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Statcon Cases Finals #1 Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for

Disqualification against former President Estrada


VERBA LEGIS before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s
Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
● A constitutional construction principle
which means that wherever possible, the words Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
used in the Constitution must be given Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification.
their ordinary meaning except where technical Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
terms are employed. Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12
● If statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
and applied without attempted interpretation.
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL , petitioner, COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the
ALFREDO S. LIM, petitioner- petition for disqualification holding that President
intervenor, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, respondents effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013
convicted former President Estrada, a former elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the garnered the second highest votes intervene and
crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Petitioner’s Contention: Risos-Vidal clarifies that
On October 25, 2007, however, former President the fundamental basis upon which former
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive President Estrada must be disqualified from
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President running for and holding public elective office
Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored is actually the proscription found in Section 40 of
to his civil and political rights. Stating “I hereby the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the
grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO OEC. She argues that the crime of plunder is both
ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of an offense punishable by imprisonment
Plunder and imposed a penalty of one year or more and involving moral turpitude;
of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his such that former President Estrada
civil and political rights.” must be disqualified to run for and hold public
elective office. That the pardon being merely
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada conditional and not absolute or plenary.
filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position
of President but was opposed by three petitions OSG contends: that "[w]hile at first glance, it is
seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases apparent that [former
prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En President Estrada's] conviction for plunder
Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second disqualifies him from running as mayor of
highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 Manila under Section 40 of the [LGC], the
synchronized elections. subsequent grant of pardon to him, however,
effectively restored his right to run for any public
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once office." 21 The restoration of his right to
more ventured into the political arena, and filed a run for any public office is the exception to the
Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as
local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of provided under Section 12 of the OEC. As to the
Manila. seeming requirement of Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
restoration/remission of a particular right to expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
be stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts that "an
airtight and rigid interpretation of Article A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] . . . would be the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
stretching too much the clear and plain him by the sentence.
meaning of the aforesaid provisions." 22 Lastly,
taking into consideration the third Whereas ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion
Clause of the pardon granted to former President temporal — Their accessory penalties. — The
Estrada, the OSG supports the position penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
that it "is not an integral part of the decree of the temporal shall carry with them that of civil
pardon and cannot therefore serve to interdiction for life or during the period of the
restrict its effectivity." sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual
absolute disquali cation which the offender shall
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions suffereven though pardoned as to the principal
of law, it is not enough that a pardon makes a penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
general statement that such pardon carries with it remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
the restoration of civil and political rights. By
virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring A rigid and in exible reading of the above
civil and political rights without categorically provisions of law, as proposed by Risos- Vidal, is
making mention what specific civil and political unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or
rights are restored "shall not work to restore the unduly restrict the power of the President to grant
right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage; executive clemency.
nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where
for the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
reclusion temporal.” In other words, she considers ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
the above constraints as mandatory requirements applied without attempted interpretation. Verba
that shun a general or implied restoration of civil legis non est recedendum. From the words of a
and political rights in pardons. statute there should be no departure.31 It is this
Court's rm view that the phrase in the presidential
Issue: pardon at issue which declares that former
President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil
Ruling: The foregoing pronouncements solidify and political rights" substantially complies with the
the thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised requirement of express restoration. For this reason,
Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of should be construed in a way that will give full
the President to pardon persons convicted of effect to the executive clemency granted by the
violating penal statutes. President, instead of indulging in an overly strict
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal's interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish
interpretation that the said Articles contain specific the import of the pardon which emanated from the
textual commands which must be strictly followed O ce of the President and duly signed by the Chief
in order to free the bene ciary of presidential grace Executive himself/herself. The said codal
from the disqualifications specifically prescribed provisions must be construed to harmonize the
by them. power of Congress to de ne crimes and prescribe
the penalties for such crimes and the power of the
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal President to grant executive clemency. All that the
Code provides: S said provisions impart is that the pardon of the
principal penalty does not carry with it the
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. — A pardon shall not remission of the accessory penalties unless the
work the restoration of the right to hold public o ce, President expressly includes said accessory
penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate
Presidential prerogative to grant executive concurring opinions in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.
clemency and, speci cally, to decide to pardon the 36 to justify her argument that an absolute pardon
principal penalty while excluding its accessory must expressly state that the right to hold public o
penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and ce has been restored, and that the penalty of
41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided perpetual absolute disqualification has been
upon by the President on the penalties imposed in remitted.
accordance with law. AHCcET
This is incorrect.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended
to former President Estrada shows that both the Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced.
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its Although the learned views of Justices Teodoro R.
accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano are to be
rst sentence refers to the executive clemency respected, they do not form part of the controlling
extended to former President Estrada who was doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and land. On the contrary, a careful reading of the
imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter majority opinion in Monsanto, penned by no less
is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved than Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no
him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, statement that denotes adherence to a stringent and
which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil overly nuanced application of Articles 36 and 41
and political rights," expressly remitted the of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect
accessory penalties that attached to the principal require the President to use a statutorily prescribed
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we language in extending executive clemency, even if
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal the intent of the President can otherwise be
Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon deduced from the text or words used in the pardon.
that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and Furthermore, as explained above, the pardon here
perpetual absolute disquali cation were expressly is consistent with, and not contrary to, the
remitted together with the principal penalty of provisions of Articles 36 and 41.
reclusion perpetua.

In this jurisdiction, the right to seek public elective


o ce is recognized by law as falling under the whole TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
gamut of civil and political rights. Thus, from both CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
elective o ce is unequivocally considered as a respondent.
political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier
statement that the pardon granted to former Facts: On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was
President Estrada admits no other interpretation appointed on a permanent status as Financial
other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a
pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil government-owned and controlled corporation
and political rights — including the right to seek (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree
elective office. No. 1080. His appointment was included in
TIDCORP's Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA)
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes for August 2001, which was submitted to the CSC
beyond the plain meaning of said penal provisions; — Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
and prescribes a formal requirement that is not only Field Office. 5
unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could be in
derogation of the constitutional prohibition relative In a letter 6 dated September 28, 2001, Director
to the principle that the exercise of presidential
Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman's
pardon cannot be affected by legislative action. appointment because the position of Financial
Management Specialist IV was not included in the and is thus not bound by the DBM's Index of
DBM's Index of Occupational Service. Occupational Service. Pursuant to this authority,
CTIDCORP's Executive Vice President Jane U. TIDCORP's Board of Directors issued Resolution
Tambanillo appealed 7 the invalidation of De No. 1185, s. 1998 approving the corporation's re-
Guzman's appointment to Director IV Agnes organizational plan, under which De Guzman was
Padilla of the CSC-National Capital Region(NCR). appointed Financial Management Specialist IV. De
According to Tambanillo, Republic Act No. (RA) Guzman's appointment was valid because the plan
8494, which amended TIDCORP's charter, providing for his position followed the letter of the
empowers its Board of Directors to create its own law.
organizational structure and sta ng pattern, and to
approve its own compensation and position classi Tambanillo also noted that prior to De Guzman's
cation system and quali cation standards. appointment as Financial Management Specialist
Specifically, Section 7 of RA 8494 provides: IV, the position had earlier been occupied by Ma.
Loreto H. Mayor whose appointment was duly
Section 7.The Board of Directors shall provide for approved by Director Bugtong. Thus, Director
an organizational structure and sta ng pattern for o Bugtong's invalidation of De Guzman's
cers and employees of the Trade and Investment appointment is inconsistent with her earlier
Development Corporation of the Philippines approval of Mayor's appointment to the same
(TIDCORP) and upon recommendation of its position.
President, appoint and x their remuneration,
emoluments and fringe benefits: Provided, That the CSC-NCR’s RULING: Director Padilla denied
Board shall have exclusive and nal authority to Tambanillo's appeal because De Guzman's
appoint, promote, transfer, assign and re-assign appointment failed to comply with Section 1, Rule
personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998,
existing law to the contrary notwithstanding. which requires that the position title of an
appointment submitted to the CSC must conform
All positions in TIDCORP shall be governed by a with the approved Position Allocation List and
compensation and position classification system must be found in the Index of Occupational
and quali cation standards approved by Service. Since the position of Financial
TIDCORP's Board of Directors based on a Management Specialist IV is not included in the
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual Index of Occupational Service, then De Guzman's
duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan appointment to this position must be invalid
shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plans in the private sector and shall TIDCORP's appeal to the CSC-CO : TIDCORP’s
be subject to periodic review by the Board no more President and CEO Joel C. Valdes sent CSC
than once every four (4) years without prejudice to Chairperson Karina Constantino-David a letter11
yearly merit reviews or increases based on appealing Director Padilla's decision to the CSC-
productivity and profitability. TIDCORP shall be Central O ce (CO). Valdes reiterated TIDCORP's
exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations argument that RA 8494 authorized its Board of
on compensation, position classification and Directors to determine its own organizational
qualification standards. It shall, however, endeavor structure and sta ng pattern, and exempted
to make the system to conform as closely as TIDCORP from all existing laws on compensation,
possible to the principles and modes provided in position classification and qualification standards.
Republic Act No. 6758. ESHAIC In addition, prior actions of the CSC show that it
recognized TIDCORP's exemption from all laws
On the basis of Section 7 of RA 8494, Tambanillo regarding compensation, position classi cation and
argued that TIDCORP is authorized to adopt an quali cation standards of its employees. The CSC
organizational structure different from that set and has approved prior appointments of TIDCORP's o
prescribed by the CSC. Section 7 exempts cers under its July 1, 1998 re-organization plan. It
TIDCORP from existing laws on compensation, also approved Mayor's previous appointment as
position classification and qualification standards, Financial Management Specialist IV. Further, a
memorandum dated October 29, 1998 issued by authority over personnel concerns at TIDCORP,
the CSC-NCR noted that "pursuant to Sec. 7 of RA the latter is still covered by the existing civil
8494[,] TIDCORP is exempt from existing laws, service laws on compensation, position classi
rules and regulations on compensation, position cation and quali cation standards. Its appointment
classi cation and qualificationstandards. of De Guzman as Financial Management Specialist
IV should have complied with these rules. SIaHTD
The CSC-CO's ruling : In its Resolution No.
030144, 14 the CSC-CO a rmed the CSC-NCR's The CSC was well-within its authority when it
decision that De Guzman's appointment should invalidated De Guzman's appointment. It held that
have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular an appointee's title to the o ce does not permanently
No. 40, s. 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum vest until the appointee complies with the legal
Circular No. 15, s. 1999. Rule III, Section 1 (c) is requirements of his appointment. The requirements
explicit in requiring that the position title indicated include the submission of the appointment to the
in the appointment should conform with the CSC for the determination of whether the
Position Allocation List and found in the Index of appointee quali es to the position and whether the
Occupational Service. Otherwise, the appointment procedure for appointment has been properly
shall be disapproved. In disallowing De Guzman's followed. Until these requirements are complied
appointment, the CSC- CO held that Director with, his appointment may still be recalled or
Bugtong was simply following the letter of the law. withdrawn by the appointing authority. 20

According to the CSC-CO, TIDCORP Issue:Whether or not RA 8494 command


misconstrued the provisions of Section 7 of RA TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant
8494 in its attempt to bypass the requirements of to the Position Classification Act despite its
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998. While exemption from laws involving position
RA 8494 gave TIDCORP sta ng prerogatives, it classification.
would still have to comply with civil service rules
because Section 7 did not expressly exempt Held: To comply with Section 1 (c), Rule III of
TIDCORP from civil service laws. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998,
TIDCORP must conform with the circulars on
The CSC-CO also supported the CSC-NCR's position classi cation issued by the DBM. Section
invocation of CSC Resolution No. 011495. Both 7 of its charter, however, expressly exempts
the charters of the DBP and TIDCORP have TIDCORP from existing laws on position
similar provisions in the recruitment and classification, among others.
administration of their human resources. Thus, the
ruling in CSC Resolution No. 011495 has been In its comment, the CSC would want us to
correctly applied in TIDCORP's appeal. disregard TIDCORP's exemption from laws
involving position classi cation because RA 6758
Lastly, the CSC-CO noted that the government is applies to all GOCCs. It also noted that Section 7
not bound by its public o cers' erroneous of RA 8494, the provision TIDCORP invokes as
application and enforcement of the law. Granting the source of its exemption, also directs its Board
that the CSC-NCR had erroneously approved an of Directors to "endeavor to make its system
appointment to the same position as De Guzman's conform as closely as possible with the principles
appointment, the CSC is not estopped from [and modes provided in] Republic Act No.
correcting its officers' past mistakes. EHSAaD 6758[.]"39 This reference of RA 6758 in Section 7
means that TIDCORP cannot simply disregard RA
CA RULING: CA cited the CSC's mandate under 6758 but must take its principles into account in
the 1987 Constitution to approve or disapprove providing for its own position classi cations. This
appointments and to determine whether an requirement, to be sure, does not run counter to
appointee possesses civil service eligibility. As Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution
TIDCORP's charter does not expressly or which provides that "the civil service embraces all
impliedly divest the CSC of administrative branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including duty "to endeavor to conform," recognizes that the
government-owned or controlled corporations with law allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA 6758,
original charters." The CSC shall still enforce but it should still try to hew closely with its
position classi cations at TIDCORP, but must do principles and modes. Had the intent of Congress
this under the terms that TIDCORP has itself been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and
established, based on the principles of RA 6758. strictly comply with RA 6758, it would have so
stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate
To further expound on these points, the CSC's it gave TIDCORP was to endeavor to conform to
authority over TIDCORP is undisputed. The rules the principles and modes of RA and not to the
that the CSC formulates should implement and be entirety of this law.
in harmony with the law it seeks to enforce. In
TIDCORP's case, the CSC should also consider These inter-relationships render it clear, as a plain
TIDCORP's charter in addition to other civil reading of Section 7 of RA 8494 itself would con
service laws. Having said this, there remains the rm, that TIDCORP is exempt from existing laws
issue of how the CSC should apply the civil service on compensation, position classi cation and quali
law to TIDCORP, given the exemptions provided cation standards, including compliance with
in the latter's charter. Does the wording of Section Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum
7 of RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow Circular No. 40, s. 1998
issued requirements pursuant to RA 6758 despite
its exemption from laws involving position
classification?

