POLITICAL LAW

POLITICAL LAW
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. STATE IMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 216538 & 216954, April 18, 2017, En Banc, Bersamin, J.:

The general rule is that the Government is never estopped by the mistake or error of its agents.

FACTS:

The governmentcreated a Motor Vehicle Lease – Purchase Plan (MVLPP) for government financial
institutions (GFI). The program involves the acquisition of motor vehicle to be leased or sold to
qualified officers of GFIs. One of those covered by the program was Petitioner. When it
implemented the program, the supervising auditor of COA, observed that the resolution of
Petitioner requiring its officers to only pay 50% of the cost of the vehicle was contrary to the rules;
that what had been approved by the Office of the President (OP) was for Petitioner to advance the
money to pay for the acquisition of the vehicle and for the officers to pay in full the cost of the
vehicle. The supervising auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance relative to the subsidy granted by
Petitioner to its officers. The latter filed its appeal with the Corporate Government Sector (CGS)
which was, however, denied. The COA En Banc, denied the Petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration,
hence, they filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DBP was deprived of due process in denying their motion for motion for
reconsideration.
2. Whether or not COA is estopped from questioning the resolution.

RULING:

1. NO. Their joint motion and their letters for reconsideration were considered by the COA in
reaching the Resolution dated December 4, 2014. As such, the petitioners had no factual and legal
bases to complain. We remind that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard
or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one's side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of
the guarantee of due process, indeed, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of previous
notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as the party was afforded the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.

2. NO. The general rule is that the Government is never estopped by the mistake or error of its
agents. If that were not so, the Government would be tied down by the mistakes and blunders of
its agents, and the public would unavoidably suffer. Neither the erroneous application nor the
erroneous enforcement of the statute by public officers can preclude the subsequent corrective
application of the statute.
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B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SATUR C. OCAMPO, et al.v. LEANDRO R.

MENDOZA SECRETARY OF DOTC, et al.
G.R. No. 190431, January 31, 2017, EN BANC, SERENO, C.J.:

The requirement of a public bidding is not an idle ceremony. Public bidding is the policy and
medium adhered to in government procurement and construction contracts. It is the accepted method
for arriving at a fair and reasonable price and ensures that overpricing, favoritism and other
anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized. Public biddings are intended to minimize occasions
for corruption and temptations to abuse discretion on the part of government authorities when
awarding contracts.

FACTS:

On December 15, 1997, DOTC/LTO awarded to Stradcom a contract for the construction and
operation of an information technology structure called the LTO IT Project Build-Own-Operate
Agreement (BOO Agreement), making Stradcom the exclusive information technology provider of
DOTC/LTO.The LTO IT Project is a long-term strategic plan to modernize the land transportation
systems. It covers the development of a System Integrated Information Technology Solution
Infrastructure, which will interconnect LTO’s district offices nationwide, enable online transaction
processing and integrate its mission critical business processes.

On September 26, 2007, Stradcom presented to the LTO the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Project as an enhancement to the current motor vehicle registration system.On May 6, 2009, the
DOTC issued Circular No. 2009-06 entitled Rules and Regulations on the Implementation of the
Radio Frequency Identification Tag for All Motor Vehicles Required to be registered under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, as Amended (DOTC RFID Rules).On June 16, 2009, the RFID
Memorandum of Agreement (RFID MOA) was entered into between DOTC/LTO and Stradcom.
The RFID MOA provided that fees due to Stradcom shall be collected and deposited by the LTO in
a government depository bank account designated by and in the name of Stradcom. Of the total
amount of P350 to be collected for each RFID tag, the base amount exclusive of VAT was
P312.50.This P312.50 was broken down as follows: P20.43 shall be given to DOTC/LTO, P259.14 shall
be due to Stradcom, and P32.73 for each RFID Tag payment shall go to the IT Training Fund to
assist the DOTC/LTO in improving its service to the public; and this fund “shall be deposited in a
bank account under the sole control” of Stradcom.

On August 7, 2009, the LTO issued Memorandum Circular No. ACL-2009-1199, entitled
“Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Radio Frequency Identification Tag for all Motor
Vehicles Required to be registered Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as Amended”
(LTO RFID IRR). Because of various stakeholders’ concerns and requests, on September 30, 2009,
the LTO issued Memorandum Circular No. ACL-2009-1220 deferring the mandatory
implementation of the RFID Project to January 4, 2010.

On December 16, 2009, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with application for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed by four party-list
representatives and taxpayers (with Ocampo and Maza also suing as motor vehicle owners) and the
Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahan ng Tsuper at Operator Nationwide (PISTON).The Petition seeks to
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annul and set aside the RFID Project as implemented by DOTC RFID Rules, LTO RFID IRR, as well
as the RFID MOA.

Ocampo,et al. claim that, first, in implementing the RFID Project, the DOTC/LTO committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated R.A. 9184, or the
Government Procurement Reform Act; and R.A. 6954, as amended by R.A. 7718, or the Build
Operate Transfer (BOT) Law as the RFID Project did not undergo public bidding. Second, the
assailed executive issuances are unconstitutional for having been issued in usurpation of the
legislative power of Congress due to the absence of a law providing for the installation of radio
frequency identification tag on all motor vehicles as a pre-requisite for the registration or re-
registration thereof.Third, the assailed executive issuances are unconstitutional, as they neither
present compelling interest nor contain sufficient safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
impermissible intrusions on the right to privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RFID MOA is valid and constitutional.

RULING:

No. The RFID MOA is void for failure to undergo competitive public bidding. As a separate project,
the RFID Project should have undergone public bidding. Section 5 of the BOT Law provides that upon
the approval of a project, a notice must be made inviting all prospective project proponents to a
competitive public bidding. The public bidding must be conducted under a two-envelope/two-
stage system: the first envelope to contain the technical proposal and the second one to contain the
financial proposal. In this case, it is patently admitted by DOTC/LTO that no public bidding was
conducted on the RFID Project, which was presented by Stradcom as a proposal that would enhance
the existing LTO IT Project. Neither does this case fall under the exception to the rule on public
bidding.

The RFID MOA must, thus, be struck down by this Court for failure to comply with the rules on
public bidding. There is no guarantee that the RFID fee that will be charged to the public is a fair
and reasonable price, as it has not undergone public bidding. Likewise, there is no guarantee that
the public will be receiving maximum benefits and quality services, especially from the additional
hardware, such as the RFID tags and readers. These are to be procured by Stradcom from its two
suppliers, which have not been identified and are not even parties to the RFID MOA. On the other
hand, Stradcom, which has been awarded the exclusive right to develop and operate the RFID
system without having undergone competitive public bidding, stands to earn considerable amounts
of revenue from the contract. In fact, in just three months, the period when the RFID Project was
implemented prior to the issuance of the Status Quo Ante Order by this Court, the LTO had already
generated ₱29,894,200 in RFID Fees. Clearly, the evils sought to be avoided by the requirement of
competitive public bidding are evident in this case.

As a substantial amendment to the BOO Agreement, there is a violation of public

policy and the BOT Law for failure to execute the contract as contained in the
original bid. Even if one were to follow Stradcom’s argument that the RFID MOA is not separate
from the BOO Agreement, still, its case would not prosper. The RFID MOA is not so much a “mere
enhancement” of the BOO Agreement as it is a substantial amendment thereof. It goes without
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saying that any contract awarded as a result of competitive public bidding must be executed
faithfully by the parties. The Court stressed the importance of such adherence to the original
contract in Agan v. PIATCO, from which we quote:

Again, the Court brightline the principle that in public bidding, bids are submitted in accord with
the prescribed terms, conditions and parameters laid down by government and pursuant to the
requirements of the project bidded upon. In light of these parameters, bidders formulate competing
proposals which are evaluated to determine the bid most favorable to the government. Once the
contract based on the bid most favorable to the government is awarded, all that is left to
be done by the parties is to execute the necessary agreements and implement them. There
can be no substantial or material change to the parameters of the project, including the
essential terms and conditions of the contract bidded upon, after the contract award. If there were
changes and the contracts end up unfavorable to government, the public bidding becomes
a mockery and the modified contracts must be struck down.

Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, in his Separate Opinion in the main Decision
in Agan,explained that the substantial amendment of a contract previously bid out, without any
public bidding and after the bidding process has been concluded, is violative of the public policy
on public biddings and the spirit and intent of the BOT Law. The very rationale for public bidding
is totally subverted by the amendment of the contract for which the bidding has already been
concluded. Competitive bidding aims to obtain the best deal possible by fostering transparency and
preventing favoritism, collusion and fraud in the awarding of contracts. That is the reason why
procedural rules pertaining to public bidding demand strict observance. Indeed, while the contract
in Agan was amended after public bidding, but prior to its execution, there is no reason why the
principle therein should not be applicable where the contract is amended during its execution as
in this case.

In fact, not only is the public potentially injured by the failure to conduct a public bidding, but so
too are other possible project proponents. As held in Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. COMELEC, the essence of public bidding is, after all, an opportunity for fair
competition and a fair basis for the precise comparison of bids. In common parlance, public bidding
aims to “level the playing field,” which means that each bidder must bid under the same conditions;
and be subject to the same guidelines, requirements and limitations. The purpose is for the best
offer or lowest bid to be determined, all other things being equal. Thus, to permit a variance
between the conditions under which the bid is won and those under which the awarded contract is
complied with is contrary to the very concept of public bidding.

As to the second and third issues raised by petitioners assailing the constitutionality of the
DOTC/LTO issuances for being issued in usurpation of Congress’ legislative powers, and for
violating the right to privacy, it is unnecessary to rule on the same considering the foregoing
discussion declaring the RFID MOA null and void for failure to undergo competitive public bidding.

II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE ON STATUTES

1. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
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ENGR. OSCAR MARMETO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 213953, September 26, 2017, En Banc, Del Castillo, J.:

Initiative and referendum are the means by which the sovereign people exercise their
legislative power, and the valid exercise thereof should not be easily defeated by claiming lack of
specific budgetary appropriation for their conduct. Nonetheless, the COMELEC is likewise given the
power to review the sufficiency of initiative petitions, particularly the issue of whether the propositions
set forth therein are within the power of the concerned sanggunian to enact.

FACTS:

Marmeto proposed an ordinance with the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Muntinlupa seeking the
creation of a sectoral council and the appropriation of P200 million for the livelihood programs
beneficial to the people of Muntinlupa City. For failure of the Sanggunian Panlungsod to act on the
proposition, Marmeto filed a petition for initiative with the same body to invoke the power of
initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). The secretary of the Sanggunian
Panlungsod of Muntinlupa referred the matter to the COMELEC. Unfortunately, COMELEC denied
Marmeto’s initiative petition because (1) the propositions therein were beyond the powers of the
Sanggunian Panglungsod to enact; and (2) lack of budgetary allocation in the FY 2014 GAA for
COMELEC to handle the initiative. Now, Marmeto alleges before the Supreme Court that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC may deny an initiative petition due to lack of budgetary allocation.

RULING:

No. In Goh v. Hon. Bayron, the Court has definitely ruled the question of whether the COMELEC
may prevent the conduct of a recall election for lack of specific budgetary allocation therefor.
Contrary to the COMELEC’s assertions, the Court ruled that the FY 2014 GAA actually expressly
provides for a line item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections. The Court
added that when the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its 'Current Operating
Expenditures,' such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions.
The Court considered the appropriation of P1.4 billion as specific enough to fund elections, which
includes both regular and special elections. Although Goh involved the conduct of recall elections,
the P1.4 billion appropriation under the FY 2014 GAA was for the conduct and supervisions of the
elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites. The term election is comprehensive enough to
include other kinds of electoral exercises, including initiative elections. The Court also notes that,
aside from the P1.4 billion appropriation for the conduct and supervision of elections, referenda,
recall votes and plebiscites, the COMELEC was also given P1.6 billion in the FY 2014 GAA for the
management and supervision of elections and other electoral exercises.

Marmeto’s propositions in his initiative petition are beyond the powers of the Sanggunian
Panglungsod ng Muntinlupa to enact. Marmeto’s initiative petitions propose the following: (1)
creation of sectoral council of 12 members from various sectors who will directly propose and enact
ordinances; (2) an appropriation of P200 million to be allocated for livelihiood projects; and (3)
Marmeto’s non-governmental organization will implement and handle the livelihood projects.
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These propositions, however, are either sufficiently covered by or violative of the LGC for the
following reasons: (A) The creation of a separate local legislative body is ultra vires. (B) The sectoral
council’s proposed function overlaps with the Local Development Council. (C) The LGC requires
local government funds and monies to be spent solely for public purposes, and provides
transparency and accountability measures to ensure this end. Marmeto's petition proposes the
appropriation of P200 million for the livelihood programs and projects of Muntinlupa residents.
Significantly, the utilization of this amount is subject to the guidelines to be later
implemented by Marmeto's MPP. That these guidelines will be drafted and implemented
subsequent to the initiative elections denies the Muntinlupa residents of the opportunity to assess
and scrutinize the utilization of local funds, and gives Marmeto and his organization an almost
complete discretion in determining the allocation and disbursement of the funds.

III. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. EMERGENCY POWERS

EDCEL LAGMAN v. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA (MR)

G.R. No. 231658, December 5, 2017, En Banc, Del Castillo, J.:

The Constitution only requires a determination of whether or not there was sufficiency of
factual basis, and not accuracy, in a declaration of martial law

FACTS:

Petitioners filed three MRs questioning the decision of the court regarding the sufficiency of factual
bases of Proclamation No. 216, where Mindanao was placed under Martial Law. They argue that the
court is required to determine the accuracy of the factual basis of the President for the declaration
of martial law and/or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court should determine the accuracy of the factual basis of the President for declaring
martial law.

RULING:

NO.Requiring the court to determine the accuracy of the factual basis of the President contravenes
the Constitution as Section 18, Article 7 only requires the Court to determine the sufficiency of
factual basis. Accuracy is not the same as sufficiency as the former requires a higher degree of
standard. The court reiterated that its power to review is limited to the determination of whether
the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had
sufficient factual basis. A review, thus, would only be limited to an examination on whether the
President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution.

Moreover, the MRs can be considered moot as the petition was only for the initial 60-day
declaration of the President. The extension by Congress cannot be challenged in the present action.
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IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY

1. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, ET AL. v. PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, ET AL.
G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017, En Banc, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC influenced the appointment process
and encroached on the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority
in the said court, beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution.

FACTS:

In its November 29, 2016 en banc decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the clustering of nominees
by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is unconstitutional. The JBC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention assailing such ruling.

According to the JBC, its new practice of "clustering” is more in accord with the purpose of the JBC
to rid the appointment process to the Judiciary from political pressure as the President has to
choose only from the nominees for one particular vacancy. JBC maintains that it did not exceed its
authority and, in fact, it only faithfully complied with the literal language of Article VIII, Section 9
of the 1987 Constitution, when it prepared six short lists for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of JBC of clustering nominees for each of the six simultaneous vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice is unconstitutional.

RULING:

YES. The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired
the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary.

The Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the President's appointing power in the
following ways: The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five to seven nominees
in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a nominee from one cluster, then he was
proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. All the
nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for appointment to any of the vacant Associate
Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee should be
considered for appointment to the position assigned to one specific cluster only.

Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for appointment was restricted to the consideration of the
one cluster in which they were included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified
for all the vacancies. Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC
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established the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a
power which the law (Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606), rules (Rule II, Section
1 (b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan), and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among
the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals),
vest exclusively upon the President.

The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate
courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A favored nominee can
be included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment; or
conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her
chances of appointment.

The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can only appoint
judges and Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism
to protect the appointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily clustering the nominees
for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into
separate short lists, the JBC influenced the appointment process and encroached on the President's
power to appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court, beyond its
mandate under the 1987 Constitution.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF EACH COMMISSION

NAYONG PILIPINO FOUNDATION, INC. v. TAN, ET AL. AND COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 213200, September 19, 2017, En Banc, Reyes, Jr., J.:

The COA, by mandate of the 1987 Constitution, is the guardian of public funds, vested of broad
powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public
funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination,
to establish the techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate accountingand auditing
rules and regulations.

FACTS:

In commemoration of NPFI’s 30th Founding Anniversary, its board of trustees authorized the grant
of an Anniversary Bonus worth P3,000 to employees who have worked for at least a year. Bonuses
were granted on its 35th Anniversary and it also paid honoraria to the members of its BAC and TWG.
The COA found the grants bereft of legal basis nor approval of the President, It also found the NPFI
did not submit the required exemption from the Department of Budget and Management for the
honoraria.

The NPFI wrote the Office of the President but the DBM found no legal basis for the grant of such
bonuses and are thus unauthorized, given the reckoning date of NPFI’s anniversary is November 6,
1972, under PD No. 37. The COA LAO-Corporate issued Notice of Suspension suspending the
disbursements. It subsequently issued a Notice of Disallowance. The COA en banc affirmed. The
NPFI filed a Motion of Reconsideration as to the DBM’s decision.
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ISSUE:

Whether the COA gravely abused its discretion upon disallowing NPFI’s payment of the bonuses,
cash gifts, and honoraria

RULING:

No, there was no grave abuse of discretion when the COA disallowed NPFI’s payment of bonuses
and cash gifts, as it was within its mandate to do so.

There was no need to order the refund of the excessive bonus on account of the good faith of NPFI.
The petitioners received them in good faith and under the honest belief it was their 30th and 35th
founding anniversary. Good faith, in relation to the requirement of refund of disallowed benefits or
allowances, is that state of mind denoting honesty or intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with
absence of all information notice, or benefit, or belief of facts which render transactions
unconscientious. The reckoning point for the counting of the milestone year insofar as NPFI was
concerned was not provided under A.O. No. 263.

The NPFI however, erred in awarding honoraria. The NPFI should have first waited for the rules
and guidelines of the DBM before payment of the honoraria. Insofar as the disallowance of benefits
and allowances of government employees, recipients or payees need not refund the amounts;
however, officers who participated in the approval of the disallowed allowances or benefits are
required to refund the disallowed benefits when they acted in bad faith or gross negligence
tantamount to bad faith.

MILLARES V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 210571, September 19, 2017, En Banc, Bersamin, J.:

The power of the Commission on Audit (COA) to disallow expenditures or uses of government
funds can only be exercised as to transactions thereon that are deemed irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, illegal, or unconscionable. Otherwise, the disallowance is whimsical,
capricious, or arbitrary. A disallowance based solely on the delinquency of loans extended by the
Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (QUEDANCOR) to boost countryside investments
and credit resources constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:

QUEDANCOR performed direct lending activities through financing programs and schemes such
as the Food and Agricultural Retail Enterprises (FARE) Program and the Sugar Farm Modernization
(SFM) Program. The COA Audit Team leader assigned to QUEDANCOR issued an Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) relative to SFM loans for failure of the QUEDANCOR
Management to collect on the loans. The COA Regional Office concurred and held petitioner
personally liable for having approved the loan transactions. Further, it held that QUEDANCOR
Management had not adequately verified the existence of viable businesses or projects of the
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concerned borrowers, a requirement for qualification under the FARE Program, and that some
borrowers had never engaged in retail business at the time loans were approved.

