m

REPORT OF APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

C:QLOR

ILLUSTRATIONS IN BLACK AND

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(CODE) (CATEGORY)

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NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS

AND
REPRODUCED BY

SPACE

ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
\\ • U. S. DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE SPRINGFIELD,VA. 22161

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NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS APOLLO

AND

SPACE BOARD

ADMINISTRATION

13 REVIEW

June

15,

1970

The Honorable Administrator

Thomas

O.

Paine Space Administration

National Aeronautics and Washington, D.C. 20546 Dear Dr. Paine:

Pursuant to your transmitting the Concurrent to call. with

directives of April final Report of the this transmittal,

17 and Apollo

April 21, 13 Review the

1970, I am Board. Board, subject

I have

recessed

We plan to reconvene later this year when most of the remaining special tests have been completed, in order to review the results of these tests to determine whether any modifications to our findings, determinations, or recommendations are necessary. In addition, we will stand ready to reconvene at your request. Sincerely yours,

Edgar M. Chairman

Cortright

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PREFACE

The Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's third mission to explore the surface of the Moon, is a harsh reminder of the immensedifficulty of this undertaking. The total Apollo system of ground complexes, launch vehicle, and spacecraft constitutes the most ambitious and demandingengineering development ever undertaken by man. For these missions to succeed, both men and equipment must perform to near perfection. That this system has already resulted in two successful lunar surface explorations is a tribute to those menand women who conceived, designed, built, and flew it. Perfection is not only difficult to achieve, but difficult to maintain. The imperfection in Apollo 13 constituted a near disaster, averted only by outstanding performance on the part of the crew and the ground control team which supported them. The Apollo 13 Review Board was charged with the responsibilities of reviewing the circumstances surrounding the accident, of establishing the probable causes of the accident, of assessing the effectiveness of flight recovery actions, of reporting these findings, and of developing recommendations for corrective or other actions. The Board has made every effort to carry out its assignment in a thorough, objective, and impartial manner. In doing so, the Board madeeffective use of the failure analyses and corrective action studies carried out by the Manned Spacecraft Center and was very impressed with the dedication and objectivity of this effort. The Board feels that the nature of the Apollo 13 equipment failure holds important lessons which, when applied to future missions, will contribute to the safety and effectiveness of mannedspace flight.

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g gear ladder

I hatch

steerable antenna 3USradar antenna ental control system radiator steerable high gain antenna

platforrr

control system quad

Command Module crew compartment power systemradiators reactioncontrol systemquad

inflight antenna (2)

r
LM descent engine

extension

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Docking VHF Docking LM overhead hatch

Aft heatshield windows combinedtunnel hatch

Service module bLunar moduledescentstage@Lunar moduleascent stage@Comrrand module-_.

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Apollo

13

space

vehicle

configuration.

CSM

in

ground

test

with

bay

4 panel

removed.

_V

Inflight

photograph of service module showing damageto bay 4.

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TABLEOF CONTENTS Page LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL PREFACE............................ TABLEOF CONTENTS ....................... CHAPTER i - AUTHORITIES Memorandum, April 17, 1970, from Administrator Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright Memorandum, April 21, 1970, from Administrator Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright and ...... and ...... iii ix

i-i

I-4

Memorandum, April 20, 1970, from Administrator and Deputy Administrator to Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel ......... Memorandum, April 20, 1970, from Administrator to Mr. Dale D. Myers, Associate Administrator for MannedSpaceFlight .................... NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, Subject: Mission Failure Investigation Policy and Procedures, April 14, 1966 ...................... NASA Management Instruction 1156.14, Subject: Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, December7, 1967 ..... CHAPTER 2 - BOARD HISTORY ANDPROCEDURES Part i.
Part 2.

1-6

1-7

i-8

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Summary of Board History and Procedures
Biography of Board Panel Chairmen • . Board Organization for Board Panels

.

.

,

2-1

Members,
• . . • ,

Observers,
• . , • •

and
• , • . • , •

2-3

Part

3.

and
• •

General
• , . •

Assignments
• • . , • • • , • • •

Part

4.

Summary

of Board

Activities

Page

CHAPTER

3 - DESCRIPTION i. 2.

OF APOLLO

13

SPACE Vehicle

VEHICLE

AND

MISSION 3-2 3-26

Part Part CHAPTER

Apollo/Saturn Apollo

V Space

.......... .......... 13 ACCIDENT

13 Mission AND ANALYSIS

Description OF APOLLO

4 - REVIEW i. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Part Part Part Part Part CHAPTER

Introduction Oxygen Apollo Surm_ary Apollo Tank

.................. No. History .............

4-1 4-2 4-25 ........ 4-36 4-44

13 Flight Analysis 13 Recovery

................ of the Accident

............... AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5 - FINDINGS, i. 2. 3. 4. A B C D E

DETERMINATIONS,

Part Part Part Part APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX

Introduction Assessment Supporting

................. of Accident Considerations ............. ............

5-1 5-5 5-12 5-40 SYSTEMS AND OPEBATIONS

Recommendations DATA: OF MISSION OF OF OF

................. APOLLO EVENTS 13 FLIGHT PANEL AND TEST PANEL

- BASELINE - REPORT - REPORT - REPORT - REPORT

MANUFAC_JRING DESIGN PROJECT AND PANEL _G_NT

PANEL

F - SPECIAL G - BOARD H - BOkRD

TESTS

ANALYSES PRODECURES PRESS STATEMEntS

ADMINISTRATIVE RELEASES AND

II

CHAPTER AUTHORITIES

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NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS
WASHINGTON,

AND

SPACE ADMINISTRATION

D.C. 20546

OFFICE

OF

THE

ADMINISTRATOR

April

17,

1970

TO SUBJECT REFERENCES:

: :

Mr.

Edgar

M.

Cortright of Apollo 13 Review Failure Board Investigation Policy

Establishment (a) NMI and NMI

8621.1 - Mission Procedures 1156.14 - Aerospace

(b)

Safety

Advisory

Panel and the

i. It is NASA policy as stated in Reference (a) document the causes of all major mission failures conduct of its space and aeronautical corrective actions as a result of the 2. craft lunar Because of the serious nature of

"to investigate which occur in

activities and to take appropriate findings and recommendations." the accident of the Apollo 13 space-

which jeopardized human life mission, we hereby establish

and the

caused Apollo

failure of the Apollo 13 13 Review Board (hereinafter The and members of the other Govern-

referred to as the Board) and appoint you Board will be qualified senior individuals ment agencies. After consultation with

Chairman. from NASA we will:

you, and the

(a) Appoint the members necessary for the effective (b) Arrange findings, the its 3. and for timely

of the Board operation of release of of the

make any subsequent Board; and on the

changes

information Board to the public. to us.

operations, and, will through report

recommendations

Congress, The Board

NASA Office of Public Affairs, to the findings and recommendations directly The (a) Board Review will: the circumstances surrounding

the

accident

to

the

space-

craft which flight and

occurred during the ground actions taken or causes actions. of the

flight of Apollo 13 and the subsequent to recover, in order to establish the accident and assess the effectiveness

probable cause of the recovery

the

(b) Review all factors Board determines to be recommendations, by the program

relating to the significant and

accident relevant,

and recovery actions including studies, be

findings, undertaken involved.

and other actions that offices, field centers,

have been or may and contractors

i-i

(c)

Direct

such

further

specific

investigations

as may

be necessary. or

(d) Report as soon causes of the accident recovery (e) upon its (f) submit 4. As (a) of of the the actions. Develop findings Document a final Chairman To

as possible its findings and the effectiveness of

relating to the cause the flight and ground

recommendations and its report. of the Board you

for

corrective or

or

other

actions,

based

determinations findings,

conclusions and

derived

therefrom. and

determinations,

recommendations

are

delegated for the such shall

the

following and

powers: operation be part Aerospace

establish

such

procedures

organization

Board as you find Board's records. Advisory To Panel for

most effective; The procedures its review and

procedures shall be furnished the

Safety (b)

comment. the execution of your

establish

procedures absence.

to assure

responsibilities (e) officers, activities bilities (d) To

in your such

designate

representatives,

consultants,

experts,

liaison

observers, or other of the Board. You as part of us the Board's

individuals as required to support the shall define their duties and responsirecords. concerning its the the organization, activities. Safety Advisory and

To keep

advised of we

periodically the are Board and

procedures, 5.

operations action

associated Aerospace

By separate

requesting

Panel established by Reference (b) to review both the procedures findings of the Board and submit its independent report to us. 6. By separate Space action to: all the elements Board of and the Office of Manned data, Space and we are directing the Associate Administrator

for

Manned

Flight that with

(a) Assure cooperate support (b) as fully

Flight technical

provide

records,

requested. through the regular OMSF organization such reviews,

Undertake

studies, and supporting actions as tions to us on corrective measures mission aspects with of respect the Apollo to hardware, program.

are required to be taken operational

to develop recommendaprior to the Apollo 14 procedures, and other

i-2

7.

All

elements within

of NASA their

will of

cooperate

with

the

Board

and

provide

full

support

areas

responsibility.

George Deputy

M.

Low T.O. Paine Administrator

Administrator

z-3

NATIONAL
i:<¸

AERONAUTICS
WASHINGTON,

AND
D.C.

SPACE
20546

ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE

OF

THE

ADMINISTRATOR

April

21,

1970

TO SUBJECT Reference:

: :

Mr.

Edgar

M.

Cortright 13 Review 17, Board subject: Establishment of

Membership Memorandum Apollo

of Apollo to you

of April Board

13 Review

In the

accordance Apollo 13

with Review

paragraph Board is

2(a)

of

Reference as

(a), follows:

the

membership

of

established

Members: Mr. Mr. Mr. Dr. Brig. Edgar Robert Neil John M. Cortright, Chairman (Assistant (Director, to the Langley Research NASA Center) Hqs.)

F. Allnutt Armstrong F. Clark

Administrator,

(Astronaut, Manned (Director, Goddard R. Hedrick, (Deputy and Jr.

Spacecraft Center) Space Flight Center) (Director of Space, DCS/R&D,

General

Walter Johnson

Hqs., USAF) Mr. Vincent L. Office Mr. Dr. Counsel: Mr. 0MSF George of

Associate Applications)

Administrator-Engineering, Nuclear Center) Propulsion Office)

Space

Science (Manager, (Director,

Milton Klein Hans M. Mark

AEC-NASA Space Ames Research

Malley Support: W.

(Chief

Counsel,

Langley

Research

Center)

Technical Mr. Charles

Mathews Flight)

(Deputy

Associate

Administrator,

Office

of

Manned Observers: Mr.

Space

William Space

A.

Anders

(Executive

Secretary,

National

Aeronautics

and

Council)

Dr. CharlesD. Harrington (Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel) Mr. I. I. Pinkel (Director, Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute, Lewis Research Center)
Congressional Mr. Public Gerald Liaison: J. Mossinghoff Liaison: Duff with (Public applicable Affairs NASA Officer, instruction, Manned you as Spacecraft are are Center) to for (Office of Legislative Affairs, NASA Hqs.

Affairs Mr. Brian

In

accordance

authorized required

appoint such the effective

experts and operations

additional consultants of the Board.

George Deputy

M.

Low

T. O.

Paine

Administrator

Administrator

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NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS
WASHINGTON,

AND

SPACE

ADMINISTRATION

D.C.

20546

April
OFFIC r OF" THE ADMINISTRATOR

20,

1970

TO

Dr.

Charles

D. Harrington Aerospace Safety and Advisory Findings of Panel Apollo 13 Review Board

Chairman, SUBJECT Attachment: : Review

of Procedures

(a)

Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, Cortright, subject: Establishment Review Board Section 6, National Authorization Act, NMI 1156.14 Aeronautics 1968 Safety

to Mr. Edgar M. of Apollo 13

References:

(a)

and

Space

Administration

(b)

- Aerospace

Advisory

Panel

i. In accordance with References (a) and (b), the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (hereafter referred to as the Panel) is requested to review the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13 Review Board (hereafter referred to as the Board) established by Attachment (a). 2. The procedures established by the Board will be made available to the Panel for review and comment as provided in paragraph 4(a) of Attachment (a). 3. As Chairman of the Panel, you are designated an Observer on the Board.

In this capacity, you, or another member of the Panel designated by you, are authorized to be present at those regular meetings of the Board you desire to attend. You are also authorized to receive oral progress reports from the Chairman of the Board or his designee from time to time to enable you to keep the Panel fully informed on the work of the Board. 4. The final report and any interim available promptly to the Panel for reports of its review. the Board will be made

5. The Panel is requested to report to us on the procedures of the Board at such times and in such form as you consider but no later than i0 days after the submission to us of the of the Board.

and findings appropriate, final report

George Deputy

M. Low Administrator

T. O. Paine Administrator

Enclosure

cc:

Mr. M/Mr.

Edgar Dale

M.

Cortright,

Chairman,

Apollo

13

Review

Board

Myers

i-6

NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS

AND

SPACE 20546

ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE

OF THE

ADMINISTRATOR

April

20,

1970

TO

Mr.

Dale

D.

Myers for Manned Space Flight

Associate SUBJECT References: : Apollo (a)

Administrator

13 Review Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, Cortright, subject: Establishment Review Board Memorandum dated April 20, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M. of Apollo 13

(b)

to Dr.

Charles

D. Harrington, subject: and Findings of Apollo i. As (a) indicated in paragraph 6 of

Review of Procedures 13 Review Board (a), you are directed to:

Reference

Assure that all elements of Flight cooperate fully with data, and technical support

the Office of Manned Space the Board in providing records, as requested.

(b)

Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews, studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop timely recommendations to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14 mission ware, operational procedures, flight of the Apollo program. with respect to hardcrews, and other aspects

2. The recommendations referred to submitted to us in such form and at but a report should be submitted no Apollo 13 Review Board submits its

in paragraph l(b) above should be such time as you deem appropriate, later than ten days after the final report.

3. The assignments to the Apollo 13 Review Board and to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel by References (a) and (b), respectively, in no way relieve you of your continuing full responsibility for the conduct of the Apollo and other OMSF programs.

Deputy cc:

Administrator Mr. Mr. Edgar Charles M. Cortright, D. Harrington, Chairman,

Administrator Apollo 13 Review Board Advisory Panel

Chairman,

Aerospace

Safety

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862 i. i

April

14,

1966 dc#e

_ec_h,e

Management Instruction
SUBJECT:
Io P_P_E MISSION FAILURE INVESTIGATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES This Instruction and documenting conduct of NASA establishes the causes space and of the policy all major and procedures mission failures activities. for investigating which occur in the

aeronautical

2.

APPLICABILITY

This
3.

Instruction

is

applicable

to

NASA

Headquarters

and

field

installations.

DEFINITION

For

the

purpose

of

this

Instruction,

the

following

term

shall

apply:

In general, objective.

a

failure

is

defined

as

not

achieving

a

major

mission

POLICY

It

is

NASA

policy

to which and

investigate occur to take and in

and the

document conduct of

the its

causes space actions

of and

all

major

mission tical result

failures activities of the

aeronauas a

appropriate recommendations.

corrective

findings

b,

The of the forth

Deputy major

Administrator failures in

may addition of

conduct to those

independent investigations Program

investigations required as set of

Officlals-ln-Charge in paragraph 5a.

Headquarters

Offices

5.

PROCEDURES

a.

Officials-in-Charge within their assigned

of

Headquarters areas, for:

Program

Offices

are

responsible,

(l)

Informing failure of or and

promptly apprising

the

Deputy him of

Administrator the nature or of other

of the

each

major status are

failure, which

investigations, will be taken.

and

corrective

actions

1-8

NMI

8621.1

April

14,

1966

(2)

Determining taking

the

causes or

or probable other actions, and

causes and actions

of all submitting to the

failures, written Deputy

corrective

reports of such Administrator.

determinations

Do

When the Deputy Administrator investigation, he will: (i)

decides

to

conduct

an

independent

Establish a (name of project) priate NASA officials; Define the such tasks specific as: the

Review

Board,

comprised

of

appro-

(2)

responsibilities

of each

Board,

encompassing

(a)

Reviewing

findings,

determinations

and

corrective

or

other actions which field installations Headquarters Program conclusions (b) as

have been developed by contractors, and the Official-in-Charge of cognizant Office and presenting the Board's adequacy to the Deputy Administrator.

to their

Reviewing the with cognizant Recommending tests) cal and and to as are

findings during the field installation such additional causes steps

course of investigations and Headquarters officials. (for example causes of additional the technifactors. actions, failure,

(c)

considered evidence

desirable, of nontechnical

to determine contributing

operational obtain

or probable

(d)

Developing recommendations based on all information Doc_nenting for corrective to the tation findings, or other Deputy the

for corrective available to the and

and other Board.

(e)

determinations actions and Administrator. Board's

recommendations such documen-

submitting

c.

Procedures determined

for by

implementing the Deputy

reco_mnendations

shall

be

Administrator.

6.

CANCELLATION

NASA

Management

Manual

Instruction

4-1-7

(T.S.

760),

March

24,

1964.

Deputy DISTRIBUTION: SDL I

Administrator

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December

7, 1967

C'ffectiv¢ dole

Management Instruction
SUBJECT: i. AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL PURPOSE This Instruction sets forth the duties, procedures, organization, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. 2. AUTHORITY The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (hereafter called the "Panel") was established under Section 6 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1968 (PL 90-67, 90th Congress, 81 Stat. 168, 170). Since the Panel was established by statute, its formation and use are not subject to the provisions of Executive Order ll007 or of NMI 1150.2, except to the extent that such provisions are made applicable to the Panel under tflis Instruction• 3. DUTIES
aB

authority for, and the and support of the

The duties of the Panel are of the National Aeronautics Authorization Act, 1968, as

set forth and Space follows:

in Section 6 Administration

"The Panel shall review safety studies and operations plans referred to it and s_all make reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator with respect to the hazards of proposed or existing facilities and proposed operations and with respect to the adequacy of proposed or existing safety standards, and shall perform such other duties as the Administrator may request."
b •

Pursuant to carrying out its statutory duties, the Panel will review, evaluate, and advise on all elements of NASA's safety system, including especially the industrial safety, systems safety,

1-10

NMI1156.14

December 7, 1967 and public safety activities, and the managementof these activities. These key elements of NASA's safety system are identified and delineated as follows: (1)
Industrial Safety. This element includes those activities which, on a continuing basis, provide protection for the well being of personnel and prevention of damage to property involved in NASA's business and exposed to potential hazards associated with carrying out this business. Industrial safety relates especially to the operation of facilities in the many programs of research, development, manufacture, test, operation, and maintenance. Industrial safety activities include, but are not limited to, such functions as: (a) (b) Determination of industrial safety criteria.

Establishment and implementation of safety standards and procedures for operation and maintenance of facilities, especially test and hazardous environment facilities. Development design of of safety requirements new facilities. for the

(c)

(d)

Establishment and implementation of safety standards and procedures for operation of program support and administrative aircraft.

(2)

Systems Safety. This element includes those activities specifically organized to deal with the potential hazards of complex R&D systems that involve many highly specialized areas of technology. It places particular emphasis on achieving safe operation of these systems over their life cycles, and it covers major systems for aeronautical and space flight activities, manned or unmanned, including associated groundbased research, development, manufacturing, and test activities. Systems safety activities include, but are not limited to, such functions as: (a) Determination of systems safety criteria, including criteria for crew safety. Determination Performance of of safety data safety requirements. analyses.

(b) (C)

systems

1-11

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_cember

7, 1967

NMI i156.14

(d)

Establishment safety plans.

and

implementation

of

systems

(3)

Public Safety. This element includes those activities which, on a continuing basis, provide protection for the well being of people and prevention of damage to property not involved in _ASA's business, but which may nevertheless be exposed to potential hazards associated with carryin_ out this business. Public safety activities include, but are not limited to, such functions as: (a) Determination of public safety criteria.

(b)

Establishment and control of public safety hazards associated with facility and systems tests and operations. Establishment of emergency and implementation, as required, or catastrophe control plans.

(c)

(4)

Safety Management. This element includes both the program and functional organizations of NASA and its contractors involved in the identification of potential hazards and their elimination or control as set forth in the foregoing description of safety activities. It also includes the management systems for planning, implementing, coordinating, and controlling these activities. These management systems include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a)

The authorities, responsibilities, and working relationships of the organizations involved in safety activities, and the assessment of their effectiveness. The procedures for insuring the currency and continuity of safety activities, especially systems safety activities which may extend over long periods of time and where management responsibilities are transferred during the life cycles of the systems. The plans and procedures for accident/Incident investigations, including those for the followup on corrective actions and the feedback of accident/Incident information to other involved or interested organizations. The analysis and dissemination of safety data.

(b)

(c)

(d)

1-12

NMI 1156.14

December

7, 1967

PROCEDURES
a•

The Panel will function in an advisory capacity to the Administrator, and, through him, to those organizational elements responsible for management of the NASA safety activities. The Panel will be provided with all information required to Uischarge its advisory responsibilities as they pertain to both NASA and its contractors' safety activities. This information will be made available through the mechanism of appropriate reports, and by means of in situ reviews of safety activities at the various NASA and contractor sites, as deemed necessary by the Panel and arranged through the Administrator. The Panel will thus be enabled to examine and evaluate not only the general status of the NASA safety system, but also the key elements of the _lanned and on-going activities in this system.

b,

ORGANIZATION a. [!embership

(l)

The Panel will consist of a maximum of nine members, who will be appointed by the Administrator. Appointments will be for a term of six years, except that, in order to provide continuity of membership, one-third of the members appointed originally to the Panel will be appointed for a term of two years, one-third for a term of four years, and one-third for a term of six years• Not more than four members of the Panel shall be employees of NASA, nor shall such NASA members constitute a majority of the composition of the Panel at any given time. Compensation and members shall be NASA Authorizatfon travel allowances for Panel as specified in Section 6 of Act, 1968.

(2)

(3)

the

b.

Officers (I) The Officers of the Panel shall be a Chairman and a Vice Chairman, who shall be selected by the Panel from their membership to serve for one-year terms. The Chairman, shall preside have the usual or Vice Chairman in his absence, at all meetings of the Panel and powers of a presiding officer.

(2)

shall

1-13

December

7, 1967

NMI I156.14

Co

Committees

(z)

The Panel is authorized to establish special committees, as necessary and as approved by Administrator, to carry out specified tasks the scope of duties cf the Panel.

the within

(2)

All such cc_:_mittee activities will be considered an inseparable extension of Panel activities, and will be in accordance with all applicable procedures and regulations set forth in this Instruction. The Chairman of each special committee shall be a member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. The other committee members may or may not be members of the Panel, as recommended by the Panel and approved by the Administrator. Appointment of Panel members to committees as officers or members will be either for one year, for the duration of their term as Panel members, or for the lifetime of the committee, whichever is the shortest. Appointments of non-Panel members to committees will be for a period of one year or for the lifetime of the committee, whichever is shorter. Compensation and travel allowances for committee members who are not members of the Panel'shall be the same as for members of the Panel itself, except that compensation for such committee members appointed from outside the Federal Government shall be at the rate prescribed by the Administrator for comparable services.

(3)

(4)

(5)

dQ

Meetings

(l)

Regular meetings of the Panel will be held as often as necessary and at least twice a_ar. One meeting each year shall be an Annual Meeting. Business conducted at this meeting will include selecting the Chairman and the Fice Chairman of the Panel, recommending new committees and committee members as required or desired, approving the Panel's annual report to the Administrator, and such other business as may be required. Special meetings of the Panel may be called by the Chairman, by notice served personally upon or by mall or telegraph to the usual address of each member at least five days prior to the meeting.

(2)

1-14

-"

NMI 1156.14

December

7, 1967

(3)

Special meetings shall be called manner by the Chairman, upon the of three members of the Panel.

in the written

same request

(4)

If practicable, the object of a special meeting should be sent in writing to all members, and if possible a special meeting should be avoided by obtaining the views of members by mail or otherwise, both on the question requiring the meeting and on the question of calling a special meeting. All meetings of special committees will be called by their respective qhairmen pursuant to and in accordance with performing their specified tasks. Minutes of all meetings of the Panel, and of special committees established by the Panel, will be kept. Such minutes shall, at a minimum, contain a record of persons present, a description of matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all reports received, issued, or approved by the Panel or committee. The accuracy of all minutes will be certified to by the Chairman of the Panel (or by the Vice Chairman in his absence) or of the committee. and Records submit an annual report to the

(5)

(6)

e.

Reports (1)

The Panel shall Administrator.

(2)

The Panel will submit to the Administrator reports on all safety reviews and evaluations with comments and recommendations as deemed appropriate by the Panel. All records and files of the Panel, including agendas, minutes of Panel and committee meetings, studies, analyses, reports, or other data compilations or work papers, made available to or prepared by or for the Panel, will be retained by the Panel. of Conflicts of Interest

(3)

f.

Avoidance

(l)

Nongovernmental members of the Panel, and of special committees establishea by the Panel, are "Special Government Employees" within the meaning of NHB 1900.2A, which sets forth guidance to NASA Special Government Employees resarding the avoidance of conflicts of interest and the observance of ethical standards of conduct. A

1"19

_ceaber 7, i_?

_

1156.14

copy of NHB 1900.2A and related NASA instructions on conflicts of interest will be furnished to each Panel or committee member at the time of his appointment as a NASA consultant or expert. (2) Nongovernmental members of the Panel or a soecial committee will submit a "NASA Special Government Employees Confidential Statement of Employment and Financial Interests" (NASA Form 1271) prior to participating in the activities of the Panel or a special committee.

.

SUPPORT a. A staff, to be comprised of full-time NASA employees, shall be established to support the Panel. The members of this staff will be fully responsive to direction from the Chairman or t_e Fanel. The director of this staff will serve Secretary to the Panel. The Executive Panel, in accordance with the specific the Chairman of the Panel, shall: as Executive Secretary of instructions

be

the from

(1)

Administer the supervision of and evaluations, the Panel. Insure that transactions, approval at Insure special

affairs of the Panel and have general all arrangements for safety reviews and other matters undertaken by

(2)

a written record is kept and submit the same to each subsequent meeting.

of all the Panel

for

(3)

that the same service is committees of the Panel.

provided

for

all

trator

CFR Title

i_, Chapter

5, Subpart

1209.5.

1-16

CHAPTER 2 BOARD HISTORY ANDPROCEDURES

Z-O

PART

i.

SUMMARY

OF BOARD

HISTORY

AND

PROCEDURES

The Apollo 13 Review Board was established on April 17, 1970, by the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator under the authority of NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966. In the letter establishing the Board, Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Director of Langley Research Center, was appointed as Chairman and the general responsibilities of the Board were set forth. The seven additional members of the Board were named Administrator to in a letter from the Administrator and the Deputy the Chairman, dated April 21, 1970. This letter also

designated a Manned Space Flight Technical Support official, a Counsel to the Board, several other supporting officials, and several observers from various organizations. In addition, in a letter dated April 20, 1970, to Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, that Panel was requested to review the Board's procedures and findings. The Review Board convened at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, on Tuesday, April 21, 1970. Four Panels of the Board were formed, each under the overview of a member of the Board. Each of the Panels was chaired by a senior official experienced in the area of review assigned to the Panel. In addition, each Panel was manned by a number of specialists, thereby providing a nucleus of expertise for the review activity. During the period of the Board's review activities, the Chairmen of the tions, analyses, four and Panels were responsible for the conduct of evaluaother studies bearing on their Panel assignments, findings Board's and recommendations, consideration. To Board assumed and for developing overview these responsibilities

for preparing preliminary other information for the Panel efforts, related to the

each member of the overall review.

specific

In addition to the direct participants in the Board activity, a number of observers and consultants also attended various meetings of the Board or its constituent Panels. These individuals assisted the Review Board participants with expertise and responsibilities. advice and counsel in their areas of

While the Board's intensive review activities were underway, the Manned Spacecraft Center Apollo 13 Investigation Team, under James A. McDivitt, Colonel, USAF, was also conducting its own analysis of the accident on Apollo 13. Coordination between the Investigation Team work and the Apollo 13 Review Board activities was effected through the MSF Technical Support official and by maintaining a close and continuing working relationship between the Panel Chairmen and officials of the MSC Investigation Team.

2-1

The Board Chairman established a series of administrative procedures to guide the Board's activities. In addition, specific assignments of responsibility were madeto all individuals involved in the Board's activities so as to insure an efficient review activity. Overall logistic and administrative support was provided by MSC. The Board conducted both Executive and General Sessions. During the Executive Sessions, plans were agreed upon for guiding the Board's activities and for establishing priorities for tests, analyses, studies, and other Board efforts. At the General Sessions, status of Panel activities was reviewed by the Board with a view towards coordination and integration of all review activities. In addition, Board members regularly attended daily status meetings of the MannedSpacecraft Center Investigation Team. In general, the Board relied on MannedSpacecraft Center postmission evaluation activities to provide the factual data upon which evaluation, assessment, and analysis efforts could be based. However, the Board, through a regular procedure, also levied specific data collection, reduction, and analysis requirements on MSC. Test support for the Board was conducted primarily at MSC but also included tests run at other NASACenters. Membersof the Board and its Panels also visited a number of contractor facilities to review manufacturing, assembly, and test procedures applicable to the Apollo 13 mission. The Chairman of the Board provided the NASADeputy Administrator with oral progress reports. These reports summarizedthe status of Review Board activities at the time and outlined the tasks still ahead. All material used in these interim briefings was incorporated into the Board's official files. As a means of formally transmitting its findings, determinations, and recommendations, the Board chose the format of this Final Report which includes both the Board's Judgments as well as the reports of the individual Panels. A general file of all the data and information collected and examined by the Board has been established at the Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia. In addition, the MSCInvestigation Teamestablished a file of data at MSC.

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PART2.

BIOGRAPNT_S

OF BOARDMEMBERS_ OF THE EDGAR NASA Langley APOLLO M.

OBSERVERS_ 13 REVIEW

AND BOARD

PANEL

CHAIRMEN

CHAIRMAN

CORTRIGHT Research Center

Edgar M. Cortright, 46, Director Hampton, Virginia, is Chairman of the Mr. Cortright has been an

of the Apollo

NASA Langley Research 13 Review Board. and administrator Center, research

Center,

aerospace at i0 NASA's years

scientist

for

22 years. He began his career Ohio, in 1948 and for the next speed aerodynamics there.

Lewis Research specialized in

Cleveland, on high-

In October 1958, Mr. Cortright was named Chief of Advanced Technology Programs at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., where he directed initial formulation of NASA's Meteorological Satellite Program. In 1960, he became Assistant Director for Lunar and Planetary Programs and directed the planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner, Ranger, and Surveyor. Mr. Cortright became Deputy Director of the Office of Space Sciences in 1961, and Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications in 1963, in which capacities he served as General Manager of NASA's space flight program using automated spacecraft. He joined the Office of Manned Space Flight as Deputy Associate Administrator in 1967 and served in a similar capacity until he was appointed Director of the Langley Research Center in 1968. He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astrothe and

nautics and of the American Astronautical Society. He •Arthur S. Fleming Award, the NASA Medal for Outstanding the NASA Medal for Distinguished Service. Mr. articles, Camera." Cortright and is the and author edited of numerous book, technical "Exploring

has received Leadership,

reports Space

and With a

compiled

the

He officer

is in

a native of Hastings, Pennsylvania, World War II. He received Bachelor aeronautical engineering from the

and and

served Master

as of

a U.S. Navy Science

degrees in Institute. Mr.

Rensselaer

Polytechnic

and

Mrs.

Cortright

are

the

parents

of

two

children.

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MEMBERS OF THEAPOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD ROBERT F. ALLNUTT NASA Headquarters Robert F. Allnutt_ 34, Assistant to the NASA Administrator, Washington, D. C., is a memberof the Apollo 15 Review Board. Mr. Allnutt was namedto his present position this year. Prior to that, he had been Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs since 1967. He joined NASAin 1960 as a patent attorney at the Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia. In 1961, he was transferred to NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C. Mr. Allnutt served as Patent Counsel for CommunicationsSatellite Corporation from January to September1965, when he returned to NASA Headquarters as Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters. He is admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia and the state of Virginia and is a memberof the American Bar Association and the Federal Bar Association. Mr. Allnutt
a B.S. Master was graduated from Virginia degree in industrial engineering. He of Laws degrees from George Washington are the parents of Polytechnic Institute with received Juris Doctor and University Law School. two sons. The family lives

in

Mr. and Mrs. Allnutt Washington, D. C.

NEIL A. ARMSTRONG NASA Astronaut

Review

Nell A. Armstrong, Board.

39,

NASA

astronaut,

is

a member

of

the

Apollo

13

Commander of the Apollo ll mission Mr. Armstrong has distinguished himself engineering test pilot.

and the first man on the Moon, as an astronaut and as an

Prior to joining the astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft Houston, Texas, in 1962, Mr. Armstrong was an X-15 rocket aircraft project pilot at the NASA Flight Research Center, Edwards,

Center,

California.

\

Mr. Armstrong joined NASA at the Lewis Ohio, in 1955, and later transferred to the aeronautical research pilot.

Research Center, Flight Research

Cleveland, Center as an

His initial space flight was as command pilot of Gemini VIII, launched March 16, 1966. He performed the first successful docking of two vehicles in space. The flight was terminated early due to a malfunctioning thruster_ and the crew was cited for exceptional piloting skill in overcoming the problem and accomplishing a safe landing. He has served on backup crews for both Gemini and Apollo. Mr. Armstrong is a Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and member of the Soaring Society of America. He has received the Institute of Aerospace Sciences Octave Chanute Award, the AIAAAstronautics Award, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, the John F. Montgomery Award, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom. He is a native of Wapakoneta, Ohio, and received a B.S. degree in aeronautical engineering from Purdue University and a M.S. degree from the University of Southern California. He was a naval aviator from 1949 to Mr. 1952 and and Mrs. flew 78 combat have missions two during the Korean action.

Armstrong

sons.

JOHN NASA Goddard

F.

CLARK Flight Center

Space

Dr. John F. Clark, 49, Center, Greenbelt, Maryland,

Director of is a member

the of

NASA Goddard Space Flight the Apollo 13 Review Board.

He is an internationally known authority on atmospheric and space sciences, holds four patents in electronic circuits and systems, and has written many scientific papers on atmospheric physics, electronics, and mathematics. Dr. Clark Programs joined NASA in 1958 at NASA Headquarters and served in the until 1961 when Programs, Office of Sciences and of Space Office he was of Space named Sciences. of the Applica-

Flight

Director of Geophysics From 1962 until 1965, Space Science tions. Steering

and Astronomy he was Director Committee,

of Space Chairman and

Office

Science

In 1965, Dr. Clark was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications (Sciences), and later that year, Acting Director of Goddard. He was named director of the center in 1966.

2-5

Dr. Clark began his career in 19h2 as an electronics engineer at the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. From 19h7 to 19h8 he was Assistant Professor of Electronic Engineering at Lehigh University, Bethelem, Pennsylvania. He returned to NRL in 1948; and prior to Joining NASA, served as head of the Atmospheric Electricity Branch there.

He is a member of the American Association of Physics Teachers, American Geophysical Union, Scientific Research Society of America, Philosophical Society of Washington, the International Scientific Radio Union, and the Visiting Committee on Physics, Lehigh University. He received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Service, Outstanding Leadership, and Distinguished Service. Dr. Clark was born in Reading, Pennsylvania. He received in electrical engineering from Lehigh University, M.S. University, and Ph.D. a B.S. degree in

degree

mathematics from George Washington from the University of Maryland. Dr. Maryland. and Mrs. Clark have two

in physics

children

and

live

in

Silver

Springs,

WALTER

R. HEDRICK,

JR.

Headquarters,

USAF

Brig. Gen. Walter R. Hedrick, Jr., h8, Director of Space, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D.C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board. He has participated extensive in most of the as Air Force's major nuclear test

projects and has and administrator.

experience

a technical

project

officer

General Hedrick Joined the Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet in 1941 and flew in combat with the 86th Fighter Bomber Group during World War II. After the War, he was assigned to the 19th Air Force, the lhth Air Force, and as a project officer under Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington. From 1952 to 1955, he was assigned to the Air Force Office of Atomic Energy. In 1955, he was assigned to the Technical Operations Division, Air Force Special Weapons Command, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. In 1957, he was named Commander of the h951st Support Squadron, Eniwetok; and the following year, he was reassigned to Kirtland AFB as Assistant to the Group Commander and later as Air Commander of the h925th Test Group.

General Hedrick Ballistics Division,

Joined the Special Systems Office, Air Force Los Angeles, in 1960. He was named Commander

of

2-6

-the Satellite Control Deputy Commander, Air assignment in 1967. General Force awards. Hedrick

Facility in 1965, and Force Systems Command.

in

1966, he was appointed He received his present

is a

Command

Pilot

and

has

received

numerous

Air

His home town is Fort Worth, Texas, and he attended logical College, Lubbock, prior to joining the service. B.S. and M.S. degrees and Mrs. in physics Hedrick are from the the University of two

Texas TechnoHe received

of Maryland. sons.

General

parents

VINCENT NASA

L.

JOHNSON

Headquarters

Vincent L Johnson, Science and Applications of the Apollo 13 Review

51, Deputy Associate (Engineering), NASA Board.

Administrator Headquarters,

for Space is a member

Mr. Johnson was appointed to his present position in 1967. Prior to that time, he had been Director of the Launch Vehicle and Propulsion Programs Division, Office of Space Science and Applications, since 1964. He was responsible for the management and development of the light and medium launch vehicles used for NASA's unmanned earth orbital and deep space programs. His division also directed studies of future unmanned launch vehicle and propulsion system requirements.

Mr. Johnson joined NASA in 1960, coming from the Navy Department where he had been an engineer with the Bureau of Weapons. His first assignments with NASA were as Program Manager for the Scout, Delta, and Centaur launch vehicles. He was of Ordnance. Laboratory. a naval Prior officer during World War II, serving to that, he was a physicist with the with the Bureau Naval Ordnance

Mr. Johnson was born University of Minnesota. He parents and Mrs. Johnson of two children.

in Red

Wing,

Minnesota,

and

attended

the

live

in Bethesda,

Maryland.

They

are

the

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MILTON NASA

KLEIN

Headquarters

Milton Headquarters, Mr.

Klein, 46, Manager, Space Nuclear Propulsion is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board. has been in his present position since

Office,

NASA

Klein

1967.

Prior

to

that he had been Deputy Manager since 1960. The Space Nuclear Propulsion Office is a joint activity of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The office conducts the national nuclear rocket program. He is also Director of the Division of Space power Nuclear Systems activities. of the AEC_ responsible for space nuclear electric

Mr. Klein became associated with atomic energy work in 19467 when he was employed by the Argonne National Laboratory. In 1950, he joined the AEC's Chicago Operations Office as staff chemical engineer. Later, he was promoted to Assistant Manager for Technical Operations. Generally engaged in reactor development work for stationary power plants, he had a primary role in the power reactor demonstration program. Mr. Klein was born in during World War II. St. Louis, Missouri. He served in the U.S.

Navy

He has a B.S. degree in chemical engineering University and a Master of Business Administration University.

from Washington degree from Harvard

Mr. Maryland.

and

Mrs.

Klein

and

their

three

children

live

in Bethesda,

NASA

HANS M. MARK Ames Research

Center

Dr. Hans M. Mark, 40, Moffett Field, California, Prior to being

Director of is a member Director

the NASA Ames of the Apollo of the Ames

Research 13 Review

Center, Board. he

appointed

Research Nuclear

Center

was, from 1964 to at the University

1969, Chairman of California,

of the Department of Berkeley, California.

Engineering

An expert in nuclear and atomic physics, he served Administrator of the University of California's Berkeley Reactor, professor of nuclear engineering and _ research the University's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore,

as Reactor Research physicist

at

California,

2-8

and

consultant written

to

the

U.S.

Army

and

the

National

Science

Foundation.

He has

many

scientific

papers. at the Mark's at the

Except Massachusetts

for 2 years Institute academic, California

as an Assistant Professor of Physics of Technology from 1958 to 1960, Dr. and research (Berkeley). career has been

administrative, University of Dr. Mark California,

centered

of

received his A.B. degree in physics from the University Berkeley, in 1951, and returned there as a research 1955, one year after receiving his Ph.D. in physics

physicist in from M.I.T. He American tion and is

a Fellow

of

the

American

Physical

Society for

and

a member

of

the

Geophysical the American

Union, the American Nuclear Society.

Society

Engineering

Educa-

Dr. Mark was born in Mannheim, Germany, States when he was ll years old. He became in 1945. Dr. and Mrs. Mark are the parents of

and came to a naturalized

the United U.S. citizen

two

children.

COUNSEL NASA

TO

THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW GEORGE T. MALLEY Research Center

BOARD

Langley

George T. Malley, 57, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, is the Legal Counsel to the Apollo 13 Review Board. He also served as Counsel to the Apollo 204 Review Board. Mr. Malley is the Senior Field Counsel of NASA and has been assigned to Langley since 1959. He was with the Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Navy, from 1950 to 1959, where he specialized in admiralty and international law. He is a retired Navy officer 1946, mainly in the South Pacific. officer of the U.S.S. Fentress. Mr. Malley has an A.B. Cornell and is degree and served His last on active assignment duty was from 1939 commanding to

from

the

University School. New York

of

Rochester

and

an LL.B. degree from Rochester, New York, Bar Association. Mr. Virginia. and Mrs.

University Law a member of the

He is a native of Bar and the Federal

Malley

and

their

two

children

live

in Newport

News,

2-9

MANNED

SPACE FLIGHT CHARLES W. NASA

TECHNICAL MATHEWS

SUPPORT

Headquarters

Charles

W.

Mathews,

49,

Deputy

Associate

Administrator

for

Manned

Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, of Manned Space Flight technical

Washington, support to

D. C., directs the Office the Apollo 13 Review Board. manager for for Aeronautics as general

Mr. Mathews has been a research engineer and project NASA and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee (NACA), since 1943. In his present assignment, he serves manager of manned space flight. Prior to his appointment Applications to this position NASA in 1968, he

had since

been

Director, Apollo January 1967.

Program,

Headquarters,

Mr. Mathews was Gemini Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, from 1963 until 1967. Prior to that time, he was Deputy Assistant Director for Engineering and Development and Chief of the Spacecraft Technology Division at MSC@ Mr. Mathews transferred to MSC (then the Space Task Group) when Project Mercury became an official national program in 1958. He served as Chief of the Operation Division. He had been at the Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, since 1943 engaged in aircraft flight research and automatic control of airplanes. He became involved in manned spacecraft studies prior to the first Sputnik flights, and he conducted early studies on reentry. Mr. Mathews was chairman of the group which developed detailed specifications for the Mercury spacecraft. Mr. Mathews has been awarded the NASA Distinguished Service Medal and the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal. He has received the NASA Group Achievement Award - Gemini Program Team. He Fellow the is a Fellow of of the American of numerous Mathews, the American Astronautical Institute of Aeronautics technical of from articles Society and an Associate and Astronautics. He is by NASA. degree in

author Mr.

published has

a native

Duluth,

Minnesota,

a B.S.

aeronautical New York. Mr. children. and

engineering

Rensselaer

Polytechnic

Institute,

Troy,

Mrs.

Mathews

live

in Vienna,

Virginia.

They

have

two

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APOLLO

13

REVIEW A.

BOARD ANDERS and

OBSERVERS

WILLIAM National Aeronautics

Space

Council

William A. Amders, 36, Executive and Space Council, Washington, D.C., Apollo 13 Review Board. Prior a NASA to being astronaut

Secretary, National Aeronautics is an official observer of the

was

appointed to his present position in 1969, Mr. Anders and an Air Force lieutenant colonel. He was lunar 8 lunar orbital celestial body. mission, man's first visit

module to the

pilot on vicinity

the Apollo of another

Mr. Anders joined the Center, Houston, Texas, in served as backup pilot for Apollo ll, the first lunar Mr. Anders was

NASA astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft 1963. In addition to his Apollo 8 flight, he Gemini ll and backup command module pilot for landing mission. a second lieutenant in the Air Force

commissioned

upon graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. After flight training, he served as a pilot in all-weather interceptor squadrons of the Air Defense Command. Prior to becoming an astronaut, he was a nuclear engineer and instructor pilot at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and has been awarded the Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Astronaut Wings, the NASA Distinguished Service Medal, and the New York State Medal for Valor. Mr. Anders was born in Hong Kong. He received the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. degree in nuclear the Air Force Institute of Technology. Mr. and Mrs. Anders are the parents of five a B.S. degree from engineering from

children.

CHARLES Douglas

D.

HARRINGTON Nuclear, Inc.

United

Dr Douglas observer Dr. chemical Aerospace

Charles D Harrington, 59, President and General Manager, United Nuclear, Inc., Richland, Washington, is an official of the Apollo 13 Review Board. Harrington, who has been associated and nuclear industrial fields since Safety Advisory Panel, a statutory with all phases of the 1941, is Chairman of the body created by Congress.

2-11

From 1941 to 1961, he was employed by the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. Harrington started with.the company as a research chemist and in 1960, after a procession of research and management positions, was appointed Vice President, Mallinckrodt Nuclear Corporation and Vice President, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. In 1961, when the fuel material processing plant of Mallinckrodt becamethe Chemicals Division of United Nuclear Corporation, Dr. Harrington was namedVice President of that division. He becameSenior Vice President, United Nuclear Corporation, Centreville, Maryland, in 1963. In 1965, Dr. Harrington was appointed President and General Manager, Douglas United Nuclear, Inc. The companymanagesproduction reactors and fuels fabrication facilities at Hanford, Washington, for the Atomic Energy Commission. He is the co-author of a book, "Uranium Production Technology," and has written numerous technical papers. He has received the Mid-West Award of the American Chemical Society for contributions to technology in the nuclear energy field. He is director of several corporations, including United Nuclear, as well as professional councils and societies. Dr. Harrington has M.S., M.A., and Ph.D. Harvard University. degrees in chemistry from

I. IRVINGPINKEL NASA Lewis Research Center I. Irving Pinkel, 57, Director, Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute at the NASALewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, is an official observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board. Until recently, he directed research at Lewis Research Center on rocket propellant and electric power generation systems for space vehicles, compressors and turbines for advanced aircraft engines, and lubrication systems for rotating machines for these systems. Mr. physicist 1940, he Virginia, 1942, he Pinkel entered Governmentscientific service in 1935 as a with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In joined the staff of the Langley Research Center, Hampton, as a physicist. Whenthe Lewis Research Center was built in transferred there.

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He has been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, SigmaXi, honorary scientific society, and Pi Mu Epsilon, honorary mathematics fraternity. He is an Ohio Professional Engineer, served on the former NACA subcommittees on Meteorological Problems, Icing Problems, Aircraft Fire Prevention and Flight Safety, and is a memberof the NASA Research and Technology Advisory Subcommitteeon Aircraft Operating Problems. He has been a Special Lecturer, Case Institute of Technology Graduate School. Mr. Pinkel has received the Flight Safety Foundation Award for contributions to the safe utilization of aircraft, the Laura Taber Barbour Award for development of a system for suppressing aircraft crash fires, the NACA Distinguished Service Medal, and the NASASustained Superior Performance Award. He was born in Gloversville, University of Pennsylvania. Mr. and Mrs. Pinkel live parents of two sons. NewYork, and was graduated from the They are the

in Fairview Park, Ohio.

JAMES E. WILSON, JR. Committeeon Science and Astronautics United States House of Representatives JamesE. Wilson, Jr., 39, Technical Consultant, United States House of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, is an official observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board. Mr. Wilson has been technical consultant to the Committee since 1963. From 1961 to 1963, he was Director of Research and Development, U.S. Naval Propellant Plant, Indian Head, Maryland. Mr. Wilson managed the Polaris Program at Indian Head from 1956 to 1961. From 1954 to 1956, Mr. Wilson served as an officer in the U.S. Army Signal Corps. He was a development engineer with E. I. DuPont, Wilmington, Delaware, from 1953 to 1954. Mr. Wilson is a memberof Phi SigmaAlpha, a National Honor Society; American Institute of Chemical Engineers; American Chemical Society; and American OrdnanceAssociation. Mr. Wilson is co-author of several publications tee on Science and Astronautics. of the House Commit-

He received a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from the University of Maine and a Master of Engineering Administration degree from George Washington University.

2-13

Mr. and Mrs. Wilson live children.

in LaPlata, Maryland.

They have two

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARDPANEL CHAIRMEN SEYMOUR C. HIMMEL NASALewis Research Center Dr. SeymourC. Himmel, Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles, Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, heads the Design Panel of the Apollo 13 Review Board. tist. Dr. Himmel joined Lewis in 1948 as an aeronautical research scienHe has occupied supervisory positions since 1953.

He has been awarded the NASA Exceptional Service Medal and the NASA Group Achievement Award as manager of the Agena Project Group. Dr. Himmel has served on a number of advisory committees. He is an Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member of Tau Beta Pi and Pi Tau Sigma. He is the author of more than 25 technical papers. Dr. Himmel has a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from the College of the City of NewYork and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from Case Institute of Technology. Dr. and Mrs. Himmel live in Lakewood, Ohio.

EDWIN C. KILGORE NASA Langley Research Center Edwin C. Kilgore, 47, Deputy Chief, Engineering and Technical Services, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, heads the Project Management Panel of the Apollo 15 Review Board. Mr. Kilgore joined the Langley science staff in 1944 and served in a variety of technical and management positions until promotion to his present position in 1968. He has received the Honorary Group Achievement Award for his role in achieving a record of 97 consecutive successes for solid propellant rocket motors and the NASA-LunarOrbiter Project Group Achievement Award for outstanding performance. He is a memberof Pi Tau Sigma, honorary mechanical engineering society.

2-1h

Mr. Virginia neering. Mr.

Kilgore was Polytechnic

born in Coeburn, Virginia. He was graduated from Institute with a B.S. degree in mechanical engi-

and

Mrs.

Kilgore

and

their

two

daughters

live

in

Hampton.

HARRIS California Institute of

M.

SCHURMEIER Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Technology

Harris M. Schurmeier, 45, Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects, California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California, heads the Manufacturing and Test Panel of the Apollo 13 Review Board. Mr. Schurmeier was appointed to his to that he was Mariner Mars 1969 Project Manager and Deputy Manager of the Voyager Manager at JPL. He has received and Exceptional Engineer the NASA Service. and current position in 1969. Prior Manager, Voyager Capsule System Project, and Ranger Project

ment

Medals for Exceptional Scientific In addition, he has received the NASA Public Service Award.

AchieveAstro-

nautics

Award,

the

He was born in St. Paul, Minnesota. He has received a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering, M.S. degree in aeronautical engineering, and a professional degree in aeronautical engineering from the California Institute of Technology. Mr. wife and Schurmeier four was a naval live officer in World War II. He and his

children

in Altadena,

California.

FRANCIS NASA

B.

SMITH

Headquarters

Francis B. Smith, 47, Assistant NASA Headquarters, is leader of the Review Board. Mr. Smith has been in his

Administrator Mission Events

for University Affairs, Panel of the Apollo 13

present

position Langley Langley

since

1967.

Prior

to

that he had been Assistant Virginia, since 1964. He is an expert in tronic tracking several systems,

Director, joined the

Research science

Center, Hampton, staff in 1947. He elec-

fields, including and missile and

radio telemetry, radar, range instrumentation.

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Mr. Smith was born in Piedmont, South Carolina, and received a B.S. degree in electrical engineering from the University of South Carolina, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He remained at the University as an instructor from 1943 to 1944 and then served in the U.S. Navy until 1946. Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their three children live in Reston, Virginia.

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PART

3.

BOARD

ORGANIZATION

AND

GENERAL

ASSIGNMENTS

FOR

BOARD

PANELS

BOARD

ORGANIZATION

After reviewing the scope of the Board's charter, the Chairman and Board Members agreed upon the Panel and Support Office structure depicted on the following organization chart. Each Panel was assigned specific responsibilities for reviewing major elements of the overall Board task, with particular emphasis technical data base upon tions by the Board could dividual NASA specialists Manned Space Flight line areas. upon establishing a sound and independent which findings, determinations, and recommendabe based. The Panels were staffed with inand established working arrangements with organization personnel working in analogous the

The Board's support offices were structured to provide necessary staff, logistics, and administrative support without duplication of available MSC assistance. In addition to this structure, the Board special assistance of expert consultants. and Panels also utilized

the

Panel assignments, complete Panel membership, organization approved by the Chairman are included Board report.

and the in this

official part of

Board the

2-17

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD E. M. CORTRIGHTo
OBSERVERS W. C. D. A. ANDERS

CHAIRMAN V.L. JOHNSON M. KLEIN H.M. MARK
CONSULTANTS

R. F. ALLNUTT N. A. ARMSTRONG J. F. CLARK
t ................. JR.

HARRINGTON I. I. PINKEL WILSON,

W. R.

D. VAN

ERICKSON OOLAH

J. E.

W. R. HEDRICK

I-in
TECHNICAL C, W. MATHEWS

I

I
COUNSEL

I
SECRETARIAT

I
EDITORIAL GROUP I

I
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

I

SUPPORT

G.

T.

MALLEY

E.

P.

SWIEDA

R.

G.

ROMATOWSKI

B.

M.

DUFF

I
I

G.

LEG,SLAT,VE I
AFFAIRS J. MOSS NGHOFF

r
MISSION F. B.

I
& EVENTS SMITH I H. M.

I
MANUFACTURING TEST S. C.

I
DESIGN

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

SCHURMEIER

HIMMEL

E. C.

KILGORE

ro i (Do
PRE-INCIDENT EVENTS ACCEPTANCE TESTING & ] W. FABRICATION E. F. BAEHR EVALUATION R. N. LINDLEY DESIGN F. BROWN, I JR. R. M. J. B. D. H. GINTER MEAD

I I

J.

J. WILLIAMS

WHITTEN

]

INCIDENT

EVENTS SYSTEM TESTING SUBSYSTEM & K. L. HEIMBURG I

&

MECHANISMS MODES LUCAS I

T.

B.

BALLARD

FAILURE W. R.

POST

INCIDENT EVENTS t QUALITY ASSURANCE &

ELECTRICAL

M.

P.

FRANK

RELIABILITY B. T. MORRIS

R.

C.

WELLS APPROVED E. M. CORTIIGHT

RELATED

SYSTEMS

J. F.

SAUNDERS,

JR.

APOLLO

15 REVIEW

BOARD

ORGANIZATION

GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS (AS DOCUMENTED IN THE BOARD'S Panel It shall be the task i - Mission of the

FOR BOARD PANELS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES) Events Panel Panel to provide a de-

Mission

Events

tailed and accurate chronology of all pertinent events and actions leading to, during, and subsequent to the Apollo 13 incident. This information, in narrative and graphical time history form, will provide the Apollo 13 Review Board an official events record on which their analysis and conclusions may be based. This record will be published in a form suitable for inclusion in the Review Board's official report. The Panel will report all significant events derived from telemetry

records, air-to-ground communications transcripts, crew and control center observations, and appropriate documents such as the flight plan, mission technique description, Apollo Operation Handbook, and crew checklists. Correlation between various events and other observations related to the failure will be noted. Where telemetry data are referenced, the Panel will comment as appropriate on its significance, reliability, accuracy, and on spacecraft conditions which might have generated the data. The chronology will consist of three major sections: Preincident Events, Incident Events, and Postincident Events. The decision-making process leading to the safe recovery, referencing the relevant contingency plans and available alternates, will be included. Preincident Events. - This section will chronicle the progress of flight from the countdown to the time of the incident. All action data relevant to the subsequent incident will be included. Incident ginning at as abnormal Events. - This section will cover that period of time so belong

the and

55 hours and 52 minutes after lift-off and continuing system behavior is relevant to the failure. Events. - This section will document the events

Postincident

and

activities subsequent to the incident and continuing to mission termination (Splash). Emphasis will be placed on the rationale used on mission completion strategy.

Panel Mr. F. B. Assistant Smith, Panel Administrator

i Membership

Chairman for University

Affairs

NASA Headquarters Washington, D. C.

2-19

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Dr:

Tom

B.

Ballard

Aerospace Technologist Flight Instrument Division Langley Hampton, Mr. M. Research Virginia P. Frank Center

Flight

Director

Flight Control Division Manned Spacecraft Center Houston, Texas Mr. John J. Williams Operations

Director, Spacecraft Kennedy Space Center Florida Mr. Nell Armstrong, As t r on aut Manned Spacecraft Houston, Texas

Board Center

Member

and

Panel

Monitor

Panel

2 - Manufacturing

and

Test

Panel

The Manufacturing and Test Panel shall review the manufacturing and testing, including the associated reliability and quality assurance activities, of the flight hardware components involved in the flight failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the analysis of the design. The purpose of this review is to ascertain the adequacy of the manufacturing procedures, including any modifications, and the preflight test and checkout program, and any possible correlation of these activities with the inflight events. The Panel shall consist of three activities:

Fabrication and Acceptance Testin6.This will consist of reviewing the fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing steps actually used during the manufacturing of the specific flight hardware elements involved. Fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing procedures and records will be reviewed, as well as observation of actual operations when appropriate. Subsystem and System Testing.This will consist of reviewing all the flight qualification testing from the completion of the componentlevel acceptance testing up through the countdown to lift-off for the specific hardware involved. Test procedures and results will be reviewed

2-20

.- as well as observing specific tests where appropriate. Results of tests on other serial number units will also be reviewed when appropriate.
Reliability and quality Assurance.This will be an overview of both the manufacturing and testing, covering such things as parts and material qualification and control, assembly and testing procedures, and inspection and problem/failure reporting and closeout.

Panel Mr. Harris M. Schurmeier, Panel

2 Membership Chairman for Flight Projects

Deputy Assistant Laboratory Jet Propulsion Laboratory Pasadena, California Mr. Edward F. Baehr

Director

Assistant Chief, Launch Vehicles Deputy Manager, Titan Project Lewis Research Center Cleveland, Ohio

Division

Mr. Karl L. Heimburg Director, Astronautics Marshall Space Flight Huntsville, Alabama Mr. Brooks T. Morris

Laboratory Center

Manager, Quality Assurance Jet Propulsion Laboratory Pasadena, California Dr. John Director F. Clark, Board

and

Reliability

Office

Member

and

Panel

Monitor

Goddard Space Flight Greenbelt, Maryland

Center

Panel

3 - Design

Panel

ciated After

The Design Panel shall examine the design of the oxygen and assosystems to the extent necessary to support the theory of failure. such review the Panel shall indicate a course of corrective action and/or refor review

which shall include requirements for further investigations design. In addition, the Panel shall establish requirements of other Apollo spacecraft systems of similar design.