We answer in the negative. "Under the principles DURA LEX SED LEX
of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain ● Dura lex sed lex is a Latin term that means
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal "the law may be harsh but it is still the law".
meaning and applied without attempted ● When the law is clear, it is not susceptible
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba of interpretation. It must be applied regardless
who may be affected, even if it may be harsh or
legis is derived from the maxim index animi sermo onerous.
est (speech is the index of intention) and rests on
the valid presumption that the words employed by OLYMPIO REVALDO , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
the legislature in a statute correctly express its OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
intent and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know Facts: Petitioner was charged with the offense of
the meaning of the words, to have used words illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code, in an
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba Information 5 which reads: That on or about the
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a 17th day of June 1992, in the (M)unicipality of
statute there should be no departure." 40 ISCTcH Maasin, (P)rovince of Southern Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
The phrase "to endeavor" means to "to devote the above-named accused, with intent of gain, did
serious and sustained effort" and "to make an effort then and there willfully, unlawfully and
to do." It is synonymous with the words to strive, feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of the species
to struggle and to seek. 41 The use of "to endeavor" of flat lumber with a total value of P1,730.52,
in the context of Section 7 of RA 8494 means that Philippine Currency, without any legal document
despite TIDCORP's exemption from laws as required under existing forest laws and
involving compensation, position classi cation and regulations from proper government authorities, to
quali cation standards, it should still strive to the damage and prejudice of the government.
conform as closely as possible with the principles
and modes provided in RA 6758. The phrase "as Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel,
closely as possible," which quali es TIDCORP's pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The prosecution
presented SPO4 Constantino Maceda (Maceda),
Sulpicio Saguing (Saguing), and SPO4 Daniel inspected his lumber. Maceda, Sunit and Rojas
Paloma Lasala (Lasala) as witnesses. entered his house while Talisic stayed outside.
Petitioner admitted to the policemen that he had no
Maceda, the person in charge of the operations permit to possess the lumber because those were
section of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in only given to him by his uncle Felixberto Bug-os
Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified that on 18 June (Bug-os), his aunt Gliceria Bolo (Bolo), his
1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with mother-in-law Cecilia Tenio (Tenio). The seven
Chief Alejandro Rojas (Rojas), SPO3 Melquiades pieces of "magkalipay" lumber were left over from
Talisic (Talisic) and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit (Sunit) to a divider he made for his cousin Jose Epiz. He
the house of petitioner to verify the report of Sunit explained further that the lumber were intended for
that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the repair of his dilapidated house. The defense
the necessary documents. They were not armed presented Caalim to corroborate the testimony of
with a search warrant on that day. They con scated petitioner.
20 pieces of lumber of different varieties lying
around the vicinity of the house of petitioner. Defense witness Candole testified that it was Bug-
Maceda asked petitioner who the owner of the os who hired him to cut a "tugas" tree on his land,
lumber was and petitioner replied that he owned sawed it into lumber and delivered the same to
the lumber. Petitioner stated that he would use the petitioner who paid for the labor transporting the
lumber to repair his house and to make furniture sawn lumber. Candole further testi ed that while
for sale. Maceda also testi ed that the lumber were they were on their way to Barangay Combado,
freshly cut. Maceda loaded the lumber on the patrol Sunit stopped them but allowed the lumber to be
jeep and brought them to the police station. For brought to the house of petitioner.
coordination purposes, Maceda informed the office
of the Department of Environment and Natural Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and
Resources (DENR) of the confiscated lumber. The seizure conducted by the police o cers was illegal
DENR entrusted to the police custody of the and thus the items seized should not have been
lumber. admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues
that the police o cers were not armed with a search
Saguing, Forester II, CENRO-DENR, Maasin, warrant when they went to his house to verify the
Southern Leyte, testified that he went to the o ce of report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession
the PNP in Maasin, Leyte to scale the confiscated lumber without the corresponding license. The
lumber which were of different varieties. The total police o cers who conducted the search in the
volume was 96.14 board feet belonging to the first premises of petitioner acted on the basis only on
group of hardwood lumber. the verbal order of the Chief of Police. Sunit had
already informed the team of the name of petitioner
Lasala, Responsible Supply Sergeant, Finance and the location the day before they conducted the
Sergeant and Evidence Custodian, PNP, Maasin, search. Petitioner argues that, with that information
Southern Leyte, testi ed that he received the 20 on hand, the police o cers could have easily
pieces of assorted sizes and varieties of lumber convinced a judge that there was probable cause to
from the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial justify the issuance of a search warrant, but they
Court, but only ten pieces remained because some did not. Because the search was illegal, all items
were damaged due to lack of storage space. recovered from petitioner during the illegal search
were prohibited from being used as evidence
For the defense, petitioner presented Dionisio against him. Petitioner therefore prays for his
Candole (Candole), Apolonio Caalim (Caalim), acquittal.
and himself as witnesses.
In its Comment, respondent People of the
Petitioner testifed that he is a carpenter specializing Philippines (respondent) contends that even
in furniture making. He was in his house working without a search warrant, the personnel of the PNP
on an ordered divider for a customer in the morning can seize the forest products cut, gathered or taken
of 18 June 1992 when policemen arrived and by an offender pursuant to Section 80 of the
Forestry Code. There is no question that the police On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we
officers went to the house of petitioner because of deem it necessary to discuss the matter. Violation
the information relayed by Sunit that petitioner had of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as
in his possession illegally cut lumber. When the Qualified Theft with the penalties imposed under
police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
the lumber were lying around the vicinity of
petitioner's house. The lumber were in plain view. The trial court applied Article 309 (3), in relation
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
"plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in considering that the amount involved was
the position to have that view are subject to seizure P1,730.52. However, except for the amount stated
and may be presented as evidence. in the Information, the prosecution did not present
any proof as to the value of the lumber. What the
Issue: prosecution presented were the Seizure Receipt 19
and Con scation Receipt 20 stating the number of
Held:On whether the police o cers had the
pieces of lumber, their species, dimensions and
authority to arrest petitioner, even without a
volumes, with "no pertinent supporting document."
warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry Code
These do not suffice.
authorizes the forestry o cer or employee of the
DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even
without a warrant, any person who has committed As we have held in Merida v. People, 21 to prove
or is committing in his presence any of the offenses the amount of the property taken for xing the
de ned by the Forestry Code and to seize and con penalty imposable against the accused under
scate the tools and equipment used in committing Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the
the offense or the forest products gathered or taken prosecution must present more than a mere
by the offender. Section 80 reads: uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. — of such estimate, the courts may either apply the
A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any minimum penalty under Article 309 or x the value
personnel of the Philippine of the property taken based on the attendant
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall circumstances of the case.
arrest even without warrant any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of Accordingly, the prescribed penalty under Article
the offenses de ned in this chapter. He shall also 309 (6) of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor
seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, in its minimum and medium periods. However,
the tools and equipment used in committing the considering that violation of Section 68 of the
offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or Forestry Code is punished as quali ed theft under
taken by the offender in the process of committing Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to
the offense. . . . (Emphasis supplied) the Forestry Code, the prescribed penalty shall be
increased by two degrees, 22 that is, to prision
Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without correccional in its medium and maximum periods
the necessary documents when the police o cers or two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
accosted him. In open court, petitioner to six (6) years. Taking into account the
categorically admitted the possession and Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the shall be taken from anywhere within the range of
fact that he did not have any legal documents four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years
therefor and that he merely intended to use the and four (4) months of arresto mayor, which is the
lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. We
possession of forest products without the proper nd it proper to impose upon petitioner, under the
documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex circumstances obtaining here, the indeterminate
sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, address, however, Iconar left a copy of the
as maximum. summons to Michael Francisco.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondent in


Decision convicting petitioner for violation of Default for failure off respondent to file Answer
Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code, despite the service of summons. Trial Court
as amended, with MODIFICATION as regards the declared that the summons was validly served to
penalty in that petitioner Olympio Revaldo is
respondent, declared that respondent in default
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
and allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and parte. Michael Francisco, through his lawyer filed
one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum. a Manifestation and Motion, he denied that he
received the summons and he was authorized to
receive on behalf of his brother. He prayed his
name to be stricken off the records as having
SAGANA VS FRANCISCO received the copy of summons. In his Affidavit of
Merit, he asserted that he was 19 y/o, and
Facts: Petioner filed a Complaint, before Regional respondent had left the house since 1993 and
Trial Court of Quezon City, to recover damages respondent would only write or call them without
alleging that on November 20, 1992, respondent informing his whereabouts. On the other hand,
with intent to kill him and without justifiable petitioner attached in his Rejoinder, the Affidavit
reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right prepared by respondent dated December 23,
thigh.On January 31, 1995, Process Server Manuel
1992, where declared he was a resident of No. 36
Panlasigue attempted to personally serve summons
Sampaguita St. Bausa Q.C. and the lawyer who
at respondent’s address at No. 36 Sampaguita
Street, Baesa Q.C., but was unsuccessful. In his notarized the affidavit was the same lawyer who
Servers Return, he stated that the occupant in that represented his brother.
house refused to give his identity and that
respondent is unknown at said residence. The Trial Trial Court denied the Manifestation and Motion
Court also attempted to serve summons to the for lack of merit, it rendered a judgment infavor of
respondent’s office through registered mail, the petitioner, ordered respondent to pay the
however, respondent failed to pick up summons. damages.Respondent received the copy of the
Trial Court’s Decision, he then filed a Notice of
The case was dismissed by the Trial Court on Appeal to Court of Appeals. The appellate court
account of petitioner’s lack of interest to directed the parties to file respective briefs, a copy
prosecute that he did not take action since the of which was sent by respondent at No. 36
filing of the Servers Return. Petitioner filed a Sampaguita St. Bausa Q.C. Respondent prayed
Motion for Reconsideration, contended that he that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction
exerted efforts to locate the respondent, it was over the person, despite the irregularity of the
confirmed that respondent indeed lived at No. 36 substituted service of summons by the court
Sampaguita Street, Bausa, Q.C. Trial Court granted Process Server and in awarding of damages to
the Motion with a condition upon the service of petitioner. Court of Appeals rendered decision
summon on the respondent within 10 days from granting the Appeal of respondent and setting
the receipt of the Order. On August 25, 1995, aside the decision of the trial court for the
Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve irregularity of the service of summons. Petitioner
summons at respondent’s address but no avail. In filed Petition for Review on Certiorari to Supreme
his handwritten annotation, he stated that Court.
respondent’s brother, Michael Francisco, told him
that respondent no longer lived at the said
Issue:
Held: In this case, personal service of summons He also received a copy of the appellate court's
was twice attempted by the trial court, although order for preliminary conference that was sent to
unsuccessfully. In the rst attempt, the resident of said address. These were never denied by
the house refused to receive the summons; worse, respondent, despite being given every opportunity
he would not even give his name. In the second to do so.
attempt, respondent's own brother refused to sign
for receipt of the summons, and then later claimed Respondent also wishes us to believe that it was
that he never received a copy, despite his pure chance that he and his brother were assisted
participation in the proceedings. The trial court by the same lawyer, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma,
also thrice attempted to contact the respondent and yet it never occurred to respondent's own
through his place of work, but to no avail. These brother or lawyer to inform him about the receipt
diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted of summons. All these militate against
in the rst sheriff's return, the process server's respondent's self-serving declaration that he did
notation, as well as the records of the case. AEIHaS not reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. Indeed, there
was no proof presented as to when respondent left
Clearly, personal service of summons was made and then returned to his original home, if he
impossible by the acts of the respondent in refusing actually did leave his home.
to reveal his whereabouts, and by the act of his
brother in claiming that respondent no longer lived In view of the foregoing, we nd that substituted
at No. 36 Sampaguita St., yet failing to disclose his service of summons was validly made upon
brother's location. We also note that it was the trial respondent through his brother. We do not intend
court which directed that the second service of this ruling to overturn jurisprudence to the effect
summons be made within seven days; thus, the that statutory requirements of substituted service
reasonable time was prescribed by the trial court must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully, and
itself. that any substituted service other than that
authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective.
Undeniably, no Sheriff's Return was prepared by 32 However, an overly strict application of the
process server Jarvis Iconar; the only record of the Rules is not warranted in this case, as it would
second service of summons was Mr. Iconar's clearly frustrate the spirit of the law as well as do
handwritten notation in the summons itself. injustice to the parties, who have been waiting for
However, the information required by law and almost 15 years for a resolution of this case. We
prevailing jurisprudence, that is, that personal are not heedless of the widespread and agrant
service was impossible because of the claim that practice whereby defendants actively attempt to
respondent no longer lived at the stated address, frustrate the proper service of summons by
that efforts were exerted to locate the respondent refusing to give their names, rebu ng requests to
through the multiple attempts to serve summons, sign for or receive documents, or eluding o cers of
and that summons was served upon a person of su the court. Of course it is to be expected that
cient age and discretion, were already in the defendants try to avoid service of summons,
records of the trial court. prompting this Court to declare that, "the sheriff
must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and
Moreover, we nd the claim that respondent moved diligent in serving the process on the defendant".
out of their residence in March 1993 without 33 However, sheriffs are not expected to be
informing his brother or parents his whereabouts,
sleuths, and cannot be faulted where the defendants
despite regular calls and letters, simply
themselves engage in deception to thwart the
incredulous. What makes this version of events
orderly administration of justice. aDTSHc
even more implausible is respondent's admission
that he received a copy of the trial court's Decision The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire
of 20 September 1999 that was sent to No. 36 jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to
Sampaguita Street. Respondent even led a Notice notify the defendant that an action has been
of Appeal coincidentally indicating that his address commenced so that he may be given an opportunity
was No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City.
to be heard on the claim against him. Under the Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
circumstances of this case, we nd that respondent Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for
was duly apprised of the action against him and had prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for
every opportunity to answer the charges made by three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
the petitioner. However, since respondent refused Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation.
to disclose his true address, it was impossible to However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
personally serve summons upon him. Considering initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
that respondent could not have received summons modes of initiative, which are specifically provided
because of his own pretenses, and has failed to for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
provide an explanation of his purported "new" omission indicates that the matter of people's
residence, he must now bear the consequences. 34 initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law.December 19, 1996, the Court
STATUTES MUST BE CAPABLE OF required the respondents to comment on the
INTERPRETATION petition and issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further
Statutory interpretation is the process by which courts
interpret and apply legislation. Some amount of orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC
interpretation is often necessary when a case involves a from proceeding with the Petition, and private
statute. Sometimes the words of a statute have a plain and a respondents conducting a signature drive for
straightforward meaning. But in many cases, there is some people's initiative to amend the
ambiguity or vagueness in the words of the statute that must
be resolved by the judge. To find the meanings of statutes,
Constitution.January 2, 1997, private respondents
judges use various tools and methods of statutory filed their Comment on the petition. They argue
interpretation, including traditional canons of statutory therein that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law
interpretation, legislative history, and purpose. In common implementing the power of people initiative to
law jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory
propose amendments to the constitution.
interpretation both to legislation enacted by the legislature
and to delegated legislation such as administrative agency
regulations. Issue:

