Dolot vs. Paje, etc., et al., G.R. No.
G.R. No. 199199, August 27,2013 Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon to transfer the case
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated
October 18, 2011 issued by RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 on Continuing
Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environment Protection Order (TEPO). Petitioner Maricris Dolot,
et al, filed the aforesaid petition with the RTC of Sorsogon alleging that
mining operations conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore puts the municipality of Matnog in
environmental dangers and despite this fact, Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee
and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining
permit. Similarly, it was alleged that representatives of PMS and DENR did
nothing to protect the interest of the people in same community, thus,
respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and
the Local Government Code. Dolot, et al primarily prayed for the shutdown
of said mining operations through issuance of TEPO as well as the
rehabilitation of the mining sites and the return of the iron ore mined in the
area.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch
53 being the designated environmental court. However, the case was
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC averred that SC
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 limit the
power of such court to try and hear the case as its territorial jurisdiction was
limited to violations of environmental laws within the boundaries of
Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla,
Casiguran and Juban.
Issue: Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No.
2011-8338.
Ruling: The SC held that such reasoning is plainly erroneous and that RTC
cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and
confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had
jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners. As reiterated by the SC,
jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a
case, is conferred by law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over
the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues
framed in the pleadings. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 also states that jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC, hence, original jurisdiction
shall be exercised by the RTCs. Both the SC AO and AC merely provide for the
venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to
confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is
lodged solely in Congress and the same cannot be delegated to another
office or agency of the Government.
The high court further emphasized that venue relates only to the place of
trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court as it is aimed to
accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does
not restrict their access to the courts. Therefore, RTC’s motu proprio
dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is incorrect. While
it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the
Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in
the RTC of Irosin, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by
the RTC as venue may be waived. Moreover, the action filed by the
petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction. With these, the SC granted the petition and directed the
the municipality to private persons had been its patrimonial property since
to the RTC of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch.
NOCUM vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005
Doctrine: Jurisdiction vs Venue; Venue can be waived in civil cases
FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt.
Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and
defamatory imputations contained in a news article. INQUIRER and NOCUM
alleged that the venue was improperly laid, among many others. It appeared
that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the
time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the
libelous article was printed and first published. RTC dismissed the complaint
without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan
filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and
admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended
complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first published in
the City of Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and
first published in the City of Makati" RTC admitted the amended complaint
and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the mistake
or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in
the Amended Complaint. Also, there is no substantial amendment, but only
formal, in the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants’
defenses and their Answers. Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court
of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners
and the other by defendants .The two petitions were consolidated. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this PETREV filed by the petitioners.
Petitioners argue that since the original complaint only contained the office
address of respondent and not the latter’s actual residence or the place
where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and first published,
the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed
to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
ISSUE: WON VENUE MAY BE WAIVED IN CIVIL CASES
HELD: YES. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising
from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction.
The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does
to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.
Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a
jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location
in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties,
rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.
In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional
it being an essential element of jurisdiction. Petitioners’ argument that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to
allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published
would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of
the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because
this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. This is not to be because the case before us is a civil action
where venue is not jurisdictional.
CA’s DECISION AFFIRMED.
Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro G.R. No. 112905; 3 February 2000
Facts: Application for registration of the same parcel of land filed 12 years
apart in different branches of the CFI; a certificate was issued in one case
while the other was still pending. In 1956, Predo Lopez, et al. filed an
application for registration of a parcel of land in Tagaytay City, to which the
Municipality of Silang, Cavite opposed; a portion of the land being leased by
1930. Applicant claimed that part of the land was their inheritance, but was
excluded in the application for registration since it is located in Laguna; same
with the part of the land in Tagaytay which was excluded from the
proceedings in the CFI of Laguna. Lower court denied the motion to dismiss
since the oppositor municipality had no personality to intervene. Meanwhile,
the Land Registration Commission discovered that part of the land had been
decreed in favor of private respondent de Castro, the land being initially
owned by one Hermogenes Orte who sold the land to the father of de Castro
in 1932. However the deed of sale was destroyed during the Japanese
occupation. Heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for execution of judgment
and cancellation of land titles of the defendants, claiming that they had been
unduly deprived ownership and possession of the land due to wrongful
registration by means of fraud and misrepresentation.
Issue: Were the heirs of Pedro Lopez deprived of their ownership and
possession of the contested land?
Ruling: No. The petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of
them as applicants for land registration. In the same way that publication of
their application for registration was supposed to have rendered private
respondents on constructive notice of such application, the publication of
notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by private respondents
had the same effect of notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thus
presumed to have been notified of the land registration proceedings filed by
private respondents, thereby providing them with the opportunity to file an
opposition thereto. Petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, they
could or should have done earlier. They neglected or omitted to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that they either had
abandoned or declined to assert it. In short, they were guilty of laches.
