Geral da ONU, no qual Ri insultou pessoalmente o
presidente norte-americano, Trump publicou online que se as palavras do Ministro
refletissem o que Kim Jong-un pensa, a Coreia do Norte “não estará entre nós por
muito mais tempo”. A declaração do presidente norte-americano foi interpretada
pelos norte-coreanos como uma declaração de guerra. A secretária de imprensa e
porta-voz da Casa Branca, Sarah Sanders, negou oficialmente tal declaração.
 Kim Jong-un responde às ameaças e sanções com mais ameaças e testes nucleares. O
sexto teste realizado por Pyongyang, em setembro de 2017, provocou um tremor
sísmico de magnitude 6,3, sendo cerca de 10 a 15 vezes mais poderoso do que os
testes anteriores. O objetivo norte-coreano de demonstrar força foi, então, bem-
sucedido, fazendo com que as tensões aumentassem mais ainda, já que os resultados
deste teste indicam que o desenvolvimento do programa nuclear norte-coreano
estava sendo realizado a um ritmo acelerado . Em resposta ao último teste nuclear, o
CSNU se reuniu novamente, publicando a resolução 2375, na qual relembra todas as
resoluções que foram publicadas tangenciando o assunto anteriormente e que
estavam sendo descumpridas pela Coreia do Norte, enfatiza o perigo internacional que
a proliferação nuclear representa, e reforça as sanções que já são aplicadas há anos.
Com a continuação das tensões, o país voltou a fazer parte da lista americana de
países financiadores do terrorismo, classificação que havia sido retirada em 2008
 Agora relaçoes mais calma desde que lideres se encontraram ( ver 2018 e 2019)
completar

Evoluçao teorica relaçoes EUA e coreia do norte

 Segundo a teoria realista de Relações Internacionais, o Sistema Internacional é


caracterizado por um princípio ordenador anárquico, no qual estão inseridas os atores.
A anarquia não remete à caos, mas quer dizer que os Estados são entidades soberanas.
Assim, os Estados são os principais atores, que por sua vez são unitários e racionais,
têm como objetivo final a maximização de benefícios e a sobrevivência, e definem seus
interesses em termos de poder, portanto possuem interesses por natureza
conflituosos entre si. Essas características fazem com que o Sistema tenha uma
dinâmica de autoajuda, ou seja, cada um é responsável pela sua própria proteção
(WALTZ, 1988; MEARSHEIMER, 2002; MORGENTHAU, 2003).
 Na ausência de uma entidade superior às outras, os Estados se mantém naturalmente
no que Waltz conceitua como “balança de poder”, na qual os poderes são distribuídos
de forma sistêmica e equilibrada entre os países, evitando que um único ator obtenha
muito poder, desenvolvendo hegemonia de forma a ameaçar a existência do restante
(WALTZ, 1988). Dessa forma, os Estados investem internamente em fortalecimento
militar e/ou externamente na formação de alianças com outros Estados. Isto acaba por
gerar dilemas de segurança, que acontecem quando um país investe em armamento
para sua defesa, mas seu vizinho se sente ameaçado e faz o mesmo investimento, e
isso resulta em um cenário competitivo, onde cada país quer ter mais armamento do
que o outro para se sentir seguro
 O dilema de segurança culmina em uma relação calcada no medo, incerteza e
desconfiança, causando crises (WALTZ, 1988), que podem escalar até se tornarem
guerras, que são consequências de um processo dinâmico, no qual os atores vão se
envolvendo com cada vez mais intensidade e expectativa, e com a
preocupação/intenção de não ser o segundo a atacar, caso a guerra realmente
aconteça
 Assim, conclui-se que a guerra acontece, essencialmente, para manter o objetivo final
de sobrevivência e segurança dos Estados, indo de acordo então, com Clausewits
(1993), que asserta que a guerra é um instrumento da política, ou a continuação desta
por outros meios.
 Aqui, a questão principal é que a detenção de armamentos nucleares possibilitam
ao país ser mais independente de seus aliados, e garantir maior segurança frente a
seus adversários. Como ferramenta para evitar que o programa nuclear seja
desenvolvido e mantido por país, o adversário usaria de ameaças de guerra
preventiva, já que para os autores medidas como sanções e inspeções não tem tanta
efetividade sozinhos, mas dependem da credibilidade que a ameaça tem.
 Para analisar se está em um cenário favorável para a proliferação propõe-se que o
potencial proliferador deve analisar as variáveis independentes, que são a intensidade
da ameaça existente à sua segurança, seu poder relativo no sistema internacional em
termos militares, o custo de um programa nuclear, além de quanto pode se confiar da
defesa por parte de algum aliado. O que relaciona as variáveis independentes e
dependentes são duas variáveis intervenientes: o benefício que a proliferação traz
para a segurança, e o custo de uma guerra preventiva
 Mais especificamente quem é ameaçado deve acreditar de que seu oponente vai
cumprir a promessa, e não que há apenas a possibilidade de agir, caso a ameaça falhe,
para este não assumir que é apenas um bluff. Após a Guerra Fria, quando aconteceu a
corrida nuclear entre os EUA e a URSS, outros países também investiram em
programas nucleares. Em um cenário internacional em que oito Estados são
detentores declarados de armamentos atômicos, observa-se um efeito pacificador de
tais, por causa de seu efeito dissuasório (especificamente, dissuasão nuclear), que será
discutido em seguida. A dissuasão nuclear é sempre punitiva, pois as armas nucleares
não têm a capacidade de defender um ataque de seu oponente, apenas de retaliar.