If no judicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court Held: The second overriding concern is the need to
is not at liberty to supply nor to make one. comply with our traditional duty to interpret R.A.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC No. 6735 to effectuate its intent. R.A. No. 6735
represents the wisdom and the will of two co-equal
Facts: December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. branches of government — the Legislative and the
Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Executive. Due respect to these two branches of
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition government demands that we utilize all rules of
to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of statutory construction to effectuate R.A. No. 6735.
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative. Upon the It has been the teaching of this Court for ages that
filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its when a law admits of two interpretations, one that
Chairman, issued an Order directing Delfin to will sustain it and another that will invalidate it, the
cause the publication of the petition, together with interpretation that will save the law should be
the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 adopted. cdtai
Constitution including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form, The simple yet decisive question is whether there
and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily is a way to interpret R.A. No. 6735 to save it.
newspapers of general circulation at his own Stated otherwise, is the law so badly written that
expense and setting the case for hearing on 12 the Court has no choice but to strike it down as
December 1996 at 10:00 a.m. inadequate? Even the gurus of grammar will not
suggest the indefensible idea that our distinguished
December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion senators and congressmen who cobbled R.A. No.
to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that it is not 6735 into law were so lacking in draftmanship
the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the skills that they wrote a completely
COMELEC. December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam incomprehensible piece of legislation. The running
argument between the majority and minority No reason has been advanced why these provisions
members of this Court may not have clearly settled cannot be construed to apply to proposed
the issue of whether the language of R.A. No. 6735 constitutional amendments. No reason has been
has adequately expressed the intent of our shown for restrictively and literally construing
lawmakers. At the very least, however, the sparks these provisions as applicable to ordinary
of the spirited debate show that there is a way to legislation only. On the other hand, the established
interpret R.A. No. 6735 in order to save it. The rule in the interpretation of statutes is for courts to
minority view that R.A. No. 6735 is seek the legislative intention and give it effect. The
comprehensible enough to be enforceable cannot inadequacy of a statute is not a ground for
be dismissed as totally unfounded, unreasonable, invalidating it. Given the lawfulness of the
and unrealistic. In truth, the minority view is legislative purpose to implement the constitutional
shared by others whose honesty of motive cannot provision on initiative to amend the Constitution, it
be assailed. It is shared by the lawmakers who is not for this Court to say how well the statute
enacted R.A. No. 6735 in compliance with their succeeds in attaining that purpose. "With the
constitutional duty to the people. It is shared by wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy
former President Corazon C. Aquino who signed or practicality of the law enacted to forward it, the
R.A. No. 6735 into law. And most important, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to
COMELEC has never wavered in its position that deal."
R.A. No. 6735 is not incomprehensible, insu cient
or inadequate. The COMELEC, under the In the case at bar, R.A. No. 6735 is not assailed by
stewardship of then Acting Chairperson Haydee the majority as unconstitutional for failure of
Yorac, understood R.A. No. 6735 without any Congress to follow the substantive requirements of
difficulty. Indeed, the COMELEC promulgated lawmaking. It even concedes that Congress
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing the rules and enacted the law in compliance with its duty to
regulations on the conduct of people's initiative to implement the provision of the Constitution
amend the Constitution. It was ready then and it is granting the people the right to amend our
ready now to implement R.A. No. 6735. More than fundamental law thru people's initiative. It goes
any department, instrumentality or agency of without saying that the subject matter of R.A. No.
government, the COMELEC is the most 6735 is within the compass of the power of
authoritative to determine whether R.A. No. 6735 Congress to legislate. Nor does the majority strike
is clear and enforceable. Article IX (c) (2) of the down R.A. No. 6735 on the ground that Congress
Constitution gave the COMELEC the exclusive breached any of the formal procedural steps in
power to "enforce and administer all laws and enacting a law. Since it is uncontested that
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, Congress did not violate any of the substantive or
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Its formal requirements of lawmaking in enacting
long experience and expertise in enforcing our R.A. No. 6735, this Court has no option but to
election laws cannot be doubted and its effectuate the same. This is our consistent stance in
interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 carries a the past. There is no reason to be inconsistent now.
considerable weight.
The majority has broken all precedents when it did
To stress once more, there is no question that the not nd R.A. No. 6735 as unconstitutional yet
intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the right refused to validate it. It relies on a reason
of the people through initiative to propose unrecognized by existing jurisprudence, i.e., that
amendments to the Constitution. Its validity is Congress inadequately expressed its intent in
questioned, however, on the ground that its key drafting R.A. No. 6735. In so doing, intervenor
provisions relating to what a petition should Roco observed that this Court "has created a third
contain fails to mention constitutional amendments specie of invalid laws, a mongrel type of
and appears to be limited to ordinary legislation constitutional but inadequate and, therefore,
proposed for enactment; approval or rejection. invalid law."
(E.g., Sec. 5(c) and subtitle II).
The Roco observation should raise our antennas. In may be created if it has an average annual income
letting loose this "mongrel" type of invalid law, the of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant
Court has overextended its checking power against prices as certi ed by the Department of Finance,
Congress. This mongrel endangers the principle of and a population of not less than 250,000
separation of powers, a touchstone of our inhabitants as certi ed by the NSO, or a contiguous
Constitution. The power of Congress to make laws territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certi
includes the power how to write laws. The court ed by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory
has the power to review the constitutionality of need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
laws but it has no authority to act as if it is the islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities,
committee on style of Congress. The Court has the which do not contribute to the income of the
power to interpret laws but the principal purpose in province.
exercising this power is to discover and enforce
legislative intent. We should heed the warning of On April 3, 2002, the O ce of the President, through
Crawford that if courts ignore the intent of the its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs,
legislative, they would invade the legislative advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
sphere and violate the tripartite theory of Province of Surigao del Norte of the de cient
government. 8 The balance of power among the population in the proposed Province of Dinagat
executive, legislative and judicial branches of our Islands.
government was xed with pinpoint precision by the
framers of our fundamental law. The Constitution In July 2003, the Provincial Government of
did not give the Court the power to alter this Surigao del Norte conducted a special census,
balance especially to alter it in its favor. Unless which declared as official, for all purposes, the
allowed by the Constitution, a non-elected court 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a
cannot assume powers which will make it more population of 371,576. October 2, 2006, the
than the equal of an elected legislature or an elected President of the Republic approved into law
executive. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands).

December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections


RODOLFO NAVARRO VS ERMITA (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite
for the ratification of the creation of the province
Facts: The mother province of Surigao del Norte under the Local Government Code (LGC). The
was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and
on June 19, 1960. The province is composed of 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the
three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and people from both the mother province of Surigao
Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands
and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of (Dinagat).
seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao,
Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this
Based on the official 2000 Census of Population Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
and Housing conducted by the National Statistics challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.
The Court dismissed the petition on technical
O ce (NSO), 2 the population of the Province of
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also
Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416,
denied.Undaunted, petitioners filed another
broken down as follows: Mainland 281,111
petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No.
Surigao City 118,534
9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that
Siargao Island & Bucas 93,354
the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
Grande Dinagat Island 106,951 uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of
Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial
known as The Local Government Code, a province territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and
rich resources from the area. They pointed out that population of the proposed Province of Dinagat
when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory
of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population requirement is a population of at least 250,000
of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, inhabitants.
Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of
the LGC. On the other hand, respondents contend in their
respective Memoranda that the Province of
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three Dinagat Islands met the legal standard for its
(3) main arguments to challenge the above creation.
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A.
No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending First, the Bureau of Local Government Finance
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption certi ed that the average annual income of the
from territorial contiguity, when the intended proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for the years
province consists of two or more islands, includes 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices
the exemption from the application of the was P82,696,433.25.
minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the
Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant Second, the Lands Management Bureau certi ed
case.July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for that though the land area of the Province of Dinagat
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the of one or more islands; thus, it is exempt from the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that required land area of 2,000 square kilometers
the allowance or disallowance of a motion to under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and
intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of Regulations Implementing the Local Government
the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the Code.
said motion was before and not after the resolution
of this case. Third, in the special census conducted by the
Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte, with
September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a the assistance of a District Census Coordinator of
Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 the NSO, the number of inhabitants in the Province
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, of Dinagat Islands as of 2003, or almost three years
allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, before the enactment of R.A. No. 9355 in 2006,
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed was 371,576, which is more than the minimum
at any time before the rendition of judgment. They requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections,
their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. In his Memorandum, respondent Governor Ace S.
They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 Barbers contends that although the result of the
elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in special census conducted by the Provincial
this case. October 5, 2010, the Court issued an Government of Surigao del Norte on December 2,
order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the 2003 was never certi ed by the NSO, it is credible
decision in this case had become final and since it was conducted with the aid of a
executory on May 18, 2010. representative of the NSO. He alleged that the lack
of certi cation by the NSO was cured by the
Petitioners contend that the proposed Province of presence of NSO o cials, who testi ed during the
Dinagat Islands is not quali ed to become a deliberations on House Bill No. 884 creating the
province because it failed to comply with the land Province of Dinagat Islands, and who questioned
area or the population requirement, despite its neither the conduct of the special census nor the
compliance with the income requirement. It has a validity of the result.
total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers,
which falls short of the statutory requirement of at Issue: WON REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355,
least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based on CREATING THE NEW PROVINCE OF
the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total DINAGAT ISLANDS, COMPLIED WITH THE
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY is only used when it describes physical contact, or
REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 461 OF a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be
KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ascertained by reference to words associated with
CODE OF 1991. or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue
League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110).
Held: The Court held that the plebiscite should Therefore, in the context of the sentence above,
have included the people living in the area of the what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" —
proposed new province and those living in the the physical mass of land area.There would arise
parent province. However, the Court did not direct no need for the legislators to use the word
the conduct of a new plebiscite, because the factual contiguous if they had intended that the term
and legal basis for the creation of the new province "territory" embrace not only land area but also
did not exist as it failed to satisfy the land area territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that
requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the word territory in the rst paragraph of Section
creating the new Province of Negros del Norte, was 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area"
declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the only. The words and phrases used in a statute
land area of the new province was only about 2,856 should be given the meaning intended by the
square kilometers, which was below the statutory legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which
requirement then of 3,500 square kilometers. the words are used furnished the rule of
HAaECD construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d.,
p. 664). 19
Respondents in Tan insisted that when the Local
Government Code speaks of the required territory The discussion of the Court in Tan on the definition
of the province to be created, what is contemplated and usage of the terms "territory," and
is not only the land area, but also the land and water "contiguous," and the meaning of the provision,
over which the said province has jurisdiction and "The territory need not be contiguous if it
control. The respondents submitted that in this comprises two or more islands," contained in Sec.
regard, the marginal sea within the three mile limit 197 of the former Local Government Code, which
should be considered in determining the extent of provides for the requisites in the creation of a new
the territory of the new province. province, is applicable in this case since there is no
reason for a change in their respective definitions,
The Court stated that "[s]uch an interpretation is usage, or meaning in its counterpart provision in
strained, incorrect and fallacious." 18 It held: the present Local Government Code contained in
Sec. 461 thereof.
The last sentence of the rst paragraph of Section
197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the The territorial requirement in the Local
"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises Government Code is adopted in the Rules and
two or more islands." The use of the word territory Regulations Implementing the Local Government
in this particular provision of the Local Code of 1991 (IRR), 20 thus:
Government Code and in the very last sentence
thereof, clearly, re ects that "territory" as therein ART. 9. Provinces. — (a) Requisites for creation
used, has reference only to the mass of land area — A province shall not be created unless the
and excludes the waters over which the political following requisites on income and either
unit exercises control. population or land area are present:
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be (1) Income — An average annual income of not
contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00)
contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive
(c) near, [n]ext, or adjacent (Webster's New World years based on 1991 constant prices, as certi ed by
Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous," when DOF. The average annual income shall include the
employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, special accounts, transfers, and germane to the purpose of the Local Government
nonrecurring income; and DICSaH Code to develop political and territorial
subdivisions into self-reliant communities and
(2) Population or land area — Population which make them more effective partners in the
shall not be less than two hundred fty thousand attainment of national goals. They assert that in
(250,000) inhabitants, as certi ed by National Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Statistics Office; or land area which must be Defensor, the Court declared as valid the
contiguous with an area of at least two thousand implementing rules and regulations of a statute,
(2,000) square kilometers, as certi ed by LMB. The even though the administrative agency added
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two certain provisions in the implementing rules that
(2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered were not found in the law. Courts determine the
city or cities which do not contribute to the income intent of the law from the literal language of the
of the province. The land area requirement shall law within the law's four corners. 30 If the
not apply where the proposed province is language of the law is plain, clear and
composed of one (1) or more islands. The unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be
according to its express terms. 31 If a literal
created shall be properly identified by metes and
application of the law results in absurdity,
bounds.
impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the
However, the IRR went beyond the criteria
prescribed by Section 461 of the Local legislative history of the law, 32 or may consider
Government Code when it added the italicized the implementing rules and regulations and
portion above stating that "[t]he land area pertinent executive issuances in the nature of
requirement shall not apply where the proposed executive construction.
province is composed of one (1) or more islands."
Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said In this case, the requirements for the creation of a
provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local
the Local Government Code, the only instance Government Code are clear, plain and
when the territorial or land area requirement need unambiguous, and its literal application does not
not be complied with is when there is already result in absurdity or injustice. Hence, the
compliance with the population requirement. The provision in Art. 9 (2) of the IRR exempting a
Constitution requires that the criteria for the proposed province composed of one or more
creation of a province, including any exemption islands from the land-area requirement cannot be
from such criteria, must all be written in the Local considered an executive construction of the criteria
prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an
Government Code.21 There is no dispute that in
extraneous provision not intended by the Local
case of discrepancy between the basic law and the
Government Code and, therefore, is null and void.
rules and regulations implementing the said law,
SaIACT
the basic law prevails, because the rules and
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law. Hence, the Court holds
that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
stating that " [t]he land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of Facts: The case constitute 54 Petitions for
one (1) or more islands" is null and void. Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and
Respondents, represented by the Office of the organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by
Solicitor General, argue that rules and regulations the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
have the force and effect of law as long as they are disqualifying them from participating in the 13
germane to the objects and purposes of the law. May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of
They contend that the exemption from the land their petitions for registration under the party-list
area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers is
system, or cancellation of their registration and parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of
accreditation as party-list organizations. the party-list system. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. parties can participate in the party-list system
7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution "[F]or as long as they eld candidates who come
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups from the different marginalized sectors that we
and organizations registered and manifested their shall designate in this Constitution."
desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent
reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral
affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s representatives was only allowed for the rst three
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s consecutive terms. 55 There can be no doubt
(PBB) registration and accreditation as a political whatsoever that the framers of the 1987
party in the National Capital Region. However, Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to
PBB was denied participation in the elections make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized parties only, and that they clearly intended the
and underrepresented" sector. party-list system to include both sectoral and non-
sectoral parties.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and Constitution to include in the party-list system both
excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written
printing of the official. in Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513,
the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary Section 5.(1) The House of Representative shall be
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the composed of not more that two hundred and fty
groups and organizations that filed manifestations members, unless otherwise xed by law, who shall
of intent to participate in the elections have be elected from legislative districts apportioned
continually complied with the requirements of among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Manila area in accordance with the number of their
Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
injunction from the Court, directing the list system of registered national, regional, and
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for supplied)
the elections.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution is
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante or organizations." The commas after the words
Orders in all petitions "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate national
and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the
Issue: framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national
and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral,
Held; Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 they would have stated "national and regional
Constitution intended the party-list system to sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it
include not only sectoral parties but also non- was never their intention to make the party-list
sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
expressly wrote in Section 5 (1), could not be any parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three
different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
only one of the three groups.The text of Section 5 regional parties or organizations to represent the
(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To
regional parties are separate from sectoral parties. require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude,
different groups: (1) national parties or by judicial at, ideology- based and cause-oriented
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; parties from the party-list system. How will these
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National ideology- based and cause-oriented parties, who
and regional parties or organizations are different cannot win in legislative district elections,
from sectoral parties or organizations. National and participate in the electoral process if they are
regional parties or organizations need not be excluded from the party-list system? To exclude
organized along sectoral lines and need not them from the party-list system is to prevent them
represent any particular sector. from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as
their only option the armed struggle. To exclude
Moreover, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 them from the party- list system is, apart from
Constitution mandates that, during the rst three being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the
consecutive terms of Congress after the rati cation clear intent and express wording of the 1987
of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. aHcACT
allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural cause-oriented political party is clearly different
communities, women, youth, and such other from a sectoral party. A political party need not be
sectors as may be provided by law, except the organized as a sectoral party and need not represent
religious sector." This provision clearly shows any particular sector. There is no requirement in
again that the party-list system is not exclusively R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political
for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. party must represent a "marginalized and
ASETHC underrepresented" sector. It is su cient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to same ideology or platform, or the same governance
party-list representatives would naturally be open principles and policies, regardless of their
to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly economic status as citizens.
negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the shall include labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor,
reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
sectoral parties applies only for the rst "three handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
consecutive terms after the rati cation of this workers, and professionals. " 56 The sectors
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
fully open after the end of the rst three "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure,
congressional terms. This means that, after this "professionals" are not by de nition "marginalized
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class and underrepresented," not even the elderly,
or type of party that quali es under the three groups women, and the youth. However, professionals, the
constituting the party-list system. elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-de
ned political constituencies," and can thus organize
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the
party-list structure ordained in Section 5 (1) and special interests and concerns of their respective
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be sectors.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel elderly, women and the youth, need not be
registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow
"marginalized and underrepresented." small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
who lack "well-de ned political constituencies" a
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" chance to win seats in the House of
appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
on Declaration of Policy. 57 Section 2 seeks "to "marginalized and underrepresented" t h e sectoral
promote proportional representation in the election parties for labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor,
of representatives to the House of Representatives indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
through the party-list system," which will enable veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that
Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and by their nature are economically at the margins of
underrepresented sectors, organizations and society, will give the "marginalized and
parties, and who lack well-de ned political underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win
constituencies," to become members of the House seats in the House of Representatives.
of Representatives. While the policy declaration in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to This interpretation will harmonize the 1987
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise
organizations and parties," the speci c to a multi-party system where those "marginalized
implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not and underrepresented," both in economic and
de ne or require that the sectors, organizations or ideological status, will have the opportunity to
parties must be "marginalized and send their own members to the House of
underrepresented." On the contrary, to even Representatives. This interpretation will also make
interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 the party-list system honest and transparent,
are "marginalized and underrepresented" would eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-
lead to absurdities. list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in
poverty, destitution and in rmity," even as they
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that
are, by their nature, economically "marginalized The major political parties are those that eld
and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, candidates in the legislative district elections.
peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural Major political parties cannot participate in the
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas party-list elections since they neither lack "well-de
workers, and other similar sectors. For these ned political constituencies" nor represent
sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors.Thus,
party must belong to the "marginalized and the national or regional parties under the party- list
underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral system are necessarily those that do not belong to
party either must belong to the sector, or must have major political parties. This automatically reserves
a track record of advocacy for the sector the national and regional parties under the party-
represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and list system to those who "lack well-de ned political
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must constituencies," giving them the opportunity to
"wallow in poverty, destitution or in rmity." It is su have members in the House of Representatives.
cient that one, or his or her sector, is below the The COMELEC excluded from participating in the
middle class. More speci cally, the economically 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
"marginalized and underrepresented" are those satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional,
who fall in the low income group as classified by and sectoral groups or organizations must
the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58 represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
TAaCED sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
The recognition that national and regional parties, represent. Petitioners may have been disquali ed by
as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines
and do not represent the "marginalized and support to the respondent. In his failure to appear
underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees before the court with a counsel and with an answer
who do not belong to the sectors they represent to the charges against him, the court has granted
may have been disquali ed, although they may have Permanent Protection Order for the respondent
a track record of advocacy for their sectors. against Sgt Yahon. It was also reiterated that Sgt
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may Yahon should provide for the financial spousal
have been disquali ed because they do not belong support to his wife from his retirement benefits.
to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to
disquali ed because one or more of its nominees petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one other claims that may be due or released to him
remaining quali ed nominee. As discussed above, from the government and the said share of
the disquali cation of petitioners, and their petitioner shall be automatically deducted from
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to respondent's benefits and claims and be given
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.

