Conscience

Introduction
Once I started my attempt in formulating ontology (study of beings) I
would like to extend it to a brief exposition of my opinions about the nature o
f conscience (in the sense of knowledge) which had eventually dictated the branc
hing towards the mentioned study. I am not though fully aware of whether I am ac
ting as a genuine businessman in the field of editions for I do not perceive the
subject to mark any remarkable sales demand! Perhaps you had better consider th
is attemp as my sweet vengeance against all those of the modern greeks who in th
e first place indulge themselves into gloating about the intellectual feats of
some of the ancient greeks while they do not exhibit any real interest for th
ose feats in themselves beyond their manipulation to achieve a certain social st
atus and to obtain a particular trade advantage. It is for that reason exactly t
hat these modern greeks do not exhibit similar performance for themselves. How c
ould they have acted in similar ways anyway! Under this mentality of “business un
dertaker”! They are a classical example of all those that are pompous about the an
cient prophets in the same time that “stone” away the contemporary ones.
Subject
The intellectual ability as a fundamental ontological one , at least in
humans (certainly not only in humans) involves the abitity to consider together
several objects. The result of such a consideration can be termed as conscience
. I call that ability fundamental in the sense of its participation to the defi
nition of beings along with the other abillities for communication and action.
However, since to my opinion intellectual ability works in a reciprocal manner ,
meaning that the mind rather distinguishes one object from another rather than
it recognizes an object in an absolute manner, then considerating together is a
core trait of the intellectual abillity. Considering together may be classified
into considering together in space , that is simultaneously , or considering tog
ether in time as a succession of phases. All that is meaningfull under the assum
ption of clarity of consideration since confusion cancells the discerning result
of consideration.
Is there any fundamental difference about considering in time as compare
d to considering in space? The field of application of these ideas is consicens
e where the answer must lie as I believe. Conscience can be regarded as the resu
lt of perception of the colours of senses. Senses constitute the primary suppli
er of the intellect by whose contribution the intellect is secured and does not
wander about without the capacity to check upon its results. Actually there can
be no sprouting of intellect without the contribution of senses , althought at
a later phase of ablactation the intellect can be distorted in the direction of
cutting the ends towards senses therefore becoming unverifiable. Considering t
ogether in the structure of conscience defines the space of conscience while t
he possibility of change of the a particular “load” of the space of conscience point
s to time succession within conscience. Conscience as product of the intellec
t involves both space and time for the perceived colors , or objects that exhibi
t those colors.
In that respect there seems to be no unbridged separation between the q
uality of space and that of time in the structure of conscience, since if one c
ould have perceived everything in the same time then the time dimension would h
ave degenerated into space dimension.. The time dimension is therefore linked to
the observer, the specific conscience that is that perceives things, and , giv
en always the prerequisite of clarity of consideration , what makes the differe
nce between the one temporal and the many perhaps spatial dimensions is the intr
oduction of the causality principle in our world of perception according to whic
h a certain group of causes yiels in a determinate way a specific result. The ca
usality principle is for the time dimension whatever clarity of colors is for th
e space dimensions. The causality principle may facilitate but not necessarily p
rovide the space illustration of clarity by yielding different results from diff
erent causes and the clarity in space may dictate a particular result after some
time but not in an obligatory manner. Both the causality principle and the spac
e lucidity consitute the complete system of clarity assumption for the conscie
nce when that applies to it. The static differentiation in space and the dynamic
differentiation in time provide not only for the mutuallity of the distinguishm
ent of objects but for the ability of that distinguishment to vary, that is for
the ability of the perceived objects to change. Moreover the ability to perceive
something within conscience that changes under the same identity can be compare
d with the ability to perceive several things in space as a whole. Only can the
link of something that is considered as the particular cause to something else
that is considered as the specific result help differentiating between the for
mer and the latter. That sounds reasonable enough since if you were allowed to f
orm any possible consideration connection of the causes towards results, includ
ing the causes themselves then you would obtain the space pattern , that is the
removal of the differentiating quality between time and space causes time to s
ubside into space.
In this context of contemplations one can inquire into certain things a
nd cultivate the formulated questions into answers. Let me start with some speci
fic examples:
-while being asleep an individual acts and moves but maynot after recall or
recalls dimly of the acted process. Additionally one may feel things during slee
p time as for example the pressure from a hard object but in a complete differ
ent and imaginary context than the actual lay out of things or one may not feel
other objects at all.
-After an accident one may loose any memory of the event and its consequences al
htough one might have reportedly been consciensously interacting with its envior
ment during the forgotten time.
The above are examples of an orientation of the investigation of the con
cept of conscience as the result of intellect. These can be refined to questions
such as: How can one be sure of a subject's consciousness? Why to search for a
subject that exhibits concience? Is consciense an isolated property or it descr
ibes a relation of the subject to its environment? How space and time notions ar
e introduced in the conscience structure? How is the subject able to to identify
a 'color' of the senses at one moment with the color perceived at the same spac
e position at another moment?
Usually to determine the sonsciousness level of a subject which then bec
omes an object of investigation the monitoring of its behaviour and its changes
is employed. That is a recourse is taken to the determination of the interaction
of the subject with its environment. However enclaves of imaginary conscience ,
as the previous examples may have hinted upon ,which accept different contexts
of localization as is the case of dreams may be considered when the individual m
ay not interact with the its observed by third environment. Though it surely int
eracts inside its imanigary environment with other imaginary objects. Or the int
eraction may exist but may be quite restricted.. Could that leave open the possi
bility of concience being a result of an automated process, in the lack of inter
action with the subject's environment?
Yet more, it is commonly obvious that neither the senses organs nor the
motion limbs of our body are necessary for the conscience to emerge. One can clo
se the eyes and continue to imagine the landscape that had seen previously or o
ne's motion within it and to make decisions upon it. It is evident therefore tha
t conscience uses the senses and instructs the limbs but it can be quite indep
endent from all those.