Caso Concreto

 no caso da Coreia do Norte, podemos observar que a variável independente de


intensidade da ameaça existente à sua segurança é influenciada grandemente pela
aliança existente entre os Estados Unidos e a Coreia do Sul, que permite a presença
militar (incluindo de armamentos nucleares) americana na península, além do apoio
norte-americano ao programa nuclear energético sul-coreano. Quando se considera a
rivalidade existente na península, reforçada pela Guerra da Coreia , faz-se entender a
magnitude da ameaça que o apoio de uma potência como os Estados Unidos à Coreia
do Sul apresenta para a Coreia do Norte.
 os Estados Unidos lutam declaradamente a favor da disseminação da democracia
pelo globo, e têm um histórico grande de interferência em regimes ditatoriais, o que
também impõe uma ameaça para a segurança e estabilidade do governo norte-
coreano. Para além da discordância relacionada ao regime político, a rivalidade entre
os países coreanos e entre Pyongyang e Washington é influenciada historicamente
com base em modelos econômicos.
 Ao analisar a variável referente ao poder relativo no sistema internacional em termos
militares, deve-se considerar que o seu maior adversário — os EUA — é uma potência
nuclear (em escala colossalmente maior do que a maioria dos outros países detentores
de armamentos nucleares), e que este país tem a colaboração de outras potências
nucleares. Relativamente, a Coreia do Norte não possuía grande poder em termos
militares (antes da nuclearização), e mesmo se tivesse, não seriam suficientes para
enfrentar uma potência nãoconvencional.
 Além disso, há a variável do custo de uma guerra preventiva para ambas as partes
envolvidas. Novamente, os Estados Unidos são uma potência em muitos sentidos,
incluindo nuclear, e conta com um posicionamento estratégico favorável no território
sul-coreano. A Coreia do Norte poderia ser muito prejudicada caso esse adversário
investisse em um ataque.
 Após todo e cada teste nuclear e de mísseis balísticos realizados pela Coreia do Norte,
a resposta dos Estados Unidos foi usar de ferramentas de contra proliferação que não
são muito radicais, como embargos e sanções. Foram realizadas, também, diversas
tentativas de diálogo e negociação diplomática, que até chegaram a alcançar acordos,
mas a Coreia eventualmente volta a se sentir ameaçada e reforça novamente seu
programa. Como vimos, tanto na teoria quanto na história, essas medidas não têm alta
efetividade, principalmente porque segundo a análise norte-coreana, os custos
impostos não superam os benefícios que a posse de armas atômicas traz para o país. O
custo que a população mais sente, que é a fome, por exemplo, é remediado por
auxílios humanitários de diversos países, amenizando a dificuldade. As sanções
econômicas e comerciais impostas ao país também não tem o impacto desejado, pois
a Coreia do Norte não respeita completamente as regras que os outros países
propõem, afinal está inserida em um sistema internacional anárquico, onde não existe
instituição supraestatal para dar ordens ou punir.
 Tanto os Estados Unidos quanto a Coreia do Norte têm credibilidade em suas
ameaças. O primeiro tem um histórico de se envolver em grandes conflitos com
grande êxito, e o segundo tem um governo mais instável, com um perfil radical, que
reage de forma exagerada à algumas ações de seus vizinhos. Os objetivos dos Estados
Unidos vão para além de sua própria segurança, mas leva também em consideração a
segurança de seus aliados, em especial da Coreia do Sul, além da estabilidade da
balança de poder, prezando pelos objetivos, que são institucionalizados e alastrados
por meio de Organizações Internacionais e acordos, de que não haja mais proliferação
nuclear no mundo, mas sim a desnuclearização