However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines


Finance Center contended that half of the
WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon cannot be given
to the respondent as it is from a military institution.
“Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish.” The petitioner contended that money due to
government employees is not liable to the creditors
● Corollary principle: General words or of the said employees in the process of
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded garnishment.
their natural and general significance
● General term or phrase should not be
reduced into parts and one part distinguished *A protection order is an order issued by the court
from the other to justify its exclusion from to prevent further acts of violence against women
operation. and their children, their family or household
● Corollary principle: where the law does not members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its
make any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there a compelling purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from
reason to justify it. further harm, minimize any disruption in their
● Application: when legislature laid down a daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability
rule for one class, no difference to other class.
● Presumption: that the legislature made no
to regain control of their life. 13 The protection
qualification in the general use of a term. orders issued by the court may be a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection
Order (PPO), while a protection order that may be
REPUBLIC VS YAHON issued by the barangay shall be known as a
Barangay Protection Order (BPO).
Facts:Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) led a petition
for the issuance of protection order under the Issue: whether petitioner military institution may
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 3 be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage
otherwise known as the "Anti- Violence Against from the retirement bene ts of its enlisted
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against personnel, and to give the same directly to the
her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. latter's lawful wife as spousal support in
Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine compliance with a protection order issued by the
Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003.
The couple did not have any child but respondent Held: It is basic in statutory construction that in
has a daughter with her previous live-in partner. In case of irreconcilable con ict between two laws, the
the Temporary Protection Order, Sgt Yahon was later enactment must prevail, being the more recent
ordered to provide reasonable financial spousal expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However, legislation. In the United States, provisions of the
if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier Child Support Enforcement Act 24 allow
statute must yield to the later enactment. The later garnishment of certain federal funds where the
law is the latest expression of the legislative will. intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal
obligation of child support. As these provisions
We hold that Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262, being were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity
a later enactment, should be construed as laying problems" and provide that "moneys payable by
down an exception to the general rule above-stated the Government to any individual are subject to
that retirement bene ts are exempt from execution. child support enforcement proceedings," the law is
The law itself declares that the court shall order the clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of
withholding of a percentage of the income or salary sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue
of the respondent by the employer, which shall be valid orders directed against Government agencies
automatically remitted directly to the woman attaching funds in their possession
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."

Petitioner further contends that the directive under


the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon's VISAYAS COMMUNITY VS YBALLE
retirement bene ts was illegal because said moneys
remain as public funds, citing the case of Paci c Facts: Respondents were hired as staff nurses (Ong
Products v. Ong . In that case, this Court sustained and Angel) and midwives (Yballe and Cortez) by
the CA when it held that the garnishment of the petitioner Visayas Community Medical Center
amount of P10,500 payable to BML Trading and (VCMC), formerly the Metro Cebu Community
Supply while it was still in the possession of the Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). MCCHI is a non-stock,
Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and non-pro t corporation which operates the Metro
therefore, null and void Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH), a tertiary
medical institution owned by the United Church of
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs Christ in the Philippines (UCCP). The National
that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive
wit: xxxx (g) Directing the respondent to provide bargaining representative of the rank-and- le
support to the woman and/or her child if entitled employees of MCCHI. Under the 1987 and 1991
to legal support.Notwithstanding other laws to the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs), the
contrary, the court shall order an appropriate signatories were Ciriaco B. Pongasi, Sr. for
percentage of the income or salary of the MCCHI, and Atty. Armando M. Alforque (NFL
respondent to be withheld regularly by the Legal Counsel) and Paterno A. Lumapguid as
respondent's employer for the same to be President of NFL-MCCH Chapter. In the CBA
automatically remitted directly to the woman. effective from January 1994 until December 31,
Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in 1995, the signatories were Sheila E. Buot as Board
the remittance of support to the woman and/or of Trustees Chairman, Rev. Iyoy as MCCH
her child without justi able cause shall render the Administrator and Atty. Fernando Yu as Legal
respondent or his employer liable for indirect Counsel of NFL, while Perla Nava, President of
contempt of court; Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-
MCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of Posting.
Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general
term "employer," which includes in its coverage On December 6, 1995, Nava wrote Rev. Iyoy
the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon's employer. expressing the union's desire to renew the CBA,
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should attaching to her letter a statement of proposals
not distinguish. Thus, Section 8 (g) applies signed/endorsed by 153 union members. Nava
toallemployers, whether private or government. subsequently requested that the following
employees be allowed to avail of one-day union
It bears stressing that Section 8 (g) providing for leave with pay on December 19, 1995: Celia Sabas,
spousal and child support, is a support enforcement Jesusa Gerona, Albina Bañez, Eddie Villa, Roy
Malazarte, Ernesto Canen, Jr., Guillerma wherein they reportedly uttered slanderous and
Remocaldo, Catalina Alsado, Evelyn Ong, scurrilous words against the o cers of the hospital,
Melodia Paulin, So a Bautista, Hannah Bongcaras, threatening other workers and forcing them to join
Ester Villarin, Iluminada Wenceslao and Perla the strike. Said union o cers, however, invoked the
Nava. However, MCCHI returned the CBA grievance procedure provided in the CBA to settle
proposal for Nava to secure rst the endorsement of the dispute between management and the union.
the legal counsel of NFL as the o cial bargaining DTAcIa
representative of MCCHI employees. HTaIAC
the Department of Labor and Employment
Meanwhile, Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that (DOLE) Regional O ce No. 7 issued certi cations
the proposed CBA submitted by Nava was never stating that there is nothing in their records which
referred to NFL and that NFL has not authorized shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered
any other legal counsel or any person for collective labor organization, and that said union submitted
bargaining negotiations. By January 1996, the only a copy of its Charter Certi cate on January 31,
collection of union fees (check-off) was 1995. MCCHI then sent individual notices to all
temporarily suspended by MCCHI in view of the union members asking them to submit within 72
existing con ict between the federation and its local hours a written explanation why they should not be
a liate. Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to take over terminated for having supported the illegal
the room being used as union o ce but was concerted activities of NAMA- MCCH-NFL
prevented to do so by Nava and her group who which has no legal personality as per DOLE
protested these actions and insisted that records. In their collective response/statement
management directly negotiate with them for a new dated March 18, 1996, it was explained that the
CBA. MCCHI referred the matter to Atty. picketing employees wore armbands to protest
Alforque, NFL's Regional Director, and advised MCCHI's refusal to bargain; it was also contended
Nava that their group is not recognized by NFL. that MCCHI cannot question the legal personality
of the union which had actively assisted in CBA
Upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI negotiations and implementation. NAMA-MCCH-
granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union NFL led a Notice of Strike but the same was
members. The next day, several union members led deemed not led for want of legal personality on the
by Nava and her group launched a series of mass part of the filer.
actions such as wearing black and red
armbands/headbands, marching around the With the volatile situation adversely affecting
hospital premises and putting up placards, posters hospital operations and the condition of con ned
and streamers. Atty. Alforque immediately patients, MCCHI led a petition for injunction in the
disowned the concerted activities being carried out NLRC
by union members which are not sanctioned by
NFL. MCCHI directed the union o cers led by Issue
Nava to submit within 48 hours a written
explanation why they should not be terminated for Held: In the Decision dated December 7, 2011, we
having engaged in illegal concerted activities declared as invalid the dismissal of MCCH
amounting to strike, and placed them under employees who participated in the illegal strike
immediate preventive suspension. Responding to conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a
this directive, Nava and her group denied there was legitimate labor organization. Since there was no
a temporary stoppage of work, explaining that showing that the complainants committed any
employees wore their armbands only as a sign of illegal act during the strike, they may not be
protest and reiterating their demand for MCCHI to deemed to have lost their employment status by
comply with its duty to bargain collectively. Rev. their mere participation in the illegal strike. On the
Iyoy, having been informed that Nava and her other hand, the union leaders (Nava group) who
group have also been suspended by NFL, directed conducted the illegal strike despite knowledge that
said o cers to appear before his o ce for NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a duly registered labor
investigation in connection with the illegal strike
union were declared to have been validly refusal to negotiate a new CBA, refused to appear
terminated by petitioner. in the investigations scheduled by petitioner
because it was the union's stand that they would
We stress that the law makes a distinction between only attend these investigations as a group, and
union members and union o cers. A worker merely failed to heed petitioner's nal directive for them to
participating in an illegal strike may not be desist from further taking part in the illegal strike.
terminated from employment. It is only when he The CA, on the other hand, found that respondents'
commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be participation in the strike was limited to the
declared to have lost employment status. 33 In wearing of armbands. Since an ordinary striking
contrast, a union o cer may be terminated from worker cannot be dismissed for such mere
employment for knowingly participating in an participation in the illegal strike, the CA correctly
illegal strike or participates in the commission of ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed.
illegal acts during a strike. The law grants the However, the CA erred in awarding respondents
employer the option of declaring a union o cer who full back wages and ordering their reinstatement
participated in an illegal strike as having lost his despite the prevailing circumstances.
employment. It possesses the right and prerogative
DISJUNCTIVE AND CONJUNCTIVE WORDS
to terminate the union officers from service.34
acADIT ● The word “or” is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of
We are not persuaded by respondents' attempt to one thing from each of the other things
enumerated. It should be construed in the sense in
dissociate themselves from the Nava group who which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.
led the illegal strike. In their motion for ● The use of the disjunctive word “or”
reconsideration led before the NLRC, respondents between two phrases connotes that either phrase
no longer denied having participated in the strike serves as qualifying phrase.
but simply argued that no termination of ● The term “or” has sometimes been held to
mean “and”, when the spirit or context of the law
employment in connection with the strike "staged so warrants.
by complainants" cannot be legally sustained ● The word “or” may also be used as the
because MCCHI "did not le a complaint or petition equivalent of “that is to say” giving that which it
to declare the strike of complainants illegal or preceded it the same significance as that which
follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is
declare that illegal acts were committed in the sometimes interpretative or expository of the
conduct of the strike." Respondents further preceding word.
assailed the NLRC's nding that they were guilty of ● The word “or” may also mean successively.
insubordination since "the proximate cause of the ● The word “and” is a conjunction pertinently
acts of complainants was the prevailing labor defined as meaning “together with”, “joined
with”, “along or together with”, “added to or
dispute and the consequent resort by complainants linked to”, used to conjoin word with word,
of [sic] a strike action." 36 When the case was phrase with phrase, clause with clause.
elevated to the CA, respondents shifted course and ● The word “and” does not mean “or”; it is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or union,
again insisted that they did not participate in the “binding together”, “relating the one to the
strike nor receive the March 15, 1996 individual other”.
notices sent by petitioner to the striking employees. ● However, “and” may mean “or” as an
EDATSC exception to the rule. The exception is resorted to
only when a literal interpretation would pervert
the plain intention of the legislature as gleaned
Respondents' inconsistent posture cannot be from the context of the statute or from external
sanctioned. While there was indeed no evidence of factors.
any illegal act committed by respondents during
the strike, the Labor Arbiter and NLRC were one ANTONIO D. DAYAO vs. COMELEC
in nding that respondents actively supported the
concerted protest activities, signed the collective Facts: LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit
reply of union members manifesting that they
association of consumers and small industry
launched the mass actions to protest management's
players in the LPG and energy sector. It sought
to register as a party-list organization for the cancellation can be entertained. Since the law does
May 10, 2010 elections and was approved by not impose such a condition, the COMELEC,
notwithstanding its delegated administrative
the COMELEC. Petitioners filed a complaint
authority to promulgate rules for the
and petition before the COMELEC for the implementation of election laws, cannot read into
cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a the law that which it does not provide. The poll
party-list organization, arguing that LPGMA body is mandated to enforce and administer
does not represent a marginalized sector of election-related laws. It has no power to
the society because its incorporators, officers contravene or amend them.23 Moreover, an
and members are not marginalized or opposition can be reasonably expected only during
underrepresented citizens. the petition for registration proceedings which
involve the COMELEC's power to register a party-
In response, LPGMA countered that Section
list group, as distinguished from the entirely
5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does separate power invoked by the complaint, which is
not require that party-list representatives the power to cancel. The distinctiveness of the two
must be members of the marginalized and/or powers is immediately apparent from their basic de
underrepresented sector of the society. It also nitions. To refuse is to decline or to turn down, 24
averred that the ground cited by the while to cancel is to annul or remove. 25 Adopting
petitioners is not one of those mentioned in such meanings within the context of Section 6,
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners refusal of registration happens during the inceptive
are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to stage when an organization seeks admission into
the roster of COMELEC-registered party-list
oppose the petition for registration.
organizations through a petition for registration.
Cancellation on the other hand, takes place after
The COMELEC dismissed the complaint for the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by
two reasons. First, the ground for the COMELEC, motu propio or upon a veri ed
cancellation cited by the petitioners is not complaint, on whether a registered party-list
among the exclusive enumeration in Section organization still holds the quali cations imposed
6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is by law. Refusal is handed down to a petition for
registration while cancellation is decreed on the
actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s
registration itself after the petition has been
petition for registration which has long been approved. EA resort to the rules of statutory
approved with finality. Petitioners’ motions construction yields a similar conclusion.
for reconsideration were denied.
The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between
Issue: WON an opposition to a petition for "refusal" and "cancellation" should be taken in its
registration is not a condition precedent to the ordinary signi cance — "refusal and/or
filing of a complaint for cancellation. cancellation" means "refusal and cancellation" or
"refusal or cancellation". It has been held that the
intention of the legislature in using the term
Held: For the COMELEC to validly exercise its
"and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or"
statutory power to cancel the registration of a
party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) are to be used interchangeably. 26
conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded
to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given
enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive
6 exists. "or" or that one word or the other may be taken
accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate
Section 6 clearly does not require that an the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered
opposition to the petition for registration be from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a
previously interposed so that a complaint for construction which by the use of the disjunctive
"or" alone will exclude the combination of several entirely separate power to cancel. As such, the
of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive absence of an opposition to a petition for
"and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the registration cannot serve to bar any interested party
alternatives standing alone. 27 from questioning, through a complaint for
cancellation, the quali cations of a party-list group.
Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and EACTSH
cancellation" and "refusal or cancellation"
according to how Section 6 intended them to be
employed. The word "and" is a conjunction used to PEOPLE VS COMADRE
denote a joinder or union; it is pertinently de ned
as meaning "together with", "joined with", "along Facts: Having a drinking spree on the terrace of the
house of Robert's father when they noticed
or together with." 28 The use of "and" in Section 6
appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre
was necessitated by the fact that refusal and
and Danilo Lozano stopped in front of the
cancellation of party-list registration share similar
house. While his companions looked on, Antonio
grounds, manner of initiation and procedural due
suddenly threw an object on the roof of the terrace
process requirements of notice and hearing. With
and fled immediately together with his
respect to the said matters, "refusal" and
companions. The object which happened to be a
"cancellation" must be taken together. The word
hand grenade suddenly explode ripping a hole in
"or", on the other hand, is a disjunctive term
the roof. Robert and his companions were hit by
signifying disassociation and independence of one
shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.
thing from the other things enumerated; it should,
They were all rushed to the Hospital however
as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
Robert died before reaching the hospital.
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.29 As
such, "refusal or cancellation", consistent with The undisputed facts show that when Antonio was
their disjunctive meanings, must be taken in the act of throwing the hand grenade, his
individually to mean that they are separate companions merely looked on without uttering a
instances when the COMELEC can exercise its
single word of encouragement or performed any
power to screen the quali cations of party-list
act to assist him. The trial court held that the mere
organizations for purposes of participation in the
party-list system of representation. presence of the two provided encouragement and
a sense of security to Antonio, thus proving the
That this is the clear intent of the law is bolstered existence of conspiracy.
by the use simply of the word "or" in the rst
sentence of Section 6 that "[t]he COMELEC may,
motu propio or upon veri ed complaint of any Issue:
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, Held: Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on
regional or sectoral party, organization or the roof of the terrace where the unsuspecting
coalition." victims were having a drinking spree. The
suddenness of the attack coupled with the
Consequently, the COMELEC's conclusion that instantaneous combustion and the tremendous
the complaint for cancellation, led four (4) months impact of the explosion did not afford the victims
after the petition was approved, is actually a sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less
belated opposition, obliterates the distinction defend themselves; thus insuring the execution of
between the power to register/refuse and the power the crime without risk of reprisal or resistance on
to cancel. Since an opposition may only be sensibly their part.Treachery therefore attended the
interposed against a petition for registration, the commission of the crime. It is significant to note
proceedings for which involve the COMELEC's that aside from treachery, the information also
power to register, it is wrong to impose it as a alleges the use of an explosive29 as an aggravating
condition for the exercise of the COMELEC's circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances
can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 producing destructive effect on contiguous
of the Revised Penal Code,30 we should determine objects or causing injury or death to any person.
which of the two circumstances will qualify the When a person commits any of the crimes defined
killing in this case. in the Revised Penal Code or special law with the
use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and agents or incendiary devises, which results in the
by means of explosives, the latter shall be death of any person or persons, the use of such
considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only explosives, detonation agents or incendiary
does jurisprudence31 support this view but also, devices shall be considered as an aggravating
since the use of explosives is the principal mode of circumstance. (shall be punished with the penalty
attack, reason dictates that this attendant of death is DELETED.)crvll
circumstance should qualify the offense instead of
treachery which will then be relegated merely as a With the removal of death as a penalty and the
generic aggravating circumstance Incidentally, insertion of the term xxx as an aggravating
with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic circumstance, the unmistakable import is to
Act No. 829433 which also considers the use of downgrade the penalty for illegal possession of
explosives as an aggravating circumstance, there is explosives and consider its use merely as an
a need to make the necessary clarification insofar aggravating circumstance.
as the legal implications of the said amendatory
law vis--vis the qualifying circumstance of by Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to
means of explosion under Article 248 of the reduce the penalty for illegal possession of
Revised Penal Code are concerned. Corollary firearms and explosives. Also, Congress clearly
thereto is the issue of which law should be applied intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating
in the instant case. circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal
possession of firearms and explosives when such
This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in possession is used to commit other crimes under
the reduction of the corresponding penalties for the Revised Penal Code.
illegal possession of firearms, or ammunitions and
other related crimes under the amendatory law. It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294
Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalties for did not amend the definition of murder under
unlawful possession of explosives are also Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives
lowered. Specifically, when the illegally possessed an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in
explosives are used to commit any of the crimes committing any of the crimes defined in the
under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is to
death of a person, the penalty is no longer death, do away with the use of explosives as a separate
unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered crime and to make such use merely an aggravating
only as an aggravating circumstance. Section 3 of circumstance in the commission of any crime
P.D. No. 1866 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. already defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
8294 now reads RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed
explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Like the aggravating circumstance of explosion in
Explosives. The penalty of prision mayor in its paragraph 12, evident premeditation in paragraph
maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine 13, or treachery in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the
of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) new aggravating circumstance added by RA No.
shall be imposed upon any person who shall 8294 does not change the definition of murder in
unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, Article 248.
acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle
grenade(s), and other explosives, including but Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant,
not limited to pillbox, molotov cocktail bombs, fire R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made applicable in
bombs, or other incendiary devices capable of this case. Before the use of unlawfully possessed
explosives can be properly appreciated as an grenade that he used in the killing and attempted
aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence was
established that the possession was illegal or not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the doubt. Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
corresponding authority or permit to possess. This Criminal Procedure requires the averment of
follows the same requisites in the prosecution of aggravating circumstances for their application.
crimes involving illegal possession of firearm35 The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been made
which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. manifest, the crime committed is Murder
1866, as amended. This proof does not obtain in committed by means of explosion in accordance
the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.
information, but no evidence was adduced by the The same, having been alleged in the Information,
prosecution to show that the possession by may be properly considered as appellant was
appellant of the explosive was unlawful. It is sufficiently informed of the nature of the
worthy to note that the above requirement of accusation against him. The trial court found
illegality is borne out by the provisions of the law appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder
itself, in conjunction with the pertinent tenets of with multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of
legal hermeneutics. the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