Miralles appealed saying he was not personally liable since his approval for the FARE Program had
been based on the review and recommendation of the Quedan Operation Officers and that he
should be excluded from liability for the SFM loans as they were granted in compliance with the
applicable rules. The COA denied his appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the COA gravely abused its jurisdiction in holding personally liable for the disallowances

RULING:

The COA’s power and authority to disallow upon audit can only be exercised over transactions
deemed as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, illegal, or unconscionable expenditures
or uses of government funds and property. Notices of Disallowance should issue only for these kinds
of transactions.

The COA only issued the notice of disallowance against Miralles because of its concern about the
failure of QUEDANCOR Management to take appropriate legal action for the collection of the
delinquent accounts. Such ground cannot validly justify the disallowance considering Notices of
Disallowance were not meant to be tools to insure compliance with the COA’s directives, and that
there was no antecedent finding the disallowed transactions had been irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, illegal, or unconscionable. The basis for the issuance of the ND did not fall
within the recognized grounds for a valid disallowance.

VI. BILL OF RIGHTS

A.FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE-POLICE POWER

1. CONCEPT, APPLICATION, AND LIMITS

SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND

DEVELOPMET, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, AND BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUEG.R.
No. 199669, April 25, 2017, En Banc, Reyes, J.:

Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is not required in
wielding police power. This is precisely because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of
burden.

FACTS:

In 2004, RA 9257 amending RA 7432 or "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to
Nation-Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For Other Purposes," was signed into
law. The new law retained the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines but removed the annual
income ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges under the law. RA 7277
pertaining to the “Magna Carta for Disabled Persons” was enacted, granting a 20% discount on
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purchase of medicines. Hence, Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with application for TRO
seeking to declare as unconstitutional Sec. 4 of RA 9257 and Sec. 32 of RA 9442.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provisions are constitutional.

RULING:

YES. It is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach the point in their lives
when the vigor of their youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. In the same way,
providing aid for the disabled persons is an equally important State responsibility. Thus, the State
is obliged to give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and
their integration into the mainstream of society.As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as
parens patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of
its people especially those who cannot tend to themselves. In fulfilling this duty, the State may
resort to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.
It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws
mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. It is also
in further exercise. of this power that the legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax
deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments.

For the petitioner's clarification, the presentation of the financial statement is not of compelling
significance in justifying its claim for just compensation. What is imperative is for it to establish
that there was taking in the constitutional sense or that, in the imposition of the mandatory
discount, the power exercised by the state was eminent domain. There is also no ousting of the
owner or deprivation of ownership. Establishments are neither divested of ownership of any of their
properties nor is anything forcibly taken from them. They remain the owner of their goods and
their profit or loss still depends on the performance of their sales.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. "The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another."

To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid classification.
The Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a priority to
address their needs. It needs no further explanation that PWDs have special needs which, for most,'
last their entire lifetime. They constitute a class of their own, equally deserving of government
support as our elderlies. While some of them maybe willing to work and earn income for
themselves, their disability deters them from living their full potential. Thus, the need for assistance
from the government to augment the reduced income or productivity brought about by their
physical or intellectual limitations.

B. DUE PROCESS
1. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
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OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. NICASIO A. CONTI

G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017, Second Division, MENDOZA, J.:

The essence of due process, therefore, as applied to administrative proceedings, is an

opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Thus, a violation of that right occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party
without giving the person the opportunity to be heard.

FACTS:

A complaint was filed against Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

commissioners, among of which is respondent Nicasio Conti for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It was alleged that the resolution issues and
signed by the said PCGG Commissioners resolved to lease five new vehicles from a leasing company
and gave way to two lease agreements in 2007 and 2009 between PCGG and the United Coconut
Planter's Bank (UCPB). The complainant asserted that the said resolution was in violation of
existing laws and administrative issuances which required the availability of appropriation of funds
and the conduct of public bidding as prerequisites for the validity of a government contract.

The Ombudsman ordered the PCGG Commissioners to file their respective counter-affidavits. All
but Conti complied with the directive. The Ombudsman found the PCGG Commissioners
administratively liable for Dishonesty, Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service. Conti moved for reconsideration, claiming that he was deprived of his right to due
process as there was nothing on record that showed he was even notified of the proceedings before
the Ombudsman until it rendered a decision on the case. He averred that he only learned of the
filing of the cases before the Sandiganbayan for the first time through news reports. He also asserted
that the copy of the decision was sent to his former address and that he could not have received
any notice even if it was sent to the PCGG office because he was already separated from the service.
The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argues that Conti was not
denied his right to due process and as he was served notices at the addresses that he stated in his
employment records at the PCGG and provided by the latter to the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Conti was deprived of his Constitutional Right to Due Process

RULING:

YES. Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered affecting one's person or property. In administrative proceedings, due process
is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain
or defend oneself. In such proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for
the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
of due process.
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The essence of due process, therefore, as applied to administrative proceedings, is an opportunity

to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Thus, a violation of that right occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving
the person the opportunity to be heard.

In this case, Conti was never given an opportunity to air his side. He was not furnished with a copy
of the Ombudsman order requiring him to file a counter-affidavit. This was admitted by the
Ombudsman as the records bore that the notices were sent to the PCGG when he was no longer a
Commissioner and to Conti's previous address in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City, which were
returned unserved with a notation that the addressee moved and left with no forwarding address.
This suffices as proof that Conti was not properly apprised of the cases against him.

A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or
collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity to be heard. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Consequently, such nullity not only applies to the entire judgment rendered by the Ombudsman
but likewise nullifies the judgment rendered by the CA reversing the findings of the Ombudsman
as to Conti' s liability. With the violation of Conti's right to due process, it is therefore plain, that
any judgment arising from it is void, whether the same be favorable to him or otherwise.

C. SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

1. WARRANT REQUIREMENT

MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, et al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017, FIRST DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to
barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant..

Facts:

Martin Villamor and Victor Bonaobra were charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for
collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as “lotteng” and possessing
a list of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash. Accoring to Villamore, he went to
Bonaobra’s house to pay a debt. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Florencio
inside their house. Villamor gave Bonaobra ₱2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table.
Bonaobra then went outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a
man later identified as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right
arm, and said, "Caught in the act ka!" Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a
search warrant. Two more men entered the house and took the money from the table. Petitioners
were then made to board the service vehicle and brought in for investigation at the police
headquarters. Villamore was charged and eventually convicted.

Issue:
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Whether or not the arrest is valid.

Ruling:

NO. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur,
namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid
warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established that petitioners had just
committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts
were done in the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD
Peñaflor, they were positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners. Considering that 15 to
20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it
doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was ongoing to allow
them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a
warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded
by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside
the compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received
from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been
committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence.

Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same does
not satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and seizure
of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there could be no valid
search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra's house is
inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree. Consequently, Villamor and Bonabora should
be acquitted.

D. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL

OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, En Banc, MENDOZA, J.:

Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling
state interest.

FACTS:

Toni Valenciano wrote a letter addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato Puno wherein he reported
that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted into a Roman
Catholic Chapel where masses are being held. He posited that such practice violated the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and the Constitutional prohibition
against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church,
denomination, or any other system of religion. MeTC Executive Judge Caridad M. Lutero reported
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that Catholic masses were being held only during lunch breaks and did not disturb court
proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates
the constitutional principle of separation of church and State.

RULING:

No. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses
in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and
employees in the performance of their official functions.

As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only during
noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not being
distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not being
adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has been no
detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state interest
compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures
may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are
contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not
impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.

The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of
establishment, but merely accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any
duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic
masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith,
it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition, without any coercion
from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the
lightings and airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there.
Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been
permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has
not prejudiced other religions.

Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium."
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The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose.""Appropriate" means "to
prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for a
distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand."

Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or
is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific
by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. This is
because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and
its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible.

Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited is the
use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The
prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the
furtherance of a particular church.

In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation of public
money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere incidental benefit
to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have placed it before "use, benefit
or support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the same provision bolsters this
interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein public funds are paid to a priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary because they rendered service in the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. That a priest
belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from the money he received is of
no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is merely to compensate the priest for
services rendered and for which other persons, who will perform the same services will also be
compensated in the same manner. Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. As such, the foregoing interpretation finds support in the Establishment
Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is proscribed is the passage of any law
which tends to establish a religion, not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.

E. EMINENT DOMAIN
1. JUST COMPENSATION

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JOSE TAPULADO

G.R. No. 199141, March 8, 2017, Second Division, MENDOZA, J.:

The RTC is bound to observe the basic factors and formula prescribed by the DAR pursuant
to Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. Nonetheless, when the RTC is faced with situations that do not warrant
the strict application of the formula, it may, in the exercise of its discretion, relax the formula's
application to fit the factual situations before it.

FACTS:
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The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject lands, owned by Jose Tapulado,
under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27 and awarded them to the farmer-beneficiaries. Tapulado, however, did not receive
any compensation from the government.

The respondents, the Heirs of Tapulado (Tapulados), rejected the valuation of the subject lands
offered. They filed a petition for determination of just compensation before the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB). The DARAB, in turn, referred their petition to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office of Davao del Sur (PARO) for the recomputation of the value of the subject lands under P.D.
No. 27 in relation to DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 13. Without waiting for the completion
of PARO's re-evaluation of the land, the Tapulados filed a petition before the R TC, sitting as Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination and payment of just compensation.

The RTC pegged the amount of ₱200,000.00 per hectare as the reasonable compensation for their
properties considering that the Tapulados lost the subject lands and were deprived of the fruits
thereof since 1972.

The CA agreed with the RTC that the computation of the just compensation should be in
accordance with R.A. No. 6657 because the compensation had remained unsettled up to the passage
of the new law. The CA wrote that for purposes of computing the just compensation, the value of
the property at the time of its taking should be considered. As the copies of the emancipation
patents were not attached, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception
of evidence as regards the date of the emancipation patents to serve as the reckoning point of the
computation of just compensation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error of law when it ordered the remand of
the case to the SAC for the reception of evidence

RULING:

No. The Court of Appeals is correct in remanding the case to the SAC for the computation of just
compensation.

A reading of R.A. No. 9700 reveals that the case still falls within the ambit of Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657, as amended. Section 5 of R.A. No. 9700, clearly provides that "previously acquired lands
wherein the valuation is subject to challenge shall be completed and resolved pursuant to Section
17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended."

Thus, all agrarian reform cases where the masterlists of agrarian reform beneficiaries had already
been finalized on or before July 1, 2009 or where the claim folders had been transmitted to and
received by LBP on or before the said date, the determination of just compensation should be in
accordance with the pertinent DAR regulations, applying Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.

In the case at bench, the subject property was awarded to the farmer-beneficiaries in 1978. On
March 24, 1980, LBP approved its initial valuation. Clearly, the process of the determination of just
compensation should be governed by Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.
 POLITICAL LAW

Accordingly, the Court sets aside the RTC valuation of their property at ₱200,000.00 per hectare.
The RTC valuation failed to comply with the parameters of Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR
regulation. It simply declared the amount of ₱200,000.00 per hectare as the fair and reasonable
amount of compensation, without any clear basis.

Although the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function, the RTC, sitting
as a SAC, must consider the factors mentioned in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.

The RTC is bound to observe the basic factors and formula prescribed by the DAR pursuant to
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. Nonetheless, when the RTC is faced with situations that do not warrant
the strict application of the formula, it may, in the exercise of its discretion, relax the formula's
application to fit the factual situations before it. In such a case, however, the RTC is duty bound to
explain and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and
formula.

Though the Court is fully aware that the subject properties have been taken by the government
since 1972, it has no option but to affirm the CA order of remand to the RTC for the computation
of the just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 because the basis for the
RTC determination of just compensation was not clear.

In the determination of just compensation, the RTC should be guided by the following:

1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property, that is, the date when the title or the emancipation patents
were issued in the names of the farmer-beneficiaries.

2. Just compensation must be determined pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of R.A.
No. 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. Nevertheless, while it should take
into account the different formulas created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation, it is
not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application. In which case,
the RTC must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or
formulas in arriving at a reasonable just compensation.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PHIL-AGRO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 193987, March 13, 2017, Third Division, REYES, J.:

The respondent has waited too long before the petitioner could fully pay the amount of just
compensation due to it. The long delay entitles them to the payment of interest to compensate for the
loss of income due to the taking.

FACTS:

Parcels of land situated in Baungon, Bukidnon, with an aggregate area of 267.0043 hectares,
registered under the name of Phil-Agro Industrial Corporation (Phil-Agro), were placed under the
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) offered an initial valuation of
P2,139,996.57 for the subject landholdings but this offer was rejected by Phil-Agro. On January 4,
 POLITICAL LAW

1999, Phil-Agro filed an Amended Complaint against the DAR Secretary and Landbank before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) praying for the fixing and payment of not less than P26,700,000.00 as
just compensation. On June 7, 2000, the parties agreed to the creation of a commission to determine
the fair market value of the subject landholdings. Phil-Agro's nominated commissioner submitted
the amount of P63,045,000.00 based on the findings of the Asian Appraisal Company, Inc., which
used the following valuation factors of the CARP: extent, character and utility of the property, sales
and holding prices of similar land, and highest and best use of the property. On the other hand,
using as basis the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Valuation of Land Voluntarily
Offered or Compulsory Acquired Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,Landbank's nominated
commissioner submitted a lower amount of P11,640,730.68. The Chairman of the Commission,
however, appraised the subject landholdings in the amount of P20,589,373.00 on the basis of the
following factors: physical attributes of the subject landholdings, soil type, terrain, adaptability to
various crops, accessibility to roads and properties in the area, and expert opinions of the Municipal
Assessor, Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Agriculturist of Baungon, Bukidnon. RTC rendered
its judgment adopting the Chairman's report assessing the value of the subject landholdings at
P20,589,373.00.

On appeal, the CA adopted Landbank commissioner’s valuation. The CA found that Landbank's
commissioner used the pertinent data from the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics, and computed the value of the subject landholdings in accordance with the
formula under the said DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.The CA further ruled that there was delay in
the payment of just compensation reckoned from the date of compensable taking. The CA ordered
Landbank to pay 6% interest per annum (as damages for delay) on the amount of just compensation
as well as 12% legal interest on the amount of just compensation plus the 6% interest, counted from
September 16, 1992, until all the amounts are fully paid. Both parties filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and a Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. On September 30, 2010, the CA
rendered an Amended Decision, ordering Landbank to pay 1% interest per annum on the amount
of just compensation counted from September 16, 1992, until all the amounts are fully paid; and to
pay 12% legal interest per annum on the amount of just compensation plus the 1% interest, from
the finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.No delay can be attributed to Landbank
because after the taking of the subject properties and before Phil-Agro’s title thereto was cancelled,
Landbank already made a deposit in favor of Phil-Agro in the form of cash and bonds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award of 1% per annum on the amount of just compensation counted from
September 16, 1992 is proper

RULING:

NO. The Court observes that the CA erred as to the reckoning point on which the award of legal
interest of 12% should accrue. The Court takes note of the fact that in the petitioner's motion for
partial reconsideration, it contended that the 12% legal interest should not be counted from the
time of the taking, considering the absence of delay when it promptly deposited the initial valuation
for the subject landholdings after the taking of the same and before the respondent's title thereto
was cancelled. Notably, while the petitioner claimed that it deposited the initial valuation in the
amount of P2,139,996.57, the said amount is way below the just compensation finally adjudged by
the CA at P11,640,730.68. Clearly, delay in payment occurred and cannot at all be disputed. The
 POLITICAL LAW

respondent was deprived of its lands since September 16, 1992, when CLOAs were issued in the
name of three farmer beneficiaries associations, and to date, had not yet received full payment of
the principal amount due to it. Evidently, from September 16, 1992 until the present, or after almost
25 years, the respondent is deprived of just compensation which therefore warrants the imposition
of interest.

It is doctrinal that to be considered as just, the compensation must be fair and equitable, and the
landowners must have received it without any delay. The requirement of the law is not satisfied by
the mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by
the DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements
set forth by R.A. No. 6657. As to the proper reckoning point of the legal interest, it is fundamental
that just compensation should be determined at the time of the property's taking. Here, the date of
the taking of the subject landholdings for purposes of computing just compensation should be
reckoned from the issuance dates of the CLOA. A CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of
the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR, and contains the restrictions and
conditions provided for in R.A. No. 6657 and other applicable laws.Since the CLOA in this case had
been issued on September 16, 1992, the just compensation for the subject landholdings should then
be reckoned there from, being considered the time of taking. This is based on the principle that
interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking.

In sum, the respondent has waited too long before the petitioner could fully pay the amount of just
compensation due to it. It is clear that the respondent voluntarily offered its subject landholdings
to be included in the CARP. The respondent submitted to expropriation and surrendered its
landholdings. Although it initially contested the valuation that the government made, the
respondent accepted the amount finally fixed by the appellate court. From the time of taking on
September 16, 1992 to the present, it has already been 25 years but the respondent has not yet
received the full amount of just compensation that was due. Thus, the long delay entitles them to
the payment of interest to compensate for the loss of income due to the taking.

Interest may be awarded as warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing
jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court had allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation
cases where there was delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was
deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance
shall be fixed at the rate of 12% per annum from the time of taking and 6% per annum from the
finality of the decision until fully paid.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS of ANTONIO MARCOS, SR.

G.R. No. 175726, March 22, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J.:

The “just compensation” guaranteed to a landowner under Section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution is precisely the same as the “just compensation” embodied in Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution. The just compensation due to an owner should be the "fair and full price of the taken
property," whether for land taken pursuant to the State's agrarian reform program or for property
taken for purposes other than agrarian reform.

FACTS:
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The deceased Antonio Marcos, Sr. (Antonio) was the owner of two parcels of agricultural land or
landholdings located at Malbog, Pilar, Sorsogon, consisting of 14.9274 hectares covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2552 and 9.4653 hectares covered by TCT No. 2562.5 On April 3, 1995,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657,6 Ramiro Marcos (Ramiro), authorized representative of the
heirs of Antonio, namely: Anita Rubio, Lolita M. Pelino, Antonio Marcos, Jr. and Ramiro, offered to
sell the landholdings to the Republic of the Philippines through its implementing arm, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

On July 10, 1996, petitioner LBP valued the lands covered by TCT Nos. 2552 and 2562 at ₱195,603.70
and ₱79,096.26, respectively. On August 11, 1997, Ramiro filed with the DAR two (2) Landowner's
Reply to Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition forms pertaining to the landholdings. In the said
forms, Ramiro indicated that the respondents were accepting LBP's valuation of the landholdings.
On the same date, the DAR Regional Director sent a memorandum to the LBP requesting the
preparation of a deed of transfer over the landholdings and payment of the purchase price to
respondents based on petitioner's valuation. While the payment of the purchase price is pending,
the DAR brought the matter of valuation to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on June 15, 2000 requesting
that summary administrative proceedings be conducted to determine the just compensation for the
landholdings. After proper proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered Decisions LV Cases
Nos. 084'0011 and 085'00,12 both dated November 29, 2000 fixing the valuation. LBP disagreed with
the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the valuation was correct.