Justificaçao international law

 how would the U.S. justify a pre-attack strike on North Korea under
international law ? several examples of pre-attack strikes taken by a
variety of states asserting self-defense; examining the context, rationale
and international response. These cases might offer insights into an
impending decision on the North Korean question.

 What kinds of strikes qualify as self-defense? helpful definitions


of the three terms primarily used by scholars to discuss types of pre-
attack self-defense: anticipatory, preemptive and preventive. Her
definitions are adapted below. Preemptive self-defense tends to have a
longer time horizon. In this case, a state often views an opponent’s
particular, tangible actions as almost certainly developing into an armed
attack against it. While there may be some time before the opponent can
launch the attack, the opponent’s actions indicate an attack is likely
should developments continue.

 Preventive self-defense seeks to halt the development of a future threat,


often without having precise information about where or when the attack
might occur. States sometimes invoke preventive self-defense even without
specific evidence of the opponent’s capacity or intent to attack. Many states
often consider actions falling within this category as illegitimate. However,
some nations, including the U.S., have supported an understanding of self-
defense that could include prevention under certain conditions.

 When determining the legitimacy of a pre-strike action, both historical


practice and statutory interpretation can influence the analysis. Clashes of
interpretation can result in controversy over what types of pre-strike attacks
states should consider lawful. One major source of variation in nations’ legal
analyses stems from differing views on the interplay between Article
2 and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) forbids states from engaging
in the threat or use of force against each other. Yet Article 51 says that the
charter does not prohibit the “inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”

 The U.N.’s 2004 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change took a
less restrictive view but qualified it, noting that: according to long
established international law, [a threatened State] can take military action as
long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it
and the action is proportionate. The problem arises where the threat in
question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the
acquisition, with allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons making
capability. Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council has the sole ability
to authorize the use of force against a state. If a state fails to receive this
authorization but makes a pre-strike attack regardless, claims of self-defense
will face much closer scrutiny.

 When have states cited self-defense to justify a pre-attack


strike?

The Cuban Missile Crisis

In 1962, before either the Soviet Union or Cuba used force against it, the U.S.
government instituted a “defensive quarantine” against Cuba. Some considered
this to constitute a blockade under international law that is regarded as an act of
aggression. Thus a blockade would violate restrictions on the use of force under
Charter Article 2(4) or would require the U.S. to assert a legal argument
claiming self-defense—a shaky proposition. By arguing that the defensive
quarantine did not technically qualify as a blockade, the U.S. attempted to
dodge the need to provide legal justification for the use of force.
Instead, in deliberations with the international community the U.S. focused its
legal rationale on regional organizations’ power to authorize force rather than
rely on legitimacy derived solely through self-defense. In Security Council
debates over the issue, no clear consensus supporting or rejecting the doctrine
of preemption emerged. Some indicated that while self-defense before an attack
was legal, the U.S. had not met the strict Caroline standard.