Nevertheless conscience structure is modified by the senses and the work
of the limbs is regulated by conscience. Without the senses and motion equipmen
t conscience cannot be checked
upon and accordingly cannot acquire sufficient depth and extent. It is coincide
ntal and isolated and discontinued, that is without the ends that could lead bey
ond and beneath a surface. The observation that the conscience enclaves such as
dreams accept different contexts within which their content might occur is impo
rtant for it suggests the way of elimination of controversial elements in the ov
erall conscience structure of a certain subject. Furthermore it indicates that c
onscience when studied is in need of a context and does not appear in an absolu
te manner, without any context. Conscience is a fundamental aspect of beings but
emerges out of the relations with other beings. In the case of dreams or other
such rather autonomous conscience enclaves it appears that this relation is n
ot deep and extensive enought and can be compared with the usefullness of a pict
ure that can decorate many diffent places. But in any case it is the product of
mutual differentiation of objects and the discrimination betwen the objects an
d the subject even when the big part of those objects forms the hidden infrastr
ucture and scaffolding of conscience manifestation just as it happens with the p
icture's material. The material elements of a picture in this metaphor coming
together in a certain way start 'glowing' and showing the picture.
At any rate the properties of the perception manifest themselves even w
ithin the frame of a fragmented and detached conscience and without the interfe
rence of any external excitement by the senses. Which means that these conscienc
e enclaves do not stop being structured as space and time loaded with all the c
olors that the senses equipment may provide excitement for perhaps in a somewh
at faded manner. This leads to the conclusion that the colors in the strict sen
se or the sounds do not require radiation or vibrations respectively in order t
o emerge within the frame of conscience. They are subjective representations of
the reality. When the element of subjectivity is removed then we get to the obje
ctive part which then may supply the scaffolding for the impression in the mind
of another subject.
Moreover the objective part of the information does not become altered ,
increased or decreased with pieces of information because of the subjective par
t of the object. A quick proof of this follows:
If we are to keep the names of the colors that the eyes expose to our mind , but
in a way so that when two subjects with intellect can commuicate over an overla
pping part of the space and time of their consciences they can refer to the same
name but with permutated subjective impact for one of them for two colors , sa
y red and green, then they can talk as if they lived in parallel worlds meaning
the same things but perceiving them in differnt ways. In particular if the indiv
iduals had the names red and green for colors but at the same place in space an
d at the same moment in time one of them perceives under the term red the green
color and under the green term the red color where and when (this is the impor
tant part of the proof ) the other perceives the red and green colors respective
ly then they use the same language to discern the same things in space and time
but in different subjective ways. That means that the objective part of informat
ion does not change since after all the same things are perceived by both indivi
duals and the discerning capability remains the same. Through this narrow cons
ideration no difference could be known and each individual could never know
the difference that emerges due to the subjective part of the information. To k
now the difference in perception one must turn the two individuals from subjects
to objects of study and then try to find the correspondence of feelings to a sp
ecific mode of function of the mind (meaning hte biological mind) , In all likel
yhood, and that serves the notion of the plasticity of the mind (it is the ide
a that if parts of the mind are removed then the rest of the mind finds ways to
make up up to a point for the loss) that sort of correspondence cannot be stri
ctly located at certain areas of the mind but it must be between a conscience f
ield and the state of function of the mind as a whole which glows then to presen
t the subject with the structure of concience. The existence of different locate
d centers can be explained by the exisetence of particular located sources of e
xcitement of the mind through the different channels of the senses which then
has to be distributed in a specific way to the rest of the mind in order that th
e subject who bears the conscience becomes enlightened. Ofcourse the existence
of this specific apparatus that activates the mind as a whole provides for the s
pecific qualities that can be perceived under the broad term: senses colors, pro
tracting the use of the term “color” to apply to all of our senses. The way that the
mind then glows is beyond our understanding not in some magical way but because
that refers to the fundamental properties of beings , to the core of substance
which is well beyond the color crust of the mutual differentiation between objec
ts, one from another and therefore because it excedes that sort of conscience's
capabilities.
Since we refer to perception units, colors as we called them , another c
larification seems necessary at this moment. One specific color simplifies a com
posite effect from the point of view of organization of the space and time loads
. When we perceive the red color for instance for a place in space during a time
period then we perceive as a simple and static quality whatever is actually pul
sing as a composite effect beneath the surface of simplicity. Ofcourse that sor
t of simplification cannot be arbitray but it must correspont to a specific mode
of function inside the mind of the perceiving subject, if things are to be cons
idered with clarity. In addition the instantaneous (am instant is a theoreti
cal notion since any instance possesses duration and is perceived without such o
nly by the employment of the afore-mentioned simplifying effect of perception)
identification of the same space “load” over several time instances can only be achi
eved on the basis of the mind impact or physiological impression to the subject
that perceives. It is the qualities perceived that define their limits and the s
hapes across the space and the phases along time for in a different case how
the subject could have known that the content of the shapes is preserved through
time! In fact for a single mind the same mode of action corresponds to the same
glowing of perception effects and in that respect the qualities are given for t
hat mind so that it can build up its conscience of shapes and phases. There lies
the infrastructue of identification of a “color” along time or across space provid
ed that the correspondence between mode of function for the mind and the state o
f its conscience is kept unchanged under conditions of clarity so that neather t
he space lucidity nor the causality principle is contravened. And in a way the p
erception of the environment becomes the necessary extension of the subject's se
lf or the subject's self the other way arround becomes the necessary center of
the perception of the particular environment. It mustn't be that the environment
causes the subject to exist or the subject causes its surroundings to exist si
nce we cannot apply the causality principle in simultaneous settlements but it i
s about the mutual determination of the subject and the objects in its conscienc
e which is somewhat different to the differentiation between objects in the same
conscience since the subject remains invisible to itself save for its parts th
at become objects within its conscience. This corroborates the assumption that
the subject is in a sense whatever it perceives with a unified conscience pointi
ng out to one subject , the unit of perception. In a similar manner the subject
is as much hidden as the objects' core behind the color shell which are only k
nown as an extension of substance that must suport the color exhibition.
One must be very carefull with those matters because they can prove to
be quite abstruse and can easily derail to become paradoxes. Up to this point ou
r thoughts describe feelings as simplifications of complex processes which con
stitute together the field of conscience. The quality of feelinngs becomes usef
ul to the subject when time and space is assigned to it, that is if it integrate
s into its conscience. However it can be usefull for the subject in an unconscio
us manner if the process behing it integrates with processes of the body bypassi
ng conscience. Then we have to stude the indirect effect to consciousness of pro
cesses at levels of unconsciousness or subsconciousness of varying degress.