RULING:

The LBP averred that the subject property was acquired by the government pursuant to Republic
Act No. (R.A. No.) 6657, thus, in determining the just compensation, Section 17 of the said law is
applicable.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, the Court essentially pointed out
that the “just compensation” guaranteed to a landowner under Section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution is precisely the same as the “just compensation” embodied in Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution. The just compensation due to an owner should be the “fair and full price of the
taken property,” whether for land taken pursuant to the State's agrarian reform program or for
property taken for purposes other than agrarian reform.

It was further stressed in Honeycomb that just compensation paid for lands taken pursuant to the
State's agrarian reform program refers to the "full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator x x x [the measure of which] is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.
The word 'just' is used to intensify the meaning of the word 'compensation' to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.”

The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a function of the courts. Section 57 of

R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
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just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the State's agrarian reform program. However, this
Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprise, underscored that, in the
exercise of the essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-SAC is not
granted unlimited discretion. The factors under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 were already translated
into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No.
6657. The said factors and the DAR formula provide the uniform framework or structure by which
just compensation for property subject to agrarian reform should be determined. Hence, aside from
considering the factors provided by law, the courts should apply the formula outlined in DAR AO
No. 5, series of 1998, in the computation of just compensation.

Nevertheless, this Court deems it premature to determine with finality the matter in controversy,
considering the lack of sufficient data to guide this Court in the proper determination of just
compensation following the guidelines that was discussed at length. This Court is not a trier of facts
and cannot receive any new evidence from the parties to aid the prompt resolution of this case.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MANILA INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA), v. HEIRS OF ELADIO SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 193828, March 27, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J.:

The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and
that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

FACTS:

On January 30, 2002, herein petitioner Republic filed with the RTC of Parañaque City a complaint
for the expropriation of fragments of two parcels of land in Parañaque City for the purpose of
installing runway approach lights spanning nine hundred (900) meters. The properties sought to
be expropriated are: (1) a 180-square-meter portion of Lot 4174 located at Barangay San Dionisio
which has an aggregate area of 2, 151 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 189 registered in the name of a certain Eladio Santiago but is now owned by herein respondents
who are his heirs (heirs of Santiago), and (2) a 540-square-meter portion of Lot No. 5012 located at
Barangay La Huerta, with a total area of 68,778 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. D-005- 01300 registered in the names Antonio, Patricio and Cecilia, all surnamed
Bernabe, but was subsequently sold to and now owned by Titan Construction Corporation,
represented by herein respondent Jerry Yao (Yao).

The group of commissioners failed to reach a concensus as to the amount of just compensation,
thus, the court set the amount.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court was correct.

RULING:
 POLITICAL LAW

YES. The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and
that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the
court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

DANILO BARTOLATA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. No. 223334, June 7, 2017, Third Division, Velasco, JR. J.:

Section 112 of the Public Land Act provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-
of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other
similar works of the government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of
the improvements existing thereon that may be affected. In view of this, all the Republic needs to do
is to enforce such right without having to initiate expropriation proceedings and without having to
pay any just compensation.

FACTS:

The Petitioner acquired a 400 sq. m. property in AFP’s Village as an Order of Award from the Burea
of Lands in 1987. The Respondents acquired 223 sq. m. of the the Petitioner’s property for the Metro
Manila Skyway Project. The agreed just compensation was for P55,000 per sq. m. or a total of
12,265,000. Since the initial payment, the respondents were yet to pay the balance of the just
compensation. Hence, the Petitioner was constrained to file a complaint for sum of money against
the Respondent. On the Respondent’s part, it pointed out a provision for easements and servitudes
encumbered on the title of the Petitioner in his grant. Thus, the Respondents argue that the
government is entitled to the easements without paying just compensation. Petitioner maintains
that RA 730 relaxed the mode of acquiring public land, from the strict method of public auction to
the more lenient non-auction sale. Petitioner, therefore, submits that PD 2004 should be
interpreted to cover all government sales of public land, with or without auction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Government should pay just compensation.

RULING:

No less than the Order of Award granting petitioner title over the subject property reads that the
parcel of land conferred to him is subject to the restrictions contained under Sec. 109-114 of CA 141,
which necessarily includes the easement provided in Sec. 112. Notably, petitioner was awarded the
subject property in 1987, while PD 2004, which allegedly removed all encumbrances and restrictions
from awarded properties, was signed into law much earlier in 1985. This alone raises suspicion on
the applicability of PD 2004 to the subject property.

What is more, the easement of right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141 is not subsumed in the phrase
"restrictions against encumbrance or alienation" appearing in the amendment introduced by PD
2004. Consequently, it was erroneous for petitioner to harp on Sec. 2 of RA 730, as amended by PD
2004, in his bid to unshackle his property from its servient state, to release it from the statutory lien
prescribed under Sec. 112 of CA 141. To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the property
owner will be entitled to just compensation for the remaining property under Sec. 112 of CA 141: (1)
 POLITICAL LAW

that the remainder is not subject to the statutory lien of right of way; and (2) that the enforcement
of the right of way results in the practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the
remaining property, or in the property owner being dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the
normal use of the said remainder.

There is then no evidentiary basis for awarding petitioner just compensation, as correctly ruled by
the RTC and the CA. However, petitioner remains the owner of the said 177 square meters and can
fully exercise all the rights of ownership over the same. Guilty of reiteration, Sec. 112 of CA 141
precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation for the government's enforcement of its right
of way. The contract allegedly entered by the parties for the government's acquisition of the affected
portion of the property in exchange for just compensation is then void ab initio for being contrary
to law. Consequently, petitioner has no right to collect just compensation for the government's use
of the 223 square meter lot. Anent the Pl,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents,
such amount paid shall be governed by the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust enrichment.

Regardless, respondents' action to compel petitioner to return what was mistakenly delivered is
now barred by the doctrine of estoppel. The doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy,
fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who
reasonably relied thereon. In this case, petitioner was erroneously paid Pl,480,000 on August 14,
1997 when respondents appropriated the amount in his favor. However, because of respondents'
representation that the amount was a mere down payment for just compensation, petitioner never
objected to the taking of his land and peacefully parted with his property, expecting to be paid in
full for the value of the taken property thereafter.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES SENANDO AND JOSEFINA SALVADOR

G.R. No. 205428, June 7, 2017, First Division Del Castillo, J.:

If as a result of the expropriation, the remaining lot suffers from an impairment or decrease
in value, consequential damages may be awarded by the trial court, provided that the consequential
benefits which may arise from the expropriation do not exceed said damages suffered by the owner of
the property.

FACTS:

Respondents are owners of a 229 sq. m. parcel of land in Valenzuela City. The Petitioners filed a
complaint for the expropriation of 83 sq. m. of the said parcel of land for the construction C-5
Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 from NLEX to McArthur Highway. 2 checks were issued to the
Petitioners in the amount of 161, 850 and 523, 449 and thereafter the RTC issued a writ of possession.
It also ruled that the Petitioner should pay consequential damages equivalent to the Capital Gains
Tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property in the Republic’s name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic should pay consequential damages.

RULING:
 POLITICAL LAW

NO. In order to determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value
of the property by considering the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual
or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax
declarations thereon. If as a result of the expropriation, the remaining lot suffers from an
impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded by the trial court,
provided that the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation do not exceed said
damages suffered by the owner of the property.

It is settled that the transfer of property through expropriation proceedings is a sale or exchange
within the meaning of Sections 24(D) and 56(A)(3) of the National Internal Revenue Code, and
profit from the transaction constitutes capital gain. Since capital gains tax is a tax on passive
income, it is the seller, or respondents in this case, who are liable to shoulder the tax.

In fact, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), in BIR Ruling No. 476-2013 dated December 18, 2013,
has constituted the DPWH as a withholding agent tasked to withhold the 6% final withholding tax
in the expropriation of real property for infrastructure projects. Thus, as far as the government is
concerned, the capital gains tax in expropriation proceedings remains a liability of the seller, as it
is a tax on the seller's gain from the sale of real property.

Besides, as previously explained, consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the
expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in
value. In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the
subject property as a result of the expropriation. More significantly, given that the payment of
capital gains tax on the transfer· of the subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in
value of the remaining property, it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be
awarded to respondents.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SUSIE IRENE GALLE

G.R. No. 171836, October 2, 2017, Special Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as
well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

FACTS:

Galle owned property that the state expropriated. The DARAB, in a 1996, decision fixed the just
compensation for the Galle property but DARAB based its valuation on outdated 1991 data, instead
of 1993 data, when the property was taken so the Supreme Court declared the 1996 DARAB order
null and void, and remanded the case to the CA to determine the just compensation.

Both the Landbank and DAR filed for reconsideration. Landbank states the 1996 DARAB decision
was already final and executory and could no longer be subject for judicial review, even if the basis
for just compensation was based on outdated 1991 data. The DAR insists the valuation based on 1991
 POLITICAL LAW

data is correct since 1991 was when the Notice of Coverage was served upon Galle and that a
property valuation discrepancy of 3 years is not significant.

The DAR did not comply with Sec 16 of RA 6657, failing to send out notice to acquire the land to
the owners by personal delivery or registered mail and post notice in the municipal building and
barangay hall where property was located. There was also lack of actual inspection by Landbank
and DAR.

In 2011, Landbank re-evaluated the Galle property to be worth Php7,534,063.91. This valuation was
based on DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992 as amended by AO No. 11, series of 1994 Landbank now
claims though, that the applicable formula is the one in AO No. 2, series of 2009, without
explanation

ISSUE:

Whether the 1996 DARAB order was already final and executory and thus beyond judicial review

RULING:

The DARAB Decision was illegal, unfair, unjust, and oppressive, because the just compensation
decreed was grossly erroneous. Galle' s properties were grossly undervalued, and the DAR
committed serious lapses in the process of expropriating the same. Undervaluation results in denial
of due process of law.

AO 6, as amended, provides for the proper method to arrive at the just compensation
The Court held that DAR AO 2-09 should not control the computation of just compensation. AO
02-09 did not have the effect of changing the basic formula to be used in the valuation: it continues
to be governed by AO 6, as amended, as LBP itself had always insisted all throughout this litigation,
until its recent change of tune.

HEIRS OF PABLO FELICIANO, JR., v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 215290, January 11, 2017, First Division, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred in
the name of the beneficiaries.

FACTS:

Petitioners heirs of Pablo Feliciano, Jr., are co-owners of a 300 hectare (ha.) parcel of agricultural
land situated at F. Simeon, Ragay, Camarines Sur, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
RT 3080 (4120). In 1972, a 135.2583 ha. portion of the afore-mentioned land was classified as un-
irrigated riceland (subject land), and placed under the coverage of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.
The Certificates of Land Transfer were distributed to the 84 tenant-beneficiaries in 1973 who were
issued Emancipation Patents in 1989. The claim folder covering the subject land was received by
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The DAR
valued the subject land at ₱1,301,498.09, inclusive of interests, but the Feliciano heirs rejected the
 POLITICAL LAW

said valuation, prompting the LBP to deposit the said amount in the latter's name on January 26,
1998. On March 24, 2000, the said amount was released to them.

After the summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation, the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Camarines Sur, Branch I rendered a
Decision fixing the value of the subject land at ₱4,64l ,080.465 or an average of ₱34,302.375/ha.

The RTC rendered a decision fixing the just compensation for the subject land at ₱7,725,904.05; and
(b) directed the LBP (i) to pay Espiritu the said amount, less amounts already paid to and received
by the Feliciano heirs, and (ii) to pay 12% interest p.a. on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation, computed from January 1, 2010 until full payment. On appeal of both parties, the CA
fixed the just compensation for the subject land at ₱7,725,904.05, plus legal interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) p.a., computed from July 1, 2009 up to the finality of the Decision, or the total
amount of ₱8,316,876,97, and directed the LBP to pay the said amount to Espiritu.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA’s ruling on just compensation is correct.

RULING:

No. The case is hereby remanded to RTC for the determination of just compensation. For purposes
of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred in the name
of the beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended,
i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and
actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax
declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property,
and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, if any, must be equally considered.

However, it bears pointing out that while Congress passed RA 9700 on August 7, 2009, further
amending certain provisions of RA 6657, as amended, among them, Section 17, its implementing
rules, i.e., DAR AO 2, Series of 2009, clarified that the said law shall not apply to claims/cases where
the claim folders were received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009. In such a situation, just
compensation shall be determined in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended,
prior to its further amendment by RA 9700.

In LBP v. Kho,the Court had succinctly explained the "cut-off rule" in the application of RA 9700:

It is significant to stress, however, that DAR AO 1, series of 2010 which was issued in line with
Section 31 of RA 9700 empowering the DAR to provide the necessary rules and regulations for its
implementation, became effective only subsequent to July 1. 2009. Consequently, it cannot be
applied in the determination of just compensation for the subject land where the claim folders were
undisputedly received by the LBP prior to July 1. 2009, and, as such, should be valued in accordance
with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its further amendment by RA 9700 pursuant to the cut-off date
 POLITICAL LAW

set under DAR AO 2, series of 2009 (cut-off rule). Notably, DAR AO 1, series of 2010 did not expressly
or impliedly repeal the cut-off rule set under DAR AO 2, series of 2009, having made no reference
to any cut-off date with respect to land valuation for previously acquired lands under PD 27 and EO
228 wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners. Consequently, the application of DAR
AO 1, series of 2010 should be, thus, limited to those where the claim folders were received on or
subsequent to July 1, 2009.

Following the above dictum, since the claim folder covering the subject land was received by the
LBP on December 2, 1997, or prior to July 1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just compensation
using pertinent DAR regulations applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700
instead of adopting the new DAR issuance. While the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the DAR since the valuation of property or
the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the
courts, and not with administrative agencies, it must explain and justify in clear terms the reason
for any deviation from the prescribed factors and the applicable formula.

In this case, the Court has gone over the records and found that neither the RTC nor the CA
considered the date when the claim folder was received nor explained their reasons for deviating
from the DAR formula. Therefore, as it stands, the RTC and the CA should have utilized the basic
formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior to the passage of RA
9700, in determining the just compensation for the subject land.

Accordingly, while the parties did not raise as issue the improper application of DAR AO 1, Series of
2010, the Court finds the need to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of just
compensation to ensure compliance with the law, and to give everyone - the landowner, the
farmers, and the State – their due.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. HEIRS OF LORENZO TAÑADA AND EXPEDITA

EBARLE
G.R. No. 170506, January 11, 2017, First Division, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The factors listed under Section 17 of RA 6657 and its resulting formulas provide a uniform
framework or structure for the computation of just compensation which ensures that the amounts to
be paid to affected landowners are not arbitrary, absurd or even contradictory to the objectives of
agrarian reform. Until and unless declared invalid in a proper case, the DAR formulas partake of the
nature of statutes, which under the 2009 amendment became law itself, and thus have in their favor
the presumption of legality, such that courts shall consider, and not disregard, these formulas in the
determination of just compensation for properties covered by the CARP. When faced with situations
which do not warrant the formula's strict application, courts may, in the exercise of their judicial
discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the factual situations before them, subject only to the
condition that they clearly explain in their Decision their reasons (as borne by the evidence on record)
for the deviation undertaken. It is thus entirely allowable for a court to allow a landowner's claim for
an amount higher than what would otherwise have been offered (based on an application of the
formula) for as long as there is evidence on record sufficient to support the award.

FACTS:
 POLITICAL LAW

The heirs of Tanada and Ebarle owned several parcels of laned in Gabon, Abucay, Bataan. The said
lands were placed under the land reform program in 1988 where part of their lands would be
included in the program. LBP valued the properties to be taken at P223,837.29 for the 16.7692
hectares of land and P192,610 for the 13 hectares of land.Dissatisfied with the valuation, the heirs
instituted summary administrative proceedings for preliminary determination of just
compensation in 1992 and 1993 with the DARAB in Region III. The heirs prayed for the properties
to be revalued at P150,000 per hectare.

The heirs presented Jose Dela Cruz, a vault keeper from the Office of the Bataan Register of Deeds
who testified he is the custodian of the documents and titles in the said office. Jose testified that
other similar lots sold in the same province were much higher. The DARAB nor LBP did not present
any witness to refute the evidence presented by the respondents. The trial court acting as a Special
Agrarian Court rendered a Decision in favor of the heirs. LBP elevated the case to the CA which
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Essentially, the sole issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the trial court utilized the
correct method in fixing the just compensation due to respondents' parcels of land which have
been subjected to land reform proceedings under Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court used the correct method in fixing just compensation.

RULING:

NO. the trial court did not use the correct method in fixing just compensation The trial court acting
as a SAC should be guided by the following factors: (1) the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the
current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by
the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to
the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any.

Pursuant to the rule-making power of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section 49
of Republic Act No. 6657,the enumerated factors were translated into a formula that was outlined
in DAR Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.
03, series of 1991, and as further amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 06, series of 1992,
entitled "RULES AND REGULATIONS AMENDING THE VALUATION OF LANDS VOLUNTARILY
OFFERED AND COMPULSORILY ACQUIRED AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ADIVHNISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 17, SERIES OF 1989, AS AMENDED, ISSUED PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6657. 14

In determining the just compensation to be paid to respondents, petitioner utilized the formula
indicated in DAR Administrative Order No. 06, series of 1992, which was in effect at the time the
lots of respondents were subjected to coverage by the government's land reform program. The said
formula is reproduced as follows:
 POLITICAL LAW

II. THE FOLLOWING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE HEREBY PROMULGATED TO AMEND
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 17, SERIES OF 1989, AS AMENDED
BY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 3, SERIES OF 1991 WHICH GOVERN THE VALUATION OF
LANDS SUBJECT OF ACQUISITION WHETHER UNDER VOLUNTARY OFFER TO SELL (VOS)
OR COMPULSORY ACQUISITION (CA)

A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of land covered by VOS or CA regardless of
the date of offer or coverage of the claim:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where: LV = Land Value
CNI =Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant, and applicable.
Al. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 215

The factors listed under Section 17 of RA 6657 and its resulting formulas provide a uniform
framework or structure for the computation of just compensation which ensures that the amounts
to be paid to affected landowners are not arbitrary, absurd or even contradictory to the objectives
of agrarian reform. Until and unless declared invalid in a proper case, the DAR formulas partake of
the nature of statutes, which under the 2009 amendment became law itself, and thus have in their
favor the presumption of legality, such that courts shall consider, and not disregard, these formulas
in the determination of just compensation for properties covered by the CARP. When faced with
situations which do not warrant the formula's strict application, courts may, in the exercise of their
judicial discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the factual situations before them, subject
only to the condition that they clearly explain in their Decision their reasons (as borne by the
evidence on record) for the deviation undertaken. It is thus entirely allowable for a court to allow a
landowner's claim for an amount higher than what would otherwise have been offered (based on
an application of the formula) for as long as there is evidence on record sufficient to support the
award.