2-21

.-

The Panel shall consist of four subdivisions:
Design Evaluation.This activity shall review the requirements and

specifications governing the design of the systems, subsystems and components, their derivation, changes thereto and the reasons therefor; and the design of the system in response to the requirements, including such elements as design approach, material selection, stress analysis, development and qualification test programs, and results. This activity shall also review and evaluate proposed design modifications, including changes in operating Modes procedures and required This by such modifications. shall review the design

Failure

Mechanisms.-

activity

of the systems to ascertain the possible sources of failure and the m_mer in which failures may occur. In this process, they shall attempt to correlate such modes with the evidence from flight and ground test data. This shall include considerations such as: energy sources, materials compatibility, nature of pressure vessel failure, effects of environment and service, the service history of any suspect systems and components, and any degradation that may have occurred. Electrical.This activity shall review the design of all electrical components associated with the theory of failure to ascertain their adequacy. This activity shall also review and evaluate proposed design modifications, including changes in operating procedures required by such modi fi c ati ons. Related Systems .- This activity shall review the design of all systems similar to that involved in the Apollo 13 incident with the view to establishing any commonality of design that may indicate a need for redesign. They shall also consider the possibility of design modifications to permit damage containment in the event of a failure.

Panel Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Assistant Director for Lewis Research Center Cleveland, Mr. William Ohio F. Brown, Jr.

3 Membership

Panel Chairman Rockets and Vehicles

Chief, Strength of Materials Branch Materials and Structures Division Administration Lewis Research Cleveland, Ohio Directorate Center

2-22

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Mr. R. N. Lindley Special Assistant NASA Headquarters Washington, Dr. William D. R. C.

to

the

Associate

Administrator

for

Manned

Space

Flight

Lucas Development Center

Director,

Program

Marshall Space Flight Huntsville, Alabama

Mr. J. F. Saunders, Jr. Project Officer for Command and Office of Manned Space Flight NASA He adquarters Washington, D. C. Mr. Robert C. Wells Systems

Service

Module

Head, Electric Flight Vehicles Branch

Section

Flight Vehicles and Systems Division Office of Engineering and Technical Langley Research Center Hampton, Virginia Mr. Vincent L. Johnson, Board Member

Services

and

Panel

Monitor

Deputy Associate Administrator for Engineering Office of Space Science and Applications NASA Headquarters Washington, D. C.

Panel The I. Project Review

4 - Project Panel the

Management will

Panel the following management tasks: struc-

Management and assess

undertake

effectiveness

of the

ture employed in Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13 incident. This review will encompass the organization, the responsibilities of organizational elements, and the adequacy of the staffing. 2. Review and assess the effectiveness employed on Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent This task will include the management systems of the management systems to the Apollo 13 incident. employed to control the

appropriate design, manufacturing, and test operations; the processes used to assure adequate communications between organizational elements; the processes used to control hardware and functional interfaces; the safety processes involved; and protective security.

2-23

3. Review the project management lessons learned from the Apollo 13 mission from the standpoint of their applicability to subsequent Apollo missions. Tasks i and 2, above, should encompassboth the general review of the processes used in Apollo 13 and specific applicability to the possible cause or causes of the mission incident as identified by the Board. Panel 4 Membership E. C. Kilgore, Panel Chairman Deputy Chief, Office of Engineering and Technical Services Langley Research Center Hampton, Virginia R. D. Ginter Director of Special Programs Office Office of AdvancedResearch and Technology NASA Headquarters Washington, D.C. Merrill H. Mead Chief of Programs and Resources Office AmesResearch Center Moffett Field, California JamesB. Whitten Assistant Chief, Aeronautical Langley Research Center Hampton, Virginia and Space Mechanics Division

Milton Klein, Board Memberand Panel Monitor Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office Washington, D.C. Board Observers William A. Anders Executive Secretary National Aeronautics and Space Council Washington, D.C. Dr. Charles D. Harrington Chairman NASAAerospace Safety Advisory Panel Washington, D.C.

2-24

I. Irving Pinkel Director Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute Lewis Research Center Cleveland, Ohio Mr. JamesE. Wilson Technical Consultant to the Committeeon Science and Astronautics United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. Apollo 13 Review Board Support Staff Brian M. Duff Public Affairs Officer MannedSpacecraft Center Houston, Texas Gerald J. Mossinghoff Director of Congressional Liaison NASA Headquarters Washington, D.C. Edward F. Parry Counsel to Office of MannedSpaceFlight NASAHeadquarters Washington, D.C. Raymond G. Romatowski Deputy Assistant Director Langley Research Center Hampton, Virginia for Administration

Ernest P. Swieda Deputy Chief, Skylab Program Control Office Kennedy Space Center, Florida Consultants to the Board Dr. WayneD. Erickson, Head Aerothermochemistry Branch Langley Research Center Hampton, Virginia Dr. Robert Van Dolah Acting Research Director Safety Research Center Bureau of Mines Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

2-25

MSC Support to the Board These persons were detailed by MSC to support the Apollo 13 Review Board during its review activity at MSC. They are identified by MSC position title. Roy C. Aldridge Assistant to the Director Mary Chandler Secretary Rex Cline Technical Writer/Editor Evon Collins Program Analyst Leroy Cotton Equipment Specialist MaureenCruz Travel Clerk Janet Harris Clerk Stenographer Marjorie Harrison Secretary Phyllis Hayes Secretary William N. Henderson Management Analyst Sharon Laws Secretary Carolyn Lisenbee Secretary Judy Miller Secretary of Administration Jamie Moon Technical Editor Dorothy Newberry Administrative Assistant Lettie Reed Editorial Assistant Charlene Rogozinski Secretary Joanne Sanchez Secretary Billie Schmidt Employee Development Specialist Frances Smith Secretary George Sowers Management Presentations Officer Elaine Stemerick Secretary Mary Thompson Administrative Assistant Alvin C. Zuehlke Electrical Engineer

2-26

PART

4.

SUMMARY

OF BOARD

ACTIVITIES

APRIL

19,

1970

Chairman E. M. Cortright met with Langley officials the Apollo 13 Review Board approach. Tentative list of other specialists were developed for consideration.

to begin planning Panel Members and

APRIL

20,

1970

Chairman trator, and membership.

Cortright key NASA

met

with in

the

NASA

Administrator, D.C., to

Deputy discuss

AdminisBoard

officials

Washington,

cials zation Review

The Chairman met with while enroute to MSC plans Board for review activity. of

NASA Office of Manned Space Flight top on NASA aircraft and discussed program the accident, and coordination with

offiorgani13

Apollo

APRIL

21,

1970

Chairman Review Board A formal officials and

Cortright support. MSC

met

with

MSC

officials

to discuss

Apollo

13

debriefing 13 Review

of

the Board

Apollo

13

crew

was

conducted at MSC. Review

for

MSC

Apollo

personnel arrivals

already on the

Detailed

discussions

between

early

Board

and

the MSC Investigation Team were held to provide quick-look Apollo 13 accident and to develop detailed procedures for the Apollo 13 Board. Chairman Cortright met with members activity of the Board and to inform them current on Board activities. The first meeting of the Board was of the Press of plans for

data on the MSC support of

to report on early keeping the Press

held

at

8 p.m.

to discuss

Board

composition, structure, assignments, and scope of review. plans were developed for appointing various specialists to Board in its analysis and evaluation.

Preliminary assist the

2-27

APRIL 22, 1970 The Board met with Colonel McDivitt's MSCInvestigation Teamto review the progress madeby MSCin identifying causes of the accident and in developing an understanding of sequences and relationships between known inflight events. In addition, MSC officials briefed the Board on MSCInvestigation Teamstructure and assignments. The Board met with Panel i of the MSCInvestigation Teamfor detailed discussion of inflight events and consideration of early conclusions on implications of preliminary data analysis. The Board held its second meeting to discuss MSCinvestigative efforts and additional appointments of Panel specialists. Board membersattended Panel i evening roundup of day's evaluation activities, _nich included detailed discussions of specific studies, data reductions, and support test activities already underway. APRIL 23, 1970 The Apollo 13 Review Board established itself in proximity to the MSCInvestigation Teamin Building 45, and arranged for all administrative and logistics support to the Board. A daily schedule of meetings, reviews, briefings, and discussions was established, including preliminary plans for contractor meetings, special support tests, and accumulation of accident-related information. Initial task assignments and responsibilities were madeto Board Panels as guidance for detailed review work. Individual Board members were assigned Panel overview responsibilities or other special tasks. Administrative procedures were developed for Board activity, ticularly to provide efficient interface with MSC personnel. par-

Board and Panel Membersagain met with MSCofficials to further review the sequence of events in the Apollo 13 mission and to examine early hypotheses concerning causes of these events. The Board convened for an evening meeting to discuss the progress to date and to coordinate Panel activities for the next few days. Discussion centered upon immediate requirements for data collection and analysis. Chairman Cortright appointed additional bring Panels up to strength. NASAspecialists in order to

2-28

APRIL

24,

1970

Board

Members,

Panel

Chairmen,

and

MSC

officials

reviewed

additional empha-

data analysis sis upon the The Board

made by MSC and contractor personnel service module (SM) cryogenic system. convened and reviewed the progress

with

particular

to

date.

Tentative

approvals were given for Board trips to North American Downey, California, Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, tions. Chairman Panel Cortright and briefed Members the Press on progress their

Rockwell (NR), and other loca-

to

date. analysis data of

Chairmen

continued mission

detailed and other

failure modes, test upon the accident.

histories,

events,

bearing

NR's genic

Board Members and Panel Chairmen met with activities involving design, qualification, oxygen tanks.

Mr. Norman Ryker of NR on and tests of SM cryo-

APRIL

25,

1970

The Board service module tions. Panels analyzed at

met to discuss details (CSM) flight hardware

of onsite inspections at principal contractor

of command installa-

examined in that time.

detail

probable

failure

modes

based

on data

Specific plans were discussed by the Board of oxygen tank assembly and checkout operations, component histories. The MSC Investigation Team members briefed Kennedy Space Center checkout operations of the and electric power systems, including a detailed tank detanking operations.

relating to evaluation including review of

Board personnel on service module cryogenic briefing covering oxygen

APRIL

26,

1970

for

Board and Panel Members detailed briefings by NR

traveled engineers

to North American and management.

Rockwell, Downey, NR reviewed its

2-29

L

progress in a review of assemblies,

an intensive analysis of the Apollo 13 malfunction, including approved special tests. Oxygen tank, fuel cell components, and other hardware were also inspected.

APRIL

27,

1970

An Executive analyses required and service module Additional briefings data. by MSC

Session of the Board met to discuss to verify tentative conclusions on EPS failure. specialists Board arrived on at MSC and

progress of specific oxygen tank failure

Board and

received of

detailed the Apollo 13

personnel

selected

aspects

Panel Members received and assessed a preliminary the Apollo 13 accident, including tentative conclusions probable failure modes. Procedures were established of review to Board observers. to provide information

MSC on

evaluation the most

of

flow

on

the

status

The Board reviewed work established review priorities

plans for the coming week with and special task assignments.

each

Panel

and

APRIL

28,

!970

Chairman Cortright outlined a plan for the Board's preliminary report scheduled for presentation to the Deputy Administrator during his visit to MSC on May i. Each Panel Chairman was to summarize the status of his Panel's activities for Dr. George Low on Friday, April 29, 1970.

Board the

Board Member Neil Member and Panel Apollo 13 inflight

Armstrong Chairman accident

completed arrangements to provide each an opportunity for detailed simulation of using MSC's CSM simulation equipment. the

Apollo

Board and Panel Members 13 service module at

reviewed enhanced the MSC Photographic

photographs of Laboratory. briefed Board

Dr. yon Elbe of Atlantic Research Company Members on cryogenics and combustion phenomena. A representative inspection at of the Manufacturing and Beech Aircraft, Boulder.

and

Panel

Test

Panel

performed

an

onsite

2-30

Manufacture and Test Panel personnel reviewed detanking procedures followed at KSCduring the Apollo 13 countdowndemonstration test (CDDT). Board and Panel personnel reviewed progress to date at a general Board meeting involving all Review Board personnel. APRIL 29, 1970 Dr. Charles Harrington, Board Observer and Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, arrived for a 2-day detailed review of Board procedures and progress in the accident review. The Board reviewed North American Rockwell preliminary tions involving oxygen tank redesign. recommenda-

The Board continued to review and examine oxygen tank ignition sources and combustion propagation processes with specialists from MSC, other NASA Centers, and contractor personnel. The Mission Events Panel continued to examine and record details of all significant mission events as a basis for other Panel evaluations and study. Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review Panel progress to date and to discuss work plans for the next several days. The Project Management Panel visited North American Rockwell at Downeyto review detailed procedures for acceptance tests, subcontractor inspections, project documentation, and other management interface areas. APRIL 30, 1970 The Safety Advisory Panel continued discussions with Board Chairman and MSCofficials on progress of total Apollo 13 review efforts. Panel Membersreviewed instrumentation used in Apollo 13 spacecraft in order to establish the validity of telemetry data being used in Board analysis. Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review progress of the work and to discuss preliminary findings of the Board. Project Management personnel visited BeechAircraft Corporation to review procedures used for assembly of cryogenic oxygen tanks and to discuss communication and information systems within the Apollo Program.

Panels continued to review detailed data in their MAYi_ 1970

respective

areas.

Board and Panel personnel participated in a joint MSC/Apo!!o 13 Review Board status presentation to the NASA Deputy Administrator. The meeting covered all significant Apollo 13 findings and early conclusions on the cause of the accident and appropriate remedial actions. The MSCstaff briefed Board Memberson initial posed design changes in oxygen tank system. evaluations of pro-

Panel Memberscontinued to assess data accumulated from the Apollo 13 mission with particular emphasis upon the design and performance of electric power systems used in the service module. Board Membersand Panel Chairmenreviewed specific test matrix being proposed by Apo!lo 13 Review Board specialists covering most significant unknownsinvolved in understanding failure mechanisms. MAY2, 1970 Board Membersmet in General Session to discuss preparation of a complete "failure tree" as an additional guide in conducting a complete review and investigation. Specific aspects of this approach were reviewed. The Project Management Panel reviewed oxygen tank reliability history and quality assurance criteria used in assembly, test, and checkout of these systems. Panel specialists continued reviewing data from the mission with emphasis upon integrating various data points into logical failure mode patterns established by MSCand Board personnel. MAY3, 1970 Chairman Cortright and Board Membersconducted a detailed review of individual Panel status and progress and established milestones for additional analytical work and preparation of preliminary findings. The Board and Panel agreed to tentative report structure, including required exhibits, tables, drawings, and other reference data.

2-32

The Board established a system for tabulating all significant mission events and explanatory data, including the support tests required to clarify questions raised by events. Panel Membersworked on individual analyses with particular attention to developing requirements for additional test activity in support of tentative conclusions. The Board agreed to strengthen its technical reviews of combustion propagation and electrical design by adding specialists in these areas. MAY4, 1970 The Design Panel continued its intensive review of the "shelf drop" incident at NRinvolving the cryogenic oxygen flight tank used in Apollo 13 in order to understand possible results of this event. The Mission Events Panel continued to analyze telemetry data received by MSC,with particular attention on data received in proximity to the data dropout period during the Apollo 13 mission and on fan turnons during the flight. The Board transmitted a formal listing of 62 requests for data, analyses, and support tests required for Board re_iew activity. The Board continued to meet with individual Panels and support offices to review the status of preliminary findings and work completed. MAY5, 1970 The Board met in General Session to discuss the scope and conduct of support test activity, including careful documentation of test methods and application of test results. MSCpersonnel briefed Panel Memberson availability of additional telemetry data in the MSCdata bank in order to insure Board consideration of all possible useful data. Panels commenced initial drafting of preliminary findings in specific areas, including summarydescriptions of system performance during the Apollo 13 flight. The Board met with the MSCInvestigation the proposed test program. Teamfor complete review of

2-33

.

MAY6, 1970

Board Members,MSC personnel_ and Membersof NASA'sAerospace Safety Advisory Panel met for detailed discussions and evaluation of accident review status and progress. The review covered oxygen tank questions, recovery operations, and a mission simulation by MSCastronauts. Panel Memberscontinued to work on the preparation Panel drafts. Chairman Cortright transmitted additional and modified procedures for control of overall the Apollo 13 accident. MAY7, 1970 The General Board Session reviewed complete analysis and test support activities being conducted for the Board and MSCat various governmental and contractor installations. Board and Panel Membersmet to discuss Ameslaboratory tests concerning liquid oxygen combustion initiation energies required in the cryogenic oxygen tank used in the Apollo 13 SM. Panel i Membersreviewed mission control equipment and operating procedures used during the Apollo 13 mission and reviewed actual mission events in detail. The Panels continued to develop preliminary and analyses for consideration by the Board. MAY8, 1970 Dr. Robert Van Dolah, Bureau of Mines, joined the Board as a consultant on combustion propagation and reviewed Apollo 13 Review Board data developed to date. The General Board Session convened to review proposed report format and scope. An agreement was reached on appendices, on the structure of the report, and on the degree of detail to be included in individual Panel reports. Chairman Cortright assigned additional specific test overview responsibilities to membersof the Apollo 13 Review activity. drafts of their reviews of preliminary

requests for tests to MSC test activity relating to

2-34

Panel 1 conducted a formal interview with the MSCFlight Director covering all significant mission events from the standpoint of ground controllers. Panels 2 through 4 continued developing preliminary reports. Panel 4 announceda formal schedule of interviews of MSC,contractors, and NASA Headquarters personnel. Board Membersexplored in detail possible failure modesequences developed by MSC personnel involving ignition and combustion within the SMcryogenic oxygen tank. The Board recessed for 3 days, leaving a cadre of personnel at MSC to edit preliminary drafts developed by the Panels and to schedule further activity for the week of May ll. MAY9, 1970 Board in recess. MAYi0, 1970 Board in recess. MAYii, 1970

Board in recess. MSC support personnel continued work obtaining additional technical data for Board review. MAY12, 1970 Board Membersreturned to MSC. Board Membersattended a General Session to review progress and status of the report. Panel Chairmenreported on individual progress of work and established schedules for completion of analyses and evaluations. Chairman Cortright reported on the Langley Research Center support test program aimed at simulation of SMpanel ejection energy pulses.

2-35

MAY13, 1970 Board Membersreviewed preliminary drafts of report chapter on Review and Analysis and Panel i report on Mission Events. Mission Events Panel Membersinterviewed Electrical, Electronic, and CommunicationsEngineer (EECOM) and one of the Apollo 13 Flight Directors on activities which took place in the Mission Control Center (MCC)during and after the flight accident period. Panel 4, Project Management Panel, conducted interviews with principal Apollo 13 program personnel from MSC and contract organizations. Panel Memberscontinued drafting ports for review by the Board. preliminary versions of Panel re-

Manufacturing and Test Panel representatives discussed program for oxygen tank testing to be conducted at Beech Aircraft. Board Membersmet in General Session to review report milestones and required test data for the week ahead. MAY14, 1970 Board met in General Session to review Panel report progress and to agree to firm schedules for completion of all Review Board assignments. Project Management Panel continued to interview key Apollo project personnel from NASACenters and contractors. Panel Memberscirculated first Membersfor review and correction. drafts of all Panel reports to Board

MAY15, 1970 Mission Events Panel personnel interviewed Apollo 13 Command Module Pilot John Swigert to verify event chronology compiled by the Panel and to review crew responses during Apollo 13 mission. Project Management Panel continued interviewing with NASA Centers and contractors. key project personnel

2-36

MSC personnel provide Board Members and Panel Chairmen with tailed briefing on all support tests and analyses being performed connection with the MSC and Board reviews. Board Members met in Executive Session to review and preliminary to provide

a dein

drafts additional

of Panel reports instructions and Panel compile Members

and findings guidance to continued data in

and determinations Panel Chairmen. to review of and edit

early

Panel

drafts

and

to

reference

support

findings.

MAY

16,

1970

Board

met

in

General

Session

to and

review to

further

revisions working

of prelimifor

nary findings and completion of the Panel discussions tation.

determinations Board report.

establish

schedules

Members continued to edit and refine Panel reports with MSC personnel and further analysis of Apollo

on basis of 13 documen-

MAY

17,

1970

Draft material for all Members and staff. Changes recirculated for additional Board to examine at various

parts of Board report was reviewed by Panel were incorporated in all draft material and review and comment.

Members met in General Session to review report progress and results from recent support tests and analyses being conducted Government and contractor installations. Board to MSC discussed following a continuing presentation series of of report support and re-

The Apollo 13 Review tests for recommendation cess of the Board.

MAY

18,

1970

report

Board and

Members examined met and

reviewed results

Special Tests and Analyses of completed tests. Session to of Board discuss report. control

Appendix

of

the

Board production

in General distribution

procedures

for

re-

2-37

Mission Events Panel distributed review by Board Members.

a final

draft of their report for

Board reviewed a preliminary draft of findings and determinations prepared by Panel Chairmen, Board Members, and Board Chairman. A Manufacture and Test Panel representative tank test programs at Beech Aircraft. MAY19, 1970 Board Membersmet in Executive Session to continue evaluation and assessment of preliminary findings, determinations, and recommendations prepared by individual Board Membersand Panel Chairmen. Board met in General Session to review final Panel report.
Board Manufacture and Test Panel preliminary Members for review and comment. Design and Panel preliminary comment. Members support met for report was report

reviewed special oxygen

draft of Mission Events
was distributed to

distributed

to Board

Members

for

review

test

Design Panel and analyses

with MSC Team the Board.

officials

to

discuss

further

MAY

20,

1970

from

Board Members met in Executive the Design Panel and from the Project Members

Session to Manufacturing final

review and and Test draft of

evaluate Panel. its report

reports

Board

Management Panel distributed for review and comment.

to

Chairman Cortright met withMr. Advisory Panel to discuss progress

of

Bruce Lundin of the Aerospace Board review and analysis.

Safety

MAY

21,

1970

Board Management

Members met in Executive Panel report.

Session

for

final

review

of Project

2-38

Board Membersand others met with MSCofficials to review in detail the activities and actions taken after the Apollo 204 accident concerning ignition flammability for materials and control in the CSM. A third draft of preliminary findings, determinations_ and recommendations was developed and circulated by the Chairmanfor review and comment. Arrangements were madewith NASA Headquarters officials for packaging, delivery, and distribution of the Board's final report. Mission Events Panel conducted an interview with Lunar Module Pilot Haise to review selected mission events bearing on the accident. MAY22, 1970 Mission Events Panel representatives met with MSC officials to review in detail several events which occurred during later flight stages. Board met in Executive Session to assess latest drafts of findings, determinations, and recommendations circulated by the Chairman. Board met in General Session to review total progress in all report areas and to establish final schedule for preparation of Board report. Langley Research Center representative M. Ellis briefed the Board on ignition and combustion of materials in oxygen atmosphere tests being conducted in support of the Apollo 13 Review. Board Observer I. I. Pinkel briefed the Board on Lewis Research Center fire propagation tests involving Teflon. MAY23, !970 Board Membersreviewed Chapter 4 of Board report entitled and Analysis." Panel Chairmen reviewed draft findings by the Board. "Review

and determinations prepared

2-39

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MAY

24,

1970

Apollo

Board Members activities

reviewed NASA Aerospace Safety during the period of 1968-69.

Panel

report

covering

Board met in Executive Session for status and progress and of documentation activity. Board met in Executive and Sessicn for

detailed review describing the

of support results of

test test

further

review

of

findings,

determinations,

recommendations.

MAY

25,

1970

Board met in Executive Session to review test progress to postpone submittal of final report until June 8 in order results of Langley Research Center panel ejection tests. Board and Members refine continued Apollo 13

and decided to consider

drafts

to review MSC Investigation Team preliminary data in the various Board appendices. for further consideration of findings,

Board met determinations,

in Executive Session and recommendations.

MAY

26,

1970

Board regarding

met crew

in

General

Session of

and

interviewed accident. tank

Astronaut

James

Lovell

understanding

inflight MSC

to

Board Members test methodology Panel Members

reviewed proposed and objectives. continued

combustion

test

and

agreed

preparation

of

individual

Panel

reports.

MAY

27,

1970

switch

Board and failure

Panel Members received during MSC heater tube

a detailed temperature

briefing tests.

on

thermostatic

Aerospace Safety Advisory Members, and Panel Chairmen to findings and conclusions.

Panel met with Chairman Cortright, Board review Board progress and status of

2-40

Board met in General Session to review status of Panel reports, documentation of test data and results, and plans for report typing and review. Board agreed to recess for several days to accumulate additional test information on panel separation and full scale tank ignition data. MAY28, 1970 Board in recess. _Y 29, 1970 Board in recess. MAY30, 1970 Board in recess. MAY31, 1970 Board in recess. JUNEi, Board Membersreturned to MSC. Board and Panel Membersmet in General Session to discuss revisions of Panel reports in light of latest information regarding thermostatic switch failure during CDDT at KSC. Board approved new schedule for Board report calling versions of Panel reports by Monday, June 8. for final 1970

2-41

JUNE2, 1970 Chairman Cortright work and future plans. briefed the Press on the status of the Board's

Board and Panel Membersparticipated in a detailed interview and discussion with MSCand contractor personnel regarding specific coordination steps taken during oxygen tank no. 2 detanking operations at KSC. Board Members met in Executive Session to review latest and to assess status of Board findings and determinations. JUNE3, 1970 Board and Panel Membersmet with MSCProgram Office personnel for a detailed update of recent MSCinformation and analyses stemming from ongoing test programs. Board Membersand Panel Chairmen completed final reviews of Panel reports and also reviewed final draft of findings, determinations, and recommendations. Board and Panel Membersreceived a detailed briefing on thermostatic switch questions with emphasis upon actions of various organizations during and after detanking operations at KSC. JUNE4, 1970 Board Membersmet in Executive Session and completed final of Chapter 4 of the Board summary. Board and Panel Memberswitnessed a special full-scale test performed at MSC. Panel Chairmen completed final revisions of individual and submitted copy to the Reports Editorial Office. revisions test results

tank ignition Panel reports

Board met in Executive Session and agreed to final schedule for report printing and delivery to the Administrator on June 15, 1970.

2-42

Board Members ter 5 of the Board mendations). Board and

JUNE5,

1970

met in Executive Session Summary Report (Findings,

and completed work on ChapDeterminations, and Recom-

report

Members reviewed final version authorized printing as Appendix

of Project E. final

Management

Panel

Board Members support activities

Hedrick and Mark completed performed for the Board.

tabulation

of

test

at

Board various

Members reviewed NASA Centers.

films

of

special

test

activities

performed

JUNE

6,

1970

Board met in Executive its review of Chapter 5 of Recommendations).

Session throughout the day and completed its report (Findings, Determinations, and

Board Members Appendix F, Special

completed review of Tests and Analyses.

analyses

to

be

incorporated

in

JUNE

7,

1970

for

The Board met final editorial

in Executive review and

Session and approved plans and publication of the Board report.

schedules

Board report

The Chairman recessed the is scheduled to reconvene to the NASA Administrator

Board until June 15 at which time the in Washington, D.C., to present its and Deputy Administrator.

2-43

This page left

blank intentionally.

2-44

CHAPTER DESCRIPTION AND OF APOLLO MISSION

3 13 SPACE VEHICLE

SUMMARY

3-0

This chapter is extracted from Mission No. M-932-70, Revision 3, published by the Division (XP), Executive Secretariat, NASA D.C.

Operation Report Program and Special Reports Headquarters, Washington,

Discussion in this chapter is broken into two parts. Part 1 is designed to acquaint the reader with the flight hardware and with the mission monitoring, support, and control functions and capabilities. Part 2 describes the Apollo 13 mission and gives a mission sequence of events summary.

3-1

PART

i

APOLL0/SATURN

V SPACE

VEHICLE

The primary flight hardware of the Apollo Program consists of the Saturn V launch vehicle and Apollo spacecraft (fig. 3-1). Collectively, they are designated the Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle (SV). Selected major systems and subsystems of the space vehicle may be summarized as follows.

SATURN

V LAUNCH

VEHICLE

The

Saturn

V launch

vehicle

(LV)

is designed

to boost

up

to

300,000 pounds into a 105-nautical mile earth orbit and to provide for lunar payloads of over 100,000 pounds. The Saturn V LV consists of three propulsive stages (S-IC, S-II, S-IVB), two interstages, and an instrument unit (IU).

S-IC

Stage

The S-IC stage (fig. 3-2) is a large cylindrical booster, 138 feet long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant F-I rocket engines. These engines develop a nominal sea level thrust total of approximately 7,650,000 pounds. The stage dry weight is approximately 288,000 pounds and the total loaded stage weight is approximately 5,031,500 pounds. The S-IC stage interfaces structurally and electrically with the S-II stage. It also interfaces structurally, electrically, and pneumatically with ground support equipment (GSE) through two umbilical service arms, three tail service masts, and certain electronic systems by antennas. The S-IC stage is instrumented for operational measurements or signals which are transmitted by its independent telemetry system. S-II The and S-II stage 33 feet in Stage booster, propellant 81.5 J-2 feet

long

(fig. 3-3) is a large cylindrical diameter, powered by five liquid

rocket engines which develop a nominal vacuum thrust of 230,000 pounds each for a total of 1,150,000 pounds. Dry weight of the S-II stage is approximately 78,050 pounds. The stage approximate loaded gross weight is 1,075,000 pounds. The S-IC/S-II interstage weighs 10,460 pounds. The S-II stage is instrumented for operational and research and development measurements which are transmitted by its independent telemetry system. The S-II stage has structural and electrical interfaces with the S-IC and S-IVB stages, and electric, pneumatic, and fluid interfaces with GSE through its umbilicals and antennas.

3-2

Instrument unit aunch escape system S-IVB

32 ft

1
/_._Boost protective cover

Inter-stage

rS-II

363
L_ I L_J

ft Inter-stage

Commandmodule

r::.

iiiiiiiill
adapter S-IC Lunar module LAUNCH VEHICLE Spacecraft Space vehicle Launch vehicle

r:.

r..,.

Figure

5-i.-

Apollo/Saturn

V

space

vehicle.

..

FLIGHT

TERMINATION (2) INSTRUMENTATI ON .7 IN FORWARD SKIRT FT

RECEIVERS

GOX DISTRIBUTOR

HELIUM CYLINDERS LINE IN OXIDIZER TANK (4)

BAFFLE ANNULAR BAFFLES LINE TUNNELS (5) 262.4 IN INTERTANK SECTION

CENTER ENGINE SUPP(

SUCTION LINES (5) FUEL IN TANK

TUNNEL FUEL SUCTION RI NG HEAT THRUST

LOWER THRUST RIN

F-l

ENGINES

(5)
INSTRUMENTATIC RETROROCKETS HEA FLIGHT CONTROL SERVOACTUATOR

Figure

3-2.-

S-IC

stage.

3-4

T FORWARD SKI RT 11-I/2 FEET ;YSTEMS TUNNEL VEHI CLE STATION 2519 LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK (37,737 CU FT) ;EET

LH2/LOX COMMON BULKHEAD 81-I/2 FEET LIQUID (12,745.5 22 FEET OXYGEN CU FT)

AFT SKIRT ,____1 THRUST STRUCTURE 14-I/2 FEET

_[ VEHICLE STATION 1541 33 FEET _I

INTERSTAGE 18-I/4 FEET

Figure

3-3.-

S-II

stage.

3-5

S-IVB The and S-IVB stage (fig. 3-4) 21.6 feet in diameter,

Stage cylindrical booster 59 feet one J-2 engine. The S-IVB

long

is a large powered by

stage is capable of multiple engine starts. Engine thrust is 203,000 pounds. This stage is also unique in that it has an attitude control capability independent of its main engine. Dry weight of the stage is 25,050 pounds. The launch weight of the stage is 261,700 pounds. The interstage weight of 8100 pounds is not included in the stated weights. The stage is instrumented for functional measurements or signals which are transmitted by its independent telemetry system. The high performance J-2 engine as installed in the S-IVB stage has a multiple start capability. The S-IVB J-2 engine is scheduled to produce a thrust of 203,000 pounds during its first burn to earth orbit and a thrust of 178,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of 4.5:1) during the first i00 seconds of translunar injection. The remaining translunar injection acceleration is provided 203,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of 5.0:1). at a thrust The engine level valves of are

controlled by a pneumatic system powered by gaseous helium which is stored in a sphere inside a start bottle. An electrical control system that uses solid stage logic elements is used to sequence the start and shutdown operations of the engine.

Instrument

Unit

The Saturn V launch vehicle is guided from its launch pad into earth orbit primarily by navigation, guidance, and control equipment located in the instrument unit (IU). The instrument unit is a cylindrical structure 21.6 feet in diameter and 3 feet high installed on top of the S-IVB stage. The unit weighs 4310 pounds and contains measurements and telemetry_ command communications, tracking, and emergency detection system components along with supporting electrical power and the environmental control system.

APOLLO

SPACECRAFT

The Apollo spacecraft (S/C) is designed to support three men in space for periods up to 2 weeks, docking in space, landing on and returning from the lunar surface, and safely entering the earth's atmosphere. The Apollo S/C consists of the spacecraft-to-LM adapter (SLA), the service module (SM), the command module (CM), the launch escape system (LES), and the lunar module (LM). The CM and SM as a unit are referred to as the command and service module (CSM).

3-6

mlI0.2 FEET

L
FORWARD SKIRT i.-..-21.6 FEET-I_

LH2 TANK I0,418 CU FT--

44.0 FEET

LOX TANK 2830 59.0 FEET

k/

\_J_

AFT SKIRT _"/!.

_

" ]

THRUST STRUCTURE (WITH ENGINE ATTACHED)

)

_' 5.2tFEET

,

33.0 FEET

=I

19 FEET AFT INTERSTAGE

Figure

3-4.-

S-IVB

stage.

3-7

ILl N

_

E

l/

E

E

L

L

11. L.' L:

U

II

g

l:

n

L

_.

Spacecraft-to-LM

Adapter

The SLA (fig. 3-5) is a conical structure which provides a structural load path between the LV and SM and also supports the LM. Aerodynamically, the SLA smoothly encloses the irregularly shaped LM and transitions the space vehicle diameter from that of the upper stage of the LV of the SM. The SLA also encloses the nozzle of the SM engine and gain antenna. to that the high

Spring thrusters are used to separate the LM from the SLA. After the CSM has docked with the LM, mild charges are fired to release the four adapters which secure the LM in the SLA. Simultaneously, four spring thrusters mounted on the lower (fixed) SLA panels push against the LM landing gear truss assembly to separate the spacecraft from the launch vehicle.

Service The service module (SM)(fig.

Module 3-6) provides the main spacecraft pro-

pulsion and maneuvering capability during a mission. The SM provides most of the spacecraft consumables (oxygen, water, propellant, and hydrogen) and supplements environmental, electrical power, and propulsion requirements of the CM. The SM remains attached to the CM until it is jettisoned just before CM atmospheric entry.

(upper

Structure.The basic structural components are forward and aft and lower) bulkheads, six radial beams, four sector honeycomb

panels, four reaction control system honeycomb panels, aft heat shield, and a fairing. The forward and aft bulkheads cover the top and bottom of the SM. Radial beam trusses extending above the forward bulkhead support and secure the CM. The radial beams are made of solid aluminum alloy which has been machined and chem-milled to thicknesses varying between 2 inches and 0.018 inch. Three of these beams have compression pads and the other three have shear-compression pads and tension ties. Explosive charges in the center sections of these tension ties are used to separate the CM from the SM. An aft heat shield surrounds the service propulsion engine to protect the SM from the engine's heat during thrusting. The gap between the CM and the forward bulkhead of the SM is closed off with a fairing which is composed of eight electrical power system radiators alternated with eight aluminum honeycomb panels. The sector and reaction control system panels are 1 inch thick and are made of aluminum honeycomb core between two aluminum face sheets. The sector panels are bolted to the radial beams. Radiators used to dissipate heat from the environmental control subsystem are bonded to the sector panels on opposite sides of the SM. These radiators are each about 30 square feet in area.

3-8

ILl

ILl

13

L

L

1J

]2

L

"

_

L_

L

_

_-_

I
UPPER (FORWARD) 21 ' JETTISONABLE PANELS (4 PLACES) LOWER (AFT) 7' FIXED PANELS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL LINEAR-SHAPED CHARGE

LONGITUDINAL LINEAR-SHAPED (4 PLACES)

CHARGE

PYROTECHN IC THRUSTERS (4 PLACES) CIRCUMFERENTIAL LINEAR-SHAPED CHARGE THRUSTER/HINGE (4 PLACES) IU

(2)

Figure

3-5.- Spacecraft-to-LM

adapter.

3-9

RED DOCKING LIGHT SM REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM QUAD

ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM RADIATORS FLYAWAY UMBILICAL

FLOODLIGHT GREEN SCIMITAR ANT DOCKING LIGHT

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTR RADIATOR

EXTENSION

UM TANKS __RE'A OXIDIZER

TANKS FUEL TANKS

\
FORWARD BULKHEAD INSTALL, FUEL CELLS PRESSURIZATION (_ [_ I

CTION

_1
J-_

ICONTROL
ISUBSYSTEM

_QUAOS

141

OXYGEN

TANKS

HYDROGEN

TANKS

_

S-BAND

HIGH

GAIN ANTENNA

AFT BULKHEAD

12 FT 10 IN. SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR6 CENTER 2 3 4 5 _ J SECTION_ _ SERVICE OXIDIZER OXYGEN SERVICE PROPULSION TANKS TANKS, HYDROGEN

. i SUBSYSTEM

SERVICE

PROPULSION

ENGINE

TANKS,

FUEL CELLS

PROPULSION

SUBSYSTEM

FUEL TANKS SERVICE HELIUM PROPULSION TANKS ENGINE AND

Figure

3-6.-

Service

module.

3-10

ILl

ILl

[

L

L

L:

LL

L

L

I_

la

L '

_' u

E

E

-

.

-

The SM interior is divided into six sectors, or bays, and a center section. Sector one is currently void. It is available for installation of scientific or additional equipment should the need arise. Sector two has part of a space radiator and a reaction control system (RCS) engine quad (module) on its exterior panel and contains the service propulsion system (SPS) oxidizer sump tank. This tank is the larger of the two tanks that hold the oxidizer for the SPS engine. Sector three has the rest of the space radiator and another RCS engine quad on its exterior panel and contains the oxidizer storage tank. This tank is the second of two SPS oxidizer tanks and feeds the oxidizer sump tank in sector two. Sector four contains most of the electrical power generating equipment. It contains three fuel cells, two cryogenic oxygen and two cryogenic hydrogen tanks, and a power control relay box. The cryogenic tanks supply oxygen to the environmental control subsystem and oxygen and hydrogen to the fuel cells. Sector five has part of an environmental control radiator and an RCS engine quad on the exterior panel and contains the SPS engine fuel sump tank. This tank feeds the engine sector and is also connected six. Sector six has by the feed rest lines to the storage of the environmental tank in control radi-

tor and an RCS engine quad on fuel storage tank which feeds

its the

exterior and contains the SPS engine fuel sump tank in sector five. The The tanks tanks.

center section contains two helium tanks and the SPS engine. are used to provide helium pressurant for the SPS propellant

Propulsion.Main spacecraft propulsion is provided by the 20500-pound thrust SPS. The SPS engine is a restartable, non-throttleable engine which uses nitrogen tetroxide (N204) as an oxidizer and a 50-50 mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical-dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel. (These propellants are hypergolic, i.e., they burn spontaneously when combined without need for an igniter.) This engine is used for major velocity changes during the mission, such as midcourse corrections, lunar orbit insertion, transearth injection, and CSM aborts. The SPS engine responds to automatic firing commands from the guidance and navigation system or to commands from manual controls. The engine assembly is gimbal-mounted to allow engine thrust-vector alignment with the spacecraft center of mass to preclude tumbling. Thrust-vector alignment control is maintained by the crew. The SM RCS provides for maneuvering about and along three axes. Additional SM systems.In addition to the SM has communication antennas, umbilical exterior mounted lights. The four antennas the VHF steerable S-band high-gain omnidirectional antennas, the the systems already described, connections, and several on the outside of the _ are two in

antenna, mounted on the aft bulkhead; mounted on opposite sides of the module radar transponder antenna, mounted

near the top; and the SM fairing.

rendezvous

3-11

Seven lights are mounted in the aluminumpanels of the fairing. Four lights (one red, one green, and two amber) are used to aid the astronauts in docking: one is a floodlight which can be turned on to give astronauts visibility during extravehicular activities, one is a flashing beacon used to aid in rendezvous, and one is a spotlight used in rendezvous from 500 feet to docking with the LM.
SM/CM separation.Separation of the SM before entry. The sequence of events during automatically by two redundant service module located on the forward bulkhead of the SM. from the CM occurs shortly separation is controlled jettison controllers (SMJC)

Command

Module

The command module (CM) (fig. 3-7) serves as the command, control, and communications center for most of the mission. Supplemented by the SM, it provides all life support elements for three crewmen in the mission environments and for their safe return to the earth's surface. It is capable of attitude control about three axes and some lateral lift translation attachment, open ocean. at high velocities CM/LM ingress and in earth atmosphere. egress, and serves as It also a buoyant permits vessel LM in

Structure.The CM consists of two basic structures joined together: the inner structure (pressure shell) and the outer structure (heat shield). The inner structure, the pressurized crew compartment, is made of aluminum sandwich construction consisting of a welded aluminum inner skin, bonded aluminum honeycomb core, and outer face sheet. The outer structure is basically a heat shield and is made of stainless steelbrazed honeycomb brazed between steel alloy face sheets. Parts of the area between the inner and outer fibrous insulation as additional sheets are filled heat protection. with a layer of

Display and controls.The main display console (MDC) (fig. 3-8) has been arranged to provide for the expected duties of crew members. These duties fall into the categories of Commander, CM Pilot, and LM Pilot, occupying the left, center, and right couches, respectively. The CM Pilot also acts as the principal navigator. All controls have been designed so they can be trols are predominantly switches switches addition, they can operated of four by astronauts basic types: wearing gloves. toggle switches, The conrotary

with click-stops, thumb-wheels, and push buttons. Critical are guarded so that they cannot be thrown inadvertently. In some critical controls have locks that must be released before be operated.

3-12

+X

÷y

_y

,_

__<

--Z / COMBINED TUNNEL HATCH

_

ATTACHMENT (TYPICAL) AUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

_

_"._'_'E7 P,TC.

(,

ATTACH POINT

(TYPICAL)

+X

+y

-Y LEFT FORWARD COMPARTMENT HAND EQUIPMENT BAY

-X

-Z

FORWARD

COMBINED

TUNNEL

HATCH

CREW
{TYPICAL)

"

.OWER , FORWARD
" _ _ _

_OMPARTMENT

HAND

EQUIPMENT

BAY

RIGHT

HAND

EQUIPMENT

/

AFT

COMPARTMENT

AFT

COMPARTMENT

Figure

3-7.-

Command

module.

3-13

Cry°genics-

7 /

/--Service / propulsion

Audio

J

r

a C autai:nln-gr_-__.>

_

/.--Audio

control--_//_

F,'I
RCS mgmt ECS I
\ I contro/-_ 7 / Flightl

coo''o'
I......... _ i \
'

I c0_t,r__L_l I=';owre_' "k________

/ _f_'_--SCS pane" ' power I

_E

n vC_i;::ie nla i cJontr o i__

• Launch vehicle • Flight attitude • Mission • Velocity • Entry

emergency

detection

sequence change monitor

• • • • •

Propellant gauging Environment control Communications control Power distribution Caution and warning

monitor

I

_

LIJJ --':--: "--J'_-]-I Systems controls "'_JJaJJl_l

I Flight controls p. I --_l=-_,LII ,_--_ll .

ul'Irl I_

/-J71

',
• % % • • J

,"

',
• % • •S S •• • •

,"

I\

..X

_o
• I %

sx
% •

Commander

CM pilot

LM pilot

Figure

3-8.-

CM

main

display

console,

3-14

Flight controls are located on the left center and left side of the MDC, opposite the Commander. These include controls for such subsystems as stabilization and control, propulsion, crew safety, earth landing, and emergency detection. One of two guidance panels also is located here, as are velocity, indicators. The CM Pilot faces the of the flight controls, and navigation attitude, and computer altitude

many

center of the console, as well as the system

and thus controls

can reach on the right him include environand transa

side of the console. Displays and controls directly opposite reaction control, propellant management, caution and warning, mental control, and cryogenic storage systems. The rotation

lation controllers used for attitude, thrust vector, and translation maneuvers are located on the arms of two crew couches. In addition, rotation controller can be mounted at the navigation position in the lower equipment bay. Critical conditions of most spacecraft caution and warning system. A malfunction

systems are monitored by a or out-of-tolerance condition

results in illumination of a status light that identifies the abnormality. It also activates the master alarm circuit, which illuminates two master alarm lights on the MDC and one in the lower equipment bay and sends an alarm tone to the astronauts' headsets. The master alarm lights and tone continue until a crewman resets the master alarm circuit. This can be caution and malfunctions. done before the crewmen deal warning system also contains with the equipment problem indicated. to sense its own The

Lunar

Module

The lunar module (LM) (fig. 3-9) is designed to transport two men safely from the CSM, in lunar orbit, to the lunar surface, and return them to the orbiting CSM. The LM provides operational capabilities such as communications, telemetry, environmental support, transportation of scientific equipment to the lunar surface, and returning surface samples with the crew to the CSM. The lunar module consists of two stages: the ascent stage and the descent stage. The stages are attached at four fittings by explosive bolts. Separable umbilicals and hardline connections provide subsystem continuity to operate both stages as a single unit until separate ascent stage operation is desired. The LM is designed to operate for 48 hours after separation from the CSM, with a maximum lunar stay time of 44 hours. Table 3-I is a weight summary of the Apollo/Saturn 5 space vehicle for the Apollo 13 mission.

3-15

Overhead S-band steerable an Rendezvous equipment radar antenna_ S-band in-flight antenna (2) Docking light ( bay Docking window Ascent stage hatch VHF antenna EVA antenna Docking target

RCS

thrust

chamber cluster

assembly

Docking Tracking Forward I hatch ight (3) Landing gear

Forward,

Ladder

Egress platform

Descent engine skirt

Descent stage

Landing radar_ antenna

Figure

3-9.-

Lunar

module.

3-]_6

TABLE

3-I.-

APOLLO

13

WEIGHT

SUMMARY

(WEIGHT

IN POUNDS)

Stage/module

Total Inert weight expendables Total weight

Final separation weight

S-IC

288OOO 11464

4746870

5034870 11464

363403

s-lc/s-ii
interstage S-If stage

78050 8100

996960

1075010 8100

92523

S-II/S-IVB interstage S-IVB stage unit

25050 4482

236671

261721 4482

35526

Instrument

Launch

vehicle

at

ignition

6,395,647

Spacecraft-LM adapter Lunar Service Command module module module

4o44

4044

9915 10532 12572

23568 40567

33483 51099 12572

"33941 **14076 **11269 (Landing)

Launch system

escape

9012

9012

* CSM/LM separation ** CM/SM separation

3-17

" TABLE

3-1.-

APOLLO

13

WEIGHT

SUMMARY

(WEIGHT

IN

POUNDS)

-

Concluded

Final Total Stage/module Inert weight Total expendables weight separation weight

Spacecraft

at

ignition

110,210

Space S-IC Space Space

vehicle thrust vehicle vehicle

at

ignition

6505857

buildup at lift-off at orbit insertion

(-)84598
6421259 299998

Main propulsion.pulsion system (DPS)

Main propulsion is provided by and the ascent propulsion system

the descent pro(APS). Each

system is wholly independent of the other. The DPS provides the thrust to control descent to the lunar surface. The APS can provide the thrust for ascent from the lunar surface. In case of mission abort, the APS and/or DPS can place the LM into a rendezvous trajectory with the CSM from any point in the descent trajectory. The choice of engine to be used depends on the cause for abort, on how long the descent engine has been operating, and on the quantity of propellant remaining in the descent stage. Both propulsion systems use identical hypergolic propellants. The fuel is a 50-50 mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetricaldimethylhydrazine and the oxidizer is nitrogen tetroxide° Gaseous helium pressurizes the propellant feed systems. Helium storage in the DPS is at cryogenic temperatures in the super-critical state and in the APS it is gaseous at ambient temperatures. Ullage for propellant settling is required prior to descent engine start and is provided by the +X axis reaction engines. The descent engine is gimbaled, throttleable, and restartable. The engine can be throttled from 1050 pounds of thrust to 6300 pounds. Throttle positions above this value automatically'produce full thrust to reduce combustion chamber erosion. Nominal full thrust is 9870 pounds. Gimbal trim of the engine compensates for a changing center of and is automatically accomplished by either the navigation system (PGNS) or the abort guidance throttle and on/off control is available in the gravity of the vehicle primary guidance and system (AGS). Automatic PGNS mode of operation.

3-18

The AGScommands on/off operation but has no automatic throttle control capability. Manual control capability of engine firing functions has been provided. Manual thrust control override may, at any time, commandmore thrust than the level commanded by the LM guidance computer
(LGC). The ascent engine is a fixed, non-throttleable develops 3500 pounds of thrust, sufficient to abort or to launch the ascent stage from the lunar surface the desired lunar orbit. Control modes are similar engine. The engine the lunar descent and place it in to those described

for the descent engine. The APS propellant is contained in two spherical titanium tanks, one for oxidizer and the other for fuel. Each tank has a volume of 36 cubic feet. Total fuel weight is 2008 pounds, of which 71 pounds are unusable. Oxidizer weight is 3170 pounds, of which 92 pounds are unusable. The APS has a limit of 35 starts, must have a propellant bulk temperature between 50 ° F and 90 ° F prior to start, must not exceed 460 seconds of burn time, and has a system life of 24 hours after pressurization. Electrical power system.The electrical power system (EPS) contains six batteries which supply the electrical power requirements of the LM during undocked mission phases. Four batteries are located in the descent stage and two in the ascent stage. Batteries for the explosive devices system are not included in this system description. Postlaunch LM power is supplied by the descent stage batteries until the LM and CSM are docked. While docked, the CSM supplies electrical power to the LM up to 296 watts (peak). During the lunar descent phase, the two ascent stage batteries are paralleled with the descent stage batteries for additional power assurance. The descent stage batteries are utilized for LM lunar surface operations and checkout. The ascent stage batteries are brought staging. All batteries and load, voltage, and failure. are provided. on the line just before ascent phase busses may be individually monitored for Several isolation and combination modes

Two inverters, each capable of supplying full load, convert the dc to ac for ll5-volt, 400-hertz supply. Electrical power is distributed by the following busses: LM Pilot's dc bus, Commander's dc bus, and ac busses A and B.

a 400

The four descent stage silver-zinc ampere-hour capacity at 28 volts.

batteries Because

are identical the batteries

and have do not

have a constant voltage at various states of charge/load levels, "high" and "low" voltage taps are provided for selection. The "low voltage" tap is selected to initiate use of a fully charged battery. Cross-tie circuits in the busses facilitate an even discharge of the batteries regardless of distribution combinations. The two silver-zinc ascent stage batteries are identical to each other and have a 296 ampere-hour

3-19

_apacity at 28 volts. The ascent stage batteries are normally connected in parallel for even discharge. Because of design load characteristics, the ascent stage batteries do not have and do not require high and low voltage taps. Nominal voltage for ascent stage and descent stage batteries is 30.0 volts. Reverse current relays for battery failure are one of many componentsdesigned into the EPSto enhance EPSreliability. Cooling of the batteries is provided by the environmental control system cold rail heat sinks. Available ascent electrical energy is 17.8 kilowatt hours at a maximum drain of 50 ampsper battery and descent energy is 46.9 kilowatt hours at a maximum drain of 25 ampsper battery. MISSION MONITORING, SUPPORT, ANDCONTROL Mission execution involves the following functions: prelaunch checkout and launch operations; tracking the space vehicle to determine its present and future positions; securing information on the status of the flight crew and space vehicle systems (via telemetry); evaluation of telemetry information; commanding the space vehicle by transmitting real-time and updata commands to the onboard computer; and voice communication between flight and ground crews. These functions require the use of a facility to assemble and launch the space vehicle (see Launch Complex), a central flight control facility, a network of remote stations located strategically around the world, a method of rapidly transmitting and receiving information between the space vehicle and the central flight control facility, and a real-time data display system in which the data are made available and presented in usable form at essentially the sametime that the data event occurred. The flight crew and the following organizations participate in mission control operations: and facilities

a. Mission Control Center (MCC), MannedSpacecraft Center (MSC), Houston, Texas. The MCCcontains the communication, computer display, and command systems to enable the flight controllers to effectively monitor and control the space vehicle. b. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), CapeKennedy, Florida. The space vehicle is launched from KSCand controlled from the Launch Control Center (LCC). Prelaunch, launch, and powered flight data are collected at the Central Instrumentation Facility (CIF) at KSCfrom the launch pads, CIF receivers, Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA), and the downrange Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR)stations. These data are

3-20

transmitted to MCC via the Apollo Launch Data"System (ALDS). Also located at KSC(AFETR)is the Impact Predictor (IP), for range safety purposes. c. Goddard SpaceFlight Center (GSFC), Greenbelt, Maryland. GSFC managesand operates the MannedSpace Flight Network (MSFN)and the NASAcommunications (NASCOM) network. During flight, the MSFN is under the operational control of the MCC. d. George C. Marshall SpaceFlight Center (MSFC), Huntsville, Alabama. MSFC,by meansof the Launch Information ExchangeFacility (LIEF) and the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) provides launch vehicle systems real-time support to KSCand MCCfor preflight, launch, and flight operations. A block diagram of the basic flight in figure 3-10. Vehicle Flight control interfaces is shown

Control Capability

Flight operations are controlled from the MCC. The MCC has two flight control rooms, but only one control room is used per mission. Each control room, called a Mission Operations Control Room(MOCR),is capable of controlling individual Staff Support Rooms(SSR's) located adjacent to the MOCR. The SSR's are mannedby flight control specialists who provide detailed support to the MOCR. Figure 3-11 outlines the organization of the MCC for flight control and briefly describes key responsibilities. Information flow within the MOCR is shownin figure 3-12. The consoles within the MOCR and SSR's permit the necessary interface between the flight controllers and the spacecraft. The displays and controls on these consoles and other group displays provide the capability to monitor and evaluate data concerning the mission and, based on these evaluations, to recommend or take appropriate action on matters concerning the flight crew and spacecraft. Problems concerning crew safety and mission success are identified to flight control personnel in the following ways: a. b. c. d. Flight Flight crew observations controller real-time observations

Review of telemetry data received from tape recorder playback Trend analysis of actual and predicted values

3-21

e. f, g.

Review of collected Correlation

data by systems specialists

and comparison with previous mission data

Analysis of recorded data from launch complex testing

3-22,

Goddard

Houston

LIEF

Marshall

ALDS

Kennedy rr= r_
O0 I h) tO

AFETR

r: ALDS LIEF - Apollo Launch Data System - Launch Information Exchange Facility

.m,
Figure 3-i0.Basic interfaces telemetry, for command, and communication flight control.

MISSION OVERALL MISSION

DIRECTOR CONDUCT

)MD) OF

]

PUBLIC MISSION TO

AFFAIRS STATUS

PUBLIC

I
DECISIONS/ACTIONS I ON SPACE VEHICLE SYSTE MS/DYNAMICS DIRECTOR (FD) AND FLIGHT MCC/MSFN OPERATIONS

I
I RECOVERY AND MISSION OD MANAGER SUPPORT OTHER I

I
MISSION AND COMMAND GROUP CONTROL SYSTEMS GROUP OPERATIONS FLIGHT GROUP DYNAMICS OPERATIONS MCCIMSFN & PROCEDURES MISSION CON-

(o&P) I
I L_ | |

FLIGHT ._BOOSTER SYSTEMS MONITOR S.IC, S-II, SYSTEMS ENGINEERS STATUS S-IVB OF (BSE_ L._ I-_ / iMONITORS POWERED

DYNAMICS

OFFICER

(FDO)

PRE LAUNCH FLIGHT EVENTS

CHECKOUT AND EVENTS

TROL PROCEDURES; FLIGHT CONTROL SCHE DU LING; MANNING; CONTROL TELETYPE FORMAT; TRAFFIC NETWORK MSFN CONTROL, HAN DISPLAYS; ANALYSIS £ONTROL RADAR DOVERS AND

FLIGHT

I
I HUNTSVILLE SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER (HOSC) I I

TRAJECTORIES; REENTRY AND TRAJECTORIES

RETROFIRE MAINTAINS AND COMPUTE SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATOR ._ R UPDATE OF REENTRY POINT COMMAND

OFFICER UPDATED PLAN;

(RETRO) ABORT UPDATES

IMPACT CONSUMABLES DATA; EMU ENGINEERS EVA DECISIONS

ESTIMATES

COMMUNICATIONS WITH SPACECRAFT

MONITORS FUNCTIONS SPACECRAFT MONITOR SYSTEMS STATUS OF ENGINEERS t E LECTRICAL. COMMUNICATION, INSTRUMENTATION. SEQUENTIAL,

GUIDANCE DURING

POWERED

FLIGHT AND PREMANEUVER GUIDANCE OFFICER (GUIDO) PREPARATION

FLIGHT FLIGHT

ACTIVITIES PLAN

(FAD)

DETAILED

LIFE AND

SUPPORT. CONTROL. AND

STABILIZATION PROPULSION. NAVIGATION

AND

IMPLEMENTATION

GUIDANCE SYS'I_ MS

LIFE I SPACE RADIATION SPACE ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT DATA (SEO)

SYSTEMS

(SURGEON) AND OF

MONITORS PHYSIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS FLIGHT CREW

I

INF LIGHT EXPERIMENT XPERIMENT ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTATION

MEAD)

I
DIRECTOR SSR

I
SSR

I

I
SYSTEMS SSR LIFE 1 AND ANALYSIS I SSR SC PLANNING I

I

VEHICLE SYSTEMS SSR

II

I
FLIGHT DYNAMICS SSR

J

I
PROGRAM OFFICE ROOM

i.=,o, i
EVALUATION

I

KSCLAUNCH OPERATIONS

Figure

B-ll.- Mission

Control

Center

organization.

3-2)4

MISSION DI RECTOR LAUNCH VEHICLE STAGES STAGE STATUS _L EQUIPMENT STATUS M AND 0 SUPERVISOR

f,Z)

VEHI CLE SYSTEMS

I

I
MCC/MSFN STATUS

u")

LU I:C r'_

0 _-w V')

FLIGHT INFORMATION

FLIGHT DYNAMICS GROUP

SYSTEMSSTATUS

FLIGHT DIRECTOR II: NETWORK STATUS SlC DATA

NETWORK CONTROLLER

ASSISTANT FLIGHT DIRECTOR MISSION PROCEDURE STATUS

I

MISSION PROCEDURE STATUS i SPACECRAFT COMMUN ICATOR
rl,

L I OFFICER 0 AND P I

FLIGHT CREW

i _ J

Figure 3-12.Information flc_within Mission Operations Control Room.

the

3-25

PART

2.