In any case the perception of simple qualities as feelings which constit
ute the conscience of a subject exhausts the perceptive mechanism of mind meanin
g that it doesn't leave space or time for anything else (another proof of the re
lative recognition of objects) though within a studying subect's conscience that
needs a context just because objects withing conscience appear in a context.The
se qualities dictate all about space and time of conscience of a specific knowle
gdge apparatus (mind) with different feelings as the different impacts of the en
vironment on the mind (there applies the causality principle under the clarifica
tion that we mean the environment of the studied object in the context of anoth
er conscience and not the environment of the object within its conscience) whic
h show as simple qualities of the same color corresponding to the same impact.
Then the distinciton between same or different can be built in an objective mann
er beyond the subjective part of the information for subjects to be able to comm
unicate with each other. In the same manner the diffence between the objects and
the subject can be built in parallel to the color crust of feelings and under t
he assumption that both the subject and the objects extend a hidden substance to
their chromatic shell. Which means that within conscience and in parallel to th
e perception of feelings a function takes place that assigns these qualitites to
beings either the subject or objects and determines them so that the co-feeli
ng dimension emerges within conscience and is continually refined by the data of
the senses or the inference mechanism. The co-feelings term is used in this con
text as a tool to describe conditions of the mind that usually are characterize
d as either emotions or desires besides the condition which is called knowledge
both of which must be knowledge in some way if knowledge is to be used as the t
erm which describes the building blocks of conscience.
Beings , as the loads of space and time within conscience are called ,
only exist within conscience. It is reasonable to suppose such a condition since
one has to suppose the considering together ability. What is not clear from the
beginning is why conscience should be beared by a being while from the mention
ed above there isn't any fundamental distinction between objects and subjects be
yond the attribution of conscience to a certain being. Beings serve as the commo
ns substance so that the speficic conscience structure of different subjects , i
ncluding the case of a subject that studies another subject in its own conscious
ness , can be overlapped or integrated to a single structure of conscience. Bei
ngs become known because they owe the ability to produce feelings in the same ex
tent that possess the alility to know feelings. The subject itself in its consci
ousness occupies space and time for that matter, and it can cause co-feelings (
the using of feelings to determine beings) . That way the self consciousness is
not separable from a specific consciensous context. Since there is not any fund
amental difference between the subject and objects beyond the role in a specific
conscience then each being must possess the ability to bear conscience exactly
to the extent that is defined in a certan context and assuming that it can defin
e clearly itself. But why each concience to be assigned to a certain being? Exa
ctly because the simpification under the feelings instrumentation points to that
and only that.
A paradox that can show in the direction of these thoughts is when the s
elf perception is based on the impact , or change that the mind of the subect un
dergoes so that for it to know itself must change. There comes to assist us the
essential difference between the role of subject and the objects within conscien
ce and the fact that beings , both subects and objects are more than their color
ed shell within conscience. The subject perceives objects and the change on its
knowing device is the operation by which it perceives the objects. So for it to
know itself directly from the feelings becomes impossilbe as beings are well be
yond that. But for it to know part which it may attribute to itself is feasile.
The more it knows about itself the more objects and their operation are expose
d to its study as parts of itself. There happens a progressive objectification o
f the subject which is then perceived as an organism of objects which can be fe
lt. That process has limits and the prevention of the above paradox appears to b
e the main limit. For one can measure is own blood pressure but if one had inven
ted and insturmentation to feel its own biological mind as a sustem of nerves h
e could have never felt the glowing conscience of that mind at object's time sin
ce at subject's time (observastion time) a conscience of the same being is alrea
dy glowing , and between object's time and subject's time there is always some e
lapsed period. . After the above contemplations we can explain how subjects can
view an aspect of themselves without knowng that it is they, as for example but
not exclusively there when memore lapse is suffered. The underlying ground is t
hat we do not know the whole of us beyond what we can make out along the proces
s of objectification of ourselves.
It is evident before all that those feelings that we usually call sentim
ents like joy or sadness or other feelings that are classified as volitions like
desires or disgusts are something more than the internal impact of an environme
ntal excitement: they detemine conditions of the subject itself. However these f
eelings for that matter sometimes are characterised by a similar simplicity and
directness to that of ordinary feelings excited by senses. And they are co-feeli
ngs in the sense tha tthey define the subject. They are not clearly the product
of an interpretation of ordinary feelings in the context of conscience with re
spect to the subject.. They are felt as qualities that do not accept any interpr
etation or different reasoning. Moreover there are such co-feelings that cannot
be clearly classified as either sentiments or desires. Such is the case of pain
which is rather a mixture of a sentiment and a strong desire rather than a clear
sentiment or a clear desire. That points to the fact that such a classification
is not absolute and that beneath all these categories of building blocks of c
onscience lies a common infrastructure. Co-feelings that have the quality of or
dinary feelings in terms of their immediate nature and simplicity. This is parti
cularly evident to us when we wonder while aching about the reasons or the utili
ty of such an orderal. Which means that we do not understand the reasons for it
, we can't interprete the unfortunate reality, while we experience the feelings.
It seems that the story of co-feelings is not an easy one to be told. Anyhow t
he story of sentiments and desires as parts of the structure of conscience is re
adily understood if one resorts to the notion of task performance in the light o
f conscience:
we have the knowledge of the task as a starting point and then we have the dispo
sition of the subject before the task which is described by the color of desire
to perform the task and after the task conclusion of the task we have the dispos
ition of the subject with respect to the result which may be the exultation of
success or the sorrow of the failure. This is task-centric aspect within conscie
nce that can drive this complex of co-feelings about the subject. Another qualit
y of those co-feelings is that they cannot exist out of a feelings context out o
f which they are meaningless. We can infer from the feelings nature of some of t
hose co-feelings that the self-awareness is not always the product of some intel
lectual process or inference but it is the more fundamental and immediate and pr
imary inside the being's conscience , in a determining manner.
The subject cannot feel itself but every feeling has a determining for t
he subject value which is called the co-feeling aspect of the feeling. And it is
exactly what we should expect about the subect since the feeling simplification
happens after the impact in the subject's mind in a clearly subjective manner.