 Operation Opera (Osirak Bombing)

On June 7, 1981, Israel launched an airstrike against the Osirak nuclear reactor
in Iraq, close to Baghdad. Although the facility was not yet operational, the
Israeli government feared Osirak would become capable of producing material
necessary for a nuclear bomb.

In a statement after the attack, the Israeli government said that its intelligence
indicated the reactor would have become operational by July or September of
that year. Given that Israel could and would not attack a “live” reactor site for
fear of nuclear contamination, it claimed to have a small window for action:

We were therefore forced to defend ourselves against the construction of an


atomic bomb in Iraq, which itself would not have hesitated to use it against
Israel and its population centers. Therefore, the Israeli Government decided to
act without further delay to insure the safety of our people.

The rationale behind the decision explicitly employed the future tense: At some
point Iraq would have nuclear weapons capability that it would then likely use
against Israel, judging by its past statements and the beliefs of Israeli
intelligence. Yet Israel lacked clear indication that Iraq had the capability to
carry out the attack, shifting the action closer to prevention than preemption.

The U.N. Security Council, including the U.S., unanimously condemned the
attack, calling it a violation of the U.N. Charter and international norms.

 Operation Infinite Reach (Al Shifa Bombing)

In 1998, the U.S. conducted its first “unreservedly acknowledged” preemptive


strike against a terrorist organization. In a plan codenamed Operation Infinite
Reach, the Clinton administration launched a missile attack on a factory in
Khartoum, Sudan, that it said produced the VX nerve agent for Osama bin
Laden. The factory, however, produced pharmaceuticals for the Sudanese
population. Many Arab nations condemned the attack as a violation of Sudanese
sovereignty.

As with other claims to self-defense, this classification has come under


significant scrutiny. Some argue that the strike is better understood as a post-
attack response to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
that had happened shortly earlier that year. Reports in the years after the Sudan
attack showed that the intelligence used in the decision contained significant
gaps.

 Invasion of Iraq
Although the George W. Bush administration legally justified its decision to
send forces into Iraq in 2003 on the basis of Security Council resolutions, the
administration relied in part on a claim of self-defense. The Bush
administration argued that Saddam Hussein's regime armed with weapons of
mass destruction presented a threat to both the region and the United States. In
context of the Bush administration’s views and statements on pre-strike attacks
in the National Security Strategy of 2002, this justification veered close to a
doctrine of preventive self-defense: an allegedly guaranteed threat on a more
ambiguous timeline that had to be stopped before it could achieve the capacity
to strike. President Bush said in a speech Oct. 7, 2002:

Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is
already significant, and it only grows worse with time. If we know Saddam
Hussein has dangerous weapons today—and we do—does it make any sense for
the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even
more dangerous weapons? … America must not ignore the threat gathering
against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the
smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. …

The ideological framework underlying this policy proposal should not have
come as a surprise. The National Security Strategy of 2002 explicitly suggested a
more flexible understanding of what constitutes an “imminent” threat (which
would legitimate certain military actions in self-defense). In it, the
administration made similar arguments, noting that the government could use
the likelihood of a future threat to justify immediate action.

 In short, the limited ground covered in this piece amounts to the following:
The U.S. could make a substantial legal argument, based on international
law and the precedent of some cases, for a pre-strike attack on North Korea.
But the variability of historical examples and the behavior of Security
Council members make it unclear what degree of legitimacy the
international community would afford the United States’ fateful decision.

Argumentos a favor de um ataque preventivo

 Each test would have been an excellent occasion for the United States to finally
decide to do to North Korea what Israel did to Iraq in 1981, and to Syria in 2007 —
namely, use well-aimed conventional weapons to deny nuclear weapons to regimes
that shouldn’t have firearms, let alone weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately,
there is still time for Washington to launch such an attack to destroy North Korea’s
nuclear arsenal. It should be earnestly considered rather than rejected out of hand.

