III. A.

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE revenge, resentment or

other evil motive.
III. A. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE State of necessity 1. Evil sought to be
(Avoidance of greater evil) avoided actually exists.
Justifying circumstances. Where the act of the person 2. The evil or injury
is said to be in accordance with the law, so that such sought to be avoided must
person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is not have been produced
free from both criminal and civil liability. Lack of dolo is by the one invoking the
basis. justifying circumstances.
3. Injury feared be greater
Criminal and civil liability. There is NO crime than that done to avoid it.
committed, the act being justified. Thus, such persons 4. There is no other
cannot be considered criminals. There is no civil liability practical and less harmful
EXCEPT in par. 4, Art. 11 (avoidance of greater evil), means of preventing it.
where the civil liability is borne by the persons benefited Fulfillment of duty or 1. Offender acted in
by the act in proportion to the benefit they may have lawful exercise of right performance of duty or in
received (Art. 101). the lawful exercise of a
right or office;
Burden of proof. The burden of proof rests on the 2. That the injury caused
accused, who must prove the circumstance by clear and or the offense committed
convincing evidence. be the necessary
consequence of the due
Justifying and exempting circumstances, performance of duty or
distinguished. the lawful exercise of such
right or office.
Justifying Exempting Obedience to superior 1. Order must have been
It affects the act, not the It affects the actor, not the order issued by a superior;
actor. act. 2. The order is for some
lawful purpose;
The act is considered to The act complained of is 3. The means used to
have been done within the actually wrongful, but the carry it out must be
bounds of law; hence, actor is not liable. lawful.
legitimate and lawful in
the eyes of the law. 1. Defense of self, relatives, and strangers

Since the act is considered
lawful, there is no
liability.
Since the act complained
of is actually wrong, there
is a crime but since the
actor acted without
voluntariness or
negligence, there is no
dolo or culpa.
Requisites of Each Circumstance
Since the act is considered
lawful, there is no
liability.
Since the act complained
of is actually wrong, there
is a crime but since the
actor acted without
voluntariness or
negligence, there is no
dolo or culpa.
1.1 Defense of Self Elements (URL)
1. Unlawful aggression.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
Why self-defense is lawful.
a. Impulse of self-preservation;
b. State cannot provide protection for each of its
constituents.

Justifying Requisites Subjects of self-defense.