F. WRIT OF AMPARO

CALLO v. COMMISSIONER MORENTE, ET AL.

G.R. No. 240324, September 19, 2017, En Banc, Carpio, Acting C.J.:

A writ of amparo will be issued when (a) there is an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form
of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political
organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and (d) the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
 POLITICAL LAW

FACTS:

Danielle Tan Parker was charged for deportation for being an undesirable, undocumented, and
overstaying alien. Danielle is a fugitive from justice in the United States with an outstanding
warrant issued against her. A Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issuedagainst Danielle
Nopuente, also known as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker. was arrested in Tagaytay.
The deportation was not carried out as she was charged with falsification and use of falsified
documents in Davao City.

Parker filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Pasig RTC. The Bureau of Immigration,
although having produced Parker, alleged the SDO had become final and executory and served as
the legal authority to detain Parker. The RTC dismissed the petition. The CA affirmed the RTC and
found Parker was unable to prove her citizenship, giving weight to the Certification issued by the
DFA saying there is no available data regarding her passport. Callo then filed a petition for a writ of
amparo.

ISSUE:

Whether the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker is threatened by the respondents to warrant
the issuance of the writ of amparo and the subsequent award of interim reliefs

RULING:

The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a
person’s constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances thereof. With the enactment of RA No.
9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the
constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory definition of
“enforced or involuntary disappearance”.

In this case, there are no elements of enforced disappearance attendant. There is also no threat of
such enforced disappearance. While there is a detention carried out by the State through the Bureau
of Immigration, not all elements are present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parkers because Callo admits Parker
is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility. Further, Callo has failed to prove her standing to
file the amparo petition on behalf of Nopuente or Parker. The rules provide a strict enumeration of
persons with standing to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo.

G. EXCESSIVE FINES AND CRUEL AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

JOEL T. MATURAN, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALLAN PATIÑO

G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017, En Banc, BERSAMIN, J.:

The penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office may be properly imposed on a
candidate for public office who repeatedly fails to submit his Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures (SOCE) pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166.1 The penalty does not amount
to the cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment proscribed by the Bill of Rights.
 POLITICAL LAW

FACTS:

Petitioner Joel Maturan filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of
Basilan to be contested in the 2016 National and Local Elections. Allan Patiño, claiming to be a
registered voter of Basilan, filed a petition for the disqualification of the petitioner on the ground
that based on the list issued by the COMELEC Campaign Finance Officer the latter had failed to
file his SOCE corresponding to the 2010 and 2013 elections.

The COMELEC eventually declared petitioner perpetually disqualified to hold public office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty imposed upon petitioner amounts to cruel, degrading and inhumane
punishment proscribed by the Bill or Rights.

RULING:

NO. We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights extends
only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of
his humanity. The proscription is aimed more at the form or character of the punishment rather
than at its severity. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the
form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount,
and applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as
cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory,
to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the
penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that
circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.

Moreover, that Congress has deemed fit to impose the penalty of perpetual disqualification on
candidates who repeatedly failed to file their SOCEs cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry.
Congress has the absolute discretion to penalize by law with perpetual disqualification from
holding public office in addition to administrative fines the seekers of public office who fail more
than once to file their SOCEs. Such penalty is intended to underscore the need to file the SOCE as
another means of ensuring the sanctity of the electoral process.

VII.LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

LEOVIGILDO DE CASTRO v. FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 192723, June 5, 2017, First Division, Caguioa, J.:

Public service demands the highest level of honesty and transparency from its officers and
employees. Public office is a public trust; it must be treated as a privilege rather than a right, and rest
firmly upon one's sense of service rather than entitlement.
 POLITICAL LAW

FACTS:

Petitioner started working as a storekeeper in the Bureau of Customs all the way up to working as
a Chief Customs Operations Officer. His wife also worked in the government. The OMB, through
its Field Investigation Office (FIO) conducted a motu proprio lifestyle check on government
officials finding out that the Petitioner had undisclosed assets, investments, and several outbound
flights. The Ombudsman (OMB) charged and later found guilty, the Petitioner with Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest of the Service. The OMB thereafter
issued an order of Preventive Suspension against the Petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner was properly found guilty.

RULING:

YES but not of grave misconduct. Section 10 of R.A. 6713 vests upon heads of executive
departments the authority to ensure faithful compliance with the SALN requirement. However, it
does not strip the Ombudsman of its sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon
complaint of any person, any public official or employee for acts or omissions which appear to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The fact that Leovigildo had not been previously placed
under a BOC sanctioned investigation does not make the Ombudsman's acts void or premature, as
the latter's power to investigate and prosecute him on account of discrepancies in his SALNs stands
independent of the power of the Commissioner of Customs to ensure compliance with the SALN
requirement within the BOC.

Leovigildo's administrative liability primarily rests on his failure to faithfully comply with the SALN
requirement, and the acquisition of assets manifestly disproportionate to his lawful income. These
acts, while undoubtedly inimical to public service, do not constitute Grave Misconduct. Misconduct
is grave where the elements of corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard
of established rules are present.

The act or omission complained of must have a direct relation to the public officer's duties and
affect not only his character as a private individual, but also, and more importantly, the
performance of his official duties as a public servant. Hence, to hold Leovigildo liable for Grave
Misconduct, the acts and omissions for which he was charged must be of such character as to have
had an effect on his duties as Chief Customs Operations Officer. The Court finds that such is not
the case.

Nevertheless, the Court still finds that substantial evidence exists on record to hold Leovigildo
guilty of Dishonesty for having acquired assets manifestly disproportionate to his lawful income,
and concealing the same by deliberately placing them in the names of his children. When a public
officer's accumulated wealth is manifestly disproportionate to his lawful income and such public
officer fails to properly account for or explain where such wealth had been sourced, he becomes
administratively liable for Dishonesty.

AMANDO TETANGCO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

 POLITICAL LAW

G.R. No. 215061, June 6, 2017, Tijam, J.:

It must be stressed that the ex officio position is actually and, in legal contemplation, part of
the principal office; hence, the ex officio member is no longer entitled to receive any form of
compensation, allowance or other euphemism from the extended agency.

FACTS:

Petitioners are the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) an members of the Monetary
Board (MB) who were disallowed by COA to have the Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses
(EME) for ex officio members of the MB. Consequently, COA conducted an audit on specific
accounts which allegedly exceeded the limitation and later became the subject of a Notice of
Disallowance. The Petitioners were made personally liable by COA for the Notice of Disallowances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) were correctly disallowed.

RULING:

YES. The nature of EME, however, was not the foremost reason for the disallowance, but the
limitations imposed by law in availing such allowance. The ex officio members of the Monetary
Board are entitled to EMEs to the extent of that appropriated in the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Since the ex officio members already received their EMEs from their respective Departments
(as appropriated in the GAA), the additional EMEs from BSP are no longer necessary. It must be
stressed that the ex officio position is actually and, in legal contemplation, part of the principal
office; hence, the ex officio member is no longer entitled to receive any form of compensation,
allowance or other euphemism from the extended agency.

Anent petitioners' defense of good faith in approving the grant of EMEs to the ex officio members
of the Monetary Board, this Court opines that said defense is unavailing. By jurisprudence, the
patent disregard of several case laws and COA directives, as in this case, amounts to gross
negligence; hence, petitioners cannot be presumed in good faith. We hold the petitioners approving
officers of the Monetary Board are liable for the excess EMEs which they received.

As the records bear out, the petitioners who approve the EMEs failed to observe the following: first,
there is already a law, the GAA, that limits the grant of EMEs; second; COA Memorandum No. 97-
038 dated September 19, 1997 is a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-
executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and
his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple
offices and receiving double. compensation; and third, the irregularity of giving additional
compensation or allowances to ex officio members was already settled by jurisprudence, during the
time that the subject allowances were authorized by the BSP.

The doctrine on the non-liability of recipients of disallowed benefits based on good faith did not
extend to petitioner Favila for the following reasons: first, there was precisely a law (the relevant
GAAs) that expressly limited the amounts of the EMEs to be received by the ex officio members;
and second, in so far as ND No. 10-004GF (2007- 2008) is concerned, his liability arose from his
 POLITICAL LAW

receipt of the subject allowances in 2008, when he was an ex officio member of the Board. Hence,
good faith did not favor him not only because he had failed to exercise the highest degree of
responsibility, but also because as a cabinet member he was aware of the extent of the benefits he
was entitled to.

B. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

RHODELIA SAMBO AND LORYL AVILA V. COMMISSION IN AUDIT

G.R. No. 223244, June 20, 2017, En Banc, Peralta, J.:

The receipt or non-receipt of illegally disbursed funds is immaterial to the solidary liability of
the government officials directly responsible therefor, as in the case of Maritime Industry Authority
v. COA, where the Court held the approving officers therein who acted in bad faith as solidarity liable
to return the disallowed funds, even if they never got hold of them.

FACTS:

QUEDANCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) where Petitioners

Rhodelia Sambo (Sambo) and Loryl Avila (Avila) are the Acting Regional Assistant Vice President
and Regional Accountant respectively for Region V. The Resident Audit Team Leader of COA of the
GOCC issued a Notice of Disallowance for the benefits of several employees of the GOCC. The
reason for the disallowance was that the payees for the benefits are casual employees and therefore
not entitled to receive benefits and allowances. The appointments were merely covered by Special
Orders issued by the QUEDANCOR President and Chief Executive Officer (COE) and were without
approval of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Hence, the employees' contracts of services are not
governed by the CSC laws, rules and regulations. Hence, they are not entitled to receive the benefits
enjoyed by government employees like the YEB, PerB and PIB. The officers, including Petitioners,
who certified or approved the payment of the disallowed benefits, were held solidarily liable for the
reimbursement of the amount.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioners should be held liable for the disallowed benefits.

RULING:

YES. Presidential Decree No. 1445 spells out the rule on general liability for unlawful expenditures.
Under this provision, an official or employee shall be personally liable for unauthorized
expenditures if the following requisites are present, to wit: (a) there must be an expenditure of
government funds or use of government property; (b) the expenditure is in violation of law or
regulation; and (c) the official is found directly responsible therefor. Clearly, therefore, public
officials who are directly responsible for, or participated in making the illegal expenditures, as well
as those who actually received the amounts therefrom shall be solidarily liable for their
reimbursement.

On the part of the approving officers, they shall only be required to refund if they are found to have
acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent amounting to bad faith. In common usage, the term
"good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and
 POLITICAL LAW

freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry.Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must
fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.

In the case at bar, we find that the petitioners have equally failed to make a case justifying their
non-observance of existing auditing rules and regulations. Petitioners failed to faithfully discharge
their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted in the irregular
disbursements paid to the employees whose appointments have not been approved by the CSC.
Being a GOCC, QUEDANCOR is bound by civil service laws. In this light, the ruling of the COA
Commission Proper in not appreciating good faith on the part of the petitioners must perforce be
upheld.

JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 213716, October 10, 2017, En Banc, Jardeleza, J.:

Under the threefold liability rule, wrongful acts or omissions by public officials can give rise
to civil, criminal, and administrative liability. Any action that may result for each may proceed
independently of each other as the quantum of evidence required in each case is different.

FACTS:

The COA formed a Special Audit Team for the conduct of audit on past and present transactions of
the APF-RSBS in connection with the purchase of four parcels of land in Calamba from Concord
Resources. The SAT found that the APF-RSBS, as represented by petitioner executed two deeds of
sale covering the properties. The deed of sale registered with the RD disclosed that the total
purchase price was P91,024,800. On the other hand, the records obtained by the audit team from
the AFP-RSBS management revealed that another deed of sale was executed by Concord alone and
has a purchase price of P341,34,300. The AFP-RSBS paid Concord the latter amount. The SAT
concluded that the deed of sale with the RD was the true one considering it was signed by both
parties. As such, the government lost P250,318,200 in the transaction. The SAT also concluded that
there was an underpayment of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes in the amount of
P16,270,683.

Thereafter, the SAT issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND) to petitioner, among others, to
immediately settle the excess payment for the Calamba properties. A Notice of Charge (NC) was
also issued directing petitioner, among others, to pay the deficiency for the taxes earlier mentioned.
Petitioner appealed the ND and NC before the COA but was denied. He argues that the action
against him has prescribed, that the COA already lost jurisdiction over him on the account of a
criminal case filed against petitioner involving the same set of facts in the Sandiganbayan, and that
the COA is not authorized to issue an NC to cover the deficiency in taxes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action against petitioner has prescribed.

RULING:
 POLITICAL LAW

The right of the State, through the COA, to recover public funds that have been established to be
irregularly and illegally disbursed does not prescribe. Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code expressly
provides that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. Even if the court were
to follow petitioner’s arguments that Article 1149 and 1153 apply, the action is still not barred. While
the sale occurred in 1997, COA’s cause of action arose only in 2005 when the SAT issued its Audit
Observation Memorandum detailing its findings.

The threefold liability rule holds that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give
rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. A public officer may be held civilly, criminally,
and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in
damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party.
If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may also be punished criminally.
Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative
sanctions. The action that may result for each liability under the threefold liability rule may proceed
independently of one another, as in fact, the quantum of evidence required in each case is different.

In this case, the conduct of an audit was not an exercise of the government’s administrative
supervision over petitioner where administrative penalties are to be meted out. Rather, this
involved a determination of his civil liability and accountability over the excess in the disbursement
of public funds and the underpaid taxes. Thus, the petitioner’s resignation, and pending case in the
Sandiganbayan does not bar the current proceeding.

Anent the validity of the NC, the court held that the authority of COA over national revenue taxes
is limited only for the sole purpose of ascertaining that all funds determined by the appropriate
agencies as collectible and due the government have actually been collected. Its authority to assist
in the collection and enforcement of all debts and claims due the government shall be done through
proper channels.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MAYOR JULIUS CESAR VERGARA

G.R. No. 216871, December 06, 2017, Second Division, Peralta, J.:

The most important consideration in the doctrine of condonation is the fact the misconduct
was done on a prior term and the subject public official was eventually re-elected by the same body
politic.

FACTS:

A complaint was filed against respondent for violation of R.A. 9003 because of maintenance of open
burning dumpsite locations. Petitioner found respondent to have violated Section 5(a) of R.A. 6713
and imposed the penalty of suspension for 6 months. On MR, this penalty was lowered to a
reprimand.

While these proceedings were ongoing, respondent was re-elected as mayor in the same locality
(but not in the immediately succeeding election). When the case was elevated to the CA, he
manifested that the doctrine of condonation should be applied as he was re-elected, which the CA
granted.
 POLITICAL LAW

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of condonation applies to respondent

RULING:

The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-elected to the same
position in the immediately succeeding election. The doctrine can be applied to a public officer
who was elected to a different position provided that it is show that the body politic electing the
person to another office is the same.

In this case, the doctrine of condonation can still be validly applied as the case was instituted prior
to the case of Ombudsman v. Jejomar Binay, which abandoned the said doctrine. As respondent
was re-elected as mayor by the same electorate the voted for him when the violation was
committed, the doctrine of condonation applies.

FRANCISCO T. BACULI v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORMv. FRANCISCO T. BACULI
G.R. No. 188681 and G.R. No. 201130, March 8, 2017, Third Division, BERSAMIN, J.:

Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President pursuant
to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline
is lodged in the same authority in whom the power to appoint is vested.

The law abhors the indefinite preventive suspension of public officials and employees, whether
they are presidential appointees or not. For presidential appointees, the suspension should last only
within a reasonable time. For non-presidential appointees, the maximum period of preventive
suspension is 90 days. Once the allowable period of preventive suspension had been served, the public
officials and employees must be automatically reinstated.

FACTS:

On July 16, 1988, Francisco Baculi was appointed as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) II
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) - Cagayan by then President Corazon C. Aquino.
However, based on reports coming from the DAR Commission on Audit and the DAR Regional
Investigating Committee of Cagayan, his transactions were allegedly tainted with irregularities.
Both bodies found Baculi entering into contracts beyond the scope of his signing or approving
authority; executing and approving contracts of lease without the corresponding Certificate of
Availability of Funds; and no public bidding being held for the purpose. On 2 September 1992, then
DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued a formal charge against the Baculi for gross dishonesty,
abuse of authority, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Simultaneously, the Baculi was placed under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending
the investigation of the complaint. Francisco Baculi alleged that he acted purely for the benefit of
the DAR Provincial Office and that the formal charge issued by Secretary Garilao was null and void
because it was based on the report of the DAR Regional Investigating Committee, a body bereft of
authority to investigate administrative complaints against presidential appointees like him.
 POLITICAL LAW

Acting on the formal charge, the DAR Legal Affairs Office conducted a formal investigation. On
May 17, 1994, then DAR Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Hector D. Soliman issued an order
dismissing the petitioner from the service. Secretary Garilao affirmed the said order. Baculi
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner and
thereafter denied his motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, in a petition for review, set
aside the order of dismissal and ruled that the former is bereft of disciplinary jurisdiction over
presidential appointees. After the CA nullified his FIRST Dismissal, Baculi commenced in the RTC
the special civil action for mandamus to compel the DAR, represented by the DAR Secretary and its
Regional Director of Agrarian Reform for Region 2, to pay his basic salaries, benefits and other
emoluments corresponding to the period from August 2, 1994 - the date of the FIRST Dismissal -
until June 25, 2003 - the date when the Office of the President dismissed him from the service, plus
interest at the legal rate.

The DAR countered in that suit that Baculi's monetary claim was unfounded because he had not
been exonerated from the offenses charged against him. It reminded that the decision of the CA
did not exculpate him, but even suggested that the DAR Secretary could still forward the findings
against him to the Office of the President for proper action. According to Baculi, he was not
reinstated. But in the decision of the court a quo which he did not refute, it is stated therein
that "Baculi reported for work at the DAR Regional Office No. 2 on March 12, 2001 until December
31, 2001 during which period, his salary and other emoluments and benefits were paid in full''. On
June 26, 2003, succeeding DAR Secretary Hemani A. Braganza forwarded his findings and his
recommendation to dismiss the petitioner from the service to the Office of the President for proper
disposition through a memorandum. Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel
B. Gaite, acting by authority of the President, ordered the dismissal of Francisco Baculi and
accordingly, denying the request for reinstatement. The dismissal order of the Office of the
President is being referred to by petitioner as his "SECOND Dismissal". After the RTC dismissed
the petition for mandamus, Baculi appealed to the CA to reverse the dismissal of his petition.
Ultimately, on June 16, 2011, the CA reversed the RTC, and decreed that Baculi was entitled to the
back salaries and other benefits owing to his position at the rate last received before the suspension
was imposed from September 4, 1992 to June 25, 2003 except the 90-day period of preventive
suspension and the period from March 12, 2001 to December 31, 2001 during which he was briefly
reinstated.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the orders of dismissal issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and the Acting
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs were valid;
2. Whether or not Baculi should have been granted reinstatement after expiration of the 90-day
preventive suspension.