 Of course, there are reasons not to act against North Korea. But the most commonly
cited ones are far weaker than generally acknowledged. One mistaken reason to
avoid attacking North Korea is the fear of direct retaliation: The U.S.
intelligence community has reportedly claimed that North Korea already has
ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads that can reach as far as the United States.
But this is almost certainly an exaggeration, or rather an anticipation of a future that
could still be averted by prompt action. The first North Korean nuclear device that
could potentially be miniaturized into a warhead for a long-range ballistic missile
was tested on September 3, 2017, while its first full-scale ICBM was only tested on
November 28, 2017. If the North Koreans have managed to complete the full-scale
engineering development and initial production of operational ballistic missiles with
nuclear warheads in the short time since then — and on their tiny total budget —
then their mastery of science and engineering would be entirely unprecedented and
utterly phenomenal. It is altogether more likely that they have yet to match warheads
and missiles into an operational weapon.

It’s true that North Korea could retaliate for any attack by using its conventional rocket
artillery against the South Korean capital of Seoul and its surroundings, where almost
20 million inhabitants live within 35 miles of the armistice line. U.S. military officers
have cited the fear of a “sea of fire” to justify inaction. But this vulnerability should not
paralyze U.S. policy for one simple reason: It is very largely self-inflicted.

When then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter decided to withdraw all U.S. Army troops
from South Korea 40 years ago (ultimately a division was left behind), the defense
advisors brought in to help — including myself — urged the Korean government to
move its ministries and bureaucrats well away from the country’s northern border and
to give strong relocation incentives to private companies. South Korea was also told to
mandate proper shelters, as in Zurich for example, where every new building must have
its own (under bombardment, casualties increase dramatically if people leave their
homes to seek shelter). In recent years, moreover, South Korea has had the option of
importing, at moderate cost, Iron Dome batteries, which are produced by both Israel
and the United States, that would be capable of intercepting 95 percent of North
Korean rockets headed to inhabited structures.

But over these past four decades, South Korean governments have done practically
nothing along these lines. The 3,257 officially listed “shelters” in the Seoul area are
nothing more than underground shopping malls, subway stations, and hotel parking
lots without any stocks of food or water, medical kits or gas masks. As for importing
Iron Dome batteries, the South Koreans have preferred to spend their money on
developing a fighter-bomber aimed at Japan.

Even now, casualties could still be drastically reduced by a crash resilience program.
This should involve clearing out and hardening with jacks, props, and steel beams the
basements of buildings of all sizes; promptly stocking necessities in the 3,257 official
shelters and sign-posting them more visibly; and, of course, evacuating as many as
possible beforehand (most of the 20 million or so at risk would be quite safe even just
20 miles further to the south). The United States, for its part, should consider adding
vigorous counterbattery attacks to any airstrike on North Korea.

Nonetheless, given South Korea’s deliberate inaction over many years, any damage
ultimately done to Seoul cannot be allowed to paralyze the United States in the face of
immense danger to its own national interests, and to those of its other allies elsewhere
in the world. North Korea is already unique in selling its ballistic missiles, to Iran most
notably; it’s not difficult to imagine it selling nuclear weapons, too.
Another frequently cited reason for the United States to abstain from an attack — that it
would be very difficult to pull off — is even less convincing. The claim is that destroying
North Korean nuclear facilities would require many thousands of bombing sorties. But
all North Korean nuclear facilities — the known, the probable, and the possible —
almost certainly add up to less than three dozen installations, most of them quite small.
Under no reasonable military plan would destroying those facilities demand thousands
of airstrikes.

Unfortunately, this would not be the first time that U.S. military planning proved
unreasonable. The United States Air Force habitually rejects one-time strikes, insisting
instead on the total “Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.” This is a peculiar conceit
whereby every single air-defense radar, surface-to-air missile, airstrip, and combat
aircraft in a given country must be bombed to destruction to safeguard U.S. pilots from
any danger, instead of just bombing the targets that actually matter. Given that North
Korea’s radars, missiles, and aircraft are badly outdated, with their antique electronics
long since countermeasured, the Air Force’s requirements are nothing but an excuse for
inaction. Yes, a more limited air attack might miss a wheelbarrow or two, but North
Korea has no nuclear-warhead mobile missile launchers to miss — not yet.

Perhaps the only good reason to hesitate before ordering an attack on North Korea is
China.