NB: A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. Constructive seizure of the
land for registration is effected through publication of the application for
registration and service of notice to affected parties. In land registration
proceeding, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests
and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule
that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. The rule refers
to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the
application for registration of title. The doctrine of stale demands or laches
is based on grounds of policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and is principally a question of the inequality
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. An
applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question
the validity of the certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once
the one-year period has elapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible.
This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at
law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value,
an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes
incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the
date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is to bring
an ordinary action in court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam
and is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent
third party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages.
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be
conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an action
as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties…
Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived.
LATORRE V. LATORRE
Facts: In October 2000, petitioner filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a
Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale
with application for Injunction against her own son, herein respondent, and
one Ifzal Ali. Petitioner alleged that respondent leased a parcel of land that
they co-owned to Ifzal in Dasmarinas Village and that respondent declared
that he is the sole owner of the said parcel of land. Respondent immediately
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the case was
improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as
one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction, in truth the case was a real action affecting title to
and interest over the subject property. Since the subject property is located
in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner should have filed the case
before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City. The RTC denied
the Motion to Dismiss of the respondent on January 2, 2001. However, on
April 28, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because
the case should have been filed in RTC Makati. Petitioner filed an MR which
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure
questions of law directly filed to the SC is the proper remedy in the case at
bar.
Held: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Petitioner prayed to the
Supreme Court to decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would
require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence
presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this
controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, the Supreme Court cannot
do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with
the Supreme Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant
to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court
will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be
obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must
so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and by immemorial tradition.
Polytrade Corporation v Victoriano Blanco
FACTS: Plaintiff Polytrade Co. filed a case to recover the purchase price of
rawhide against Defendant Blanco in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
Plaintiff has its principal office located in Makati, JP Rizal while defendant
Victoriano Blanco resides in Maycauayan, Bulacan. Prior to the case filed by
the plaintiff, both parties made a written stipulation in their contract that
***that the parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila***
Blanco moved to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue because
as per in the contract suit the parties agreed in writing that the stipulation
abovementioned must be followed. Hence, because of such covenant he can
only be sued in the courts of Manila.
ISSUE: W/N venue was properly laid.
HELD: YES. The stipulation where the parties agree to sue or be sued in the
Courts of Manila, was held not to preclude the filing of the suit in the
residence of the plaintiff or of the defendant. The Court held that the plain
meaning of the stipulation is that the parties merely consented to be sued in
Manila. The qualifying words that “Manila” and “Manila alone is the venue”
are totally absent. The stipulation is merely permissive.
Example of permissive stipulation:
“In case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the court of Davao City” –
absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement that would
indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the parties.
Gochan vs. Young [GR 131889, 12 March 2001]
Facts: Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation (Gochan Realty) was
registered with the SEC on June 1951, with Felix Gochan, Sr., Maria Pan Nuy
Go Tiong, Pedro Gochan, Tomasa Gochan, Esteban Gochan and Crispo
Gochan as its incorporators. Felix Gochan Sr.'s daughter, Alice inherited 50
shares of stock in Gochan Realty from the former. Alice died in 1955, leaving
the 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr. In 1962, the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children, Richard
Young, David Young, Jane Young Llaban, John Young Jr., Mary Young Hsu and
Alexander Thomas Young (the Youngs). Having earned dividends, these
stocks numbered 179 by 20 September 1979. 5 days later (25 September), at
which time all the children had reached the age of majority, their father John
Sr., requested Gochan Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by
cancelling the stock certificates in his name and issuing in lieu thereof, new
stock certificates in the names of the Youngs. On 17 October 1979, Gochan
Realty refused, citing as reason, the right of first refusal granted to the
remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation. In 1990, John, Sr.
died, leaving the shares to the Youngs. On 8 February 1994, Cecilia Gochan
Uy and Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of
stock to the rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of
property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of officers and directors
and damages against Virginia Gochan, et. al. (Gochans) A Notice of Lis
Pendens was annotated to the real properties of the corporation.
On 16 March 1994, the Gochans moved to dismiss the complaint alleging
that: (1) the SEC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; (2) the the
Youngs were not the real parties-in-interest and had no capacity to sue; and
(3) the Youngs' causes of action were barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The motion was opposed by the Youngs. On 29 March 1994, the Gochans
filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. The Youngs opposed
the said motion. On 9 December 1994, the SEC, through its Hearing Officer,
granted the motion to dismiss and ordered the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens annotated upon the titles of the corporate lands; holding that
the Youngs never been stockholders of record of FGSRC to confer them with
the legal capacity to bring and maintain their action, and thus, the case
cannot be considered as an intra-corporate controversy within the
jurisdiction of the SEC; and that on the allegation that the Youngs brought
the action as a derivative suit on their own behalf and on behalf of Gochan
Realty, rhe failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirement on
derivative action necessarily result in the dismissal of the complaint. The
Youngs filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. On 28 February
1996, the Court of Appeals ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the
case as far as the heirs of Alice Gochan were concerned, because they were
not yet stockholders of the corporation. On the other hand, it upheld the
capacity of Cecilia Gochan Uy and her spouse Miguel Uy. It also held that the
Intestate Estate of John Young Sr. was an indispensable party. The appellate
court further ruled that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the
titles of the corporate real estate was not justified. Moreover, it declared
that the Youngs' Motion for Reconsideration before the SEC was not pro
forma; thus, its filing tolled the appeal period. The Gochans moved for
reconsideration but were denied in a Resolution dated 18 December 1997.