APOLLO

13

MISSION

DESCRIPTION

PRIMARY

MISSION

OBJECTIVES

The

primary

mission

objectives

were

as

follows: sampling of materials

in

Perform selenological inspection, survey, and a preselected region of the Fra Mauro Formation. and activate an Apollo Lunar Surface

Deploy (m_SEP). Develop Obtain

Experiments

Package

man's

capability of

to

work

in the

lunar

environment. sites. of major events and

photographs

candidate

exploration

the

Table 3-II lists time of occurrence

the Apollo in ground

13 mission sequence elapsed time.

TABLE

3-II.

- APOLLO

13 MISSION

SEQUENCE

OF EVENTS

Event

Ground elapsed (hr:min:sec) April ll) 00:00:00 00:12:40 02:35:46 02:41:47 03:06:39 04:01:03 04:18:01 05:59:59 30:40:50 55:54:53 61:29:43 77:56:40 79:27:39 105:18:32 137:39:49 138:02:06 141:30:02 142:40:47 142:54:41

time

Range zero (02:13:00.0 p.m.e.s.t., Earth parking orbit insertion Second S-IVB ignition Translunar injection CSM/S-IVB separation Spacecraft ejection from S-IVB S-IVB APS evasive maneuver S-IVB APS Midcourse Cryogenic Midcourse

maneuver for lunar impact correction - 2 (hybrid transfer) oxygen tank anomaly correction - 4

S-IVB lunar impact Pericynthion plus 2-hour maneuver Midcourse correction - 5 Midcourse correction - 7 Service module jettison Lunar module jettison Entry interface Landing

3-26

Launch and Earth Parking Orbit Apollo 1B was successfully launched on schedule from Launch Complex 39A, KennedySpace Center, Florida, at 2:13 p.m.e.s.t., April ll, 1970. The launch vehicle stages inserted the S-IVB/instrument unit (IU)/ spacecraft combination into an earth parking orbit with an apogeeof 100.2 nautical miles (n. mi. ) and a perigee of 98.0 n. mi. (100-n. mi. circular planned). During second stage boost, the center engine of the S-II stage cut off about 132 seconds early, causing the remaining four engines to burn approximately 3_ seconds longer than predicted. Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 feet per second (fps) lower than planned. As a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted with cutoff velocity within about 1.2 fps of planned. Total launch vehicle burn time was about 44 seconds longer than predicted. A greater than B-sigma probability of meeting translunar injection (TLI) cutoff conditions existed with remaining S-IVB propellants. After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems were verified and preparation was madefor translunar injection (TLI). Onboardtelevision was initiated at 01:35 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.) for about 5.5 minutes. The second S-IVBburn was initiated on schedule for TLI. All major systems operated satisfactorily and all end conditions were nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory. Translunar Coast The CSM separated from the LM/IU/S-IVB at about 03:07 g.e.t. Onboard television was then initiated for about 72 minutes and clearly showedCSM "hard docking," ejection of the CSM/LM from the S-IVB at about 0_:01 g.e.t., and the S-IVB auxiliary propulsion system (APS) evasive maneuver as well as spacecraft interior and exterior scenes. The SMRCSpropellant usage for the separation, transposition, docking, and ejection was nominal. All launch vehicle safing activities were performed as scheduled. The S-IVBAPS evasive maneuverby an 8-secondAPS Ullage burn was initiated at 04:18 g.e.t, and was successfully completed. The liquid oxygen dumpwas initiated at 04:39 g.e.t, and was also successfully accomplished. The first S-IVB APSburn for lunar target point impact was initiated at 06:00 g.e.t. The burn duration was 217 seconds, producing a differential velocity of approximately 28 fps. Tracking information available at 08:00 g.e.t, indicated that the S-IVB/IU would impact at 6°53' S., B0°5B ' W. versus the targeted B° S., B0 ° W. Therefore, the second S-IVB APS (trim) burn was not required. The gaseous nitrogen pressure dropped in the IU ST-124-MBinertial platform at 18:25 g.e.t, and the S-IVB/IU no longer had attitude control but began tumbling slowly.

3-27

At approximately velocity increase

19:17 g.e.t., a step input in of approximately 4 to 5 fps.

tracking data indicated a No conclusions have been

reached on the reason for this increase. The velocity change altered the lunar impact point closer to the target. The S-IVB/IU impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 g.e.t. (08:09:40 p.m.e.s.t. April 14) at 2.4 ° S., 27.9 ° W., and the seismometer deployed during the Apollo 12 mission successfully detected the impact. The targeted impact point was 125 n. mi. from the seismometer. The actual impact point was 74 n. mi. from the seismometer, well within the desired 189-n. mi. (350-km) radius. The accuracy correction No. 1 of the TLI maneuver was such that spacecraft (MCC-1), scheduled for ll:41 g.e.t., was not and resulted circumlunar on 62 n. mi. midcourse required.

MCC-2 was performed as planned at 30:41 g.e.t, the spacecraft on the desired, non-free-return with a predicted closest approach to the moon

in placing trajectory All SPS burn

parameters were normal. The accuracy of MCC-3 was such that MCC-3, scheduled for 55:26 g.e.t., was not performed. Good quality television coverage of the preparations and performance of MCC-2 was received for 49 minutes beginning at 30:13 g.e.t. At approximately 55:55 g.e.t. (10:08 p.m.e.s.t.), the crew reported an undervoltage alarm on the CSM main bus B. Pressure was rapidly lost in SM oxygen tank no. 2 and fuel cells 1 and 3 current dropped to zero due to loss of their oxygen supply. A decision was made to abort the mission. The increased load on fuel cell 2 and decaying sure in the remaining oxygen tank led to the decision to activate LM, power down the CSM, and use the LM systems for life support. At 61:30 g.e.t., a 38-fps midcourse maneuver (MCC-4) was presthe

performed

by the LM DPS to place the spacecraft in which the CM would nominally land in the at approximately 152:00 g.e.t.

a free-return Indian Ocean

trajectory on south of Mauritius

Transearth At pericynthion plus 2 hours

Coast (79:28 g.e.t.), a LM DPS maneuver was

performed to shorten the return trip time and move the earth landing point. The 263.4-second burn produced a differential velocity of 860.5 fps and resulted in an initial predicted earth landing point in the midPacific Ocean at 1_2:53 g.e.t. Both LM guidance systems were powered up and the primary system was used for this maneuver. Following the maneuver, passive thermal control was established and the LMwas down to conserve consumables; only the LM environmental control (ECS) and communications and telemetry systems were kept powered The (at LMDPS was 10-percent used to perform MCC-5 at 105:19 g.e.t. throttle) produced a velocity change of powered system up.

burn

The 15-second about 7.8 fps

3-28

and

successfully

raised

the

entry

flight

path

angle

to

-6.52 ° • condi101:53 to be in

The CSM was partially tions of the CM with first g.e.t. Thermal conditions order for Due entry. to the unusual

powered up for a check of the thermal reported receipt of S-band signal at on all CSM systems observed appeared

spacecraft

configuration,

new

procedures

leading The at then by

to entry were developed and verified in ground-based simulations. resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction (MCC-7) entry interface (EI) -5 hours, Jettison of the SM at EI -4.5 hours, jettison the CM. of the LM at EI -1 hour prior to a normal atmospheric entry

MCC-7 was successfully accomplished at 137:40 g.e.t. The 22.4-second LM RCS maneuver resulted in a predicted entry flight path angle of -6.49 °. The SM was jettisoned at 138:02 g.e.t. The crew viewed and photographed the SM and reported that an entire panel was missing near the S-band highgain antenna and a great deal of debris was hanging out. The CM was powered up and then the LM was Jettisoned at 141:30 g.e.t. The EI at 40,000 feet was reached at 142:41 g.e.t.

Entry

and

Recovery

Weather in the prime recovery area was as follows: broken stratus clouds at 2000 feet; visibility l0 miles; 6-knot ENE winds; and wave height 1 to 2 feet. Drogue and main parachutes deployed normally. Visual contact with the spacecraft was reported at 142:50 g.e.t. Landing occurred at 142:54:41 g.e.t. (01:07:41 p.m.e.s.t., April 17). The landing point was in the mid-Pacific Ocean, approximately 21°40 ' S., 165°22 ' W. The CM landed in the stable 1 position about 3.5 n. mi. from the prime recovery ship, USS IWO JIMA. The crew, picked up by copter, was safe aboard the ship at 1:53 p.m.e.s.t., after landing. a recovery less than helian hour

3-29

U

1/-

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L:

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L

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n

n

u

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I

This page left blank

intentionally.

3-30

CHAPTER 4 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF APOLLO 15 ACCIDENT

4-0

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li

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1:

12

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PART

i.

INTRODUCTION

It became

clear

in

the

course

of the

Board's

review

that

the

acci-

dent during the Apollo 13 mission was initiated in the service module cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2. Therefore, the following analysis centers on that tank and its history. In addition, the recovery steps taken in the period beginning with the accident and continuing to reentry are discussed. Two oxygen tanks essentially identical to oxygen tank no. 2 on

Apollo 13, and two hydrogen tanks torily on several unmanned Apollo ll, and 12 manned missions. With lar emphasis on each difference in the history of the earlier tanks, assembly, and test history.

of similar design, operated satisfacflights and on the Apollo 7, 8, 9, 10, this in mind, the Board placed particuthe history of oxygen tank no. 2 from in addition to reviewing the design,

4-1

PART

2.

OXYGEN

TANK

NO.

2 HISTORY

DESIGN

On February 26, 1966, the North American Aviation Corporation, now North American Rockwell (NR), prime contractor for the Apollo command and service modules (CSM), awarded a subcontract to the Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) to design, develop, fabricate, assemble, test, and deliver the a follow-on Block Block to an II Apollo cryogenic earlier subcontract was procured. drawing in figure 4-1 indicates, each oxygen an inner shell, arranged to provide a vacuum tank gas storage under which subsystem. the somewhat This was different

I subsystem

has

As the simplified an outer shell and

space to reduce heat leak, and a dome enclosing paths into the tank for transmission of fluids and electrical power and signals. The space between the shells and the space in the dome are filled with insulating materials. Mounted in the tank are two tubular assemblies. One, called the heater tube, contains two thermostatically protected heater coils and two small fans driven by 1800 rpm motors to stir the tank contents. The other, called the quantity probe, consists of an upper section which supports a cylindrical capacitance gage used to measure electrically the quantity of fluid in the tank. The inner cylinder of this probe serves both as a fill and drain tube and as one plate of the capacitance gage. In addition, a temperature sensor is mounted on the outside of the quantity probe near the head. Wiring for the gage, the temperature sensor, the fan motors, and the heaters passes through the head of the quantity probe to a conduit in the dome. From there the wiring runs to a connecter which ties it electrically to the appropriate external circuits in the CSM. The routing of wiring and lines from the tank through the dome is shown in figure 4-2. As shown in figure 4-2, the fill line from the exterior of the SM

enters the oxygen tank and connects to the inner cylinder of the capacitance gage through a coupling of two Teflon adapters or sleeves and a short length of Inconel tubing. The dimensions and tolerances selected are such that if "worst case" variations in an actual system were to occur, the coupling might not reach from the fill line to the gage cylinder (fig. 4-3). Thus, the variations might be such that a very loose fit would result.

The supply line from the tank leads from the head of the quantity probe to the dome and thence, after passing around the tank between the inner and outer shells, exits through the dome to supply oxygen to the fuel cells in the service module (SM) and the environmental control system (ECS) in the command module (CM). The supply line also connects

4-2

• °

Closeout cap Blowout disc

Fan

Supply line

motor Temperature sensor "hermostat Heater

To fuel Insulation ceil/ECS'_ Capacitance gage Fan motor Pressure switch Closeout cap Relief valve Overboard

Pressure transducer

Figure

&-l.-

Oxygen

tank

no.

2 internal

components.

tl

!1

L

....

._

__

__

Fill

tube

conduit

Electrical wiring Oxygen vent tube

Supply

Filter

O0 O0
fan Temperature sensor _ /i 1

Quantity

probe

Figure

4-2.-

Oxygen

tank

wiring

and

lines.

4-4

Fill tube

\
Fill tube

I

r
Adverse tolerance case

\

\ I \r
I

Nominal tolerance case

\

I


I

e

Dimension a depends on value of e

Part

Max dim

Nom dim 0.24

Min dim 0.16

a :_ 0.28 b c d e

1.095!1.0801.065 Probe 0.26 1.45 18 ° 0.20 1.43 21 ° 0.14 1.41 24 °

Figure

4-3.-

Nominal

and

adverse

tolerance

cases.

r-: I"

to a relief valve. Under normal conditions, pressure in the tank is measured by a pressure gage in the supply line and a pressure switch near this gage is provided to turn on the heaters in the oxygen tank if the pressure drops below a preselected value. This periodic addition of heat to the tank maintains the pressure at a sufficient level to satisfy the demand for oxygen as tank quantity decreases during a flight mission. The oxygen tank is designed for a capacity of 320 pounds of supercritical oxygen at pressures ranging between 865 to 935 pounds per square inch absolute (psia). The tank is initially filled with liquid oxygen at -297 ° F and operates over the range from -340 ° F to +80 ° F. The term "supercritical" means that the oxygen is maintained at a temperature and fluid. pressure which assures that it is a homogeneous, single-phase

over

The burst twice the

pressure of the normal operating

oxygen tank is about 2200 psi pressure at that temperature.

at

-150 ° F, The relief

valve is designed to relieve pressure in the oxygen tank overboard at a pressure of approximately i000 psi. The oxygen tank dome is open to the vacuum between the inner and outer tank shell and contains a rupture disc designed to blow out at about 75 psi. The are approximate amounts set forth in table of principal 4-1. materials within the oxygen

tank

TABLE

4-1.-

MATERIALS

WITHIN

OXYGEN

TANK

Approximate Mat eri al quantity, lb

Available energy, Btu

Teflon-wire sleeving Aluminum Stainless Inconel and

insulation solid forms )

1.1

2,400

(all

0.8
2.4 1.7

20,500 15,000 2,900

steel alloys

shown

Two in

oxygen figure

tanks 4-4.

are mounted Figures 4-5

on a shelf in bay 4 of the through 4-8 are photographs

SM, as of portions

4-6

_

:uel cell

2
Fuel cell 3 Fuel cell 1

f
_Fuel I Oxygen tank 2"-_ Oxygen subsystem shelf module Il -Oxygen tank 1 - Oxygen valve module Oxygen servicing panel .Hydrogen 1 cell

/drogen subs _.she If module

tank 2

Fisure_-4.

- Arrangement

of

fuel

cells

and

cryogenic

systems

in

bay

h.

4-7

I1

N

E

:"

E

:I2

L

L

K

I::

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Figure

4=5.=

Fuel

cells

shelf.

4-9

.,¢- _*

_<-C

-

L

-_C,2

/

L,

'

Figure

4-6.-

Oxygen

tank

shelf.

Preceding page blank
4-11

L

k

E

'_ k

'L.

' _

" L

L"

L_

/Li

_

K

L

FigureX_=_XX

Hydrogen

tank

shelf.

Preceding page blank
4-13

ILl li

E

"

L:

E

L

L

.

i_

E

l.:

:

'

F

4_8°

--

Figure

_X_

Inside

view

of

panel

covering

bay

4.

Preceding page blank
4-15

of the Apollo 13 service module (SM109) at the North American Rockwell plant prior to shipment to KSC. Figure 4-5 showsthe fuel cell shelf, with fuel cell 1 on the right, fuel cell 3 on the left, and fuel cell 2 behind cells 1 and 3. The top of oxygen tank no. 2 can be seen at the lower left. Figure 4-6 showsthe oxygen tank shelf, with oxygen tank no. 2 at left center. Figure h-7 shows the hydrogen tank shelf with hydrogen tank no. 1 on top and hydrogen tank no. 2 below. The bottom of the oxygen shelf shows someof the oxygen system instrumentation and wiring, largely covered by insulation. Figure h-8 is a photograph of the bay 4 panel, which was missing from the service module after the accident. A more detailed description in Appendix D to this report. of the oxygen tank design is contained

MANUFACTURE The manufacture of oxygen tank no. 2 began in 1966. Under subcontracts with Beech, the inner shell of the tank was manufactured by the Airite Products Division of Electrada Corporation; the quantity probe was madeby Simmonds Precision Products, Inc. ; and the fans and fan motors were produced by Globe Industries, Inc. The Beech serial number assigned to the oxygen tank no. 2 flown in the Apollo 13 was 10024XTA0008. It was the eighth Block II oxygen tank built. Twenty-eight Block I oxygen tanks had previously been built by Beech. The design of the oxygen tank is such that once the upper and lower halves of the inner and outer shells are assembledand welded, the heater assembly must be inserted in the tank, movedto one side, and bolted in place. Then the quantity probe is inserted into the tank and the heater assembly wires (to the heaters, the thermostats, and the fan motors) must be pulled through the head of the quantity probe and the 32-inch coiled conduit in the dome. Thus, the design requires during assembly a substantial amount of wire movementinside the tank, where movementcannot be readily observed, and where possible damageto wire insulation by scraping or flexing cannot be easily detected before the tank is capped off and welded closed. Several minor manufacturing flaws were discovered in oxygen tank no. 2 in the course of testing. A porosity in a weld on the lower half of the outer shell necessitated grinding and rewelding. Rewelding was also required when it was determined that incorrect welding wire had been inadvertently used for a small weld on a vacuumpumpmounted on

Preceding page blank
4-17

the outside of the tank dome. The upper fan motor originally installed _as noisy and drew excessive current. The tank was disassembled and the heater assembly, fans, and heaters were replaced with a new assembly and new fans. The tank was then assembled and sealed for the second time, and the space between the inner and outer shells was pumpeddown over a 28-day period to create the necessary vacuum.
TANK TESTS AT BEECH

Acceptance testing of oxygen tank no. 2 at Beech included dielectric, insulation, and functional tests of heaters, fans, ion pumps. The tank was then leak tested at 500 psi and proof at 1335 psi with helium. After the and pressurized heaters powered R00 psi for

extensive and vactested

helium proof test, the tank was filled with liquid oxygen to a proof pressure of 1335 psi by use of the tank by 65 V ac. Extensive heat-leak tests were run at 30 hours over a range of ambient conditions and 100 was outpounds released

25 to

flow rates. At the conclusion of the heat-leak tests, about of oxygen remained in the tank. About three-fourths of this

by venting the tank at a controlled rate through the supply line to about 20 psi. The tank was then emptied by applying warm gas at about 30 psi to the vent line to force the liquid oxygen (LOX) in the tank out the fill line (see fig. h-2). No difficulties were recorded in this det anking operation. The taukwas working, The tank acceptance higher the was than test indicated by but was a formal that the the rate of heat leak into some the re-

permitted

specifications. somewhat of this

After

rate improved, accepted with

still waiver

higher than condition.

specified. Several

other minor discrepancies were also accepted. These included oversized holes in the support for the electrical plug in the tank dome, and an oversized rivet hole in the heater assembly Just above the lower fan. None of these items were serious, and the tank was accepted, filled with helium at 5 psi, and shipped to NR on May 3, 1967.

ASSEMBLY

AND

TEST

AT

NORTH

AMERICAN

ROCKWELL

oxygen number

The assembly of oxygen shelf serial number 0632AAG3277, with Beech tank serial number 10024XTA0009 as oxygen tank no. 1 and serial 1002_XTA0008 as oxygen tank no. 2, was completed on March ll, 1968. was to be installed in SM 106 for flight in the Apollo l0

The shelf mission.

4-18

Beginning on April 27, the assembled oxygen shelf underwent standard proof-pressure, leak, and functional checks. One valve on the shelf leaked and was repaired, but no anomalies were noted with regard to oxygen tank no. 2, and therefore no rework of oxygen tauk no. 2 was
required. None in the tanks. On June _, of the oxygen tank testing at NR requires use of L0X

1968,

the

shelf

was

installed

in

SM of

106. the shelf in the

Between August 3 and August 8, 1968, testing SM was conducted. No anomalies were noted.

Due to electromagnetic interference problems with the vac-ion pumps on cryogenic tank domes in earlier Apollo spacecraft, a modification was introduced and a decision was made to replace the complete oxygen shelf in SM 106. An oxygen shelf with approved modifications was prepared for installation in SM 106. On October 21, 1968, the oxygen shelf was removed from SM 106 for the required modification and installation in a later spacecraft. The oxygen shelf was removed in the manner various lines and wires were disconnected shown in figure and bolts which 4-9. hold

After

the shelf in the SM were removed, a fixture suspended from a crane was placed under the shelf and used to lift the shelf and extract it from bay h. One shelf bolt was mistakenly left in place during the initial attempt to remove the shelf; and as a consequence, after the front of the shelf was raised about 2 inches, the fixture broke, allowing the shelf to drop back into place. Photographs of the underside of the fuel cell shelf in SM 106 indicate that the closeout cap on the dome of oxygen tank no. 2 may have struck the underside of that shelf during this incident. At the time, however, it was believed that the oxygen shelf had simply dropped back into place and an analysis was performed to calculate the forces resulting from a drop of 2 inches. It now seems likely that the shelf was first accelerated upward and then dropped. The remaining bolt was then removed, the incident recorded, and the oxygen shelf was removed_ithout further difficulty. Following removal, the oxygen shelf was retested to check shelf integrity, including proof-pressure tests, leak tests, and functional tests of pressure transducers and switches, thermal switches, and vac-ion pumps. No cryogenic testing was conducted. Visual inspection revealed no problem. These tests would have disclosed external leakage or serious internal malfunctions of most types, but would not disclose fill line leakage within oxygen tank no. 2. Further calculations and tests conducted during this investigation, however, have indicated that the forces experienced by the shelf were probably close to those originally

4-19

hoist --Fuel cell shelf

E A

r-

Sling

|

ro o

r_
Sling adapter _"

stment of ballance

weights

Figure

4-9.-

Hoist

and

sling

arrangement

-

oxygen

shelf.

calculated assuming a 2-inch drop only. The probability of tank damage from this incident, therefore, is now considered to be rather low, although it is possible that a loosely fitting fill tube could have been displaced by the event. The shelf passed these The 109 tests and was installed in SM 109 on

November 22, were repeated

1968. in SM

shelf tests accomplished earlier in SM 106 in late December and early January, with no SM 109 was shipped to Kennedy further testing, assembly on Space Center the launch

significant problems, (KSC) in June of 1969 vehicle, and launch.

and for

TESTING

AT

KSC

At the Kennedy Space Center assembled on the Saturn V launch moved to the launch pad. The countdown this point,

the CM and the SM were vehicle, and the total

mated, vehicle

checked, was

Up

to

demonstration test (CDDT) began on March 16, 1970. nothing unusual about oxygen tank no. 2 had been

noted during the extensive testing at KSC. The oxygen tanks were evacuated to 5mmHg followed by an oxygen pressure of about 80 psi. After the cooling of the fuel cells, cryogenic oxygen loading and tank pressurization to 331 psi were completed without abnormalities. At the time during CDDT when the oxygen tanks are normally partially emptied to about 50 percent of capacity, oxygen tank no. 1 behaved normally, but oxygen tank no. 2 only went down to 92 percent of its capacity. The normal procedure during CDDT to reduce the quantity in the tank is to apply gaseous oxygen at 80 psi through the vent line and to open the fill line. When this procedure failed, it was decided to proceed with the CDDT until completion and then look at the oxygen detanking problem in detail. An Interim Discrepancy Report was written and transferred to a Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Discrepancy Report, since a GSE filter was suspected. On Friday, March 27, 1970, detanking operations were resumed, after discussions of the problem had been held with KSC, MSC, NR, and Beech personnel participating, either personally or by telephone. As a first step, oxygen tank no. 2, which had self-pressurized to 178 psi and was about 83 percent full, was vented through its fill line. The quantity decreased to 65 percent. Further discussions between KSC, MSC, NR, and Beech personnel considered thatthe problem might be due to a leak in the path between the fill line and the quantity probe due to loose fit in the sleeves and tube. Referring to figure _-2, it will be noted that such a leak would allow the gaseous oxygen (G0X) being supplied to the vent line to leak directly to the fill line without forcing any

4-21

significant amount of LOXout of the tank. At this point, ancy report against the spacecraft system was written.

a discrep-

A "normal" detanking procedure was then conducted on both oxygen tanks, pressurizing through the vent line and opening the fill lines. Tank no. 1 emptied in a few minutes. Tank no. 2 did not. Additional attempts were madewith higher pressures without effect, and a decision was madeto try to "boil off" the remaining oxygen in tank no. 2 by use of the tank heaters. The heaters were energized with the 65 V tic. GSEpower supply, and, about l-l/2 hours later, the fans were turned on to add more heat and mixing. After 6 hours of heater operation, the quantity had only decreased to 35 percent, and it was decided to attempt a pressure cycling technique. With the heaters and fans still energized, the tank was pressurized to about 300 psi, held for a few minutes, and then vented through the fill line. The first cycle produced a 7-percent quantity decrease, and the process was continued, with the tank emptied after five pressure/vent cycles. The fans and heaters were turned off after about 8 hours of heater operation. Suspecting the loosely fitting fill line connection to the quantity probe inner cylinder, KSCpersonnel consulted with cognizant personnel at MSCand at NRand decided to test whether the oxygen tank no. 2 could be filled without problems. It was decided that if the tank could be filled, the leak in the fill line would not be a problem in flight, since it was felt that even a loose tube resulting in an electrical short between the capacitance plates of the quantity gage would result in an energy level too low to cause any other damage. Replacement of the oxygen shelf in the CMwould have been difficult and would have taken at least 45 hours. In addition, shelf replacement would have had the potential of damaging or degrading other elements of the SMin the course of replacement activity. Therefore, the decision was madeto test the ability to fill oxygen tank no. 2 on March 30, 1970, twelve days prior to the scheduled Saturday, April ll, launch, so as to be in a position to decide on shelf replacement well before the launch date. Accordingly, flow tests with G0Xwere run on oxygen tank no. 2 and on oxygen tank no. 1 for comparison. No problems were encountered, and the flow rates in the two tanks were similar. In addition, Beech was asked to test the electrical energy level reached in the event of a short circuit between plates of the quantity probe capacitance gage. This test showedthat very low energy levels would result. On the filling test, oxygen tanks no. 1 and no. 2 were filled with LOXto about 20 percent of capacity on March 30 with no difficulty. Tank no. 1 emptied in the normal manner, but emptying oxygen tank no. 2 again required pressure cycling with the heaters turned on.

4-22

As the launch date approached, the oxygen tank no. 2 detanking problem was considered by the Apollo organization. At this point, the "shelf drop" incident on October 21, 1968, at NRwas not considered and it was felt that the apparently normal detanking which had occurred in 1967 at Beechwas not pertinent because it was believed that a different procedure was used by Beech. In fact, however, the last portion of the procedure was quite similar, although a slightly lower G0Xpressure was utilized. Throughout these considerations, which involved technical and management personnel of KSC,MSC,NR, Beech, and NASA Headquarters, emphasiswas directed toward the possibility and consequencesof a loose fill tube; very little attention was paid to the extended operation of heaters and fans except to note that they apparently operated during and after the detanking sequences. Many of the principals in the discussions were not aware of the extended heater operations. Those that did know the details of the procedure did not consider the possibility of damagedue to excessive heat within the tank, and therefore did not advise management officials of any possible consequencesof the unusually long heater operations. As noted earlier in this chapter, and shownin figure 4-2, each heater is protected with a thermostatic switch, mounted on the heater tube, which is intended to open the heater circuit when it senses a temperature of 80° F. In tests conducted at MSC since the accident, however, it was found that the switches failed to open when the heaters were powered from a 65 V dc supply similar to the power used at KSCduring the detanking sequence. Subsequentinvestigations have shown that the thermostatic switches used, while rated as satisfactory for the 28 V dc spacecraft power supply, could not open properly at 65 V tic. Qualification and test procedures for the heater assemblies and switches do not at any time test the capability of the switches to open while under full current conditions. A review of the voltage recordings made during the detanking at KSCindicates that, in fact, the switches did not open when the temperature indication from within the tank rose past 80° F. Further tests have shown that the temperatures on the heater tube may have reached as much as 1000 ° F during the detanking. This temperature will cause serious damageto adjacent Teflon insulation, and such damagealmost certainly occurred. None of the above, however, Wasknown at the time and, after extensive consideration was given to all possibilities of damagefrom a loose fill tube, it was decided to leave the oxygen shelf and oxygen tank no. 2 in the SMand to proceed with preparations for the launch of Apollo 13.

4-23

.. The manufacture and test history of oxygen tank no. 2 is discussed in more detail in Appendix C to this report.

4-24

PART

3.

THE

APOLLO

13

FLIGHT

The

Apollo

13

mission

was

designed

to perform

the

third

manned

lunar landing. The selected site was in the hilly uplands of the Fra Mauro formation. A package of five scientific experiments was planned for emplacement on the lunar surface near the lunar module (LM) landing point: (1) a lunar passive seismometer to measure and relay meteoroid impact and moonquakes and to serve as the begun with the Apollo 12 seismometer; (2) ing the heat flux from the lunar interior material conductivity to a depth lunar environment experiment for effects on the lunar environment; density and temperature variations dust detector experiment. Additionally, of selenological second a heat to the point in a seismic net flow device for measursurface and surface

of 3 meters; (3) a charged-particle measuring solar wind proton and electron (4) in a cold cathode gage for measuring the lunar atmosphere; and (5) a

set

the Apollo 13 landing crew was samples of the lunar surface Candidate lunar orbit the command

to gather the for return to

third earth were

for extensive scientific analysis. scheduled to be photographed from topographic camera carried aboard

future landing sites with a high-resolution module.

During the week prior to launch, backup Lunar Module Pilot Charles M. Duke, Jr., contracted rubella. Blood tests were performed to determine prime crew immunity, since Duke had been in close contact with the prime crew. These tests determined that prime Commander James A. Lovell and prime Lunar Module Pilot Fred Haise were immune to rubella, but that prime Command Module Pilot Thomas K. Mattingly III did not have immunity. Consequently, following 2 days of intensive simulator training at the Kennedy Space Center, backup Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., was substituted in the prime crew to replace Mattingly. Swigert had trained for several months with the backup crew, and this additional work in the simulators was aimed crew so that the new combination during the mission. toward integrating him into the prime of crewmen could function as a team

KSC

Launch Launch

was on Complex

time 39A.

at 2:13 p.m., e.s.t., on April ll, 1970, from the The spacecraft was inserted into a lO0-nautical-

mile circular earth orbit. The only significant launch phase anomaly was premature shutdown of the center engine of the S-II second stage. As a result, the remaining four S-II engines burned 34 seconds longer than planned and the S-IVB third stage burned a few seconds longer than planned. At orbital insertion, the velocity was within 1.2 feet per second of the planned velocity. Moreover, an adequate propellant margin was maintained in the S-IVB for the translunar injection burn.

4-25

Orbital insertion was at 00:12:39 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.). The initial one and one-half earth orbits before translunar injection (TLI) were spent in spacecraft systems checkout and included television transmissions as Apollo 13 passed over the Merritt Island Launch Area, Florida, tracking station. The S-IVB restarted at 02:35:46 g.e.t, for the translunar injection burn, with shutdown coming some5 minutes 51 seconds later. Accuracy of the Saturn V instrument unit guidance for the TLI burn was such that a planned midcourse correction maneuverat 11:41:23 g.e.t, was not necessary. After TLI, Apollo 13 was calculated to be on a free-return trajectory with a predicted closest approach to the lunar surface of 210 nautical miles. The CSM was separated from the S-IVB about 3 hours after launch, and after a brief period of stationkeeping, the crew maneuveredthe CSM to dock with the LMvehicle in the LM adapter atop the S-IVB stage. The S-IVB stage was separated from the docked CSM and LM shortly after 4 hours into the mission. In mannedlunar missions prior to Apollo 13, the spent S-IVB third stages were accelerated into solar orbit by a "slingshot" maneuver in which residual liquid oxygen was dumpedthrough the J-2 engine to provide propulsive energy. On Apollo 13, the plan was to impact the S-IVB stage on the lunar surface in proximity to the seismometer emplaced in the Oceanof Storms by the crew of Apollo 12. Two hours after TLI, the S-IVB attitude thrusters were ground commandedon to adjust the stage's trajectory toward the designated impact at latitude 3° S. by longitude 30° W. Actual impact was at latitude 2.4 ° S. by longitude 27.9° W.--74 nautical miles from the Apollo 12 seismometer and well within the desired range. Impact was at 77:56:40 g.e.t. Seismic signals relayed by the Apollo 12 seismometer as the 30,700-pound stage hit the Moonlasted almost 4 hours and provided lunar scientists with additional data on the structure of the Moon. As in previous lunar missions, the Apollo 13 spacecraft in the passive thermal control (PTC) modewhich calls for a roll rate of three longitudinal axis revolutions each hour. rest periods and at other times in translunar and transearth a stable attitude is not required, the spacecraft is placed stabilize the thermal response by spacecraft structures and was set up continuous During crew coast when in PTCto systems.

At 30:40:49 g.e.t., a midcourse correction maneuverwas madeusing the service module propulsion system. The crew preparations for the burn and the burn itself were monitored by the Mission Control Center (MMC)at MSC by telemetered data and by television from the spacecraft. This midcourse correction maneuverwas a 23.2 feet per second hybrid

4-26

transfer burn which took Apollo 13 off a free-return trajectory and placed it on a non-free-return trajectory. A similar trajectory had been flown on Apollo 12. The objective of leaving a free-return trajectory is to control the arrival time at the Moonto insure the proper lighting conditions at the landing site. Apollo 8, 10, and ll flew a pure freereturn trajectory until lunar orbit insertion. The Apollo 13 hybrid transfer maneuverlowered the predicted closest approach, or pericynthion, altitude at the Moonfrom 210 to 64 nautical miles. From launch through the first 46 hours of the mission, the performance of oxygen tank no. 2 was normal, so far as telemetered data and crew observations indicate. At 46:40:02, the crew turned on the fans in oxygen tank no. 2 as a routine operation. Within 3 seconds, the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity indication changed from a normal reading of about 82 percent full to an obviously incorrect reading "off-scale high," of over 100 percent. Analysis of the electrical wiring of the quantity gage shows that this erroneous reading could be caused by either a short circuit or an open circuit in the gage wiring or a short circuit between the gage plates. Subsequentevents indicated that a short was the more likely failure mode. At 47:54:50 and at 51:07:44, the oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on again, with no apparent adverse effects. The quantity gage continued to read off-scale high. Following a rest period, the Apollo 13 crew began preparations for activating and powering up the LM for checkout. At 53:27 g.e.t., the Commander (CMR)and Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) were cleared to enter the LM to commence inflight inspection of the LM. Groundtests before launch had indicated the possibility of a high heat-leak rate in the LM descent stage supercritical helium tank. Crew verification of actual pressures found the helium pressure to be within normal limits. Supercritical helium is stored in the LM for pressurizing propellant tanks. The LMwas powered down and preparations were underway to close the LMhatch and run through the presleep checklist when the accident in oxygen tank no. 2 occurred. At 55:52:30 g.e.t., a master alarm on the CMcaution and warning system alerted the crew to a low pressure indication in the cryogenic hydrogen tank no. 1. This tank had reached the low end of its normal operating pressure range several times previously during the flight. At 55:52:58, flight controllers in the MCC requested the crew to turn on the cryogenic system fans and heaters. The Command Module Pilot (CMP)acknowledgedthe fan cycle request at 55:53:06 g.e.t., and data indicate that current was applied to the oxygen tank no. 2 fan motors at 55:53:20.

4-27

ILl ]LJ:-

L

E

L:

L

L:

L.

L:

u

n

n

z

L

L

L

About spacecraft

l-l/2 minutes later, at was lost almost totally

55:54:53.555, telemetry for 1.8 seconds. During

from the

the period a low crew

of data loss, the caution and warning system alerted the crew to voltage condition on dc main bus B. At about the same time, the heard a loud "bang" and realized that a problem existed in the spacecraft. The events between problem was evident to detail in Part 4 of It is now pressure fects of covering lines or sion show oxygen

fan turnon at 55:53:20 and the time when the the crew and Mission Control are covered in some chapter, "Summary Analysis of the Accident."

this

clear that oxygen tank no. 2 or its associated tubing lost integrity because of combustion within the tank, and that efoxygen escaping from the tank caused the removal of the panel bay 4 and a relatively slow leak in oxygen tank no. i or its valves. Photos of the SM taken by the crew later in the misthe panel missing, the fuel cells on the shelf above the tilted, and the high-gain antenna damaged.

shelf

The resultant loss of oxygen made the fuel cells inoperative, leaving the CM with batteries normally used only during reentry as the sole power source and with only that oxygen contained in a surge tank and repressurization packages (used to repressurize the CM after cabin venting). The LM, therefore, became the only source of sufficient electrical power and oxygen to permit safe return of the crew to Earth. The figure various telemetered parameters of 4-10 and listed in table 4-11. primary interest are shown

in

4-28

e',:_',',

!_'_

_l::t_4 _.

--_-

t+-

d
o
¥ +m_. i 0 0.)

b
I1) O) O)

:.i:ili:_2

I

c;
::=: :4:

,-4 ! .-=t

_0
oH

_,_
,_td:,!

N
............... ,_ _E;_ _,_
o

N
o_ 1 I

I

I

I

_.

=.

_.

=

Im,l Ji1_ I_ I III,I

roll

I" "_J I_I_ _rl:l

4-29

0_-_

AC _s I and 2v_ta_ Dc i_s A ancl II v_t_

Htiium la_ lJmi*r_url Bay3 mWItzlr tank surfacm t_ure

Ox_m rank I and 2 qulntlty, ten_afllt ure and pressure

TABLE 2.5 MINUTES BEFORE

4-II.THE

DETAILED TO

CHRONOLOGY 5 MINUTES

FROM AFTER THE ACCIDENT

ACCIDENT

Time_

6.e.t.

Event

Events 55:52:31

During

52

Seconds

Prior

to

First

Observed

Abnormality

Master caution and warning triggered by low hydrogen pressure in tank no. 1. Alarm is turned off after 4 seconds. Ground Crew Oxygen Oxygen Oxygen requests acknowledges tank tank tank no. no. no. 1 tank stir. stir. on. decreases on. electrical disturbance 8 psi.

55:52:58 55:53:06 55:53:18 55:53:19 55:53:20 55:53:20

tank fans

1 pressure 2 fans

turned

Stabilization control system indicates a power transient. Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure

55:53:21

decreases

4 psi.

Abnormal 55:53:22.718

Events

During

90

Seconds

Preceding

the

Accident disturbance

Stabilization control system indicates a power transient. 1.2-volt ll.l-amp sample. decrease rise in in fuel ac bus cell

electrical

55:53:22.757 55:53:22.772

2 voltage. 3 current for one

55 :53:36

Oxygen tank no. for 24 seconds. ll-volt sample. decrease

2 pressure

begins

rise

lasting

55:53:38.057

in

ac bus

2 voltage

for

one

55:53:38.085

Stabilization control system indicates a power transient.

electrical

disturbance

4-31

TABLE4-11.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THEACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THEACCIDENT - Continued
Time, g.e.t. Event

55:53:41.172 55:53:41.192

22.9-amp

rise

in

fuel

cell

3 current electrical

for

one

sample.

Stabilization control system indicates a power transient. Oxygen tank no. of 953.8 psia. Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure

disturbance

55:54:00

rise

ends

at

a pressure

55:54:15 55:54:30

2 pressure

begins

to

rise. scale

Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity drops from full for 2 seconds and then reads 75.3 percent. Oxygen tank rapidly. Flow rate of to decrease. no. 2 temperature begins to

55:54:31

rise

55:54:43

oxygen

to

all

three

fuel

cells

begins

55:54:45

0xygen. tank no. of 1008.3 psia. Oxygen sample tank no. (invalid

2 pressure

reaches

maximum

value

55:54:48

2 temperature reading).

rises

40 ° F

for

one

55:54:51

Oxygen tank no. and then begins loss, indicating Oxygen tank no.

2 quantity Jumps to off-scale high to drop until the time of telemetry failed sensor. 2 temperature reads -151.3 ° F. off-

55:54:52 55:54:52.7O3

Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature scale low, indicating failed Last telemetered before telemetry Sudden

suddenly sensor. oxygen psia. on X, body Y,

goes

55:54:52.763

pressure from loss is 995.7 activity system

tank

no.

2

55:54:53.182 55:5_:53.220

accelerometer control

and

Z axes.

Stabilization begin.

rate

changes

4-52

2.5

MINUTES

BEFORE

TABLE THE

4-II.DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE

ACCIDENT

- Continued

Time,

_. e. t.

Event

55:54:53.323 55:54:53.5 55:54:53.542

Oxygen 2.8-amp X, Y, 0.65g

tank rise and and

no.

i pressure fuel

drops cell CM

h.2

psi.

in total

current. indicate 1.17g,

Z accelerations in 0.65g, respectively.

1.8-Second

Data

Loss

55:54:53.555 55:54:53.555+

Loss

of

telemetry

begins. warning Alarm triggered is turned by dc main off in 6 the cryogenic this time period

Master caution and bus B undervoltage.

seconds. All indications are that oxygen tank no. 2 lost pressure in and the panel separated.

55:54:54.741

Nitrogen pressure indicating failed Recovery Events During

in fuel sensor. data.

cell

1 is

off-scale

low

55:54:55.35

of telemetry 5 Minutes

Following

the

Accident valve body 7 seconds. to to 28.5 29.0 higher High tempera-

55:54:56

Service propulsion ture begins a rise Dc main dc main bus bus

system engine of 1.65 ° F in 0.9 0.9 volt volt

55:54:56

A decreases B decreases

volts and volts. than the current

55:5h:56

Total fuel cell current is 15 amps final value before telemetry loss. continues for 19 seconds. Oxygen tank no. after telemetry s ens ors. Oxygen lowing line, tank no.

55:54:56

2 temperature reads off-scale recovery, probably indicating

high failed

55:54:56

2 pressure

reads

off-scale

low

fol-

telemetry recovery, indicating a broken supply a tank pressure below 19 psi, or a failed sensor.

4-33

. TABLE4-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THEACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THEACCIDENT - Continued

Time s g.e.t.

Event

55:54:56

Oxygen begins

tank no. I pressure to drop steadily.

reads

781.9

psia

and

55:54:57

Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity reads off-scale high following telemetry recovery indicating failed sensor. The reaction control system helium tank begins a 1.66 ° F increase in 36 seconds. Oxygen flow rates to zero after decreasing The surface dizer tank 15-second fuel for cells i and 7 seconds. C temperature

55:54:59

55:55:01

3 approached

55:55:02

temperature of the service module in bay 3 begins a 3.8 ° F increase period.

oxiin a

55:55:02

The service propulsion system helium tank temperature begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a 32-second period. Dc main bus A voltage recovers to 29.0 main bus B recovers to 28.8 volts. Crew Crew reports, reports, "I believe "We've had we've a main had volts; dc

55:55:09

55:55:20 55:55:35 55:55:29

a problem

here."

B bus

undervolt."

Oxygen lasting

tank no. 2 temperature 59 seconds, probably

begins steady drop indicating failed sensor.

55:56:10

Crew reports, "Okay right now, Houston. The voltage is looking good, and we had a pretty large bang associated with the caution and warning there. And as I recall, main B was the one that had had an amp spike on it once before." Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity becomes erratic for state, 69

55:56:38

seconds before assuming an indicating failed sensor.

off-scale-low

4-34

TABLE 2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE

4-II.ACCIDENT

DETAILED TO

CHRONOLOGY AFTER

FROM THE ACCIDENT Concluded

5 MINUTES

Time,

g. e. t.

Event

55:57:04

Crew

reports,

"That

jolt

must

have

rocked

the

sensor on--see now--oxygen quantity 2. It was oscillating down around 20 to 60 percent. Now it's full-scale high again." 55:57:39 Master caution and bus B undervoltage. 6 seconds. Dc to Ac main fall bus bus B drops rapidly. 2 fails within warning Alarm triggered is turned by dc main off in

55:57:40

below

26.25

volts

and

continues

55:57:44 55:57:45 55:57:59 55:58:02

2 seconds

Fuel Fuel

cell cell

3 fails. 1 current begins
/

to

decrease. by ac bus 2 after 2 seconds. by dc main off in 13

Master caution and warning caused being reset. Alarm is turned off Master caution and bus A undervoltage. seconds. warning Alarm

55:58:06

triggered is turned

55:58:07

Dc main bus A drops below 26.25 volts and in next few seconds levels off at 25.5 volts. Crew Crew now, Main reports, reports, too, B is
"ac

the

55:58:07 55:58:25

2 is showing we got

zip." bus A undervolt 25-1/2.

"Yes,

a main

showing. reading

It's reading about zip right now." triggered Alarm is

56:00:06

Master caution and warning flow rate to fuel cell 2. 2 seconds.

by high hydrogen turned off in

4-35

1/

N

E

'"

L

L

L

'

PART

4.

SUMMARY

ANALYSIS

OF

THE

ACCIDENT

Combustion in to oxygen tank no. removal of the bay fuel cells, to the attempt to determine

oxygen tank no. 2 led to failure of that tank, damage i or its lines or valves adjacent to tank no. 2, 4 panel and, through the resultant loss of all three decision to abort the Apollo 13 mission. In the the cause of ignition in oxygen tank no. 2, the

course of propagation of the combustion, the mode of tank failure, and the way in which subsequent damage occurred, the Board has carefully sifted through all available evidence and examined the results of special tests and analyses conducted by the Apollo organization and by or for the Board after the accident. (For more information on details of mission events, design, manufacture and test of the system, and special tests and analyses conducted in this investigation, refer to Appendices B, C, D, E, and F of this report.) Although tests and analyses are continuing, sufficient information is now available to provide a reasonably clear picture of the nature of the accident and the events which led up to it. It is now apparent that the extended heater operation at KSC damaged the insulation on wiring in the tank and thus made the wiring susceptible to the electrical short circuit which probably initiated combustion within the tank. While the exact point of initiation of combustion may never be known with certainty, the nature of mit taking corrective The The initiation, integrity, Board has the occurrence is sufficiently understood steps to prevent its recurrence. the most probable accident failure in its mode. key phases: 2 system to per-

identified discussion

following

treats

the

propagation and loss of

of combustion, oxygen tank no.

loss of oxygen tank i system integrity.

no.

INITIATION

Key

Data 2 fans in turned on. 2 voltage.

55:53:20* 55:53:22.757

Oxygen 1.2-volt

tank

no.

decrease

ac bus

*In evaluating fact that the Apollo time and quantitizes may be made to Part

telemetry data, consideration must be given to the pulse code modulation (PCM) system samples data in in amplitude. For further information, reference B7 of Appendix B.

4-56

55:53:22.772

ll.l-ampere followed by

"spike" drop in

recorded current

in fuel and rise one fan

cell 3 current in voltage typmotor--indicat-

ical of removal ing opening of 55:53:36 Oxygen tank no.

of power from motor circuit. 2 pressure

begins

to

rise. circuit with the fans were spike and spacecraft

arcing

The evidence points as the initiating

strongly event.

to an electrical About 2.7 seconds

short after current in the

turned on in the SM oxygen tanks, an ll.l-ampere simultaneously a voltage-drop spike were recorded

electrical system. Immediately thereafter, current drawn from the fuel cells decreased by an amount consistent with the loss of power to one fan. No other changes in spacecraft power were being made at the time. No power was on the heaters in the tanks at the time and the quantity gage and temperature sensor are very low power devices. The next anomalous event recorded was the beginning of a pressure rise in oxygen tank no. 2, 13 seconds later. Such a time lag is possible with lowlevel combustion at the time. These facts point to the likelihood that an electrical short circuit with arcing occurred in the fan motor or its leads to initiate the accident sequence. The energy available from the short circuit was probably iO to 20 joules. Tests conducted during this investigation have shown that this energy is more than adequate to ignite Teflon of the type contained within the tank. (The quantity gage in oxygen tank no. 2 had failed at 46:40 g.e.t. There is no evidence tying the quantity gage failure directly to accident initiation, particularly in view of the very low energy available from the gage.) This likelihood of electrical initiation is enhanced by the high probability that the electrical wires within the tank were damaged during the abnormal detanking operation at KSC prior to launch. Furthermore, initiation. there is no evidence pointing to any other mechanism

of

PROPAGATION

OF

COMBUSTION

Key

Data begins rise (same event

55:53:36

Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure noted previously). ll-volt decrease recorded

55:53:38.057

in ac

bus

2 voltage.

4-37

N

N

E

' L

L

L:

L

h

L

N_

1:

L,:

L:

Lt

n

J..:

L

.

55:53:41.172

22.9-ampere

"spike"

recorded

in

fuel

cell

3 current, typanother

followed by drop in current and rise in voltage ical of one fan motor -- indicating opening of motor circuit. 55:54:00 55:54:15 55:54:30 Oxygen Oxygen tank tank no. no. 2 pressure 2 pressure levels begins off to at rise 954

psia.

again.

Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage reading drops from full scale (to which it had failed at 46:40 g.e.t.) to zero and then read 75-percent full. This behavior indicates the gage short circuit may have corrected itself. Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins to rise rapidly.

55:54:31
55:54:45

Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reading recorded value of 1008 psia. Oxygen tank 996 psia. no. 2 pressure reading

reaches

maximum

55:54:52.763

had

dropped

to

The available evidence points to a combustion process as the cause of the pressure and temperature increases recorded in oxygen tank no. 2. The pressure reading for oxygen tank no. 2 began to increase about 13 seconds after the first electrical spike, and about 55 seconds later the temperature began to increase. The temperature sensor reads local temperature, which need not represent bulk fluid temperature. Since the rate of pressure rise in the tank indicates a relatively slow propagation of burning, it is likely that the region immediately around the temperature sensor did not become heated until this time. There are materials within the tank that can, if ignited in the

presence of supercritical oxygen, react chemically with the oxygen in exothermic chemical reactions. The most readily reactive is Teflon used for electrical insulation in are metals, particularly aluminum. the tank. Also There is more potentially reactive than sufficient Tef-

lon in the tank, if reacted with oxygen, to account for the pressure and temperature increases recorded. Furthermore, the pressure rise took place over a period of more than 69 seconds, a relatively long period, and one which would be more likely characteristic of Teflon combustion than metal-oxygen reactions. While the data available on the combustion of Teflon in supercritical oxygen in zero-g are extremely limited, those which are available indicate that the rate of combustion is generally consistent with these

4-38

observations. The cause of the 15-second period of relatively constant pressure first indicated at 55:53:59.763 has not been precisely determined; it is believed to be associated with a change in reaction rate as combustion proceeded through various Teflon elements. While there is enough electrical power in the tank to cause ignition in the event of a short circuit or abnormal heating in defective wire_ there is not sufficient electric power to account for all of the energy required to produce the observed pressure rise. LOSSOF OXYGEN TANKNO. 2 SYSTEM INTEGRITY
Key Data indication (-151 ° F) from

55:54:52 55:54:52.763
55:54:53.182 55:54:53.220 55:54:53.555* 55:54:55.35 55:54:56

Last oxygen Last loss Sudden

valid tank

temperature no. 2.

pressure reading from of data--996 psia. accelerometer control data

oxygen

tank

no.

2 before

activity system begins. data. indications

on X_ body

Y,

and

Z axes. begin.

Stabilization Loss of

rate

changes

telemetry

Recovery Various rises. Oxygen Oxygen the relatively

of telemetry temperature

in

SM begin

slight

55:54:56 55:54:56 After

tank tank slow

no. no.

2 temperature 2 pressure

reads reads

off-scale

high.

off-scale described

low. above took

propagation

process

place, there was a relatively rity. About 69 seconds after peak recorded, 1008 psia, the tank relief valve is designed for 8 seconds, dropping to 996

abrupt loss of oxygen tank no. 2 integthe pressure began to rise, it reached the pressure at which the cryogenic oxygen to be fully open. Pressure began a decrease psia before readings were lost. Virtually

*Several try data"

bits

of data

have

been

obtained

from

this

"loss

of

teleme-

period.

4-39

all

signals

from

the

spacecraft

were

lost

about

1.85

seconds

after

the

last presumably valid reading ing, and 0.8 second after the (which may or may not reflect

from within the tank, a temperature readlast presumably valid pressure reading the pressure within the tank itself since

the pressure transducer is about 20 feet of tubing length distant). Abnormal spacecraft accelerations were recorded approximately 0.22 second after the last pressure reading and approximately 0.38 second before the loss of signal. These facts all point to,a relatively sudden loss of integrity. At about this time, several solenoid valves_ including the oxygen valves feeding two of the three fuel cells, were shocked to the closed position. The "bang" reported by the crew also probably occurred in this time period. Telemetry signals from Apollo 13 were lost for a period of 1.8 seconds. When signal was reacquired, all instrument indicators from oxygen tank no. 2 were off-scale, high or low. Temperatures recorded by sensors in several different locations in the SM showed slight increases of signal. Photographs jettisoned this event. show that the in the several taken later by bay 4 panel seconds following reacquisition the Apollo 13 crew as the SM was ejected, undoubtedly during

was

Data oxygen mation,

are

not

adequate

to

determine

precisely

the

way

in

which

the

tank no. 2 analyses,

system lost its integrity. and tests performed during

However, available this investigation

inforindicate

that most probably the combustion within the pressure led to localized heating and failure at the pressure is at this point, the upper Inconel conduit is located, enter along the the pressure vessel. wire insulation

vessel ultimately vessel closure. It

end of the quantity probe, that the 1/2-inch through which the Teflon-insulated wires It is likely that the combustion progressed and reached this location where all of the by ignition and failure of the metal of the

wires come together. This, possibly augmented in the upper end of the probe, led to weakening closure or the conduit, or both. Failure at this point would lead immediately

to

pressurization

of 75

the tank dome, which is equipped psi. Rupture of this disc or of oxygen, accompanied tions recorded were

with a rupture disc rated at about the entire dome would then release into bay release. 4. The

by combustion products, probably caused by this

accelera-

space enough

Release of the oxygen then began to pressurize the oxygen shelf of bay 4. If the hole formed in the pressure vessel were large and formed rapidly enough, the escaping oxygen alone would be

adequate to blow off the bay 4 panel. However, it is also quite possible that the escape of oxygen was accompanied by combustion of Mylar and Kapton (used extensively as thermal insulation in the oxygen shelf compartment, figure 4-11, and in the tank dome) which would augment the

4-40

Figure

4-11.X_-_X_

Closeup

view

of

oxygen

tank

shelf.

4-41

N

N

L. ,. ,.....

M_

pressure recorded

caused by at various

the oxygen itself. The slight temperature increases SM locations indicate that combustion external to place. Further testing of panel ejection. The disrupting communications may shed additional light ejected panel then struck from the spacecraft for

the tank probably took on the exact mechanism the high-gain antenna, the 1.8 seconds.

LOSS

OF

OXYGEN

TANK

NO.

i INTEGRITY

Key 55:54:53.323 Oxygen to 879 to Loss of tank no. psia). telemetry

Data 1 pressure drops 4 psia (from 883 psia

55:54:53.555 55:54:55.35 55:54:56

data.

Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure reads 782 psia and drops steadily. Pressure drops over a period of 130 minutes to the point at which it was insufficient to sustain operation of fuel cell no. 2. is no clear evidence of abnormal behavior associated with

There

oxygen tank no. 1 prior to loss of signal, although the one data bit (4 psi) drop in pressure in the last tank no. 1 pressure reading prior to loss of signal may indicate that a problem was beginning. Immediately after signal strength was regained, data show that tank no. 1 system had lost its integrity. Pressure decreases were recorded over a period of approximately 130 minutes, indicating that a relatively slow leak had developed in the tank no. 1 system. Analysis has indicated that the leak rate is less than that which would result from a completely ruptured line, but could be consistent with a partial line rupture or a leaking check or relief valve. Since there is no evidence that there was any anomalous condition arising within oxygen tank no. l, it is presumed that "the loss of oxygen tank no. 1 integrity resulted from the oxygen tank no. 2 system failure. The relatively sudden, and possibly violent, event associated with loss of integrity of the oxygen tank no. 2 system could have ruptured a line to oxygen tank no. l, or have caused a valve to leak because of mechanical shock.

Preceding page blank
4-43

PART

5.

APOLLO

13 RECOVERY

UNDERSTANDING

THE

PROBLEM

In the

period

immediately

following

the

caution

and

warning

alarm the

for main bus B undervoltage, and crew, the cause of the difficulty were not apparent.

the associated "bang" reported by and the degree of its seriousness

The i. 8-second loss of telemetered data was accompanied by the switching of the CSM high-gain antenna mounted on the SM adjacent to bay 4 from narrow beam width to wide beam width. The high-gain antenna does this automatically 200 milliseconds after its directional lock on the ground signal has been lost. A confusing factor was the repeated firings of various SM attitude control thrusters during the period after data loss. In all probability, these thrusters were being fired to overcome the effects that oxygen venting and panel blowoff were having on spacecraft attitude, but it was believed for a time that perhaps the thrusters were malfunctioning. The failure of oxygen tank no. produced a shock which closed 2 and valves consequent removal of the bay 4 in the oxygen supply lines to about the dc 3

panel

fuel cells 1 and 3. These fuel cells ceased to provide power in minutes, when the supply of oxygen between the closed valves and cells was depleted. main bus A, but the Fuel cell failure of

2 continued to power ac bus 1 through fuel cell 3 left dc main bus B and ac

bus 2 unpowered (see fig. 4-12). The oxygen tank no. 2 temperature and quantity gages were connected to ac bus 2 at the time of the accident. Thus, these parameters could not be read once fuel cell 3 failed at 55:57:44 until power was applied to ac bus 2 from main bus A.

fuel

The crew was not alerted to closure of the oxygen feed cells 1 and 3 because the valve position indicators in to give warning only if both The hydrogen valves remained the oxygen open. The

valves to the CM were valves been

arranged closed.

and hydrogen crew had not

alerted to the oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise or to its subsequent drop because a hydrogen tank low pressure warning had blocked the cryogenic subsystem portion of the caution and warning system several minutes before the accident. When the crew heard the bang and got the master alarm for low dc

main bus B voltage, the command module, stowing

Commander was in the lower equipment bay of the a television camera which had Just been in use.

4-4

Fuel cell 1

DC main A

AC bus i

l

Fuel cell 2

r

-LI %I1

Fuel cell 3 J DC main B

I
Cryo 0 2 tank 2 pressure gage

II

:

l

2 Inverter

AC bus 2

I
Cryo 0 2 tank 2 fan Cryo 0 2 tank 2 quantity, temperature gages

m

[

SCS telemetry channels

Figure

4-12.-

Electrical

configuration

at

55:54:53

g.e.t.

it.