RULING:

1. The FIRST Dismissal of Baculi was void. Presidential appointees come under the direct
disciplining authority of the President pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of
a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority in whom the
power to appoint is vested. As such, the DAR Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him.
The SECOND Dismissal of Baculi was valid. It was of no moment to the validity and efficacy of the
dismissal that only Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Gaite had signed and issued
 POLITICAL LAW

the order of dismissal. In so doing, Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite neither exceeded his
authority, nor usurped the power of the President. The dismissal of Baculi through the order, being
by authority of the President, was entitled to full faith and credit as an act of the President herself.

2.YES. By law, Baculi should have been automatically reinstated at the end of the 90-day period of
his preventive suspension because his case was not finally decided within the said period. We have
to point out that preventive suspension is of two kinds. The first is the preventive suspension
pending investigation, and the second is the preventive suspension pending appeal where the
penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is either suspension or dismissal but after review the
respondent official or employee is exonerated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not
in a nature of penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate
charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing
witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that
period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after
investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be
reinstated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is authorized by law whenever the charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or
whenever there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges that would warrant
removal from the service. If the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the
administrative case within a period of 90 days from the start of preventive suspension pending
investigation, and the respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive suspension is lifted
and the respondent is "automatically reinstated in the service." In the case of presidential
appointees, the preventive suspension pending investigation shall be "for a reasonable time as the
circumstances of the case may warrant."

Nonetheless, there shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the respondent
officials are presidential or nonpresidential appointees. The law abhors indefinite preventive
suspension because the indefiniteness violates the constitutional guarantees under the due process
and equal protection clauses, as well as the right of public officers and employees to security of
tenure. The CA correctly decreed that Baculi should be paid his back salaries and other benefits for
the entire time that he should have been automatically reinstated at the rate owing to his position
that he last received prior to his preventive suspension on September 4, 1992. Such time
corresponded to the period from December 4, 1992 until June 25, 2003, but excluding the interval
from March 12, 2001 until December 31, 2001 when he was briefly reinstated.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. CRISOSTOMO PLOPINIO

April 03, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

Dropping from the rolls is not disciplinary in nature. It shall not result in the forfeiture of any
benefit of the public official or employee concerned nor in said public official or employee's
disqualification from reemployment in the government. Thus, the concerned public official or
employee need not be notified or be heard.

FACTS:

Plopinio served as a COMELEC Election Officer III of Sipocot, Camarines Sur.. A certain Alberto G.
Adan (Adan) filed a letter-complaint against respondent alleging that he had incurred frequent
absences. The COMELEC En Banc resolved for him to immediately cease and desist from
 POLITICAL LAW

performing his official duties, based, among other grounds, on his unauthorized absences pursuant
to Dir. Ibanez’s recommendation. The latter, however later on withdrew his recommendation
because of the inability to fully establish a successive 30-day AWOL. Respondent lamented that the
COMELEC en banc was misled by Dir. Ibañez's initial recommendation and that he was not
afforded due process as he was never confronted with any formal charge regarding his alleged
absenteeism prior to COMELEC Resolution

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent was deprived of due process.

RULING:

YES. A public officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls for AWOL without prior notice,
under any of the following circumstances: (1) the public officer or employee was continuously
absent without approved leave for at least 30 working days; or (2) the public officer or employee
had established a scheme to circumvent the rule by incurring substantial absences, though less than
30 working days, three times in a semester, such that a pattern was readily apparent.

Respondent was dropped by the COMELEC en banc from the rolls of employees for alleged AWOL,
but respondent's circumstances did not constitute a clear-cut case of AWOL. It is stressed that in
this case, there was no proof that respondent was actually absent or did not report for work
for 30 days or more. Respondent's AWOL was merely presumed from the fact that his DTRs for
certain dates were not on file with the COMELEC Personnel Department.

The COMELEC en banc cannot simply disregard Dir. Ibanez's Memorandum dated October 7, 2003
recalling his Memorandum dated August 20, 2003, when the COMELEC en banc entirely based its
Resolution No. 03-0278, dropping respondent from the rolls, on Dir. Ibanez's Memorandum dated
August 20, 2003. Therefore, there is no more factual basis for the presumption that respondent had
been AWOL for the said time periods that would have, in turn, justified his being dropped from the
rolls. Without such presumption, the COMELEC could only insist on the dropping of respondent
from the rolls on the ground of AWOL if it could establish that respondent had been actually absent
without approved leave for 30 days or more - which the COMELEC en banc utterly failed to do in
this case.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION BUREAU (FFIB),

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICES (MOLEO) v. PS/Supt. Rainier A. Espina
G. R. No. 213500, March 15, 2017,Per Curiam:

Gross neglect of duty is defined as "negligence characterized by want of even slight care, or by
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to
their own property."

FACTS:
 POLITICAL LAW

On July 11 and 17, 2012, Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) filed before the
Ombudsman a complaint and a supplemental complaint, charging Espina and several other PNP
officers and private individuals for: (a) violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080,RA 3019,RA 918411
and its IRR, and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b) Grave Misconduct and
Serious Dishonesty, arising from alleged anomalies that attended the Philippine National Police's
(PNP) procurement of 40 tires, and repair, refurbishment, repowering, and maintenance services
of a total of 28 units of V-150 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and the related transportation and
delivery expenses of 18 units of LAVs between August and December 2007. It averred that the PNP
did not comply with the bidding procedure prescribed under RA 9184 and its IRR. Further, it
claimed that there were "ghost deliveries,"i.e., the tires were never delivered to the PNP and no
repair and refurbishment works were actually performed on the LAV. Espina, as the Acting Chief
of the Management Division of the PNP Directorate for Comptrollership at the time the
procurements were made, was impleaded in the aforesaid complaints for noting or signing the
Inspection Report Forms (IRFs), which confirmed the PNP's receipt of the tires and other supplies,
and the performance of repair and refurbishment works on the LAV. According to the FFIB-
MOLEO, by affixing his signature on the IRFs, Espina supposedly facilitated the fraudulent
disbursement of funds amounting to P409,740,000.00 when no goods were actually delivered and
no services were actually rendered. In his defense, Espina denied any participation in the bidding
and/or procurement process and maintained that he belonged to the Management Division which
is responsible for the inspection of deliveries made to the PNP after the bidding and procurement
process, according to him, it was not his responsibility to personally inspect and confirm deliveries
and go beyond the contents of the IRFs submitted by his subordinates, absent any irregularity
reported by the property inspectors who are tasked to check and examine deliveries.

Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Espina and several other PNP officers as charged and,
accordingly, recommended their dismissal from government service. Ombudsman held that Espina
executed indispensable acts which led to the completion of the illegal transactions. Ombudsman
noted the admission of one of the experts engaged in the repair of the LAVs that the repair and
refurbishment works thereon were still on-going as late as February 2008 until 2010 and, hence,
could not have been completed in December 2007.On reconsideration, the Ombudsman dropped
the charges against Espina and several other PNP Officers but sustained the other findings,
including their dismissal from service in view of their administrative liability. Ombudsman pointed
out that while it was not Espina's duty to make his own inspections of the alleged deliveries and
work "it was incumbent upon Espina to affix his signature only after checking the completeness
and propriety of the documents." Aggrieved, Espina filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, impleading both the Ombudsman and the FFIB-MOLEO. CA ruled in favor of Espina and
held that his act of affixing his signature on the IRFs could not be considered as Grave Misconduct
because he had no participation in the bidding and procurement process. As such, no liability could
attach to him absent a nexus between his functions as Acting Chief of the Management Division
and the alleged anomalous procurement process. CA found Espina guilty, instead, of Simple
Misconduct. It rejected Espina's defense of reliance in good faith on the acts of his subordinates,
holding that he had the obligation to supervise them. However, CA absolved Espina from the charge
of Serious Dishonesty, considering that he did not personally prepare the IRFs but merely affixed
his signatures thereon. At best, he imprudently failed to check and counter-check the contents of
the IRFs and the Work Orders he signed, CA imposed on Espina a three-month suspension
 POLITICAL LAW

reckoned from the time he was actually dismissed from service. Dissatisfied, Ombudsman and
FFIB-MOLEO moved for reconsideration which was denied; hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Espina should be held administratively liable for the charges imputed against him

RULING:

YES. In the case at bar, Espina was charged with grave misconduct and serious dishonesty before
the Ombudsman which found him guilty as charged, and imposed on him the supreme penalty of
dismissal from government service with all its accessory penalties, while the CA adjudged him guilty
only of simple misconduct. CA correctly observed that while Espina may have failed to personally
confirm the delivery of the procured items, the same does not constitute dishonesty of any form
inasmuch as he did not personally prepare the IRFs but merely affixed his signature thereon after
his subordinates supplied the details therein. Neither can Espina's acts be considered misconduct,
grave or simple. The records are bereft of any proof that Espina was motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or deliberate intent of violating the law, or disregarding any established rule, or that he
wrongfully used his position to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to
duty and the rights of others.

However, the Court finds Espina administratively liable, instead, for Gross Neglect of Duty,
warranting his dismissal from government service. Notably, the FFIB-MOLEO's supplemental
complaint accused Espina with failure to exercise due diligence in signing the IRFs, which is
sufficient to hold him liable for Gross Neglect of Duty. Gross neglect of duty is defined as
"negligence characterized by want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that
care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property." In contrast,
simple neglect of duty is the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task
expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."

As aptly observed by the CA, Espina had the obligation to supervise his subordinates and see to it
that they have performed their respective functions in accordance with law. To recall, Espina was
the Acting Chief and Head of the PNP's Management Division and, as such, had supervisory
powers over the departments or sections which comprise it, one of which is the Internal Control
and Inspection Section (ICIS), among others. Espina himself admitted that the property inspectors
who were tasked to personally inspect deliveries to the PNP belong to the ICIS which was under his
management and stewardship. Indeed, the Court has pronounced that a public officer's high
position imposes upon him greater responsibility and obliges him to be more circumspect in his
actions and in the discharge of his official duties. This particularly applies to the instant
controversy, especially where Espina's signature was one of the final steps needed for the release of
payment for the procured items. Espina was expected to employ diligence in ensuring that all claims
were supported by complete pertinent documents. As succinctly put by the CA, Espina's duty as
Acting Chief was not merely ministerial and perfunctory as it related to the disbursement of funds
over which a great responsibility attached. More so, considering the sheer magnitude of the amount
in taxpayers' money involved, i.e., P409,740,000.00, Espina should have exercised utmost care
before signing the IRFs.
 POLITICAL LAW

Verily, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a "[p ]ublic office is a
public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice
and lead modest lives." This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be mere
rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this
standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service.Erring public officials may also be held personally liable for
disbursements made in violation of law or regulation, as stated in Section 52, Chapter 9, Subtitle B,
Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.Thus, public officers, as recipients of public trust,
are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of
their ability. Unfortunately, Espina failed miserably in this respect.

Separate Concurring Opinion

Caguioa, J.

This opinion is submitted to further emphasize the exceptional circumstances that render the
doctrine espoused in Arias v. Sandiganbayan(Arias) inapplicable to this case. While I concur with
the ponencia, I wish to emphasize that the Court's ruling in this case should not be misconstrued
as disregarding the inescapable realities of government service which the Court had taken judicial
notice of in Arias - "dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments and
positions."

In Arias, the Court, recognizing the volume of documents department heads are required to
routinely sign, held that such heads "have to rely, to a reasonable extent, on their subordinates and
on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations." Therein,
the Court proceeded to rule that a finding of conspiracy to defraud the government cannot be made
to rest on the department head's signature alone, in the absence of some reason or irregularity
which would impel further inquiry. The ponencia holds that the Arias doctrine cannot be applied
in this case due to the existence of reasons that should have impelled Espina to go beyond the
findings and recommendations reflected on the face of the IRFs. I agree.

Standard Operating Procedure XX4 (SOP 24) prescribes the guidelines for inspection and
acceptance of deliveries of supplies, police products, materials and equipment, as well as the repair,
renovation and construction works rendered in favor of the PNP. In this case, Espina does not deny
that he did not conduct further inquiry before affixing his signature on the IRFs in question despite
the suspiciously short 7-day period indicated therein within which the repair and refurbishment
works on the LAV s were supposedly completed. Espina merely claims that he was not bound to go
beyond the findings and recommendations reflected on the IRFs, as he was merely required to
"note" the same. Espina's liability for gross negligence arises from his reliance on the findings and
recommendations of his property inspectors despite the glaring irregularities appearing on the face
of the IRFs. Notably, while Espina claims that no apparent irregularities were in fact ascertainable
from the IRFs' supporting documents, he failed to submit these supporting documents in evidence,
nor prove, by any other means, that these supporting documents were in fact appended to the IRF
s at the time he affixed his signature thereon. These evidentiary lapses, whether inadvertent or
otherwise, place Espina's compliance with SOP 24 in serious doubt. It bears stressing that his duty
to ascertain the propriety of the repairs conducted on the LAVs and the reasonableness of the
corresponding cost were positive ones spelled out in SOP 24. It was thus incumbent upon him to
 POLITICAL LAW

show proof that such duty was in fact complied with, particularly in this case, where the anomalies
behind the transactions in question could have been easily uncovered, if only he complied with
SOP 24.

ROSEMARIE B. BINTUDAN v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017, En Banc, BERSAMIN, J.:

An accountable officer who tolerated the posting of the number combination of the safety
vault where the funds of the office in her custody were kept is guilty of negligence, and cannot be
relieved of her accountability.

FACTS:

Rosemarie Bintudan was a Disbursing Officer II at the DILG-Cordillera Administrative Region

(DILG-CAR) Provincial Office. One night, unidentified suspects gained access inside and robbed
the DILG-CAR Provincial Office. They carted away the contents of the vault amounting to
₱114,907.30. By her letter dated March 17, 2005, the petitioner reported the robbery to the Provincial
Office in Lagawe, Ifugao Police as well as to the Audit Team Leader (ATL) of DILG-CAR. On April
6, 2005, she requested the ATL to be relieved from liability over the stolen money. The COA denied
Bintudan's request for relief because of her negligence. Bintudan thus filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the CA.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petition for review was the correct remedy
2. Whether or not Bintudan was negligent.

RULING:

1. No. Bintudan has filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to assail the decision of
the COA en bane. Such remedy is improper because her proper remedy is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes. The findings show that the Bintudan was severely negligent in the performance of her duties
as the disbursing officer. She did not properly discharge her responsibility to safeguard the public
funds entrusted to her. The ATL found that she had withdrawn from a nearby bank the funds for
salaries 13 days from the deadline for the submission of reports, and had placed the funds inside the
safety vault despite the number combination having been left posted at safety vault's very door. She
was further found to have even failed to inform the security guard on duty that she had kept a
considerable amount of cash in the safety vault if only to ensure that the amount would be safe.

NINI LANTO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ET AL.

G.R. No. 217189, April 18, 2017, En Banc, Bersamin, J.:

It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the
discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with
malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from
the performance of an official duty.
 POLITICAL LAW

FACTS:

Leonel Labrador, the former Chief of the POEA’s Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD),
was dismissed by the Secretary of Labor for acts of bribery. The COA State Auditor issued an audit
observing various expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the payment of salaries and benefits to
Labrador for the period covering August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. Based on these observations,
the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance and found that POEA and the responsible officers
including Petitioner should be held liable for the refund of the amount received by Labrador.
Hence, Petitioner questions her personal liability as to the refund of the said amount.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COA was correct in finding petitioner personally liable for the refund.

RULING:

NO. The petitioner's good faith in certifying to the correctness of the payrolls based on available
records about Labrador having actually reported to work, and on her absolute lack of knowledge of
his having been dismissed and of the pendency of the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan
constituted compelling circumstances that justified applying the exception in her favor. At the time
she made the certifications of the payrolls she relied on the relevant public and official documents
showing that Labrador had rendered actual service during the periods concerned. Her honest belief
that Labrador was legally entitled to the salary payments thereby became established.

Only convincing proof of the petitioner's malice or bad faith in the performance of her duties could
have warranted the rejection of her plea of good faith. But the COA did not adduce proof of her
malice or bad faith. At any rate, not extending the benefit of good faith and regular performance of
duty to the petitioner herein would be unfair and unjust if the Court absolved the petitioner in
Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit from personal liability for the same disallowed salaries of
Labrador on the basis of good faith.

The fact that the petitioner was on foreign assignment when the COA rendered the assailed
issuances plausibly explained why she did not seasonably assail or oppose the disallowances. In
light of the foregoing circumstances, the COA's directive to withhold the petitioner's salary was
void and produced no legal effect. As such, the assailed COA issuances did not attain finality and
immutability as to her.

C. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATION

RE: MEDICAL CONDITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIA CRISTINA J. CORNEJO,

SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. 16-10-05-SB, March 14, 2017, LEONEN, J.:

Disability retirement is conditioned on the incapacity of the employee to continue his or her
employment for involuntary causes such as illness or accident. The social justice principle behind
retirement benefits also applies to those who are forced to cease from service for disabilities beyond
their control.
 POLITICAL LAW

FACTS: On October 20, 2016, this Court received a letter from Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang stating that Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo
(Justice Cornejo) has been on sick leave since June 13, 2016. According to the attached clinical
abstract from the Attending Physician of Cardinal Santos Medical Center, Justice Cornejo was
diagnosed with acute cerebrovascular disease in bilateral cerebral and cerebellar hemispheres;
controlled hypertension; systemic lupus erythematous; pancytopenia; colon cancer stage III s/p left
hemicolectomy; and acute kidney injury secondary to poor oral intake. On November 8, 2016, this
Court noted the letter from Presiding Justice Cabotaje-Tang and directed the Head of the Supreme
Court Medical Services to certify Justice Cornejo's capability to function as a Sandiganbayan Justice.
On December 13, 2016, based on the reports submitted by the Supreme Court medical officers and
his own physical evaluation of Justice Cornejo, the Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer,
Medical and Dental Services, opined that Justice Cornejo was "physically and medically
incapacitated to perform her duties, and responsibilities as Sandiganbayan Justice."