A reading of the title36 of R.A. No. 8294 will show Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a
that the qualifier illegal/unlawful. ..possession is single act constitutes two or more grave or less
followed by of firearms, ammunition, or grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
explosives or instruments... Although the term means of committing the other, the penalty for the
ammunition is separated from explosives by the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
disjunctive word or, it does not mean that be applied in its maximum period.
explosives are no longer included in the items
which can be illegally/unlawfully possessed.In this The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in
context, the disjunctive word or is not used to the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo
separate but to signify a succession or to conjoin principle, is intended to favor the accused by
the enumerated items together.37 Moreover, imposing a single penalty irrespective of the
Section 2 of R.A. 8294,38 subtitled: Section 3. crimes committed. The rationale being, that the
Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, accused who commits two crimes with single
Disposition or Possession of Explosives, clearly criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity
refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale, or than when the crimes are committed by different
possession of explosives. acts and several criminal resolutions.

What the law emphasizes is the acts lack of The single act by appellant of detonating a hand
authority. Thus, when the second paragraph of grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of
Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by RA No. several separate and distinct offenses, yet these
8294 speaks of the use of the aforementioned component criminal offenses should be
explosives, etc. as an aggravating circumstance in considered only as a single crime in law on which
the commission of crimes, it refers to those a single penalty is imposed because the offender
explosives, etc. unlawfully manufactured, was impelled by a single criminal impulse which
assembled, dealt in, acquired, disposed or shows his lesser degree of perversity.41 ςrνll
possessed mentioned in the first paragraph of the
same section. What is per se aggravating is the use Under the aforecited article, when a single act
of unlawfully manufactured or possessed constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
explosives. The mere use of explosives is not. the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
The information in this case does not allege that period irrespective of the presence of modifying
appellant Antonio Comadre had unlawfully circumstances, including the generic aggravating
possessed or that he had no authority to possess the circumstance of treachery in this case.42 Applying
the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact
penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the
death. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is,
the death penalty. cralawlibraryThree justices of however, a weak one, in the absence of other
the Court, however, continue to maintain the circumstances — and none has been brought to our
unconstitutionality of R.A. 7659 insofar as it attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by
prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless, they the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has,
submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa,
the law is constitutional and that the death penalty when the spirit or context of the law warrants it
can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
It is, also, noteworthy that R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3
propose amendments to the constitutional
provisions on Congress, to be submitted to the
Gonzales vs Comelec people for rati cation on November 14, 1967,
whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for a convention in
Facts: The Congress passed 3 resolutions 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the
simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments Constitution, in general In other words, the subject-
to the Constitution so as to increase the matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is different from that of
membership of the House of Representatives from R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments
a maximum of 120, as provided in the present proposed under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be
Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second, submitted for rati cation several years before those
calling a convention to propose amendments to that may be proposed by the constitutional
said Constitution, the convention to be composed convention called in R.B.H. No. 2. Again, although
of two (2) elective delegates from each the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same
representative district, to be elected in the general date, they were taken up and put to a vote
elections. And the third, proposing that the same separately, or one after the other. In other words,
Constitution be amended so as to authorize they were not passed at the same time.
Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the In any event, we do not find, either in the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without Constitution, or in the history thereof, anything that
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. would negate the contested of different Congresses
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the
approval by the President, became Republic Act same Congress to pass the same in different
No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the sessions or different days of the same
Constitution proposed in the aforementioned congressional session. And, neither has any
resolutions be submitted, for approval by the plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial
people, at the general elections. The petitioner of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same
assails the constitutionality of the said law day. Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to
contending that the Congress cannot call a constitutional convention to propose
simultaneously propose amendments to the amendments, why not let the whole thing be
Constitution and call for the holding of a submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise,
constitutional convention. proposing some speci c amendments, to be
submitted for rati cation before said convention is
Issue: WON Congress can simultaneously propose held? The force of this argument must be
amendments to the Constitution and call for the conceded, but the same impugns the wisdom of the
holding of a constitutional convention? action taken by Congress, not its authority to take
it. One seeming purpose thereof is to permit
Held: Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae Members of Congress to run for election as
maintains that Congress may either propose delegates to the constitutional convention and
amendments to the Constitution or call a participate in the proceedings therein, without
convention for that purpose, but it cannot do both, forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or
nothing should be done is a political question, not Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already
subject to review by the courts of justice. On this asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw
question there is no disagreement among the appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife
members of the Court. at AAA's neck, appellant removed his shorts, as
well as AAA's pajamas. He slowly parted AAA's
legs and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina.
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellant's
A doctrine or rule of construction: The meaning of an shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her
unclear or ambiguous word (as in a statute or contract) twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days
should be determined by considering the words with which after, appellant again raped her by inserting his
it is associated in the context. organ into AAA's vagina. AAA recounted that
● where a particular word or phrase is
appellant raped her at least three (3) times a week
ambiguous in itself or equally susceptible of at around the same time until 15 October 2002,
various meanings, its correct construction may when she was 14 years old. After the last rape
be made clear and specific by considering the incident, AAA did not go home after school and
company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated. instead went to the house of her friend, Marvin. 7
● to remove doubt refer to the meaning of
associated or companion words On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television
with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Afterwards,
People vs Flores AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that
appellant would spank her for going home late.
Facts: AA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, 5 Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that
since she was just a few months old. 6 BBB is appellant might have done to her, aside from
married to appellant, who was working abroad for spanking. At that point, AAA nally cried and
six (6) years. Appellant came home in 1997 and divulged that she has been raped by appellant.
lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a Marvin told AAA to file a complaint. 8
restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.
for six (6) days a week. Five (5) witnesses testi ed AAA stayed at her mother's friend's house and
for the prosecution. They are the victim herself, came back on 18 October 2002. She, together with
Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek
(PO1 Babor), P/Sr. Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr. Insp. assistance. Marvin went with the Barangay Tanod
Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran). in apprehending appellant, who at that time, was
trying to escape. 9
In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then
11 years old, was sleeping inside the house when PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the
she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. AAA Women's and Children Desk of Makati Police
could see appellant's face as there was a light Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the
coming from the altar. AAA was naturally statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin. She
surprised and she asked appellant why the latter did then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory
such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her
to undergo medico-legal examination. 10
not to mention the incident to anybody. AAA then
saw appellant went back to his bed and touch his P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz con rmed that she conducted the
private part. AAA immediately went back to sleep. medico-legal examination on AAA. Results of the
examination, as indicated in the medico-legal
The following day, at around the same time, and
report, show that the "hymen is with presence of
while BBB was at work, appellant again touched
deep healed laceration at 1 o'clock and shallow
AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to
healed laceration at 2 o'clock positions at the time
resist but appellant threatened that he will kill her
of examination." Said report concluded that AAA
and BBB.
is in a "non-virgin state physically." 11 P/Sr. Insp.
Ortiz opined that the lacerations could have been
caused by any solid object, like the penis inserted modi ed by the Court of Appeals to reclusion
at the genitalia. 12 TDEASC perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
Article 266-B provides:
Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at
the barangay outpost at 2:10 p.m. on 18 October The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
2002 when they were summoned by Barangay crime of rape is committed with any of the
Kagawad Ramon Espena. Acting on the complaint following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house
of appellant to invite him for questioning. Duran "1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
saw appellant about to board a jeep. They stopped age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
the jeep and asked appellant to alight therefrom parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or a
and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. nity within the third civil degree, or the common-
Appellant voluntarily went with them. Appellant law spouse of the parent of the victim;
was then brought to the police station. 13
The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship in
Only appellant testified in his defense. While
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It
appellant admitted that he was a strict father to
relied on the established fact that AAA was still a
AAA in that he would scold and spank her
minor when she was raped and on the stipulated
whenever the latter would ran away, he denied
fact that appellant is her guardian. One of the
raping AAA. 14 He alleged that AAA has the instances wherein the crime of rape may be quali
propensity to make up stories and was even once ed is when the victim is a minor AND the accused
caught stealing money from her grandmother. is her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe
Appellant recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA to this interpretation and hence, we hold that the
asked permission to go out to buy a "project." She Court of Appeals erred in considering the
never came home. 15 qualifying circumstance of relationship.