The subject cannot feel itself in the same simplifying manner that it perceives
the objects under ordinary feelings since that wouldn't permit for composite str
ucture of consciece, for how could it then have supported that composite nature
of conscience of different impacts for each excitement! That means that the sel
f notion is always about an organism within conscience and not some particular
spot of the structure of that conscience. It has been already infered that ther
e is not any absolute distinguishment between categories of co-feelings and that
all possess something of the nature of ordinary feelings in terms of their dire
ctness. All that makes us suppose that each ordinary feeling has the capacity to
determine the subject and therefore it extends to comprise some co-feeling prop
erty. We all know that the same conditions that produce sorrow or pain for a ce
rtain being within its conscience, are indiferrent with respect to co-feelings f
or another subect . This means that the co-feelings as expected are highly subje
ctive as they determine in a direct manner the subject and therefore cannot be f
elt by another subject for they bear no relation to it. But we have then pushed
through the idea that the subject cannot feel itself. Insead we have come to be
lieve that with each feeling the subject completes the feeling of itself and th
at seems more reasonable since with the perception of each object beneath certai
n feelings the self notion is completed in a manner that is immediate and direct
and fundamental with the directness of feelings. Ofcourse that happens as long
as the clarity assumption is not violated and no mean circle of perception is in
troduced. Another conscern that emerged through this paragraph of controversies
was about the case when the subject perceives an aspect of itself without the a
bility to classified it as self. Then we see the the co-feeling value of an arr
angement of feelings is not mandatory and that the integration nature of the co-
feelings becomes more evident. But for a feeling not to have a mandatory co-feel
ing value means a serious blow to the previous attempts to connect the feelings
with a direct self determing value. That cooncern is fed as well by the observat
ion that the same conditions produce that co-feelings for a subject are neutral
with respect to that formation for another subject. Given that the co-feelings a
re not independent from feelings we have to refine the explanation further on an
d we are left to rely upon the integration notion of co-feelings pretty much in
the same way perhaps that the colors of conscience integrate to the structure of
conscience.
In the case of pain there are channels of perception that produce that f
eeling which can then be intercepted. In addition to the previous case there is
the similar case of delightful feelings as during the orgasmic phase of sexual
activity but in the positive direction if pain was considered negative. If two
subjects perceive an overlapping part of space and time through of their consci
ences it is exactly as expected that the co-feeling value of feelings differs si
nce the “same” space and time is seen through the impact to different minds. Each fe
eling possesses a co-feeling value inside the brain after the idea that the brai
n glows as a whole to show conscience. But that co-feeling value may not express
but within a certain degree of integration with other feelings co-feeling value
. Or it may turn to a part of a composite co-feeling effect. For example when mo
re than one limbs are sore the effect is a composite pain effect. In the case of
internal organs that do not produce normally a feeling the co-feeling value se
ems to be independent contrary to the earlier assumptions unless we consider the
complex nature of feelinng that possess co-feeling values once again and then w
e observe the marked importance of the co-feeling value of the feeling of the o
rgan against the feeling value of the organ. This is totally corroborated by the
different color of the pain as to the object characterization which is the orga
n in that case, the co-feeling colors or qualities of pain that refer to the su
bject. The qualities of pain that are the result of objectification of the subje
cts self permit the spacial and timely location of pain usually in contrast to n
on-pain areas. Since the important part in the complex is that of the co-feeling
value we would not expect that the pain differs much between organs which is a
ctually the observed situation.
Beings are perceived within the context of a conscience by their feelin
gs that differ from each other across the space simultaneously or change along t
ime. That sort of mutuality of appearacne in the space of the conscience of the
several feelings is not so much determinate as to prevent a quality to exist in
different settings of other qualities. Therefore while the conscience space is
characterized by the mutuality of the identification of the feelings with respec
t to other differing feelings the felt qualities and the beings beneath that co
lored surface tend to give some idea of absolute bearing of the qualities. Yet m
ore, if one closes the eyes everything becomes black and the quality of the bla
ck color falls into our perception without the requirement for any other color.
But even if no other color could have been perceived or even if no other channel
of senses had been available in a setting like that through a simple quality i
t would have emerged the distinction between the subject and a simple object. Co
nsidering therefore differing qualities of feelings acrosse the space and along
time is somethng different from the determination of beings behind that setting
that manifest themselves within the context of a conscience by their mutual dete
rmination. Ofcourse beings go beyhond their “chromatic surface within a conscience
and not well understood or not at all understood changes happen to them in tha
t consciencous context.
If a change occures to the brain then instantly the perceived environment in sub
ject's conscience changes without the needfullness that the causality principle
apply . Ofcourse the preceived environment is different aspect to the environme
nt for the subject turned to object within the context of another conscience of
a subject that studies the previous subject. In that way things might be thought
to have no reason to change , but the existence of a quality within diffent set
tings, the depth of objects beyond the surface of appearance within a conscience
allow both for changes and for the spread of changes in a dynamic way. Addition
ally under conditions of presumed clarity of perception and knowledge the change
s in the structure of conscience that a subject perceives need time and do not
overlap towards confusion. Therefore the causality principle may apply well as p
resumed and the model escapes the trap of stagnation. A necessary correction tha
t happened along this paragraph was about the mutual determination of beings and
not of the qualities through which these are felt in the context of a conscienc
e. The limits of being in space and time assure of that mutuality which is obser
ved across the limit.