On January 10, 2017, this Court required Justice Cornejo to comment on Dr. Banzon's December 13,
2016 Memorandum. On January 13, 2017, Justice Cornejo wrote Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno to request the approval of her optional retirement, effective March 1, 2017, due to serious
health concerns. She stated that she had been in government service since August 1977 and has
been in the judiciary from January 1987 to the present. Justice Cornejo's letter request bore her
thumbprint instead of a signature. On February 6, 2017, Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang
recommended the approval of Justice Cornejo's request.

RULING:

Disability retirement is conditioned on the incapacity of the employee to continue his or her
employment for involuntary causes such as illness or accident. The social justice principle behind
retirement benefits also applies to those who are forced to cease from service for disabilities beyond
their control. We rule to grant the request for retirement, but with modification. Justice Cornejo
has been in government service for more than 39 years, the last 30 years of which she had
continuously rendered in the judiciary. We acknowledge Justice Cornejo's request for optional
retirement. However, in light of Justice Cornejo's actual medical condition, this Court will treat her
letter request as one for retirement due to disability. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910, grants a 10-
year lump sum of 10 years' gratuity-computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the
highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation, and other allowances such as personal
economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance to a retired
Sandiganbayan Justice – if the reason for the retirement is any permanent disability contracted
during his or her incumbency in office and before the date of retirement.

D. CIVIL SERVICE

CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017, En Banc, SERENO, CJ:

The Civil Service Commission has been expressly granted the power to promulgate policies,
standards, and guidelines for the civil service; and to render opinions and rulings on all personnel and
other civil service matters.
 POLITICAL LAW

FACTS:

The Public Attorney's Office (PAO) received a copy of the report of Career Executive Service
Board(CESB) which stated, among others, that out of 35 filled positions in the PAO, 33 were
occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility. The PAO Deputy Chief sent a letter to
CESB, informing the latter that the subject positions are permanent in nature pursuant to Section
6 of RA 9406 which accorded security of tenure to its occupants and as such, may only be removed
in accordance with law. The CSC opined that for purposes of permanent appointment to the subject
positions, no third level eligibility is required but only RA 1080 (BAR) civil service eligibility.

The CESB issued Resolution No. 918 denying the PAO's request to declassify the subject positions.
The CESB noted that the positions in question "require leadership and managerial competence"
and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for
these posts cannot be considered permanent. The PAO assailed the said resolution before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). Ruling in favor of PAO, the CSC declared that the CESB would be in
violation of R.A. 9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification - in this case, third-
level eligibility - for purposes of permanent appointments to certain PAO positions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction to reverse CESB Resolution No. 918

RULING:

YES. The CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB
Resolution No. 918. Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC the administration of
the civil service, which is comprised of "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."

The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is given the comprehensive mandate
to administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution; and Section 12,
Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It has also been expressly granted the power to
promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil service; and to render opinions and
rulings on all personnel and other civil service matters.

The question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is clearly a civil service matter
falling within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC.It must likewise be emphasized that the
CSC has been granted the authority to review the decisions of agencies attached to it under Section
12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code. Since the CESB is an
attached agency of the CSC, the former's decisions are expressly subject to the CSC's review on
appeal.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS v.BAI HAIDY D. MAMALINTA

G.R. No. 226622, March 14, 2017, En Banc, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 POLITICAL LAW

Mamalinta's afore-described act of premature proclamation may still be considered as Grave

Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. While
Mamalinta may be absolved from administrative liability for her acts of double proclamation and
unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing as such acts were done under duress, she is
nevertheless administratively liable for her premature proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning
candidate on the basis of an incomplete canvass of votes.

FACTS:

During the 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
appointed Mamalinta as Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) for South Upi,
Maguindanao, together with Abdullah K. Mato (Mato) and Pablito C. Peñafiel (Peñafiel), Sr. as Vice-
Chairman and Member, respectively. While performing their functions, the MBOC allegedly
committed the following acts: (a) on May 16, 2004, the MBOC proclaimed Datu Israel Sinsuat
(Sinsuat) as Mayor, Datu Jabarael Sinsuat as Vice-Mayor, and eight (8) members of
the Sangguniang Bayan as winning candidates, on the basis of nineteen (19) out of the thirty-five
(35) total election returns; (b) on even date, the MBOC caused the transfer of the place for
canvassing of votes from Tinaman Elementary School, South Upi, Maguindanao to Cotabato City
without prior authority from the COMELEC; and (c) two days later or on May 18, 2004, they
proclaimed a new set of winning candidates, headlined by Antonio Gunsi, Jr. (Gunsi) as Mayor and
four (4) new members of the Sangguniang Bayan on the basis of thirty (30) out of thirtyfive (35)
election returns. Thus, on May 20, 2004, Atty. Clarita Callar, Regional Election Director of the
COMELEC, reported the incidents to the COMELEC En Banc, which in turn, directed the
COMELEC Law Department to conduct a fact-finding investigation on the matter, which thereafter,
recommended the filing of administrative and criminal cases against the members of the MBOC.
Subsequently, Mamalinta was formally charged with Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty,
Gross Inefficiency and Incompetence, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. Mamalinta denied the charges against her, claiming that the MBOC's acts of double
proclamation and transferring the place for canvassing were attended by duress in view of the
imminent danger to their lives due to the violence and intimidation initiated by Gunsi's supporters.

The COMELEC En Banc found Mamalinta guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and accordingly, dismissed her from public
service, with imposition of all accessory penalties relative thereto. It ruled that the MBOC's acts of
proclaiming two (2) sets of winning candidates; issuing such proclamations based on an incomplete
canvass of votes; and transferring the place for the canvassing of votes are blatant violations of
various laws and COMELEC resolutions on the conduct of elections, and thus, sufficient to hold
Mamalinta liable for the afore said administrative offenses, thereby justifying her dismissal from
service. The COMELEC En Banc did not lend credence to Mamalinta's claim of duress and/or
threats, opining her failure to substantiate the same. Mamalinta moved for reconsideration, which
was denied. Aggrieved, she appealed to the CSC, which affirmed the COMELEC En Banc ruling. The
CSC likewise did not lend credence to Mamalinta's claims of violence, opining that they were self-
serving, absent any evidence supporting the same. Mamalinta filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the CSC. She elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for review. CA
reversed and set aside the CSC ruling, and accordingly, reinstated Mamalinta to her former position
prior to her dismissal, without loss of seniority rights, and with payment of the corresponding back
salaries and all benefits which she would have been entitled to if not for her illegal dismissal. CA
found that Mamalinta sufficiently substantiated her claims of duress by presenting various
 POLITICAL LAW

documentary evidence, namely, the Joint-Affidavit she executed with her Vice-Chairman, Mato,
and the Minutes of the MBOC and the Report both prepared by Pefiafiel, all of which recounted
the acts of duress and intimidation pressed on them. Further noting that Mamalinta immediately
flew to Manila after escaping the hostile incidents they experienced in order to report the same to
then-COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, the CA concluded that Mamalinta and the rest of the
MBOC were indeed forced, intimidated, and coerced into performing the acts constituting the
charges against them, and thus, they could not be held administratively liable therefor. The
COMELEC moved for reconsideration, which was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA correctly reversed and set aside the CSC ruling, which consequently, absolved
Mamalinta from the administrative charges of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

RULING:

NO. A judicious review of the records reveals that Mamalinta is being charged of committing the
following acts, namely: (a) the double proclamation of Sinsuat and Gunsi as mayor of South Upi;
(b) the transfer of the place for canvassing of votes from Tinaman Elementary School, South Upi,
Maguindanao to Cotabato City without prior authority from the COMELEC; and (c) the premature
proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning candidate on the basis of an incomplete canvass of election
returns.

Anent the first two (2) acts complained of, CA is correct that Mamalinta should not be held
administratively liable for the same to warrant her dismissal from the service, as such acts were
committed while under duress and intimidation. Records reveal that Mamalinta and the rest of the
MBOC were under heavy duress from supporters of mayoralty candidate Gunsi. As stated in
Mamalinta's Joint Affidavit with Mato, the Vice-Chairman of the MBOC, they were forcibly taken
and held hostage by Gunsi's supporters, and while detained, were forced, intimidated, and coerced
into declaring Gunsi as the winning candidate, despite their earlier proclamation that Sinsuat was
the true winner of the mayoralty elections. Mamalinta and Mato's statements in their Joint Affidavit
were then corroborated by the Minutes of the MBOC and the Reportboth prepared by Pefiafiel,
another member of the MBOC, stating inter alia, that while the MBOC was canvassing the votes,
Gunsi's supporters kicked open the doors of the room, rushed towards the members of the MBOC,
and even attempted to throw chairs to them. Irrefragably, the foregoing incidents show that duress
and intimidation were clearly exercised against Mamalinta and the rest of the MBOC, and thus, the
latter succumbed to the same by performing the aforesaid acts albeit against their will. However,
as soon as Mamalinta and the MBOC escaped from their dire situation, she immediately flew to
Manila to report the incidents to the COMELEC, thus, there is more reason to believe that
Mamalinta and the MBOC did not willingly commit the aforementioned acts. To clarify, the CA did
not err in considering Mamalinta and Mato's Joint Affidavit as well as the Minutes of the MBOC
and the Report both prepared by Pefiafiel, although they were not formally offered as evidence
during the investigation before the COMELEC. As a rule, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. Hence, in proper cases, the procedural rules
may be relaxed for the furtherance of just objectives.
 POLITICAL LAW

These notwithstanding, the Court notes that the CA failed to determine Mamalinta's administrative
liability on the third act she was accused of committing. COMELEC En Banc correctly pointed out
that the uncanvassed election returns can still drastically affect the outcome of the elections, since
"at the time of Sinsuat's proclamation, he garnered only 1,230 votes, with 4 election returns that
have yet to be canvassed. These 4 election returns amount to 3,049 votes, or equivalent to 42.91%
of the total registered voters of South Upi, Maguindanao." Notably, Mamalinta's defense of duress
is untenable in this instance as there was no showing that the MBOC was intimidated or coerced
into proclaiming Sinsuat as the winning candidate for the position of Mayor of South Upi,
Maguindanao. The allegations of Mamalinta that force and threats were exerted on her to make
said premature proclamation are self-serving and not supported by any other evidence. Therefore,
Mamalinta's afore-described act of premature proclamation may still be considered as Grave
Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.
While Mamalinta may be absolved from administrative liability for her acts of double proclamation
and unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing as such acts were done under duress, she is
nevertheless administratively liable for her premature proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning
candidate on the basis of an incomplete canvass of votes.

CONCEPCION DAPLAS, City Treasurer of Pasay City v. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution in order
to promote transparency in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against government officials
bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means.

FACTS:

Two (2) complaints were filed against Petitioner by the DOF in the Ombudsman (OMB) averring
violations of Sections 7 and 8 of RA 3019, Section 8 of RA 6713, Section 2 of RA 1379, Article 183 of
the RPC and Executive Order No. 6 (EO 6), constituting Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, arising out of her failure to disclose the true
and detailed statement of her assets, liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and financial
connections, and those of her spouse in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALNs). The OMB found petitioner guilty of the charges and imposed the penalty of Dismissal,
and its accessory penalties, without prejudice to criminal prosecution. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower courts correctly found the petitioner guilty.

RULING:

NO. Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the
administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are lacking to warrant petitioner's
dismissal from service. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
 POLITICAL LAW

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or
employee, and would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere
non-declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense.

Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition,
a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration
results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and
income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of income
and acquisitions.

Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive
the authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names.
Petitioner's failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge
of dishonesty in the absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make
false statements. Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in
accomplishing her SALN.

MARITA TOLENTINO and FELY SAN ANDRES v. SHERIFF IV GLENN A. UMALI

A.M. No. P-16-3615, January 24, 2017, En Banc, PER CURIAM:

Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule

of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. A misconduct is grave where the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are
present.

FACTS:

Tolentino and San Andres filed a letter-complaint alleging that Umali received the amount of
₱100,000.00 from San Andres representing payment of the judgment debt awarded in Tolentino’s
favor in Criminal Case No. 01-7892 then pending before the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan.It appears,
however, that such amount was neither delivered to Tolentino or the clerk of court, nor was it
deposited to the MTC’s bank account.As requested, a conference was held during which Umali
agreed to pay the unremitted judgment debt.Thereafter, the case was referred to OCA for
appropriate action.In his comment, Umali asserted that the matter was merely a result of a
misunderstanding, and that it had been resolved, since he already remitted the full amount of the
judgment debt in Tolentino’s favor.

The OCA recommended that Umali is guilty of grave misconduct because records reveal that he
did not give the amount paid to the clerk of court, nor did he deposit the money to the court’s
depository bank. He only remitted the PhP 100,000.00 to Tolentino after the requested conference
was held. There is indeed a strong ground to believe that Umali had the initial intention of
misappropriating the subject amount; and if it was not because of Tolentino and San Andres’ letter-
complaint, the malversation could have been fully consummated.

ISSUE:

Whether Umali is guilty of grave misconduct.

 POLITICAL LAW

RULING:

YES. The Court agrees with the OCA’s recommendation. Under Section 46 (A)(3), Rule 10 on the
Schedule of Penalties of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from service in the first instance. The
penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
perpetual disqualification from holding public office and being barred from taking civil service
examinations.

Umali’s bare assertion that his failure to turn over the judgment debt in accordance with Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court resulted from a “misunderstanding” is specious, at best. The fact that Umali did
not offer any form of explanation as to the nature, cause and incidents of this so-called
misunderstanding shows that it was a mere afterthought and a lame excuse offered after his
misdeed had been discovered. Moreover, while the Court is aware that it may consider
circumstances to mitigate the imposable penalty prescribed under the RRACCS, no such
circumstance has been invoked, nor does any appear from the records of the case.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICES v. P/S SUPT. LUIS L. SALIGUMBA
G.R. No. 223768, February 22, 2017, Third Division, VELASCO, JR., J.:

Simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to
a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference."

FACTS:

The PNP Directorate for Research and Development conducted an ocular inspection of the units
delivered and issued Weapons Transportation and Communication Division (WTCD) Report The
WTCD Report was recommended for approval by Joel Crisostomo L. Garcia, which
recommendation was concurred in by Luis L. Saligumba. Upon receipt of the initial batch, the PNP
through its Technical Inspection Committee on Watercrafts discovered various deficiencies in the
equipments, which make their use risky to end-users. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (OMB-MOLEO) conducted an investigation on the
aforesaid procurement by PNP.

The complaint charges Saligumba, as member of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee (IAC),
together with other public individuals, with Gross Neglect of Duty and Gross Incompetence. In
holding Saligumba administratively liable for simple neglect of duty, the Ombudsman ruled that
while persons other than those formally appointed as inspectors may be authorized to conduct the
inspection, the members of the IAC are still expected to exercise due diligence in seeing to it that
the policies or guidelines for inspection are dutifully observed, which they failed to do so. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Saligumba is guilty of simple neglect of duty.

 POLITICAL LAW

RULING:

YES. Saligumba evidently neglected to efficiently and effectively discharge his functions and
responsibilities. Simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper
attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference."

He even admitted that he did not personally inspect the deliveries since a group of experts and
selected personnel knowledgeable of rubber boats had conducted the inspection for him. While
they are not mandated to exclusively inspect the items delivered, Saligumba and other IAC
members should not have merely relied on the reports and instead confirmed such findings by
personally inspecting the deliveries, especially since there were noted discrepancies from the
report. The WTCD reports relied upon by respondent IAC members which were prepared by the
actual inspectors contained remarks that the PRBs delivered lacked some accessories. The WTCD
reports also provided information showing non-compliance with the NAPOLCOM standard
specifications. Prudence dictates that Saligumba should have brought it upon himself to personally
check the said items, especially when the very WTCD reports IAC members relied upon already
show deviations of the NAPOLCOM specifications.

Saligumba and other members of the IAC fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them,
for failing to perform the task of inspecting the deliveries in accordance with the conditions of the
procurement documents and rejecting said deliveries in case of deviation.

Simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension without pay for
one month and one day to six months.Thus the imposition of the penalty of six months suspension
by the Ombudsman is proper.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA v. GLORIA

B. AQUINTEY, EDUARDO F. MENDOZA AND AGNES N. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 204766, March 6, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J.:

Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some orders, which a superior officer is entitled
to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and
reasonable instructions of the employer.

FACTS:

Dr. De Leon was designated by then DOH secretary Dr. Dayrit as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
Ilocos Training and Regional Medical Center (ITRMC) for a fixed term of one year. As Dr. De Leon
remained in his position beyond the one-year period, Secretary Dayrit issued a department order
relieving him of his duties and designating Dr. Janairo as his replacement. Claiming that he was
aggrieved by such replacement, Dr. De Leon filed a petition for injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court issued a TRO and thereafter,
a writ of preliminary injunction, directing Secretary Dayrit to cease and desist from enforcing his
order relieving Dr. De Leon from his post as OIC and designating Dr. Janairo as his replacement.
 POLITICAL LAW

Secretary Dayrit and Dr. Janairo then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. The CA issued a Resolution which
ordered the maintenance of the status quo, particularly Dr. Janairo's assumption of the office of the
OIC. Thereafter, Secretary Dayrit issued a department order directing Dr. Janairo to perform his
function as OIC of ITRMC. Nonetheless, Dr. De Leon refused to vacate the office and continued to
perform the duties of the OIC.

Dr. Janairo issued several office orders, memoranda and letters addressed to the respondents
Aquintey, et al. However, Aquintey et al. did not comply with the said issuances. This prompted
Dr. Janairo to file before the Department of Health (DOH) an administrative complaint
chargingherein Aquintey, et al. with gross insubordination, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It was alleged that they disregarded and
defied the orders of Dr. Janairo, with full knowledge that the latter was the lawfully OIC of the
Ilocos Training and Regional Medical Center (ITRMC).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Aquintey, et al. are guilty of gross insubordination when they chose not to follow
the various orders of Dr. Janairo which were issued in his capacity as OIC of the ITRMC.

RULING:

YES. Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some orders, which a superior officer is entitled
to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and
reasonable instructions of the employer.

In her Answer to the show-cause letter of Dr. Janairo, respondent Aquintey, aside from refusing to
obey the directives of the former, even accused him of grave misconduct, abuse of authority and
usurpation of authority. On the other hand, respondent Mendoza never filed an answer or
comment to Dr. Janairo's show-cause letter. On her part, respondent Villanueva never attempted
to see and meet with Dr. Janairo to discuss the condition of the hospital, as required by the latter.
These instances clearly show that respondents never recognized Dr. Janairo's authority as OIC.