The Lunar Module Pilot was in the tunnel between the CSM and the LM, returning to the CSM. The Command Module Pilot was in the left-hand couch, monitoring spacecraft performance. Because of the master alarm indicating low voltage, the CMP movedacross to the right-hand couch where CSM voltages can be observed. He reported that voltages were "looking good" at 55:56:10. At this time, main bus B had recovered and fuel cell 3 did not fail for another l-l/2 minutes. He also reported fluctuations in the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity, followed by a return to the off-scale high position. (See fig. 4-13 for CMpanel arrangement). Whenfuel cells 1 and 3 electrical output readings went to zero, the ground controllers could not be certain that the cells had not somehowbeen disconnected from their respective busses and were not otherwise all right. Attention continued to be focused on electrical problems. Five minutes after the accident, controllers asked the crew to connect fuel cell 3 to dc main bus B in order to be sure that the configuration was known. Whenit was realized that fuel cells 1 and 3 were not functioning, the crew was directed to perform an emergencypowerdown to lower the load on the remaining fuel cell. Observing the rapid decay in oxygen tank no. 1 pressure, controllers asked the crew to switch power to the oxygen tank no. 2 instrumentation. Whenthis was done, and it was realized that oxygen tank no. 2 had failed, the extreme seriousness of the situation became clear. During the succeeding period, efforts were madeto save the remaining oxygen in the oxygen tank no. 1. Several attempts were made, but had no effect. The pressure continued to decrease. It was obvious by about l-l/2 hours after the accident that the oxygen tank no. 1 leak could not be stopped and that shortly it would be necessary to use the LM as a "lifeboat" for the remainder of the mission. By 58:40 g.e.t., the LMhad been activated, the inertial guidance reference transferred from the CSM guidance system to the LM guidance system, and the CSM systems were turned off. RETURN TOEARTH The remainder of the mission was characteriz_ d by two main activities--planning and conducting the necessary propulsion maneuvers to return the spacecraft to Earth, and managing the use of consumables in such a way that the LM, which is designed for a basic mission with two crewmenfor a relatively short duration, could support three men and serve as the actual control vehicle for the time required.

4-46

ILl

L

L

One mission.

significant anomaly At about 97 hours

was noted 14 minutes

during the remainder of the into the mission, the IAfP

reported hearing a "thump" and observing venting from the LM. Subsequent data review shows that the LM electrical power system experienced a brief but major abnormal current flow at that time. There is no evidence

E

that this anomaly was related organization is continuing. A number necessary of propulsion to return the

to

the

accident.

Analysis

by

the

Apollo

was

options were developed and spacecraft to a free-return Normally, for such

considered. trajectory the service maneuvers.

It and proHow-

to make pulsion

any required system (SPS)

midcourse corrections. in the SM would be used

ever, because of the high electrical engine, and in view of its uncertain of the the LM structure of the SM after the descent engine if possible.

power requirements condition and the accident, it was

for using that uncertain nature decided to use

The minimum practical return time was 133 hours g.e.t, to the Atlantic Ocean, and the maximum was 152 hours g.e.t, to the Indian Ocean. Recovery forces were deployed in the Pacific. The return path selected was for splashdown in the Pacific Ocean at 142:40 g.e.t. This required a minimum of two burns of the LM descent engine. A third burn was subsequently made to correct the normal maneuver execution variations in the first two burns. One small velocity adjustment were from was also made the with reaction control system thrusters. All burns 4-14 and 4-15 depict the flight plan followed dent to splashdown. The most critical consumables were water, satisfactory. the time of Figures acci-

used

to

cool

the

CSM

and

[

LM systems during use; CSM and LM battery power, the CSM batteries being for use during reentry and the LM batteries being needed for the rest of the mission; LM oxygen for breathing; and lithium hydroxide (Li0H) filter cannisters used to remove carbon dioxide from the spacecraft cabin atmosphere. These consumables, and in particular the water and LiOH cannisters, appeared to be extremely marginal in quantity shortly after the accident, but once the LM was powered down to conserve electric power and to generate less heat and thus use less water, the situation improved greatly. Engineers at MSC developed a method which allowed the crew to use materials on board to fashion a device allowing use of the CM Li0H eannisters in the LM cabin atmosphere cleaning system (see fig. 4-16). At splashdown, many hours of each consumable remained available (see figs. 4-17 through 4-19 and table 4-111).

U

4-48

m

ii

I

!

1:

I

_A_J

,i*];

ILl IJ

E .2L

_Ad

E

!

iJ

Figure /

4-13.-

_in

display

panel.

4-47

fi

;tart of problem (55:55)
to

r_

free-return (61:30)

\ F_
I kO

MCC-5 ] r_ MCC-2 for entry corridor (137:40) for entry corridor (105:18)

PC + 2 hr for Pacific landing (79:28)

Figure

4-14.-

Translunar

trajectory

phase.

CM power up G.E.T. 140:10

r_ r
_ Entry altitude G. E.T. 142:30 MCC-7 G.E.T. 137:40

P_
r

I kJ3 0

LM jettison G.E.T. 141:30 E

L

LM power up (3.E.T. 133:35

SM jettison G.E.T. 138:01

/--- Landing G.E.T. 142:54

Figure

4-15.-

Final

trajectory

phase.

r_

r
,

Figure

4-16.-

Lithium

hydroxide

canister

modification.

4-51

300

250

200

r
-kI k.n

r

Po

Anomaly55:54
I

100

I

LM jettison (141:30) enters LM (57:43)

r
50

!few
II II II II II II 60 0 50

I 70

Behind moon(77:09) I I I I I I I I 80 90

I I I I I I I
I

I
I00 Time, hours

I
Ii0

I 120

28.2 Ibs remainingI 130 140

150

Figure

4-17.- Usable

remaining

water.

r

..

.... j

•snqe_s

saIq_mnsuoo

ma_sXs

_a_od

leOI_Oal_

-'@I-_

a_L_I_

s_noq 'atoll 0_I ONI
II _

0£I
I

Ogl
I

011
I

001
I

06
I

08
I I

OL
I

09
I II

O_ 0 II II Ill I II 00t7

I I;

_

5UlUlgLUa_ S_udraw n'_OT .........

I I (60:L/) uoom pu,qa_

,I_ _ ', \

tTcj _;c_; ,_l_zmouv _
>

i
(0£:It71)
uosq

_

008
(I) 9_ E2m

Lf_ I

00_I

3
--.

v

0091

O00g

70

60

50

r
40
e_J >, X

!

o

30 Anomaly 55:54 I I ICrew enters LM (57:43) II I I Behind moon (77:09) I II j II I II I II j I I i _ 60 70 80 90

r

2O

28.53 Ibs remaining LM jettison (141:30) I I I I i i II 120 130 140

10

-

0 50

I i00 Time, hours

I II0

J
150

Figure

_-19.-

Usable

remaining

oxygen.

TABLE4-III.CABINATMOSPHERE CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL BY LITHIUMHYDROXIDE Re qui re d Available in LM Available in CM 85 hours 53 hours 182 hours

A more detailed recounting of the events during the Apollo 13 launch countdown and mission will be found in Appendix B to this report.

4-55

This

page

left

blank

intentionally.

4-56
NASA-MSC-Coral., Houston, Texas

CHAPTER

5

FINDINGS,

DETERMINATIONS,

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

5-0

PART

I.

INTRODUCTION

The

following

findings,

determinations,

and

recommendations

are

the

product of about 7 weeks of concentrated review by the Apollo 13 Review Board. They are based accident investigation by the Manned Spacecraft tractors, formed by and on or for an extensive series of special the Board and its Panels.

of the on that Center tests

Apollo 13 accident review, on the (MSC) and its conand analyses per-

of

Sufficient work has been done to identify the malfunction and the direction which the

and understand the corrective actions

nature must

take. All indications are that an electrically initiated fire in oxygen tank no. 2 in the service module (SM) was the cause of the accident. Accordingly, the Board has concentrated on this tank; on its design, manufacture, test, handling, checkout, use, failure mode, and eventual effects on the rest of the spacecraft. The accident the most probable cause has been identified. report, some details of the accident are not is generally understood, However, at the time of completely clear. and this

Further tests and analyses, which will be carried out under the overall direction of MSC, will continue to generate new information relative to this accident. It is possible that this evidence may lead to conclusions differing in detail from those which can be drawn now. However, it is most unlikely that fundamentally different results will be obtained. Recommendations corrective actions are provided should take. as to the Significant general direction which the modifications should be made

to the SM oxygen storage tanks and related equipments. The modified hardware should go through a rigorous requalification test program. This is the responsibility of the Apollo organization in the months ahead. In reaching its findings, determinations, and recommendations, it was necessary for the Board to review critically the equipment and the organizational elements responsible for it. It was found that the accident was not the result of a chance malfunction in a statistical sense, but rather resulted from an unusual combination of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat deficient and unforgiving design. In brief, this is what happened: a. After assembly flew on Apollo 13 American Rockwell is now known, switches on fail and acceptance testing, the oxygen tank no. was shipped from Beech Aircraft Corporation (NR) in apparently satisfactory condition. however, the heater during 2 to

which North

b. It thermostatic would Center

that the tank contained two protective assembly, which were inadequate and test operations at Kennedy Space

subsequently (KSC).

ground

5-1

c. In addition, it is probable that the tank contained a loosely fitting fill tube assembly. This assembly was probably displaced during subsequent handling, which included an incident at the prime contractor's plant in which the tank was jarred. d. In itself, the displaced fill tube assembly was not particularly serious, but it led to the use of improvised detanking procedures at KSC which almost certainly set the stage for the accident. e. Although Beech did not encounter any problem in detanking during acceptance tests, it was not possible to detank oxygen tank no. 2 using normal procedures at KSC. Tests and analyses indicate that this was due to gas leakage through the displaced fill tube assembly. f. The special detanking procedures at KSCsubjected the tank to an extended period of heater operation and pressure cycling. These procedures had not been used before, and the tank had not been qualified by test for the conditions experienced. However, the procedures did not violate the specifications which governed the operation of the heaters at KSC. g. In reviewing these procedures before the flight, officials of NASA,NR, and Beech did not recognize the possibility of damagedue to overheating. Many of these officials were not aware of the extended heater operation. In any event, adequate thermostatic switches might have been expected to protect the tank. h. A number of factors contributed to the presence of inadequate thermostatic switches in the heater assembly. The original 1962 specifications from NR to Beech Aircraft Corporation for the tank and heater assembly specified the use of 28 V dc power, which is used in the spacecraft. In 1965, NRissued a revised specification which stated that the heaters should use a 65 V dc power supply for tank pressurization; this was the power supply used at KSCto reduce pressurization time. Beech ordered switches for the Block II tanks but did not change the switch specifications to be compatible with 65 V dc. i. The thermostatic switch discrepancy was not detected by NASA,NR, or Beech in their review of documentation, nor did tests identify the incompatibility of the switches with the ground support equipment (GSE)at KSC, since neither qualification nor acceptance testing required switch cycling under load as should have been done. It was a serious oversight in which all parties shared. j. The thermostatic switches could accommodate the 65 V dc during tank pressurization because they normally remained cool and closed. However, they could not open without damagewith 65 V dc power applied. They were never required to do so until the special detanking. During this

5-2

procedure, as the switches started to open when they reached their upper temperature limit, they were welded permanently closed by the resulting arc and were rendered inoperative as protective thermostats. k. Failure of the thermostatic switches to open could have been detected at KSCif switch operation had been checked by observing heater current readings on the oxygen tank heater control panel. Although it was not recognized at that time_ the tank temperature readings indicated that the heaters had reached their temperature limit and switch opening should have beenexpected. i. As shownby subsequent tests, failure of the thermostatic switches probably permitted the temperature of the heater tube assembly to reach about i000 ° F in spots during the continuous 8-hour period of heater operation. Such heating has been shownby tests to severely damagethe Teflon insulation on the fan motor wires in the vicinity of the heater assembly. From that time on, including pad occupancy, the oxygen tank no. 2 was in a hazardous condition when filled with oxygen and electrically powered. m. It was not until nearly 56 hours into the mission, however, that the fan motor wiring, possibly movedby the fan stirring, short circuited and ignited its insulation by meansof an electric arc. The resulting combustion in the oxygen tank probably overheated and failed the wiring conduit where it enters the tank_ and possibly a portion of the tank itself. n. The rapid expulsion of high-pressure oxygen which followed, possibly augmentedby combustion of insulation in the space surrounding the tank, blew off the outer panel to bay 4 of the SM, caused a leak in the high-pressure system of oxygen tank no. i, damagedthe high-gain antenna, caused other miscellaneous damage, and aborted the mission. The accident is judged to have been nearly catastrophic. Only outstanding performance on the part of the crew, Mission Control, and other membersof the team which supported the operations successfully returned the crew to Earth. In investigating the accident to Apollo 13, the Board has also attempted to identify those additional technical and management lessons which can be applied to help assure the success of future space flight missions; several recommendationsof this nature are included. The Board recognizes that the contents of its report are largely of a critical nature. The report highlights in detail faults or deficiencies in equipment and procedures that the Board has identified. This is the nature of a review board report.

5-3

It is important, however, to view the criticisms in this report in a broader context. The Apollo spacecraft system is not without shortcomings, but it is the only system of its type ever built and successfully demonstrated. It has flown to the Moon five times and landed twice. The tank which failed_ the design of which is criticized in this report, is one of a series which had thousands of hours of successful operation in space prior to Apollo 13. While and operate ments speak dedication_ the the for this team of designers, engineers_ and technicians that build

Apollo spacecraft also has themselves. By hardheaded team can maintain this

shortcomings, self-criticism

the accomplishand continued in space.

nation's

preeminence

5-4

PART

2.

ASSESSMENT

OF ACCIDENT

FAILURE

OF

OXYGEN

TANK

NO.

2

l.

Findings
a.

The Apollo 13 mission was aborted as the direct result of the rapid loss of oxygen from oxygen tank no. 2 in the SM, followed by a gradual loss of oxygen from tank no. i, and a resulting loss of power from the oxygen-fed fuel cells. There is no evidence of any forces external to oxygen tank no. 2 during the flight which might have caused its failure. Oxygen tank no. aluminum, which oxygen. 2 contained if ignited materials, including Teflon will burn in supercritical and

b.

Co

d.

Oxygen tank no. 2 electrical wiring, aluminum fans.

contained unsealed

potential electric

ignition sources: motors, and rotating

e.

During the special detanking the countdown demonstration

of oxygen tank no. test (CDDT) at KSC,

2 following the thermo-

static switches on the heaters were required to open while powered by 65 V dc in order to protect the heaters from overheating. The switches were only rated at 30 V dc and have been
f.

shown

to

weld

closed

at

the

higher

voltage. heaters normally time of located in prior to the the accident.

Data indicate that in flight the tank oxygen tanks no. i and no. 2 operated accident, and they were not on at the The electrical circuit only about 7 millijoules the temperature sensor second. Telemetry electrical by short motor or

for the quantity probe would generate in the event of a short circuit and wires less than 3 millijoules per

h.

data izmnediately disturbances of circuits accompanied its leads in oxygen

prior to the accident indicate a character which would be caused by electrical tank no. 2. within minutes arcs in the fan

i.

The pressure and temperature abnormally during the 1-1/2 accident.

oxygen tank immediately

no. 2 rose prior to the

5-5

Determinations (i) The cause of the within the tank. Analysis showed failure of oxygen tank no. 2 was combustion

(2)

that account

the

electrical the

energy

flowing

into

the

tank could not and temperature. (3)

for

observed

increases

in pressure

The heater, temperature sensor, initiate the accident sequence.

and

quantity

probe

did

not

(4)

The cause of the combustion was most of Teflon wire insulation on the fan electric arcs in this wiring.

probably the motor wires,

ignition caused by

The protective thermostatic switches on the heaters in oxygen tank no. 2 failed closed during the initial portion of the first special detanking operation. This subjected the wiring in the vicinity of the heaters to very high temperatures which have been subsequently shown to severely degrade Teflon insulation.

(6)

The

telemetered to ignite

data the

indicated Teflon

electrical

arcs

of

sufficient by sub-

energy

insulation,

as verified

sequent tests. These tests also verified that the 1-ampere fuses on the fan motors would pass sufficient energy to ignite the insulation by the mechanism of an electric arc.

(7)

The combustion of Teflon wire insulation alone could sufficient heat to account for the observed increases tank pressure and local temperature, and heat and fail the tank or its associated bility of such failure at the top of the strated by subsequent tests.

release in

could locally overtubing. The possitank was demon-

(8)

The rate of flame propagation along Teflon-insulated as measured in subsequent tests is consistent with dicated rates of pressure rise within the tank.

wires the in-

SECONDARY

EFFECTS

OF

TANK

FAILURE

o

Findings a. Failure cluding: of the tank was accompanied by several events in-

5-6

A

%ang"

as heard

by

the

crew.

Spacecraft motion as the attitude control command module (CM). Momentary Closing Loss of of loss of

felt by the crew and as measured by system and the accelerometers in the

telemetry. valves of the by shock loading. no. 4 and i system. adjacent sectors

several

integrity temperature SM. the panel by of the

oxygen

tank

Slight of the Loss of

increases

in bay

covering the the crew. fuel

bay

4 of

the

SM,

as

observed

and

photographed Displacement Damage
b °

cells antenna

as photographed as photographed

by by

the the

crew. crew.

to

high-gain

The panel zation of is required

covering the bay. to blow bays

of bay About off

4 could be blown 25 psi of uniform panel. of the SM are

off by pressuripressure in bay

4

the

Co

The

various

and

sectors

interconnected if any slow

with open passages one were supplied rate. The CM attachments

so that all would be pressurized with a pressurant at a relatively

d.

would the SM. CM

be

failed shield

by and

an

average would

pressure separate

of

about i0 psi on the CM from the Determinations

heat

this

(1)

Failure of the oxygen tank no. 2 caused a rapid local pressurization of bay 4 of the SM by the high-pressure oxygen that escaped from the tank. This pressure pulse may have blown off the panel covering bay 4. This possibility was substantiated by a series of special tests. The pressure pulse from a tank failure might have been augmented by combustion of Mylar or Kapton insulation or both when subjected to a stream of oxygen and hot particles emerging from the top of the tank, as demonstrated in subsequenttests.

(2)

5-7

(3)

Combustion or vaporization of the Mylar account for the discoloration of the SM observed and photographed by the crew. Photographs condition of of the SM by the tank crew no. did 2.

or Kapton might engine nozzle as

(4)

not

establish

the

the

oxygen

(5)
(6)

The high-gain by the panel_

antenna damage probably resulted or a portion thereof, as it left

from striking the SM.

The loss of pressure on oxygen tank no. i and the subsequent loss of power resulted from the tank no. 2 failure. Telemetry, although good, is insufficient to pin down exact nature, sequence, and location of each event of accident in detail. the the

(7)

(s)

The telemetry data, crew testimony, photographs, and special tests and analyses already completed are sufficient to understand the problem and to proceed with corrective actions.

OXYGEN

TANK

NO.

2 DESIGN

3.

Findings
a,

The

cryogenic

oxygen

storage

tanks

contained and

a combination ignition

of oxidizer, sources.
b ,

combustible

material,

potential

Supercritical volume, and system. The heaters,

oxygen was fluid-handling

used to minimize the weight, problems of the oxygen supply

c.

fans, and

and

tank

instrumentation of the oxygen

are supply.

used

in

the

measurement Determinations

management

(i)

The storage of Apollo system. Heaters supply Fans

supercritical

oxygen

was

appropriate

for

the

(2)

are required is used. used to

to maintain

tank

pressure

as

the

oxygen

(3)

were

prevent the

excessive oxygen to

pressure improve

drops

due

to of

stratification,

to mix

accuracy

5-8

quantity measurements, and to insure adequate heater at low densities and high oxygen utilization rates. need for oxygen stirring on future flights requires investigation.

input The further

(4) The
and

amount burned

of material in the given

in

the

tank

which could

could have

be

ignited reduced

environment

been

significantly.

(5) The
when with (6)

potential ignition considered in the its assembly

sources constituted an light of the particular

undue tank

hazard design

difficulties. and the supplier of the extent of this hazard. tank

NASA, the prime contractor, were not fully aware of the

(7)

Examination of the high-pressure module following the Apollo 204 tion to the danger failed to recognize

oxygen system in the service fire, which directed attenoxygen of the environment, tank.

of fire in a pure the deficiencies

PREFLIGHT

DAMAGE

TO

TANK

WIRING

0

Findings
a.

The oxygen tank static switches heating. The the The

no. 2 heater assembly contained designed to protect the heaters

two thermofrom over-

b.

thermostatic switches were designed heater current at 80 ° ± i0 ° F. heaters are operated on on the to 28 V dc in

to

open

and

interrupt

c.

flight

and

at

NR.

d.

The heaters are operated poration and 65 V dc at higher voltages are used

65 V ac Kennedy

at Beech Aircraft CorSpace Center. These tank pressurization. at in 30 V dc. a closed to inter-

accelerate

e.

The thermostatic While they would position, rupt this

switches were rated at 7 amps carry this current at 65 V dc fail if they started to

they would load.

open

fo

Neither qualification nor acceptance testing assemblies or the tanks required thermostatic to be checked at 65 V dc. The only test of

of the heater switch opening switch opening

5-9

was a continuity cycled open and g. The thermostatic cause this would were depleted to

check closed

at Beech in which in an oven.

the

switch

was

switches had never only happen if the nearly zero.

operated in flight beoxygen supply in a tank

hi

The thermostatic switches had never operated under load because the heaters had only been relatively full tank which kept the switches During the CDDT, the oxygen tank no. 2 would a

on the ground used with a cool and closed. not detank in

i.

a normal procedure 8 hours depleted j.

manner. On March 27 and 28, was followed which subjected of continuous of oxygen. operation until

special detanking the heater to about tanks were nearly

the

A second special March 30, 1970. The oxygen tanks

detanking

of

shorter

duration

followed

on

k.

had

not

been

qualification procedure. and currents

tested

for

the

conditions encountered fied allowable heater
i.

in this voltages

However, speciwere not exceeded.

The recorded internal tank temperature went off-scale high early in the special detanking. The thermostatic switches would normally open at this point but the electrical records show no thermostatic switch operation. These indications were not detected at the time. The which oxygen would tank have heater controls at KSC contained switch ammeters operation.

m.

indicated

thermostatic

Determinations

(i)

During the the heaters period, powered

special detanking of March in oxygen tank no. 2 were

27 and 28 at KSC, when left on for an extended while

the thermostatic by 65 V dc and

switches started to open were probably welded shut.

(2)

Failure of the thermostatic switches to open could have been detected at KSC if switch operation had been checked by observing heater current readings on the oxygen tank heater control panel. Although it was not recognized at the time, the tank temperature readings indicated that the heaters had reached their temperature have been expected. limit and switch opening should

5-10

(3)

The

fact

that

the

switches

were

not

rated

to

open

at

65 V

dc

was not detected by documentation or in

NASA, NR, or Beech in their qualification and acceptance resulted in severe that heater assembly i000 ° F.

reviews of testing. Subsecould

(4)

The failed switches quent tests showed have reached about

overheating. temperatures

(5)

The high temperatures severely damaged the Teflon insulation on the wiring in the vicinity of the heater assembly and set the stage for subsequent short circuiting. As shown in subsequent tests_ this damage could range from cracking to total oxidation and disappearance of the insulation. During and following the no. 2 was in a hazardous oxygen and was electrically special detanking, condition whenever energized. the oxygen tank it contained

(6)

5-ii

PART

3.

SUPPORTING

CONSIDERATIONS

DESIGN,

MANUFACTURING,

AND

TEST

5.

Finding

The pressure vessel structed of Inconel operating pressure. Determination

of the supercritical oxygen tank is con718, and is moderately stressed at normal

From a structural viewpoint, the supercritical oxygen pressure vessel is quite adequately designed, employing a tough material well chosen for this application. The stress analysis and the results of the qualification burst test program confirm the ability of the tank to exhibit adequate performance in its intended application. 6. Findings

a.

The oxygen tank motors immersed Fan motors of

design includes in supercritical design have

two unsealed oxygen. a test history

electric

fan

b.

this

of

failure and

during acceptance test phase-to-ground faults.
Co

which

includes

phase-to-phase

The

fan

motor

stator

windings

are

constructed

with

Teflon-

coated, ceramic-insulated, to-phase and phase-to-ground motor design. d. The motor case is largely

number 36 AWG wire. insulation is not

Full phaseused in the

aluminum.

Determinations

(i)

The stator winding during manufacture The use tionable

insulation is brittle of the stator coils. in supercritical

and

easily

fractured

(2)

of these motors practice.

oxygen

was

a ques-

7.

Findings

a.

The cryogenic oxygen could be ignited and

storage tanks contained materials that which will burn under the conditions

5-12

prevailing within the tank, including Teflon, solder, and Drilube 822. b. c.

aluminum,

The tank contained electrical wiring exposed to the supercritical oxygen. The wiring was insulated with Teflon. Somewiring was in close proximity to the rotating fan.
The design essentially completion. was such "blind"

to heater elements and
of the equipment was to inspection after

do

that the assembly and not amenable

e.

Teflon insulation of the electrical wiring inside the cryogenic oxygen storage tanks of the SM was exposed to relatively sharp metal edges of tank inner parts during manufacturing assembly operations. Portions of this wiring completion of assembly. remained unsupported in the tank on

f.

Determinations (i) The tank contained ignition a hazardous sources. combination of materials and

potential

(2)

Scraping of the electrical wiring insulation against metal inner parts of the tank constituted a substantial cumulative hazard during assembly, handling, test, checkout, and operational use. "Cold flow" of the Teflon insulation, when pressed against metal corners within the tank for an extended period of time, could result in an eventual degradation of insulation protection. The externally applied electrical tests (500-volt Hi-pot) could not reveal the extent of such possible insulation damage but could only indicate that the relative positions of the wires at the time of the tests were such that the separation or insulation would withstand tential without electrical breakdown. the 500-volt po-

(5)

(4)

(5)

The design was these hazards. There is no ufacturing.

such

that

it was

difficult

to

insure

against

(6)

evidence

that

the

wiring

was

damaged

during

man-

5-13

9.

Findings
a.

Dimensioning of the short Teflon and of the cryogenic oxygen storage tank looseness to the point of incomplete in the event of worst-case tolerance

Inconel tube segments fill line was such that connection was possible buildup. the top of the tank of its final closure

b,

The insertion of these quantity probe assembly and welding was

segments into at the point to achieve.

difficult

c.

Probing pensate

with a hand for limited

tool was used visibility of

in manufacturing the tube segment

to compositions.

Determination It was possible for a tank to have been assembled with a relatively loose fill tube parts that could go undetected final inspection and be subsequently displaced. i0. Findings
a.

set of in

The Apollo spacecraft system vessels, many of which carry and other plumbing. Investigation other systems but is being of potential

contains oxidants,

numerous pressure plus related valves

b.

hazards

associated

with

these

was not complete at the time of pursued by the Manned Spacecraft

the report, Center. valve combinawiring and is

C.

One piece of equipment, the fuel cell oxygen supply module, has been identified as containing a similar tion of high-pressure oxygen, Teflon, and electrical as in the oxygen tank no. 2. The wiring is unfused routed through a lO-amp circuit breaker.

Determination The fuel cell oxygen supply potentially hazardous. ll. Findings
a.

valve

module

has

been

identified

as

In the normal sequence of cryogenic oxygen tegration and checkout, each tank undergoes assembly into an oxygen shelf for a service transportation to facilitate shelf assembly integration of shelf assembly to the SM.

storage tank inshipping, module, factory test, and then

5-14

b.

The SMundergoes factory transportation, air shipment to KSC, and subsequent ground transportation and handling.

Determination There were environments during the normal sequence of operations could displaced.

subsequent to the final acceptance cause a loose-fitting set of fill 12. Findings
a.

tests at Beech that tube parts to become

At

North

American

Rockwell, the oxygen the inner

Downey,

California,

in

the

attempt a bolt moved. b. Attempts lifting

to remove restraining

shelf assembly from SM 106, edge of the shelf was not re-

to lift fixture,

the shelf with thereby jarring

the bolt in place the oxygen tanks

broke the and valves.

C.

The oxygen shelf assembly incorporating S/N XTAO008 in the tank no. 2 position, which had been shaken during removal from SM 106, was installed in SM 109 one month later. An analysis, shelf inspection, and a partial retest emphasizing electrical continuity of internal wiring were accomplished before reinstallation.

d.

Determinations

(i)

Displacement of fill tube the "shelf drop" incident without detection.

parts could have occurred, at the prime contractor's

during plant,

(2)

Other damage to the tank may have occurred from the jolt, but special tests and analyses indicate that this is unlikely. The "shelf of project at KSC. drop" incident was not brought to the officials during subsequent detanking attention difficulties

(3)

13.

Finding Detanking, expulsion of liquid oxygen out the fill line of the oxygen tank by warm gas pressure applied through the vent line, was a regular activity at Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, in emptying tests. a portion of the oxygen used in end-item acceptance

5-15

Determination

The no. the 14. Findings
a.

latter stages of the detanking operation on oxygen tank 2 conducted at Beech on February 3, 1967, were similar to standard procedure followed at KSC during the CDDT.

The

attempt

to detank by the with

the

cryogenic

oxygen

tanks on 2. March

at

KSC 23, 1970,

after the CDDT was unsuccessful
b,

standard procedures regard to tank no.

A special detanking procedure was used to empty oxygen tank no. 2 after CDDT. This procedure involved continuous protracted heating with repeated cycles of pressurization to about 300 psi with warm gas followed by venting. It was verify employed that the both tank after could CDDT and after be filled. a special test to

c.

There is no indication from the heater voltage recording that the thermostatic switches functioned and cycled the heaters off and on during these special detanking procedures. At the completion of detanking following CDDT, the switches are only checked to see that they remain closed at -75 ° F as the tank is warmed up. They are not checked to verify that they will open at +80 ° F. Tests subsequent to the flight showed that the current

e.

fo

associated with the heaters would cause weld closed if they
g.

KSC 65 V dc ground powering of the the thermostatic switch contacts to attempted to interrupt this current.

A second test showed that without functioning thermostatic switches, temperatures in the 800 ° to i000 ° F range would exist at locations on the heater tube assembly that were in close proximity with the motor wires. These temperatures are high enough to damage Teflon and melt solder.

Determinations

(i)

Oxygen manner

tank no. 2 (XTA 0008) did not comparable to its performance liquid oxygen, i.e., that in the

detank after CDDT in a the last time it had test at Beech. some

contained

acceptance tank during had

(2)

Such change events

evidence of of

indicates

undergone

internal configuration the previous 3 years.

the

intervening

5-16

(3)

The

tank

conditions

during

the

special

detanking

procedures oxygen in sub-

were outside all prior storage tanks. Heater sequent tests exceeded

testing of Apollo CSM assembly temperatures i000 ° F.

cryogenic measured

(4)

Severe damage to the insulation to the tank, as determined from from the special procedure. Damage to supported boiling

of electrical wiring internal subsequent tests, resulted

(5)

the insulation, particularly lengths of wiring, may also with this procedure.

on the long have occurred

undue

to

associated

(6) MSC,

KSC, and switches were

NR personnel did not know not rated to open with 65

that V dc

the GSE

thermostatic power

applied. 15. Findings
a,

The change in tank was made system during

detanking procedures on the cryogenic oxygen in accordance with the existing change control final launch preparations for Apollo 13.

b.

Launch operations personnel who made the change did not have a detailed understanding of the tank internal components, or the tank history. They made appropriate contacts before making the change.

C,

Communications, primarily by telephone, among MSC, KSC, NR, and Beech personnel during final launch preparations regarding the cryogenic oxygen system included incomplete and inaccurate information. The MSC Test Specification Criteria Document (TSCD) which was used by KSC in preparing detailed tank test procedures states the tank allowable heater voltage and current as 65 to 85 V dc and 9 to 17 amperes with no restrictions on time.

d,

Determinations

(l)

NR and MSC personnel who prepared the the tank heater thermostatic switches the tank. personnel assumed by the switches.

TSCD did not know would not protect

that

(2)

Launch operations from overheating

the

tank

was

protected

5-17

b)

Launch operations personnel at KSC stayed specified tank heater voltage and current detanking at KSC.

within limits

the during

the

16.

Findings
ao

After receipt of the Block II oxygen tank specifications from NR, which required the tank heater assembly to operate with 65 V dc GSE Aircraft did not supplier to make higher voltage. power only during tank pressurization_ Beech require their Block I thermostatic switch a change in the switch to operate at the

b.

NR did between

not review the tank the switch and the

or heater GSE.

to

assure

compatibility

c.

MSC did not review bility between the

the tank or heater to switch and the GSE. by MSC, NR,

assure

compati-

d.

No tests were specified switch under load.

or Beech

to

check

this

Determinations

(i)

NR and Beech thermostatic inadequate.

specifications governing switch protection of the

the powering and heater assemblies

the were

(2)

The specifications governing assemblies were inadequate.

the

testing

of

the

heater

17.

Finding The was no. hazard associated with not given consideration 2. the in long heater the decision cycle during detanking to fly oxygen tank

Determinations

(i)

MSC, KSC, and NR personnel thermostatic switches did heating. If the long period of thermostatic switches been replaced.

did not know that the tank heater not protect the tank from over-

(2)

continuous heater operation with failed had been known, the tank would have

5-18

L

.

z,.-,,_

A-_

18.

Findings Management controls requiring detailed reviews and approvals

of design, manufacturing test procedures, hardware and flight readiness are and

processes, assembly procedures, acceptance, safety, reliability, in effect for all Apollo hardware

operations. the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen system were not was originally in as

When

designed, the management great detail as they are Determination

controls now.

defined

From review of documents and interviews, it appears that the management controls existing at that time were adhered to in the case of the cryogenic oxygen system incorporated in Apollo 19. Finding The only oxygen tank no. was a small leak through corrected. Determination No indications of a potential inflight malfunction of tank no. 2 were present during the launch countdown. the oxygen 2 anomaly the vent during the final quick disconnect, countdown which was 13.

MISSION

EVENTS

THI_OUGH ACCIDENT

20.

Findings a. The center engine of the S-If stage of the Saturn V vehicle prematurely shut down at 132 seconds due to 16 hertz oscillations in thrust chamber pressure. Data indicated less than O.ig vibration in the CM. launch large

b.

Determinations (i) Investigation of the Board accident. of this S-If anomaly except insofar as it was not within the purview relates to the Apollo 13

5-19

(2)
21. Findings

The resulting oscillations or vibration of the space vehicle probably did not affect the oxygen tank.

a.

Fuel

cell

current

increased

between

46:40:05 tank

and no.

46:40:08 were

indicating turned on b. The oxygen 46:40:08.

that oxygen tank no. during this interval. tank no. 2 quantity

i and

2 fans

indicated

off-scale

high

at

Determinations (i) The oxygen 46:40:08. tank no. 2 quantity probe short circuited at

(2)

The

short

circuit

could

have

been

caused

by

either

a

com-

pletely loose fill tube part or a solder splash being carried by the moving fluid into contact with both elements of the probe capacitor. 22. Findings

a.

The the

crew tank

acknowledged Mission fans at 55:53:06. current increased

Control's

request

to

turn

on

b. c.

Spacecraft The due

by

i

ampere

at

55:53:19. at 55:53:19

oxygen tank no. i pressure to normal destratification.

decreased

8 psi

Determination

The fans in oxygen at 55:53:19. 23. Findings a.

tank

no.

i were

turned

on

and

began

rotating

Spacecraft current voltage decreased

increased by 1-1/2 amperes 0.6 volt at 55:53:20.

and

ac bus

2

Stabilization and Control System (SCS) gimbal command telemetry channels, which are sensitive indicators of electrical transients associated with switching on or off of certain spacecraft electrical loads, showed a negative initial transient during oxygen tank no. 2 fan turnon cycles and a positive initial transient during oxygen tank no. 2 fan turnoff

5-20

cycles during the Apollo 13 mission. A negative initial transient was measuredin the SCSat 55:53:20. c. The oxygen tank no. 2 pressure decreased about 4 psi when the'fans were turned on at 55:53:21.

Determinations

(i) (2)

The It

fans cannot

in be

oxygen

tank

no.

2 were or

turned not

On

at were

55:53:20. rotating

determined

whether

they

because the pressure show destratification. 24. Finding An ll.l-amp spike 1.2-volt decrease Determinations (i) A short circuit

decrease was too small to It is likely that they

conclusively were.

in fuel cell were measured

3

current and a momentary in ac bus 2 at 55:53:23.

occurred

in

the

circuits

of

the

fans fuses

in or

oxygen opened

tank no. 2 which resulted in either blown wiring, and one fan ceased to function. circuit probably dissipated an energy

(2)

The

short

in excess

of i0 joules which, as shown in subsequent tests, is more than sufficient to ignite Teflon wire insulation by means of an electric arc. 25. Findings a. A momentary measured at A 22.9-amp 55:53:41. ll-volt decrease 55:53:38. spike in fuel cell in ac bus 2 voltage was

b.

3

current

was

measured

at

C.

After the electrical transients, CM current and ac bus 2 voltage returned to the values indicated prior to the turnon of the fans in oxygen tank no. 2.

Determination Two short circuits occurred in the oxygen tank no. 2 fan circuits between 55:53:38 and 55:53:41 which resulted in either blown fuses or opened wiring, and the second fan ceased to function.

5-21

26.

Finding Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure rise from 887 to 954 psia between 55:53:36 and 55:54:00. It then remained nearly constant for about 15 seconds and then rose again from 954 to 1008 psia, beginning at 55:54:15 and ending at 55:54:45. Determinations

(i) (2)

An

abnormal

pressure

rise

occurred

in

oxygen

tank

no.

2.

Since no other known energy source in the tank this pressure buildup, it is concluded to have combustion initiated by the first short circuit a wire insulation fire in the tank.

could produce resulted from which started

27.

Findings a. The pressure relief about i000 psi. valve was designed to be fully open at

b.

Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure 1008 psia at 55:54:45 to 996 psia at 55:54:53, telemetry data were lost.

drop from at which

time

Determination This drop resulted from relief valve as verified the in normal operation of subsequent tests. the pressure

28.

Findings
ao

At

55:54:29,

when

the

pressure

in

oxygen

tank

no.

2 exceeded

the master caution and warning trip level of 975 psia, the CM master alarm was inhibited by the fact that a warning of low hydrogen pressure was already in effect, and neither the crew nor Mission Control was alerted to the pressure rise.
b •

The master system is

caution and such that an

warning system out-of-tolerance

logic for the cryogenic condition of one in

measurement which triggers a master alarm prevents another master alarm from being generated when any other parameter the same system becomes out-of-tolerance.
Co

The low-pressure trip level of the master caution and warning system for the cryogenic storage system is only i psi below the specified lower limit of the pressure switch which controls the tank heaters. A small imbalance in hydrogen tank

5-22

pressures or a shift in transducer or switch calibration can cause the master caution and warning to be triggered preceding each heater cycle. This occurred several times on Apollo 13.
d.

A limit

sense

light

indicating

abnormal

oxygen

tank

no.

2

pressure should have come on in Mission Control about 30 seconds before oxygen tank no. 2 failed. There is no way to ascertain that the light did, in fact, come on. If it did Determinations come on, Mission Control did not observe it.

(i)

If the pressure switch setting trip levels were separated by there would be less likelihood

and master caution and warning a greater pressure differential, of unnecessary master alarms.

(2)

With the present master caution and warning system, a spacecraft problem can go unnoticed because of the presence of a previous out-of-tolerance condition in the same subsystem. Although a master alarm at 55:54:29 or observance of a limit

sense light in Mission or Mission Control in

Control could have alerted the crew sufficient time to detect the pressure

rise in oxygen tank no. 2_ no action could have been taken at that time to prevent the tank failure. However_ the information could have been helpful to Mission Control and the crew (4) in diagnosis of spacecraft malfunctions. Control warning can be modified system. to

The limit constitute

sense system in Mission a more positive backup

29.

Finding Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a temperature rise of 38 ° F beginning at 55:54:31 sensed by a single sensor which measured local temperature. This sensor indicated off-scale low at 55:54:53. Determinations (i) An abnormal and sudden temperature rise tank no. 2 at approximately 55:54:31. The had The temperature progressed temperature was a local value to the vicinity of sensor failed at occurred in oxygen

(2)

which rose when the sensor. 55:54:53.

combustion

(3)

5-23

30.

Finding Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry indicated the following changes: (i) quantity decreased from off-scale high to off-scale low in 2 seconds at 55:54:30, (2) quantity increased to 75.3 percent at 55:54:32, and (3) quantity was off-scale high at 55:54:51 and later became erratic. Determinations (i) Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity data between 55:54:32 55:54:50 may represent valid measurements. Immediately indications preceding and following this time were caused by electrical faults. and

(2)

period,

the

31.

Findings

At about 55:54:53, or loss, the body-mounted

about half a second before linear accelerometers in

telemetry the command began were 0.65g milli-

module, which are sampled at i00 times per second, indicating spacecraft motions. These disturbances erratic, but reached peak values of 1.17g, in the X, Y, and Z directions, respectively, seconds before data loss. b. The body-mounted level activity roll, for 1/4 pitch, second and yaw rate beginning at

0.65g, and about 13

gyros showed 55:54:53.220.

low-

The integrating accelerometers indicated that a velocity increment of approximately 0.5 fps was imparted to the spacecraft between 55:54:53 and 55:54:55. Doppler tracking data measured an incremental velocity ponent of 0.26 fps along a line from the Earth to the craft at approximately 55:54:55. The crew heard a loud "bang" at about this time. 55:54:53 narrow-beam and comspace-

e.

Telemetry data were lost between approximately 55:54:55 and the spacecraft switched from the antenna to the wide-beam antenna.

g.

Crew observations and photographs showed the bay 4 panel be missing and the high-gain antenna to be damaged.

to

5-24

ILl

II

E

E

E

E

k

L

'"

"

'

"

Determinations

(i)

The spacecraft was subjected to abnormal forces at approximately 55:54:53. These disturbances were reactions resulting from failure and venting of the oxygen tank no. 2 system and subsequent separation and ejection of the bay 4 panel. The high-gain antenna was damaged section thereof from bay 4 at the either by the time of panel panel or a separation.

(2)

32.

Finding Temperature sensors in bay 3, bay 4, and the the SM indicated abnormal increases following data at 55:54:55. central column reacquisition of of

Determination Heating took separation. 33. Findings a. The telemetered nitrogen scale low at reacquisition Fuel this The the the Determinations (i) The nitrogen pressure failed at the time of sensor in fuel the accident. caused by cell i or its wiring cell I time. continued to pressure in fuel cell of data at 55:54:55. operate for about i was offplac e in the SM at approximately the time of panel

b.

3 minutes

past

Co

wiring to the nitrogen sensor shelf which supports the fuel oxygen tanks.

passes cells

along the immediately

top of above

(2)

The failure was probably sensor wiring or shock. This is the only oxygen system at

physical

damage

to

the

(3)

known instrumentation that time.

failure

outside

the

34.

Finding Oxygen tank 782 psia at more slowly no. i pressure approximately at 55:54:56. decreased rapidly 55:54:54 and then from began 879 psia to to decrease

5-25

Determination

A leak mately 35. Findings
a.

caused loss 55:54:54.

of

oxygen

from

tank

no.

i beginning

at

approxi-

Oxygen

flow

rates

to

fuel

cells

I and

3 decreased

in

a

5-second period beginning at 55:54:55, but sufficient volume existed in lines feeding the fuel cells to allow them to operate about 3 minutes after the oxygen supply valves were cut off. The crew reported at 55:57:44 that five valves in the reaction

control system (RCS) were closed. The shock required to close the oxygen supply valves is of the same order of magnitudeas the shock required to close the RCS valves. c. Fuel cells i and 3 failed at about 55:58.

Determination The oxygen supply valves to fuel by cells the i and of 3, and the five RCS

valves, ejection

were probably or both.

closed

shock

tank

failure

or panel

MISSION

EVENTS

AFTER

ACCIDENT

36.

Findings

Since

data

presented

to

flight

controllers

in Mission

Control

are updated only once per second, the 1.8-second loss of data which occurred in Mission Control was not directly noticed. However, the Guidance Officer did note and report a "hardware restart" of the spacecraft computer. This was quickly followed by the crew's report of a problem.
b.

Immediately after the crew's report of a "bang" and a main bus B undervolt, all fuel cell output currents and all bus voltages were normal, and the cryogenic oxygen tank indications were as follows:

5-26

Oxygentank no. i:

Pressure: Several hundred psi below normal Quantity: Normal Temperature: Normal

Oxygentank no. 2:

Pressure: Off-scale low Quantity: Off-scale high Temperature: Off-scale high

C.

The nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i indicated zero, which was incompatible with the hydrogen and oxygen pressures in this fuel cell_ which were normal. The nitrogen pressure is used to regulate the oxygen and hydrogen pressure, and hydrogen and oxygen pressures in the fuel cell would follow the nitrogen pressure. the crew nor Mission Control had was risen aware at the time just

d.

Neither

that oxygen tank no. 2 pressure before the data loss.

abnormally

The flight controllers believed that a probable cause these indications could have been a cryogenic storage instrumentation failure, and began pursuing this line vestigation.

of system of in-

Determination Under these conditions it was reasonable to suspect a cryogenic

storage system instrumentation the readings before taking any tank no. 2 quantity measurement hours earlier also contributed bility 37. Findings
a.

problem, and to attempt to verify action. The fact that the oxygen was known to have failed several to the doubt about the credita-

of

the

telemetered

data.

During the 3 minutes following data loss, neither the flight controllers nor the crew noticed the oxygen flows to fuel cells i and 3 were less than 0.i ib/hr. These were unusually low readings for the current being drawn. Fuel cells loss. i and 3 failed at about 3 minutes after the data

b.

5-27

After

the

fuel

cell

failures,

which

resulted

in dc

main A,

bus B failure and the undervoltage condition on dc main bus Mission Control diverted its prime concern from what was initially believed to be a cryogenic system instrumentation problem to the electrical power system.
d.

Near-zero

oxygen

flow

to

fuel

cells was

i and

3 was

noted with

after no power

the main bus B failure, but output from the fuel cells.
e .

this

consistent

The flight controllers have been disconnected to connect fuel dc main bus B. cell i

believed from the

that the fuel cells busses and directed bus A and fuel

could the crew 3 to

to dc main

cell

f.

The and

crew that

reported the the talkback

fuel cells indicators

were configured confirmed this.

as

directed

Determinations

(1)

Under these conditions it was logical for the flight controllers to attempt to regain power to the busses since the fuel cells might have been disconnected as a result of a short circuit in the electrical system. Telemetry does not indicate whether or not fuel cells are connected to busses, and the available data would not distinguish between a disconnected fuel cell and a failed one.

(2)

If the crew had been aware of the reactant valve closure, they could have opened them before the fuel cells were starved of oxygen. This would have simplified subsequent actions.

38.

Finding The fuel cell reactant'valve closed talkback unless indicators both the in the spaceoxygen

craft valves

do not indicate are closed.

hydrogen

and

Determinations

(l)

If these talkbacks were designed so that either a hydrogen or oxygen valve closure would indicate "barberpole," the Apollo 13 crew could possibly have acted in time to delay the failure of fuel cells i and 3, although they would nevertheless have failed when oxygen tank no. i ceased to supply oxygen.

5-28

(2)

The ultimate outcome would not have been changed, but had fuel cells not failed, Mission Control and the crew would have mad to contend with the failure of dc main bus B and bus the 2 or attitude situation. control problems while trying to evaluate

the not ac

Reaction

Control

System

39.

Findings
a.

The

crew

reported

the

talkback

indicators

for

the

helium

isolation valves in the SM RCS quads B and D indicated closed shortly after the dc main bus B failure. The secondary fuel pressurization valves for quads A and C also were reported closed. The SM RCS quad D propellant tank pressures decreased shortly after the crew was requested to confirm that helium

until the

isolation

valves

were

opened

by

the

crew.

During the l-i/2-hour period following the accident, Mission Control noted that SM RCS quad C propellant was not being used, although numerous firing signals were being sent to it. Both the valve solenoids and the onboard indications for quad of valve

d.

position powered

of the propellant by dc main bus B.

isolation

valves

C are

e

°

During the l-i/2-hour period immediately following the accident, Mission Control advised the crew which SM RCS thrusters to power and which ones to unpower.

Determinations (i) The the following accident: valves were closed by shock at the time of

Helium

isolation fuel

valves

in

quads

B and in quad

D quads A and C were

Secondary (2) The

pressurization isolation same shock. valves

valves in

propellant by the

C probably

closed

(3)

Mission Control correctly determined system and properly advised the crew matic attitude control.

the status of the RCS on how to regain auto-

5-29

Managementof Electrical
40. Findings
a.

System

After fuel cell I failed, the total dc main bus A load was placed on fuel cell 2 and the voltage dropped to approximately 25 volts, causing a caution and warning indication and a master alarm. After determining the fuel cell 2 could not supply enough power to dc main bus A to maintain adequate voltage, the crew connected entry battery A to this bus as an emergency measure to increase the bus voltage to its normal operating value. Mission Control directed the crew to reduce the electrical

b.

C.

load on dc main bus checklist contained

A by following in the onboard

the emergency powerdown Flight Data File.

When the power requirements were sufficiently reduced so that the one remaining fuel cell could maintain adequate bus voltage, Mission Control directed the crew to take the entry battery off line.
o

e

Mission Control then directed the crew to charge this battery in order to get as much energy back into it as possible, before the inevitable loss of the one functioning fuel cell.

Determinations

(i)

Emergency use of the entry battery loss of dc main bus A, which could munications between spacecraft and functions. Available emergency duction of loads on powerdown the fuel

helped prevent potential have led to loss of comground and other vital CM

(2)

lists facilitated cell and batteries.

rapid

re-

Attempts

to Restore

Oxygen

Pressure

41.

Findings After determining that the CM problems were not due to in-

strumentation malfunctions, and after temporarily a stable electrical system configuration, Mission sought to improve oxygen pressures by energizing and heater circuits in both oxygen tanks.

securing Control the fan

5-30

b.

When these procedures failed Mission Control directed the and 3 by closing the hydrogen

to arrest the oxygen loss, crew to shut down fuel cells and oxygen flow valves.

i

Determinations

(i)

Under

more

normal

conditions

oxygen

pressure

might

have

been tanks;

increased no other

by turning on heaters known actions had such

and fans in the a possibility.

oxygen

(2)

There was a possibility that oxygen was leaking downstream of the valves; had this been true, closing of the valves might have preserved the remaining oxygen in oxygen tank no. i.

Lunar

Module

Activation

42.

Findings With imminent loss of oxygen from oxygen tanks no. i and for

no. 2, and failing electrical power in necessary to use the lunar module (LM) the return to Earth. b. Mission Control about 15 minutes There were three and the before

the CM, it was as a "lifeboat"

crew delayed LM activation until the SM oxygen supply was depleted. LM activation checklists contained

different

in the Flight however, none tion. It was

Data File for normal and contingency situations; of these was appropriate for the existing situanecessary to activate the LM as rapidly as and CM reentry batteries

possible to conserve LM consumables to the maximum extent possible. Mission Control modified and referred the crew to This time bypassed to less

d.

the normal LM activation checklist specific pages and instructions. and reduced the activation

unnecessary steps than an hour. platform was which manually

e

°

The LM inertial list procedure the LM.

aligned during an onboard checktransferred the CM alignment to

5-31

Determinations

(i)

Initiation the crew remaining

of

LM

activation more

was

not

undertaken with

sooner to

because conserve

was properly SM oxygen.

concerned

attempts

(2)

Mission Control was able to make workable on-the-spot cations to the checklists which sufficiently shortened time normally required for powering up the LM.

modifithe

45.

Findings

During the LM powerup and the CSM time interval during which Mission rections which resulted in neither attitude control system. This caused some concern in Mission

powerdown, there was a brief Control gave the crew dimodule having an active

bo

Control into

because inertial

of

the

possibility gimbal lock
C.

of the spacecraft condition.

drifting

platform

The Command Module Pilot (CMP) stated that he was cerned because he could have quickly reestablished manual attitude control if it became necessary.

not condirect

Determination

This situation was not hazardous to the lock actually occurred, sufficient time establish an attitude reference. 44. Findings LM flight controllers were in on duty of

crew because was available

had to

gimbal re-

a.

in Mission the

Control crew

at

the

time into

of the accident the LM.

support

scheduled

entry

If the accident had occurred at some other time during the translunar coast phase, LM system specialists would not have been on duty, and it would have taken at least 30 minutes to get a fully manned team in Mission Control.

Determination

Although an hour present

LM flight controllers were not required until after the accident, it was beneficial for them as the problem developed.

more than to be

5-52

LM

Consumables

Management

45.

Findings The LM was designed to support two men on a 2-day expedition to the lunar surface. Mission Control made major revisions in the use rate of water, oxygen, and electrical power to sustain three men for the 4-day return trip to the Earth. An emergency powerdown checklist was available in the Flight Data File on board the LM. Minor revisions were made to the list to reduce electrical energy requirements to about 20 percent reduction Mission be the LM of normal operational values with in usage of coolant loop water. determined after guidance the second and that this ground maximum elapsed system a corresponding

a,

b.

Control until for primary up

powerdown time, to be

could allowing

delayed

80 hours abort

navigation

kept

powered
d.

maneuver.

Mission Control developed contingency plans for further reduction of LM power for use in case an LMbattery problem developed. Procedures for use of CM water in the LM also were developed the to for use if needed.

e.

Toward existed planned

end of the mission, sufficient consumable margins allow usage rates to be increased above earlier This was done. at 141:30 the approximate remaining

levels. LM was

f.

_hen

the

jettisoned

margins Electrical Water Oxygen Determinations

were: power 4-1/2 5-1/2 124 hours hours hours

(i)

Earlier

contingency

plans

and

available

checklists of the

were LM well

adequate to extend beyond its normal (2) Mission further Control increase

life support capability intended capability.

maintained the flexibility of being the LM consumables margins.

able

to

5-33

Modification

of LM

Carbon

Dioxide

Removal

System

46.

Findings

a.

The

lithium

hydroxide

(LiOH)

cartridges,

which

remove

water

and carbon dioxide become ineffective
b,

from the LM cabin due to saturation maximum allowable

atmosphere, would have at about i00 hours. carbon dioxide partial

Mission

rules

set

pressure at 7.5mm Hg. before cabin atmosphere reaches this value.
C.

LiOH cartridges carbon dioxide

are normally changed partial pressure

Manned Spacecraft Center engineers devised procedure for using the CM LiOH cannisters dioxide removal. Instructions were given modified craft. cartridge container using

and checked out a to achieve carbon on how to build a in the space-

materials

do

The crew made the modification at 93 hours, and carbon dioxide partial pressure in the LM dropped rapidly from 7.5mm Hg to O.imm Hg. Mission Control gave attaching additional the crew further instructions cartridges in series with the for first

e.

modification. After this addition, pressure remained below 2mm Hg for return trip. Determination

the carbon dioxide partial the remainder of the Earth-

The Manned Spacecraft Out a modification to dioxide concentration

Center succeeded in improvising and checking the filter system which maintained carbon well within safe tolerances.

LM

Anomaly

47.

Findings
a.

During descent

the time battery

interval current

between 97:13:53 and 97:13:55, LM measurements on telemetry showed a of no more than 3 amperes per of 30 amperes per battery. The cannot be determined because the off-scale high at 60 amperes.

rapid increase from values battery to values in excess exact value in one battery measurement for battery

2 was

5-34

b.

At

about

that from LMP

time the

the

Lunar of the

Module the LM LM

Pilot descent

(LMP)

heard

a

"thump" c. When the

vicinity out

stage. window, he observed

looked

right-hand

a venting LM descent tinued for

of small particles from the general area where the batteries i and 2 are located. This venting cona few minutes.

d.

Prior to batteries currents of the ii turned

97:13 the battery load-sharing among the four had been equal, but immediately after the battery returned to nominal, batteries i and 2 supplied 9 amperes total. By 97:23 the load-sharing had re-

to equal. interface between the LM and the CSM

e.

There was no electrical at this time. An MSC investigation of

f.

the

anomaly

is

in progress.

Determinations (I) An at The The anomalous incident occurred in the LM electrical system about 97:13:53 which appeared to be a short circuit. thump and the short was venting circuit were related to this anomaly.

(2) (9) (4)

apparent

cleared

itself. to the CSM or to the

This anomaly accident. This anomaly

not

directly

related

(5)

represents

a potentially

serious

electrical

problem.

CM Battery

Recharging

48.

Findings About one half of the electrical capacity of reentry

a.

battery A (20 of 40 amp-hours) was used during emergency conditions following the accident. A small part of the capacity of reentry battery B was used in checking out dc main bus B at 95 hours. The reduced charge remaining in the batteries limited the amount of time the CM could operate after separation from the LM.

5-35

b.

Extrapolation capacity remainder

of LM

electrical

power

use for

rates LM

indicated for

a the

in excess of that of the flight.

required

operation

C.

Mission Control worked out a procedure for using LM battery power to recharge CM batteries A and B. This procedure used the electrical umbilical between the 154 and the CM which normally carried electrical energy from the CM to The procedure was nonstandard and was not included lists. the in LM. check-

d.

The and

procedure B were

was

initiated recharged

at by

112 128

hours hours.

and

CM batteries

A

fully

Determination

Although there is always some risk involved in using new, untested procedures, analysis in advance of use indicated no hazards were involved. margin of The procedure safety for the worked reentry very well to provide operation. an extra

Trajectory

Changes

For

Safe

Return

to Earth

49.

Findings

After the accident, it became apparent could not be accomplished and that the must be altered for a return to Earth. At one but than the time of th@ accident, the

that the lunar landing spacecraft trajectory

b.

spacecraft

trajectory

was

which would have returned it to the vicinity of the Earth, it would have been left in orbit about the Earth rather reentering for a safe splashdown. the following midcourse

c.

To return the spacecraft corrections were made: A 38-fps correction at system (DPS), required

to Earth,

61:30, using the LM descent to return the spacecraft to

propulsion the Earth.

An 81-fps burn at 79:28, the DPS engine, to shift Ocean to the Pacific and 9 hours.

after swinging past the Moon, using the landing point from the Indian to shorten the return trip by

A 7.8-fps burn at 105:18 using the perigee from 87 miles to 21 miles.

DPS

engine

to lower

Earth

5-36

A 3.2-fps correction at 137:40 using LM RCSthrusters, to assure that the CMwould reenter the Earth's atmosphere at the center of its corridor.
d.