The trial court found that force and intimidation Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial
attended the commission of the crime of rape conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA.
through the testimony of the victim, which the trial However, we cannot simply invoke this admission
court deemed "straightforward, consistent and to consider guardianship as a qualifying
credible." The trial court also established that circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances
appellant is the adoptive father of AAA since 1989 that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to
and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused
birth certi cate, testimonies of witnesses, and cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty
admission made by AAA. 17 Finally, the trial court of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions.
dismissed appellant's defense of denial as self- This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and
serving and which cannot prevail over AAA's irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the
positive testimony. death penalty, the prosecution must speci cally
allege in the information and prove during the trial
The Court of Appeals a rmed the nding that AAA the qualifying circumstances of minority of the
was raped by appellant, but it did so only on two victim and her relationship to the offender
(2) counts. AAA's testimony that she was de led by
appellant was corroborated by the medical ndings Issue:
of the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep
healed and shallow healed laceration only confirms Held: Further, according to the maxim noscitur a
AAA's claim of rape. SaIEcA sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase
susceptible of various meanings may be made clear
In both rape incidents, the trial court applied and specific by considering the company of words
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in in which it is found or with which it is associated.
imposing the penalty of death, which was later Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing
of the circumstances of relationship between the Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case
perpetrator and the victim which will justify the No. 21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas
imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial of said civil
the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, case to await the result of the criminal Case No.
stepparent or collateral relative within the second 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas.
degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be
noted that the words with which "guardian" is
 Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the
associated in the provision all denote a legal
crime of frustrated homicide committed
relationship. From this description we may safely
deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a against the person of Cesar Carandang,
person who has a legal relationship with a ward. petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr.
This relationship may be established either by appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
being the ward's biological parent (natural where the case is now pending.
guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian).
Appellant is neither AAA's biological parent nor is  Petitioner herein filed a complaint in the
AAA's adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover
"guardian" contemplated by law. 46 from the defendant Tomas Valenton, Jr. and
his parents, damages, both actual and moral,
Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of for the bodily injuries received by him.
being a guardian was not even mentioned in the
Informations. What was clearly stated was that  Defendants presented a motion to suspend
appellant was the "adopting father" of AAA, which the trial of the civil case, pending the
the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish. termination of the criminal case against
Tomas Valenton, Jr. in the Court of Appeals.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the
The judge ruled that the trial of the civil
qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant
action must await the result of the criminal
could only be convicted for two (2) counts of
simple rape, and not qualified rape. case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration
was submitted, but the court denied the
We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals' award of same; hence this petition for certiorari.
civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00
and moral damages from P75,000.00 to  Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil
P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.47 Code, which is as follows: “In cases of
The award of exemplary damages in the amount of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 action for damages, entirely separate and
pursuant to People v. Guillermo. 48 While no distinct from the criminal action, may be
aggravating circumstance attended the commission brought by the injured party. Such civil action
of rapes, it was established during trial that shall proceed independently of the criminal
appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the prosecution, and shall require only a
crime. Hence, the award of exemplary damages is preponderance of evidence."
proper.
 STATCON PART: EJUSDEM GENERIS (noscitur
CESAR M. CARANDANG, petitioner, vs. VICENTE a sociis???)
SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court  Respondents argue that the term "physical
of First Instance of Manila and TOMAS injuries" is used to designate a specific crime
VALENTON, Sr. and TOMAS VALENTON, defined in the Revised Penal Code, and
Jr., respondents. therefore said term should be understood in
its peculiar and technical sense, in accordance
This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable with the rules statutory construction.
Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First
 Accused was charged with and convicted of
● A rule of interpretation that where a class of
the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it things is followed by general wording that is not
was found in the criminal case that a wound itself expansive, the general wording is usually
was inflicted by the defendant on the body of restricted things of the same type as the listed
items.
the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which
● General rule: where a general word or
wound is a bodily injury, the crime committed phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
is not physical injuries but frustrated specific words of the same class or where the
homicide, for the reason that the infliction of latter follow the former, the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
the wound is attended by the intent to kill. restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
 ISSUE: whether the term "physical injuries" specifically mentioned.
● Purpose: give effect to both particular or
used in Article 33 means physical injuries in general words, by treating the particular words as
the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical indicating the class and the general words as
injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with indicating all that is embraced in said class,
although not specifically named by the particular
intent to kill or not. words.
● Principle: based on proposition that had the
 Article in question uses the words legislature intended the general words to be used
"defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would
have not enumerated the specific words.
Defamation and fraud are used in their ● Presumption: legislators addressed
ordinary sense because there are no specific specifically to the particularization.
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using ● The rule is used to interpret otherwise
unclear statutes, contracts and estate documents
these terms as means of offenses defined such as trusts or wills.
therein, so that these two terms defamation
and fraud must have been used not to impart
to them any technical meaning in the laws of EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY
the Philippines, but in their generic sense. GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., Respondent
 Evident that the term "physical injuries" FACTS: In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original
could not have been used in its specific sense developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from
as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty
for it is difficult to believe that the Code Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts
Commission would have used terms in the with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to
same article some in their general and Marcelo over several parcels of land in the
another in its technical sense. In other words, Subdivision including the receivables from the
the term "physical injuries" should be lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest,
understood to mean bodily injury, not the Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National
crime of physical injuries, because the terms Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human
used with the latter are general terms. Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that
a water facility is available in the subdivision.
 DECISION: the respondent judge committed The said water facility has been the only source
an error in suspending the trial of the civil of water of the residents for thirty (30) years.
case, and his order to that effect is hereby
In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block
revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer
with the trial of said civil case without Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was
awaiting the result of the pending criminal issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died.
case. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently
wrote to the respondent Association
EJUSDEM GENERIS
demanding the removal of the overhead water Here, the water facility was undoubtedly
tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused established for the bene t of the community. Water
and filed a case before the Housing and Land is a basic need in human settlements, 35 without
Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo which the community would not survive. We
Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving therefore rule that, based on the principle of
heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the
favor of the respondent Association. One of the intention of the law to create and maintain a
things it affirmed was the existence of an healthy environment in human settlements, 36 the
easement for water system/facility or open location of the water facility in the Subdivision
space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 must form part of the area reserved for open space.
wherein the deep well and overhead tank are
situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB
Board of Commissioners, the Board found that
Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space CIR VS CA

ISSUE: Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Facts: A shipment of 438 packages of foodstuffs,
Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” declared in the name of respondent Eusebio
as defined in P. D. 1216. Dichoco, hereinafter referred to as private
respondent, under Entry No. 109924 (70) arrived
RULING: Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land on December 16, 1970 at the Port of Manila on
is considered an “open space.” The Court used board the S/S "St. Isidro". The shipment was
the basic statutory construction principle of covered by a "Customs No-Dollar Declaration",
ejusdem generis to determine whether the area dated December 15, 1970. Against this shipment
falls under “other similar facilities and the Collector of Customs of Manila issued, on
amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific December 28, 1970, in S. I. Case No. 12055, a
mention of areas reserved for water facilities. warrant of seizure and detention for violation of
Ejusdem generis states that where a general Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code,
word or phrase follows an enumeration of in relation to Central Bank Circulars Nos. 247, 289,
particular and specific words of the same class, 294, and 295 and section 102 (k) of the said Code.
the general word or phrase is to be construed to On the same date, private respondent requested the
include – or to be restricted to – things akin to release of the shipment upon the posting of a cash
or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, bond, which request, although favorably
those specifically mentioned. Applying that recommended by the Collector of Customs, was
principle, the Court found out that the denied by the Commissioner of Customs.
enumeration refers to areas reserved for the However, the proper taxes and duties amounting to
common welfare of the community. Therefore, P25,998.00 were imposed on the shipment and
the phrase “other similar facilities and paid by private respondent. After hearing, the
amenities” should be interpreted in like Collector of Customs issued his decision, on
manner. It is without a doubt that the facility January 19, 1971, decreeing the seizure and
was used for the benefit of the community. forfeiture of the shipment "for the simple reason
Water is a basic necessity, without which, that claimants failed to comply with the
survival in the community would be impossible. regulations, that is, with the Central Bank circulars
requiring the production of release certi cates for
The term "open space" is de ned in P.D. 1216 as importations similar to the subject articles." On
"an area reserved exclusively for parks, appeal, the Commissioner of Customs a rmed the
playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, decision on January 21, 1971.
places of worship, hospitals, health centers,
barangay centers and other similar facilities and PC: Herein petitioner contends that the importation
amenities. 33 of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the
articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture
under Section 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and
Customs Code; that the foodstuffs in question importation is absolutely prohibited", but allows
being articles of prohibited importation cannot be redemption of other kinds of importation including
released under bond; and that respondent court forfeited foodstuffs.
acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, in ordering the release of the
foodstuffs in question. On January 27, 1971 private
respondent led before respondent court a "petition Issue:
for review, with a motion for release of goods
under bond", upon the grounds that the decision Held: The court cannot sustain the stand of the
appealed from was not supported by substantial respondents. The importation in question is a
evidence and that the goods seized did not prohibited importation under Section 102 (k) of the
constitute prohibited importation as contemplated Tariff and Customs Code which provides, in part,
in Sections 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and as follows:
Customs Code.
"SEC 102. Prohibited Importations. — The
RC: Private respondent Eusebio Dichoco, in importation into the Philippines of the following
contending that the instant petition is without basis articles is prohibited:
in fact and in law, does not deny that "articles of
prohibited importation cannot be released under xxx xxx xxx
bond" as provided in section 2301 of the Tariff and k. All other articles the importation of which is
Customs Code. He, however, vigorously denies prohibited by law."
that the "foodstuffs in question are articles of
prohibited importation." He argues that the Tariff Respondents contend that this last paragraph must,
and Customs Code distinguishes articles of by application of the principles of ejusdem generis,
"prohibited importation" from those that can be be restricted only to those articles the importation
imported "only upon conditions prescribed by law" of which is "absolutely prohibited," or to
or "importation effected contrary to law". He contraband. This contention is not acceptable. In
further argues that Section 102 of the Tariff and the rst place, the speci c things enumerated in
Customs Code, which enumerates the articles of paragraphs (a) to (j), inclusive, of Section 102 have
"prohibited importations", refers to contraband or no distinguishable common characteristics and
absolutely prohibited articles and concludes in its they differ greatly from one another, and the rule
sub-paragraph (k) with a general statement, "all of ejusdem generis "applies only where the speci c
other articles the importation of which is prohibited words preceding the general expression are of the
by law". Respondent maintains that under the well same nature. Where they are of different genera,
known rule of ejusdem generis, this general the meaning of the general word remains
statement must be restricted only to those articles unaffected by its connection with them." (Black,
which are absolutely prohibited or those On Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 218; 50 Am.
considered contraband. Respondent then insists Jur., p. 248).
that foodstuffs belong to that kind of importation
that are, under Section 1207 of the Tariff and Moreover, calling contraband only the things
Customs Code, "subject to importation only upon "absolutely prohibited by law" is a misnomer, for
conditions prescribed by law", as distinguished contraband means any article the importation or
from articles "of prohibited importation," exportation of which is prohibited by law (Black,
mentioned in the same section; that said foodstuffs, Law Dictionary).
furthermore, can be classi ed under "importation
effected contrary to law" as distinguished from Section 102, when examined, shows that it
"prohibited importation" mentioned in section prohibits the importation of two categories of
2530 of the same Code. Respondent likewise articles, namely those which are absolutely
argues that section 2307 also distinguishes prohibited, for example, those enumerated in
different kinds of importations when it provides paragraphs b, c, d, f, h, and j, and those articles
that there can be no redemption "where the which are qualifiedly prohibited, that is, those that
may be imported subject to certain conditions or importation in question was made contrary to
limitations, for example, those enumerated in Central Bank circulars, then said importation is an
paragraphs a and i. Accordingly the general importation prohibited by law. That importation,
provision in paragraph k, to wit: "all other articles even if it be termed "importation effected contrary
the importation of which is prohibited by law" to law", as respondents call it, is nonetheless a
cannot be so restricted as to comprise only those "prohibited importation."
articles the importation of which is absolutely
prohibited like explosives. Articles of prohibited
importation cover not only absolutely prohibited
articles but also quali edly prohibited articles. CIR vs AMEX
Paragraph (k) is comprehensive in the sense that it
prohibits the importation of all articles not Facts: Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the
mentioned in the preceding provision but Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked
prohibited by other existing statutes (Tejam, with servicing a unit of AMEX-Hongkong Branch
Commentaries on the Tariff Code of the and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK
Philippines, Vol. I, p. 6A). The legal effects of the receivables from card members situated in the
importation of quali edly prohibited articles are the Philippines and payment to service establishments
same as those of absolutely prohibited articles. in the Philippines. It filed with BIR a letter-request
(Geotina v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-33500, for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing
August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362, 379, 383.) The as basis Section 110B of the 1997 Tax Code, which
laws which prohibit importation mentioned in held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the
Section 102 (k) include the pertinent Central Bank purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated sales by
Circulars which have the force and effect of laws. a VAT-registered person may at his option be
"Customs law" includes not only the provisions of refunded or credited against other internal revenue
the Tariff and Customs Code but also all other laws taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.”
and any regulation made pursuant thereto that is
subject to enforcement by the Bureau of Customs In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No.
or otherwise subject to its jurisdiction (Sec. 3514 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed
of Tariff and Customs Code) and articles imported that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is
in violation of Central Bank Circulars have the paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is
status of "merchandize of prohibited importation" remitted inwardly to the Philippine and accounted
(Chan Kian v. Collector of Customs of Manila, Jan. for in accordance with the rules and regulations of
31, 1966, No. L-20803, 16 SCRA 133, 136; Seree the Central Bank of the Philippines, your service
Investment Co. v. Commissioner of Customs, No. income is automatically zero rated xxx” Petitioner
L-21217, Nov. 29, 1965,15 SCRA 431, 434; claimed, among others, that the claim for refund
Bombay Department Store v. Commissioner of should be construed strictly against the claimant as
Customs, No. L-20460, Sept. 30, 1965, 15 SCRA they partake of the nature of tax exemption. CTA
104, 107-108). It cannot be gainsaid that the rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding
importation in question violated Central Bank that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA
Circulars, inasmuch as in the words of petitioner affirmed this decision and further held that
Commissioner of Customs in its decision of respondent’s services were “services other than the
January 21, 1971, "it was established thru the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of
admission of claimant (Dichoco) that the necessary goods for persons doing business outside the
release certificate in connection with his Philippines” and paid for in acceptable foreign
importation was not secured from the Central currency and accounted for in accordance with the
Bank. In view thereof, the collector after instituting rules and regulations of BSP. Section 102 of the
the necessary seizure proceedings forfeited the 438 Tax Code 11 provides: "Sec. 102. Value-added tax
packages of foodstuffs for alleged violation of on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
Central Bank Circulars Nos. 247, 289, 294 and 295 — (a) Rate and base of tax. — There shall be
in relation to Section 2530 (f) and Section 102 (k) levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax
of the Tariff and Customs Code." 4 If the equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts
derived from the sale or exchange of services . . . which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency
"The phrase 'sale or exchange of services' means and accounted for in accordance with the rules and
the performance of all kinds of services in the regulations of the [BSP];'"
Philippines for others for a fee, remuneration or
consideration, including those performed or Issue: "Whether or not the Court of Appeals
rendered by . . . persons engaged in milling, committed reversible error in holding that
processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for respondent is entitled to the refund of the amount
others; . . . services of banks, non-bank nancial of P3,352,406.59 allegedly representing excess
intermediaries and nance companies; . . . and input VAT for the year 1997." 10
similar services regardless of whether or not the
performance thereof calls for the exercise or use of Held: The canon of statutory construction known
the physical or mental faculties. The phrase 'sale or as ejusdem generis or "of the same kind or specie"
exchange of services' shall likewise include: xxx does not apply to Section 4.102-2(b)(2) of RR 7-95
xxx xxx as amended by RR 5-96.
'(3) The supply of . . . commercial knowledge or
information; '(4) The supply of any assistance that First, although the regulatory provision contains an
is ancillary and subsidiary to and is furnished as a enumeration of particular or speci c words,
means of enabling the application or enjoyment of followed by the general phrase "and other similar
. . . any such knowledge or information as is services," such words do not constitute a readily
mentioned in subparagraph (3); xxx xxx xxx '(6) discernible class and are patently not of the same
The supply of technical advice, assistance or kind. 72 Project studies involve investments or
services rendered in connection with technical marketing; information services focus on data
management or administration of any . . . technology; engineering and architectural designs
commercial undertaking, venture, project or require creativity. Aside from calling for the
scheme; xxx xxx xxx exercise or use of mental faculties or perhaps
producing written technical outputs, no common
"The term 'gross receipts' means the total amount denominator to the exclusion of all others
of money or its equivalent representing the contract characterizes these three services. Nothing sets
price, compensation, service fee, rental or royalty, them apart from other and similar general services
including the amount charged for materials that may involve advertising, computers,
supplied with the services and deposits and consultancy, health care, management,
advanced payments actually or constructively messengerial work — to name only a few.
received during the taxable quarter for the services
performed or to be performed for another person, Second, there is the regulatory intent to give the
excluding value-added tax. STIcaE general phrase "and other similar services" a
broader meaning. 73 Clearly, the preceding phrase
"(b) Transactions subject to zero percent (0%) rate.
"as well as" is not meant to limit the effect of "and
— The following services performed in the
other similar services."
Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be
subject to zero percent (0%) rate[:] Third, and most important, the statutory provision
upon which this regulation is based is by itself not
'(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods
restrictive. The scope of the word "services" in
for other persons doing business outside the
Section 102(b)(2) of the Tax Code is broad; it is
Philippines which goods are subsequently
exported, where the services are paid for in not susceptible of narrow interpretation. 74
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP); AND CASUS OMISSUS