circumstance
Defense of person, right,
property, or honor
Defense of relatives
Defense of strangers
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of
means employed to
prevent or repel it;
3. Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of
the person defending
himself.
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of
means employed to
prevent or repel it;
3. Lack of sufficient
provocation on part of
relative, or, in case of
provocation, the one
making the defense had
no part therein.
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of
the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
3. The person defending
was not induced by
(1) Defense of person
(2) Defense of rights
(3) Defense of property. The defense of property rights can
be invoked if there is an attack upon the property although
it is not coupled with an attack upon the person of the
owner of the premises. All the elements for justification
must however be present. [People v. Narvaez]
(4) Defense of home. Violent entry to another’s house at
nighttime; by a person who is armed with a bolo; and
forcing his way into the house, shows he was ready and
looking for trouble.
(5) Defense of honor and reputation
Slap on the face. Hence, a slap on the face is considered
as unlawful aggression since the face represents a person
and his dignity. [Rugas vs. People].
Hand on woman’s lap. Placing of hand by man on the
woman’s upper thigh is unlawful aggression.
1.1.1 Unlawful Aggression
Unlawful aggression. When peril to one’s life, limb, or
right is actual or imminent. Presupposes actual, sudden,
and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and
not merely threatening or intimidating attitude. The
victim must attack the accused with actual physical force
or with a weapon. [People v. Colinares (2011)]
 Peril to one’s limb
 Not retaliation
 Must be continuing
o Except: aggressor retreats to obtain a
more advantageous position to ensure
the success of the initial attack
 Picking up a weapon
 Not “agreement to fight”
1.1.2 Reasonableness of the means employed
Test of reasonableness. The means employed depends
upon:
1. nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor
2. aggressor’s physical condition, character, size, and
other circumstances
3. and those of the person defending himself
4. the place and occasion of the assault.
Doctrine of rational equivalence. Rational
equivalence presupposes the consideration not only of the
nature and quality of the weapons used by the defender
and the assailant, but of the totality of circumstances
surrounding the defense vis-à-vis the unlawful aggression.
It considers: (1) the emergency; (2) the imminent danger
to which the person attacked is exposed; (3) the instinct,
more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense;
and (4) the proportionate-ness of the defense does not
depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent
danger of such injury. [Espinosa v. People (2010)]
1.1.3 Lack of sufficient provocation
Lack of sufficient provocation on the defender’s
part. When the law speaks of provocation either as a
mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-
defense, it requires that the same be sufficient or
proportionate to the act committed and that it be
adequate to arouse one to its commission. It is not enough
that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying.
Insults. Verbal argument is not considered sufficient
provocation, BUT INSULTS in vulgar language are. Also
includes the scenario where the accused tried to forcibly
kiss the sister of the deceased.
1.2 Defense of Relatives
Relatives for self-defense. (SAD-SiR)
a. Spouse
b. Ascendants
c. Descendants
d. Legitimate, natural, or adopted Siblings, or relatives by
affinity in the same degrees (parents-in-laws, children-in-
law, siblings-in-law)
e. Relatives by consanguinity within 4th civil degree
Unlawful aggression, reason. The law acknowledges
the possibility that a relative, by virtue of blood, will
instinctively come to the aid of their relatives.
In case of provocation by relative, the one making
the defense had no part therein. Although the
provocation prejudices the person who gave it, its effects
do not reach the defender who took no part therein,
because the latter was prompted by some noble or
generous sentiment in protecting and saving a relative.
Basis. It is found not only upon a humanitarian
sentiment, but also upon the impulse of blood which
impels men to rush, on the occasion of great perils, to the
rescue of those close to them by ties of blood.
1.3 Defense of Strangers
Basis. What one may do in his defense, another may do
for him. The ordinary man would not stand idly by and see
his companion killed without attempting to save his life.
Note: Motive is relevant only in this kind of defense.
Stranger. Any person not included in the enumeration of
relatives under [par. 2 of Art. 11]
CASES
Accused not entitled to self-defense when
unlawful aggression ceases to exist
People v Decena
FACTS: The victim appeared to be drunk and grabbed
Decena by the neck and poked his neck with a fork
when they were in the basketball court, then they were
told off by the tanod. When victim left the basketball
court, fight between the victim and Decena ensued,
with Decena stabbing the victim to death.
HELD: In this case, unlawful aggression (victim
grabbing the neck of Decena and poking with fork)
already ceased when they were broken up by the tanod
and victim left the court. When the aggressor leaves,
the aggression ceases. Since the aggression no longer
existed, Decena can no longer claim the right to defend
himself against the aggressor.
Unlawful aggression must originate from
offended party
People v Placer
FACTS: Maria Gernale and her husband, Rosalino
Gernale, were on their way home on board a tricycle
with Maria’s father, another female passenger and five
young children. While their tricycle was moving,
another tricycle carrying appellants Ramon and Virgilio
Placer almost hit them. Placer brothers and Rosalino
alighted from their respective tricycles and a heated
altercation ensued between them. When things had
subsided, Gernale and Placers proceeded their separate
ways. Maria realized that appellants were chasing
them. The Placer brothers were able to overtake the
tricycle driven by Rosalino and later blocked its path.
Three alighted from their tricycles; confrontation
followed. Ramon stabbed Rosalino in the chest.
Rosalino fell towards the direction of his tricycle and
just as he was about to fall, Virgilio stabbed him in the
stomach. Brothers immediately fled the area on board
