PEOPLE V. PACITA ORDONO G.R. NO. 132154
[7]
Facts : On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young girl was
found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion,
Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley Victore,
fifteen (15) years old, who three (3) days before was reported
missing. Post-mortem examination conducted by the NBI, revealed
that the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina
as the authors of the crime. The police thereupon invited the two
(2) suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning.
However, for lack of evidence , they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina
returned to the police station and acknowledged that they had
indeed committed the crime.The police immediately conducted an
investigation and put their confessions in writing. They however
could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the two (2)
accused in the course of the investigation because there were no
practicing lawyers in the Municipality. Be that as it may, the
statements of the two (2) accused where nevertheless taken.Both
accused were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional
right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of
their choice. They assure that they understood their rights and did
not require the services of counsel, hence, the investigation was
conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of
Police, other police officers and the suspect’s wife and mother, in
attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary
statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their participation
in the crime.
Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer, visited and interviewed
them. In the interview which was duly tape-recorded both accused
admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated
individually the events surrounding their commission thereof
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the
office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and
counseling. PAO lawyer apprised each of the accused of his
constitutional rights and explained to them each of the questions
and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised
them to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading them
to defer the affixing of their second signature/ thumbmark thereon.
After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz
and informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and
thumbmarks for the second time in their respective confessions.
They assured that their statements had been given freely and
voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not been coerced
into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally
asked the accused to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their
respective confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty.
Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel,
followed by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the
signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused
pleaded not guilty.
The accused are now assailing their conviction on the ground that
constitutional infirmities attended the execution of their
extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of counsel to assist
them during custodial investigation thereby making their
confessions inadmissible in evidence.
Issue: WON the confessions is inadmissible in evidence due to the
lack of counsel assistance during custodial investigation.
Facts: Yes, The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial
confession inadmissible. The presence of the mayor, municipal
judge and the family of the accused during the confession did not
cure the defect.
confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4)
fundamental requirements:
(a) the confession must be voluntary;
(b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel;
(c) the confession must be express; and,
(d) the confession must be in writing.[6]
Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect
than an accused's right to counsel to adequately protect him in his
ignorance and shield him from the otherwise condemning nature of
a custodial investigation. The person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false
or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense.
Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial
investigation any statement elicited from the accused is
inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.[8]
Before persons can appear as substitute for counsel, two (2)
conditions must be met:
(a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and,
(b) a valid waiver must be executed.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of
Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief
of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand
in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2)
accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a
waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the
assistance of counsel.[9] Consequently, any admission obtained
from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days
later does not remedy this omission either. It could not cure the
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation when the
extrajudicial statements were being taken.[10]
With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered
inadmissible in evidence, we are left with the interview taken by
DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite as evidence. The taped
interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to
the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated
the crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence.[15] By analogy,
statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should
likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of
an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer
to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any
other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio
announcer, they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as
in fact he was not, hence their uncounselled confession to him did
not violate their constitutional rights.
Accordingly, herein accused should be held liable for the special
complex crime of rape with homicide on two (2) counts as defined
and penalized in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
RA 7659.
10. People vs. Escordial
G.R. Nos. 138934-357
The complainant, Michelle Darunday, was living with Erma Blanca,
and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. On the night of the incident, Erma was
awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head covered
with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four
inches long and asked where the money was. Erma Blanca and
Michelle Darunday gave the money because they were threatened
by the man to be killed.
The assailant then blindfolded Michelle and began to rape her. After
satisfying his lust, the assailant conversed for a while with
complainants. The accused, threatening to call his companions,
then, again, raped the complainant in the other orifice of the
complainant’s nether regions. Accused then warned the women not
to report or else they would be killed. After 30 mins. The
complainants told their neighbor of what happened. Then they told
the owner of the boarding house what happened who then told the
police.
Physical description of the assailant was given by the complainant
at the police station. Police found that the descriptions given by the
complainant fit that of a worker in the Coffee Break Corner, where
the accused was employed. Heading there, the police asked of the
accused whereabouts which was, as they were told, watching a
basketball game. The police arrested the accused (w/o warrant) and
proceeded to the police station where he saw the complainant and
inadvertently blushed. Complainant then identified him based on the
marks on the neck and matched other physical descriptions. Court
of first instance ruled that accused is found guilty of robbery and
rape with no mitigating circumstances and is hereby sentenced with
maximum penalty of death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?
HELD: NO.
The accused-appellant was watching a basketball game when he
was seized therefore he was not 1.) In flagrante delicto 2.) He was
not an escaped convict 3) the arrest was not after direct
consummation of the crime.
The question here is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b)
because the police officers had personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would lead them to believe that accused-
appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase “personal
knowledge” in paragraph Section 5(b) of Rule 113 has been defined
that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must
be based upon “probable cause” which means “an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based
on actual facts. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded
on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officer making the arrest.
Here, in question of the “Personal Knowledge”, the police were not
at the scene of the crime when it happened, therefore “Personal
Knowledge” does not apply. Furthermore, there was ample time for
police to procure a warrant and no reason for them not to obtain
one. This deficiency is, however, cured once accused-appellant
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and not questioning
the invalidity of the arrest.
protection against warrantless searches applies to blood alcohol
tests unless specific exigent circumstances exist. Because each case
must be considered based on its individual facts, there are cases in
which the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood would be
considered an exigent circumstance, but there is no reason to create
a categorical rule. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against bodily intrusions outweighs the state’s interest in
gaining evidence quickly.
In his partial concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that
the case in question does not provide the basis for any categorical
rule on the issue of conducting a blood alcohol test without a
warrant. He also wrote that the Fourth Amendment does not allow
the warrant requirement to be entirely ignored in drunk driving
arrests. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that
there must be a categorical rule on this issue to provide appropriate
guidance to law enforcement officials. He argued that exigent
circumstances exist and justify a warrantless blood test if the officer
believes there is not sufficient time to obtain a warrant before
critical evidence is lost through natural metabolic processes. If there
is time to secure a warrant, the officer must do so. Justice Stephen
G. Breyer and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the partial
concurrence and partial dissent.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he
argued that the body’s natural metabolization of alcohol constitutes
the destruction of evidence and represents an exigent circumstance.
The importance of obtaining evidence allows the police to conduct a
warrantless blood alcohol test without violating the Fourth
Amendment.

The accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the

police after he had being pointed by a Ramie as the possible suspect
of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these
out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police. Thereby
all questions answered by accused-appellant is hereby deemed as
hearsay. Furthermore, his right to counsel was violated. Hence,
evidence is inadmissible in court.

Hence, it is found that the prosecution has failed to meet the degree
of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in a criminal case.

In lieu of the above mentioned, the Supreme Court hereby reverses

the sentence and acquits the accused-appellant.

Missouri v. McNeely

Facts of the case

On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw
Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed
McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three
times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his
eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol.
McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused
to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for
driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain
a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent
statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder
ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed
McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit.

The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and

McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample
because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk
of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented
an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court
of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case
represented a departure from current case law; it transferred the
case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri
affirmed the trial court's decision.

Question
Does the Fourth Amendment prevent the taking of a warrantless
blood sample under exigent circumstances?

Conclusion
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4
plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s