'(2) Services other than those mentioned in the EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS
AND CASUS OMISSUS
preceding subparagraph, the consideration for
Latin: the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the The Ombudsman, however, contends that:
other.
the dismissal of the informations in
A maxim of interpretation meaning that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of the other. When certain persons or Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
things are specified in a law, contract or will, an intention to does not mean that petitioner was
exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. In this thereafter exempt from criminal
case, the reference to the assignment to a financial institution
excludes assignment to any other entity.
prosecution;

The express mention of one person, thing or consequence that new informations may be filed by
implies the exclusion of all others. the Ombudsman should it find
probable cause in the conduct of its
Rule may be expressed in a number of ways:
● Expressum facit cessare tacitum - what is preliminary investigation;
expressed puts an end to that which is implied
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited that the filing of the complaint with the
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or Presidential Commission on Good
construction, be extended to other matters. Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the
● Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non
exceptis - A thing not being excepted must be filing of the information with the
regarded as coming within the purview of the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted
general rule the prescriptive period;
● Expressio unius est exclusion alterius - The
expression of one or more things of a class that the absence of the petitioner from
implies the exclusion of all not expressed, even
though all would have been implied had none the Philippines from 1986 until 2000
been expressed; opposite the doctrine of also interrupted the aforesaid period
necessary implication based on Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Kokoy vs SImeon The PCGG avers that the Omdudsman need
not wait for a new complaint with a new
FACTS: Romualdez is being charged with docket number for it to conduct a preliminary
violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for investigation on the alleged offenses of the
failure to file his Statements of Assets and petitioner;
Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his
tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and And since both RA No. 3019 and Act No.
Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 3326 (the Act To Establish Periods of
during his tenure as Technical Assistant in Prescription For Violations Penalized By
the Department of Foreign Affairs. Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
Romualdez claims that the Office of the
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in Run) are silent as to whether prescription
recommending the filing of 24 informations should begin to run when the offender is
against him for violation of Section 7 of
absent from the Philippines, the RPC should
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft be applied.
and Corrupt Practices Act;
(RPC provides that prescription is interrupted
Romualdez asserts that the Ombudsman when accused is outside of the Philippines)
(Marcello) cannot revive the aforementioned
cases which were previously dismissed by
the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of ISSUE:
February 10, 2004.
HELD: In the case at bar, the silence of RA No.
He also claims that the case should be 3019 on the question of whether or not the
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
absence of the accused from the Philippines would not have made speci ed enumerations in a
prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive statute had the intention been not to restrict its
period is more apparent than real. Even before meaning and to con ne its terms to those expressly
the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. mentioned. 41
3326 was already in effect as early as December
4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically de nes Had the legislature intended to include the
"special acts" as "acts de ning and penalizing accused's absence from the Philippines as a
violations of the law not included in the Penal ground for the interruption of the prescriptive
Code". CcAHEI period in special laws, the same could have been
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- expressly provided in Act No. 3326. A case in
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of
40 this Court was categorical in ruling that — 1997 where the legislature made its intention clear
and was thus categorical that —
The law on prescription of offenses is found in SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any
Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for Provision of this Code — All violations of any
offenses punishable thereunder. For those provision of this Code shall prescribe after ve (5)
penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 years.
applies.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the same be not known at the time, from the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
same be not known at the time, from the proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and The prescription shall be interrupted when
punishment.The running of the prescriptive period proceedings are instituted against the guilty
shall be interrupted when proceedings are persons and shall begin to run again if the
instituted against the guilty person, and shall proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
begin to run again if the proceedings are constituting jeopardy.
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not The term of prescription shall not run when the
provide that the absence of the accused from the offender is absent from the Philippines.
Philippines prevents the running of the (Emphasis supplied)
prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that
can be gathered from the foregoing is that the According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not Revised Penal Code lls the so- called "gap" in Act
consider the absence of the accused from the No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the
Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the operation of the prescriptive period for violations
prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal
alterius. To elaborate, — Code can and shall still be applied in cases where
the accused is absent from the Philippines. In
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory effect, Article 91 would supplement Act No.
construction that the express mention of one 3326.
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. This rule is expressed in the familiar This could not have been the intention of the
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." framers of the law.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised
construction, be extended to others. The rule Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special
proceeds from the premise that the legislature laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within
the ambit of "special law" as contemplated and absence of the accused from the Philippines shall
used in Article 10 of the RPC. not suspend the running of the prescriptive period.
Our duty, however, is only to interpret the law. To
In the case of United States v. Serapio, 42 the go beyond that and to question the wisdom or
Court had the occasion to interpret the term effects of the law is certainly beyond our
"special laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then constitutionally mandated duty. As we have
Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now already explained —
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as referring
to penal laws that punish acts not defined and Even on the assumption that there is in fact a
penalized by the Penal Code of the Philippines. legislative gap caused by such an omission,
Thus — neither could the Court presume otherwise and
supply the details thereof, because a legislative
This contention makes it necessary to de ne lacuna cannot be lled by judicial at. Indeed, courts
"special laws," as that phrase is used in article 7 may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the
of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes scope of a statute and include therein situations
especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An
have the meaning applied to the phrase "special omission at the time of the enactment, whether
laws," as the same is generally used? . . . It is con careless or calculated, cannot be judicially
dently contended that the phrase "leyes supplied however after later wisdom may
especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
is not used with this general signi cation: In fact, authorized to insert into the law what they think
said phrase may refer not to a special law as should be in it or to supply what they think the
above de ned, but to a general law. A careful legislature would have supplied if its attention has
reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the been called to the omission. 44
phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify
"special laws" in the general signi cation of that Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal
phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply says, interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor
in effect, that when a crime is made punishable of the accused only relates to the following issues:
under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the (1) retroactive or prospective application of laws
crime) is not subject to the provisions of said providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2)
code. 43 the determination of the nature of the felony
committed vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive
Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and period; and (3) the reckoning of when the
Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the
same result would obtain. A con ict will arise aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to
from the contemporaneous application of the two support the Majority Opinion's conclusion that the
laws. The Revised Penal Code explicitly states prescriptive period in a special law continues to
that the absence of the accused from the run while the accused is abroad.
Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the
prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail
over Article 91 because it speci cally and directly We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law
applies to special laws while the Revised Penal on prescription in criminal cases equally provides
Code shall apply to special laws only suppletorily the authority for the rule that the prescriptive
and only when the latter do not provide the period runs while the accused is outside of
contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on
construction dictate that special legal provisions prescription of penal statutes supports this
must prevail over general ones. IHCacT conclusion. In the old but still relevant case of
People v. Moran, 45 this Court extensively
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio's discussed the rationale behind and the nature of
reservations about the effects of ruling that the prescription of penal offenses —
"We should at rst observe that a mistake is construction of prescriptive laws on criminal
sometimes made in applying to statutes of statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality
limitation in criminal suits the construction that of the State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in
has been given to statutes of limitation in civil the operation of prescriptive periods cannot
suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are simply be implied nor derived by mere
essentially different. In civil suits the statute is implication. Any diminution of this endowment
interposed by the legislature as an impartial must be directly and expressly sanctioned by the
arbiter between two contending parties. In the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter
construction of the statute, therefore, there is no must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof,
intendment to be made in favor of either party. the accused.
Neither grants the right to the other; there is
therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary
presumptions, of construction are to be made. But
it is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is
granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor, SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORP. VS CIR
surrendering by act of grace its rights to
prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no FACTS:
longer the subject of prosecution.' The statute is
not a statute of process, to be scantily and San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a
grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that domestic corporation engaged in the business of
after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut
offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to
oil and other allied products. It was assessed and
return to his country, and resume his immunities
ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal
as a citizen and that from henceforth he may cease
to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the Revenue miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales
proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable
statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed year 1987 particularly on SPMC’s sales of crude
in favor of the defendant, not only because such oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM)
liberality of construction belongs to all acts of while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured
of the statute, is a recognition and noti cation by products. SPMC opposed the assessments. The
the legislature of the fact that time, while it Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax
assigned to it xed and positive periods in which it Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for review.
destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the
views, it must be remembered that delay in liberal application of the rules because, on the
instituting prosecutions is not only productive of merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for
expense to the State, but of peril to public justice the 3% miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude oil
in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere
which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported
natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the
by UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and
policy of the law that prosecutions should be
prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax
promptitude should be vigorously maintained. pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
They are not merely acts of grace, but checks Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled
imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant products, subsequently exported said products,
activity from its subalterns, and to secure for SPMC should be exempted from the miller’s tax.
criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained." (Emphasis supplied) ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC’s sale of crude
coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3%
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny miller’s task.
petitioner the bene ts accruing from the liberal
HELD: Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to
NO. Petition was denied. declare Republic Act No. 7227 as unconstitutional
on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and
RATIO: duty-free) importation of raw
materials, capital and equipment. It reads:
The language of the exempting clause of Section
168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be
exemption applied only to the exportation of operated and managed as a separate customs
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods
and capital within, into and exported out of the
and dessicated coconuts, whether in their
Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as
original state or as an ingredient or part of any
provide incentives such as tax and duty-free
manufactured article or products, by the importations of raw materials, capital and
proprietor or operator of the factory or by the equipment. However, exportation or removal of
miller himself. goods from the territory of the Subic Special
Economic Zone to the other parts of the
Where the law enumerates the subject or Philippine territory shall be subject to customs
condition upon which it applies, it is to be duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff
construed as excluding from its effects all those Code and other relevant tax laws of
not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].
exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in
the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic
meaning that does not appear nor is intended or Act No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax
reflected in the very language of the statute incentives to the importation of raw
cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from materials, capital and equipment only thereby
the premise that the legislature would not have violating the equal protection clause of the
made specific enumerations in a statute if it had Constitution.
the intention not to restrict its meaning and
He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Order No. 97-A for being violative of their right
to equal protection. They asserted that private
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not
a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its different from the retail establishments located
application in this case is consistent with the outside.
construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s claim for Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7227 is
tax exemption will violate these established valid on the ground that it violates the equal
principles and unduly derogate sovereign protection clause.
authority.
Decision: The SC ruled in the negative. The
COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOC., INC. VS phrase ‘tax and duty-free importations of raw
TORRES materials, capital and equipment was merely cited
as an example of incentives that may be given to
Facts: entities operating within the zone. Public
respondent SBMA correctly argued that the
This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on
respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as which petitioners impliedly rely to support their
Executive Secretary from allowing other private restrictive interpretation, does not apply when
respondents to continue with the operation of tax words are mentioned by way of example.
and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special
The petition with respect to declaration of expenses as authorized expenditures of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A SEF. Declaring further, the respondent's audit
cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of findings on pages 36 and 37 in the Annual
the equal protection of the laws is not violated by Audit Report on the Province of Cebu for the
a legislation based which was based on reasonable year ending December 31, 1999 as null and
classification. A classification, to be valid, must void. Hence, the instant petition by the
(1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane Commission on Audit on the expenses for
to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to college scholarship grants, since chargeable to
existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local
all members of the same class. Applying the government unit concerned expressly was not
foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds mentioned under R.A. NO.5447. With the
no violation of the right to equal protection of the effectivity of the Local Government Code of
laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying 1991, petitioner contends that R.A. No. 5447
between the establishments inside and outside the was repealed, leaving Section 100 (c) of the
zone. There are substantial differences in a sense Code to govern the disposition of the SEF, to
that, investors will be lured to establish and wit:
operate their industries in the so-called ‘secured
area and the present business operators outside the SEC. 100. Meeting and Quorum; Budget
area. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to (c) The annual school board budget shall give
extend to them the benefits and incentives priority to the following:
accorded in R.A. 7227. (1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of
school buildings and other facilities of public
elementary and secondary schools;
COA VS PROVINCE OF CEBU
(2) Establishment and maintenance of extension
FACTS: The provincial governor of the classes where necessary; and
province of Cebu, as chairman of the local (3) Sports activities at the division, district,
school board, under Section 98 of the Local municipal, and barangay levels.
Government Code, appointed classroom
teachers who have no items in the DECS
ISSUE: Whether or not the salaries and
plantilla to handle extension classes that would
personnel-related benefits of public school
accommodate students in the public schools. In teachers appointed by the local chief
the audit of accounts conducted by the executives in connection with the
Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of establishment and maintenance of extension
Cebu, for the period January to June 1998, it classes; as well as the expenses for college
appeared that the salaries and personnel- scholarship grants, chargeable to the Special
related benefits of the teachers appointed by Education Fund (SEF) of the local government
the province for the extension classes were unit concerned?
charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise
charged to the SEF were the college
HELD: Invoking the legal maxim "expressio unius
scholarship grants of the province.
est exclusio alterius," petitioner alleges that since
Consequently, the COA issued Notices of salaries, personnel-related bene ts and scholarship
Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying grants are not among those authorized as lawful
that disbursements for the salaries of teachers expenditures of the SEF under the Local
and scholarship grants are not chargeable to Government Code, they should be deemed
the provincial SEF. Faced with the Notices of excluded therefrom. Moreover, petitioner claims
Suspension issued by the COA, the province of that since what is allowed for local school boards to
Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a determine underSection 995 of the Local
petition for declaratory relief with the trial Government Code is only the "annual
court. On December 13, 1999, the court a quo supplementary budgetary needs for the operation
and maintenance of public schools," as well as the
rendered a decision declaring the questioned
"supplementary local cost to meet such needs," the the supplementary budget of the local school boards.
budget of the local school boards for the Thus, it should be made clear that
establishment and maintenance of extension classes
should be construed to refer only to the upkeep and CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
maintenance of public school building, facilities and
similar expenses other than personnel-related bene not every kind of personnel-related bene ts of public
ts. This is because, petitioner argued, the school teachers may be charged to the SEF. The SEF
maintenance and operation of public schools may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-
pertain principally to the DECS. related bene ts of teachers appointed by the local
school boards in connection with the establishment and
The contentions are without merit. It is a basic maintenance of extension classes. Extension classes as
precept in statutory construction that the intent of referred to mean additional classes needed to
the legislature is the controlling factor in the accommodate all children of school age desiring to
interpretation of a statute. enter in public schools to acquire basic education. 9

With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a


Evidently, what was expressly repealed by the Local reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government
Government Code was only Section 3, of R.A. No. Code reveals that said grants are not among the
5447, which deals with the "Allocation of taxes on projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be
Virginia type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf appropriated. It should be noted that Sections 100 (c)
tobacco." The legislature is presumed to know the and 272 of the Local Government Code substantially
existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike
particular or speci c provision of law, it does so payment of salaries of teachers which falls within the
expressly. The failure to add a speci c repealing clause ambit of "establishment and maintenance of extension
particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed classes" and "operation and maintenance of public
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing schools," the "granting of government scholarship to
law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable poor but deserving students" was omitted in Sections
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government Code. Casus
new and the old laws. 7 Hence, the provisions omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or
allocating funds for the salaries of teachers under thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be
Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447, which are not inconsistent held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not for
with Sections 272 and 100 (c) of the Local this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where
Government Code, remain in force and effect.
TSIEAD the legislature has omitted it. 10