their tricycle. Rosalino was pronounced dead.
HELD: The sequence of the events showed that the
aggression originated from Ramon, not from Rosalino,
thereby removing any factual and legal bases for
Ramon’s plea of self-defense.
No unlawful aggression where the accused got
hold and control of the weapon used by victim to
attack him
People v Dulin
FACTS: Accused and victim grappled for the weapon.
Accused got hold of it and stabbed the victim to death.
 HELD: When accused got hold and control of the
weapon, the threat ceased. Hence, no unlawful
aggression anymore.
3 elements must be present to be entitled to the
justifying circumstance of self-defense
People v Dela Cruz
FACTS: The accused-appellant, De la Cruz, has invoked
the claim of self-defense when he killed Macapagal, the
previous partner of his current live-in partner, San
Antonio. Macapagal has barged into the house of the
current couple and banged at the door of De la Cruz’s
room. When De la Cruz has opened the door, he saw
that Macapagal has pointed a gun at him; he
immediately closed the door but opened it the second
time, however, this time, he was armed with a .38
caliber revolver. The altercation between the two has
led to Macapagal’s death.
HELD:
1. No unlawful aggression - The Court held that
in the case at bar, the accused was able to prevent
the harm to himself when he closed the door upon
seeing the victim with a gun outside his room. The
Court asserted that the accused could have stopped
there but he chose to go out of his room, armed
with a .38 caliber revolver and to confront the
victim – during this instance, he was not acting out
of self-defense.
2. Means employed were unreasonable and
unnecessary - the number of the wounds
sustained by the victim indicated a determine
effort to kill on the part of the accused.
3. No lack of sufficient provocation - The act of
taking the gun from his cabinet and opening the
door the second time around in order to confront
the victim does not suggest the lack of provocation
on the part of the accused.
Battered Woman Syndrome as Self-Defense
before RA 9262 (all 3 elements must be present)
People v Genosa
First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person's mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable — not necessarily immediate and actual
— grave harm to the accused, based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense.
RA 9262 abandons Genosa
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a
Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome
do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the
Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman
who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at
the time of the commission of the crime, the courts
shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
RA 9262. The Genosa ruling states that BWS is valid as a
defense when all the requisites of self-defense are present.
Sec. 26 abandons the precedent set by Genosa case.
Battered woman syndrome –refers to a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering relationships as a
result of cumulative abuse.
Means employed in defense of honor was
excessive
People v Jaurigue
The Court ruled that in Avelina’s case, despite her
defending her honor, she was still guilty of homicide
because the means employed by her in defense of that
honor was evidently excessive.
Avelina was in a well-lit chapel at that time with
several people surrounding them inside,
including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and
other dignitaries of the church.
There was no possibility of her being raped in this
scenario.
Killing to defend property rights is
disproportionate to unlawful aggression by the
victims
People v Narvaez
FACTS: Narvaez was taking his rest inside his house
when he heard that the wall of his house was being
chiseled. He saw that Fleischer and Rubia, were fencing
the land of the father of the deceased Fleischer. He
asked the group to stop but they refused. The accused
got mad so he got his shotgun and shot Fleischer. Rubia
ran towards the jeep and knowing there is a gun on the
jeep, the accused fired at Rubia as well. Narvaez
claimed he acted in defense of his person and rights.
Held: There was aggression by the deceased not on the
person of the accused but on his property rights when
Fleischer angrily ordered the continuance of the
fencing. The third element of self-defense is also
present because there was no sufficient provocation on
the part of Narvaez since he was sleeping when the
deceased where fencing. Accused is entitled to
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense,
because one can defend oneself, but cannot
immediately kill.
However, the second element was lacking. Shooting the
victims from the window of his house is
disproportionate to the physical aggression by the
victims. Thus, there is incomplete self-defense.
2. Avoidance of greater evil
People v Ricohermoso
FACTS: The land Ricohermoso cultivated belonged to
Geminiano. When the latter went to the house of the
former, as if by prearrangement, Ricohermoso
unsheathed his bolo and approached Geminiano from
the left while Severo (Rico’s father-inlaw) got an axe
and approached from the right. Rico stabbed
Geminiano first and while in a helpless position, the
 latter was hacked on the back by Severo. Geminiano
died later. Juan invoked the justifying circumstance of
greater necessity in explaining his act of preventing
Marianito from shooting Rico and Severo.
HELD: Juan erroneously invoked the justifying
circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury.
Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to
disable Marianito. Padernal’s malicious intention was
to forestall any interference in the felonious assault
made by his father and brother-in-law on Geminiano. It
was designed to insure the killing of Germiniano de
Leon without the any risk to his assailants.
People v Hernandez
Facts: Appellant was convicted by the trial court with
the crime of slander by deed for absconding in order to
prevent her marriage with complainant, after the latter
has made subsequent marriage preparations. As the
date of the marriage was approaching, appellant felt a
sense of torture because she was not honestly in love
with Vivencio. She then decided to leave her home as a
last recourse in order to prevent the marriage believing
that if anyone will be humiliated by the failure of the
marriage, it would be she being a girl and not Vivencio.
HELD: Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the
evil of going through a loveless marriage. (Art. 11 par.4,
RPC)
3. Fulfillment of duty