If we were to push these ideas to some ideals by turning some propertie
s to their extreme values we could distinguish between a conscience of only spac
e where everything is perceived statically because there is no potential for cha
nge because everything are simultaneously apparent and a coscience of a single
object beside the subject with eternal changes that make up for the lost informa
tion by the simplicity of space. The idea of everything known in advance points
to a unique such conscience that includes everything. But the idea of everythin
g known with the eternal course of time points to diffent subjects of such an el
ementary perception according to the sequence of perceptual events. This idea is
more problematic one in terms of space arrangement, since it does not allow for
acurate space conception between the subject and the possible different objects
that seem overlapping along time. Both ideas are ideal situations and cannot be
acomplished within our conscience as real structures. However this extremities
are useful in determining the strength of our ideas in the present study includ
ed the ideas about feelings and their co-feeling value. After supposing a cons
cience of flat knowlegde of everything one must further assume that the causalit
y principle holds through the lack of evidence for the opposite allegation and f
urther more assume that the causality principle can be applied in many different
ways. Therefore one should not have expected that the subjects of elementary pe
rception though eternal due to the attempt to include everything can exhaust ev
ery possiblitiy. And the many different ways of application of the causality pri
nciple do make sense then in terms of materialization to beings. In the case of
the flat undestanding of everything the subject that perceives everything in an
absolute manner , if any such subject is linked to such a conscience, shouldn't
glow an aspect of the reality through through special coloring of it. If ever t
here was an objective perception of beings beyond subjective restrictions that i
s the one! Ofcourse then that conscience lay-out can't be attbibuted to a being
confined to a particular spot of that superspace. For then that spot must have b
een beyond the subject's capacity to perceive objects contrary to its knwing eve
ryhting. That conscience must be attributed to a subject that exists everywhere
but can't be to any ordinary time and space synthesis of beings. The whole of it
can exist everywhere in the same way that the product of a synthesis of parts o
f a machine is the machine that spans all the space where parts exists, yet at t
he location of every part one in parallel thinks of all the machine. Now this is
no disregard for that subject , at least no more than the baby's groping at the
face of its parent. And no parent would ever punish his or her child for attemp
ting to feel the parent.
The equivalence of space and time dimensions suggests the opossite situa
tion as well: space should be able of becoming time as an application of the ca
usality principle, hence the assumtion for the beings of elementary perception.
It is worth investigating how space should show in such a being's conscience. Of
coure at any stage of perception the subject is able of distingushing between it
self and objects that do not occupy clear spatial locations. Therefore it should
not be able of clean localization of itself in that conscience. It is like the
sense of smell deprived of the any spatial hint. In a way that subject fill the
whole space of its conscience and the structure of that conscience does not give
a clean idea of its space let alone any spatial extentions. The causality princ
iple is in full effect along a specific materialization but there isn't any sens
e of options for choice. There isn't much foreseeing capacity as well! That sort
of subject is more evidently defined as the ability to glow the content of its
concience. Since there isn't any choice then there must be no clear discern betw
een joy or sorrow for the result. Consequently the appearance of the specifing c
ofeeling value of desires must sink back to the an indicernible state of sheer k
nowledge within conscience.
Can a conscience hold in a unifying way everything that can be born? Ca
n a subject's conscience hold everything including the subject? Can a subject be
defined upon itself? That is certainly a bad definition that does not produce a
nything useful. Therefore a subject is only defined upon the objects which are g
iven birth within its conscience and bear definition value for the subject..That
is the subject that perceives everything allocates space and time in its consci
ence for every possible object. But the subject itself cannot be classified as o
bject within the context of any concience nor can be allocated space and time in
that context. For then it would have resulted as a differentiation from its env
ironemnt beyond it where that could not have existed. And its view would have do
wngraded into a shallow aspect of the picture which is not the complete and full
story . What about the volition or emotion within that concience then? There ar
e many different paths of causality succesions but no choice again in the sense
that every choice is made within that context by the included objects rathern th
an by the subject.. Here we have neither the desire for fulfillment nor the emot
ional check upon that progress. But we have the provision for every object and i
f that is called love then that love bears no relation to desires or sentiments
. There pops in the popular verse that love is about what you do not about what
you say or feel or desire. Love is the contribution to creation. Love is not the
attraction or the admiration. To reproduce humans depend on attraction and admi
ration feelings that manifest themselves in courting. Those feelings are not the
individuals' love for each other but a wish and a reward respectively.
Finish
This aspect about perception is not conclusive for many issues. Still mo
re it may be wrong in many ways. Even yet it may have not any practical value be
side the value of demystification that waves away the possibilities on manipulat
ion of these issues. Since folk that wish to manipulate choose to enhance their
opinion through the use of an imposing authority which remains mysterious. Anywa
y this point of finish delineates more a limit than a conclusion. Not only have
the composers of music the privilege of producing unfinished work with some ma
rket value though! Besides politicians usually work for the benefit of society i
n unfinished tasks. For example they fight unemployment but for pure quality ma
tters of the scenario avoid the hollywood style happy ending. They have develop
ed a notion about the justification of it. It is called “feasibility”. But that noti
ons tends to be quite obscure in explaining how some are able of pulling the co
w's (=society's) breast to get tones of milk and others find the milking quite a
n ordeal!
Appendix
A. What is the determining factor of where “self” lies within the space of conscei
nce? It is evident that when the perception of space separates self from others
then the perception of space bears self-defining value in parallel to the others
-defining value. But in order to know the subject's self or the objects' selves
within the subjects conscience there must be some prosessing of the information
gathered by senses to produce the notion of objects by extending the depth and e
xpanding the surface of direct feelings. There is in the space structure that po
ints to the subject of the conscience since that structure may as well be obviou
s within the context of another conscience. There is however subjective value in
side direct feelings because they are about how the subject produces an aspect o
f the objective space. If we consider the case of a subject that suffers an inju
ry we may beyond any doubt witness that the same picture that involves no pain t
o ourselves might be combined with severe pain for the subject of a conscience.
Clearly we do not perceive that same data within the common space of our and
its concience. Moreover those data are not linked to the visional perception of
the injured part of the subject's body. And those data's transmission to the i
ntegrating brain can be intercepted with drugs for instance resulting in no feel
ing of pain while the body part remains even severely injured.
On the other hand each feeling alone though direct possesses small value
as an information bit even when that information is about the objects around. I
t is the integration of feelings within a conscience either directly into consci
ence's space and time or after some processing that produces large amount of inf
ormation. That integration permits the expansion and extension beyond the direct
feelings surface that utilizes the co-feelings' value in determining beings as
the substance of the felt surface. Taken granted that beings are mutually define
d with the reciprocation occuring eigther between the subject and objects or amo
ng obects within the context of a conscience that each emerges in contrast to th
e others to the felt surface then each feeling bears co-feeling bits of informat
ion. One can't assume that a being is absolutely defined outside any context of
relations to other beings for that eliminates any reason for that sort of consid
eration. However there is qualitative difference in the relationship between a
subject and the objects it perceives to the relationship between two objects th
at are allocated parts of the same space and may not perceive each other at all
or may possess a very transient line of bordering to each other which might not
go beyond the range of a subjective aspect. For example sun “touches” earth as he se
ts in the west but that touch is not real in terms of space contact. The aspects
of the sun and the earth touch each other within the field of vision which con
stists of neihbouring angles of information transmitting visible light rays. Suc
h ray does not bear any means to define the position of the optical message alon
g the ray itself , and that is the reason that we experience mirroring effects w
here a bent ray does not reveal any information about this bending.