In the same vein, however noble the intention of the


Even under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
province in extending said scholarship to deserving
allocation of the SEF for the establishment and
students, we cannot apply the doctrine of necessary
maintenance of extension classes logically implies the
implication inasmuch as the grant of scholarship is
hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services. Every statute is neither necessary nor indispensable to the operation
understood, by implication, to contain all such and maintenance of public schools. Instead, such
scholarship grants may be charged to the General
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object
Funds of the province.
and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 11 of the 1997 Rules of
fairly and logically inferred from its terms.Ex Civil Procedure, a petition for declaratory relief may
necessitate legis. 8 Verily, the services and the be led before there is a breach or violation. The
corresponding compensation of these teachers are Solicitor General claims that the Notices of Suspension
necessary and indispensable to the establishment and issued by the COA to the respondent province
maintenance of extension classes. amounted to a breach or violation, and therefore, the
petition for declaratory relief should have been denied
Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public by the trial court.
schools is lodged principally with the DECS. This is
the reason why only salaries of public school teachers
appointed in connection with the establishment and REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
maintenance of extension classes, inter alia, pertain to
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term that means by
referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
its corresponding object. It is a rule of construction used any statute;
typically in distributing property. For example, when a will (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
says "I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
to A", the principle of reddendo singula singulis would apply
as if it read "I devise all my real property, and bequeath all
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
my personal property, to B", since the word devise is (5) must be general and consistent with
appropriate only to real property and the term bequeath is public policy; and
appropriate only to personal property. (6) must not be unreasonable.
CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO The police power of the City Council, however
broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
FACTS: constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject
to the limitation that its exercise must be
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord reasonable and for the public good. In the case at
7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING
ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING CLAUSES
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, Provisos:
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically
Provisos, generally
prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the ● to limit the application of the enacting
clause, section or provision of a statute, or except
Malate District which was notoriously viewed as something, or to qualify or restrain its generality,
a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate or exclude some possible ground of
Tourist Development Corporation avers that the misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and intended by legislature to be brought within its
purview.
motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates ● Rule: restrain or qualify the generality of
that they do not market such nor do they use the enacting clause or section which it refers.
women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also ● Purpose: limit or restrict the general
avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate language or operation of the statute, not to
enlarge it.
motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The
City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid ● Location: commonly found at the end of a
statute, or provision & introduced, as a rule, by
exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the word "Provided"
the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the
purpose of the law is to promote morality in the ● Determined by: What determines whether a
clause is a proviso is its substance rather than its
City. form. If it performs any of the functions of a
proviso, then it will be regarded as such,
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. irrespective of what word or phrase is used to
introduce it.
HELD: Proviso may enlarge scope of law
● It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain
The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and the legislative intention and it prevails over
void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be proviso.
valid, it must not only be within the corporate ● Thus it may enlarge, than restrict
powers of the local government unit to enact and Proviso as additional legislation
must be passed according to the procedure
● Expressed in the opening statement of a A saving clause in a statute is an exception of a special thing
section of a statute out of the general things mentioned in the statute ; it is
ordinarily a restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to
● Would mean exactly the reverse of what is
save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc., from the
necessarily implied when read in connection with
annihilation which would result from an. unrestricted repeal.
the limitation
● Purpose: ● Provision of law which operates to except
from the effect of the law what the clause
➢ To limit generalities
provides, or save something which would
➢ Exclude from the scope of the statute otherwise be lost.
that which otherwise would be within its terms ● Used to save something from effect of
repeal of statute
What proviso qualifies
● Legislature, in repealing a statute, may
● General rule: qualifies or modifies only the preserve in the form of a saving clause, the right
phrase immediately preceding it; or restrains or of the state to prosecute and punish offenses
limits the generality of the clause that it committed in violation of the repealed law.
immediately follows. ● Where existing procedure is altered or
substituted by another, usual to save proceedings
● Exception: unless it clearly appears that the
under the old law at the time the new law takes
legislature intended to have a wider scope
effect, by means of saving clause
Exception to the rule ● Construed: in light of intent by legislature
● Given strict or liberal meaning depending
● Proviso construed to qualify only the on nature of statute
immediately preceding part of the section to
which it is attached; if no contrary legislative
intent is indicated. Ricardo vs NLRC
● Where intent is to qualify or restrict the
phrase preceding it or the earlier provisions of the Facts: Petitioner was hired as a laborer at the
statute or even the statute itself as a whole, then D.M. Consunji, Inc., a construction firm, on
the proviso will be construed in that manner, in November 5, 1974. He became a skilled welder
order that the intent of the law may be carried out
and worked for private respondent until March
Exceptions: 23, 1986 when his employment was terminated on
Exception and Proviso distinguished the ground that the project petitioner had been
assigned to was already completed and there was
Exception: no more work for him to do. Skeptic of private
respondent's reason, petitioner brought his plight
● Exempts something absolutely from the before the Labor Arbiter who consolidated the
operation of statute
● Takes out of the statute something that same with three (3) other separate complaints for
otherwise would be a part of the subject matter of illegal dismissal and various money claims
it. against private respondent. After filing their
● Part of the enactment itself, absolutely respective position papers and other documents
excluding from its operation some subject or
thing that would otherwise fall within the scope.
pertinent to their causes/defenses, the parties
agreed to submit the case for decision based on
Proviso: record.

● Defeats its operation conditionally. On May 12, 1988, Labor Arbiter Fernando V.
● Avoids by way of defeasance or excuse
Cinco rendered a decision, finding that
● If the enactment is modified by engrafting
upon it a new provision, by way of amendment, complainants worked continuously in various
providing conditionally for a new case- this is the projects ranging from five (5) to twenty (20) years
nature of proviso. and belonged to a work pool. Private respondent
questioned on appeal the aforesaid decision of the
Similar: in a way since one of the functions of proviso is to
except something from an enacting clause.
Labor Arbiter on the ground that the complainants
were all project employees who were hired on a
Saving Clause: project-to-project basis, depending on the
availability of projects that the former was able to
close with its clients.
Private respondent questioned on appeal the "project" employees, who are specifically
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter on the excepted therefrom. Thus, the Court therein said:
ground that the complainants were all project
employees who were hired on a project-to-project
basis, depending on the availability of projects
that the former was able to close with its clients. The general rule is that the office of a proviso is
to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately
Petitioner cites Article 280 of the Labor Code as preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of
legal basis for the decision of the Labor Arbiter in the clause that it immediately follows. (Statutory
his favor. The text of Article 280 states as Construction by Ruben Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 173).
follows: Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — preceding part of the provision to which it is
The provisions of written agreement to the attached, and not to the statute itself or to other
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the sections thereof. (Chinese Flour Importers
oral agreement of the parties, an employment Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil.
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee 469 (1951); Arenas v. City of San Carlos, G.R.
has been engaged to perform activities which are No. 24024, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA 318 (1978).
usually necessary or desirable in the usual The only exception to the rule is where the clear
business or trade of the employer, except where legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only
the employment has been fixed for a specific the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso)
project or undertaking the completion or but also earlier provisions of the statute or even
termination of which has been determined at the the statute itself as a whole. (Commissioner of
time of the engagement of the employee or where Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de
the work or services to be performed is seasonal Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055 (1960)
in nature and the employment is for the duration
of the season. Indeed, a careful reading of the proviso readily
discloses that the same relates to employment
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it where the employee is engaged to perform
is not covered by the preceding paragraph: activities that are usually necessary or desirable in
Provided, That, any employee who has rendered the usual business or trade of the employer but
at least one year of service whether such service is hastens to qualify that project employment is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a specifically exempted therefrom. Finally,
regular employee with respect to the activity in petitioner relies on Policy Instruction No. 20
which he is employed and his employment shall which was issued by then Secretary Blas F. Ople
continue while such actually exists. Petitioner to stabilize employer-employee relations in the
claims that the above-quoted proviso in Article construction industry to support his contention
280 of the Labor Code supports his claim that he that workers in the construction industry may now
should be regarded as a regular employee. be considered regular employees after their long
years of service with private respondent. The
ISSUE: pertinent provision of Policy Instruction No. 20
reads:
HELD: We disagree. The proviso in the second
paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code has Members of a work pool from which construction
recently been explained in Mercado v. NLRC,4 company draws its project employees, if
where it was held that said proviso deems as considered employees of the construction
regular employees only those "casual" employees company while in the work pool, are non-project
who have rendered at least one year of service employees or employees for an indefinite period.
regardless of the fact that such service may be If they are employed in a particular project, the
continuous or broken. It is not applicable to completion of the project or of any phase thereof
will not mean severance of employer-employee nearest employment office the termination of
relationship. workers everytime a project is completed proves
that the employees are not project employees.
Contrariwise, the faithful and regular effort of
private respondent in reporting every completion
Respondent Commission correctly observed in its of its project and submitting the lay-off list of its
decision that complainants, one of whom employees proves the nature of employment of
petitioner, failed to consider the requirement in the workers involved therein as project
Policy Instruction No. 20 that to qualify as employees. Given this added circumstance behind
member of a work pool, the worker must still be petitioner's employment, it is clear that he does
considered an employee of the construction not belong to the work pool from which the
company while in the work pool. In other words, private respondent would draw workers for
there must be proof to the effect that petitioner assignment to other projects at its discretion.
was under an obligation to be always available on
call of private respondent and that he was not free
to offer his services to other employees.
Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
introduce any evidence of such nature during the vs. FILIPINAS COMPAÑIA DE SEGUROS,
times when there were no project.
Facts: Respondent Filipinas Compañia de
Noteworthy in this case is the fact that herein Seguros, an insurance company, is also engaged
private respondent's lay-off reports and the in business as a real estate dealer. On January 4,
termination reports were duly submitted to the 1956, respondent, in accordance with the single
then Ministry of Labor and Employment rate then prescribed under Section 182 of the
everytime a project was completed in accordance National Internal Revenue Code.1 paid the
with Policy Instruction No. 20, which provides: amount of P150.00 as real estate dealer's fixed
annual tax for the year 1956. Subsequently said
Project employees are not entitled to termination Section 182 of the Code was amended by
pay if they are terminated as a result of the Republic Act No. 1612, which took effect on
completion of the project or any phase thereof in August 24, 1956, by providing a small of
which they are employed, regardless of the graduated rates: P150 if the annual income of the
number of projects in which they have been real estate dealer from his business as such is
employed by a particular construction company. P4,000, but does not exceed P10,000; P300, if
Moreover, the company is not required to obtain a such annual income exceeds P10,000 but does not
clearance from the Secretary of Labor in exceed P30,000; and P500 if such annual income
connection with such termination. What is exceeds P30,000.
required of the company is a report to the nearest
Public Employment Office for statistical On June 17, 1957, petitioner Commissioner of
purposes. Internal Revenue assessed and demanded from
respondent (whose annual income exceeded
The presence of this factor makes this case P30,000.00) the amount of P350.00 as additional
different from the cases decided by the Court real estate dealer's fixed annual tax for the year
where the employees were deemed regular 1956. On July 16, 1957, respondent wrote a letter
employees. The cases of Ochoco v. National to petitioner stating that the "records will show
Labor Relations Commission,5 Philippine that the real estate dealer's fixed tax for 1956 of
National Construction Corporation v. National this Company was fully paid by us prior to the
Labor Relations Commission,6 Magante v. effectivity of Republic Act No. 1612 which
National Labor Relations Commission,7 and amended, among other things, Sections 178 and
Philippine National Construction Corporation v. 192 of the National Internal Revenue Code." And,
National Labor Relations, et al.,8 uniformly held as to the retroactive effect of said Republic Act
that the failure of the employer to report to the No. 1612, respondent added that the Republic Act
No. 1856 which, among other things, amended 1956, the total annual tax then prescribed for the
Section 182 of the National Internal Revenue year 1956, require it to pay an additional sum of
Code, Congress has clearly shown its intention P350.00 to complete the P500.00 provided in
when it provided that the increase in rates of taxes Republic Act No. 1612 which became effective
envisioned by Republic Act No. 1612 is to be by its very terms only on August 24 1956, would,
made effective as of 1 January 1957". in the language of the Court of Tax Appeals result
in the imposition upon respondent of a tax burden
On October 23, 1957, petitioner informed to which it was not liable before the enactment of
respondent that "Republic Act No. 1856 which said amendatory act, thus rendering its operation
took effect June 22, 1957 amended the date of retroactive rather than prospective, which cannot
effectivity of Republic Act 1612 to January 1, be done, as it would contravene the aforecited
1957. However, the said amendment applies only Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1612 as well as
to fixed taxes on occupation and not to fixed taxes the established rule regarding prospectivity of
on business." Hence, petitioner insisted that operation of statutes.
respondent should pay the amount of P350.00 as
additional real estate dealer's fixed annual tax for
the year 1956.On November 20, 1957, respondent
filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for The view that Congress did intend to impose said
review. increased rates of real estate dealer's annual tax
prospectively and not retroactively, finds some
Issue: affirmation in Republic Act No. 1856, approved
on June 22, 1957, which fixed the effective date
Held: As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, of said new rates under Republic Act No. 1612 by
unless the contrary is provided. (Art. 4, Civil inserting the following proviso in Section 182 of
Code of the Philippines; Manila Trading and the National Internal Revenue Code:
Supply Co. vs. Santos, et al., 66 Phil., 237; La
Provisora Filipina vs. Ledda, 66 Ph 573.) Provided, further, That any amount collected in
Otherwise stated, a state shou!d be consider as excess of the rates in effect prior to January one,
prospective in its operation whether it enacts, nineteen hundred and fifty-seven, shall be
amen or repeals a tax, unless the language of the refunded or credited to the taxpayer concerned
statute clearly demands or expresses that it shall subject to the provisions of section three hundred
have a retroactive effect (61 C. J. 1602, cited in and nine of this Code. (Sec. 182 (b) (2) (1).)
Loremo vs. Posadas, 64 Phi 353.) The rule applies
with greater force to the case bar, considering that Petitioner, however, contends that the above-
Republic Act No. 1612, which imposes the new quoted provision refers only to fixed taxes on
and higher rates of real estate dealer's annual occupation and does not cover fixed taxes on
fixed tax, expressly provides in Section 21 thereof business, such as the real estate dealer's fixed tax
the said Act "shall take effect upon its approval" herein involved. This is technically correct, but
on August 24, 1956. we note from the deliberations in the Senate,
where the proviso in question was introduced as
The instant case involves the fixed annual real an amendment, that said House Bill No. 5919
estat dealer's tax for 1956. There is no dispute that which became Republic Act No. 1856 was
before the enactment of Republic Act No. 1612 considered, amended, and enacted into law, in
on August 2 1956, the uniform fixed annual real order precisely that the "iniquitous effects" which
estate dealer's was P150.00 for all owners of were then being felt by taxpayers. in general, on
rental properties receiving an aggregate amount of account of the approval of Republic Act No.
P3,000.00 or more a year in the form of rentals2 1612, Which was being given retroactive effect
and that. "the yearly fixed taxes are due on the by the Bureau of Internal Revenue by collecting
first of January of each year" unless tendered in these taxes retroactively from January 1, 1956, be
semi-annual or quarterly installments.3 Since the eliminated and complaints against such action be
petitioner indisputably paid in full on January 4,
finally settled. (See Senate Congressional Record,
May 4, 1957, pp. 10321033.)

It is also to be observed that said House Bill No.


5819 as originally presented, was expressly
intended to amend certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code dealing on fixed
taxes on business. The provisions in respect of
fixed tax on occupation were merely subsequently
added. This would seem to indicate that the
proviso in question was intended to cover not
only fixed taxes on occupation, but also fixed
taxes on business. (Senate Congressional Record,
March 7, 1957, p. 444.)The fact that said proviso
was placed only at the end of paragraph "(B) On
occupation" is not, therefore, view of the
circumstances, decisive and unmistakable
indication that Congress limited the proviso to
occupation taxes.

Even though the primary purpose of the proviso is


to limit restrain the general language of a statute,
the legislature, unfotunately, does not always use
it with technical correctness; consequently, where
its use creates an ambiguity, it is the duty of the
court to ascertain the legislative intention, through
resort to usual rules of construction applicable to
statutes, generally an give it effect even though
the statute is thereby enlarged, or the proviso
made to assume the force of an independent
enactment and although a proviso as such has no
existence apart from provision which it is
designed to limit or to qualify. (Statutory
Construction by E. T. Crawford, pp. 604-605.)

. . . When construing a statute, the reason for its


enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construe with reference to its intended
scope and purpose. (Id. at p. 249.)

On the general principle of prospectivity of statute


on the language of Republic Act 1612 itself,
especially Section 21 thereof, and on the basis of
its intended scope and purpose as disclosed in the
Congressional Record we find ourselves in
agreement with the Court of Tax Appeals.