The Gochans filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether the action filed by the Spouses Uy was not a derivative suit,
because the spouses and not the corporation were the injured parties.
Held: The following portions of the Complaint shows allegations of injury to
the corporation itself, to wit: "That on information and belief, in further
pursuance of the said conspiracy and for the fraudulent purpose of
depressing the value of the stock of the Corporation and to induce the
minority stockholders to sell their shares of stock for an inadequate
consideration as aforesaid, respondent Esteban T. Gochan . . ., in violation of
their duties as directors and officers of the Corporation . . ., unlawfully and
fraudulently appropriated [for] themselves the funds of the Corporation by
drawing excessive amounts in the form of salaries and cash advances . . . and
by otherwise charging their purely personal expenses to the Corporation";
and "That the payment of P1,200,000.00 by the Corporation to complainant
Cecilia Gochan Uy for her shares of stock constituted an unlawful, premature
and partial liquidation and distribution of assets to a stockholder, resulting
in the impairment of the capital of the Corporation and prevented it from
otherwise utilizing said amount for its regular and lawful business, to the
damage and prejudice of the Corporation, its creditors, and of complainants
as minority stockholders." As early as 1911, the Court has recognized the
right of a single stockholder to file derivative suits. "Where corporate
directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires
acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute
suit to remedy the wrong, a single stockholder may institute that suit, suing
on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the
corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the
corporation and indirectly to the stockholders." Herein, the Complaint
alleges all the components of a derivative suit. The allegations of injury to
the Spouses Uy can coexist with those pertaining to the corporation. The
personal injury suffered by the spouses cannot disqualify them from filing a
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. It merely gives rise to an
additional cause of action for damages against the erring directors. This
cause of action is also included in the Complaint filed before the SEC. The
Spouses Uy have the capacity to file a derivative suit in behalf of and for the
benefit of the corporation. The reason is that the allegations of the
Complaint make them out as stockholders at the time the questioned
transaction occurred, as well as at the time the action was filed and during
the pendency of the action.
SPOUSES SARAZA, vs. FRANCISCO G.R. No. 198718. November 27, 2013
FACTS: The case stems from an amended complaint filed by William
Francisco against Fernando and Spouses Teodoro and Rosario (Rosario)
Saraza (Spouses Saraza). The respondent alleged in his complaint that on
September 1, 1999, he and Fernando executed an Agreement that provided
for the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in Bangkal,
Makati City, which at that time was still registered in the name of one Emilia
Serafico and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 40376 (later
covered by TCT No. 220530), for a total consideration of ₱3,200,000.00. The
amount of ₱1,200,000.00 was paid upon the Agreement’s execution, while
the balance of ₱2,000,000.00 was to be paid on installments to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s parents,
with the bank. A final deed of sale conveying the property was to be executed
by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan.
It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail for any reason to transfer
the subject property to the respondent’s name, Rosario and Fernando’s 136-
sq m property covered by TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure
the loan that was to be paid by the respondent shall be considered a
collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses Saraza signified their
conformity to the Agreement. The respondent was also allowed to take
immediate possession of the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through a
contract of lease. The petitioners likewise furnished PNB with an Authority,
allowing the respondent to pay their obligations to the PNB, to negotiate for
a loan restructuring, to receive the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126
upon full payment of the loan secured by its mortgage, and to perform such
other acts as may be necessary in connection with the settlement of the loan.
When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached ₱226,582.13, the
respondent asked for the petitioners’ issuance of a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) that would authorize him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan. The petitioners
denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that
the petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority, which provided
that the owner’s copy of TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the
mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses Saraza also caused the
eviction of the respondent from the property covered by TCT No. 156126.
These prompted the respondent to institute the civil case for specific
performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of Imus, Cavite on
December 7, 2004.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case as it
involved an adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati City.

HELD: As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the action
should have been instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of
Imus, Cavite, is misplaced. Although the end result of the respondent’s claim
was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still
essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought
Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which
he had previously made.
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific
performance with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that
after it accepted the offer of petitioners, they sold to a third person several
parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court sustained the
trial court’s order allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for
specific performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners’ position that
the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots
were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the
original Complaint. The Court reiterated the rule that a case for specific
performance with damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court
where any of the parties reside.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the
respondent’s action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff." Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that
he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was
proper.