To conclude this first appendix , the really true mutualism in beings d
efinition is revealed when the fundamental properties of theirs are examined. Be
ings are defined under this study as combined ability for perception of data,
communication of data and action (change of data) . . That is the reason that t
hese properties are labeled fundamental once they are the absolutely necessary g
eneral frame for a being's definition. In fact the perception part renders being
s as subjects of concience and the communication part renders them as objects of
conscience. The action part supports both the subject's role and the object's
role if the change conscerns themselves or not respectively. Moreover whatever i
s perceived bears its equivalent in terms of communication within another concie
nce's context and an underlying equivalent in terms of action in both cases. Tha
t aspect of affairs is not to be confused with the cause and effect sequence of
changes. A feeling corresponds to a situation in the brain which then glows the
feeling.This situation is a complex activity of the brain which unfolds at diffe
rent levels of organization from causes to purposes (more analytic levels of org
anization provides the causes of phenomena while more synthetic levels provide t
he purposes , while conditions might be used in more proper sense for the prere
quisites to a result). Conditions provided by an activity outside the brain wh
ich may have taken part in a complete different time and space setting ( for exa
mple when one observes stars through a telescope he sees with reference to the p
resent what has taken place in the past exactly at the time that the rays whic
h were emitted by the star began to travel until they reached the observer's ey
e through the telescope. ) may in turn yield as a result a situation in the mind
which then will glow the feeling in the context of the subject's conscience. In
an oposite way the situation in one's mind may provide the prerequisite for a
n activity of one's body which along a chain from conditions to result might p
roduce the situation in another brain that will glow the corresponding feeling w
ithin its conscience. In this way the first mind communicated a message (data se
nt) to the second mind through a chain of action. Data are conceived in the cont
ext of a conscience but may or may not be apparent to a subject. Not every bit o
f data is a feeling to a being but each feeling represents the most primitive an
d direct form data for the construction of the conscience. Feelings are primiti
ve in the sense of the starting point for processes that yield more sophisticat
ed data, especially encoded, and direct in the sense that though they simplify t
he perception of an activity they correspond directly to an activity without the
need of any other interference.

B.€In €this €second appendix to this study I will refer to the question of what render
s accumulated information within states of the brain legitimate to be conceived.
We are all aware that as the brain glows as conscience €not everything that lies
behind the curtains€that form the colored surface shows itself within€perception€€, rath
er it is that the details behind the perceived colors€ as feelings are concealed.
But then what governs what is hidden and what is a feeling?€Ofcourse what is felt
pertains to the indentity of the conscience and the subject that bears that cons
cience. So it's pretty meaningless to try to figure out a€ theory about what is fe
lt without any consideration of€ the subject that feels. One can go as far as tell
ing that the subject's senses function in that way because this function is part
of the definition of what the subject is. But that is a form of knowledge that
though€ true does not give any insight to the subject's brain and given that we re
ally do not know subjects unless we investigate them€ and to the extent that we do
that then the above€ definition of subjects (describing what they can sense )€ can€ b
ecome extremely theoretical and not really aplicable. That sort of explanation d
oes not give a clue about the causes in the analysis of the brain or causality l
aws that may be discovered at some of these levels that then would allow predict
ion of the states of the mind and its glare of conscience. How are we to perfom
an identification of the subject€ and in the same time a formulation of its comple
te picture based on the local knowledge that we get€? What makes two subjects diff
ering€ in perception or perceiving€ the same things?
I believe the answer to this lies in the fact that the feelings nature is the na
ture of€ a task which manifests itself€ in the concience of subject as a simplified
color. Any such€ task refers to the brain's operation thought it encodes a lot of
what it is going on outside the brain . Actually the sense organs are€ burdened wi
th the job of securing this meaning of the brains state with respect to the outs
ide world.€ That task may be seen through different structure and function levels
but some levels are more revealing about the task and fitted to its description.
As an example when one examines a machine though €there are many ways to dissect€ t
heoretically the machine entity into parts that are connected together€ only a spe
cific analysis reveals immediately the functional relation of some parts that is
essential to the machine's operation understanding. If you try and analyse a ca
r machine without respect to the integrity of its operating€ parts, therefore divi
ding the space of the fuel tank for example in that analysis then that sort of c
oining makes it harder to acquire the role of the fuel tank and to achieve this€ e
nd you must reunite the separately considered parts to a whole again.€
€ € € € At this point one might ask this as well: if one were not interested in the tran
sportation function of a car then there would be€ absolutely no reason for its min
d to dwell at a certain analysis level that explained that function of a car thr
ough the operation of its engine and the way that this rotates the wheels. For t
he brain that interest lies in serving the body€ which however is not able to enjo
y that service, rather the brain enjoys the service it provides to the body (inc
luding the brain) . Obviously one cannot clearly separate the brain from the res
t of the body at least without extreme difficulty in terms of pain for example.
Parts of the brain may be overwhelmed with bits of information that each could h
ave showed directly as a feeling within conscience but that does not happen and
all this information stays beyond conscience though it may affect somehow the su
rface of perception within conscience. But if one had managed to assemble an ind
entical brain brain in an identical state to the state of the subject's brain th
en that brain should have glowed as conscience the same things. The fact that fe
elings represent tasks means the subject feels changes. And that is the best fit
ted way to govern the functions of the body or the functions of the brain itself
as its parts interrelate to each other and a state of operation determines to a
n extent the next stage of its operation.