All and

course the CM the

corrections were executed with expected accuracy reentered the Earth's atmosphere at 142:40 to crew safely at 142:54, near the prime recovery

return ship. e.

Without the not navigate eters.

CM guidance or compute

and navigation return-to-Earth

system, the crew maneuver target

could param-

Determinations

(1)

This best

series chance

of of

course success

corrections was logical and had the because_ as compared to other options_

it avoided use of the damaged SM; it put the spacecraft on a trajectory, within a few hours after the accident, which had the best chance for a safe return to Earth; it placed splashdown where the best recovery forces were located; it shortened the flight time to increase safety margins in the use of electrical power and water; it conserved fuel for other course corrections which might have become necessary; and it kept open (2) an option to further reduce the flight time. targeting

Mission Control were essential

trajectory planning for the safe return

and maneuver of the crew.

Entry

Procedures

and

Checklists

50.

Findings a. Preparation for reentry required nonstandard cause of the lack of SM oxygen and electrical The SM RCS SM and the Apollo 13 separation engines normally CM by continuing provide to fire procedures bepower supplies. the

b.

separation between after separation.

c.

SM RCS engines could not continue to fire after because of the earlier failure of the fuel cells.

d.

The CM guidance and navigation system was powered down due to the accident. The LM guidance and navigation system had also been powered down to conserve electrical energy and water. A spacecraft inertial attitude reference had to be established prior to reentry.

5-37

et

The

reentry

preparation the additional

time

had

to be required

extended by the

in

order

to situa-

accomplish tion.
fe

steps

unusual

In order layed as supply
g.

to conserve the CM batteries, LM jettison long as practical. The LM batteries were of the for power necessary for the CM activation. course

was deused to

part

The

procedures

accomplishing

final

correction

and the support

reentry preparation personnel under the set of procedures

were developed by operations direction of Mission Control. was defined within 12 hours

An

initial

after the accident• These were refined the following 2 days, and evaluated in KSC by members of the backup crew. i. The procedures were read to the reentry, allowing the crew time

and modified during simulators at MSC and

crew about 24 hours prior to to study and rehearse them.

j

Trajectory evaluations of contingency conditions for LM and SM separation were conducted and documented prior to the mission by mission-planning personnel at MSC. Most of the steps taken were extracted which had been developed, tested, and from other procedures simulated earlier•

k.

Determinations

(i)

The

procedures

developed

worked

well

and

generated in using simulated,

no

new

hazards beyond which have not practiced over (2)

those unavoidably inherent been carefully developed, a long training period.

procedures and

It is not practical cedures for use in

to develop, simulate, and every possible contingency.

practice

pro-

51.

Findings
ao

During the a half-hour due to the present•

reentry preparations, after SM jettison, period of very poor communications with spacecraft being in a poor attitude with

there was the CM the LM

b.

This condition Control.

was

not

recognized

by

the

crew

or by

Mission

5-38

Determination Some of the reentry preparations were unnecessarily prolonged by

the poor communications, but since the reentry preparation timeline was not crowded, the delay was more of a nuisance than an additional hazard to the crew. 52. Findings

The crew maneuvered the spacecraft to the wrong LM roll attitude in preparation for LM jettison. This attitude the CM very close to gimbal lock which, had it occurred, have lost the inertial attitude reference essential for automatic If gimbal attitude reentry. guidance lock had reference system control of reentry.

put would an

occurred, a less accurate but could have been reestablished

adequate prior to

Determination The most significant consequence of losing the attitude in this situation would have been the subsequent impact remaining reentry reestablish this preparation reference, reference on the

timeline. In taking the time to less time would have been available

to accomplish the rest of the necessary procedures. The occurrence of gimbal lock in itself would not have significantly increased the crew hazard.

5-39

PART

4.

RECOMMENDATIONS

i. The modified

cryogenic to:

oxygen

storage

system

in

the

service

module

should

be

a.

Remove

from

contact

with

the

oxygen

all

wiring,

and

the

unsealed materials; fire in

motors, which can potentially short circuit and ignite or otherwise insure against a catastrophic electrically the tank.

adjacent induced

b. bustible sources.

Minimize the use of Teflon, materials in the presence

aluminum, and other relatively comof the oxygen and potential ignition

2.

The

modified

cryogenic

oxygen

storage

system

should

be

subjected

to

a rigorous requalification program, tential operational problems. 3. The warning systems on board the

including

careful

attention

to po-

Apollo

spacecraft and modified

and

in the

Mission

Control Center should be carefully reviewed with specific attention to the following: a. expected

where

appropriate,

Increasing the differential between master alarm trip normal operating ranges to avoid unnecessary alarms.

levels

and

b. Changing the caution and warning system logic to prevent an outof-limits alarm from blocking another alarm when a second quantity in the same subsystem goes out of limits.

c. Establishing a second level on critical quantities with a visual easily overlooked.

of limit sensing in Mission Control or audible alarm which cannot be

fuel 4.

d. Providing cell reactant Consumables

independent talkback valves plus a master emergency a equipment

indicators for each of the six alarm when any valve closes. in be the LM and to the CM should their be pore-

and

viewed tential 5. The

to determine for use in Manned

whether steps should "lifeboat" mode. Center should

taken

enhance

Spacecraft

complete

the

special

tests

and

analyses now underway in order to understand of the Apollo 13 accident. In addition, the anomalies should receive careful attention. continue their support to MSC in the areas of

more compl@tely the details lunar module power system Other NASA Centers should analysis and test.

5-40

6. Wheneversignificant anomalies occur in critical subsystems during final preparation for launch, standard procedures should require a presentation of all prior anomalies on that particular piece of equipment, including those which have previously been corrected or explained. Furthermore, critical decisions involving the flightworthiness of subsystems should require the presence and full participation of an expert who is intimately familiar with the details of that subsystem. 7. NASA should conduct a thorough launch vehicle, and ground systems other strong oxidizers, to identify hazards in the light of information reexamination which contain and evaluate developed in of all of its spacecraft, high-density oxygen, or potential combustion this investigation.

8. NASAshould conduct additional research on materials compatibility, ignition, and combustion in strong oxidizers at various g levels; and on the characteristics of supercritical fluids. Whereappropriate, new NASA design standards should be developed. 9. The MannedSpacecraft Center should reassess all Apollo spacecraft subsystems, and the engineering organizations responsible for them at MSCand at its prime contractors, to insure adequate understanding and control of the engineering and manufacturing details of these subsystems at the subcontractor and vendor level. Wherenecessary, organizational elements should be strengthened and in-depth reviews conducted on selected subsystems with emphasis on soundness of design, quality of manufacturing, adequacy of test, and operational experience.

5-41

This

page

left

blank

intentionally.

2

5-42
b

NASA

--

MSC

.

REPORT OF - APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD
-

APPENDIX
l

A

BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 . FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS

- VATIONAL

AERONAUTICS

AND

SPACE ADMINISTRATION

c

CONTENTS Part APPENDIX A - BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al APOLLO SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATION LAUNCH ESCAPE ASSEMBLY .............. COMMANDMODULE.................. SERVICE MODULE ................... SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER .............. A2 SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION DATA .............. INTRODUCTION ................... A2.1 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL ............... Guidance Attitude Attitude Thrust A2.2 A2.3 A2.4 A2.5 and Control Reference Control and Thrust Systems Interface . . . . . .......... Page A-l A-3 A-3 A-3 A-8 A-9 A-11 A-11 A-12 A-12 A-12 A-14 A-16 A-18 A-20 A-22 A-24 A-24 ~-26 A-28 A-28

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vector Control . . ......

GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM (G&N) . ...... STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM (SCS) ...... . . . ...... . . . . ...... . . . ...... . . . ......

SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM (SPS) REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS). SM RCS Functional CM RCS Functional Description Description

~2.6

ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEM . . . . . . . ...... Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii

.

..I

.

.

I

.,

*“I

-._--

_-.

-

._I_x__~__.

--

---.

-..*---_l----...

--.-.--~

--..

-~

___-___o__ll_.

-__Y._--

--

Part Functional Major Description .............. Description Data ........... ..... ......

Page A-30 A-32 A-66 ~-67 A-70 ......... A-72 A-81 A-81 .............. A-83 A-86 A-88 A-88 .............. A-89 A-90 A-90 Subsystem ....... A-90 ~-92 A-93 A-93 .............. Description and Restrictions ...... ..... A-93 A-93 A-97
-

Component/Subsystem and Design Limitations Meter

Performance Operational Systems Test

and Restrictions

................ Lighting

Command Module A2.7

Interior

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM ............ Introduction Functional ................... Description

Oxygen Subsystem A2.8

.................

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ............. Introduction Functional ................... Description

~2.9

SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS ................. Introduction Sequential Origin ................... Events Control

of Signals

................

A2.10

CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM ............. Introduction Functional Major ................... Description

Component Subsystem Limitations

Operational

iv

..-l ,....-- _-__---_____-

-,.. -..-

-_

-

Part A2.11 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page A-?9 A-99 A-99 ............. System . . . . . . . . . A-99 A-99 A-103 A-106 A-106 A-109 A-111 A-111 A-111 A-114 A-119 A-119 A-119 A-122 .......... A-123 A-123 A-128 A-131 A-133 A-133

...................... (G-meter) Uprighting

Accelerometer Command Module A2.12 A2.13

CREWPERSONAL EQUIPMENT .............. DOCKING AND TRANSFER ................ Introduction Functional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Description ..............

A3

LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION ........... INTRODUCTION .................... LM CONFIGURATION .................. Ascent Descent Stage Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Connections ................ ................ ...........

IN - SLA - S-IVB LM-CSM Interfaces Stowage Provisions A4

MISSION CONTROL CENTER ACTIVITIES INTRODUCTION ....................

MISSION OPERATIONS CONTROLROOM .......... MCC SUPPORT ROOMS ................. MISSION SUPPORT AREAS ...............

Communications, Command, and Telemetry System (CCATS) .................

Y

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Part Real-Time A5 Computer Complex (RTCC). . . . . . . . .

Page A-134 A-139

EXCERPTS FROM APOLLO FUEL CELL AND CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGE SYSTEM FLIGHT SUPPORT HANDBOOK . . . . . . .

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BASELINE DATA:

APOLLO 13 FLIGHT

SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS Part Al briefly describes Appendix A is divided into five parts. the Apollo spacecraft configuration; Part A2 provides a systems description of the Apollo spacecraft configuration with special emphasis on the electrical power system (EPS); Part A3 describes the lunar module systems; Part A4 briefly describes the Mission Control Center at Houston, Texas, and its interface with the spacecraft during the mission; and Part A5 gives a detailed description of the fuel cells and cryogenic gas storage systems aboard the Apollo spacecraft. This baseline material may not always represent the precise Apollo 13 configuration in every case, since there is a continuous updating which is documented periodically. For example, Fuel Cell 2 on Apollo 13 was normally connected to bus A in the distribution system, rather that as described in Part ~2.6. The data were extracted from the following sources:

APPENDIX A PART Al and A2 PART A3 Technical Manual SM2A-03-Block II-(l) Apollo Operations Handbook Block II Volume 1, dated January 15, 1970. Technical Handbook, 1970. Spacecraft,

Manual LMA790-3-L&l, Apollo Operations Lunar Module, Volume 1, dated February Center August Flight Operations 31, 1969. Plan -

1,

PART A4 PART A5

Manned Spacecraft dated H Missions,

Apollo Fuel Cell and Cryogenic Gas Storage System Flight Support Handbook, dated February 18, 1970, prepared by Propulsion and Power Division, Manned Spacecraft Center.

A-l I~.. I .,. .__ ".----. -.. . _.---.-l-__-l.~ ---1--_l.-l--l__

This

page left

blank

intentionally.

.-

A-2

PART Al APOLLO SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATION The Apollo spacecraft consists command module (CM), service module adapter (SLA), and the lunar module stations are shown in figure Al-l. of a launch escape assembly (LEA), (SM), the spacecraft lunar module (LM). The reference system and

LAUNCH ESCAPE ASSEMBLY The LEA (fig. Al-2) provides the means for separating the CM from the launch vehicle during pad or first-stage booster operation, This assembly consists of a Q-ball instrumentation assembly (nose cone), ballast compartment, canard surfaces, pitch control motor, tower jettiskirt, an open-frame tower, son motor, launch escape motor, a structural and a boost protective cover (BPC). The structural skirt at the base which encloses the launch escape rocket motors, is of the housing, secured to the forward portion of the tower. The BPC (fig. Al-31 is attached to the aft end of the tower to protect the CM from heat during and from exhaust damage by the launch escape and tower jettison boost, secure the tower Explosive nuts, one in each tower leg well, motors. to the CM structure. COMIWNDMODULE The CM (fig. Al-b), the spacecraft control center, contains necessary automatic and manual equipment to control and monitor the spacethe required equipment for safety and craft systems; it also contains The module is an irregular-shaped, primary comfort of the flight crew. structure encompassed by three heat shields (coated with ablative material and joined or fastened to the primary structure) forming a trunThe CM consists of a forward compartment, a cated, conic structure. and an aft compartment for equipment. (See fig. Al-b.) crew compartment, The command module is conical shaped, 11 feet 1.5 inches long, The 12 feet 6.5 inches in diameter without the ablative material. ablative material is nonsymmetrical and adds approximately 4 inches the height and 5 inches to the diameter. and to

A-3

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Block

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spacecraft

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SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER (SLA) \

NOTE:

LM IS NOT UTILIZED SOME MISSIONS

ON

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Block II spacecraft A-5
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S-IV8 INSTRUMENT UNIT (SHOWN AS REFERENCE)

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Al-2.-

configuration.

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Block

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command module.

SERVICE MODULE The service module (fig. Al-51 is a cylindrical structure formed by l-inch-thick aluminum honeycomb panels. Radial beams, from milled aluminum alloy plates, separate the structure interior into six unequal sectors around a circular center section. Equipment contained within

-Y ’ccgq
1 and 4 are 50-degree 2 and 5 are 70-degree 3 and 6 are 60-degree
Service module items sectors sectors sectors Sector 1 Empty NASA equipment Sector 2 Environmental system space radiator Service propulsion system Reaction control system package (+Y -axis) Service propulsion system oxidizer sump tank

Sector 4 Fuel cell power plant (three) Helium servicing panel Super-critical oxygen tank (two) Super-critical hydrogen tank (two) Reaction control system control unit Electrical power system power control relay box Service module jettison controller sequencer (two) Sector 5 Environmental control system space radiator Service propulsion system fuel sump tank Reaction control system package C-Y axis) Sector 6 Environmental control system space radiator Reaction control system package (-Z axis) Service propulsion system fuel storage tank

Center Section Sector 3 Service propulsion system helium tank (two) Service propulsion system Service propulsion system engine Reaction control system package (+Z -axis) Environmental system space radiator Fairing Service propulsion system oxidizer storage tank Electrical power system space radiator’s (eight)

Figure

Al-5.-

Service

module.

id-8

the service module is accessible through maintenance doors located around the exterior surface of the module. Specific items, such as propulsion and most of the SC onboard consumables systems (SPS and RCS), fuel cells, (and storage tanks) contained in the SM compartments, are listed in The service module is 12 feet 11 inches long (high) and figure Al-5. 12 feet 10 inches in diameter. Radial beam trusses on the forward portion of the SM structure provide a means for securing the CM to the SM. Alternate beams one, and five have compression pads for supporting the CM. Beams two, three, four, and six have shear-compression pads and tension ties. A flat center section in each tension tie incorporates redundant explosive charges for SM-CM separation. These beams and separation devices are enclosed within a fairing (26 inches high and 13 feet in diameter) between the CM and SM. SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER The spacecraft LM adapter (SLA) (fig. Al-6) is a large truncated It houses cone which connects the CSM and S-IVB on the launch vehicle. the lunar module (LM), the nozzle of the service propulsion system, and The adapter, constructed the high-gain antenna in the stowed position. is 154 inches in diameter at the of eight 2-inch-thick aluminum panels, Separation forward end (CM interface) and 260 inches at the aft end. of the CSM from the SLA is accomplished by means of explosive charges which disengage the four SLA forward panels from the aft portion. The individual panels are restrained to the aft SLA by hinges and accelerWhen reaching an ated in rotation by pyrotechnic-actuated thrusters. angle of 45 degrees measured from the vehicle's X-axis, spring thrusters The panel jettison velocity and (two per panel) jettison the panels. direction of travel is such as to minimize the possibility of recontact with the spacecraft or launch vehicle.

A-9

Panel separation by explosive charges

FAM-1503F

Figure

Al-6.-

Spacecraft

LM adapter.

PART A2 SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION DATA INTRODUCTION Systems description data include description of operations, component description and design data, and operational limitations and restrictions. Part 2.1 describes the overall spacecraft navigation, guidance, and control requirements and the resultant systems interface. Parts A2.2 through A2.10 present data grouped by spacecraft systems, arranged in the following order: guidance and navigation, stabilization and control, service propulsion, reaction control, electrical power, environmental control, telecommunications, sequential, and caution and warnings. Part A2.11 deals with miscellaneous systems data. Part A2.12 deals with crew personal equipment. Part A2.13 deals with docking and crew transfer. These data were extracted from the technical manual SM2A-03BLOCK (l), Apollo Operations Handbook, Block II Spacecraft, Volume 1, dated January 15, 1970. II-

A-11

PART A2.1 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL Guidance and Control Systems Interface

The Apollo guidance and control functions are performed by the primary guidance, navigation, and control system (PGNCS), and stabilization and control system (SCS). The PGNCS and SCS systems contain rotational and translational attitude and rate sensors which provide discrete input information to control electronics which, in turn, integrate and condition the information into control commands to the spacecraft propulsion systems. Spacecraft attitude control is provided by commands to the reaction control system (RCS). Major velocity changes are provided by commands to the service propulsion system (SPS). Guidance and control provides the following basic functions: a. b.
C.

Attitude Attitude Thrust

reference control and thrust vector control.
-

The basic guidance and control functions may be performed automatically, with primary control furnished by the command module computer (CMC) or manually, with primary control furnished by the flight crew. The subsequent paragraphs provide a general description of the basic functions. Attitude Reference

The attitude reference function (fig. A2.1-1) provides display of the spacecraft attitude with reference to an established inertial refThe display is provided by two flight director attitude indierence. cators (FDAI) located on the main display console, panels 1 and 2. The displayed information consists of total attitude, attitude errors, and angular rates. The total attitude is displayed by the FDAI ball. Attitude errors are displayed by three needles across scales on the top, right, and bottom of the apparent periphery of the ball. Angular rates are displayed by needles across the top right, and bottom of the FDAI face. Total attitude information is derived from the IMU stable platform or the gyro displ~ coupler (GDC). The IMU provides total attitude by maintaining a gimbaled, gyro-stabilized platform to an inertial reference orientation. The GDC provides total attitude by updating attitude information with angular rate inputs from Qyro assembly 1 or 2.

A-12 -__ .___^.-.__-. -.- _.-.. -_-._I

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-_---L---' TOTAL ATTITUDE * INERTIAL COUPLING DATA UNIT GIMBAL ANGLES COMMAND MODULE COMPUTER (CMC)

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Guidance

and control.

Attitude error information is derived from three sources, The first source is from zhe II.L? through the coupling Jata unit (CDU) which c-spares I;?J gimbai angiea with CLIC commanded angles set into the CDU. Any angular difference between the IMU gimbals and the CDU angles is sent to the FDAI for display on the attitude error- needles. The second source is from gyro assembly 1 which contains three (one for each of the ;i, Y, and Z axes) single-degree-of-freedom attitude gyros. Any spacecraft rotation about an axis will offset the case of a gyro from the This rotation is sensed as a displacement off null, and a signal float. is picked off which is representative of the magnitude and direction of This signal is sent to the FDA1 for display on the attitude rotation. error needles. The third source is from the GDC which develops attitude errors by comparing angular rate inputs from gyro assembly 1 or 2 with an internally stored orientation. These data are sent to the FDA1 for display on the attitude error needles. Angular rates are derived from either gyro assembly 1 or 2. Normally, the no. 2 assembly is used; however, gyro assembly 1 may be switched to a backup rate mode if desired. For developing rate information, the gyros are torqued to null when displaced; thus, they will produce an output only when the spacecraft is being rotated. The output signals are sent to the FDA1 for display on the rate needles and to the GDC to enable updating of the spacecraft attitude. Attitude Control

-.

The attitude control function is illustrated in figure A2.1-2. The control may be to maintain a specific orientation, or to command small rotations or translations. To maintain a specific orientation, the attitude error signals, described in the preceding paragraph, are also r\,uted to the control reaction jet on-off assembly. These signals are conditioned and applied to the proper reaction jet which fires in the direction necessary to return the spacecraft to the desired attitude. The attitude is maintained within specified deadband limits. The deadband is limited within both a rate and attitude limit to hold the spacecraft excursions from exceeding either an attitude limit or angular the reaction jets are fired To maneuver the spacecraft, rate limit. automatically under ccmmand of the CMC or manually by flight crew use of the rotation control, control function is In either case, the attitude inhibited until the maneuver is completed, Translations of small magnitude are performed along the +X axis for fuel settling of SPS propellants prior to burns, or for a backup deorbit by manual commands of the translation control. An additional control is afforded by enabling the minimum impulse control at the lower equipment bay. The minimum impulse control produces one directional pulse of small magnitude each time it is moved from detent. These small pulses are used to position the spacecraft for navigational sightings.

A-14

ENERGY STORAGE

POWER GENERATION

ENTRY AND POST LANDING BATTERY A

FUEL CELL

a’I 1 I CRYOGLNtC SUBSYSTEM . 1A

FUEL CELL

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MAIN BUS I SWITCH F-l (BATA/c) (MDC-5) I

Motor switches 51 and 52 CIOIC when main bus tic witches 54 and 55 ore set to Bat A/C and Bet B/C. 0 2 FCI coon be connected to SMbusB6 FC3foSMbusA DC bus cantlot circuit breoksn ore illurtmted in battety charger ond CM DC bus contml circuits schematic

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A2.6l.-

Electrical

power

subsystem

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diagram.

A-29

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.

-

.-

Functional

Description

The primary source of energy is the cryogenic gas Energy storage.storage system that provides fuel (H2) and oxidizer (02) to the power Two hydrogen and two oxygen tanks, with the assogenerating system. are located in the service module. Storage ciated controls and plum.bing, of reactants is accomplished under controlled cryogenic temperatures and automatic and manual pressure control is provided. pressures; Automatic heating of the reactants for repressurization is dependent on energy demand by the power generating and/or envircnmental control subsystems. Manual control can be used when required. A secondary source of energy storage is provided by five silver oxide-zinc batteries located in the CM. Three rechargeable entry and postlanding batteries supply sequencer logic power at all times, supplemental dc power for peak loads, all operating power required for entry and postlanding, and can be connected to power either or both pyro cirTwo pyro batteries provide energy for activation of pyro devices cuits. throughout all phases of a mission. Power generation.Three Bacon-type fuel cell power plants, generting power through electrochemical reaction of H2 and 02, supply primary dc power to spacecraft systems until CSM separation. Each power plant is capable of normally supplying from 400 to 1420 watts at 31 to 27 V dc (at fuel cell terminals) to the power distribution system. During normal operation all three power plants generate power, but two are adequate to complete the mission. Should two of the three malfunction, one power plant will insure successful mission termination; however, spacecraft loads must be reduced to operate within the limits of a single powerplant. Normal fuel cell connection to the distribution system is: fuel cell 1 to main dc bus A; fuel cell 2 to main dc busses A and B; ax-&fuel is provided for power cell 3 to main dc bus B. Manual switch control plant connection to the distribution system, and manual and/or automatic control for power plant isolation in case of a malfunction. During the CSM separation maneuver, the power plants supply power through the SM buses to two SM jettison control sequencers. The sequencers sustain SM RCS retrofire during CSM separation and fire the SM positive roll RCS engines 2 seconds after separation to stabilize the SM during entry. Roll engine firing is terminated 7.5 seconds after separation. The power plants and SM buses are isolated from the umbilical The sequencers are connected to the SM buses when through a SM deadface. the CM/SM SEP switch (MDC-2) is activated; separation occurs 100 milliseconds after switch activation.

L

A-30

Primary dc power is converted into ac by solid Power conversion.state static inverters that provide 115/200-volt 400-cps 3-phase ac power up to 1250 volt-amperes each. The ac power is connected by motor switch + controls Uo twc ac buses for distribution to the ac loads. One inverter has the capability of supplying all spacecraft primary ac power. One inverter can power both buses while the two remaining inverters act as redundant sources. However, throughout the flight, each bus is powered by a separate inverter. Provisions are made for inverter isolation in the event of malfunctions. Inverter outputs cannot be phase synchronized; therefore, interlocked motorized switching circuits are incorporated to prevent the connection of two inverters to the same bus. three solid verter A second conversion unit, the battery charger, assures keeping the entry and postlanding batteries in a fully charged state. It is a state device utilizing dc from the fuel cells and ac from the into develop charging voltage,

Power distribution.Distribution of dc power is accomplished via two redundant dc buses in the service module which are connected to two redundant buses in the command module through a SM deadface, the CSM umbilical, and a CM deadface. Additional buses provided are: two dc buses for servicing nonessential loads: a flight bus for servicing inflight telecommunications equipment; two battery buses for distributing power to sequencers, gimbal motor controls, and servicing the battery relay bus for power distribution switching; and a flight and postlanding bus for servicing some communications equipment and the postlanding loads. Three-phase ac is distributed via two redundant ac buses, providing bus selection through switches in the ac-operated component circuits. Fower to the lunar module is provided through two umbilicals which are manually connected after completion of transposition and docking, An average of 81 watts dc is provided to continuous heaters in the abort sensor assembly (ASA), and cycling heaters in the landing radar, rendezand inertial measurement unit (IMU). Power vous radar, S-band antenna, consumption with all heaters operating simultaneously is approximately 309 watts. LM floodlighting is also powered through the umbilical for use during manned lunar module operation while docked with the CSM. A dc sensing circuit monitors voltage on each main dc bus, and an ac sensing circuit monitors voltage on each ac bus. The dc sensors provide an indication of an undervoltage by illuminating a warning light. The ac sensors illuminate a warning light when high- or low-voltage limits are exceeded. In addition, the ac sensors activate an automatic disconnect of the inverter from the ac bus during an overvoltage condition. conditions are displayed by illumination of an overload The ac overload warning light and are accompanied by a low voltage light. Additional

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sensors monitor fuel cell overload and reverse current conditions, viding an automatic disconnect, together with visual indications disconnect whenever either condition is exceeded. Switches, meters, lights, controlling and monitoring all Major and talk-back indicators functions of the EPS. Description the cryogenic storage

proof the for

are provided

Component/Subsystem

The subsequent paragraphs describe and each of the various EPS components.

subsystem

Cryogenic storage.The cryogenic storage subsystem (figs. ~2.6-2 and ~2.6-3) supplies hydrogen to the EPS, and oxygen to the EPS, ECS, and for initial LM pressurization. The two tanks in the hydrogen and oxygen systems are of sufficient size to provide a safe return from the furthest point of the mission on the fluid remaining in any one tank. The physical data of the cryogenic storage subsystem are as follows:

Weight of usable cryogenics (lb/tank)

Design storage pressure bia> 900235

Minimum allowable operating pressure (psi4

Approximate flow rate at min dq/dm (+li;5',F e;viro;m;nt: lb hran s 1.71

Approximate quantities at minimum heater an~pef~nt~~$ing (min dq/dm)

--

320 (min) 28 (min) H2
O2

245 (+15,
-20)

150 100

0.140

45 to 25% 53 to 33%

Initial pressurization from fill to operating pressures is accomplished by GSE. After attaining operating pressures, the cryogenic fluids are in a single-phase condition, therefore, completely homogeneous. This avoids sloshing which could cause sudden pressure fluctuations, possible damage to internal components, and prevents positive mass quantity gaugThe single-phase expulsion process continues at nearly constant ing. pressure and increasing temperature above the 2-phase region.

-

A-32

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Cryogenic

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A-34

& TANK 1 & TANK 2 PRESS XDUCERS ZRYO PRESS[MDC- 2)

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PRESSUREAND MOTOR SWITCHES ARE SHOWN IN LOW PRESSUREPOSITION VAC ION PUMP FUSES OPENED DURING PRELAUNCH COUNTDOWN

Figure

~2.6-3.-

Cryogenic

storage

subsystem

(hydrogen)

A-35

Two parallel dc heaters in each tank supply the heat necessary to maintain design pressures. Two parallel 3-phase ac circulating fans circulate the fluid over the heating elements to maintain a uniform density and decrease the probability of stratification. A typical heater A2.6-4. Relief valves provide and fan installation is shown in figure check_valves provide tank isolation, and individual overpressure relief, fuel cell shutoff valves provide isolation of malfunctioning power plants. Filters extract particles from the flowing fluid to protect the ECS and EPS components. The pressure transducers and temperature probes indicate the thermodynamic state of the fluid. A capacitive quantity probe indicates quantity of fluid remaining in the tanks.

FAN &MOTOR

CAPYl1lvE PRORE-

‘I v

ENCASED INTERNALLY

Figure

A2.6-4.-

Cryogenic pressurization measurement devices.

and quantity
c ,

A-36

or manually Repressurization of the systems can be automatically The automatic mode is designed to give controlled by switch selection. at design pressures. a single-phase reactant flow into the feed lines The heaters and fans are automatically controlled through a pressure As pressure in the tanks decreases, switch-motor switch arrangement. the pressure switch in each tank closes to energize the motor switch, Both tanks have to declosing contacts in the heater and fan circuits. When crease in pressure before heater and fan circuits are energized. either tank reaches the upper operating pressure limit, that respective pressure switch opens to again energize the motor switch, thus opening The 02 circuits are energized the heater and fan circuits to both tanks. at

865 psia minimum and de-energized

at 935 psia

maximum.

The H2 circuits

The energize at 225 psia minimum and de-energize at 260 psia maximum. most accurate quantity readout will be acquired shortly after the fans During all other periods partial stratification may dehave stopped. grade quantity readout accuracy. When the systems reach the point where heater and fan cycling is at a minimum (due to a reduced heat requirement), heat leak of the tank is sufficient to maintain design pressures, provided flow is within the min This realm of operation dq/dm values shown in the preceding tabulation. The minimum heat requirement is referred to as the min dq/dm region. region for oxygen starts at approximately 45-percent quantity and terBetween these tank quanminates at approximately 25-percent quantity. tities, minimum heater and fan cycling will occur under normal usage. The amount of heat required for repressurization at quantities below 25-percent starts to increase until below the j-percent level practically In the hydrogen system, continuous heater and fan operation is required. the quantity levels for minimum heater and fan cycling are between apwith continuous operation occurring at 53 and 33 percent, proximately approximately the 5 percent-level. Assuming a constant level flow from each tank (02 - 1 lb/hr,

0.09 lb/hr) each successive repressurization period is of longer H2 The periods between repressurizations lengthen as quantity duration. decreases from full to the minimum dq/dm level, and become shorter as quantity decreases from the minimum dq/dm level to the residual level. Approximate repressurization periods are shown in table A2.6-I, which also shows the maximum flow rate in pounds per hour from a single tank with the repressurization circuits maintaining minimum design pressure. The maximum continuous flow that each cryogenic tank can provide at minimum design pressure is dependent on the quantity level and the heat The heat required to maintain a conrequired to maintain that pressure. stant pressure decreases as quantity decreases from full to the minimum

A-37

As quantity decreases beyond the minimum dq/dm region, the dq/dm point. heat required to maintain a constant pressure increases. As fluid is a specific amount of heat is withdrawn. withdrawn, When the withdrawal rate exceeds the heat that can be supplied by the heaters, fan motors, and heat leak, there is a resultant pressure decrease below the minimum design operating level. The ability to sustain pressure and flow is a factor of heat required versus the heat provided by heaters, fan Since heat leak characteristics of each tank heat leak. the flow each tank can provide will also vary to a small input from heaters, fan motors, and heat leak into an 02 595.87 motors similar of the amount motors, and vary slightly, degree. Heat tank is

Btu/hour (113.88-watt heaters supply 389.67 Btu, 52.8-watt fan supply 180.2 Btu, and heat leak supplies 26 Btu). Heat input from (18.6-watt heaters supply sources into a H2 tank is 94.6 Btu/hr

fan motors supply 23.89 Btu, and heat leak supplies 63.48 Btu, 7-watt These figures take into consideration the line loss between 7.24 Btu). the power source and the operating component. TABLE ~2.6-I.Quantity (percent) 100 :z 85 80 75 :p 60 55 z; 40 52 25 20 1.5 10 'I . 5 5 OXYGENAND HYDROGENREPRESSURIZATION AND FLOW.

Wren
Repressurization time, minutes (865 to 935 psia) 4.0 4.3 4.6 5:: 2:; 7.4 8.7 9.6 10.8 11.5 12.4 12.6 13.0 13.1 Flow at 865 psia 3.56 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 24.5 26.5 28.5 31.0 33.5 36.0 39.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 40.5 40.5 42.0 47.0 58.0 71.0 Continuous 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.65 0.76 0.80 0.87 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.83 0.71 0.54 0.37 0.23 0.16

I

'4.;: . 5.27 6.02 7.01 7.94 9.01 10.80 12.54 14.19 15.69 17.01 17.56 17.56 16.55

A-38

-.

--..

I..-.--

-I_i_^-----_-.--~ll~-IIII1l~.

__;__-.

__.I.~-

--.-

.I____

I__

-

To avoid excessive temperatures, which could be realized during continuous heater and fan operation at extremely low quantity levels, a thermal sensitive interlock device is in series with each heater element. The device automatically opens the heater circuits when internal tank at +7G" F. shell temperatures reach +9G" F., and closes the circuits oxygen temperature will be approximately Assuming normal consumption, -157" F., at mission termination, while hydrogen temperature will be approximately -385" F. The manual mode of operation bypasses the pressure switches, and supplies power directly to the heaters and/or fans through the individual control switches. It can be used in case of automatic control failure, heater failure, or fan failure. Tank pressures and quantities are monitored on meters located on The caution and warning system (CRY0 PRESS) will alarm when MIX-2. oxygen pressure in either tank exceeds 950 psia or falls below 8GG psia. Since a The hydrogen system alarms above 270 psia and below 220 psia. common lamp is provided, reference must be made to the individual pressure and quantity meters (MDC-2) to determine the malfunctioning tank. Tank and reactant temperatures of each tank are telempressures, quantities, etered to MSFN. Oxygen relief valves vent at a pressure between 983 and 1010 psig and reseat at 965 psig minimum. Hydrogen relief valves vent at a pressure Full flow between 273 and 285 psig, and reseat at 268 psig minimum. venting occurs approximately 2 pounds above relief valve opening pressure. All the reactant tanks have vat-ion pumps to maintain the integrity of the vacuum between the inner and outer shell, thus maintaining heat SM main de bus A distributes power leak at or below the design level. to the H2 tank 1 pump and bus B to the H2 tank 2 pump. Fuses provide power source protection. disable the circuit for MNA- MJTB (m-29), buses, which distribute breakers allow These fuses are removed during prelaunch to Circuit breakers, G2 VAC ION PUMPS flight.

for the CM main Provide power source protection The circuit power to the O2 vat-ion pumps. pump circuits throughout flight, and

use of the O2 vat-ion

provide a means of disabling
are opened on the launch pad,

circuit

if necessary.

The O2 circuit
tank quantity.

breakers

and closed

at 90 percent

The most likely period of overpressurization in the cryogenic system The possibility will occur during operation in the minimum dq/dm region. of overpressurization is predicted on the assumption of a vacuum breakAlso, under certain condown, resulting in an increase in heat leak. extremely low power levels and/or a depressurized cabin, ditions, that is,

A-39 ~*_.... -- __ ‘._ _” -.,.. _. -.-. --. . _...,“.---. __cI_ -- .-__.. --.x_I-

demand may be lower preceding conditions tank.

than the minimum dq/dm flow would result in an increase

necessary. Any of the of pressure within a

In the case of hydrogen tank overpressurization, prior to reaching relief valve cracking pressure, tank pressure can be decreased by performing an unscheduled fuel cell hydrogen purge. A second method for relieving overpressure is to increase electrical loads, thus increasing fuel cell demand. However, in using this method, consideration must be given to the fact that there will be an increase in oxygen consumption, which may not be desirable. Several procedures can be used to correct an overpressure condition in the oxygen system. One is to perform an unscheduled fuel cell purge. A second is to increase oxygen flow into the command module by opening the ECS DIRECT O2 valve. The third is to increase electrical loads, which may not be desirable gen consumption. because this method will also increase hydrosysreach .

A requirement for an overpressure correction tems simultaneously is remote, since both reactant the minimum dq/dm region in parallel.

in both reactant systems do not

During all missions, to retain a single tank return capability, there is a requirement to maintain a balance between the two tanks in each of the reactant systems. When a 2- to b-percent difference is indicated on the oxygen quantity meters (MIX-2), the O2 HEATERS switch (MDC-2) of the lesser tank is positioned to OFF until tank quantities equalize. A 3-percent difference in the hydrogen quantity meters (MDC-2) will require positioning the H2 BEATERS switch (MDC-2) of the lesser tank to OFF until tank quantities equalize. This procedure retains the automatic operation of the repressurization circuits, and provides for operation of the fan motors during repressurization to retain an accurate quantity readout in all tanks. The necessity for balancing should be determined shortly after a repressurization cycle, since quantity readouts will be most accurate at this time. Batteries.Five silver in the EPS. These batteries oxide-zinc are located storage batteries in the CM lower are incorporated equipment bay.

Three rechargeable entry and postlanding batteries (A, B, and C) power the CM systems after CSM separation and during postlanding. Prior to CBI separation, the batteries provide a secondary source of power while The entry batteries are used for the fuel cells are the primary source. the following purposes:

A-40

a.

Provide

CM power after fuel cell

CSM separation power during emergency peak load periods (failure (relays, (Delta V

Supplement b. maneuvers)
C.

Provide Provide Provide Provide Batteries

power during power for sequencer power for

operations circuitry

of two fuel indicators,

cells) d. etc.)
e.

EPS control logic power aids

f.
g*

recovery

during

postlanding by selection.

A, B, or C can power pyro

circuits

Each entr;{ and postlanding battery is mounted in a vented plastic case and consists of 20 silver oxide-zinc cells connected in series. The cells are individually encased in plastic containers which contain relief valves that open at 35 + 5 psig, venting during an overpressure into the battery case. The three cases can be vented overboard through a common manifold, the BATTERY VENT valve (RHEB-252), and the ECS waste water dump line. Since the BATTERY VENT is closed prior to lift-off, the interior of the battery cases is at a pressure of one atmosphere. The pressure is relieved after earth orbit insertion and completion of cabin purge by positioning the control to VENT for 5 seconds. After completion the control is closed, and pressure as read out on position 4A of the System Test Meter (LEB-101) should remain at zero unless there is battery outGutgassing can be caused by an internal battery failure, an gassing. abnormal high-rate discharge, or by overcharging. If a pressure increase is noted on the system test meter, the BATTERY VENT is positioned to VENT for 5 seconds, and reclosed. Normal battery charging procedures require a check of the battery manifold after completion of each recharge. Since the battery
be indicated

vent
by

line

is

connected

to the waste in the battery to VENT.

water manifold

dump line

line,
which

it provides a means of monitoring
would

waste water dump line plugging,

when the BATTERY VENT control

a pressure rise is positioned

Each battery is rated at 40-ampere hours (AH) minimum and will deliver this at a current output of 35 amps for 30 minutes and a subsequent output of 2 amps for the remainder of the rating.

A-41

At Apollo mission and will provide this ever, 40 AH is used in 45 AH for postlanding

loads, each battery is capable of providing amount after each complete recharge cycle. mission planning for inflight capability, capability of a fully charged battery.

45 AH
Howand

Open circuit voltage is 37.2 volts. Sustained battery loads are a battery bus voltage of extremely light (2 to 3 watts); therefore, approximately 34 V dc will be indicated on the spacecraft voltmeter, exhave been activated to tie the battery cept when the main bus tie switches only batteries A and B will be outputs to the main dc buses. Normally, Battery C is isolated during prelaunch connected to the main de buses. by opening the MAIN A-BAT C and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers (RHEB-275). Battery C will therefore provide a backup for main dc bus power in case of failure of battery A or B or during the time battery A or B is being The two-battery configuration provides more efficient use of recharged. fuel cell power during peak power loads and decreases overall battery The M&IN A- and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers are closed recharge time. prior to CSM separation or as required during recharge of battery A or B. Battery C, through circuit breakers BAT C to BAT BUS B (RHEB-250), provides backup power to the in the event of failure of entry battery A or B. are normally open until a failure of battery A or can also be used to recharge battery A or B in the the normal charging circuit. BAT BUS A and BAT C to respective battery bus These circuit breakers This circuit B occurs. event of a failure in

-

The two pyrotechnic batteries supply power to initiate ordnance debatteries are isolated from the rest of vices in the SC. The pyrotechnic the EPS to prevent the high-power surges in the pyrotechnic system from These affecting the EPS, and to insure source power when required. Entry and postlanding batteries are not to be recharged in flight. oattery A, B, or C can be used as a redundant source of power for initiating pyro circuits in the respective A or B pyro system, if either This can be performed by proper manipulation of the pyro battery fails, Caution must be exercised to isolate the circuit breakers on RHEB-250. failed pyro battery by opening the PYRO A (B) SE& A (B) circuit breaker, prior to closing the yellow colored BAT BUS A (B) to PYRO BUS TIE circuit breaker.

-

A-42

Performance

characteristics Rated capacity per battery 40 amp-hrs (25 ampere rate) 0.75 amphrs (75 amps for 36 seconds)

of each SC battery

are as follows: Ambient battery temperature

Battery Entry and Postlanding A, B, and c (3) Pyre A and B (2)

circuit voltage (max.)

open
Nominal voltage Minimum voltage

37.8 V dc mar 29 V dc 27 V dc (37.2 V dc i; (35 amps (35 amps
flight) load) load)

50” to 110" F

37.8 V dc max 23 v dc 20 v dc (37.2 V dc ir (75 amps (75 amps
flight) load) load)

60” to
110" F

(32 V dc open circuit)
in the SC due to the

NOTE: Pyro battery load voltage is not measurable extremely short time they power pyro loads.

Fuel cell power plants.Each of the three Bacon-type fuel cell power plants is individually coupled to a heat rejection (radiator) system, the hydrogen and oxygen cryogenic storage systems, a water storage system, and a power distribution system. A typical power plant schematic is shown in figure A2.L5. The power plants generate dc power chemical reaction. The by-product water age tank in the CM where it is used for cooling p'zposes in the ECS. The amount to the power produced which is relative table ~2.6-11.) on demand through an exothermic is fed to a potable water storastronaut consumption and for of water produced is equivalent to the reactant consumed. (See

TABLE ~2.6-II.Load (amps 1 0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 '15 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100

REACTANT CONSWTIOPJ urn WATER PRODUCTION

O2 lb/hr 0.0102 0.0204 0.0408 0.0612 0.0816 0.1020 0.1224 0.1428 0.1632 0.1836 0.2040 0.3060 0.4080 0.5100 0.6120 0.7140 0.8160

T

H2 lb/hr
0.001285 0.002570 0.005140 0.007710 0.010280

H2° Ib/hr 0.01149 0.02297 0.04594 0.0689i 0.09188 0.11485 0.13782 0.16079 0.18376 0.20673 0.2297 0.34455 0.45940 0.57425 0.68910 0.80395 0.91880 I.03365 1.1485 1.26335 1.3782 1.49305

T

x/hr 5.21 10.42 20.84 31.26 41.68 52.10 62.52 72.94 83.36 93.78 104.20 156.30 208.40 260.50 3~2.60 364.70 416.80 448.90 521.00 573.10 625.20 677.30 729.40 781.50 833.60

0.012850
0.015420 0.017990 0.020560 0.023130 0.025700 0.038550 0.051400 0.064250 0.077100 0.089950 0.10280 0.11565 0.12850 0.14135 0.15420 0.16705 0.17990 0.19275 0.20560 0.21845 0.23130 0.24415 0.25700 H20 = 10.42

0.9180
1.0200 1.1220 1.2240 1.3260 i .4280 1.5300 1.6320 1.7340 1.8360 1.9380 2.0400 I

1.6079
1.72275 1.83760 1.95245 2.06730 2.18215 2.2970 cc/amp/hr

885.70
937.90 989.00 1042.00

XMIJLAS:
O2 = 2.04 x lO-2 H = 2.57 x 10 -3 I 2 H20 = 2.297 x 10m2 lb/amp/hr

A-44
-----.“.~ .._. ---~~--___-

I

1111II IIIII 1111II

I I I

I I I
I

I I

I I

I I

I
I

I I
I

uxYGEN GAS PURITY LEVEL (% BY VOLUME)

1,i e;ure AZ. 6- '(.-

O2 gas purity

effect

on purge

interval.

A-49

tiiii

i i

i

I I
/

I

/Ml

I I

/ // ///: /‘A%’
SPiC I-klRIfY

I

10,000 0.1 11 1 99.0

II I

HYDROGEN GAS INERT LEVEL (P;hl)

libb 99.9

100 99.99

10 I 99.999

HYDROGEN GAS PURITY LEVEL f% BY VOLUME)

Figure

A2.6-8.-

H2 gas purity

effect

on purge

interval.
-

A-50 I - . ..-.... 1 . __l_"-^"--..---..-_.

resulting from a decreased voltage, crease in fuel cell skin temperature voltage.

by a gradual deload, is followed which causes a decrease in terminal

The range in which the terminal voltage is permitted to vary is determined by the high and low voltage input design limits of the compoFor most components the limits are 30 volts dc and nents being powered. To remain within these design limits, the dc bus voltage 25 volts de. must be maintained between 31.0 and 26.2 volts dc. To compensate for it is recommended sustained bus voltage be maintained becyclic loads, Bus voltage is maintained within prescribed tween 26.5 and 30.0 V dc. limits by the application of entry and postlanding batteries during load increases (power up). Load increase or decrease falls well within the limits of power supply capability and, under normal conditions, should not require other than normal checklist procedures. Power up.- Powering Up SpaCeCraft systems is performed in one continuous sequence providing the main bus voltage does not decrease below 26.5 volts. If bus voltage decreases to this level, the power up sequence can be interrupted for the time required for fuel cell temperatures to increase with the resultant voltage increase or the batteries can be connected to the main buses thus reducing the fuel cell load. In most cases, powering up can be performed in one continuous sequence; however, when starting from an extremely low spacecraft load, it is probable that a power up interruption or earlier battery coupling may be required. The greatest load increase occurs while powering up for a delta V maneuver. Power down.- Powering down spacecraft systems is performed in one continuous sequence providing the main bus voltage does not increase above 31.0 volts. Powering down from relatively high spacecraft load levels, that is, following a delta V, the sequence may have to be interrupted for the time required for fuel cell temperature, and as a result, bus voltage to decrease. To expedite power down, one fuel cell can be disconnected from the buses increasing the loads on the remaining fuel cells and decreasing bus voltage, thus allowing continuation of the power down sequence. Fuel cell disconnect.If the requirement arises to maintain a power plant on open circuit, temperature decay would occur at an average rate of approximately 6 deg/hr, with the automatic in-line heater circuit activating at a skin temperature of 385’ F and maintaining power plant temperature at 385” F. In-line heater activation can be confirmed by a 4.5- to 6-amp indication as observed on the dc amps meter (MDC-3) with the de indicator switch positioned to the open circuited fuel cell position. Reactant valves remain open. Fuel cell pumps can be turned off until the in-line heater circuit activates, at which time they must be on.

A-51

Closing of reactant valves during a power plant disconnect is dependent on the failure experienced. If power plant failure is such as to allow future use, that is, shutdown due to partially degraded output, it is recommended the reactant valves remain open to provide a positive reactant pressure. The valves should be closed after power-plant skin temperature decays below 300" F. The reactant valves are closed during initial shutdown, if the failure is a reactant leak, an abnormally high regulator output pressure, or complete power-plant failure. Prior to disconnecting a fuel cell, if a single inverter is being power plants is connected to both main de used, each of the remaining buses to enhance load sharing since bus loads are unbalanced. If two inverters are being used, main de bus loads are relatively equal; therefore, each of the remaining power plants is connected to a separate main dc bus for bus isolation. If one power plant had been placed on open circuit for an extended period of time , prior to powering up to a configuration requiring three power plants, reconnecting is accomplished prior to the time of heavy load demands. This permits proper conditioning of the power plant which has been on open circuit. The time required for proper conditioning is a function of skin temperature increase and the load applied to the power plant. Inverters.Each inverter (fig. ~2.6-9) is composed of an oscillator, an eight-stage digital countdown section, a de line filter, two silicon controlled rectifiers, a magnetic amplifier, a buck-boost amplifier, a demodulator, two dc filters, an eight-stage power inversion section, a harmonic neutralization transformer, an ac output filter, current sensing transformers, a Zener diode reference bridge, a low-voltage control, and an overcurrent trip circuit. The inverter normally uses a 6.bkHz square wave synchronizing signal from the central timing equipment (CTE) which maintains inverter output at 400 Hz. If this external signal is completely lost, the free running oscillator within the inverter will provide f7 Hz. The internal pulses that will maintain inverter output within oscillator is normally synchronized by the external pulse. The subsequent paragraphs describe the function of the various stages of the inverter. The 6.4-kHz square wave provided by the CTE is applied through the internal oscillator to the eight-stage digital countdown section. The oscillator has two divider circuits which provide a 1600-Hz signal to the magnetic amplifier. The eight-stage digital countdown section, triggered by the 6.4-kHz displaced one signal, produces eight 400-Hz square waves, each mutually One pulse-time is pulse-time from the preceding and following wave. The eight square 156 microseconds and represents 22.5 electrical degrees. waves are applied to the eight-stage power inversion section. ._

..-

r - I---

25-30 VOCTS D-C INPUT I

-----VOLTAGE

7 BlAS r

-----TRANSFORMER

1

DEMODULATOR

A-C FILTER

I .6 KH,

VOLTAGE'& CURRENT REGULATION --s---

L-L I -I

30 BUS 2

r --I

OSCILLATOR CONTROL

1

I
COUNTDOWN

I I I I I I

WI
EMP HI4-

:aw

I--

I I I -- -I

4.4 KHz

rIf-NEGATIVE SQUARE WAVE

-------

1

NOTE:

Unless othcwiw specified: I. hetier 1 is shown. 2. A denotes input voltage.

Figure

~2.6-9. - Inverter

block

diagram.

A-53

The eight-stage power inversion section, fed a controlled voltage from the buck-boost amplifier, amplifies the eight 400-Hz square waves produced by the eight-stage digital countdown section. The amplified mutually displaced 22.5 electrical degrees, are next square waves, still applied to the harmonic neutralization transformer. The harmonic neutralization section consists of 31 transformer windings on one core. This section accepts the 400-Hz square-wave output of the eight-stage power inversion section and transforms it into a ?-phase 400-Hz 115-volt signal. The manner in which these transformers are wound on a single core produces flux cancellation which eliminates all harmonics up to and including the fifteenth of the fundamental frequency. The 22.5" displacement of the square waves provides a means of electrically rotating the square wave excited primary windings around the 3-phase, wye-connected secondary windings, thus producing the 3-phase 400-Hz sine wave output. This 115-volt signal is then applied to the ac output filter. The ac output filter eliminates the remaining higher harmonics. Since the lower harmonics were eliminated by the harmonic neutral transCircuitry former, the size and weight of this output filter was reduced. in this filter also produces a rectified signal which is applied to the The amplitude of Zener diode reference bridge for voltage regulation. After this signal is a function of the amplitude of ac output voltage. filtering, the 3-phase 115-volt ac 400-Hz sine wave is applied to the ac buses through individual phase current-sensing transformers. The current-sensing transformers produce a rectified signal, the amplitude of which is a direct function of inverter output current magnitude. This dc signal is applied to the Zener diode reference bridge to it is also paralleled to an overcurrent regulate inverter current output: sensing circuit. The Zener diode reference bridge receives a rectified de signal, from the circuitry in the ac output filter. representing voltage output, A variance in voltage output unbalances the bridge, providing an error signal of proper polarity and magnitude to the buck-boost amplifier via the magnetic amplifier. The buck-boost amplifier, through its bias voltcompensates for voltage variations. When inverter current age output, output reaches 200 to 250 percent of rated current, the rectified signal applied to the bridge from the current sensing transformers is of sufficient magnitude to provide an error signaL,causing the buck-boost amplifier to operate in the same manner as during an overvoltage condition. The bias output of the buck-boost amplifier, controlled by the error signal, will be varied to correct for any variation in inverter voltage or a When inverter current output beyond-tolerance increase in current output. the overcurrent sensing circuit is exceeds 250 percent of rated current, activated.

A-54 -^-".---. ___..--------__1_1 -_. -I_ _--

The overcurrent sensing circuit monitors a rectified dc signal repWhen total inverter current output exceeds resenting current output. this circuit will illuminate an overload 250 percent of rated current, If current output of any single phase exceeds lamp in 15+5 seconds. 300 percent of rated current, this circuit will illuminate the overload lamp in 5-+1 seconds. The AC BUS 1 OVERLOADand AC BUS 2 OVERLOADlamps are in the caution/warning matrix on MDC-2. The de power to the inverter is supplied from the main dc buses The filter reduces the high-frequency ripple through the de line filter. and the 25 to 30 volts de is applied to two siliconin the input, controlled rectifiers. The silicon-controlled rectifiers are alternately set by the 1600-Hz signal from the magnetic amplifier to produce a de square wave with an on-time of greater than 90" from each rectifier. This is filtered and supplied to the buck-boost amplifier where it is transformer-coupled with the amplified 1600-Hz output of the magnetic amplifier, to develop a fildc which is used for amplification in the power inversion tered 35 volts stages. The buck-boost amplifier also provides a variable bias voltage to the eight-stage power inversion section. The amplitude of this bias voltage is controlled by the amplitude and polarity of the feedback signal from the Zener diode reference bridge which is referenced to output voltage and current. This bias signal is varied by the error signal to regulate inverter voltage and maintain current output within tolerance. The demodulator circuit compensates for any low-frequency ripple (10 to 1000 Hz) in the dc input to the inverter. The high-frequency ripple is attenuated by the input filters. The demodulator senses the 35-volt dc output of the buck-boost amplifier and the current input to the buck-boost amplifier. An input dc voltage drop or increase will be reflected in a drop or increase in the 35-volt dc output of the buckboost amplifier, as well as a drop or increase in current input to the buck-boost amplifier. A sensed decrease in the buck-boost amplifier voltage output is compensated for by a demodulator output, coupled through the magnetic amplifier to the silicon-controlled rectifiers. The demodulator output causes the SCR's to conduct for a longer time, thus increasing their filtered dc output. A sensed increase in buck-boost amplifier voltage output, caused by an increase in dc input to the inverter, is compensated for by a demodulator output coupled through the magnetic amplifier to the silicon-controlled rectifiers, causing them to conduct for shorter periods, thus producing a lower filtered dc output to the buck-boost amplifier. In this manner, the 35-volt dc input to the power inversion section is maintained at a relatively constant level irrespective of the fluctuations in de input voltage to the inverter.

A-55

The low-voltage control circuit samples the input voltage to the Since the buck-boost inverter and can terminate inverter operation. amplifier provides a boost action during a decrease in input voltage to 35 volts dc to the in an attempt to maintain a constant the inverter, power inversion section and a regulated 115-volt inverter output, the high boost required during a low-voltage input would tend to overheat As a precautionary measure, the the solid state buck-boost amplifier. low-voltage control will terminate inverter operation by disconnecting operating voltage to the magnetic amplifier and the first power inversion stage when input voltage decreases to between 16 and 19 volts dc. A temperature sensor with a range in each inverter and provides an input a light at an inverter overtemperature is telemetered to MSFN. of +32O to +248' F is installed to the C&WSwhich will illuminate of 190" F. Inverter temperature

solid-state battery charger A constant voltage, Battery charger.(fig. A2.6-lo), located in the CM lower equipment bay, is incorporated (MDC-3) controls power switch into the EPS. The BATTERY CHARGERselector as well as connecting the charger output to the input to the charger, selected battery (fig. A2.6-14). When the BATTERY CHARGERselector (Kl) is actiswitch is positioned to entry battery A, B, or C, a relay vated completing circuits from ac and dc power sources to the battery charger. Battery charger output is also connected to the selectedbattery to be charged through contacts of the MAIN BUS TIE motor switch. Positioning the MAIN BUS TIE switch (A/C or B/C) to OFF for battery A or B, and both switches to OFF for battery C will disconnect main bus loads from the respective batteries and also complete the circuit from the charger to the battery. The battery charger is provided 25 to 30 volts from both main!dc All three buses and 115 volts 400-Hz T-phase from either of the ac buses. de input and produce phases of ac are used to boost the 25- to TO-volt In addition, phase A of the ac is used to 40 volts dc for charging. The logic network in the charger, supply power for the charger circuitry. which consists of a two-stage differential amplifier (comparator), Schmitt trigger, current sensing resistor, and a voltage amplifier, sets up the The first stage of the comparator is initial condition for operation. thus setting the Schmitt in the on mode, with the second stage off, Maximum base drive trigger first stage to on with the second stage off. is provided to the current amplifier which turns the switching transistor to the on mode. With the switching transistor on, current flows from the transformer rectifier through the switching transistor, current sensing resistor, and switch choke to the battery being charged. Current lags As current flow increases, the voltage due to switching choke action. voltage drop across the sensing resistor increases, and at a specific level sets the first stage of the comparator to off and the second stage

-

A-56 I_ . _--II _.._I.. _.. -4-_"1"e._.-II _l-.l..-_-~~,-"--

r --w--m i t-[ I I i I[
LCURRENT AMPLIFIER

r--

1

I-

---

1

i I
i

I--

I

.----

J
DC INDICATORS SW (MDC-3) VOLTMETER TELEMETRY DC INDICATORS SW (MDC-3) AMMETER _ _ +

1
C
B .I1 : b

BATTERY CHARGE (MDC-3)

rI
* I SWITCHING DIODE m- J

BATTERY CHARGER BAT A CHG (MDC-5) BATTERY BUS A BAT A PWR ENTRY/POST (RHEB 250) LANDING

BOA

CB41 (ON BATTERY) 40 VDC BATTERY DC NEG _A

MNDC

.,

Figure

~2.6-ILO.- Battery

charger

block

diagram.