The supposed confusion as to what the CA considers as the status quo in the present controversy is
more imagined than real as the fact remains that the language of the CA in its Resolution clearly
considered Dr. Janairo's assumption of the office of the OIC as the status quo

Furthermore, any doubts which may have been entertained by respondents as to who was really
entitled to the contested office of the OIC, should have been cleared when DOH Secretary Dayrit
issued Department Order No. 231-D which affirmed Dr. Janairo's assumption of the office of OIC of
the ITRMC. Respondents had no excuse in not recognizing Secretary Dayrit's Order as he occupies
a position which is even higher than that of Dr. Janairo or Dr. De Leon. As DOH employees, they
are bound to obey the lawful orders of the DOH Secretary, notwithstanding any legal issues that
may exist between Dr. De Leon and Dr. Janairo. Thus, it becomes apparent that, in view of the clear
language of the above CA Resolution and the DOH Secretary's Order, respondents' deliberate
refusal to obey Dr. Janairo is not prompted by confusion or by what they claim as their belief in
good faith, but by their personal preference or bias in favor of Dr. De Leon and against Dr. Janairo.
Thus, respondents' defiance of the successive memoranda and office orders of Dr. Janairo clearly
 POLITICAL LAW

constitutes gross insubordination as it was a continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct order
which is reasonable and was given by and with proper authority.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind ay accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing
evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of any
disciplinary action upon the employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and
his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position.
In this case, the attending facts and the evidence presented, point to no other conclusion than the
administrative liability of respondents for gross insubordination.

E. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. OMBUDSMAN

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 159139 & 174777, June 6 , 2017, En Banc, Jardaleza, J.:

As a general rule, the Court does not intervene with the Ombudsman's exercise of its
investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Office of the Ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of the public service. This policy rests on the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, which is one of the foundations of our republican government.

FACTS:

In 2004, the Court promulgated its decision, finding that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in awarding to Infotech the contract involving automated counting machines, despite
the latter’s failure to comply with certain technical requirement. Thus, the court ordered the
Ombudsman to determine the criminal liability if any, of the public officials and private individuals
involved in the nullified contract. Consequently, the Ombudsman issued a resolution
recommending the filing of information against them, however, the same was reversed in their
Supplemental Resolution finding no probable cause in filing the same. Thus, the Petitioners in this
case, question the dismissal of the administrative and criminal complaints.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaints.

RULING:

NO. The Court emphatically stresses that its directive to the OMB to render a report on a regular
basis, pursuant to this Court's Decision promulgated on January 13, 2004, does not in any way
impinge upon, much less rob it of its independence as provided under the Constitution.
 POLITICAL LAW

Our pronouncements in the June 13, 2006 Resolution are consistent with the Court's policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsman's conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave the
Ombudsman sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause. As a general rule, the Court does not intervene with the
Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service. This policy rests on
the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, which is one of the foundations of our republican
government.

In view of the constitutional delineation of powers, we reject the petitioners' contention that we
already made a determination in the Infotech case that a crime has been committed. We could not
have made such determination without going beyond the limits of our judicial power andthereby
unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the constitutionally created Office of the Ombudsman. In
Infotech, we only exercised our mandate to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC. In the exercise
of our certiorari jurisdiction in Jnfotech, we only resolved whether the COMELEC acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. We never decided whether the facts were
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondents were probably guilty thereof.

Lest it be forgotten, separation of powers is not merely a hollow doctrine in constitutional law;
rather, it serves a very important purpose in our democratic republic government, that is, to prevent
tyranny by prohibiting the concentration of the sovereign powers of state in one body.

CINDY SHIELA COBARDE- GAMALLO v. JOSE ROMEO ESCANDOR

G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017, Third Division, Velasco, J.:

The OMB is authorized to promulgate its own rules of procedure by none other than the
Constitution, which is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, otherwise
known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989”. With that, the CA cannot just stay the execution of
decisions rendered by the OMB when its rules categorically and specifically warrant their
enforcement, else the OMB’s rule-making authority be unduly encroached and the constitutional and
statutory provisions providing the same be disregarded.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against respondent Escandor for violation of the Anti-
Sexual Harrasment Act. Petitioner was a contractual employee of NEDA, Regional Office No. 7
where Escandor was its Regional Director. The Ombudsman adjudged Escandor guilty of grave
misconduct meted him with the penalty of dismissal. Pursuant to the Rules of the Ombudsman,
the Ombudsman directed the implementation of Escandor’s dismissal from the service, through
the then Secretary of NEDA Romulo L. Neri. Escandor went to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari.
In support of his petition, Escandor claimed that he timely moved for reconsideration of the said
Decision; thus, it would be premature for the OMB and the NEDA to dismiss him from the service.
The CA sided with Escandor and enjoined the Ombudsman and Secretary Neri from implementing
his dismissal.
 POLITICAL LAW

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal against Escandor can be immediately
implemented despite the pendency of his motion for reconsideration.

RULING:

Yes. The issue presented in these consolidated petitions is not novel. In fact, it has long been settled
in a number of cases, to wit: Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, Villasenor, et al. v.
Ombudsman, et al., and The Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina, stating that the OMB's
decision, even if the penalty imposed is dismissal from the service, is immediately executory despite
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and cannot be stayed by mere filing of
them. Section 7 of the OMB Rules of Procedure is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not
stop the decision from being executory, and that such shall be executed as a matter of course.

Here, Escandor was ordered dismissed from the service. Undoubtedly, such decision against him is
appealable via Rule 43 to the CA. Nonetheless, the same is immediately executory even pending
appeal or in his case even pending his motion for reconsideration before the OMB as that is the
clear mandate of Section 7, Rule III of the OMB Rules of Procedure, As such, Escandor’s filing of a
motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation of the OMB’s order of
dismissal since a decision of the OMB in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course
under the afore-quoted Section 7. Further, in applying Section 7, there is no vested right that is
violated as the respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended while
his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. To note, there is no
such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.

HON. CESAR D. BUENAFLOR v. JOSE R. RAMIREZ, JR.

G.R. No. 201607, February 15, 2017, Third Division, BERSAMIN, J.:

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over a case involving the validity of the
termination of employment of an officer or employee of the Civil Service.

FACTS:

On August 27, 2001, Chairman Eufemio Domingo of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) appointed respondent Jose R. Ramirez, Jr. as Executive Assistant III3 and concurrently
designated him as Assistant Accountant. On September 28, 2001, Chairman Domingo resigned, and
petitioner Cesar D. Buenaflor succeeded him. The petitioner terminated Ramirez as of the same
date as Chairman Eugenio's resignation on the ground that his tenure had expired by virtue of the
position of Executive Assistant being personal and confidential, and, hence, co-terminous with that
of the appointing authority.

Believing that his appointment had been contractual in nature, Ramirez sued in the RTC to declare
his dismissal null and void. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-4577-8, was raffled to Branch
96. Buenaflor, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed his answer, wherein
 POLITICAL LAW

he contended, among others, that Ramirez had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
should have instead filed an administrative complaint in the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over Ramirez’s complaint.

RULING:

NO. It cannot be disputed that Ramirez's complaint was thereby challenging the validity of his
termination from the service, and that he thereby wanted the RTC to pry into the circumstances of
the termination. Such challenge was outside of the RTC's sphere of authority. Instead, it was the
CSC that was vested by law with jurisdiction to do so. Disciplinary cases and cases involving
personnel actions affecting employees in the Civil Service, like appointment or separation from the
service, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. Indeed, the Constitution vests in the CSC
the jurisdiction over all employees of the Government, including all its branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.

DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO v. OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, et al.

G.R. No. 193092, February 21, 2017, En Banc, SERENO, CJ.:

Clearly, the operative ground for disqualification arises when a member of the investigating
and adjudicatory body is connected to the same unit as that of any of the parties to the case.

FACTS:

Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio is the head of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) of the Office of
the Ombudsman. He asked the employees of the OSP what to do with the monetary contributions
solicited in their charity drive. The employees agreed that the monetary proceeds of their project
would be donated to the typhoon victims in Quezon province, specifically for the construction of
manual deep wells.

After informing the OSP employees that the contractor of the deep wells declined the project, he
solicited suggestions on the use of the funds. He proposed that these be donated to Gawad Kalinga
Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Gawad Kalinga). He claimed that the employees
participated in the discussion and eventually agreed to donate the funds to Gawad Kalinga.

Private respondent Assistant Special Prosecutor Elvira C. Chua contested the donation to Gawad
Kalinga. He lodged a complaint against Villa-Ignacio before the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs
Board (IAB), alleging that the latter committed estafa. The IAB, then chaired by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, is the body that investigates the officials and personnel of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Villa-Ignacio questioned the proceedings before Casimiro. He claimed that under the IAB's own
rules, A.O. 16, Casimiro should be disqualified from the proceedings because both the latter and
Chua belonged to the same unit - the Office of the Ombudsman's Central Office. Despite Villa-
 POLITICAL LAW

Ignacio’s claim, the IAB recommended the filing before the Sandiganbayan of an Information for
estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. It also ruled that
A.O. 16 did not apply, since the questioned charity drive transpired prior to the assignment of Chua
to the Central Office. Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the
IAB.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman, et al had gravely abused their discretion in allowing Casimiro to
actively participate in the proceedings against Villa-Ignacio.

RULING:

YES. The Ombudsman, et al committed grave abuse of discretion when they failed to observe their
own rules in the conduct of their proceedings against Villa-Ignacio. They blatantly violated their
own regulations by continuously disregarding the disqualification of Casimiro. Certiorari, therefore,
lies.

As can be read in paragraphs 2 and 3, Section III(N) of A.O. 16 patently disqualifies a person who
belongs to the same component unit as any of the parties to the case, regardless of the timeframe
that the acts complained of transpired. Clearly, the operative ground for disqualification arises
when a member of the investigating and adjudicatory body is connected to the same unit as that of
any of the parties to the case. In this case, there is no dispute that Chua reports to the Central
Office, which is the same as the unit of Casimiro. Straightforwardly, the latter should have been
disqualified from acting on her complaint against Villa-Ignacio.

In Fabella v. Court of Appeals, the dismissed public school teachers were tried by an improperly
constituted tribunal. The Court ruled therein that the "committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void." Given
that Villa-Ignacio herein faced a similar predicament, we likewise rule that the proceedings against
him before the IAB, as approved by the Ombudsman, are null and void.

VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

1.QUASI JUDICIAL (ADJUDICATORY) POWER
i. ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 213581, September 19, 2017, En Banc, Leonen, J.:

Due process in administrative proceedings does not require the submission of pleadings or a
trial-type of hearing. However, due process requires that a party is duly notified of the allegations
against him or her and is given a chance to present his or her defense.

FACTS:
 POLITICAL LAW

Bank Officer III Mariam Gayak was assigned to the Davao Regional Office so Verlina Silo andEvelyn
Yap were designated as Acting Bank Officer III and Bank Officer II, respectively. Upon Gayak’s
return, Yap had to turn over her cash accountability to Silo. The COA conducted an audit on Yap’s
accountability from her time as Bank Officer II, which revealed P32,706,100 was missing. Upon the
audit of Silo’s accountability, Silo was nowhere to be found.

On December 23, 2005, Silo executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the cash shortage,
executing another of the same tenor when the BSP formed a Fact Finding Task Force. The COA
filed administrative charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct as well as criminal charges of
malversation and violation of Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019 against Silo, Yap, and Dequita,
who was branch manager. The Ombudsman found Silo liable but dismissed the others of all
charges. The COA moved for partial reconsideration but was rebuffed.

The BSP requested the COAfor an evaluation of Yap’s liability considering the dismissal of the
administrative case against her. Instead of providing an opinion regarding Yap’s liability, the COA
issued a decision denying the request to extinguish Yap’s liability and held her liable.

ISSUE:

Whether the COA observed the tenets of due process

RULING:

The COA erred in treating the request for opinion as a request for relief from accountability. The
COA is mandated to act on money claims, requests for hiring of legal retainers, requests for write-
offs of unliquidated cash advances and dormant amounts, and requests for relief from
accountability for losses due to acts of man. Instead of issuing an opinion, the COA treated the
request for an opinion as a request from relief from accountability even if Yap and Dequita were
not parties to the request for opinion.

The COA’s insistence that Yap and Dequita were not deprived of their right to due process since
they were able to file counter-affidavits in the administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman
has no leg to stand on as administrative and criminal proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman are different from the audit proceedings before it. The COA rendered its decision in
blatant disregard to its own rules, treating the request for opinion as a request for relief from
accountability even if the former did not include the required documents and comments or
recommendations needed under the 1997 Rules or the 2009 Rules.

CARLOS SAUNAR v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 186502, December 13, 2017, Third Division, Martires, J.:

The due process requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to
judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heart. Such
reasonable opportunity should not be confined to the mere submission of position papers and the
parties must given the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them.

FACTS:
 POLITICAL LAW

Petitioner was a former Regional Director of the NBI. He was the one who conducted an
investigation regarding the alleged corruption concerning tobacco excise taxes against Governor
Singson, Senator Jinggoy Estrada, and President Estrada. He was required by the Sandiganbayan to
testify in the plunder case against President Estrada and he dutifully appeared during the hearing
dates.

Thereafter, the NBI Director Wycoco informed petitioner that he was relieved from his duties and
was asked to report to the Deputy Director for Regional Operation Services for further instructions.
He reported thereto and was informed that an investigation as being conducted over his testimony.
He was not assigned any duty and was instead told to make himself available. Petitioner made
himself accessible by staying near NBI and he also attended court hearings whenever required.

Petitioner thereafter received a letter from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission requiring him
to answer a charge from Wycoco recommending action against petitioner for failure to report to
duty. A witness presented in one of the hearings in the charge against him. However, he was absent
in that hearing has he received no notice thereof. He was subsequently reassigned as regional
director of the Bicol Regional Office.

Petitioner then received a copy of the OP decision dismissing him from service. The OP held that
petitioner failed to report for work for more than a year which he himself admitted when he
explained that he did not do so because he had not been assigned any specific duty or responsibility.
It further held that he should have reported to work even without any duty specifically assigned to
him. The CA affirmed the OP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was validly dismissed form service.

RULING:

In administrative cases, the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily transgress the requirement
of due process. This does not mean, however, that formal hearings should be regarded as mere
superfluities. While a formal hearing is not obligatory as the due process requirement is satisfied if
the parties are given the opportunity to be heard through pleadings, the idea that a formal hearing
is not indispensable should not be hastily thrown around.

In this case, petitioner was not treated fairly in the proceedings as he was deprived of the
opportunity to appear in all clarificatory hearings and he was not notified of the clarificatory
hearing where a witness was presented thereby denying him the chance to propound questions.

Gross neglect of duty, as an administrative offense, refers to negligence characterized by the glaring
want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to
consequences with respect to other persons who may be affected.

In this case, petitioner remained compliant with the lawful orders given to him. He would attend
court hearings pursuant to special orders and he also stayed near NBI establishments awaiting
possible assignments. He also complied when he was reassigned to the Bicol Office. Petitioner’s
 POLITICAL LAW

actions was not tantamount to inexcusable or gross negligence as there was no intention to
abandon his duty as an NBI officer.

B. FACT FINDING POWER

AGAPITO J. CARDINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC

G.R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017, En Banc, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final
and non-reviewable by courts of justice.

FACTS:

Cardino and Jalosjos both ran for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte. After
Jalosjos’ proclamation as the winner, Cardino filed a petition for quo warranto before the
COMELEC. Cardino sought for the nullification of the candidacy of Jalosjos on the ground of
ineligibility. He alleged that Jalosjos was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who subsequently
became a naturalized citizen of the USA. He claimed that after applying for reaquisition of her
Filipino citizenship and taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, Jalosjos
filed a Certificate of Candidacy, attached therein an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American
citizenship that was subscribed and sworn to before Judge De Guzman-Laput on July 16, 2012.

Cardino alleged that Jalosjos’ Affidavit of Renunciation was falsified since the latter arrived back in
the Philippines on July 17, 2012 after leaving on May 30, 2012. Cardino argued that it was physically
impossible for Jalosjos to have personally appeared before Judge Laput to execute, sign and swear
to her Affidavit of Renunciation. Since the affidavit was a falsified document that had no legal effect,
Jalosjos still possessed both Philippine and American citizenship when she filed her COC. Jalosjos
answered that it was a mere clerical error. Jalosjos asserts that the mistake in the entry for the date
of execution of the Affidavit of Renunciation did not negate the fact she still performed the
necessary acts to renounce her American citizenship under oath before she filed her COC.

Giving credence to Jalosjos’ presented evidence, The COMELEC second division dismissed
Cardino’s petition for quo warranto. Cardino moved for reconsideration but the same was denied
by the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC avers that the date July 16, 2012 written on Jalosjos'
Affidavit of Renunciation was proven to be a mere clerical error. This fact was explained by Judge
Laput when she testified that Jalosjos personally appeared before her and sworn to the Affidavit of
Renunciation on July 19, 2012.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in denying the petition for Quo Warranto.

RULING:

YES. After carefully reviewing the evidence on hand, the Court finds no proper reason to disturb
the factual findings of the COMELEC. As held in Typoco v. Commission on Elections, The findings
of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and non-
 POLITICAL LAW

reviewable by courts of justice.1awp+This principle is applied with greater force when the case
concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the Constitution intended to place the poll body -
created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself- on a level higher than statutory
administrative organs.

The Court affirms the findings of the COMELEC Second Division that Jalosjos' Affidavit of
Renunciation is not a falsified document. As such, Jalosjos complied with the provisions of Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. By virtue thereof, Jalosjos was able to fully divest herself of her
American citizenship, thus making her eligible to run for the mayorship of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte.

The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second Division that the date of July 16, 2012 in
the Affidavit of Renunciation was indeed a clerical error. The COMELEC Second Division gave
greater weight to the evidence offered by Jalosjos, particularly the testimony of Judge De Guzman-
Laput, who unequivocally stated that Jalosjos personally appeared before her sala on July 19, 2012
to subscribe to the Affidavit of Renunciation.

IX. ELECTION LAW

A. POLITICAL PARTIES

MARIO SALVADOR v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALEXANDER BELENA

G.R. No. 230744,September 26, 2017, Tijam, J.:

In construing Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, the word “and” between “without political party” and
“without support from any political party” is treated as conjunctive. It means in addition to. The word
“and", whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentences, must be accepted as binding
together and as relating to one another. Applying the foregoing to Section 13, the proper construction
is that the allowable expenditure for candidates without any political party and without support from
any political party is P3.00.

FACTS:

Salvador, who belonged to a local political party, was a mayoralty candidate in San Jose City, Nueva
Ecija in 2010. Belena complained of Salvador’s overspending as punished under the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC). Citing Salvador's Statement of Election Contribution and Expenditure
(SOCE), Belena averred that Salvador spent a total of P449,000.00 in the 2010 election, when the
maximum expenditure allowed by law is P275,667.00. COMELEC En Banc found probable cause
and directed its Law Deparment to file the appropriate criminal information against Salvador for
overspending. COMELEC En Banc held that since Salvador belonged to a political party, he was
only allowed to spend P3.00 per voter. Salvador now argues that under R.A. 7166, he was allowed to
spend P5.00 per voter (instead of P3.00 per voter) since he received no support from his party
although he was a member thereof.