€ € € € €€ However even at this point of interpretation of phenomena about intellect one is
not really at a position to explain the absolute nature of colors . The sort of
glare that the brain emits as conscience goes deep beyond the surface of things
as they appear within any limited conscience and is closely linked to the substa
nce that exhibits that surface. Actually as it has already been said these color
s define the subject that bears the conscience . The subject ,being as that , wi
thin the domain of ontology has already been defined as a complex capacity to pe
rceive, communicate and act. Given that last observation one should not expect t
hat the action -rather than using the term task- which is simplified to an impr
ession of the senses be completely determined. But this is something different
from the cabling of neural networks that can stimulate a muscle or through muscl
es a capable of motion limb. At higher levels of integration where purproses of
things at lower levels are sought things can be missed or ignored through the s
implification of an action into the quality of an impression. If one considers t
he case of light then one may convince oneself that at small intervals of freque
ncies of the visible spectrum the color impression is the same. Which means that
the action which corresponds to an impression can vary. However the impression
is definite. This makes it evident that it is not at the immediately below level
s of analysis that the impression is defined. But details at even deeper levels
of analysis are important for the characterization of the impression. Additiona
lly one must take into consideration that impressions are collected as aspects o
f the world (complementary in the frame of conscience) and not treating the worl
d as an absolutely discerned from self object. Beyond a particular aspects. When
a threshold effect is discovered that can filter out differences so that the i
mpression is preserved then that explains things in the particular level but in
any case it has been proven impossible to explain the “colors” of impressions besid
e shapes.
The notion of defining a sensation including infinite many levels of ana
lysis for consideration of phenomena that evade the grosser higher level of an
alysis (nevertheless the simple color of the sensation indicates states of the
mind and not states of objects in conscience and the action that corresponds to
them, though the states of the mind are affected possibly by the states of seve
ral objects ) has become powerful through this course of contemplations but may
contradict several outcomes from natural sciences though not directly but at th
e level of their interpretation. For example with respect to the conspicuous ph
ysics of quanta approach., the interpretation for a compulsory loss of determin
ate nature of phenomena as a universal characteristic and not as a characteri
stic of the observer impinges on that notion. On the other hand if one adopted a
n attitude of relating quanta theories to inherent observer's weaknesses then th
ey would only infer that understanding the exact nature of sensations goes well
beyond the capability of a subject furnished with limited conscience. Nor does a
ll this mean anything specific with respect to supernatural phenomena as the lif
e beyond this life. It is clearly undestandable that the coloring of reality app
lies perhaps in the same way with different animals. Ofcourse according to any r
easonable approach progression of life beyond death is almost equivalent as a n
otion with the extension of life before birth. That happens because the reason w
hich might support life beyond death though unknown would not differ from the re
ason that supports life before birth. And in few words that reasoning involves t
he argument that life is not restricted to its manifestation within this world.
It is simply a question that our minds are not capable of producing a credible
answer beyond speculations. To say that probability and a probalistic distribut
ion determines the frequencies of phenomena without maintaining any reasoning th
at supports this notion , just out of an attempt to fit theories to data, does n
ot justify a probabilistic approach as a universal approach rather than a subjec
tive approach (with reference to the capabilities of a certain observer) . It is
a pity when natural sciences lead the way of philosophy since it is then that b
oth philosophy and natural sciences forfeit their true purpose. Then data are di
storted to fit into our theories and fictional prodcuts come to the point of con
fusion with science. As is the case with all the otherwise called scientific the
ories for the genesis of the universe and such things. Natural sciences come the
n to a state of stagnation and people tend to believe that all that oughts to be
known is known. Ofcourse in the line of such approaches people manipulate other
people and certain people make a lot of money. One should always recall that fo
r two thousand years Aristotle had been considered the only true science and tha
t clearly is an indicator for stagnation. When man turns to believing that they
know perhaps all things but little then stagnation and arrogance and manipulatio
n follow if they haven't already been so. One must recognize when true science r
evolutions happen against when the application of the already known is just exte
nded to its fullest size in order to make the most of it perhaps in an accelerat
ed manner of resolving technical issues. Only then does one know that we know no
thing compared to what is left to be known.

C The “colour” of the impressions through the sensor organs.

By the term colour of the impressions we certainly do not mean the actual colour
in the narrow sense of the feeling whose creation is influenced by the eyes. Ea
ch sensor organ , be it located or scattered troughout the body , is connected w
ith a specific set of colours , certainly not in the visual sense, that signal
s the state of the mind as is influenced by the excitement of that sensor organ.
The lack of the excitement, the rest state of the organ is connected with a cor
responding colour as well , let it be for example the dark colour which the mind
sees through eyes or the silence colour which the mind sees through ears. The r
esting colour for a sensor organ is equivalent to the other colours in terms of
the amount of the information that is enveloped within the influence of the orga
n but it is special in the sense that it does not represent an excitement of the
organ , that is a specific condition of the organ being the negation for the
occurence of any excitement of the organ. We can't say that the world would have
been red had the lack of agents to excite the eye been the case. In that case t
he world would be black. In a similar way silence is the starting point for the
brain to mark sounds aided by the ears. Silence is the state of absence of sound
s.Likewise the absence of smell , or taste , or touch mark the negative state fo
r excitemensts of the corresponding sensor organs though there might not be any
dedicated word in our languages for those states. This fact perhaps shows the i
mportance of some senses for the language itself. For instance sounds are of fun
damental nature in the utterance of the language phrases as well as visions mat
ters for the scripted form of communication.
What is realy remarkable with the colours of the senses is that they do not add
to the amount of the information percieved. A fair example about that is when t
he colours are considered under the same set of names but at the same place of s
pace , at the same time , the visual impact to each of two subjects is commuted.
That is, both of two subjects may agree to name the colour effect produced by r
adiation from a certain place of space at certain time as the green colour and e
qually the same to name the effect of radiation from another place of space at a
nother time as the red colour. That agreement permits them to communicate just
fine in terms of colours provided additionally that the perception of colours i
s consistent in all places and times within limits.. Then if for one of them th
e experience of the red and that of the green colour are taken to be produced “r
ight” according to a reference convention but for the other the experience of the
red and that of the green colour are taken to be inversed with respect to the
impact on the first individual.that state of affairs does not at all influence t
he communication of the two individuals being the subjective part of the informa
tion , provided that every other colour is experienced in the same way by the in
dividuals in question , and neither subject can really tell the two ways of exp
eriencing the red and the green colours apart with reference to the individuals.