A-57

to on. The voltage amplifier is set off to reverse the Schmitt trigger to first stage off and second stage on. This sets the current amplifier off, which in turn sets the switching transistor off. The switching transistor in the off mode terminates power from the source, causing the field in the choke to continue collapsing, discharging into the battery, then through the switching diode and the current sensing resistor to the opposite side of the choke. As the EMF in the choke decreases, current through the sensing resistor decreases, reducing the voltage drop across the resistor. At some point, the decrease in voltage drop across the sensing resistor reverses the comparator circuit, setting up the initial condition and completing one cycle of operation;. The output load current, due to the choke action, remains&relatively constant except for the small variation through the sensing resistor. This variation is required to set and reset the switching transistor and Schmitt trigger through the action of the comparator.

Battery charger output is regulated by the sensing resistor until 37 volts. battery voltage reaches approximately At this point, the biased voltage sensor circuit is unbiased, and in conjunction with the sensing resistor, provides a signal for cycling the battery charger. As battery voltage increases, the internal impedance of the battery increases, decreasing current flow from the charger. the battery is At 39.8 volts, fully charged and current flow becomes negligible. Recharging the batteries until battery amp hour input equates amp hours previously discharged from the battery assures sufficient battery capacity for mission completion. The MSFN will monitor this function. If there is no contact with the MSFN, battery charging is terminated when the voltmeter indicates 39.5 V dc with the DC INDICATORS switch set to the BAT CHARGERposition. output placing Battery Charger voltage is monitored is monitored on the inner the DC INDICATORS switch charger current output is on the DC VOLTS METER (MDC-3). Current scale of the DC AMPS meter (MDC-3) by (MIX-3) to the BAT CHARGERposition. telemetered to the MSFN.

__-.

When charging battery A or B, the respective BAT RLY BUS-BAT A or B circuit breaker (MDC-5) is opened to expedite recharge. During this period, only one battery will be powering the battery relay bus. Relay bus voltage can be monitored by selecting positions 4 and B on the Systems Test Meter (LEB-101) and from the couches by the Fuel Cell-Main Bus B-l and Fuel Cell - Main Bus A-3 talk-back indicators (MDC-3) which will be barber-poled. If power is lost to the relay bus, these indicators will revert to the gray condition, indicating loss of power to the relay bus and requiring remedial action. Recharge of a battery immediately after it is exposed to any appreciable loads requires less time than recharge of a battery commencing 30 minutes or more after it is disconnected from these loads. Therefore, it is advantageous to connect batteries to the charger as soon as possible

A-58

after they are disconnected overall recharge time.

from the main buses

since

this

decreases

The dc and ac power distribution to components Power distribution.A singleof the EPS is provided by two redundant buses in each system. point ground on the spacecraft structure is used to eliminate ground loop Sensing and control circuits are provided for monitoring and effects. protection of each system. Distribution of dc power (fig. ~2.6-11) is accorr,plished with a twowire system and a series of interconnected buses, switches, circuit The dc negative buses are connected to breakers, and isolation diodes. The buses consist of the following: the vehicle ground point (VGP). a. and/or Two main de buses entry and postlanding (A and B), batteries powered by the A, B, and C. three fuel cells

Two battery buses (A and B), each powered by its respective b. C can power either entry and postlanding battery A and B. Battery both buses if batieries A and/or B fail. Flight and postlanding bus, or directly by the three and diodes, B, and C, through dual diodes.
C.

or

p owered through both entry and postlanding both through main dc buses either

main dc buses batteries A, and isolation

d. diodes.
e.

Flight

bus,

powered bus,

through

Nonessential Battery relay the individual

powered

dc main bus A or B. batteries

f. through

bus, powered by entry and postlanding battery buses and isolation diodes.

Pyro b?Lzes, isolated from the main electrical power system when gA capbility is provided to connect either powered by the pyre batteries, entry battery to the A or B pyro system in case of loss of a pyro battery. completely isolated from the main SM jei;tison controllers, h. electrical power system until activated during CSM separation, after which they are powered by the fuel cells. Power from the fuel cell power plants can be connected to the main de buses through six motor switches (part of overload/reverse current circuits in the SM) which are controlled by switches in the CMlocated to either or both of the main on MDC-3. Fuel cell power can be selected de buses. Six talk-back indicators show gray when fuel cell output is When an overload condition connected and striped when disconnected. the overload-reverse current circuits in the SM automatically occurs,

A-59 I I-. _.__I.. _“.,_ ,.._.___._._...._ ____I __-__ ---.-_.I-__..-I^_I-^. .-_---.-___.-.-

disconnect the fuel cell power plants from the overloaded bus and provide visual displays (talk-back indicator and caution and warning lamp illumination)(FC BUS DISCONNECT) for isolation of the trouble. A reverse current condition will disconnect the malfunctioning power plant from the dc sysThe de undervoltage sensing circuits (fig. ~2.6-12) are provided to tem. indicate bus low-voltage conditions. If voltage drops below 26.25 volts dc, the applicable de undervoltage light on the caution and warning panel Since each bus is capable of handling all EPS (MDC-2) will illuminate. an undervoltage condition should not occur except in an isolated loads, if too many electrical units are placed on the bus simulinstance; taneously or if a malfunction exists in the EPS. A voltmeter (MDC-3) is provided to monitor voltage of each main dc bus, the battery charger, and each of the five batteries. An ammeter is provided (MDC-3) to monitor A, B, C, and the battery current output of fuel cells 1, 2, 3, batteries charger. During high power demand or emergencies, supplemental power to the main de buses can be supplied from batteries A and B via the battery buses During entry, spacecraft and directly from battery C (fig. ~2.643). power is provided by the three entry and postlanding batteries which are connected to the main dc buses prior to CSM separation; placing the MAIN BUS TIE switches (MDC-5) to BAT A/C and BAT B/C provides this function after closing the MAIN A-BAT C and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers The switches are manually placed to OFF after completion of (MB-275). RCS purge and closing the FLIGHT AND POST LDG-BAT BUS A, BAT BUS B, and BAT C circuit breakers (RHEB-275) during main chute descent. The AUTO position provides an automatic connection of the entry batteries to the main dc buses at CSM separation. The auto function is used only on the launch pad after the spacecraft is configured for a LES pad abort.

~2.6-11, permits isolating nonA nonessential bus, as shown on fig. essential equipment during a shortage of power (two fuel cell power The flight bus distributes power to inflight telecommuniplants out). cations equipment. The flight and postlanding bus distributes power to some of the inflight telecommunications equipment, float bag No. 3 conthe ECS postlanding vent and blower control, and postlanding comtrols, munications and lighting equipment. In flight, the postlanding bus receives power from the fuel cells and/or entry and postlanding batteries through the main de buses. After completion of RCS purge during main the entry batteries supply power to the postlanding bus chute descent, directly through individual circuit breakers. These circuit breakers (FLIGHT & POST LANDING-BAT BUS A, BAT BUS B, and BAT C - RHEB-275) are normally open in flight and closed during main chute descent just prior to positioning the MAIN BUS TIE switches to OFF.
Motor switch contacts which close when the MAIN BUS TIE switches are placed to ON, complete the circuit between the entry and postlanding batteries and the main dc buses, and open the connection from the battery

A-60

The battery relay bus provides dc power to the charger to the batteries. the fuel cell and inverter control circuits, fuel cell ac sensing units, and the fuel cell+nain BUS A and B talk-back reactant and radiator valves, batteries supply power to ordnance indicators on MDC-3. The pyrotechnic devices for separation of the LES, S-IVB, forward heat shield, SM from CM, and for deployment_and release of the drogue and main parachutes during a pad abort, high-altitude abort, or normal mission progression. The three fuel cell power plants supply power to the SM jettison controllers for the SM separation maneuver. Distribution of ac power (fig. A2.6-14) is accomplished with a fourwire system via two redundant buses, ac bus 1 and ac bus 2. The ac neutral bus is connected to the vehicle ground point. The ac power is provided by one or two of the solid-state ll5/200-volt 400-Hz 3-phase inverters. The dc power is routed to the inverters through the main dc Inverter No. 1 is powered through dc main bus A, inverter No. 2 buses. through dc main bus B, and inverter No. 3 through either de main bus A or B by switch selection. Each of these circuits has a separate circuit breaker and a power control motor switch. Switches for applying power to the motor switches are located on MDC-3. All three inverters are identical and are provided with overtemperature circuitry. A light inin the caution/warning group on MDC-2, illuminates at 190" to dicator, indicate an overtemperature situation. Inverter output is routed through a series of control motor switches to the ac buses. Six switches (MDC-3) control motor switches which operate contacts to connect or disconnect the inverters from the ac buses. Inverter priority is 1 over 2, 2 over and 3 over 1 on any one ac bus. This indicates that inverter 2 cannot 3, be connected to the bus until the inverter 1 switch is positioned to OFF. Also, when inverter 3 switch is positioned to ON, it will disconnect inverter 1 from the bus before the inverter 3 connection will be performed. The motor switch circuits are designed to prevent connecting two inverters to the same ac bus at the same time. The ac loads receive power from either ac bus through bus selector switches. In some instances, a single phase is used for operation of equipment and in others all three. Overundervoltage and overload sensing circuits (fig. ~2.6-12) are provided for each bus. An automatic inverter disconnect is effected during an overvoltage. The ac bus voltage fail and overload lights in the caution/ warning group (MDC-2) provide a visual indication of voltage or overload malfunctions. Monitoring voltage of each phase on each bus is accomplished by selection with the AC INDICATORS switch (MDC-3). Readings are displayed on the AC VOLTS meter (MDC-3). Phase A voltage of each bus is telemetered to MSFN stations. Several precautions should be taken during any inverter switching. The first precaution is to completely disconnect the inverter being taken out of the circuit whether due to inverter transfer or malfunction. The second precaution is to insure that no more than one switch on AC BUS 1 or AC BUS 2 (MIX-3) is in the up position at the same time. These

k

~-64

,

1

P

+ + +

INVERTER NO. INVERTER NO. INMRTER NO.

1 2 3 ONLY ONE INMRI~K CAN POWEF BUS AT ANY ONE TIME

L
4-

INVERTER NO. INVERTER NO. INVERTER NO. EPS SENSOR

1 2 3 ONLY ONE INMRTER CAN POWER BUS AT ANY ONE TIME

Ib
I -1
FUEL CELL pH SENSOR (+A) PUMP MOTORS - F&L CELL 2 -c pH SENSOR (d)A) PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 3 -c 4 4 --) -----, ---, ----, _3 d _3 pH SENSOR ( +A) CRYOGENIC CRYOGENIC

AC SENSE UNIT AND ;NDI~TORS (VOLTMETER)

sw
PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 1

AC SENSE UNIT AND AC INDICATORS SW (VOLTMETER)

c
c

pH SENSOR (+A) PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 2 ptl SENSOR (CA) PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 3

c + ----) ----, ----, SYSTEM (+ 6. * --) * + (+A) @A, 98) --k 4 d +

pH SENSOR (‘+A) CRYOGENIC CRYOGENIC FUEL OTY AMPL 2 (CC) FAN MOTORS - SYS 2

FUEL 0TY AMPL 1 (6 C) FAN MOTORS - S% 1

BATTERY CHARGER TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENVlRONLNNTAL STABILIZATION SPS GAUGING CONTROL AND (CC)

PATTERY CHARGER TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STABILIZATION SPS GAUGING CONTROL SYSTEM @AA.$‘C, %? SYSTEM NOTE: 1. For complerc AC distribution bm&out rchr to individwl system section

CONTROL SYSTEM

AND CONTROL (+O (‘#B) (#A)

EXTERIOR LIGHTING INTERIOR LIGHTING GLN AC POWER ( $0)

EXTERIOR LIGHTING INTERIOR LIGHTING GCN AC POWER ($4) ORDEAL 1661

Figure

A2.6-lb.-

Alternating

current

power distribution.

precautions are necessary to assure positive power transfer since power to any one inverter control motor switch is routed in series through the A third precaution must be exercised to preswitch of another inverter. clude a motor switch lockout when dc power to inverter 3 is being transThe AC ferred from dc main bus A to dc main bus B, or vice versa. INSERTER 3 switch (MIX-3) should be held in the OFF position for 1 second operation from one main dc bus to the when performing a power transfer other. Performance Alternating; current formance and design data Alternating Phases Displacement Steady-state Transient Recovery Unbalance Frequency limites Normal (synchronized to central timing equipment) Emergency (loss central timing equipment) Wave characteristics (sine wave) Maximum distortion Highest harmonic Crest factor Rating of voltage voltage current 3 120 * 2" 115.5 (+L 3 phases) 115 (+35, -1.5) -65) V ac (average V ac 15 ms, steady from average) and Design Data The ac and dc per-

and direct current data.for the EPS is as follows:

To 115 * 10 V within state within 50 ms 2 V ac (worst 400 f 3 Hz phase

400 f 7 Hz

5 percent 4 percent 1.414 f 10 percent 1250 V ac

Direct

current Steady-state limits Normal voltage 29 * 2.0 V dc 26.2 CM V dc for cyclic loads)

Minimum CM bus Min Precautionary bus Maximum CM bus Max Precautionary bus During postlanding preflight checkout periods Ripple voltage Operational

26.5 V dc (allows
31.0 v dc 30.0 V dc (allows 27 to 30 V dc

CM and

for

cyclic

loads)

1 V peak to peak Limitations and Restrictions

Fuel cell power plants.Fuel cell power plants are designed to function under atmospheric and high-vacuum conditions. Each must be able to maintain itself at sustaining temperatures and minimum electrical loads at both environment extremes. To function properly, fuel cells must operate under the following limitations and restrictions: External nonoperating temperature Operating temperature inside SM External
pressure

-20"

to +140" F.

+30" to 145" F. Atmospheric 27 to 31 V dc

nonoperating voltage

Normal

Minimum operating voltage at terminals Emergency operation Normal operation

20.5 V dc at 2295 watts
level) 27

(gross

Power

v ac

.

._

.._-.,

.._

.

..-

_~...---

.-..

-.“--_~-

-“pi._._

..---.-

^

_*.l

“~-

____il_-

Maximum operating at terminals Fuel cell overload disconnect

voltage

31.5 V dc

75 amperes no trip, 112 amperes disconnect after 25 to 300 seconds
1 second minimum before disconnect

Maximum reverse

current

Minimum sustaining power/ 420 watts fuel cell power plant (with in-line heater OFF) In-line heater power (sustain F/C skin temp above 385" F min) Maximum gross power under emergency conditions Nitrogen Reactant Oxygen Hydrogen Reactant consumption/fuel cell power plant Hydrogen Oxygen Minimum skin temperature for self-sustaining operation Minimum skin for recovery Maximum skin temperature in flight temperature PPH = Amps x (2.57 PPH = Amps x (2.04 x lo-') x 10m2) pressure pressure 58.4 to 68.45 nominal)
57.3 to 67.0 nominal)

160 watts (5 to 6 amps) 2295 watts at 20.5 V dc min.

50.2

to 57.5 psia psia psia

(53 psia, (62.5 (61.5

nominal)

psia, psia,

+385” F

+360° F
+500" F

Approximate external environment temperature range outside SC (for radiation)

-260”

to +400" F

A-68

Fuel cell power plant normal operating temperature range Condenser operating Purging O2 purge H2 purge exhaust normal temperature nominal duration duration rate frequency

+385” to +450" F

+150"

to +175" F load after profile tank fill

Dependent on mission and reactant purity 2 minutes 80 seconds

Additional flow while purging Wwn Hydrogen

Up to 0.6 lb/hr Up to 0.75 lb/hr

( nominal

0.67

lb/hr)

The cryogenic storage subsystem must Cryogenic storage subsystem.be able to meet the following requirements for proper operation of the fuel cell power plants and the ECS: Minimum usable Oxygen Hydrogen Temperature fill Oxygen Hydrogen quantity 320 lbs of -297" -423" range F. F. (approx.) (approx.) each tank (min) (min)

28 lbs each tank

at time

Operating pressure @men Normal Minimum Hydrogen Normal Minimum Temperature Oxygen Hydrogen probe

865 to 935 psia 150 psia 225 to 260 psia 100 psia
range

-325”
-425"

to

+80° F
F

to -200"

Maximum allowable difference in quantity balance between tanks

A-69 ,. . - - _..-.-. .._ __I" ._.-__"_ _I ___,___cI_ ,. ._..-. --~..-~~-----~~~~p__,p_---. ._._._I __I- .I...__

Oxygen tanks Hydrogen and 2 tanks

No. 1 and No. 1

2 to

4 percent

3 percent

Pressure relief valve operation Crack pressure Oxygen Hydrogen Reseat pressure Oxygen Hydrogen Full flow, maximum relief Q-vge n Hydrogen

983 psig 273 psig

min. min.

965 psig min. 268 psig min.
1010 psig max. 285 psig max.

Additional data about 1imitatiOnS and restrictions Additional data.may be found in the CSM/LM Spacecraft Operational Data Book SNA-8-D-027, vol I, (CSM ~1168-447). Systems Test Meter

The SYSTEMS TEST meter and the alphabetical and numerical switches located on panel 101 in the CM LEB, provide a means of monitoring vario&s measurements within the SC, and verifying certain parameters displayed only by event indicators. The following can be measured using the SYSTEMS TEST meter, the respective switch positions, and the range of each sensor. Normal operating parameters of measurable items are covered in the telemetry listing. Conversion of the previously listed measurements to the SYSTEMS TEST meter indications are listed in Table A2.6-IV. The XPNDR measurements are direct readouts and do not require conversion.

A-70 .l_l - ~~-I- . . ~"--.. "l.--__l^.-.. _-.._L;__l_-.,_l

TABLE &Z.&III.-

SYSTEMSTEST DATA >sitions Alphabetical select A B C
0 t0

Systems test indicatioafid(";yT v2 pressure, psia F/C 1 SC 206OP F/C 2 SC 2061~ F)C 3 SC 2062~ o2 pressure, psia F/C 1 SC 2066~ F/C 2 SC 2067P F'/C 3 SC 2068P 92 pressure, psia F/C 1 SC 2069~ F/C 2 SC 2070P F'/C 3 SC 2071P <pS radiator outlet F/C 1 SC 208~ F'/C 2 SC 20881 F~C 3 SC 2089~ 3attery manifold pressure, psia Bat7; relay LM power SpS oxidizer SP 0049T line

identity

Switch Numerical select 1 1 1

Sensor range 0 to 75 psia

75 psia

1 2 2

D A B 0 to 75 Pia

2 2 3 temperature 3 3 3

C D A -50" to t300" F B C D A B D
0 t0

20

psia

bus CCO232V

o to +45 V dc 0 to t10 amps o to +200e F -50" to ~50" F

temperature

5

A

CM-RCS oxidize~y~a~eCRte2;l~Tature -P engine, +Y engine, sys B CR 2116~ -P engine, sys B CR 2110T CWengine, sys B CR 2119T CCWengine, sys A CR 2114T -Y engine, sys A CR 2103T pwr output AGC signal

6 5 2 6 6 XPNDR XPNDR

B D C D A C A B >I.0 V dc (nornina Test A.0 V ac Operate 0.0 to 4.5 v ac Locked A.0 V Unlocked 4.8

Phase lockup NOTE : position 7 on the numerical selector

XPNDR switch

C . is an off Fosltlon*

A-

71
___---..----------___ .---

_.---.c_---

__^__1__--

Command Module

Interior

Lighting system (fig. A2.6-15) furnishes lower equipment bay and tunnel read nomenclature, indicators, provided on SC which will be

The command module interior lighting illumination for activities in the couch, panel lighting to areas, and back-lighted and switch positions. Tunnel lighting is concerned with LM activity.

Floodlighting for illumination of work areas is provided by use of fluorescent lamps. Integral panel and numerics lighting is provided by electroluminescent materials. Tunnel lights are incandescent. Pen flashlights are provided for illuminating work areas which cannot be illuminated by the normal spacecraft systems, such as under the couches. Electroluminescence (EL) is from a crystalline phosphor (Z#) the phenomena whereby light is emitted placed as a thin layer between two

closely spaced electrodes of an electrical capacitor. One of the electrodes is a transparent material. The light output varies with voltage and frequency and occurs as light pulses, which are in-phase with the input frequency. Advantageous characteristics of EL for spacecraft use are an "after-glow" of less than 1 second, low power consumption, and negligible heat dissipation.

RAL AND NUMERICS (PANEL tlctm

FLOODLIGHT FIXTURES

Figure

~2.6-15.-

CM interior

1.ighting.

A-72

TABLE .42.6-m.-

SYSTEMSTEST METER INDICATIONS

Systems test meter display 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 ,':c 3.6 43:: 4.2 t:: 4.8 5.0

EPS radiator Outlet temperature (" F.) ; 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 -50 -36 -22

CM-R% Oxidizer valve
tawerature (” F.)

LM Power (amps) 0

SPS temperature (" F.)

Battery manifold Pressure @=A) 0.00 0.80 1.60 2.40 3.20 4.00 4.80 5.60 6.40 7.20 8.00

Batter: relay bus ('J dc 0 1.8

-8

-50 -46 -4;

0.4
0.8

+6 +20 +34 +4a +62 +76 +90 +104 +118 +I32 t146 +16o +174 +188 +202 +216 +230 +244 1258 +272 e86 +300

-33
-34 -30 -26 -22 -18 -14 -10 1; 0 +4 +10 +14 +18 +22 +26 +30 t34 +38

1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2
5::

16 24

8”

3.6
5.4 7.2 9.0 lo.8 12.6 14.4 16.2 18.0 19.8 21.6 23.4 25.2 27.0 28.8 30.6 32.4 34.2 36.0 37.8 39.6 41.4 43.2 45.0

4’:

27
30 33 36 529 45 48 51 54 2 63 6”: 72 75

4.4 4.8 5.2
21:

104 112 120 136 144 152 160 x8 176 184 192 200

96

88

8.80 9.60 10.40 11.20 12.00 12.80 13.60 14.40 15.20 16.00 16.80 17.60 18.40 19.20 20.00

6.4 6.8 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.2 9.6 10.0

128

+4-i?
+46 t50

The interior floodlight system consists of six Floodlight system.floodlight fixture assemblies and three control panels (fig. ~2.6-16). Each fixture assembly contains two fluorescent lamps (one primary and one secondary) and converters. The lamps are powered by 28 V dc from main This assures a power source for lights de buses A and B (fig. A2.6-17). in all areas in the event either bus fails. The converter in each floodlight fixture converts 28 V dc to a high-voltage pulsating dc for operation of the fluorescent lamps. the left Floodlights are used to illuminate three specific areas: the right main display console, and the lower main display console, Switches on MDC-8provide control of lighting of the equipment bay. left main display console area. Switches on MDC-5provide control of Switches for control lighting of the right main display console area. of lighting of the lower equipment bay area are located on LEB-100. Protection for the floodlight circuits is provided by the LIGHTING - MN A and MN B circuit breakers on FXEB-226. Each control panel has a dimming (DIM-l-2) toggle switch control, a and an on/off (FIXED-OFF) toggle switch rheostat (FLOOD-• FF-BRT) control, control. The DIM-l position provides variable intensity control of the primary flood lamps through the FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat, and on-off control The DIM-2 position of the secondary lamps through the FIXED-OFF switch. provides variable intensity control of the secondary lamps through the and on-off control of the primary lamps through FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat, When operating the primary lamps under variable the FIXED-OFF switch. turn on of the lamps is acquired after intensity control (DIM-l position), In transferring the FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat is moved past the midpoint. variable intensity control to the secondary lamps, the FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat should first be rotated to the OFF position before placing the The rheostat is then moved to the full DIM switch to the DIM-2 position. bright setting and should remain in this position unless dimming is desired. Dimming of the secondary flood lamps should not be used unless Dimming of dimming control of the primary floodlights is not available. the secondary lamps results in approximately a go-percent reduction in lamp life. The range of intensity variation is greater for the primary than the secondary floodlights. The commander's control panel (MIX-~) has a POST LANDING-OFF-FIXED switch which connects the flight and postlanding bus to his floodlights The POST LANDING position provides single intensity (fig. A2.6-17). lighting to the commander's primary or secondary lamps as selected by the It is for use during the latter DIM-l or DIM-2 position, respectively. stages of descent after main dc bus power is disconnected, and during postlanding.

A-74 _ .__._...-...a-=.-

-FLOOOT DIM FIXED

COUCH LIGHT ASSEMBLIES __^.._ -

1 MDC-5 2
POST LDG

COMPONENTS 6 LIGHT ASSEMBLIES 3 CONTROLPANELS LH SIDE DISPLAY MDC-8 RH SIDE DISPLAY MDC-5 LEB 100 3 CIRCUIT BREAKERS RHEB 226

Figure

A2.6-16.-

CM floodlight

configuration.

+ 7 I

POST LANDING BUS

+

f

DC MAIN BUS B

DC MAIN BUS A

9)

I-- _-------------------------------, 1 I

RHEB 226

---------------------T I

FLOOD, MNA $

I
t

i

-___ i

7.5A

i

1

DIM

I I

MDC 8

t I

:----~~~~-~~~E!! ---- c------ I I---C ---- ---!E-----J
I
, I

I

+

I I

,

I I

I

I

______ I

I

I 0 NEGATIVE DC BUS

I 63

P
I

LIGHT

LIGHT

LIGHT

L--=+-t
q P NEGATIVE DC BUS

1

NEGATIVE DC BUS

Figure

~2.6~17.- CM floodlight

system

schematic.

Integral lighting system.The integral lighting system controls the EL lamps behind the nomenclature and instrument dial faces on all MDC! and on specif'ic panels in the lower equipment bay, left hand panels, and right hand equipment bay (figs. ~2.6-18 and ~2.6-19). equipment bay, The controls (fig. ~2.6-18) are rotary switches controlling variable transformers powered through the appropriate ac bus. Each rotary control switch has a mechanical stop which prevents the switch being positioned of a circuit because of malfunctions is performed by to OFF. Disabling opening the appropriate circuit breaker on RHEB-226. The INTEGRAL switch on MIX-~ controls the lighting of panels viewed by the commander, MD&l, and the left half of 2. The INTEGRAL switch on MDC-5 con7, 8, 9, 15, trols the lighting of panels viewed by the LM pilot, MDC-3, 4, 5 and 6, 16, RHEB-229 and 275, and the right half of MIX-2. The INTEGRAL switch on LEB-100 controls the lighting of MDC-10, LEB-100, 101, 122 and the DSKY lights on 140, RHEB-225, 226 and LHEB 306. Intensity of the lighting can be individually controlled in each of the three areas. Numerics lighting system.Numerics lighting control is provided over all electroluminescent digital readouts. The NUMERICS rotary switch on MDC-8 controls the off/intensity of numerals on the DSKY and Mission Timer on MIX-2, and the range and delta V indicators of the Entry Monitor the off/intensity of the System of MDC-1. The switch on LEB-100 controls numerals on the LEB-140 DSKY and the Mission Timer on LHEB-306. Protection for the integral and numerics circuits is provided by the LIGHTINGNUMERICS/INTEGRAL-LEB AC 2, L MIX AC 1, and R MIX AC 1 circuit breakers on RHEB-226. These circuit breakers are used to disable a circuit in case of a malfunction. The L MDC AC 1 circuit breakers also feed the EMS roll attitude and scroll incandescent lamps. The six light fixtures in the CM tunnel provide Tunnel lighting.illumination for tunnel activity during docking and undocking. Each of 28 V dc the fixtures, containing two incandescent lamps, is provided through a TUNNEL LIGHTS-OFF switch on MIX-2 (fig. ~2.6-20). Main dc bus A distributes power to one lamp in each fixture,.and main dc bus B to the other lamp. Protection is provided by the LIGHTING/COAS/TUNNEL/RNDZ/ SPOT MN A and MN B circuit breakers on RKEB-226.

A-77
-.--. . _.._. _-_ ..L--. -.

.:.:.>: s;$;: 1Nj’EGRAL cl .-. -: NUMERICS B

INTEGRAL

INTERIOR LIGHTS

(MDC 81
r NUMRICS LED LIGHTS FLOOD t INTEGRAL

OFF

BIT

OFF

RRT

OFF

BRT

(LEB 100)

Figure

~2.6-18.-

CM integral/numerics

illuminat

,ion

system.

LIGHTING NUhlERlCS'lNTCGRAL +?BUSl < P AC NEUT I I p ) I I dB)

lRHEB 2261 BUS 2 NOMFN ' tEB-A?$ I I I +AC,NEUl I ) QA 7)

hlECHANICA1 STOP 110 PLACES,

INTERIOR LIGHTS

-

L

INTERIOR LIGHTS

NOMEN , MDC 5

LHEB 306 EMS (INCANDESCENT1

I

hlDC 1 1 MDC 3 I
L

ROLL ATT IND 141 SCROLL (6)

Figure

A2.6-lg.-

Integral

and numerics

panel

lighting

schematic.

r
I
MN DC1 BUS B I o+

---

1 I I

r -- iI
I I I t I
I
TUNNEL LIGHTS --c-

TUNNEL LIGHT I ASSEMBLIES

I T

6

I I

I
I

MN B INITIATORI

I I I I I i i I 1 I I I 1 I

MN BUS A I

I I DC I
CB28

II
DC NEG

1 LH COAS 1

Figure

~2.6-20.-

Tunnel

lighting

schemat .c.

PART A2.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM Introduction The environment control system (ECS) is designed to provide the flight crew with a conditioned environment that is both life-supporting, The ECS is aided in the accomplishment and as comfortable as possible. of this task through an interface with the electrical power system, The ECS also interfaces with which supplies oxygen and potable water. the electronic equipment of the several Apollo systems, for which the with the lunar module (LM) for pressurizing ECS provides thermal control, the LM, and with the waste management system to the extent that the water and the urine dump lines can be interconnected. The ECS is operated continuously During this operating period phases. three major functions for the crew: a. b. c. Spacecraft atmosphere control throughout all Apollo mission the system provides the following

Water management Thermal control.

Control of the spacecraft atmosphere consists of regulating the pressure and temperature of the cabin and suit gases; maintaining the desired humidity by removing excess water from the suit and cabin gases; controlling the level of contamination of the gases by removing CO*, and ventilating the cabin after landing. matter; odors, and particulate There are provisions for pressurizing the lunar module during docking and subsequent CSM/LM operations. Water management consists of collecting, sterilizing, and storing and delivering chilled and the potable water produced in the fuel cells, heated water to the crew for metabolic consumption, and disposing of the excess potable water by either transferring it to the waste water system Provisions are also made for the collection or by dumping it overboard. and storage of waste water (extracted in the process of controlling humidity), delivering it to the glycol evaporators for supplemental and dumping the excess waste water overboard. cooling,

A-81

Thermal control consists of removing the excess heat generated by the crew and the spacecraft equipment, transporting it to the cab heat exchanger (if required) , and rejecting the unwanted heat to space, either by radiation from the space radiators, or in the form of steam by boiling water in the glycol evaporators. the Five subsystems operating required functions: a. b. c. d. e. Oxygen subsystem Pressure suit circuit (PSC) in conjunction with each other provide

Water subsystem Water-glycol Postlanding subsystem ventilation (PLV) subsystem.

The oxygen subsystem controls the flow of oxygen within the command module (CM); stores a reserve supply of oxygen for use during entry and emergencies; regulates the pressure of oxygen supplied to the subsystem and PSC components; controls cabin pressure in normal and emergency (high flow-rate) modes; controls pressure in the water tanks and glycol reservoir; and provides for PSC purge via the DIRECT 02 valve. The pressure suit circuit provides the crew with a continuously conditioned atmosphere. It automatically controls suit gas circulation, pressure, and removes debris, excess moisture, odors, and temperature; and carbon dioxide from both the suit and cabin gases. The water subsystem (potable section) collects and stores potable water; delivers hot and cold water to the crew for metabolic purposes; and augments the waste water supply for evaporative cooling. The waste water section collects and stores water extracted from the suit heat exchanger, and distributes it to the water inflow control valves of the evaporators, for evaporative cooling. The water-glycol potable water chiller, cooling for the cabin The postlanding circulating ambient subsystem provides and the spacecraft atmosphere. ventilation air through cooling for equipment; the PSC, the and heating or a means for cabin after landing.

-

subsystem provides the command module

a-82

Functional

Description

The environmental control system operates continuously throughout all mission phases. Control begins during preparation for launch and continues through recovery. The following paragraphs describe the operating modes and the operational characteristic of the ECS from the time of crew insertion to recovery. Spacecraft atmosphere control.SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed; During prelaunch operations and the DIRECT O2 valve is the
opened

slightly (approximately 0.2 pound per hour flowrate) to provide an oxygen purge of the PSC. Just before prime crew insertion the 02 flowrate is increased to 0.6 pound per hour. This flow is in excess of that required for metabolic consumption and suit leakage. This excess flow causes the PSC to be pressurized slightly above the CM cabin. The slight overpressure maintains the purity of the PSC gas system by preventing the cabin gases from entering the PSC. Any changes made in the pressure or composition of the cabin gas during the prelaunch period is controlled by the ground support equipment through the purge port in the CM side hatch. As soon as the crew connects into the PSC, the suit gas becomes contaminated by C02, odors, moisture, and is heated. The gases are circulated by the suit compressor through the CO2 and odor absorber assembly where a portion of the CO2 and odors are removed; then through the heat exchanger, where they are cooled and the excess moisture is Any debris that might get into the PSC is trapped by the removed. debris trap or on felt pads on the upstream side of each LiOH cartridge. During the ascent, the cabin remains at sea level pressure until the ambient pressure decreases a nominal 6 psi. At that point the CABIN PRESSURE RELIEF valve vents the excess gas overboard, maintaining cabin pressure at 6 psi above ambient. As the cabin pressure decreases, a relief valve in the O2 DEMAND REGULATORvents suit gases into the cabin to maintain the suit pressure slightly above cabin pressure. Sometime after attaining orbit it will be necessary to close the DIRECT 02 valve to conserve oxygen. (Refer to Volume 2, Apollo Operations Handbook for the procedure.) After the DIRECT O2 valve is closed, makeup oxygen for the PSC is supplied by the DEMANDREiGULATORwhen the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed or from the cabin via the cabin pressure regulator when the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is open.

A-83

Before changing from a suited to a shirtsleeve environment it is necessary to open the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE, for the following reasons. When a suit is vented (by removing helmet, gloves, etc.) some of the PSC gases flow into the cabin, which results in contaminating the cabin gas, and in lowering suit pressure relative to cabin pressure. Opening the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE allows cabin gas to circulate through the PSC for scrubbing, and tends to equalize the pressure differential between the PSC and cabin. If the valve is not opened, the resultant pressure differential will cause the suit DEMANDREG to dmp oxygen into the PSC at a flowrate that will turn on the 02 Opening the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE will FLOW HI warning light. correct this situation. During normal space operations, the cabin pressure is maintained at a nominal 5 psia by the cabin pressure regulator, at flowrates up to 1.4 pounds of owgen per hour. In the event a high leak rate develops, the EMERGENCYCABIN PRESSURE regulator will supply oxygen at high flow rates to maintain the cabin pressure above 3.5 psia for more than 5 minutes, providing the leak is effectively no larger than a l/2-inch hole. When performing depressurized operations the suit circuit is maintained above 3.5 psia by the O2 DEMANDREGULATOR; the pressure regulator shuts off automatically to prevent wasting pressure cabin oxygen.

Prior to entry SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed, isolating the suit circuit from the cabin; the O2 DEMAND REGULATORthen controls Cabin pressure is maintained during the descent by suit pressure. the cabin pressure regulator until the ambient pressure rises to a maximum of 0.9 psi above cabin pressure. At that point the cabin relief valve will open, allowing ambient air to flow into the cabin. As the cabin pressure increases, the 02 DEMANDREGULATOR admits oxygen into the suit circuit to maintain the suit pressure slightly as measured at the suit compressor inlet manifold. below the cabin,

After spacecraft landing, the cabin is ventilated with ambient air by postlanding ventilation fan and valves. When the CM is floating upright in the water, the POST LANDING VENT switch is placed in the HIGH (day) or LOW (night) position. Either of these positions will supply power to open both vent valves and start the fan. In the HIGH position, the fan will circulate 150 cubic feet per minute (cfm); LOW, 100 cfm. An attitude sensing device automatically closes both valves and removes power from the fan motor when the CM X axis rotates more than 60 degrees from vertical. Once the device is triggered, it will remain locked up until the CM is upright, and the POST LANDING VENT switch is placed in This action resets the control circuit for normal the OFF position. The PLVC switch on panel 376 provides an override system operation.

~-84

control for opening the PLV valves and turning on the fan in case the attitude sensor is locked up and cannot be reset; or when the CM is inverted and egress must be made through the tunnel hatch. In either case the POST LANDING VENT switch must be in the LOW or HIGH position. Water management.In preparing the spacecraft for the mission, the potable and waste water tanks are partially filled to insure an adequate supply for the early stages of the mission. From the time the fuel cells are placed in operation until CSM separation, the fuel cells replenish the potable water supply. A portion of the water is chilled and made available to the crew through the drinking fixture and the food preparation unit. The remainder is heated, and is delivered through a separate valve on the food preparation unit. the crew connects into the suit circuit until entry, From the time the water accumulator pumps are extracting water from the suit heat exchanger and pumping it into the waste water system. The water is delivered to the glycol evaporators through individual water control Provision is made for dumping excess waste water manually valves. when the tank is full. A syringe injection injection of bactericide system to kill is incorporated to provide for bacteria in the potable water periodic system.

Thermal control.Thermal control is provided by two water-glycol coolant loops (primary and secondary). During prelaunch operations ground servicing equipment cools the water-glycol and pumps it through the primary loop, providing cooling for the electrical and electronic equipment, and the suit and cabin heat exchangers. The cold water-glycol is also circulated through the reservoir to m&e available a larger quantity of coolant for use as a heat sink during the ascent. Additional heat sink capability is obtained by selecting maximum cooling on the CABIN TEMP selector, and placing both cabin fans in operation. This cold soa?ss the CM interior structure and equipment. Shortly before launch, one of the primary pmps is placed in operation, the pump in the ground servicing unit is stopped, and the unit is isolated from the spacecraft system. During the ascent, the radiators will be heated by aerodynamic friction. To prevent this heat from being added to the CM thermal load, the PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS valve is placed in the PULL TO BYPASS The coolant then position at approximately 75 seconds before launch. circulates within the CM portion of the loop. The heat that is generated in the CM, from the time that the ground servicing unit is isolated until the spacecraft reaches 1lOK feet, is Above 1lOK feet absorbed by the coolant and the prechilled structure.

~-85

I____ _ ..--.... .-. _“.^_.---_. ~._. Il------l_l

_-.-

,.--”

___-_..--._

.~..--

__111-__.“.“-11141-.1-

it is possible primary glycol

to reject evaporator.

the

excess

heat

by evaporating

water

in the

After attaining orbit the reservoir is isolated from the loop to maintain a reserve quantity of coolant for refilling the primary loop in case of loss of fluid by leakage. The PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS valve is placed in the position (control pushed in) to allow circulation through the radiators end the radiator outlet temperature sensors. If the radiators have cooled sufficiently (radiator outlet temperature is less than the inlet) they will be kept on-stream; if not, they will be After the radiators bypassed until sufficient cooling has tsken place. have been placed on-stream, the glycol temperature control is activated (GLYCOL EVAP TEMP IN switch in AUTO); and the CABIN TEMP selector is positioned as desired. The primary loop provides thermal control throughout the mission unless a degradation of system performance requires the use of the secondary loop. Several hours before CM-SM separation the system valves are positioned so that the primary loop provides cooling for the cabin heat and the suit heat exchanger. exchanger, the entire cold plate network, The CABIN TEMP control valve is placed in the MAX COOL position, and both cabin fans are turned on to cold-soak in the CM interior structure. Prior to separation t'ne PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS, and the GLYCOL TO RADIATORS SEC valves are placed in the BYPASS position to From that time prevent loss of coolant when the CSM umbilical is cut. (until approximately 1lOK feet spacecraft altitude) cooling is provided by water evaporation. Oxygen Subsystem The oxygen subsystem shares the oxygen supply with the electrical power system. Approximately 640 pounds of oxygen is stored in two cryogenic tanks located in the service module. Heaters within the tanks pressurize the oxygen to 900 psig for distribution to the using equipment. Oxygen is delivered to the command module through two separate each of which is connected to an oxygen inlet restrictor supply lines, assembly. Each assembly contains a filter, a capillary line, and a The filters provide final filtration of gas spring-loaded check valve. which are wound around the hot glycol entering the CM. The capillaries they restrict the total O2 flow rate to a line serve two purposes; maximum of 9.0 pounds CM. The check valves per hour, and they heat the oxygen entering serve to isolate the two supply lines. the

-

A-86

Downstream of the inlet check valves the two lines tee together and a single line is routed to the OXYGEN-S/M SUPPLY valve on panel 326. This valve is used in flight as a shutoff valve to back up the inlet check valves during entry. It is closed prior to CM-SM separation.

PART A2.8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM Introduction The communications subsystem is the only link between the spacecraft and the manned space flight network (MSFN). In this capacity, the communications subsystem provides the MSFN flight controllers with data through the pulse code modulated (PCM) telemetry system for monitoring spacecraft parameters, subsystem status, crew biomedical data, event occurrence, and scientific data. As a voice link, the communications subsystem gives the crew the added capability of comparing and evaluating data with MSFN computations. The communications subsystem, through its MSFN link, serves as a primary means for the determination of spacecraft position in space and rate of change in position. CM-I.&l rendezvous is facilitated by a ranging transponder and an active ranging system. Through the use of television camera, crew observations and public information can be transmitted in realtime to MSFN. A means by which CM and IM telemetry and voice can be stored in the spacecraft for later playback, to avoid loss because of an interrupted communications link, is provided by the communications subsystem in the form of the data storage equipment (DSE). Direction-finding aids are provided for postlanding location and rescue by ground personnel. The following a. Provide (1) and in (2) orbital (3)
(4)

list voice

summarizes communication via the

the

general

telecormn

functions:

between:

Astronauts

intercom (USBE)

CSM and MSFN via the unified S-band equipment and recovery phases via the VHF/AM CSM and extravehicular CSM and L&l via CSM and launch CSM and recovery VHF/AM control force center (LCC) via astronaut (EVA) via

VHF/AM

(5) (6) storage

PAD COMM

swimmers via log via

swimmers umbilical to the data

(7) Astronauts equipment

and the voice

intercomm

A-88
.-I~ .._-. .-_.... -x ,...-._-

b.

Provide (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

data

to the MSFN of: status biomedical activity life status reception information time-referencing via status television system (PISS) and biomed storage status

CSM system Astronaut Astronaut EVA personal I.&4 system update

support recorded

on CSM data of:

equipment

C.

Provide (1) (2)

and processing for the

Digital Digital (WE)

command module for the central

computer timing

(CMC)

data

equipment in three d.

(3) Real-time CM systems Facilitate (1) (2) (3)

commands to remotely between: the the

perform

switching

functions

ranging

MSFN and CSM via LM and CSM via CSM and LM via a recovery

USBE transponder radar transponder system location. spacecraft sub(RRT)

rendezvous

the VHF/AM ranging aid VHF for spacecraft

e. f. systems

Provide

Provide a time reference for all except the guidance and navigation Functional

time-dependent subsystem.

Description

The functional description of the telecommunications system is divided into four parts: intercommunications equipment, data equipment, radio frequency equipment, and antenna equipment. All of these functional groups of equipment interface with each other to perform the system In the functional descriptions of these parts, such interfaces tasks. will be apparent.

-

PART A2.9 SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS Introduction Sequential systems include certain detection and control subsystems of the launch vechicle (LV) and the Apollo spacecraft (SC). They are utilized during launch preparations, ascent, and entry portions of a . . early mission terminations, docking maneurmssion, preorbital aborts, Requirements of the sequential sequences. vers, and SC separation Figure AZ!.%1 systems are achieved by integrating several subsystems. illustrates the sequential events controlsubsvstem (SECS), which is the and its interface with the following nucleus of sequential systems, subsystems and structures: a. b. c. d. e. f. g* h.
1.

Displays Emergency Electrical Stabilization Reaction Docking

and controls detection power (EDS) (EPS) (SCS)

and control control (RCS)

(DS) (T/C) (ELS) (LES)

Telecommunications Earth Launch Structural Sequential lauding escape

J-

Events

Control

Subsystem of 12 controllers listed as follows: (MESC) (SMJC)
-

which

The SECS is an integrated subsystem consisting may be categorized in seven classifications a. b. Two master Two service events module sequence jettison controllers controllers

A-90

c. d. e. f.

One reaction Two lunar Two lunar Two earth

control module docking landing

system

controller

(RCSC) controllers (LSSC)

(LM) separation events sequence controllers

sequence

(LDEC) (ELSC)

controllers

65. One pyro

continuity

verification

bGX (PCVB)

Five batteries and three fuel cells are the source of electrical power. The SMJC is powered by fuel cells; however, battery power is The RCSC is powered by the fuel cells and used for the start signal. batteries. The remaining controllers of the SECS are powered by batteries exclusively.

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

STRUCTURES . LAUNCH ESCAPE SUBSYSTEM EARTH LANDING SUBSYSTEM

EMERGENCY DETECTION SUBSYSTEM 4 ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM

SEQUENTIAL EVENTS CONTROL SUBSYSTEM

Figure

A2.9-l.-

SECS interface.

A-91 _~ . ". ~.__ .___".,.~ _---" _"~... ....-. I_"._.__C_"-.-~.-__.-..---_--_-_-.-_-_ll_l .^... -.---,

Origin

of Signals

The SECS receives manual and/or automatic signals and performs control functions for normal mission events or aborts. The manual signals are the result of manipulating switches on the main display console (MDC) or rotating the Commander's translation hand control counterclockwise, which is the prime control for a manual abort. Automatic abort signals are relayed by the emergency system (EDS).

-

A-92

FART A2.10 CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM Introduction The caution and warning system (C&WS) monitors critical parameters or out-ofof most of the systems in the CM and SM. When a malfunction tolerance condition occurs in any of these systems, the crew is immediately alerted in order that corrective action may be taken. Functional Description

Upon receipt of malfunction or out-of-tolerance signals, the C&WS simultaneously identifies the abnormal condition and alerts the crew Each signal will activate the appropriate systems to its existence. The master alarm circuit status indicator and a master alarm circuit. visually and aurally attracts the crew's attention by alarm indicators Crew acknowledgment on the MDC and by an audio tone in the headsets. of an abnormal condition consists of resetting the master alarm circuit, while retaining the particular systems status malfunction indication. The capability exists for the crew to select several modes of observing and of monitoring CM or SM systems status and master alarm indicators systems. Major Component Subsystem Description

The C&WS consists of one major component, the detection unit. It is located behind MDC-3, and therefore is neither visible nor accessible The balance of the system is made u-p to the crew during the mission. aural alerting and associated circuits, and those of visual indicators, Visual switches required to control the various system functions. indicators include the two uppermost fuel cell electromechanical event devices on MDC-3, as well as all systems status and master alarm lights. The detection unit circuits consist of comparators, logic, lamp Also incorporated are and a master alarm and tone generator. drivers, two redundant power supplies, a regulated +12 and a -12 V dc for the electronics. Inputs to the detection unit consist of both analog and event-type Alarm limits signals. The analog signals are in the 0 to 5 V dc range. for these signals trigger voltage comparators, which, in turn, activate thus causing activation of the master logic and lamp-driver circuits,

A-93

^-

.__

_.

.

. .

.‘_

__.

.

__I___~

__.__-

_-

-_.-.

“--.

. .__-_..-_ms....m----

_.----

~---

.-,_,^._

-.._

I.-

alarm circuit and tone generator, illumination of applicable systems status lights on MDC-2, and for certain measurements, activation of applicable electromechanical event indicators on MDC-3. Several event inputs are monitored by the C&WS detection unit. These signals originate from solid state and mechanical switch closures in malfunction sensing devices. These signals will directly illuminate applicable system status lights and, through logic circuitry, activate the master alarm lights and tone generator. One event signal, originating within the detection unit, directly illuminates the C/W light, but activates only the MASTER ALARM switch lights of the master alarm circuit. One event signal, from MSFYN stations through the UDL portion of "CRRW ALERT," originates the communications system. This system status light can only be extinguished by a second signal originating from the MSFN. The master alarm circuit alerts crew-members whenever abnormal conditions are detected. This is accomplished visually by illumination of remote MASTER ALARM switch-lights on MDC-1, MDC-3, and LEB-122. An audio alarm tone, sent to the three headsets, aurally alerts the crew. The output signal of the tone generator is a square wave that is alternately 750 and 2000 cps, modulated at 2.5 times per second. Although the tone is audible above the conversation level, it does not render normal conversation indistinct or garbled. When the crew has noted the abnormal condition, the master alarm lights and the tone generator are deactivated and reset by depressing any one of the three MASTER ALARM switch-lights. This action leaves the systems status lights illuminated and resets the master alarm circuit for alerting the crew if another abnormal condition should occur. The individual systems status lights will remain illuminated until the malfunction or out-of-tolerance or the NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch (MIX!-3) is condition is corrected, positioned to ACK. The C!&WS power supplies include sensing and switching circuitry that insure unit self-protection should high-input current, or high- or low-output voltage occur. Any of these fault conditions will cause the illumination of the master alarm lights and the C/W system status light. The tone generator, however, will not be activated because it requires the 12 V dc output from the malfunctioned power supply for its operation. The crew must manually select the redundant power supply to return the C&WSto operation. This is accomplished by repositioning the CAUTION/ WARNING-POWER switch on MDC-2. In so doing, the C/W status light is extinguished, but the master alarm circuit remains activated, requiring it to be reset. Incorporated into the C&WSis the capability to test the lamps of Position 1 of the CAUTION/ systems status and master alarm lights. WARNING-LAMP TEST switch tests the illumination of the left-hand group of status lights on MDC-2 and the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-1.

A-9

4

__

,..-

..__

_--._,__-,..--l.--=/~~-

.I

I

"I.

--

-""."

.~

_-__-_-..,

--1__1

~^

~---.---l--.---....-..I

.__I-

___-___(,__

Position 2 hand group located on on LEB-122

tests the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-3 and the rightMASTER ALARM light, of status lights on MDC-2. The third LEB-122, is tested by placing the CONDITION LAMPS switch to TEST.

The position of the CAUTION/WARNING - CSM-CM switch (MIX-2) Before CM-SM separation, establishes the systems to be monitored. systems in both the CM and SM are monitored for malfunction or out-oftolerance conditions with this switch in the CSM position. Positioning the switch to CM deactivates systems status lights and event indicators associated with SM systems. (MDC-2) permits The CAUTION/WARNING - NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch For most variable modes of status and alarm light illumination. of the mission, the switch is set to the NORMAL position to give of abnormal condition normal C&WSoperation; that is, upon receipt signals, all systems status lights and master alarm lights are During the ascent phase, the switch is set to capable of illumination. the BOOST position, which prevents the MASTER ALARM switch-light on This prevents possible confusion on MDC-1 MDC-1 from illuminating. between the red MASTER ALARM light and the adjacent red ABORT light. The ACK switch position is selected when the crew desires to adapt or if a continuously illuminated systems status their eyes to darkness, will activate While in this mode, incoming signals light is undesirable. To determine the only the master alarm lights and the tone generator. the crew must depress either MASTER ALARM switchabnormal condition, This illuminates the applicable systems status light on MDC-1 or -3. The systems and deactivates and resets the master alarm circuit. light, status light will remain illuminated as long as the switch-light is as long as the abnormal depressed. However, it may be recalled condition exists by again pressing either switch-light. A stowable tone booster is added to the caution to allow all three astronauts to sleep simultaneously Stowage of this unit during non-use periods removed. A3. and warning system with the headsets is under locker

The unit consists of a power plug, tone booster, and a photosensitive device which can be used on the left or right side of the The power connection is made to the UTILITY receptacle command module. which provides an audible signal, on MDC-15 or 16. The tone booster, is mounted by velcro pad to the left-hand or right-hand girth shelf. The photo-sensitive device is mounted by velcro over the MDC-1 or MDC-3 MASTER ALAP&J lamp. Since the MASTER ALARM is triggered activate the monitored symptom, it will by any caution/warning tone booster until the

A-95

MASTER ALARM is extinguished by a manual reset. In the event of a caution/warning system power supply failure, this unit will provide the audio alarm. Electrical power distribution .- The C&WSreceives power from the MNA & MNB buses (see fig. A2.10-1). Two circuit breakers, located on MDC-5, provide circuit protection. Closure of either circuit breaker will allow normal system operation.

Figure

A2.10-l.-

C&WSpower

distribution

diagram.

Operational

Limitations

and Restrictions

With the CAUTION/WARNING - NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch in the BOOST position during ascent, the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-1 will not illuminate should a malfunction occur. The master alarm circuit reset capability of the light is also disabled during this This requires the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-3 to be time. used exclusively for monitoring and resetting functions during boost. Several peculiarities should be noted in regard to the CAUTION/WARNING POWERswitch. Whenever this switch is moved from or through the OFF position to either power supply position, the master alarm circuit is activated, requiring it be reset. Also, switching from one power supply to another (when there is no power supply failure) may cause the C/W system status light to flicker as the switch passes through the OFF position. Should both power supplies fail, the C&WSis degraded to the extent that the complete master alarm circuit, as well as those system status lights that illuminate as the result of analog-type input signals, are rendered inoperative. This leaves only those status lights operative that require event-type input signals. They include the following SM and CM lights: CMC, ISS, BMAG 1 TEMP, BMAG 2 TEMP, SPS ROUGHECO, PITCH GMBL 1, PITCH GMBL 2, YAW CMBL 1, YAW GMBL 2, 02 FLOW HI, FC BUS DISCONNECT., AC BUS 1, AC BUS 1 OVERLOAD, AC BUS 2, AC BUS 2 OVERLOAD, MN BUS A UNDERVOLT, MN BUS B UNDERVOLT, and CREWALERT. The C/W light will be operative only while the CAUTION/WARNING - POWER switch is in position 1 or 2. The CAUTION/WARNING - CSM-CM switch must be in the CSM position in order to conduct a lamp test of those system status lights associated with SM systems. The status lights of CM systems may be tested with the switch in either position. Circuit design permits a complete lamp test to be conducted with the CAUTION/WARNING switch in the NORMAL or In the BOOST position, all lamps except the MASTER ACK position only. ALARM light on MDC-1 may be tested. Normally, each abnormal condition signal will activate the C&WS and illuminate the applicable master alarm circuit and tone generator, However, after initial activation of any status systems status light. light that monitors several parameters, and reset of the MASTER ALARM, any additional out-of-tolerance condition or malfunction associated with the same system status light will not activate the MASTER ALARM until the first condition has been corrected, thus extinguishing the status light.

A-97

__=I

.

..“.-_

_..“...

,.,,

“‘

..--.

-~-___

--

-----^1

Each crewmember's audio control panel has a power switch which will allow or inhibit the tone signal from entering his headset. The AUDIO-TONE position allows the signalto pass on to the headset, while the AUDIO position inhibits the signal.

PART A2.11 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS DATA Introduction Miscellaneous systems data pertain in other systems. These items consist (G-meter), and uprighting system. Timers Two mission timers (electrical) and two event timers (electrical/ mechanical) are provided for the crew in the command module. One mission timer is located on panel 2 of the MDC and the other on panel 306 in the left-hand forward equipment bay. Each mission timer has provisions for manually setting the readout (hours, minutes, and seconds), and the capability of starting, stopping, and resetting to The numerical elements are electroluminescent lamps and the zero. intensity is controlled by the NUMBRICS light control on panels MDC-8 and LEB-100. The event timers are located on MDC-1 and -306 in the left-hand forward equipment bay, and provide the crew with a means of monitoring and timing events. Ali timers reset and start automatically when lift-off occurs, and the timer located on MDC-1 will be automatically reset and restarted if an abort occurs. The event timers are integrally illuminated by an internal electroluminescent lamp and controlled by the INTEGRAL light controls located on MDC-8 and LEB-100. Accelerometer (G-meter) to items of timers, that are not covered accelerometers

The accelerometer or G-meter @DC-l) provides the crew with a visual indication of spacecraft positive and negative G-loads. This meter is illuminated by an internal electroluminescent lamp and controlled by the INTEGRAL light control on MDC-8. Command Module The CM uprighting system the CM has assumed a stable, consists of three inflatable valves, two air compressors, able bags are located in the The in the aft compartment. Uprighting System

is manually controlled and operated after The system inverted floating attitude. air bags, two relays, three solenoid-control control switches, and air lines. The inflat'34 forward compartment and the air compressors control switches and circuit breakers are

located in the crew compartment. The switches control relays which are powered by the postlanding bus and the relays control power to the compressors which are powered by battery buses A and B. (See figure A2.11-1.)

FLTIPL BUS c EPS BAT BUSA IRHLE-2N FLOAT BAG 1 BAT A IMDC-8) FLOAT BAG L WC-81 25A UPRIGHT svs CWPR 1 EAT A IAHEB-ml

EATTLRV BUS B CT EPS BAT I )BUSB WEB-2??I I 5A P ) FLOAT BAG R BAT B iMDC~81 2%

2CA

xLA

>

I 5A Y )'

------

----1

-----

/ I i Q,
VfNl I ! _--m---e NORMCLOSED CONTRNVALVL M. l-V BAG 4

I I

1

I I
_---e-m-

Pizmid---MRM CIOSED ,----m-m COMROLVALVf NO.Z+VBAG r CONTROL VALVE W.3+ZBAG

T
52

1
COMPRtSSOR COlvTROt MOTOR SWITCHLS IRHLB-2981

Figure

A2.11-l.-

Sequential

systems

operational/functional

diagram.

FLOAT BAG 1L switch controls inflation Functional description.switch 2R controls inflation of the air of the air bag on -Y axis, and switch 3 CTR controls inflation of the air bag bag on the +Y axis, Two of the bags are on the +Z axis of the CM (see fig. A2.11-1). If the 45 inches in diameter; the other bag is 24 inches in diameter. the crewmember at station 1 initiates CM becomes inverted after landing, filling of the three bags by setting the FLOAT BAG lL, 2R, and 3 CTR When the CM is uprighted, the three FLOAT BAG switches switches to FILL. will be set to OFF. A 4.25f0.25-psi relief valve is located in the inlet Backup relief valves set at 13.5 psi are located in the of each bag. outlet of each compressor.

-.

A-102 ___l.s^ _.--..-" .--.. ^..._I -.-. "."._

FART A2.12 CREWPERSONAL EQUIPMENT This section contains the description and operation of Contractorand NASA-furnished crew personal equipment and miscellaneous stowed equipment that is not described in other sections of the handbook. All mador items are identified as Contractor-furnished equipment (CFE) or Government-furnished (NASA) property (GFP - synonymous with GFE). The crew equipment usage in SM2A-03-BLOCK. a. Spacesuits (1) Intravehicular (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (2) Spacesuit Assembly is presented in the general order A brief outline is as follows: of operational

Biomedical Harness and Belt Constant Wear Garment (CWG) Flight Coveralls Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA) Associated Umbilicals, Adapters, Spacesuit Assembly

and Equipment

Extravehicular (a) (b) (c)

Liquid-Cooled Garment (LCG) PGA with Integrated Thermal Meteroid Associated Equipment

Garment

(ITMG)

b.