Perhaps the only good reason to hesitate before ordering an


attack on North Korea is China.
But that’s not because Beijing would intervene against the United States. The notion
that China is North Korea’s all-around protector is badly out of date. Yes, the Chinese
do not want to see North Korea disappear with U.S. troops moving up to the Yalu River
and China’s border. But President Xi Jinping’s support for maximum economic
sanctions, including a de facto blockade of oil imports — a classic act of war —
amounts to a change of sides when it comes to North Korean nuclear weapons.
Anybody who believes China would act on North Korea’s behalf in the event of an
American attack against its nuclear installations has not been paying attention.

But China’s shift has surfaced a quite different reason for the United States not to
bomb: While North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is of course very dangerous,
it does ensure its independence from Chinese influence. In a post-strike scenario, the
Pyongyang regime might well crumble, with the country becoming a Chinese ward.
That could give Beijing dominant influence over South Korea as well, given the
preference of some South Koreans — including President Moon Jae-in, according to
reports — for Chinese as opposed to American patronage. A China-dominated Korean
Peninsula would make Japan less secure and the United States much less of a Pacific
power.

In theory, a post-attack North Korea in chaos could be rescued by the political


unification of the peninsula, with the United States assuaging Chinese concerns by
promptly moving its troops further south, instead of moving them north. In practice,
however, this would be a difficult plan to carry out, not least because South Korea’s
government and its population are generally unwilling to share their prosperity with
the miserably poor northerners, as the West Germans once did with their East German
compatriots.

For now, it seems clear that U.S. military authorities have foreclosed a pre-emptive
military option. But the United States could still spare the world the vast dangers of a
North Korea with nuclear-armed long-range missiles if it acts in the remaining months
before they become operational.

It’s true that India, Israel, and Pakistan all have those weapons, with no catastrophic
consequences so far. But each has proven its reliability in ways that North Korea has
not. Their embassies, for instance, don’t sell hard drugs or traffic in forged banknotes.
More pertinently, those other countries have gone through severe crises, and even
fought wars, without ever mentioning nuclear weapons, let alone threatening their use
as Kim Jong Un already has. North Korea is different, and U.S. policy should recognize
that reality before it is too late.

The term “rogue nation” has no official government definition. But as used by prominent
politicians, the term generally refers to tyrannies that lack normal diplomatic relations with the
United States and other democracies and engage in or threaten to engage in international
terrorism or aggression.5 The President and members of Congress from both parties *468 cite
Iran and North Korea as examples of rogue nations.

But the United States cannot always count on diplomacy in dealing with rogue nations. The
United States rarely engages in diplomatic negotiations with Iran and North Korea.20 Even if
more discussions could take place, the United States knows from experience that these
nations often do not keep their diplomatic promises.21 The United States also cannot rely
solely on threats of retaliation as it did with the former Soviet Union. Iran and North Korea for
whatever reason do not seem very concerned about the possibility of mutual assured
destruction.22

B. Armed Attacks and Armistice Violations by North Korea North Korea has engaged in many
serious armed attacks on South Korea in the past decade. South Korea routinely has responded
to these armed attacks by using military force in self-defense. Here are some prominent
examples: exemplos que estao no resumo historico

In conclusion, these numerous incidents show that the United States would not have to rely on
a controversial reinterpretation of Article 51 to justify military action against Iran or North
Korea. Both countries regularly engage in armed attacks against allies of the United States.
Article 51 would allow the United States, acting in collective self-defense, to use military force
to respond to these attacks. In the case of North Korea, the United States also presumably
could justify military force based on a material violation of the armistice agreement if it were
to occur. Once the United States has a ground for using military force against the rogue nation,
it could direct that force against nuclear weapons development facilities as a legitimate
military target, subject to limitations discussed below.