People v Delima
FACTS: Defendant Felipe Delima, a policeman, found
the escaped Lorenzo Napilon in the house of
a Felipe Alegria. Napilon was armed with a pointed
piece of bamboo shaped like a lance. Napilon struck his
lance at defendant, who dodged the strike and to
impose his authority, fired his revolver without hitting
the criminal. The criminal ran away with his weapon,
and defendant went after him and fired his revolver,
this time hitting and killing him.
HELD: The Court ruled that the killing was done in the
performance of a duty. The deceased was under the
obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading
service of his sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which
compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme
means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was
justified by the circumstances.
People v Lagata
FACTS: Custodian fired at a prisoner causing him
believing he was trying to escape.
HELD: While custodians should take care for prisoners
not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would
authorize them to fire against them. Theirs is the
burden of proof as to such necessity. It was clear that
Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The
record does not show that Tipace was bent on
committing any act of aggression or that he attempted
to escape. According to Lagata himself, Tipace was
running towards and around him. How could anyone
intending to escape run towards and around the very
guard one was supposed to escape from?
Mamangun v People
FACTS: A policeman in pursuit of a snatcher
accidentally shot one of the bystanders who were
actually helping him chase the snatcher.
HELD: To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty,
without more, do not completely justify the petitioner’s
firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner,
as one of the policemen responding to a reported
robbery then in progress, was performing his duty as a
police officer as well as when he was trying to effect the
arrest of the suspected robber and in the process,
fatally shoot said suspect, albeit the wrong man.
However, in the absence of the equally necessary
justifying circumstance that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence if the due
performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete
justification, a privilege mitigating circumstance under
Art. 13 and 69 of the RPC. There can be no quibbling
that there was no rational necessity for the killing of
Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a warning
shot before pulling the trigger against Contreras who
was one of the residents chasing the suspected robber.
People v Ulep
FACTS: Accused-appellant and the other police officers
involved originally set out to restore peace and order at
Mundog Subdivision where the victim was then
running amuck. The victim threatened the safety of the
police officers despite accused-appellant's previous
warning shot and verbal admonition to the victim to lay
down his weapon.
HELD: As a police officer, it is to be expected that
accused-appellant would stand his ground. Up to that
point, his decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire
to halt the victim's further advance was justified under
the circumstances. A police officer is not required to
afford the victim the opportunity to fight back. Neither
is he expected – when hard pressed and in the heat of
such an encounter at close quarters – to pause for a
long moment and reflect coolly at his peril, or to wait
after each blow to determine the effects thereof. But he
cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty when he
fatally shot the victim in the head, even after the latter
slumped to the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds
sustained while charging at the police officers. Sound
discretion and restraint dictated that a veteran
policeman should have ceased firing at the victim the
moment he saw the latter fall to the ground. The victim
at that point no longer posed a threat. Shooting him in
the head was obviously unnecessary.
The law does not clothe police officers with authority to
arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill- it must be
stressed that their judgment and discretion as police
officers in the performance of their duties must be
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but
within reasonable limits.
People v. Oanis
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified
in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure
and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never
justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him
with wanton violence or in resorting to dangerous
means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.
4. Exercise of right or office
Valeroso v People
 FACTS: Mario Valeroso, as caretaker of a vacant lot,
put up a No Trespassing sign to which was
ignored by a Julita Castillo when she put up a nipa hut.
Valeroso acted in his own accord in demolishing
the nipa hut, believing that he is within his capacity to
demolish said property as caretaker or the lot.

HELD: Petitioner was NOT acting in the fulfilment of

his duty when he took the law into his own hands and
summarily demolished Mrs. Castillo’s hut.

Sycip v CA

FACTS: Petitioner ordered his bank to stop payment of

postdated checks he issued to seller. Reason for the
stop payment order was there were defects and
incomplete features of the house he has bought on
installment.

HELD: Following Article 11 (5) of the RPC, petitoner’s

exercise of a right of the buyer under Art 23 of PD 957
is a valid defense to charges against him.

Sec 23 of PD 957: The buyer of a townhouse unit has

the right to suspend his amortization payments, should
the subdivision or condominium developer fail to
develop or complete the project in accordance with
duly approved plans and specifications.

5. Obedience to a lawful order of a superior

When unaware of illegality. A subordinate is not

liable for carrying out an illegal order of his superior if he
is not aware of the illegality of the order and he is not
negligent.

People v Beronilla

FACTS: Accused was tried for murder for ordering the

execution of prisoners. (Japanese occupation)

HELD: Where the accused acted upon orders of

superior officers that they, as military subordinates,
could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without
being aware of their illegality, without any fault or
negligence on their part, the act is not accompanied by
criminal intent. A crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act be innocent.