G-Load Restraints (1) (2) (3) Crewman Restraint Interior Hand Bar Restraints Rest Stations Velcro Straps and Snap Restraint Areas Handhold Harness and Straps

C.

Zero-g (1) (2) (3)

A-103

d.

Internal (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Sighting

and Illumination

Aids

Window Shades Mirrors Crewman Optical LM Active Docking Alignment Target Sight (COAS)

Window Markings Miscellaneous Sighting Aids and Illumination Aids

e.

External (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Exterior Running

Spotlight Lights

EVA Floodlight EVA Handles Rendezvous with Beacon Aids RL Disks

f.

Mission (1) (2) (3) (4)

Operational Data File Toolset

Flight Inflight Cameras

Accessories (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

& Miscellaneous (PPKs)

Waste Bags Pilot's Preference Kits Fire Extinguishers Oxygen Masks Utility Outlets Scientific Instrumentation Support

Outlets

63. Crew Life (1) (2) Water Food

A-104

-^ -------.(... ._.__--. .-_.-_.

(3) (4) (5) h. 1. ii.

The Galley

System System

Waste Management Personal Hygiene

Medical Radiation

Supplies

and Equipment and Measuring Aids Ducts Equipment

Monitoring Recovery

Postlanding (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Postlanding

Ventilation

Swimmer Umbilical Recovery Snagging Seawater Survival Beacon Line Pump Kit

and Dye Marker

k.

Equipment

Stowage

PART AZ.13 DOCKING AND TRANSFER Introduction This section identifies system and the operations Docking operational tions and text describe docking. These activities the physical associated with characteristics of the docking and separation. docking

sequence .- The following sequence of illustrathe general functions that are performed during will vary with the different docking modes.

After the spacecraft and third stage have orbited the earth, possibly up to three revolutions, the third stage is reignited to place the spacecraft on a translunar flight. Shortly after translunar injection, the spacecraft transposition and docking phase takes place (fig. A2.13-1). When the CSM is separated from the third stage, docking is achieved by maneuvering the CSM close enough so that the extended probe (accomplished during earth orbit) engages with the drogue in the LM. When the probe engages the drogue with the use of the capture latches, the probe retract system is activated to pull the LM and CSM together. Upon retraction, the LM tunnel ring will activate the 12 automatic docking ring latches on the CM and effect a pressure seal between the modules through the two seals in the CM docking ring face. After the two vehicles are docked, the pressure in the tunnel is equalized from the CM through a pressure equalization valve. The CM forward hatch is removed and the actuation of all 12 latches is verified. Any latches not automatically actuated will be cocked and latched manually by the crewman. The LM to CM electrical umbilicals are retrieved from their stowage position in the LM tunnel and connected to their respective connectors in the CM docking ring. The vehicle umbilicals supply the power to release the L&J from the SLA. Once the hold-down straps are severed, four large springs located at each attachment point push the two vehicles apart, and the combined CSM/LM continues towards the moon.

-

A-106

H

A-107 . _..-_ _. _. ..~ - - ..._” ..--_ _.._.1-- I-__~ _-__..^ _.__ ~,l_____~ __--~-s_--.--

Once in lunar orbit, the tunnel is repressurized. The probe assembly and drogue assembly are removed from the tunnel and stowed in the CM. The pressure in the LM is equalized through the LM hatch valve, With the pressure equalized, the IM hatch is opened and locked in the open position to provide a passageway between the two modules. After two crewmen transfer to the LM, the CM crewman retrieves the drogue from its stowage location in the CM, passes it through the tunnel, and helps to install and lock it in the tunnel. The drogue may be installed and locked by the LM crewmen, if they choose. The probe assembly is then retrieved from its stowage location in the CM and installed and preloaded to take all the load between the modules. This accomplished, the LM hatch is closed by the I.&l crewmen. The 12 docking latches are released and cocked by the crew-man in the CM so that the latches are ready for the next docking operation. The CM forward hatch is reinstalled and checked to assure a tight seal. The modules are now prepared for separation. The probe EXTEND RELEASE/RETRACT switch in the CM (MDC-2) is placed energizing the probe extend latch. The probe in the EXTEND position, extends and during extension will activate a switch energizing an enternal electrical motor to unlock the capture latches. After the probe extends, the I.M pulls awsy from the CM and descends to the lunar surface. If the switch is not held until the probe reaches f'ull extension, the The capture latches will reengage to hold the two vehicles together. switch would then have to be reactivated and separation performed with the RCS. it will be several hours before the first man steps After landing, few hours are spent checking the IM ascent foot on the moon. The first This completed, the cabin is depressurized and one stage and resting. Following a short period, of the crewmen descends to the lunar surface. Lunar surface activities the se'cond crewman descends to the surface. will vary for each mission. engine Following is fired completion using the of the lunar surface exploration the ascent depleted descent stage as a launch platform,

After rendezvous and docking in lunar orbit, the LM crewmen transfer back to the CM, After the CSM and I&i pressures have equalized, the LM crew opens the LM hatch while the CM pilot removes the tunnel hatch. The drogue and probe are removed and stowed in the LM. Lunar samples, film, and equipment to be returned to earth are transferred from the LM to the CM. Equipment in the CM that is no longer needed is put into the LM, and the LM hatch is closed, the CM hatch is replaced, and the seal checked.

A-108

The IN is then released by firing the separation system (detonating cord) located around the circumference of the docking ring, thus serving the ring and abandoning the I&I (fig. A2.13-1). This completed, the CM SPS engine is fired, placing the spacecraft in a return trajectory toward the earth. Functional Description

The docking system is a means of connecting and disconnecting the LM/CSM during a mission and is removable to provide for intravehiclular transfer between the CSM and L&l of the flight crew and transferrable equipment. The crew transfer tunnel, or CSM/LM interlock area, is a passageway between the CM forward bulkhead and the LM upper hatch. The hatch relationship with the docking hardware is shown in fig. AZ.l3-2. (The figure does not show the installed positions.) For descriptive purposes that portion of the interlock area above the CM forward bulkhead to the docking interface surface is referred to as the CM tunnel. That portion of the interlock outboard of the L&I upper hatch extending to the docking interface surface is referred to as the I&l tunnel. The CM tunnel incorporates the CM forward hatch, probe assembly, docking ring and seals, and the docking automatic latches. The L&I tunnel contains a hinged pressure drogue locking mechanism, drogue support fittings, drogue assembly, hatch, and L&f/CM electrical umbilicals.

A-109

A-

110

-.-- .

..-

--

. ..--.

--.

.-.

.._ _... “... /..

-__-

-.“.”

,,..--,

-.~,

.__ 1-1--1-

-

-~-~---~

PART A3 LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION INTRODUCTION This part includes descriptions of the LM, the LM - spacecraft-tolunar module adapter (SLA) - S-IVB connections, the LM-CSM interfaces, and LM stowage provisions are included in this chapter. These data were extracted from the technical manual LMA 790-3-I&I, Apollo Operations Handbook, Lunar Module, Volume 1, dated February 1, 1970. LM CONFIGURATION The LM (fig. A3-1) is designed for manned lunar landing missions. It consists of an ascent stage and a descent stage; the stages are joined together at four interstage fittings by explosive nuts and bolts. Subsystem continuity between the stages is accomplished by separable interstage umbilicals and hardline connections. Both stages function as a single unit during lunar orbit, until separation is required. Stage separation is accomplished by explosively severing the four interstage nuts and bolts, the interstage umbilicals, and the water lines. All other hardlines are disconnected automatically at stage separation. The ascent stage can function as a single unit to accomplish rendezvous and docking with the CSM. The overall dimensions of the LM are given in figure A3-2. Station reference measurements (fig. Al-l) ar e established as follows: a. The Z- and Y-axis station reference measurements (inches) at a point where both axes intersect the X-axis at the vehicle vertical centerline: the Z-axis extends forward and aft of the intersection; the Y-axis, left and right. The point of intersection is established as zero. start b. -Z-axis The +Y-axis measurements measurements increase increase (+Z) to the and aft right (-Z) from zero; the

-Y-axis measurements increase to the left.
forward

Similarly,

the tZ- and
from zero.

station reference measurements (inches) start at a C. The X-axis This reference design reference point identified as station +X200.000. point is approximately 128 inches above the bottom surface of the footpads (with the landing gear extended); therefore, all X-axis station reference measurements are +X-measurements.

A-111 __._. -. .,",.. __. _---. -___ . ,..____,,.--ll~--ll-".-----*l __Xsll_---_~-. ~-^_-l_-_--ll--_

Figure

A3-l.-

LM configuration.

::- 112

(--14,

I”-=

7

28’ a 2” 19’ 10.65”

t
Y 8.86”

1

d

FORWARD

Figure

A3-2.-

LM overall

dimensions.

A-113

.-

Ascent

Stage

The ascent stage, the control center and manned portion of the IN, accommodates two astronauts. It comprises three main sections: the crew compartment, midsection, and af't equipment bay. The crew compartment and midsection make up the cabin, which has an approximate overall volume of 235 cybic feet. The cabin is climate-controlled, and pressurized to 4.8 - 0 .2 psig. Areas other than the cabin are unpressurized. Crew Compartment. - The crew compartment is the frontal area of the ascent stage; it is 92 inches in diameter and 42 inches deep. This is the flight station area; it has control and display panels, armrests, body restraints, landing aids, two front windows, a docking window, and an alignment optical telescope (AOT). Flight station centerlines are 44 inches apart; each astronaut has a set of controllers and armcontrol, and display panels are along the Circuit breaker, rests. upper sides of the compartment. Crew provision storage space is The main control and display panels are canted beneath these panels. and centered between the astronauts to permit sharing and easy scanning. between the flight stations, is used in An optical alignment station, conjunction with the AOT. A portable life support system (PLSS) donning slightly aft of the optical alignstation is also in the center aisle, ment station. The crew compartment has 12 control panels: Control and display two main display panels (1 and 2) and display panels (fig. A3-3): two center panels (3 and 4) that that are canted forward 10 degrees, slope down and aft 45 degrees towards the horizontal, two bottom side panels (5 and 6), two lower side panels (8 and 12), one center side panel rate display (14), two upper side panels (11 and 161, and the orbital earth and lunar (ORDEAL) panel aft of panel 8.

A-114

-- ._-. -

___I__ -."111..-- -_--

---. -

.-I_^_

Figure

A3-3.-

Cabin

interior

(looking

forward).

Panels 1 and 2 are located on each side of the front face assembly Each panel is constructed of two 0.015-inchi centerline, at eye level. thick aluminum-alloy face sheets, spaced 2 inches apart by formed channels. The spacer channels are located along the sheet edges; additional channels, inboard of the edge channels, reinforce the sheets. This forms a rigid box-like construction with a favorable strength-toweight ration and a relatively high natural frequency. Four shock mounts support each panel on the structure. Panel instruments are mounted to the back surface of the bottom and/or to the top sheet of the panel. The instruments protrude through the top sheet of the panel. All dial faces are nearly flush with the forward face of the panel. Panel1 contains warning lights, flight indicators and controls, and propellant quantity indicators. Panel 2 contains caution lights, flight indicators and controls, and Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS) and Environmental Control Subsystem (ECS) indicators and controls. Panel 3 is immediately below panels 1 and 2 and spans the width of these two panels. Panel 3 contains the radar antenna temperature indicators and engine, radar, spacecraft stability, event timer, RCS and lighting controls. Panel 4 is centered between the flight stations and below panel 3. Panel 4 contains attitude controller assembly (ACA) and thrust translation controller assembly (TTCA) controls, navigation system indicators, and LM guidance computer (I&C) indicators and controls. Panels 1 through 4 are within easy reach and scan of both astronauts. Panels 5 and 6 are in front of the flight stations at astronaut waist height. Panel 5 contains lighting and mission timer controls, engine start and stop pushbuttons, and the X-translation pushbutton. Panel 6 contains abort guidance controls. The panel is Panel 8 is at the left of the Commander's station, canted up 15 degrees from the horizontal; it contains controls and displays for explosive devices, audio controls, and the TV camera connection. Panel 11, directly above panel 8, has five angled surfaces that contain circuit breakers. Each row of circuit breakers is canted 15 degrees to the line of sight so that the white band on the circuit breakers can be seen when they open.

A-116

canted tions,

Panel 12 is at the right of the LM Pilot's station. The panel is up 15 degrees from the horizontal; it contains audio, communicaand communications antennas controls and displays. up 36.5 degrees for electrical from power

Panel 14, directly above panel 12, is canted It contains controls and displays the horizontal. distribution and monitoring.

Panel 16, directly above panel 14, has four angled surfaces that Each row of circuit breakers is canted contain circuit breakers. 15 degrees to the line of sight so that the white band on the circuit breakers can be seen when they open. (ORDEAL) panel is The orbital rate display - earth and lunar immediately aft of the panel 8. It contains the controls for obtaining I,M attitude, with respect to a local horizontal, from the LCC. Windows: Two triangular windows in the front face assembly provide visibility during descent, ascent, and rendezvous and docking phases of the mission. Both windows have approximately 2 square feet of viewing area; they are canted down to the side to permit adequate peripheral and downward visibility. A third (docking) window is in the curved overhead portion of the crew compartment shell, directly above the Commander's flight station. This window provides visibility for docking maneuvers. All three windows consist of two separated panes, vented to space environment. The outer pane is made of Vycor glass with a thermal (multilayer blue-red) coating on the outboard surface and an antireflective coating on the inboard surface. The inner pane is made of structural glass. It is sealed with a Race seal (the docking window inner pane has a dual seal) and has a defog coating on the outboard surface and an antireflective coating on the inboard surface. Both panes are bolted to the window frame through retainers. All three windows are electrically heated to prevent fogging. The heaters for the Commander's front window and the docking window receive their power from 115-volt ac bus A and the Commander's 28-volt dcbus, respectively. The heater for the LM Pilot's front window receives power from 115-volt ac bus B. The heater power for the Commander's front window and the docking window is routed through the AC BUS A: CDR WIND HTR and HEATERS: DOCK WINDOWcircuit breakers, respectively; for the LM Pilot's front window, through the AC BUS B: SE WIND HTR circuit breaker. These are 2-ampere circuit breakers on panel 11. The temperature of the windows is not monitored with an indicator; proper heater operation directly affects crew visibility and is, therefore, visually determined by the astronauts. When condensation or frost appears on a window, that window heater is turned on. It is turned off when the abnormal condition disappears. When a window shade is closed, that window heater must be off.

The midsection structure (fig. A3-4) is a ring-stiffened Midsection.The bulkheads consist of aluminum-alloy, chemically semimonocoque shell. milled skin with fusion-welded longerons and machined stiffeners. The midsection shell is mechanically fastened to flanges on the major structural bulkheads at stations +'Z27,OO and -Z27.00. The crew compartment shell is mechanically secured to an outboard flange of the +Z27.00 +x294.643 and +X233.500, The up-per and lower decks, at stations bulkhead. are made of aluminum-alloy, integrally stiffened and respectively, The lower deck provides structural support for the ascent machined. The upper deck provides structural support for the docking stage engine. tunnel and the overhead hatch.

Figure

A3-A.-

Cabin

interior

(looking

aft).

Two main beams running fore and aft, integral with those above the crew compartment, are secured to the upper deck of the midsection; they support the deck at the outboard end of the docking tunnel. The aft ends of the beams are fastened to the aft bulkhead (-Z27.000) which has provisions for bolting the tubular truss members that s&port both aft interstage fittings. Ascent stage stress loads applied to the front beam are transmitted through the two beams on the upper deck to the aft bulkhead. Descent Stage

The descent stage is the unmanned portion of the LM. It contains the descent engine propellant system, auxiliary equipment for the end scientific experiment packages to be placed on the astronauts, The descent stage structure provides attachment and lunar surface. support points for securing the LN within the spacecraft-lunar module adapter (SLA). LM - SLA - S-IVB Connections

At earth launch, the LM is within the SLA, which is connected to the S-IVB booster. The SLA has an upper section and a lower section. to which the landing gear is attached, provide attachment The outriggers, The LM is mounted points for securing the IN to the SLA lower section. to the SLA support structure on adjustable spherical seats at the apex it is held in place by a tension holddown of each of the four outriggers; Before the IN is removed, the upper strap at each mounting point. These section of the SLA is explosively separated into four segments. which are hinged to the lower section, fold back and are then segments, The IN is then explosively forced away from the SLA by spring thrusters. released from the lower section. LM-CSM Interfaces A ring at the top of the ascent stage provides for joining the LM to the CSM. The ring, which is clamping mechanisms in the CM, provides structural drogue portion of the docking mechanism is secured The drogue is required during docking operations to See figure A3-5 for orientation CM-mounted probe. CSM. a structural compatible continuity. below this mate with of the LM interface with the The ring. the to the

The crew transfer tunnel (LPI-CM interlock Crew transfer tunnel.area) is the passageway created between the I&I overhead hatch and the CM forward pressure hatch when the I&l and the CSM are docked. The

A-119
..- .--. * _- -.--- --l_--_“.“.l..I... .-_--.-__ll-___ll_“_~

tunnel permits intervehicular exposure to space environment.

transfer

of crew and equipment

without the the

Final docking latches: Twelve latches are spaced equally about periphery of the CM docking ring. They are placed around and within CM tunnel so that they do not interfere with probe operation. When the latches insure structural continuity and pressurization secured, between the LM and the cT4, and seal the tunnel interface. Umbilical: An electrical umbilical, in the tunnel, is connecCed by an astronaut to the CM. be made without drogue removal. IX portion of the This connection can

CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT \

STANDOFF ;CSM-ACTIVE ALIGNMENT

CROSS DOCKING TARGET)

LM

ACQUISITION

LM -Y-AXIS

CH

LM COAS LINE OF SIGHT POST PITCHOVER POSITION

CSM AND

ACOUISITION ORIENTATION LIGHT (TIP)

\

STANDOFF CROSS ANU ALIGNMENT STRIPS (LM -ACTIVE DOCKlnv.I.-. ALIGNMENT TARCEll

Figure

A3-5.-

LM-CSM reference

axes.

A-120

Docking hatches.the CSM has a single, is not removable. It

The IN has a single docking (overhead) hatch; integral, forward hatch. The LM overhead hatch is hinged to open 75 degrees into the cabin. is a conical structure with of the crew transfer tunnel. of the crew transfer tunnel the LM, during Service three tunnel mounts contains drogue in the tunnel.

The drogue assembly Docking drogue.provisions for mounting in the LM portion The drogue may be removed from either end and may be temporarily stowed in the CM or Propulsion System (SPS) burns. One of the a locking mechanism to secure the installed

Docking probe.The docking probe provides initial CM-LM coupling and attenuates impact energy imposed by vehicle contact. The docking probe assembly consists of a central body, probe head, capture latches, pitch arms, tension linkages, shock attenuators, a support structure, probe stowage mechanism, probe extension mechanism, probe retraction system, an extension latch, a preload torque shaft, probe electrical umbilicals, and electrical circuitry. The assembly may be folded for removal and stowage from either end of the transfer tunnel. The probe head is self-centering. When it centers in the drogue the three capture latches automatically engage the drogue socket. The capture latches can be released 'oy a release handle on the CM side of the probe or by depressing a probe head release button from the I&l side, using a special tool stowed on the right side stowage area inside the cabin. Visual alignment aids are used for final alignment Docking aids.of the IN and CSM, before the probe head of the CM makes contact with The LM +Z-axis will align 50 to 70 degrees from the the drogue. CSM -Z-axis and 30 degrees from the CSM +Y-axis. The CSM position represents a 180-degree pitchover and a counterclockwise roll of 60 degrees from the launch vehicle alignment configuration. An alignment target is recessed into the LM so as not to protrude into the launch configuration clearance envelope or beyond the LM envelope. -~46.30O and -20.203, has a The target, at approximately stations radioluminescent black standoff cross having green radioluminescent disks on it and a circular target base painted fluorescent white with black orientation indicators. The base is 17.68 inches in diameter. Cross members on the standoff cross will be aligned with the orientation indicators and centered within the target circle when viewed at the intercept parallel to the X-axis and perpendicular to the Y-axis and Z-axis.

A-121

Stowage Provisions The IM has provisions for stowing crew personal equipment. The equipment includes such items as the docking drogue; navigational star charts and an orbital map; umbilicals; a low-micron antibacteria filter for attachment to the cabin relief and dump valve; a crewman's medical kit; an extravehicular visor assembly (EWA) for each astronaut; a special multipurpose wrench (tool B); spare batteries for the PLSS packs; and other items.

-_

A-122

PART A4 MISSION CONTROL CENTER ACTIVITIES INTRODUCTION The Mission Control Center (MCC) is located at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas. The MCC contains the communications, computer display and command systems to effectively monitor and control the Apollo spacecraft. These data were extracted from information furnished by Flight Operations Directorate, Manned Spacecraft Center. Flight operations are controlled from the MCC. The MCC contains two flight control rooms, but only one control room is used per mission. a Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR), Each control room, called is capable of controlling individual Staff Support Rooms (SSR) located adjacent to the MOCR. Both the MOCR's and the SSR's operate on a To accomplish this, the various flight control functions 24-hour basis. Figures A4-1 and A4-2 and consoles are staffed by three g-hour shifts. show the floor plans and locations of personnel and consoles in the Figure Ah-3 shows MOCR activity during the Apollo MOCR and the SSR's. and figure Ah-4 shows the MOCR and SSR organizational 13 flight, structure.

1. Flight Operations Director: Responsible for successful completion of mission flight operations for all missions being supported. 2. Mission Director: Overall mission responsibility and control of flight test operations, which include launch preparation. In Project Mercury there were no alternative mission objectives that could be exercised other than early termination of the mission. The Apollo missions, however, offer many possible alternatives which have to be decided in real time. 3. Public Affairs Officer: Responsible for providing information on the mission status to the public. 4. Flight Director: Responsible for detailed control of the mission from lift-off until conclusion of the flight. 5. Assistant Flight Director: Responsible tothe Flight Director for detailed control of the mission from lift-off through conclusion of the flight; assumes the duties of the Flight Director during his absence. 6. Experiments and Flight Planning: Plansand monitors accomplishment of flight planning and scientific experiment activities. 7. Operations and Procedures Officer: Responsible to the Flight Director for the detailed implementation of the MCC/Ground Operational Support Systems mission control procedures. 8. Vehicle Systems Engineers: Monitor and evaluate the performance of all electrical, mechanical and life support equipment aboard the spacecraft (this includes the Agena during rendezvous missions).

9. Flight Surgeon: Directs all operational medical activities concerned with the mission, including the status of the flight crew. 10. Spacecraft Communicator: Voice communications with the astronauts, exchanging information on the progress of the mission with them. 11. Flight Dynamics Officer: Monitors and evaluates the flight parameters required to achieve a successful orbital flight; gives “GO” or “ABORT” recommendations to the Flight Director. 12. Retrofire Officer: Monitors impact prediction displays and is responsible for determination of retrofire times. 14. Booster Systems Engineer: Monitors pro pellant tank pressurization systems and advises the Bight crew and/or Flight Director of systems abnormalities. 15. Guidance Officer: Detects Stage I and Stage II slowrate deviations and other programmed events, verifies proper performance of the Inertial Guidance System, commands onboard computation function and recommends action to the Flight Director. 16. Network Controller: Hasdetailedoperational control of the Ground Operational Support System network. 17. DepartmentofDefenseRepresentative: Overall control of Department of Defense forces supporting the mission, including direction of the deployment of recovery forces, the operation of the recovery communications network, and the search, location and retrieval of the crew and spacecraft.

Figure

Ah-l.-

Personnel

and console

locations.

A-124

-__ ~. _ _---_l----_l_-

--

Legend of symbols 0 i lg [Bi 8 Clock Zone fire alarm panel “A” “6” power panel power panel

Frre extinguisher

[XI Air duct m Ozone exhaust

Room no. 310 311 312 312A 313 314 316 319

Room name Flight dynamtcs SSR Vehicle systems SSR Life systems SSR Flight crew SSR Operation and procedures SSR AiSEP SSR Control and display terminal Display and timing Meteaological center

324
324A

3248 1 327 Recovery
::;A

329 330
zz:“,

control Recovery control display projection Simulation control Summary display projection Mission operations control room no. 1

f Comm booth Visitors viewing area

332

Figure

Ab-2.-

Floor

plan of MOCKand SSR's.

I
Fliyht Act~wt~fs DfflCU

I
Spacecraft Commll,~Icator AD

1

I
Network CCWllOlli?l I IST

l Retrofire Officer Flight

I Dynalu~cs officer Guidance Dff1cer / Yaw ;

I CSM Systeiw Engineers EECDM 1 t : GNC LM Systems Engineers TELCDM ! CONTROL ’

I EMU E”iJlWXS -J Booster Systeins

Figure

A4-4.-

NOCR and SSR organizational

structure.

MISSION OPERATIONS CONTROL ROOM The MOCR was the center for mission control operations. The prime controlpositions were stationed in this area. The MOCRwas broken Responsibilities of the groups were down into three operations groups. as follows : a. Mission (I) Command and Control Group for overall conduct of the mission. between the Flight

Mission Director (MD) The MD was responsible

(2) Flight Operations Director (FOD) The FOD was responsible for the interface Director and management.

(3) Flight

Director (FD) The FD was responsible for MOCR decisions and actions concerning vehicle systems, vehicle dynamics, and MCC/MSFN operations. Flight Director

(4) Assistant Flight Director (AFD) The AFD was responsible for assisting the in the performance of his assigned duties.

(5) Flight

Activities Officer (FAO) The FAO was responsible for developing the flight plan.

and coordinating

(6) Department

of Defense Representative (DOD) The DOD Representative was responsible for coordination and direction of all DOD mission support forces and sites. assisttask.

(7) Assistant DOD Representative The Assistant DOD Representative was responsible for ing the DOD Representative in the performance of his

(8) Network

Controller (NC) (NETWORK) The Network Controller was responsible Director for the detailed operational analysis of the MSFN.

to the Flight control and failure

(9) Assistant Network Controller The Assistant Network Controller assisted the Network Controller in the performance of his duties and was responsible for all MCC equipment and its ability to support.

~-128
-.__ -_“~ i_ .,l----.l.. -.-.._-_ . .._.-..-.~_l_l____.-_ll_l__~-,-“,~-.~..l_--.-

(10)

Public Affairs Officer (PAO) The PA0 was responsible for keeping on the progress of the mission.

the public

informed

(11)

Surgeon The Flight Surgeon was responsible to the Flight Director for the analysis and evaluation of all medical activities concerned with the flight. Spacecraft Communicator (CAPCOM) The Spacecraft Communicator was responsible to the Flight Director for all voice communications with the flight The CAPCOMalso served in conjunction with FAO as crew. This position was manned by a crew procedures advisor. a member of the backup flight crew. Officer (EO) (EXPO) The primary function of the EO was to provide overall operational coordination and control for the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment Package (ALSEP), and the Lunar Geology ExperiThe coordination was with the various MOCR ment (LGE). operational positions and the ALSEP SSR; the Principal Investigators, Management, the Program Officer, Goddard, The EO was also and the Manned Space Flight Network. responsible to the Flight Director for providing ALSEP and LGE status and any ALSEP or LGE activities that could have an effect on the Apollo mission. Operations Group (MOCR)

(12)

(13) Experiments

b.

Systems (1)

Environmental, Electrical, and Communications (EECOM) The CSM EECOM Engineer was responsible to the FD for monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM environmental, and sequential systems. electrical, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) The GNC Engineer was responsible to the Flight Director for monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM guidance, control, and propulsion systems. navigation, The LM Environmental and Electrical Engineer was responsible to the FD for monitoring and troubleshooting the electrical, and sequential systems. LM environmental,

(2)

(3) TELCOM

A-129 ._ . ."- -" _..-. ...._..---~I.*ll _--. l.--"._-.*----1.--1".1_1_..

(4) CONTROL
and Control Engineer was The LM Guidance, Navigation, responsible to the Flight Director for monitoring and troubleshooting the LM guidance, navigation, control, and propulsion systems.

(5) Booster

Systems Engineer (BSE) The Booster Systems Engineers' responsibilities delegated as follows: (a)

were

BSE 1 had overall responsibility for the launch veIn addition, hicle including command capability. BSE 1 was responsible for all S-IC and S-II stage functions. for all S-IVB of command. for all exception stage

(b) BSE 2 had prime responsibility functions with the exception (c) BSE 3 had prime responsibility unit (IU) functions with the

instrument of command. .-

(6)

Apollo Communications Engineer (ACE) (INCO) and Operations and Procedures Officer (O&P) (PROCEDURES) The INCO and O&P shared a console and responsibility. The INCO's prime responsibility to the Flight Director was for monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM, LM, TV, PLSS, and erectable antenna communication systems. He was also responsible for execution of all commands assoThe O&P's prime ciated with the communication systems. responsibility to the Flight Director was for the detailed implementation of the MCC/MSFN/GSFC/KSC mission control The O&P was also responsible for interface procedures. scheduling and directing all telemetry and DSE voice He also developed all communication inputs playbacks. and changes to the ground support timeline. Dynamics Group

C.

Flight (1)

Flight Dynamics Officer (FIDO) The Flight Dynamics Officer participated in prelaunch checkout designed to insure system readiness, monitored powered flight events and trajectories from the standpoint of mission feasibility; monitored reentry events and updated impact point estimates as and trajectories, required.

A-130 ._",__,_ ^ _,._,._ - _._____________ _-_l_l._ ,_--, *-II.-L .I"._._ ".---.--+-.,. .._ __ ,__~. ..---_ - _,....... - _;..II~ ._ .. .-----...- ^_._ --III

(2)

Retrofire Officer (REPRO) The Retrofire Officer participated in prelaunch checkout designed to insure system readiness and maintained an updated reentry plan throughout the mission. Officer (GUIDO) and YAW The Guidance Officer participated in prelaunch checkout designed to insure system readiness and performed the guidance monitor functions during power flight and spacecraft initialization. The GUIDO was also responsible for CSM and LM display keyboards (DSKY) as well as CMC and LGC The second Guidance Officer (YAW) had command updates. the same duties except that he was not responsible for command functions. MCC SUPPORT ROOMS

(3) Guidance

Each MOCR group had a staff support room (SSR) to support all activities required by each MOCR position. These SSR's were strategically located in areas surrounding the MOCR's and were manned by the various personnel of a given activity. a. Staff Support Room

(1) Flight Dynamics SSR The Flight Dynamics SSR was responsible to the Flight Dynamics Group in the MOCR for providing detailed analysis of launch and reentry parameters, maneuver requirements, It also, with the assistance of and orbital trajectories. the Mission Planning and Analysis Division (WAD), provided real-time support in the areas of trajectory and guidance to the MOCR Flight Dynamics team on trajectory and guidance An additional service required provided interface matters. between the MOCR Flight Dynamics team and parties normally outside the Flight Control team such as Program Office spacecraft contractor representatives, representatives, et cetera.
(2)

Flight Director's SSR The Flight Director's SSR was responsible for staff support to the Flight Director, AFD, Data Management Officer., and to the Apollo CommuniFAO. This SSR was also responsible cations Engineer in the MOCR for monitoring the detailed The SSR was also status of the communication systems. Ground Timeline responsible for two TV channel displays: and Flight Plan.

A-131

(3) Vehicle

Systems SSR The Vehicle Systems SSR was responsible to the Systems Operations Group in the MOCR for monitoring the detailed status and trends of the flight systems; avoiding, correcting, and circumventing vehicle equipment failures; and detecting and isolating vehicle malfunctions. After the S-IVB was deactivated, the portable life support system engineer and the Experiments Officer occupied the two booster consoles in the Vehicle Systems SSF. Life Systems SSR The Life Systems SSR was responsible to the Life Sy-stems Officer for providing detailed monitoring of the physiological and environmental data from the spacecraft concerning the flight crew and their environment. Spaceflight Meteorological Room The Spaceflight Meteorological Room was responsible Mission Command and Control Group for meteorological space radiation information. to the and

(4)

(5)

(6)

Space Environment Console (SEC) (RADIATION) The Space Environment Console was manned jointly by a Space Environment Officer (SEO) from the Flight Control Division and a Space Environment Specialist from the Space Physics Division. During mission support, the SE0 was responsible the proper operation of the confor the console position, of all necessary activities and sole, and the completion The SEC was the central collecting and coordiprocedures. nating point at MSC for space radiation environment data during mission periods. Planning and Analysis (SPAN) Room The SPAN Room was the liaison interface between the MOCR, the data analysis team, vehicle manufacturers, and KSC Launch Operations. During countdown and real-time operations, the SPAN team leader initiated the appropriate action necessary for the analysis of spacecraft anomalies. Operations Control Room (ROCR) The Recovery Operations Control Room was responsible for the recovery phase of the mission and for keeping the Flight Director informed of the current status of the recovery the Recovery Operations Control Additionally, operations. Room provided an interface between the DOD Representative and the recovery forces.

(7) Spacecraft

(8) Recovery

A-132 .^ .-.-_-.. __..-__ _.-_ __-.v,-___ _ ..-~.-.--- .._.... .~--l~ -..-.,.l__ll_l__l__l__ll_l(".~."--".~------

(9) ALSEP SSR
The ALSEP SSR was responsible to the Experiments Officer, Lunar Surface Program Office, and Principal Investigators for providing detailed monitoring of ALSEP central station and experiments data. The SSR was also responsible for all scheduling of activities, commanding, and data distribution to appropriate users. MISSION SUPPORT AREAS The two primary support areas for the MOCR flight control team were the CCATS area and the RTCC area located on the first floor of the MCC. These two areas of support and their operational positions interfaced with the MOCR flight control team. Communications, Command, and Telemetry System (CCATS)

The CCATS was the interface between the MCC and MSFN sites. CCATS was a hardware/software configuration (Univac 494 computer) having the capability to provide for the reception, transmission, routing, processing, display and control of incoming, outgoing, and internally generated data in the areas of telemetry, command, tracking, and administrative information. The CCATS consoles were augmented with various high-speed printers (HSP) and TTY receive-only (RO) printers adjacent Figure Ah-5 illustrates the CCATS operational organito the consoles. CCATS personnel interfaced with the MOCR flight control team zation. were as follows: Command Support Console This console was a three-position support element whose operators were concerned with the total command data flow from the generation and transfer of command loads from the RTCC to the verification of space The three comvehicle acceptance following uplink command execution. mand positions were: (1) Real-Time (2) Command Controller (RTC) a.

Command Load Controller

(LOAD CONTROL) (CCATS CMD)

(3) CCATS Command Controller

A-133 . ..-."I____".x. ..-..-.. ..* ,...,II, ,_ t.__,.._ - .---.--l.l---

Telemetry Instrumentation Control Console This console was a two-position support element whose operators were concerned with the telemetry control of incoming data from the MSFN. telemetry program control was exercised on the incoming data. Certain The two telemetry positiozis were: b. (1) (2)
C.

Telemetry

Instrumentation. Controller

Controller (CCATS TM)

(TIC)

CCATS Telemetry

Instrumentation Tracking Controller Console This console was a two-position support element whose operators were concerned with the tracking radar support involving the spacecraft and ground systems operations and configurations. The two tracking positions were: (1) Instrumentation Tracking Controller (TRK)

(2) USB Controller Central Processor Control Console This console was a two-position support element and provided the facilities for monitoring and controlling selected software and hardware functions applicable to the configuration of the CCATS computer The two positions were: complex. (1) (2) e. Central Central Processor Processor Controller Maintenance (CPC) and Operations overall (M&O) communications

a.

Communications Controller Console The operators of this console provided management between MCC and MSFN elements. Real-Time Computer Complex

(RTCC)

The RTCC provided the data processing support for the MCC. It storage and limit sensing, traaccomplished the telemetry processing, command load generation, display jectory and ephemeris calculations, and many other necessary logic processing and calculations. generation, The RTCC supported both MOCR's and as such had two divisions known as each capable of supporting one MOCR. computer controller complexes, Each complex was supported by two IBM 360 computers, known as the mission operations computer (MOC) and the dynamic standby computer (DSC). the RTCC The DSC served as backup to the MOC. Figure Ah-6 illustrates A brief description of the operational organization for each complex. RTCC positions f'~llo~~.

A-134 ._". _ -.. -_.-.-.I^--.-_-I_-. ."--., -, ...---fl"..."Li ",._-II .._^ .."-.-l-.-_-."--‘.~l-.--.--

Flujilt D,rector

Network Colltroller

Figure

A&?.-

WATS operational

organization.

Flight

Director

+

Flight Dynamics Processing Controller

Tracking Data Selection Controller

Telemetry Processing Controller

Network and Command Processing Controller

Figure

~4-6.- RTCC operational

organization.

a. complexes. b.

RTCC Director Controlled and coordinated

the

activities

of the

two computer

RTCC Computer Supervisor (Computer Sup) Responsible for the operational control of the

complex.

Tracking Data Selection Controller (Data Select) Monitored the tracking data being processed in the RTCC and insured the data used as input to the MOCR and SSR displays was the Evaluated the quality of tracking data received during best obtainable. Evaluated the trajecthe launch phase and selected the source of data. tory determinations and was responsible for the various related displays. Informed the MOCR Flight Dynamics Officer concerning the quality and status of the data.
c.

Flight Dynamics Processing COntrOller (COIIIPUter WnmiCS) Controlled and monitored all trajectory computing requirements requested by MOCR flight dynamics personnel and MOCR recovery activities. Performed evaluation and analysis of the predicted trajectory quantities as they related to the mission plan.
d.

Network and Command Processing Controller (Computer Command) Coordinated with MOCR personnel who had command responsibility and transfer of requested command and directed the generation, review, loads. e. Telemetry Processing Controller (Computer TM) This position had access to all telemetry data entering and leaving the RTCC and interfaced with the MOCR and SSR positions using Duties included monitoring telemetry input data, coortelemetry data. monitoring computer generated telemetry disdinating input requests, and keeping the MOCR aware of the telemetry processing status. plays, f. NOTE From ALSEP deployment to splashdown TRK and TIC will be re.sponsible for scheduling sites This will to support the scientific package. include calling up of sites and data/command handling to MCC.

A-137 I .. . . _,.. -.I---... ,.__-_._..-I _..I"..- -.-11.. ~. .- _I-. ^ ..__ _^ ^..-.-_l-"____

This

page left

blank

intentionally.

A-138

(1.

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._..~.

I---

..--

~--..-

-..-

_--__l__l-

.-l-t_l----,---

.

.

-

“.

_

^...

.

_.

.

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-

_.-l-l.-

.-__.-

-

.I

-_,,.-

-_.

PART A5 EXCERPTSFROMAPOLLO FUEL CELL AND CRYOGENICGAS STORAGESYSTEMFLIGHT SUPPORTHANDBOOK The information contained in this part was extracted from the Apollo Fuel Cell and Cryogenic Gas Storage System Flight Support Handbook, and Power dated February 18, 1970. It was prepared by the Propulsion Division of the Manned Spacecraft Center. The text was taken from SecSection 3.0 Cryogenic Gas tion 2.0 Fuel Cell Operation and Performance, Storage System Operation and Performance, Section 4.0 Instrumentation Subsystem Maland Caution and Warning, Section 5.0 Fuel Cell/Cryogenic Section 7.0 Fuel Cell/Cryogenic Subsystem Hardware function Procedures, Description.

2.0

FUEL CELL OPERATION AND PERFORMANCE

The fuel cell operation and performance are described by nominal system performance and operational data for both ground and flight environments and fuel cell response to a variety of component malfunctions. Nominal system performance and operational data are presented in curve and table format to assist in rapid reference. The data include procedures and curves for making rough estimates of radiator performance. Apollo 10 and 11 flight data were used to generate a portion of the curves used for evaluating radiator performance. Fuel cell response of measured parameters (temperature, voltage, etc.) to specific component malfunctions make up the remainder of the data The curves are adequately noted to allow application presented. without written procedures. The fuel cell operation and performance data assist the user in evaluating fuel cell performance, identification of flight anomalies and provide a basis for developing corrective'actions. The sources of the data were the original'NASA Apollo Elock II Fuel Cell, Cryogenic Gas Storage System,and Flight Batteries Flight Support Handbook','dated September 1968, NASA-MSC, North American Rockwell, Pratt and Whitney, Beech Aircraft and Boeing-Houston. These data were reviewed and found to be accurate as of December 1969.

A-140

..--

-..“...

,------mm

.__--._l”-.-.--l_l..-

_I

..,,..

-ill_--.-

-__.....

_ “.-.-----ill-.-

--.,__I

.-----

2.1

FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

NOMINAL FUEL CELL PRESSURIZED SYSTEM VOLUMES Hydrogen Nitrogen Glycol Glycol Loop Loop Loop (Fuel Accumulator Glycol Cell) (Fuel Plumbing Glycol Cell) and Radiator Loop Volume and Fuel of Helium of Helium Volume 250 in3

Oxygen Loop

88 in3
3098 in3 107 in3 30 in3 117 in3 66 in3 (20 in3 water -glycol removed from accumulator)

Net Fuel Cell

Average NR Glycol Volume Estimated Fuel Cell

183 in3 = 0.79 gallons

TOTAL SYSTEM SPEC LEAKAGE INTO BAY IV Hydrogen System, Cells (3) Fuel Cell Oxygen System, 5.3 x 10-j (3) nitrogen

scc/sec

system

1.6 x lO-4 scc/sec SYSTEM PRESSURESUMMARY SUPPLY PRESSURES SUPPLY PRESSURES (PSIA) NOMINAL Hydrogen Oxygen Nitrogen 245 + 15 900 + 35 1500 MINIMUM 100 150 165

REGULATEDPRESSURES S/N 650769 AND ON DEAD ABOVE ABSOLUTE NITROGEN BAND PSIA PRESSURE PSI PSI 57.90 - 67.60 57.90 - 67.95 50.20 - 57.75 6.20 - 11.35 6.20 - 11.7 --.2-.4 .5-.? 2.02.15

DEL IVERY PRESSURE Water 62 psia PRESSURELIMITS Maximum water system discharge back pressure Maximum reactant vent back pressure 16 psia 59.55 psia

A-142

2.1

FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLSYSTEM WATER SYSTEM PRESSURES Potable Water Tank Valve Valve 25 psia 5.5 psid 44 psia 6 . 0 +'24 -. + 2, Plus ?r 1 + 4 cabin pressure

Water Relief Cabin Relief

Water Tank Vent Valve

FUEL CELL GROUNDHEATER POWERSETTINGS STARTUP HEAT SCHEDULE 1 ZONE 1 AMPERES 1

NORMALOPERATION HEAT SCHEDULE 1 ZONE 1 1 2 3 1 SEA LEVEL OPERATION 1.2 - 1.6 amperes 8.0 - 12.0 amperes 1.2 - 1.6 amperes I 1 VACUUMOPERATION 0 amperes 0 amperes 0 amperes 1 1

DRYOUT HEAT SCHEDULE ZONE 1 2 SEA LEVEL OPERATION 1.75 - 2.05 amperes As required to maintain 460°F to 485'F skin temperature. Approximately 23.9 amps. 3 1.75 - 2.05 amperes 1.5 - 1.65 amperes VACUUMOPERATION 1.5 - 1.65 amperes 21.0 - 22.5 amperes

A-143

2.1

FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

FUEL CELL DISCONNECT OVERLOADDATA OVERLOADCURRENT DATA Required Disconnect Delay (set) 100 minimum 25 - 300 8- 150 2-8 :, 622 - 1.2 0:42 - 0.76 0.24 - 0.55 Test Delay (se4 No transfer i"8 5.81 0.776 1.07 0.572 0.470 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 Transfer Time (set)

FUEL CELL DISCONNECT REVERSE CURRENTDATA REVERSE CURRENT DATA Load ':%j 4 20 :i Required Disconnect Delay (set) No trip i - 10 1 - 1.3 Test Delay (set) No transfer 2.10 1.11 1.22 0.046 0.046 Transfer Time (set)

2.1

FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

REACTANT CONSUMPTIONAND WATER PRODUCTION
LOAD AMps 0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 O2 lb/hr H2 lb/hr lb/hrs 0.0102 0.0204 0.0408 0.0612 0.0816 0.1020 0.1224 0.1428 0.1632 0.1836 .001285 .002570 .005140 .007710 .010280 .012850 .015420 .017990 .020560 .023130 .025700 .038550 .051400 .064250 .077100 .089950 .10280 .11565 .I2850 .A4135 .I5420 .16705 .I7990 .I9275 .20560 .218L,5 .23130 .24415 .25700 .01149 .02297 .04594 .06891 .09188 .11485 .13782 .l6079 .18376 .20673 .2297 .34455 .45940 .57425 .68910 .80395 .91880 1.03365 1.1485 1.26335 1.3782 1.49305 I .6079 1.72275 1.83760 1.95245 2.06730 2.18215 2.2970 H20 = IO.42 H20 = 2.297 cc/Amp H2° cc/hr 5.21 10.42 20.84 31.26 41.68 52.10 62.52 72.94 83.36 93.78 104.20 156.30 208.40 260.50 312.60 364.70 416.80 468.90 521.00 573.10 625.20 677.30 729.40 781.50 833.60 885.70 937.90 989.90 1042.00 Hr Hr

0.2040
0.3060 0.4080 0.5100 0.6120 0.7140 0.8160 0.9180 1.0200 1.1220 I .2240 1.3260 1.4280 1.5300 1.6320 1.7340 1.8360 1.9380 2.0400 x 10 -2 I x 1O-3 I

65
70 75 80 85 90 95 100 FOFMJLAS: O2 = 2.04 H2 = 2.57

x 10 -2 lb/Amp

A-145

3.0

CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGESYSTEM OPERATION AND PERFORMANCE

The cryogenic system operation and performance are described by nominal system performance and operational data for both ground and flight

environments.

Nominal system performance and operational data are presented in curve and table format to assist in rapid reference. The curves, with the exception of those used for heat leaks and pressure change are adequately noted to allow application without written rates, The data include formulas, methods, and curves for procedures. calculating cryogenic tank heat leak s and pressure change rates for both equilibrium and non-equilibrium (stratified) conditions. Apollo 7 and 8 flight data were used to provide a comparison of equilibrium (calculated) tank pressure cycle time to actual flight pressure cycle time for a variety of tank quantities. and performance data assist the user in The fuel cell operation evaluating cryogenic system performance, identification of flight and provide a basis for developing corrective actions. anomalies, The sources of the data were the original'NASA Apollo Block II Fuel Cell, Cryogenic Gas Storage System, and Flight Batteries Flight Support Handbook',' dated September 196S, NASA-MSC, North American Rockwell, Pratt and Whitney, Beech Aircraft and Boeing-Houston. These data were reviewed and found to be accurate as of December 1969.

3.1

CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY Hydrogen Oxygen

TANK WEIGHT (PER TANK) Empty (Approx.) Usable Fluid (100% Stored Fluid indication) Residual Maximum Fill Quantity 80.00 28.15 29.31 4% 30.03 6.80 lb. FT3 lb. lb. lb. 90.82 323.45 330.1 2% 337.9 lb. lb. lb. lb.

TANK VOLUME (PER TANK) TANK FLOW RATE (PER TANK) Max. for 10 Minutes hour Max Flow

4.75 FT3

1.02 lbs/hr 6 lbs/hr 130°F @

4.03

lbs/hr @

Max. for l/2 Relief Valve

10.40 lbs/hr 26 lbs/hr 130°F

TANK PRESSURIZATION Heaters (2 elements Flight Resistance Maximum Voltage Power Total Heater Heat Input Per Tank (2 Elements) Ground Resistance Maximum Voltage Power Total Heater Heat Input Per Tank (2 Elements) * Conversion Factor: 1 watt per tank) 78.4 ohms per element 28 V DC 10 watts per element* 68.2 BTU/Hr 78.4 ohms per element 65.0 V DC 54.0 watts element* 368 BTU/Hr per 10.12 ohms per element 28 V DC 77.5 watts per element* 528.6 BTU/Hr 10.12 ohms per element 65.0 V DC 417.5 watts element* 2848 BTU/Hr per

= 3.41 BTU/Hr

3.1

CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY Hydrogen Oxygen 935 psia 865 psia 30 psia

Pressure Switch Open Pressure Close Pressure Deadband

idax. Min. Min. (2

260 psia 225 psia 10 psia

Destratification Motors Motors Per Tank) Voltage Power - Average Total Average Motor Heat Input Per Tank SYSTEEl PRESSURES Normal Operating Spec Min. Dead Band of Pressure Switches Relief Valve Note:

115/200 V 400 cps 3.5 watts per motor* 23.0 BTU/Hr

115/200 V 400 cps 26.4 watts per motor* 180 BTU/Hr

245 515 psia 10 psi

900 +35 psia 30 psi

Relief Valves are Referenced to Environmental Pressure, therefore Pressure at Sea Level (psig) will be same value in vacuum (psia) 273 psig 983 psig 1010 psig 965 psig 285 psig 268 psig

Crack Full Outer Burst Flow :::: Min. Reseat

Tank Shell Disc Burst Pressure + 10 90 _ 2. psid 75 2 7.5 psid

Nominal

SYSTEM TEMPERATURES Stored Fluid (Over -425 to 80°F N.A. for 113 and Subs. 80°F + 10 -2OO'F = 3.41 BTU/Hr -3OO'F to 80°F N.A. for 114 and Subs. 80°F + 10 -75'F Heater Thermostat Temp. Protection) Open Close * Conversion Max. t.1 i n. Factor: 1 watt

3.1

CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY Hydrogen Oxygen

TANK HEAT LEAK (SPEC PER TANK) Operating (dQ/dM @ 14O'F) 7.25 BTU/HR (.0725 #/hr) 27.7 BTU/HR (.79 #/hr)

VALVE MODULE LEAKAGE RATES External 400 see H2/HR/ Valve 0.736 x 1O-6 lbs H2/HR/Valve LIFE 600 HRS @ Cryogenic Temps and operating pressure -225 psia 400 see 02/HR/ Valve 9.2 x 1O-6 lbs 02/HR/Valve 600 HRS @ Cryogenic Temps. and operating pressure -865 psia

A-149 -__._ .."" ,--._ I,, ..- .._. .__., . .~ ._.~ .... _-..I._.-... I. _ ,, _.... ...-_.. _.~.-- ___. -x _," __.__--.l 1._._-,._. __,,_.__. ...._ . _ ,...-

4.0

INSTRUMENTATION AND CAUTION AND WARNING

The tabular data presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 list instrumentation measurements and specify instrumentation range, accuracy and bit value, if applicable. All of the data in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 can be used for system monitoring during ground checkout. Table 4.1 lists data displayed to the crew and telemetered from the vehicle to the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) during missions. Table 4.2 lists data available only for system monitoring during ground checkout. Event indications displayed to crew during flight are noted in Table 4.2. The instrumentation sensor location, with the exception of voltage and current data, can be found by referring to the fuel celllcryogenie schematics located in Section 7.0. Voltage and current readout and schematic locations can be obtained by referring to North American Rockwell drawings V37-700001, Systems Instrumentation, and V34-900101, Integrated System Schematics Apollo CSM, respectively. The Caution and Warning System monitors the most critical fuel cell/ cryogenic measurements and alerts the flight crew to abnormal system The data presented in Table 4.1 are specification nominal operation. caution and warning limits for the applicable measurements. Malfunctions procedures, Section 5.0, are provided for problem isolation as a result of a caution and warning alarm. The source of the data was North American Rockwell Measurement Systems End-to-End Calibrated Accuracy Tolerances, TDR68-079, dated January 10, 1969 and the original Flight Support Handbook.

A-150
__.-. _ _ . ..-.. -.. ^_ . ..---_-.-_” -..,^ i*_,r ._“_ ,__“.-,-.----f.ell _... _Ili”---.---L__l_-l__l---I_LLll,-_-___.l---,.--------~. “-I.---

TABLE 4.1 INSTRUMENTATION/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUMMARY

EAStiREMENT NUMBER * CCO206V CCO207V SC2113C SC2114C sc2115c SC206OP SC2061P SC2062P SC2066P SC2067P SC2068P SC2069P SC207OP
~~2071~

MEASUREMENT NAME DC Bus Voltage DC Bus Voltage FC 1 Current FC 2 Current FC 3 Current FC 1 N2 Press FC 2 N2 Press FC 3 N2 Press FC 1 02 Press FC 2 02 Press FC 3 02 Press FC 1 H2 Press FC 2 H2 Press FC 3 i-12 Press page 4-11 A B

RANGE o-45 volts

T

At JRACY PERCENT ACTUAL 20.94 iO.42V

T T
BIT VALUE 0.178 0.395

CAUTION AND WARNING SET NGS HIGH LOW -

1

26.25

O-100 amps

11.07

11.07 a

O-75 psia

-14.30

~3.22 psia

0.295

-

O-75 psia

i4.30

23.22 psia

0.295

-

-

O-75 psia

14.30

k3.22 osia

0.295

-

-

t See note,

TABLE 4.1 INSTRUMENTATION/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUMMARY (Continued)

IEASUREMENT NUMBER * SC2081T SC2082T SC2083T SC2084T SC2085T SC2086T SC2087T SC2088T SC2089T SC2090T SC2091T SC2092T SC2139R SC2140R SC2141R * See nnte,

MEASUREMENT NAME FC 1 Cond Ex Temp FC 2 Cond Ex Temp FC 3 Cond Ex Temp FC 1 Skin Temp FC 2 Skin Temp FC 3 Skin Temp FC 1 Rad Out Temp FC 2 Rad Out Temp FC 3 Rad Out Temp FC 1 Rad In Temp FC 2 Rad In Temp FC 3 Rad In Temp FC 1 H2 Flow Rate FC 2 H2 Flow Rate FC 3 H2 Flow Rate page 4-11

RANGE 145-250°F

T

AC RACY ACTUAL PERCENT ~2.18 t2.29'F

BIT VALUE 0.417

CAUTION AND WAF NG SE1 NGS HIGH im150°F 175'F

1

80-550°F

21.15

i5.40°F

1.94

360°F

5OO'F

-50 to +300°F

i . 71

5.98'F

1.38

-3OOf

-50 to +300°F

k1.71

?5.98'F

1.38

O-O.2 lb/hr

+_lO.O

kO.020 lb/hr

0.00079

0.0

0.16

TP E 4.1 TRUMENTATION/CA UN AND W-SUMMARY EASUREMENT NUMBER * SC2142R SC2143R SC2144R SCOO3OQ SCOO31Q SCOO32Q SCOO33Q SCOO37P SCOO38P SCOO39P SCOO4OP SC0041T SC0042T SC0043T SC0044T * See note, MEASUREMENT NAME FC 1 O2 Flow Rate FC 2 02 Flow Rate FC 3 O2 Flow Rate H2 Tank 1 Qty H2 Tank 2 Qty O2 Tank 1 Qty O2 Tank 2 Qty O2 Tank 1 Press O2 Tank 2 Press H2 Tank 1 Press H2 Tank 2 Press O2 Tank 1 Temp 02 Tank 2 Temp H2 Tank 1 Temp H, Tank 2 Temp page 4-11 -420 to -2OO'F +2.68 t6.03'F -320 to +~O'F k2.68 +10.85'F O-350 psia +2.68 kg.38 psia 50-1050 psia 22.68 k26.8 psia o- 100% 52.68 2.68% o- 100% +2.68 2.68% O-l.6 AC RACY PERCENT ACTUAL dO.0 kO.160 lb/hr

RANGE lb/hr

l-

lConti
BIT VALUE

ION AND WARNING

0.0063

SF 0.0

1 YEi1.27 -

0.4%

800

0.4%

-

4.23

950

1.48

220

270

1.57

-

-

0.867

-

-

TABLE 4.1 Il~STRtiMENTATIOid/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUM?lARY (Continued) CAUTIOH AND WARNING SE TINGS Low HIGH

1EASUREMEHT NUMBER* SC216OX SC2161X SC2162X *SC0050Q '*SCOO51Q ,*SCOO52P '*scoo53P

MEASUREMENT NAME FCl pH High FC2 pH High FC3 pH High H2 Tank 3 Qty 02 Tank 3 Qty H2 Tank 3 Press. 02 Tank 3 Press.