V. Precedents for Using Justified Military Force To Accomplish Greater Ends Under the theory
described above, the United States might take advantage of a legally sufficient justification to
use military force (i.e., conventional armed attacks or armistice violations) to accomplish
greater ends (i.e., the destruction of nuclear weapons development facilities not directly
related to those attacks and violations). Two precedents support this practice. In 1989, the
United States invaded Panama in response to armed attacks by the Panamanian Defense
Forces, but accomplished the greater end of ousting General Manuel Noriega and restoring
democracy.119 Similarly, when the United States and a multinational coalition invaded Iraq,
they justified the action on grounds that Iraq violated the terms of a 1991 cease fire, but
hoped to accomplish the greater aims of removing Saddam Hussein and preventing Iraq from
deploying weapons of mass destruction. Although these actions have found many critics, they
have established a principle that cannot be overlooked or easily dismissed.

Conclusion This article has presented a theory for how the United States might justify military
strikes aimed at destroying a rogue nation’s nuclear weapons facilities under the U.N. Charter.
The United States would not have to rely on a controversial interpretation of Article 51 that
would permit actions in self-defense even if an armed attack has not already occurred. The
basis for this position is simply stated: Nations like Iran and North Korea constantly are
engaging in actual armed attacks and other aggression that by themselves justify the use of
military force. The United States might cite one of these armed attacks as a ground for using
military force and, in using that force, could destroy nuclear weapons development facilities.
Indeed, although I think that the chances that the United States 34 HOW THE U.S. MIGHT
JUSTIFY A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE 162 See U.N. Charter art. 51. Where would the United States
make this legal argument? Article 51 requires a nation that uses military force in self-defense
to inform the Security Council. If the United States uses force against Iran or North Korea, I
predict that the United States at a minimum would send a communication to the Security
Council saying that it acted under Article 51 in collective selfdefense in response to an armed
attack. A preemptive strike under any circumstances would be very controversial. Attempting
to justify an attack on grounds of anticipatory self-defense rather than collective self-defense
in response to a conventional attack would simply increase the controversy. actually will use
preemptive force are slim, I predict that if the United States ever does strike Iran or North
Korea, it will advance in one form or another the arguments presented in this paper

Outro argumento

The U.S. now finds itself in a position of accepting the North Korean nuclear threat or
doing something dramatic to remove it. Accepting a North Korean nuclear capability
has negative implications for the growth of regional nuclear programs and
the proliferation of technological know-how to Iran and others. One thing is certain: the
U.S. must not consider a preventive attack on North Korea’s nuclear missile capability
without strong guarantees of Chinese neutrality. The current Chinese position of
“neutrality as long as the U.S. does not strike first” does not help to distinguish between
a preemptive and a preventive policies, since both are first-strike approaches. North
Korea is China’s problem, too. Regional instability threatens Chinese economic growth
and international political influence. China’s recent support for increased UN
sanctions on North Korea shows that the Chinese government is willing to crack down
on its client. China may be convinced to remain neutral if given certain necessary
assurances, and the U.S. can and should provide them. Among the most important
considerations is an agreement among key actors to an end state which China, Russia,
South Korea, and the U.S. can all accept.

Another war with North Korea has terrible implications. It would no doubt be militarily
and economically painful; but, from a strictly U.S. security perspective, a nuclear threat
to the U.S. homeland from an unpredictable despot makes a preventive war conceivable
and possibly even necessary, no matter how awful. To this point, Senator Lindsey
Graham recently voiced a succinct and pragmatic argument for preventive action,
stating, “If there’s going to be a war to stop [Kim Jong Un (sic)], it will be over there. If
thousands die, they’re going to die over there, they’re not going to die here.”

Continued strategic patience and further negotiation with North Korea mean the
continued acceptance of failure and the continuation of a situation that the U.S. has long
considered unacceptable. Tolerating a North Korean nuclear threat requires accepting
that Kim Jong-un is rational and predictable, and that he will act within international
norms. His actions to ensure his power to date do not engender confidence.

A distasteful alternative to the current policy is a preventive attack, which could mean
resuming the unresolved war on the Korean Peninsula. The consequences of waiting for
North Korea’s nuclear threat to mature are potentially far worse. The President now
faces a difficult decision on whether the threat of a nuclear North Korea is truly
unacceptable.

