Silverio vs Court of Appeals Digest

Filed Under: Liberty of Abode and of Travel, Political Law Digest, Right to Travel

Facts:

In 1985, Ricardo C. Silverio was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act. In
due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. In 1988, or more than 2 years after the filing of the
Information, the People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and
to issue a hold departure Order against Silverio on the ground that he had gone abroad several times
without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled
hearings. The RTC granted the motion.

Issue:

Whether the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than
the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
Held:

Yes. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as
a valid restriction on his right to travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means
be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may
be employed by such Court or officer.

Silverio has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court
when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be
rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the
territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts
by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should
run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable
at all times to Court Orders and processes.

How should Article III, Section 6 of

the 1987 Constitution be interpreted?

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only
onTHE BASIS OF "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a
limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text. (Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94284, April
8, 1991)
- See more at: http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/12/silverio-vs-court-of-appeals- Field Code Changed
digest.html#sthash.vybzfeNU.dpuf
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-
DEE,Respondents. [Velasco Jr., 2009]Facts:
Beatriz Silverio died. Her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding
for thesettlement of her estate.- In Nov 2004, during the pendency of the case in RTC of Makati City,
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to removeRicardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the estate.
Edmundo S. Silverio also filed an opposition for the removalof Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of
the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.- RTC granted the petition and removed
Silverio Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Silverio Jr. as thenew administrator. The
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.- In 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an
Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use RealEstate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate
of the Late Beatriz Silverio, without Authority from this HonorableCourt.- On May 31, 2005, the RTC
issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying privaterespondent’s
motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to,
uponreceipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The
Omnibus Order alsodirected Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park,
Makati City within fifteen (15) daysfrom receipt of the order.- Silverio-Dee received a copy of the said
Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record
on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Order which was denied by RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by
private respondent on December 22, 2005.- On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of
Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January23, 2006.- RTC denied the appeal on two
grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s appeal was against an order denying a motionfor reconsideration
which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s
Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of
Rule 41.- Hence, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with the CA which
issued a TRO and ruledthat Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the
Rules of Court applying the "fresh ruleperiod" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.
Issues
: WON the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are
InterlocutoryOrders which are not subject to appeal? [Yes, they are interlocutory orders.]
Ratio:
1. SC first cited the CA decision which ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was a final
order. CA saidthat the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the
property dated May 4,2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and
void since the possession of estateproperty can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order
from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; andSec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the
Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possessionand management of the real as well as
the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the paymentof the debts and expenses
of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). CA also reiterated that afinal order is one
that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court,
while aninterlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something
to be decided upon.2. The SC added that it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that
the ground for the appeal of theinterlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment
itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot beappealed separately from the judgment. It is only
when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee
appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of
the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect theorder is not a final
determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their
rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an
inchoate right tothe properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property.
The underlying rationale is thatuntil a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the
pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of thesame. The Court in
Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals
said that although the right of an heir over the property of thedecedent is inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner toexercise rights of ownership over
such inchoate right as provided in Art 493 of the Civil Code.