ISSUE:
 POLITICAL LAW

Whether or not there is probable cause to hold Salvador criminally liable for campaign
overspending.

RULING:

Yes. Verily, Section 100 of the OEC made a categorical declaration as to the allowable expenditure
by any kind of candidate, whether a member of a political party or an independent candidate. With
the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7166, a distinction was made between a candidate without
a political party and without support from any political party and a candidate with political party
and who receives support from a political party. The former is allowed to spend the P5.00 per
votercap while the latter is allowed to spend the P3.00 [per voter] cap. In enacting these provisions,
the legislature intended to ensure equality between and among aspirants with deep pockets and
those with less financial resources.

The law is clear — the candidate must both be without a political party and without support from
any political party for the P5.00 cap to apply. In the absence of one, the exception does not apply.
Thus, We do not subscribe with petitioner’s assertion that there is a room for different
interpretation in terms of constructing the provision of Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, as amended. To
allow Salvador’s contention is to deviate from the intention of the legislature in enacting the law,
as the same would find all candidates on equal footing, whether member of a political party or not.
Coming to the present case, it is undisputed that the current number of registered voters in San
Jose City, Nueva Ecija is 91,889. Following the provisions of the law and its proper interpretation,
Salvador is entitled to spend the amount of P275,667.00, as he is allowed to spend P3.00 for each
registered voter. However, Salvador spent the amount of P449,000.00 as declared in his SOCE.
Clearly, he exceeded the allowable limit provided by law. As such, it constitutes an election offense
under Article 262 in relation to Article 263 of the OEC.

B. CANDIDACY
1. QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES

JOSEPH DIMAPILIS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G. R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications
for the position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for
disqualification under the law.

FACTS:

In 2013, sought his re-election as Punong Barangay and filed his COC, declaring under oath that he
is "eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to." Ultimately, he won in the said elections and was
proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in 2013. The Legal
Department of COMELEC filed a Petition for Disqualification against the Petitioner alleging that
he was barred from running as he was suffering an accessory penalty of Perpetual disqualification
after being found guilty of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct. Petitioner in his answer
averred that the Petition partakes the nature of a petition to cancel his CO under Section 78 of the
 POLITICAL LAW

Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC Division granted the Petition as affirmed by the COMELEC
En Banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC correctly cancelled Petitioner’s COC.

RULING:

YES. To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an office.
Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to
an office or appointed to a particular position." In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of
Grave Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished with dismissal from service with all its
accessory penalties, including perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Verily,
perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered
petitioner's COC void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time
he filed the same.

The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office. The
COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws"
relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office
those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the final and executory OMB
rulings dismissing him from service now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the
COMELEC to cancel petitioner's CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.

C. REMEDIES AND JURISDICTION IN ELECTION LAW

1. PETITION NOT TO GIVE DUE COURSE OR CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY

SOFRONIO ALBANIA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EDGARDO TALLADO

G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017, Peralta J.:

A violation of the three-term limit rule is not included among the grounds for disqualification, but
a ground for a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

Edgardo Tallado (Tallado) and Jesus Typoco (Typoco) were both candidates for the position of
Governor in Camarines Norte. After losing the elections, Tallado questioned the results and was
later proclaimed as the winner and assumed office. He thereafter served as Governor for 2 more
terms and again filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The Petitioner, a registered
voter, filed a Petition for Disqualification on the ground that he violated the term limit under RA
 POLITICAL LAW

7160 and his suspension from office for 1 year for being guilty of grave abuse of authority. The
petition was dismissed for being filed out of time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent is disqualified to run as Governor.

RULING:

NO. The grounds for disqualification of a candidate are found under Sections 12 and 68 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,
as well as Section 40 of the Local Government Code.

Respondent's suspension from office is indeed not a ground for a petition for disqualification as
Section 40(b) clearly speaks of removal from office as a result of an administrative offense that
would disqualify a candidate from running for any elective local position. In fact, the penalty of
suspension cannot be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets
the qualifications for the office as provided under Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160.

Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to cancel a certificate of candidacy, such
petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as provided under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, as the COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond
the reglementary period, and dismissed the petition for being filed out time.

In this case, respondent filed his COC for Governor of Camarines Norte for the 2016 elections on
October 16, 2015, and he had 25 days therefrom to file the petition for denial of due course or
cancellation of COC on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule, which fell on November
10, 2015. However, the petition was filed only on November 13, 2015 which was already beyond the
period to file the same; thus, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for being filed out of time.

In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did not
win as such. It was only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he was
proclaimed as the duly elected Governor. He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of
his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the office for
the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time that
respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full service of his term. The period
when he was out of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor. As he
had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for three consecutive terms as
Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran again in the 2016
elections.

D. PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATON OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATIONS v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 223505, October 3, 2017, En Banc, CAGUIOA, J.:
 POLITICAL LAW

Under BP 881 and RA 7166, it is unlawful for any person to bear, carry, or transport firearms
or other deadly weapons in public places during the election period, even if otherwise licensed to do
so, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC. Sec. 35 of RA 7166 also uses the mandatory word
“shall” to impose upon the COMELEC its duty to issue rules and regulations to implement the law.

In RA 5487, the PNP exercises general suspension over the operation of all private detective
and watchman security guard agencies. The COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority as it
only regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons by PSAs
and other specified persons during election period.

FACTS:

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9981 which set the election period for the May 2016 National and
Local Elections beginning January 10, 2016 up to June 8, 2016 (120 days before and 30 days after
election day). It also issued the assailed Resolution No. 10015 that provided for the gun ban.Under
the gun ban, Private Security Agencies (PSAs) may obtain authority to bear, carry, and transport
firearms outside their place of work or business and in public places during the election period after
compliance with foregoing documentary requirements and under the conditions set forth therein.

Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 because COMELEC
does not have any authority to promulgate rules regarding the bearing, carrying, or transporting of
firearms by PSAs. Petitioner alleges PSAs should not be required to secure authority from the
COMELEC as Republic Act No. 5487 already grants tPSAs and their security guards, watchmen,
detectives and security personnel the authority to possess, bear, carry, and transport firearms, being
necessary equipment for the conduct of its business and practice of its personnel’s profession. It
also maintains that the PNP has the power to promulgate rules and regulations under Sec. 17 of the
said law. Further, it asserts the COMELEC’s powers are defined and limited to election related
matters under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In issuing the assailed resolution, the COMELEC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Lastly, Resolution
No. 10015 allegedly violates the equal protection of laws and non-impairment of obligations of
contracts as it impairs the contracts of its member PSAs with their respective clients.

The Office of the Solicitor General posits that the petition has become moot and academic as the
assailed resolution was no longer in effect since the election period already expired on June 8, 2016.
In addition, comments on the substantive issues were provided by the OSG in that (1) COMELEC’s
powers are not limited to those enumerated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution as it also derives
its powers from Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and RA No. 7166; (2) the assailed resolution does not
violate the equal protection clause as written authority is also needed by public officials and
members of the PNP and AFP among others; and (3) the non-impairment clause was not violates
as it does not prevent PSAs from performing their contractual obligations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is moot and is proper and timely filed

RULING:

As a general rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual and ongoing controversies. However,
recognized exceptions to the rule are the following: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
 POLITICAL LAW

(2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; (3)
when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The present case falls under the fourth exception. For this exception to apply, two factors must be
present namely (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
could be subjected to the same action.

The power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and implement election
laws is enshrined in the Constitution under Sec. 6, Article IX-A and Sec. 2, Article IX-C.
Under BP 881 and RA 7166, it is unlawful for any person to bear, carry, or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons in public places during the election period, even if otherwise licensed to do so,
unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC. Sec. 35 of RA 7166 also uses the mandatory word
“shall” to impose upon the COMELEC its duty to issue rules and regulations to implement the law.
In RA 5487, the PNP exercises general suspension over the operation of all private detective and
watchman security guard agencies. The COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority as it only
regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons by PSAs and
other specified persons during election period.

Resolution No. 10015 does not violate the equal protection clause and the non-impairment of
contracts clause. The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by the other persons or other classes in
the same place and in like circumstances”. The guaranty of the equal protection of laws is not
violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must
(1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The assailed
resolution applies to any and all persons, whether private individuals or public officers.

As for the violation of the non-impairment clause, said clause is limited only in application to laws
that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract
between parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies
for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. The existing contracts between the PSAs and their
clients are not affected by said resolution as all they need to do is secure written authority from the
COMELEC in order to fulfill the terms of the contracts.

X. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

CITY OF DAVAO, ET AL. v. ROVERT OLANOLAN

G.R. No. 181149, April 17, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

Barangay funds shall be kept in the custody of the city or municipal treasurer, at the option
of the barangay, and any officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the
 POLITICAL LAW

possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for the
safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of the law.

FACTS:

Respondent was the elected Punong Barangay in 2002. His opponent filed a protest which was
granted by COMELEC, declaring his opponent as the duly elected punong barangay. Respondent
filed a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition and the court issued a status quo ante
order. The DILG implemented said order reinstating the respondent as Punong Barangay. After the
Annual Budget had been passed upon, the SC En Banc dismissed his petition and recalled the status
quo ante order. The City Legal Officer opined that the Recall order was an order of dissolution,
hence, the City of Davao refused to recognize all acts and transactions entered into by respondent
after his receipt of the order as it signified his immediate ouster from office.The respondent again
filed a Petition for Mandamus to allow the release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred
under his administration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Local Government was correct in refusing to release the funds.

RULING:

YES. While the Court en banc indeed issued an SQAO on November 9, 2004 which temporarily
reinstated respondent to the disputed office, the same was recalled on March 31, 2005 when a
Decision was rendered dismissing respondent's petition in G.R. No. 165491. While respondent did
file a motion for reconsideration of the March 31, 2005 Decision, the Court's recall of the SQAO was
without any qualification; hence, its effect was immediate and non-contingent on any other
occurrence. As such, respondent cannot successfully argue that the SQAO's recall was suspended
during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration.

In this case, petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds to
respondent considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay
of Brgy. 76-A. Surely, it was part of petitioner's fiscal responsibility to ensure that the barangay
funds would not be released to a person without proper authority.

Moreover, "[t]he city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall
exercisegeneral supervision over component barangays to ensure that the said barangays act within
the scope of their prescribed powers and functions." Hence, given the COMELEC's ruling revoking
respondent's election and proclamation as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A, which in fact, was later
on validated by no less than the Court, petitioner could not have been faulted for not automatically
releasing the funds sought for by respondent in his mandamus petition.

LAO, ET AL. v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, ET AL.

G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017, Leonen, J.:

Republic Act No. 7160 requires prior authorization from the sangguniang panlungsod, law, or
ordinance, before a city mayor may sign a contract in behalf of the city. If the city mayor has no
 POLITICAL LAW

authority from the sangguniang panlungsod to sign a contract, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod have standing to file a case to have this contract declared null and void.

FACTS:

Mega Farms President Bryan See submitted to the CDO City Council an unsolicited proposal for
the redevelopment of the Agora Complex into a terminal, public market, and vegetable landing area
under a build-operate-transfer scheme, which the CDO City Government (LGU) accepted. The LGU
caused the publication of an Invitation to Bid where no one competed with Mega Farm’s proposal,
hence the the city mayor and Mega Forms executed the BOT Contract, the terms of which were
allegedly different from those in the draft contract.

Petitioners, city councilors, filed for the nullity of the redevelopment of the market alleging Mega
Farm was unqualified to undertake the redevelopment of the complex given it had a small paid-up
capital as compared to the cost of the project; that the provisions of the contract were infirm for
being disadvantageous to the LGU; that petitioners have no cause of action; and that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the case and to issue a temporary restraining order.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, saying it had no power to issue a TRO or a preliminary injunction
over the same and that the parties had no standing because they were not parties to the contract.
The RTC also denied the Motion for Reconsideration, saying the validity of the Agora Complex BOT
Contract was not a constitutional issue.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC correctly denied the issuance of the temporary restraining order and correctly
dismissed the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction and petitioners’ standing

RULING:

The Regional Trial Court correctly denied the issuance of a TRO against the contract. Despite the
provisions of RA 8975, trial courts still retain jurisdiction over the main cause of action to nullify or
implement a national government contract. RA 8975 expressly prohibits the issuance by all courts,
other than the Supreme Court, of any TROs, preliminary injunctions, or preliminary mandatory
injunctions against national government projects, including BOT projects of LGUs. The only
exception when a court other than the Supreme Court may grant injunctive relief is if it involves a
matter of extreme urgency, involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

A real party in interest which may file a case questioning the validity of a contract entered into by
the city mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city itself. It is the local
government unit which stands to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in
this case. The city councilors merely represent the city in the suit.

OTHER TOPICS:

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, ET AL. v. MARIA ELENA MALAGA

 POLITICAL LAW

G.R. No. 204906, June 5, 2017, Del Castillo, J.:

The mere submission of the lowest bid does not automatically entitle the petitioners to the
award of the contract. The bid must still undergo evaluation and post qualification in order to be
declared the lowest responsive bid and thereafter be awarded the contract.

FACTS:

Respondent, who is a private contractor, was the lowest bidder for two concreting projects of the
DPWH. The roads to be concreted, however, suffered severe deterioration on account of the
prevailing typhoon causing proposals that the projects to be implemented by administration or be
taken with urgency. However, due to failure of the Secretary to respond on such request, the
biddings were opened. Only after the said bidding did the Secretary of DPWH issue a memo
approving the implementation but only insofar as 1 project. When Respondent was informed that
the other project will not be awarded to her, she filed for damages before the RTC. The RTC
dismissed the case for being a suit against the State. However, the CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent has the right to the project.

RULING:

NO. Before a government project is awarded to the lowest calculated bidder, his bid must undergo
a mandatory post-qualification procedure whereby the "procuring entity verifies, validates, and
ascertains all statements made and documents submitted by the bidder with the lowest calculated
or highest rated bid using a non-discretionary criteria as stated in the bidding documents.” The
mere submission of the lowest bid does not automatically entitle the petitioners to the award of the
contract.

From the foregoing, it must be concluded that since respondent's lowest calculated bid for the
subject project did not undergo the required post-qualification process, then she cannot claim that
the project was awarded to her. And if the project was never awarded to her, then she has no right
to undertake the same. If she has no right to the project, then she cannot demand indemnity for
lost profits or actual damages suffered in the event of failure to carry out the same. Without a formal
award of the project in her favor, such a demand would be premature. Consequently, she has no
right of action against petitioners, and no cause of action in Civil Case No. 27059. Indeed, "only
when there is an invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or remedial law become
operative. Verily, a premature invocation of the court's intervention renders the complaint without
a cause of action and dismissible on such ground."

In short, respondent's causes of action solely and primarily based on a supposed award, actual or
potential, do not exist. This is so for the precise reason that such an award and the whole bidding
process for that matter, no longer exist, as they were mooted and superseded by the DPWH's
decision to undertake the subject project by administration, as well as by the reservation contained
in the Invitation to Bid that at any time during the procurement process, government has the right
to reject any or all bids.
 POLITICAL LAW

||| GMA NETWORK v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 192128 & 192135-36, September 13, 2017, Caguioa, J.:

The 60-day prescriptive period under Sec. 28 of the Public Service Act can be availed of as a
defense only in criminal proceedings filed under Chapter IV thereof and not in proceedings pertaining
to the regulatory or administrative powers of the NTC over a public service utility’s observance of the
terms and conditions of its Provisional Authority.

FACTS:

GMA applied for three Certificates of Public Convenience with NTC for TV stations in Dumaguete
and Zamboanga as well as a radio station in Zamboanga. The NTC issued provisional authorities
well until 1998 which GMA renewed only on 2003 via ex-parte motions. Because of their late filing,
NTC scheduled a clarificatory hearing where GMA was directed to explain why it should not be
administratively sanctioned.

GMA blamed the turnover of the documents from its previous handling lawyers as well as the
downturn in the broadcast industry which adversely affected their expansion plans and projects.
Though CPCs were renewed, GMA was asked to pay a fine of P200 per day for failing to immediately
renew their CPCs. Upon reconsideration, rates were lowered to P50 a day.

The CA dismissed GMA’s petition which asked to have the penalties waived given the violations
have prescribed and that such were contrary to public policy.

ISSUE:

Whether the penalties imposed by NTC are exorbitant and contrary to law

RULING:

The 60-day prescriptive period under Sec. 28 of the Public Service Act can be availed of as a defense
only in criminal proceedings filed under Chapter IV thereof and not in proceedings pertaining to
the regulatory or administrative powers of the NTC over a public service utility’s observance of the
terms and conditions of its Provisional Authority. The NTC’s imposition of a fine pursuant to Sec.
21 of the Public Service Act is made in an administrative proceeding and must comply with the
notice and hearing requirement, which the NTC appropriately followed. Further, the P25,000 limit
provided by Sec. 23 of the Public Service Act applies to criminal actions under the Public Service
Act, but not for administrative proceedings under Sec. 21.

SMALL BUSINESS CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 230628, October 3, 2017, En Banc, VELASCO, JR., J.:

Considering an executive order’s clear directive of halting all increases in the salary of GOCC
employees, it cannot be said that such order’s moratorium applies only to resolutions which provides
for increases. It applies also to actual granting of these increases.
 POLITICAL LAW

FACTS:

Small Business Corporation (SB Corp.) is a GOCC. Its Board of Directors (BOD) was authorized by
law to provide for their organizational structure and extend to their employees salaries currently
enjoyed by other government employees. The BOD passed a resolution approving its salary
structure.

Meanwhile, EO No. 7which provided for a moratoriumon GOCC employees’ salaries was issued and
exceptions are only made through specific authorization of the President. Soon after this issuance,
the Governance Commission for GOCCs (GCG) was established as the oversight body as regards
policies GOCC.

The BOD then passed another resolution which set the guidelines for the implementation of its
first resolution. This included merit increases for their qualified employees. However, this second
resolution was denied by the GCG citing the issuance of EO No. 7 and a Notice of Disallowance
(ND) was issued against the officers who were able to receive increases. SB Corp. appealed to COA
but the latter denied the petition on the ground SB Corp. does not have the authority to solely grant
merit increases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the moratorium is applicable to merit increases implemented by SB Corp.

RULING:

The merit increases provided in the second resolution only changes the salary and not the position
of the employees. The moratorium imposed by EO No. 7 is broad enough to include kinds of salary
increases of GOCC employees.

The first resolution did not acquire precedence over this moratorium because when the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) approved the former, EO No. 7 was already in effect. The wording in EO No.7 is
clear: “until specifically authorized by the President.” The CSC has no authority to carve an
exception to EO No. 7. Only the President can do so.

A plain reading of the order reveals the clear directive of halting the granting of additional salaries
to GOCC employees to curb excessive amounts granted to GOCC officers. There is also no
retroactive application of EO No. 7 because the same applies to actual merit increases and not only
to the first resolution which gave way to that merit increase.