If the second subject liked to express to the first the fact of feeling green co
lour where the first feels red and that of feeling red colour where the first fe
els green that would be equivalent to saying that it feels diffently the same pl
ace at the same time with the first but how could be that found out? We have the
same parts of the world sensored and the same names for what is sensed there s
o how the experiences could be told apart? The difference does not lie either t
o the name or to the spot of the world but in the state of the minds of the subj
ects. Unless that state of mind becomes the object of examination every effort t
o tell the experiences appart will be in vain. That is the alteration of the sta
te of the mind due to the excitement of the sensor organs. But even if we could
told appart these experiences we could not have possibly by verifying the diff
erence explain the nature of the colour of the feelings against any possibility.
Especially when the amount of information that can be processed through the use
of language has limitations. That is another expression for saying that we cann
ot explain in an absolute manner the nature of the colours. We may only go as fa
r as taking them for granted regarding a subject.
The nature of the feelings then being of unlimited depth escapes our comprehensi
on even as we perceive the difference of experiencing them. To simplify the per
ception of a composite action , bears clearly and by all means , an arbitrary el
ement of choice as to the final result. That correspndence between actions and t
he feelilngs of them can't happen in a unique manner . That means that each acti
on does indicate the final colour of its feeling.

D Mirages-Illusions-Hallucinations
The fact that the impressions gained by the senses actually describe states of t
he mind underpins the phenomena of mirages or even hallucinations, while perhaps
, if I am not very much mistaken, illusions refer to wrong ideas as the outcome
of mental processing rather than mental intake. At any rate there is not that un
bridged difference between the former and the latter by all accounts. There are
situations when the misconception can be most direct and under other circumstanc
es the misconception needs further mental construction. Anyway on the other side
of that of the subjet, the side of the objects, many things might happen beyond
notice or even with the same impact in the subjects mind. This means that the s
ubject's mind is allowed with several possibilities in many of the times that m
ay explain the data through senses. But why the mind does not remain on the grou
nd of certainty and is engaged into the interpretation? Sometimes forcefully! Fo
r if you are looking through a mirror you may become forced to believe that ther
e is something where in the right perspective you would have determined as the “in
side” of the mirror. An extremity of how the states of mind extend and fill , thr
ough the perception or imagination and interpretation of its data lies on the s
ide of the dreams or hallucinations. A first answer that pops in my mind about t
hat has to do with the fact that any organism maintains the impact of its surrou
ndings through its senses on its mind with the intention to use it. And in the d
irection of using it needs to adopt assumptions. There fits the interpetation. W
hen the mind will not perceive the presence of a mirror then it will deal with t
he reflection on a mirror as the real thing on the imaginary side of the mirror.
In this case the assumption is that there is no assumption about or notice of t
he mirror. In any case the mind of an organism is not made to process things rig
ht all the time. Limited in capacity it is built on the basis of forming assumpt
ions and testing them but , and here lies the adaptative importance, in a primar
ily safe and at the same time fruitful manner. Additionally the complete state o
f the mind which is not the state of the objects but is affected by their state
is decisive to lesser or greater depths for the making of the feelings , since l
ocality of an impression is the way of its integration to the whole and even a s
imple feeling is analysed in many directions through brain channels to pass its
information necessary for that process of integration
C Pain
Pain is undoubtedly the feeling which forms a negative pole that governs our li
ves. Pain is more than a threatening feeling and is there so that the threatenin
g feeling cannot be overidden. That happens because a threatening feeling along
a course without a real threat at the end of the course would fail to interraup
t the destructive course a good many times
Furthermore, pain which is reallly an indisputable feeling unlike fear grows b
y degrees as the damage increases -pain marks a damage that is already there whi
le fear shows the danger of a damage- so that one might step back in time befor
e damage grows too big. I must confess something: that all such contemplation so
metimes fails to be scientific when it has become much personal. People attempt
always to arrange matters of sorrow in their minds so that the arrangement gets
them out of the way temporarily in order to get on with their lives. Nevertheles
s matters of sorrow and more than anything pain, nomatter how much one has been
“prepared” for them take people by surprise and shake severly if not destroy comple
tely the structure of their preparation. They are said to destroy life sometimes
let alone mental preparations! So there is pain that is sufferable and pain un
bearable over a certain period. There is always that point of distinction perha
ps depending on the state of the subject and the type of pain as well , which sh
ows that the talks about heroism sometimes if not most of the time is a matter o
f lack. This is an important clarification against the propaganda that urges peo
ple to sacrifice themselves for greater causes in the sense of manipulating them
.
In the above respect pain is necessary to a form of life that is prone to damag
es and permits for the correction of many types of damages below a certain lev
el of destruction. Pain is the mark of imperferction however perferction is the
mark of no development.
The biological effect which corresponds to pain is the affected damage , but not
-this is important- not alone. It is the affected damage as is relayed to the b
rain. It might have been another short of harm that had affected the brain in th
e same way and created the same feeling of pain. Feelings are always states of m
ind and their biological correspndence are the states of brain. Pain modifies th
e behaviour of the subject but when that modification is not combined with a cor
rection potential has little evolutionary impact. The capacity for self repair h
owever increases greatly the survival rates and affects the population in the di
rection of evolution as well.
There comes the critical question: Great pain that accompanies fatal conditions
exists because the machinery of pain that creates less pain is there which serv
es the individuals as well as the species but great pain seems unecessary for th
ere is not any possible usefull reaction then. So an individual that much impair
ed need not have suffered the accompanying great pain if evolution had had the
chance to develop a mechanism of bypassing the pain. To state more clearly the
question I ought to ask whether the individual is that much unimportant compar
ed to the population and the evolution branch? That question is not within scie
nce as it clearly shows. Population and evolution branch need rigorous individua
ls and individuals need the survival skills that will determine the evolutionar
y branch and the population.
Another question is : are some individuals of less value than others? Are there
any “lost” souls? Again a non-scientific question. Every individual is eventually lo
st and yes with respect to a certain type of environment some are of greater val
ue regarding their abilities to survive and reproduce and extend the evolutionar
y branch. And there are individuals among a population that not only did not m
anage to complete the life cycle but they did not survive birth.
They are there because biological organisms are not born to fit to their environ
ment but they build their fitness to it within their genetic frame and allow for
modifications of that frame in the long term to secure the adaptation process b
eyond the individual.
Are these individuals less unique? No! Are they losses along the process of ada
ptation? Yes in a sense they are casualties. Are they less fortunate? Is there
providence? Why them and not others? This may sound different from what I mean
it to mark but is a cockroach not so happy as a cat?