Outro argumento

In 1993, when North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear


Non-Proliferation Treaty after it was caught secretly manufacturing
plutonium, Secretary of Defense William Perry urged a preventive attack.
When the commander of U.S. forces in Korea outlined the catastrophic
war that might result, Bill Clinton rejected Perry’s advice. But,
Silverstone notes, he did so on purely pragmatic grounds. In the
administration’s internal deliberations, no one argued against preventive
war on moral grounds. Conceptually, something had changed.
If Clinton peeked under a door that his predecessors had tried to bolt
shut, George W. Bush flung it open. “Given the goals of rogue states
and terrorists,” his administration declared in its first National Security
Strategy after 9/11, “the United States can no longer solely rely on a
reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a
potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude
of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of
weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike
first.”
This was mostly nonsense. Al-Qaeda, which had no regime to protect,
may have been difficult to deter. But the Bush administration provided
no evidence that deterrence would prove any less successful against
“rogue states” like Iraq, Iran or North Korea than it had proved against
Stalin and Mao. The National Security Strategy slandered Bush’s Cold
War predecessors as “reactive.” Unable to grasp their principles, Bush
mistook them for passivity.
Among the duplicities that attended Bush’s new doctrine was a linguistic
one. Instead of admitting that he was embracing preventive war, Bush
called it “preemption.” That was a lie. Preemptive war has an entirely
different status in international law because it refers to an entirely
different thing: a response to imminent attack.
The Iraq War should have discredited Bush’s frightening new doctrine.
But the peculiar circumstances of the Iraq fiasco kept it alive. Because
Saddam Hussein turned out not to be developing a nuclear bomb,
rejecting the war didn’t require rejecting the doctrine
that underlay it. The fact that Bush got the intelligence wrong obscured
the fact that Iraq would have constituted a reckless departure from
American tradition even if he had gotten the intelligence right.
Barack Obama illustrates the point. He won the presidency in part by
opposing the war in Iraq. Yet he adopted one of its underlying
assumptions when it came to Iran. Obama yearned to stop Tehran’s
nuclear program diplomatically. But from the beginning of his
presidency, he was clear: If diplomacy failed, his Plan B was not
deterrence. It was preventive war.
Now Donald Trump is perpetuating that assumption when it comes to
North Korea. Referring to the potential for Pyongyang to test an
intercontinental ballistic missile that could carry a nuclear warhead, he
tweeted, “It won’t happen.” This week Mike Pence declared that, “When
the president says all options are on the table, all options are on the
table. We’re trying to make it very clear to people in this part of the
world that we are going to achieve the end of a denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula—one way or the other.”
To legitimize preventive war, Trump’s advisors are resuscitating all the
bad arguments made about Iraq and Iran. Kim Jong Un’s ballistic missile
tests, argues UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, prove that he is “not a
rational person.” Really? Kim is a monster. But from the standpoint of
regime preservation, his pursuit of nuclear weapons is highly rational.
Since 9/11, the United States has deposed governments in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Libya. It just bombed regime targets in Syria. What do
these regimes have in common? They couldn’t deter an American attack
because they didn’t have nuclear weapons. The North Koreans
refer over and over to Muammar Qaddafi, who abandoned his nuclear
program in a bid to win the West’s affection, and ended up
being sodomized by Libyan rebels who were using NATO as their air
force. As Dartmouth’s David Kang has explained, “To dismiss North
Korea’s security fears is to miss the root cause of North Korea’s
actions.”
Hawks assert that Pyongyang cannot be deterred. But it has been
deterred. North Korea first tested a nuclear weapon 11 years ago. It has
possessed biological and chemical weapons since the 1970s or 1980s. Yet
North Korea’s leaders have not used them, most likely because they
know that doing so would imperil what they value most: their hold on
power.
Nonetheless, media outlets, including The New York Times, abet Trump
by calling his potential strike “preemption,” thus implying that the mere
fact of a North Korean nuclear missile—or the mere fact that Pyongyang
has threatened that if the U.S. were about to attack, it would so first
(which actually would be “preemption”)—places the U.S. and its allies in
imminent danger. Bush’s linguistic lie has triumphed. Preventive war has
gained moral respectability even as it has disappeared from America’s
lexicon.