RANGE Normal - High Normal - High Normal - High O-100% O-100% O-350 psia 50-1050 psia

}7TmP

KY ACTUAL

BIT VALUE Event Event Event

-

* See note, page A-160 ** CSM 112 through 115 only

,

,I

TABLE 4.2 GROUND TEST INSTRUMENTATION MEASUREMENT NAME FC 1 Bus A FC 2 Bus A FC 3 Bus A SC2125X ** SC2126X ** SC2127X ** scoo92x scoo93x scoo94x scoo95x FC 1 Bus B FC 2 Bus B FC 3 Bus B Pressure O2 tanks low 1 & 2 l&2 Normal - Low Open - Close Event Event Normal - Low Open - Close Event Event BIT VALUE

I

RANGE

Motor Switch Close O2 tanks Pressure H2 tanks low 1 & 2

Motor Switch Close H2 Tanks l&2 Fan Notor Oper Tank 1 O2 Fan blotor Oper Tank 2 O2 page A-160

SCO36OV SCO361V

* See note,

** Data also

displayed

to crew

TABLE 4.2 GROUND TEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) MEASUREMENT NUWGER * SCO362U SCO363U MEASUREMENT NAME Fan Motor Oper Tank 1 H2 Fan Motor Oper Tank 2 H2 FC H2 Inline FC H2 Inline FC 1 DC Volts FC 2 DC Volts FC 3 DC Volts Htr ON Htr OFF Out Out Out ON OFF 25-40 volts 25-40 volts 25-40 volts Close - Open Close - Open Close - Open Event Event 0.059 0.059 0.059 Event Event Event

RANGE

VALUE

SC2075X SC2076X SC2116V SC2117U sc2iiau SC213OX SC2131X SC2132X

FC 1 H2 Purge Valve Oper FC 2 H2 Purge Valve Oper FC 3 H2 Purge Valve Oper page A-160

* See note,

TABLE 4.2 GROUND TEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) MEASUREMENT NUMBER* SC2133X sc2134x SC2135X SC2326X ** SC2327X ** sc232ax ** FC 3 0 /H Shutoff Valve apeG Hold FC 1 Htr Voltage Zone 1 FC 1 Htr Voltage Zone 2 FC 1 Htr Voltage Zone 3 page A-160 ** Data also displayed to crew MEASUREMENT NAME FC 1 O2 Purge Valve FC 2 O2 Purge Valve FC 3 02 Purge Valve FC 1 0 /H Shutoff Valve ape{ Hold I RANGE Close - Open Close - Open Close - Open Off - Hold Off - Hold Off - Hold

BIT VALUE Event Event Event Event Event Event

GC5000V GC500lV GC5002V

O-120 vrms

0.472

* See note,

TABLE 4.2 GROUND TEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

I~IEASUREMENT NUMBER* GC5003U GC5004V GC5005U

MEASUREMENT NAME FC 2 Htr Voltage Zone 1 FC 2 Htr Voltage Zone 2 FC 2 Htr Voltage Zone 3 FC 3 Htr Voltage Zone 1 FC 3 Htr Voltage Zone 2 FC 3 Htr Voltage Zone 3 FC 1 Htr Current Zone 1 FC 1 Htr Current Zone 2 FC 1 Htr Current Zone 3 page A-160

RANGE O-120 vrms

BIT VALUE 0.472

GC5006V GC5007U GC5008V

O-120 vrms

0.472

GC5009C GC5010C GC50llC

O-5 arms O-50 arms O-5 arms

0.0197 0.197 0.0197

* See note,

TABLE 4.2 GROUND TEST INSTRU~IENTATION (Continued) MEASUREMENT NUMBER* GC5012C GC5013C GC5014C MEASUREMENT NAME FC 2 Htr Current Zone 1 FC 2 Htr Current Zone 2 FC 2 Htr Current Zone 3 FC 3 Htr Current Zone 1 FC 3 Htr Current Zone 2 FC 3 Htr Current Zone 3 FC 1 Htr Power FC 2 Htr Power FC 3 Htr Power BIT VALUE 0.0197 0.197 0.0197

RANGE O-5 arms O-50 arms O-5 arms

GC5015C GC5016C GC5017C

O-5 arms O-50 arms O-5 arms

0.0197 0.197 0.0197

GC5019E GC5020E GC502lE

O-5000 watts

19.7

* See note,

page A-160

TABLE 4.1 NOTE The measurement identification used in Table 4.1 consists of seven two letters followed by four numbers and one letter as characters: shown below. FUNCTIOiJAL SYSTEM CODE DISCRETE NUMBER

MODULE CODE CLASSIFICATION Ji SC 9099P blodule The first C G S Function Code letter designates the measurement location by module: F"'"""'"'"'

Command Module GSE Auxiliary Service Subsystem Module Code denotes the subsystem within which the measurement and Checkout Equipment

The second letter originates: C Discrete Electrical Number

Power

Characters three through within each system. Measurement The seventh or type: C E P Classification character, Current Power Pressure Quantity

six

are discrete

numbers listed

sequentially

a letter, R T U X

denotes Rate

measurement

classification

Temperature Voltage Discrete Event

Q

A-160

I

^_

._

..,,,.,_.

l.l

..ll-_-l‘._,~,-”

..-A

---_I

_---”

--_...-

_ -----__--

_-,llll-_-_ll._

5.0

FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEMMALFUKTION PROCEDURES

The procedures describe the proper order and nature of emergency steps the crew must perform to determine the source of a fuel cell or cryogenic storage system problem/malfunction. A Caution and Warning alarm and light or abnormal instrumentation indication is evaluated by a malfunction procedure logic diagram. The logic diagrams enable the crew to determine the source of the problem and corrective actions, if required. Fuel cell shutdown and bus short isolation (not related to Caution and Warning) procedures are also presented as part of the malfunction procedures. The procedures are primarily used as a guide for locate a problem and are presented for the flight the crew actions. The source Procedures. of the data was CSM 108 (Apollo the flight crew to monitor as a guide Malfunction to

12) Flight

A-161 -- ..1_---" ----- -,. --_- -~ ...- _ . I_ ^l-.l--_~~---.-"".--_. ~- -.- ~_.-.ll-l_~_ -.-_

YMPTOM

1

PROCEDURE

REMARKS

340 pia 220 1111

I I I I

I
I I I I I I I

I
I I

I I
I

I

I

PROCEDURE

-EMARKS

.

..I

.I

L-

.--

.

..-

-..----F

^..-“~--.l

..-ll ~_

--

-_.,.

~ -.--.~.

SYMPTOM

PROCEDURE

REMARKS

~-164 ~. ,.- .., .----. .- ---."I_. ...----I. _.. ."-. .._-- I -.--".^.._._... ~"_",-~ _-..___ --,...----.---

PROCEDURE

I

REMARKS

~-165

A-166

PROCEDURE

REMARKS

~-167

PROCEDURE

REMARKS

SYMPTOM m 3I a-,

PROCEDURE

REMARKS

A-170 I"e.-"--I...~-_ .-_-_ j( _I__,_*_. _-__"__l__.---,_.---_._. _... -._.w- .._ -__ ...I -..,,. ____,,-_.-__. __---_

E :

7.0 The fuel isometric filtration

FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEMHARDWARE DESCRIPTION cell/cryogenic hardware description includes the subsystem drawings, fluid schematics, component descriptions and provisions.

Isometric drawings locate operational hardware: tubing runs, sizes A schematic drawing of the and part numbers: and system interfaces. Environmental Control System describes the water and oxygen system interfaces. Fuel cell and cryogenic storage system schematics aid understanding These schematics are also used to reference of the system plumbing. to specific hardware component descriptions. Filtration clearances data describe and the filters the component rating,size, protected, location its minimum and type.

Hardware descriptions are intended for rapid reference to the specific physical hardware affected as a result of a malfunction. Fuel cell/ cryogenic subsystem interactions with interfacing components and subsystems are clarified by this background information. The sources of the data included North American Rockwell Uperational Checkout Procedures (OCP's), Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Fuel Cell Electrical Power Supply-PC3A-2 Support Manual, dated February 1, 1969, Pratt and Whitney Apollo Fuel Cell Component Descriptions, and Beech Aircraft Corporation Project Apollo Cryogenic Gas Storage Subsystem Flight Support Manual, dated September 6, 1968. The descriptions are applicable through CSM-115 including identified hardware changes for shown were current and correct as CSM 112-115 . The configurations of December 1969.

A-172

.___...

.-,-_

._

.--.

*

.

..-_

-...

_._-..

..--f-

._”

l--ll.-ll.

“--

.___

-^--

-.

._-I.

.

.”

--....

-

.-..

._“.--.

*___“_.-^

.--.

..--.

7.1

SYSTEM HARDWARE ISOMETRIC DRAWINGSAND SCHENATIC

A-173

/ /

FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEM LOCATION IN SERVICE MODULE

\ \ \ \

C/M-S/M?MBILICAL

FUEL CELL SHELF \

O2 SUBSYSTEM SHELF MODULE \

H2 TANKS-

H2 SUBSYSTEM SHELF MODULE \

I BEAM NO. 3 VIEW LOOKING INBOARD SECTOR IV

A-174

FUEL CELL SHELF INTERFACE

FUEL PUMP

F/C SHELF LEVEL

4

/N2

REG

I
-7Y /

BEAM NO. 3

BEAM NO. 4

GLY FILL (LOOP NO. 1) ME 273-0036-0002

N; FILL ME 273-0036-0001 INTERFACES Fl - H2 IN F2 - O2 IN F3 - O2 VENT F4 - H,O OUT F5 - N; FILL F6 - H2 VENT F7 - WATER GLYCOL OUT F8 - WATER GLYCOL IN

ME 27%0075-0004

EPS 02 VENT ME 273-0041-0001

A-175
_.. . . . .~. ._ _ ..__ ,, -1__-.-._ -... ..__.. -_.. ,_“_..

OXYGEN SUBSYSTEM SHELF MODULE

y-O2
c-\.

VALVE MODULE (ECS 2)

-OS-S

-. Ll!!iiJ I

Y
BEAM NO. 4
I

BEAM NO. 3

02 '

A-176

HYDROGEN SUBSYSTEMSHELF MODULE

-

H, TANK NO. 1

BEAM NO. 3

BEAM NO.

HS-3 (F/C 3) HS-2 (F/C 2) HS-1 (F/C 1) RELIEF H2

!I I 4, FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE

/ Ii2 VALVE MODULE

EPS WATER GLYCOL RADIATOR TEMPERATURESENSOR LOCATION FR( TO RAumj

SIGNAL CONDITIONERS sc2092TSC2091 T-

-v

BEAM 4

an IRAU. F/C 1 OUT1iET

SC20

\

F/C 2 KAU. INLET SC2092T F/C 3 KAU. INLET

VIEW LOOKING INBOi (FUEL CELL SHE1 c *DE’

WATERGLYCOL SERVICE MODULE LINES
(F/C3) V37-458020-143 (TZ) (3/S)'

(Tl) (F/C3) V37-458056-25 (Tl) (F/Cl) V37-458056-21

(Tl) (F/C2) V37-458056-23

iUOIATOR

RREA

RADIATOR AREA

FUEL CELL 12

/A

C No. 3
I FUEL CELL 13 '4 .a,-+: "37-G

EFFECTIVE IIN S/C 098 THRU 106
EFFECTIVE 01( 5/C 107 MO WRS LINE SIZE III INCHS(OUlSIM DIMTER) NOTE: WL TliICKJ@%.S - .OZO IMCIES MTERIM 30-L CRES l WL THICKMSS - .035 MIXES (MTERIN N ALLOY)

A-179

CRYOGENIC HYDROGENSERVICE MODULE LINES ME 273-O( BEAr' T

F/C Shelf

Area

v37-454030-39 v37-454049-19

( l/4 Jm (l/4)(21

[21v37-454049-23 q v37-454030-45 &Jv37-454031-29 [zlv37-454049-55 m ~37-454031-43 Ql V37-454049-63 m ~37-454030-47 QV37-454049-25

(l/4) (l/4) (l/4) (l/4) (l/4) (l/4) (i/4) (l/4)

02 Shelf

Area

V37-454208-107 v37-454208-113

(l/4 (318

m EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106

q

EFFECTIVE ON SjC 107 AND SUBS ( ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE DIAMETER) NOTE: WALL THICKNESS = .020 INCHES

JRYGGENIC OXYGEN SERVICE XODULE LIIiES V37-454207-115 /c-3-v37-454207-H3 Beam 2 c OS5 (l/4) (l/4)

-LECS 02 LINES (CM-SM Umbilical)

Beam 3 ---

F/C Shelf

Area-

1

v37-454031-25(1/4)(l) TJv17-454049-53(1/4)(2)

(?)V37-454049-49 (l)V37-454031-21 (l)V37-454031-39 (2)v37-454049-61 (21v37-454049-51 (l)V37-454031-23 (l)V37-454031-33 (2)V37-454049-57

II
02 Shelf Area-

I F/C 3

I

II11 k

H2 Shelf

Area-

V37-454207-111 (l/4) -v37-454207-109 (l/4) --V37-454207-107 (l/4) 454207-105 (l/4) -v37-454207-103(1/4) -OS-5 (ECS-2) ' %OS-4 (ECS-1) %S-3 (F/C-3) qos-2 (F/C-Z) OS-1 (F/C-l)

'

(1) EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106 2 EFFECTIVE ON S/C 107 AND SUBS I ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE DIAMETER) NOTE: WALLTHICKNESS = .020 INCHES

FUEL CELL NITROGEN SERVICE MODULE LIiJES

B

F/C Shelf

Area --

I
El v37-454&9-33(1/4)7a v37-454030-57(1/4) m v37-454030-59(1/4) i Ql v37-'!54049-35(1/4

N2 Supply -P

\

(F5)

-q al
a v37-454030-51(m) v37-454030-49(1/4)V37-454@+2'7(1/4)-

I,

EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106 EFFECTIVE ON S/C 107 AND SUBS ( ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE DIAMETER) NOTE: WALL THICKNESS = .020 INCHES

A-187

A-184

V37-454240-104 V37-454240-103 V37-454240-102

ME282-0047-0040

ME284-0119-0001 7-454240-101 ME284-0115-0001

1
ME282-0046-0002

O2 TANK 3 V37-454225-11 V37-454240-101

HYDROGEN/OXYGEN TANK SHELF MODULE- SECTOR r (SIDE VIEW - BEAM 6 SIDE) EFFECTIVE ON CStq 112-115

A-lP!iY

.-... ..,

~.

._.. .-.-

---_.

._.__.. ,^-.-.“-l..~

.^._ . .“. ,.__

--.--_

_.x._...__ - _... -_-_

.-

_--_lll-

HYDROGEN RELIEF (HR)

r / ’

SECTOR VI ._

/-

V37-454240-12.5

V37-454203-1194 TO ECS'-

V37-454240- 15 V37-454240-l FROM O2 TANK 2

HYDROGEN/OXYGEN SERVICE MODULE LINES EFFECTIVE ON CSM 112-115

k

V37-454240-20 V37-454240-21

HYDROGEN TANK 3 SUPPLY TO VALVE SHELF MODULE

FROMH2 TANK 3 SECTOR I

FORCSM 112-115 V37-454240-24 HYDROGEN TANK 3 SUPPLY INTERFACE WITH TANKS 1 & 2 - HYDROGEN SHELF VALVE MODULE- SECTOR IV EFFECTIVE ON CSM 112-115

A-18cj ... ,; .-.. ~ .-- .,_^ -_, . _~ __ ...l.--.-.._.. -.--.._..-., __-._-._ .-_I

7.2

FUEL CELL COMPONENT DESCRIPTIONS

A-190

--___

__-.

I_

.____,-____.

-I

..”

._.._

I_.”

.__.

_”

.--.

--..-.

.___._,.---1--.-1”

.,..

-

_...._

^

_

A-1()1

7.3

CRYOG NIC GASSTORAGE SYSTFN
COMPhENT DESCRIPTIONS

A-192

_.

.

^...

“1

.

.^.

-.~

.-__

_-.....

l*.-l-

.“_

.

.

.

-_--.

__.__

.

t

-_~--..^-“--

I_._.

.-.

.

.

-

.^

_.

.ll.“l.-_^-

.”

-.-.

.

-l-._-^--_~_l__“-

CRYOGENIC STORAGE SYSTEM SCHEMATIC

A E El D 1 F2 0 R 1 1 g5 M s

NOTE:

0

Denotes component descriptions in numerical order (See Pages7-56 through

7-78)

HzTANK 3

TABLE 7.3.1 CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGE SYSTEM INTERFACES CGSS INTERFACES ELECTRICAL INTERFACE Valve Modules Pigtails Hermetically sealed pin receptacle Pigtails Hermetically sealed pin receptacle

Tank Connectors

TANK INTERFACE LINE SIZES Fill Connections l/4" O.D. (0.015 wall) l/4" 0.0. (0.015 wall) 3/16" O.D. (0.022 wall) l/4" 0.b. (0.015 wall) 3/8" O.D. (0.022 wall) 3/4" O.D. (0.028 wall) 3116" O.D. (0.022 wall) l/4" O.D. (0.022 wall)

Vent Connections Relief Connections

Feed Connections CRYOGENIC VALVE MODULE Feed Connections F/C Supply Relief Connections Outlet

l/4" O.D. (0.015 wall) l/4" O.D. (0.022 wall) l/4" O.D. (0,022 wall

l/4" 0-D. (0.022 wall) l/4" O.D. (0,022 wall) l/4" O.D. (0.022 wall)

Valve

FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE Feed Connections F/C Supply (2) (3) l/4" O.D. (0.022 wall l/4" O.D. (0.022 wall l/4" O.D. (0.022 wall) l/4" O.D. (0.022 wall)

Connections

m&/-?-j

OXYGEN AND HYDROGEN STORAGE TANK

Electrical

Connector

Vent

Connector

Fill

Connector

Feed

Line

Vent

Connector

Fill

Connector

q

H2 STORAGE TANK

q

02 STORAGE TANK

Each storage tank consists of two concentric spherical shells. The annular space between them is evacuated and contains the thermal insulation system, pressure vessel support, fluid lines and the electrical conduit. The inner The shell, or pressure vessel is made from forged and machined hemispheres. pressure vessel support is built up on the pressure vessel from subassemblies and provides features which transmit pressure vessel loads to the support The fluid lines and the electrical lead line exit the pressure assembly. vessel at its top, traverse the annular space and exit the outer shell as 02, top of tank coil cover; H2, girth ring equator. follows:

Structural respectively. listed in

and physical parameters are listed in Tables 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, Tank volumes, with expansion and contraction data, are Tube sizing is listed in Table 7.3.5. Table 7.3.4.

.,...-

".._.

._--

_- _.._ --.._l_-..-.

.~._...-.--.-..--"-.l..l"-l Lo---.------

..,-.. 11..-

TABLE 7.3.2

CRYOGENIC TANK STRUCTURAL LIMITS Hydrogen Oxygen Inconel 718 180,000 145,0006 30 x 10 No creep at 145,000 0.29

Material Ultimate Strength, psi Yield Strength, psi Young's Modulus, psi Creep Stress, psi Poisson's Safety Ratio Factors -

5 Al-2.5 Sn ELI Ti 105,000 95,000 17 x lo6 71,200 0.30

Ultimate Yield Creep Design Proof Burst Stress Pressure, Pressure, Level, psia psia psi

1.5 1.33 1.33 53,000 400 psia 450 psia

1.5 1.33 N.A. 110,000 1357 psia 1537 psia

A-196 .__-_- _ ._ ,_^ .___ _^ .._II________x. _. "_l_l___, .__ _ ..-___ _. ---... -- -...._-.. ----L"II__L-__ _ ,__-_~_. ^_.. .- ._ .._.I.^ .I .^.. ___1 .'-'_--

TABLE 7.3.3 Parameter Pressure Vessel Material Inside Diameter Wall Thickness Outside Outer Shell Diameter

CRYOGENIC TANK PHYSICAL PARAMETERS Hydrogen 5Al-2.5 28.24 Sn ELI Ti Oxygen Inconel 25.06 .059 25.178 718 .004 faooO

- Inches - Inches - Inches

004 .044 c:ooo 28.328

Material Inside Outside Diameter Diameter - Inches - Inches - Inches

5Al-2.5 31.738 31.804

Sn ELI Ti

Inconel 26.48 26.52

750

Wall Thickness Support Flange Flange Bolt Diameter Thickness Circle

.033 + .002

.020 + .002

- Inches - Inches - Inches

37.966 .070 i 32.216 8 .OlO

28.228 .080 c .OlO 27.50 12

Diameter

Number of Bolts Annulus Annular Insulation Vacuum Level Average Burst Disc Pressure (Empty) (TORR) - MM Hg Space - Inches

1.705" Vapor-cooled and passive radiation shields. 5 x lo-7 24 Days 10 90 psi r 2.

.653" Vapor-cooled shield with oreloaded insulation. 5 x 10-7 24 Days

Pump Down Time

Burst Weight Spec Actual

75 psi

f 7.5

75.0 lb. (Maximum) 80.0 lb.

93.5 lb. 90.8 lb.

Electrical/Instrumentation Beech/NAA Interface Pigtails & Hermetically sealed pin receptacle Hermetically sealed pin receptacle

A-197

TABLE 7.3.4 CRYOGENIC TANK VOLUMES (With Expansion and Contraction Data1 (Less INTERNAL VOLUME .02 ft3 for components H2 Tank ft3 ft3 6.8314 6.8045 ft3 ft3

02 Tank Ambient Ambient Pressure Temperature Pressure Max. Min. (02) Max. Min. (02) Max. Min. (H2) Max. Min. (Hz) Max. Min. (02) Max. Min. (H2) Max. Min. Volumes Average Size Cold 835 psia O2 225 psia H,
L

Max. Max.

tol. tel.

4.7528 4.7471

Full Ambient -297OF 02 -423OF Full 935 psia -294'F Full 865 psia -294'F Full 260 psia -418'F Full 225 psia -418'F Full 935 psia + 80°F Full 260 psia -ZOOoF H2

tol. tol. tol. tel. tel. tol. tol. tol. tol. tol. tol. tol. tol. tol.

4.7213 4.7156 4.7532 4.7497 4.7508 4.74705

ft3 ft.3 ft3 ft3 ft3 ft3

6.777 ft3 6.7698 ftd N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.805 6.80048 6.8014 6.7963 ft3 ft3 -ft3 ft3

N/A N/A
WA N/A 4.7848 4.7812 N/A N/A ft3 ft3

N/A N/A 6.8597 6.8550 ft3 ft3

Used for

Tank Calculations 4.74892 Ft3 6.7988 Ft3

Average Size Warm 935 psia 02 260 psia H2

4.7830

Ft3

6.8573

Ft3

A-198

_I-~

.-

.._-

-.....

..“_

T..-I-

..----

--.-

_

,_

______..

_.

._

. . .

--I

_-.

. .._.--

.I

TABLE 7.3.5

CRYOGENIC TANK TUBE SIZING Hydrogen Oxygen l/2 O.D. (Inside 3/4 O.D. (Outside Inconel x .015 wall coil cover) x .028 wall coil cover) 750 AMS 5582

Vent Tube

l/4 O.D. x .015 wall 304 L SST

Fill

Tube

l/4 0.0. x -015 wall 304L SST Common with line Tube vent

3/8 O.D. x .022 wall Inconel 750 AMS 5582 l/4 O.D. x .015 wall Inconel 750 AMS 5582 l/2 O.D. x .015 wall Inconel 750 AMS 5582 3/16 O.D. x .015 wall Inconel 750 AMS 5582 l/4 O.D. x .015 wall Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Feed Tube* Electrical

l/2 O.D. x .015 wall 304L SST l/4 O.D. x .015 wall 304L SST

Vapor Cooled* Shield Tube Pressure Vessel to Vapor* Cooled Shield Tube * Three tubes joined to provide

a single

feed line

for

the oxygen

tank only.

A-199

.

.._.

--

.

-.

--.

_

,.

-----...

.-..-.

.s

_-

_,

~--_---

1_1

i-l-

-

._..___._--

___--.--

--11

_----

--*-----

-.

q

PRESSURIZATION AND DESTRATIFICATION UNIT

Each of the storage tanks con tains a forced cation unit. pressurization and destratifi Each unit consists of the fol lowing: a. A 2.0 inch diameter s upport tube 3/4 the tank diameter in length. Two heaters. Two fan motors.

convection FAN & MOTOR

approximately

b. c. d.

Two thermostats. Eliminated for H2 on CSM 113 and on and eliminated for 02 on CSM 114 and on.

TUBE FAN & MOTOR ENCASED INTERNALLY enas of the tube, the tube, force it top and bottom of the each heater interface. element

The tube provides a large surface area for efficient heat transfer, and is small enough to be installed through the pressure vessel neck. The heaters are placed along the tube's outer surface .* and brazed I . in A motor-fan is mounted at the upper ana lower place. which draw fluid through the inlet ports located along across the heat transfer surface and expel it near the vessel. Block II tanks utilize separate sets of lead wires for and for each motor fan through the electrical connector FAN MOTORS

The motors are three phase, four wire, 200 volts A.C. line to line, 400 The cycles miniature induction type with a centrifugal flow impeller. minimum impeller speed of the oxygen unit in fluid is 1800 rpm with a torque of 0.90 in. oz., and the hydrogen unit is 3800 rpm with a torque Two fans and motors are used in each vessel. of 0.45 in. oz.. Stator Stack , Yoke Ring Bushing Field /--Winding

Bearings -4 Impel ler \ MOTOR FAN Rotor

A-200

q

PRESSURIZATION
S’I’ATOR

AND DESTRATIFICATION

UNIT(COIITINUED)

SLOT

STAMR

TEZl’H

-\

SPIDER

STATOR RFTAIRER
i I-

R?XESiED

SWI’

STRAIN

RELIEF

A-201 . . _ ., ..).-....---. _-_-‘ -.- .."-.-____-_~ l___l___."_~-.-~_~..---_-1__~ -_-__-_---11----

q
HEATERS

PRESSURIZATION AND DESTRATIFICATION UNIT

(CONTINUED)

The heaters are a nichrome resistance type, each contained in a thin stainless steel tube insulated with powered magnesium oxide. The heaters are designed for operation at 28 volts DC during in-flight operation , or 65 volts DC for GSE operation to provide pressurization within the specified time. The heaters are spiralled and brazed along the outer surface of the tube. The heaters are wired in parallel to provide heater redundancy at half power. The heaters have small resistance variation over a temperature range of + 80°F to -420°F.

THERMOSTATS .GLASS SEAL BASE ASSEMBLY INSULATOR CAP BI-METAL DISC

THRUST PIN WAVE WASHER

The thermostats are a bimetal type unit developed for cryogenic service. They are in series with the heaters and mounted inside the heater tube with a high conducting mounting bracket arranged so that the terminals protrude through the tube wall. When the heater tube reaches 80 *lOoF, the thermostats open cutting power to the heaters to prevent over heating of the pressure vessel. When the tube reaches -200°F in the hydrogen tank or -75°F oxygen tank the thermostats close allowing power to be supplied to the heaters.

in the

q

DENSITY SENSOR PROBE

The density sensor consists of two concentric tubes which serve as capacitor plates, with the operating media acting as the dielectric between the two. The density of the fluid is directly proportional to the dielectric constant and therefore probe capacitance. The gage is capable of sensing fluid quantity from empty to full during fill and flight operation. The accuracy of the probe is 1.5% of full scale. TEMPERATURE SEN DENSITY PROBE PRESSUREAND OESTRATIFICATION UNIT fl

Hydrogen Quantity Gaging System Range Accuracy Output Voltage Output Impedance Power O-100% full (.17-4.31 #/ft3) ~2.68 % full range O-5 V DC 500 ohms 2-l/2 watts 115 V 400 cps O-100% full O-5 V DC 500 ohms 2-l/2 watts 400 cps

115 V

q

TEMPEKATURESENSOR

The temperaturesensoris a four-wire platinum resistance sensing element mounted on the density sensor (see photograph of density sensor probe). It is a single point sensor encased in a Inconel sheath which only dissipates 1.5 millivolts of power per square inch to minimize self-heating errors. The resistance of the probe is proportional to the fluid temperature and is accurate to within 1.5%.

Hydrogen Temperature Gaging System Range Accuracy Output Voltage Output Impedance Power -42O'F to -ZOOoF t2.68 % full range O-5 VDC 5000 ohms 1.25 watts 115 V 400 cps

Oxygen -32O'F to +80°F t2.63 % full range o-5 v DC 5000 ohms 1.25 watts 115 V 400 cps

@

SIGNAL CONDITIONER

The temperature and density amplifiers are separate modules, contained The density module functions as an infinite in the same electrical box. feedback balancing bridge and utilizes solid state circuitry. The temperature module also uses solid state circuits and amplifies the voltage generated across the sensor which is linearly proportional to the resistance of the sensor. The output in both cases is a O-5 volt DC analog voltage which is fed into the NR interface. The voltage required to run the signal conditioner is 115 V, 300 cycle single phase, and draws a total of 3.75 watts of power. The accuracy of the unit is 1.0% of full scale. The modules hermetically are encased sealed. in Emerson-Cumings epoxy potting and the unit is

q

ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR

The electrical receptacle is a hermetically sealed device capable of It contains straight pins withstanding system pressures and temperature. with solder cups attached.to facilitate the soldering of lead wires from units and the the temperature and density probes, the destratification The pins are sealed in a ceramic materi al which has the same heaters. coefficient of thermal expansion as the shell and pin material.

A-284
..-._ “__ ..” -..“-._-_“~ .-.. ~--.I __.^ 11-~ . .~. . ..---T-----..,-I -~ ..-1_ 1-1-1”^1.-1~ . . ..I -..I .” --.1-1 ..l--.l.. -I-.. . . ...*

q

VAC-10~ PUMP

DESCRIPTION The vat-ion pump is attached directly to the vacuum annulus of the oxygen tank which maintains the insulation space at reduced pressure required for adequate insulation. Pumping action results from bombarding the titanium cathode with ionized gas molecules which become chemically bound to the titanium. The impacting ions sputter titanium from the cathode. The sputtered titanium particles also contribute pumping by gettering action. The pump can be used as a vacuum readout device since the input current to the pump is directly proportional to pressure. The unit is powered by a DC-DC converter capable of putting out the required amounts of power. CONSTRUCTION Vat-ion pumps have no moving parts. The pumps consist of two titanium plates spot welded to a vacuum tight stainless steel enclosure with an anode structure mounted between the plates connected to a coppergold brazed electrical feedthrough. A permanent magnet maintains a magnetic field between the electrodes causing the ions to follow spiral paths thus increasing transit time. POWERSUPPLY ( CONVERTER) The converter is a solid state device capable of supplying power to the vat-ion The unit is energized by a 28 V DC source pump over a large range of pressure. out 4.2 ma at 10 Volts and is current limited to 350 ma. The unit is capable of puttinq The unit employs a squ,are wave invert&r, a DC and lma at 4000 volts.

toroid

transformer

and a quadrupler

circuit

on the output.

Choke filters

are supp lied

on the 28 volt DC input to keep to acceptable limits the amount of conducted interference being fed back from the output. The metal case is well bonded to reduce to acceptable limits radiated interference. The circuits are enc losed in Emerson-Cumings stycast 2850 Ft.

A-205

q
PERFORMANCE

VAC-ION --

PUMP (CONTINUED)

The pumping rate of the pump is constant at 1 liter is related to pressure as shown by the graph below.

per second.

Pump current

rnc>auKt

VSlJJKKtNI

1 I/s Vaclon PUMP

I

ma

Pump Current
LIFE SPAN The practical life span of a vac- ion pump while pressure ranges is as follows: 1 1 1 1 x x x x 10e6 10-5 10-4 10-3 region region region region 10,000 1,000 100 10 pumping in the various

hours hours hours hours

A-20.6 _ .._ _I . ‘ . "..-."-_"_ ..--.-~. __.,-_ _. .._.. -.---." ._.(. . _-

q

FILTER

.FILTBR

The filter is a multiple disc type element rated at 175 The discs are stacked on a mandrel-like cartridge. The to trap fibers and particles which could get downstream hinder valve module and fuel cell operation. The filter inside the density probe adapter and is welded onto the line.

microns absolute. filter is used of the tank and is mounted feed and vent

A-207 ~~__r _" -_-^ I-.. ._._.__~. .--. .--;" -_ -~ _-,___-.-...~III_IIIIII-..-x--.--_-__-~I

q

SYSTEM (TANK) VALVE MODULE

TANK 2 HALF

h

TANK 1 HALF

CHECK

-,_m-----I

OVERBOARD RELIEF

I____----

I A

OVERBOARD RELIEF PS PRESSURE SWITCH 0 m CHECK VALVE

0R T 0

RELIEF VALUE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER

The system (tank) valve module for the hydrogen system and oxygen system Each module contains two relief valves, two are functionally indentical. pressure transducers, two pressure switches: and one check valve. These module components are each separately described on the following pages.

A-208

la
ATMOSPHERIC SENSING PORT-

RELIEF VALVES

NEGATIVE RATE SPRING IL ASSEMBLY

I

BELLOWS POPPET PRESSURIZED VOLUME POSITIVE RATE SPRING ASSEMBLY VENTA L TANK PRESSURE

The relief valve, part of the system valve module, is differential type designed to be unaffected by back pressure in the downstream plumbing. The valve has temperature compensation and a self-aligning valve seat. The valve consists of an ambient pressure sensing bellows preloaded with a belleville spring, which operates a poppet valve. Virtually zero pressure increase between crack and full flow is obtained by cancelling out the positive spring rate of the pressure sensing element with a negative-rate belleville spring (see above right). The large sensing element and small valve produces large seat forces with a small crackto-reseat pressure differential assuring low leakage at the reseat pressure. The Belleville springs are made of 17-4 PH and 17-7 PH stainless steels. The bellows is a three-ply device designed to prevent fractures due to resonant vibrations. The relief crack pressure is 273 psig minimum for hydrogen tanks and 983 psig minimum for oxygen tanks. The valve is atmospheric sensing; therefore, relief crack pressure in space is 273 psia minimum for hydrogen and 983 psia minimum for oxygen. Oxygen Full Flow Pressure 1010 psig 965 psig (max.) (min.) Hydrogen 285 psig 268 psig (max.) (min.)

Reseat Pressure

A-209
. i. .I-... . .L-i-““_l.l”~-.._-l_.,.,. _ -..-. --. ~__ -“,“111111 .“lll”----.,l--_x__-_-

q

PRESSURESWITCH

TTANK

PRESSURE

H
REFE PRES

rSENSING

DIAPHRAM PIVOTED TOGGLE LEVER HORSESHOE SPRING INSULATOR '

A

.ELECTRICAL CONTACT ARM

The pressure switch, part of the system valve module, is a double pole, single throw absolute device. A positive reference pressure (less than atmospheric) is used to trim the mechanical trip mechanism to obtain the required absolute switch actuation settings. The reference pressure is typically between 4 to 10 psia. A circular convoluted diaphragm senses tank pressure and actuates a toggle mechanism which provides switching to drive motor switch (Cryogenic Electrical Control Box Assembly). The motor driven switch controls power to both the tank heaters and destratification motors. The pressure switch body is 302 stainless steel the diaphragm is 17-7 stainless steel. This unit is capable of carrying the current required by the motor driven switch without any degradation. The convoluted diaphragm actuates the switch mechanism in a positive fast manner which eliminates bounce and the resultant voltage transients.

and

11

CRYOGENIC PRESSURETRANSDUCER

TANK

The pressure transducer, part of the system valve module, is an absolute 'The transducer consists of a silicon pickup (vacuum reference) device. comprised of four sensors mounted on a damped edge diaphragm and an integral signal conditioner. The unit senses tank pressure through the discharge line from the tank. The signal conditioner output is a O-5 VDC analog output which is linearly proportioned to tank pressure.

Hydrogen Range Accuracy' Output Voltage Output Impedance Power Voltage 0 to 350 psia + 2.68 % full O-5 V DC 500 ohms 1.5 watts 23 V DC range

Oxygen 50 to 1050 psia * 2.63 %full range O-5 V DC 500 ohms 1.5 watts 23 V DC

A-211 ,. , ._..~_. ..._ .-...._.- -. I ,_..i _-... -.--.-L ,_., __ -.^ ..I_. . --,.. _...-*....^.. - _ .. ..- _.. I,._L .‘ _ _~--l_l-__-__--.., -_.~~.._-l_-,.l ~I-.

•l

CHECK VALVE (SYSTEM MODULE)

From Tank 2 t G?7 Spring Seat Assv -

Seal

The check valve, part of the system valve module, is designed to open at The single poppet IS a differential pressure of approximately 1 psia. during flow in spring loaded and has a large area to prevent chattering This large area also helps in obtaining a positive the normal direction. seal if pressurized in the reverse direction.

A- 2.12

El

FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE

VALVE MODULE ENVELOPE

TO FUEL CELLS

-FROM FLOWSCHEMATIC

TANK

The fuel cell valve module consists shutoff valves contained in a cast modules are functionally identical. are described on succeeding pages.

of two check valves and three solenoid The separate hydrogen and oxygen body. Individual valve module components

A-213
. __ . _“-.* .-*.-._--... ,.. .._. ____-“-^ ‘_--.” -.-.. ---..... .‘_“..,...I -...--

q

SOLENOID VALVES

POSITION SWITC SOLENOID NO. 1

OUTLET SIMPLIFIED

The solenoid valves, part of the fuel cell valve module, employ a poppetThis poppet is actuated by a magnetic armature which is seat arrangement. The upper solenoid is used to open the suspended on a Belleville spring. The snap-over-center belleville spring both valve; the lower to close it. guides the armatures and latches the valve open or closed. A switch to The valve opens against indicate valve closed position is incorporated. pressure and pressure helps seal the valve against leakage in the normal flow The valve body is 321 stainless steel. The maximum in-rush direction.

current
circuit

is 10 amps with steady state current
has diode noise suppression.

at 2 amps. The solenoid

coil

A- 214

q

CHECK VALVE (FUEL CELL MODULE)

f

FROM SYSTEM VALVE MODULE

MAIN S AUXI SEAT
Seated auxiliary - both main and seats are closed. Cracked - at low flows the auxiliary seat is barely open and catches contaminant particles, the main seat is wide open and protected from contaminants. Full flow - both main and secondary seats are wide open; the high flow velocities carry particles through the valve without fouling the seat.

The check valve, part of differential pressure of main seat and 'auxiliary large seat area provides the reverse direction.

the fuel cell module, is designed to open at a approximately 1 psia. The valve consists of a seat operating as shown pictorially above. A a positive low leakage seal if pressurized in

8 ti2-02 Ezl

INLINE FILTER

.-+qfq!p-& -

FLOW DIRECTION

The hydrogen and oxygen reactant filter consists of a multiple of chemically The discs are stacked on a mandrel-like cartridge. The filter etched discs. is used to trap contamination which could get downstream of the reactant tank The filter is rated at 5~ nominal and 12~ absolute with a valve modules. The filter design does not allow it to dirt holding capacity of .25 grams. generate system contamination and provides closer adherence to specified filter rating.

A-216 --_ ".,_ .l._-~-.l----l--_--.l-,-~-_ .-"---. ,._--- -,., --__.-_ -..--ll.l".lll .._ _,._-4__ -,"-..--.-.,----.--w--e.-.-I_._.

q

FILL AND VENT DISCONNECTS - AIRBORNE

Each vent and fill disconnect utilizes a spring loaded poppet and a pressure cap that can be locked into place. The ground unit is connected by aligning grooves on the ground sleeve with keys on the airborne body, pushing until a stop is reached (about 40 lbs. force is required), and turning the ground sleeve until engagement is complete. The spring loaded poppets can be self opening on installation of mating ground disconnects, or can be opened subsequent to installation of the ground disconnect, depending on the type of ground unit that is used, The poppet is self closing on removal of the ground unit regardless of the type used.

A- 21’7

. ..-

.

,

_.

.._

^.”

,.“__-___

.

__*_*_.

_l^--~.-l_---.“~---~-~

------

-il_-.

_“-ll-“l_-~-

--.-

__L.-_-_

-___

_-

._-_-_

7.4

FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SYSTEM FILTRATION

A-218

_

I

.--.

_,..- _ .

". ^..^--..---"--~_. ,__-,..____-.. __ .-_- I .--_ ,_____.. . .-.^_( ,I__..-I- _--.~--

TABLE 7.4.1 FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION CRITICAL COMPONENT acondary Bypass Valve MINIMUM CLEARANCE 0 to 0.006 in. tapered pintle on travel annulus depending 75~ nom. 100~ absolute2 Area = 6.6 in Hole Size = 0.030 in.dia Stem Clearance = 0.013 in. Max. Stroke = 0.048 in. 40~ absolute Area2= 0.076 in. 5~ nom. 12~ absolute Holding capacity = .25 grams 1 5p nom. 12~ absolute Holding capacity = .25 grams FILTER PROTECTION LOCATION RATING - SIZE No filter OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

ater/Glycol

Pump

Internal to Pump Inlet I Internal to Water Separator Pump Between H -0 Valve Module & fi -a2 Fuel Cell Moduli 1

Non Bypassing Type Made from Sinter Cd Powder Chem Milled Stacked Disc Filter Element

ater Separator heck Valve

2 Pump

rimary

Bypass Valve

Bi-Metalic Flapper Stroke = 0.040 in. Clearance (min) at full regeneration = 0.013 in.

D

D
1 D

Between H -0 Valve Module & 6 -a2 Fuel Cell Modulz

Chem Milled Stacked Disc Filter Element

2 Regulator

Valve seat clearance open = 1Op nom. 0.008 in. Min. radial slid25~ absolute2 Area 0.076 in ing clearance exposed to gas = 0.006 inches I9

1 D

Internal Regulator

to Inlet

Made from Sinter Powder

D

Filtration Valve for Apollo

also

provided clearance

by filter

at the H2 Regulator flow

Inlet conditions

(see H2 Regulator) at 2200 watts

2 D

open seat

is based on regulator

plus

purge

8 regulator.

TABLE 7.4.1 FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued) CRITICAL COMPONENT H2 Purge Valve MINIMUM CLEARANCE Ball travel from seat = 0.020 in. to 0.025 in. Min diametric clearance = 0.005 in. 0.0305 in. dia.

1

FILTERt PROTECTION LOCATION RATING - SIZE Internal to Valve Inlet

OTHER CHARACTERISTIC! CylindricalShaped Screen, Bypassing Type Lee Jet Size 0.0305 in. orifice, 750 LOHM lade from jinter Powder

611 nom. 18~ absolute2 Area 0.35 in. Protective screen (perforated cap) hole size = 0.008 in.

1. H2 Purge Valve Orifice (Valve exit)

Internal and Upstream of Orifice @ Valve Exit

02 Regulator

Valve Seat clearance open = 0.005 in. Min. radial sliding clearance exposed to gas = 0.0035 in. b Ball Travel from Seat = 0.020 in. to 0.025 in. Min. diametr c clearance 0.005 in. 0.0120 in. d a.

Internal 10~ nom. ?egulator 25~ absolute Area = 0.076 in 21

to Inlet

02 Purge Valve

Internal to 6~ nom. \Jalve Inlet 18~ absolute = Area = 0.35 in2 Protective screen (perforated cap) hole size = 0.008 in. flow conditions Internal and llpstream of Orifice P Valve Exit

IylindricalShaped Screen, 3ypassing Type Lee Jet Size = 3.0120 in. orifice, 4500 LOHM

1. O2 Purge Valve Orifice (Valve exit)

open I% Valve for Apollo

seat clearance 8 regulator.

is based on regulator

at 2200 watts

plus

purge

TABLE 7.4.1 FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued) CRITICAL COMPONENT 2 Vent Valve MINIMUM CLEARANCE Ball seal .020 to .025 inches from seat. Valve pintle travel from sealing seat is .OlO-.012 Maximum diametric in. clearance .006 inches. 0.0186 in. dia. FILTER PROTECTIO!i LOCATION RATING - SIZE 6~ nom. Internal to Valve Inlet 18~ absolute Area = 0.35 in? OTHER CHARACTERISTICS CylindricalShaped Screen, Bypassing Type

1. N Vent Valve Okfice

Protective screen (perforated cap) hole size = 0.008 in.

Internal and Upstream of Orifice 0 Valve Exit

Lee Jet Size = 0.0186 in. orifice, 2000 LOHM Cylindrical Screen

2. N Vent Valve V&t Port Plug I2 Fill Valve Ball seal .020 to .025 inches from seat. Valve pintle travel from sealing seat is .OlO-.012 in. Minimum diametric clearance .005 inches.

6~ nom. Internal to Valve Exit 18~ absolute Area = 0.15 in?

1. Inlet

Port

6~ nom. Internal to 18~ absolute Valve Inlet Area = 0.034 in? (Min) 6~ nom. Internal to 18~ absolute Valve at InterArea = 0.074 in?stage and Exit (Min) Port Valve Seat Clearance Open, 0.0015 in. Min. radial sliding clearance exposed to gas = 0.0035 in. I9 is based on regulator 10~ nom. 25~ absolute Area 0.076 in.' flow conditions Internal Regulator to Inlet

Disc-shaped Screen

2. Interstage 3. Exit Port

Cylindrical Screen

I2 Regulator

Made from Sinter Powder

I3

Valve open seat clearance for Apollo 8 regulator.

at 2200 watts

plus

purge

TABLE 7.4.1 FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued) CRITICAL COMPONENT 1 Regulator Overboard J&t Port Plug rletering Orifice 0.0215 in. dia. MINIMUM CLEARANCE FILTER PROTECTION LOCATION RATING - SIZE 200 MESH screen 0.001%0.0026in dia.wire Protective screen (perforated cap) hole size = 0.008 in. None at Valve Provided by Pump Inlet Filter Internal Regulator to Exit OTHER CHARACTERISTICS Screen Twill Plain None or

Between N2 Regulator and 02 & H2 Regulators

Radiator Bypass Valve Main Valve Bypass Valve Orifice/Stroke Main Valve Bypass Valve Valve Module, H2 (Consists of 2 relief lalves, 2 press. iwitches, 2 press. transducers, and one :heck valve) Jalve Module, O2 (Consists of 2 relief valves, 2 press. switches, 2 press. transducers, and one check valve)

0.0015 to 0.003 in. 0.002 to 0.004 in. 0.156 0.420 in/O.060 in/O.018 in. in.

Filtrati'on at Coolant Inlet

Filter Pump

175~ absolute Internal to H2 Area = 0.97 in? Cryogenic Tanks Outlet

Chem Milled Stacked Disc Filter Element

175~ absolute Internal to 02 Area = 0.97 in? Cryogenic Tanks Outlet

Chem Milled Stacked Disc Filter Element

<

I

TABLE 7.4.1 FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued) CRITICAL COMPONENT 12-0 Fuel Cell Valve lodu?e (Consist of 2 :heck valves and 3 solenoid valves each) MINIMUM CLEARANCE

-T

FILl RATING - SIZE 5~ nom. 12~ absolute iolding capacity = .25 grams

PROTECTION LOCATION 3etween H -0 Valve 'lodule ani H2-0 -uel Cell Mo&l$

OTHER CHARACTERISTIC Chem Milled Stacked Disc Filter Element

}

/

/

REPORT OF APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

APPENDIX

B - REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL C - REPORT OF MANUFACTURING AND TEST PANEL D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL

APPENDIX

APPENDIX APPENDIX

E - REPORT OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT PANEL NTO(_.CCE-SSUO--N NUMBS)

7n4_9
_

'_

_

(P
(N._SA Cl_6R_TMX OR A'D dUMBER)

(CODE)

(CATEGORY)

NATIONAL

........

INISTRATION

..2

AI_PENDIX. ., REPORT OF MISSION

B EVENTS PANEL

CONTENTS Page

Part APPENDIX BI B2 B3 TASK PANEL SUMMARY PRELAUNCH ACCIDENT LAUNCH B - REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL

ASSIGNMENT ORGANIZATION OF EVENTS AND

................ ................ ................. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE

B-I B-3

B-5

B4

MISSION

.................... COUNTDOWN ................ and Gas Servicing .....

B-II B-II B-II B-13 B-25

Mechanical Cryogenic Spacecraft

Build-up Servicing Closeout

.............. and Terminal Count PRIOR ....

LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR COAST PHASE TO THE ACCIDENT ................ Launch and Flight Systems Low Summary

B-26

........... ........ Alarm ......

B-26 B-27
B-30 B-31 B-37 B-37

Spacecraft Hydrogen Cryogenic

Operation Master

Pressure

Tank

Destratification

.......

B5

INCIDENT

EVENTS

................ ................

INTRODUCTION STATUS OF THE

SPACECRAFT

PRIOR

TO

THE

ACCIDENT FAN TURNON

................. AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL

B-45

ANOMALIES OXYGEN LOSS LOSS TANK

................... PARAMETERS FROM 55:53:30 UNTIL

B-45

OF TELEMETRY

............... ...............

B-51 B-54

OF TELEMETRY

iii

Part
SPACECRAFT EVENTS AT THE TIME LOSS .................... CHANGES IN SPACECRAFT DYNAMICS OF TELEMETRY

Page

B-56
........ IN SERVICE B-67

B-62

TEMPERATURE MODULE FAILURE OPERATION OF

CHANGES OBSERVED ................... CRYOGENIC OF THE OXYGEN

SYSTEM POWER

...... SYSTEM

B-67 B-80 B-83 B-8_

ELECTRICAL

B6

POSTINCIDENT IMMEDIATE Chronology Actions

EVENTS RECOVERY

............... ..............

of Spacecraft Reconfiguration ..................

B-84

Evaluation of Electrical and Cryogenic Oxygen Problem .............. Maintenance Lunar PLANS TO Module of Attitude Control .......

B-88
B-92 B-97

Activation TAKEN TO

........... RETURN THE CREW

AND EARTH

ACTIONS

.................. and Systems Management .................. Earth Trajectory Control .....

B-IO0

Consumables Actions Return to

B-I02 B-111

Entry Procedures and Checklist Definition ................

B-120 ........ ...... ..... .... B-127 B-127 B-130

B-7

INSTRUMENT OXYGEN OXYGEN OXYGEN

SYSTEM TANK TANK TANK

CHARACTERISTICS

TEMPERATURE QUANTITY 2 PRESSURE

MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENTATION

B-i34

iv

Part PULSE MISSION REFERENCES CODE MODULATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Page B-l_7 B-152

CONTROL

...............

...................

B-158

v

This page left

blank intentionally.

vi

PART

BI

TASK

ASSIGNMENT

Panel i was assigned the task to chronology of mission events directly This event sequence would then form a use by Panel i, other Panels, and the To provide such a chronology, dated sequence of all data whether observations, inflight photographs, other sources of information. Of the requirement to as crew observations ance of the validity

develop a detailed and accurate related to the flight of Apollo baseline of data for analytical Review Board.

13.

Panel i worked to produce a consoliderived from telemetry records, crew air-to-ground communications, or special significance to Panel i was different to provide sources, greater such assur-

correlate data taken from and telemetry, in order of data wherever

possible. conditions for its work,

Panel

In order to provide meaningful boundary i divided its effort into three areas: which covered accident. covered conclusion the of

to

i. Preincident events, the time of the inflight 2. Incident and events, to

the

flight

from

countdown

which the

flight

from

approximately related data

55 hours events. 3. period In to

52 minutes

immediately

Postincident splashdown. of the

events,

which

covered

the

subsequent

mission

each

three

areas

the

main

purpose

of

the

Panel

was

to

provide the most efficient presentation of events for the Board's use in reviewing, evaluating, and interpreting the significance of mission events. Consequently, Panel I devoted a considerable portion of its time to the task of data interpretation and verification. As was intended from the Charter of the Board, the primary focus of the Panel's work was the period of time during serious inflight difficulties, and this particular emphasis. which the service its presentation module of data encountered reflects

B-I

This page left

blank intentionally.

B-2

PART

B2

PANEL

ORGANIZATION

Panel i was chaired by Mr. Francis B. Smith, trator for University Affairs, NASA Headquarters, The Board Monitor was Mr. Neil Armstrong from the Center. Additional Panel Members were: Mr. Dr. Mr. John Thomas M. P. J. Williams, B. Ballard, Manned Kennedy Langley Space Center,

Assistant AdminisWashington, D.C. Manned Spacecraft

for

preincident for incident

events events events

Research

Center, for

Frank,

Spacecraft

Center,

postincident

Although each of the above specialized in one phase of the Panel's total assignment, the Panel acted as one unit in the review and assessment of data and in the analysis and interpretation of those events identified with the accident.

B-3

This page left blank

intentionally.

B-4

PART SUMMARY OF

B3 EVENTS

Apollo 13 was launched on schedule from Kennedy Space Center 2:13:00 e.s.t, on April ii, 1970. The crew consisted of James E. Commander (CDR); John L. Swigert, Command Module Pilot (CMP); and

at Lovell, Fred W.

Haise, Lunar Module Pilot (LMP). The preflight countdown was routine and although some malfunctions and anomalies occurred during boost and earlier portions of the flight, none except the premature cutoff of one of the S-II engines was considered at the time to be of a serious nature. At about 55:54, the crew had just completed a television broadcast; Swigert was in the left seat of the command module, LMP Haise was in lunar module, and CDR Lovell was in the CM lower equipment bay, when three heard a loud bang. At about the same time in Mission Control

CMP the all

in Houston, the Guidance Officer (GUIDO) noted on his console display that there had been a momentary interruption of the spacecraft computer. He told the Flight Director, "We've had a hardware restart. I don't know what it was." At almost the same time, CDR Lovell, talking to Mission Control, said, "I believe we've had a problem here." Also at about the same time, the Electrical, Environmental, and Communications Engineer (EECOM) in Mission Control noticed on his console display the sudden appearance of limit sensing lights indicating etered quantities relating to the spacecraft's that a few cryogenic, of the telemfuel cell, and

electrical system had suddenly gone beyond pre-set limits. Astronaut Swigert in the command module, noting a master alarm about 2 seconds after the bang, moved from the left seat to the right seat where he could see the instruments indicating conditions of the electrical system, and noticed a caution light indicating low voltage on main bus B, one of the two busses supplying electrical power for the command module. At that time, he reported to Mission Control, "We've had a problem. We've had a main B bus undervolt." At the same time, however, he reported the voltage on and assumed fuel cell that the 3, which main bus supplied power to main bus B, looked good B undervolt condition had been a transient

one. However, 2 or 3 minutes later, when another master alarm sounded, LMP Haise moved into the right-hand seat to recheck the fuel cells and noted that two of the three fuel cells (no. i and no. 3) were showing no hydrogen or oxygen flow and no electrical output and that fuel cell 2 was carrying the command module's total electrical load through bus A. Bus B was dead. In addition, several other electrical and cryogenic system abnormalities were evident. Detailed studies and analyses of telemetry records made since the

flight indicated that during the 90 seconds before the "bang", several abnormal events occurred. At about 55:53:23, within a few seconds after the crew had turned on two fan motors which stir the supercritical cryogenic

B-5

oxygen in oxygen amplitude current

tank and

no. 2, voltage

electrical "glitches" (transient highfluctuations) occurred which could be

in-

dicative of momentary electrical short circuits. Analyses of telemetry data also indicate that first one fan motor and then the other probably became disconnected from the electrical bus concurrently with the glitches. Thirteen seconds after the first glitch (16 seconds after the fans were turned on) the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2 started to rise; during the next 24 seconds it increased from a normal value of 891 psia to 954 psia; it remained at that pressure for approximately 21 seconds and then again increased to a maximum value of 1008 psia (approximately the pressure at which the relief valve was set to open), at which point the relief valve apparently opened and pressure began decreasing. During the last 23 seconds of this period, during the second oxygen pressure increase, telemetry indicated that oxygen tank no. 2 temperature also began to increase sharply; and concurrently with the sudden temperature rise, the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage, which had been inoperative for the previous 9 hours, began to show fluctuating readings. At about 90 seconds after the start of the pressure rise, telemetry transmission from the spacecraft was suddently interrupted for a period of 1.8 seconds. Putting all of this and other information together with the service in

module photographs taken later the condition of the spacecraft immediately before things happened: i. oxygen The oxygen pressure. and during

by the crew and with subsequent system leads to a determination this 1.8-second interval the

changes that

following

tank

no.

2

system

failed,

leading

to

loss

of

all

2. producing 3.

The service the "bang" The

module heard

panel by the velocity

covering crew. changed

bay

4 blew

off,

possibly

spacecraft's

by

0.5

fps.

4. Transmission of telemetry from the spacecraft was interrupted (possibly caused by the panel striking and damaging the high-gain antenna through which data were being telemetered). 5. Various valves closed (contributing to tude control). 6. Valves closed (leading of oxygen). 7. Oxygen in the reaction some difficulties control systems in maintaining (RCS) were automatic shocked atti-

controlling to failure

oxygen of both

flow fuel

to fuel cells _ and cells 2-1/2 minutes

3 were shocked later for lack

tank

no.

i started

leaking

oxygen.

B-6

8. automatic reaction

Venting control

of

oxygen

produced

forces

on by

the

spacecraft opposing

which

the

stabilization thrusters.

system

counteracted

firing

spacecraft

9. erroneous

Various readings.

sensors

or

their

wiring

were

damaged

to

cause

subsequent

These nor cally the

changes

occurred controllers

so

rapidly, have

of had

course, a clear

that picture

neither of

the specifi-

crew

mission had

could

what In the

happened. Control an oxygen Center, instrumentation tank no. 2 after the failure quantity and or less gage current than 1.8-second since had data earlier failed readings 0 percent loss, in and were of fu_ the since so the

Mission suspected the

EECOM flight other abnormal

first

(46:40) pressures, (e.g.,

temperatures, more than i00

voltages, percent

scale) as to instrumentation also initially Center,

appear unrealistic. failure than of believed, that the from

They appeared real quantities. information was

more indicative of an The Flight Director available or initial were to to him in the in during instruDurconin I and 3 an 3

the

Control nature. the ment ing first

difficulty

electrical Center's

electronic efforts validate failure. the ground

Consequently, 3 or 4 minutes and at to readings

Mission after identify minutes, switching what had

Control the a possible both fuel the cell

malfunction

instrumentation flightcrew bus and cell also they fuel cell failures power to i and

the

next

several

trollers attempt back for on the connected

worked to

configurations get had fuel no cells output fuel the supplying to low

understand They from reason. battery and to it the

happened that fuel they minutes to aid

line. same entry power

determined bus. For to insure

and cell

dis-

Later several bus A

disconnected connected 2 in

command elecvoltage.

module's trical

against

further

due

Shortly EECOM fuel an were cells unusually i

after trying and high This 3,

the the

malfunction, to and Guidance of to attitude their the the a great At genesis

while restore

the

Apollo Officer

13

crew power (GNC)

and

the from

unsuccessfully

electrical

output reported on the

Navigation control

level added

thruster since and the used ground it

activity indicated excessive control to and Flight lie

spacecraft. abnormal fuel. crew the began rather attitude cause to

problems, spacecraft next deal and the of hour of to same the or

other thruster and the

conditions Consequently,

aboard during to of pay the

were

required control of the

attention identifying 'time, problem the

maintaining eliminating Director in the RCS,

spacecraft

instability. that the the

suspect in

might

than

high-gain

antenna

instrumentation.

B-7

During

this

period

(about

14 minutes

after

the

accident)

CDR

Lovell

reported, "...it looks to me, looking out the hatch, that we are venting something. We are venting something out into space ...... it's a gas of some sort." He subsequently described this venting as extremely heavy and unlike anything he had seen in his three previous space flights. For about i hour 45 minutes after the accident, the crew and ground controllers wrestled with electrical problems caused by oxygen supply and fuel cell failures and with attitude stability problems caused by the venting of oxygen, the shock closing of thruster system valves, and electrical system failures. During this period they went through a series of control system reconfigurations until automatic control was finally established at 57:32. In the meantime, as it became more apparent that the loss of oxygen from oxygen tank no. i could not be stopped and that fuel cell 2 would soon expire, the LM was powered up (57:40), LM telemetry was turned on (57:57) and attitude control was transferred from the CM after the accident, the to CM the was LM (58:34). completely At 58:40, 2 hours powered down. 45 minutes

that

One of the main concerns then was to make the trajectory changes would return the spacecraft safely to Earth within the lifetime

of the onboard consumables--water, oxygen, thruster fuel, and electric power. At the time of the accident the spacecraft was on a trajectory which would have swung it around the Moon (about 21 hours after the accident) and returned it to Earth where it would have been left in a highly elliptical orbit about the Earth with a perigee (nearest approach to Earth) of about 2400 miles. Four trajectory correction burns were made during the remainder of the flight as illustrated in figure B6-9. 61:30 - A 38 descent propulsion fps incremental velocity system (DPS) engine and (delta the LM V) burn primary using the guidance and

navigation system (PGNS). This burn was performed 16 hours before they swung around the Moon, and was targeted to place the spacecraft on a trajectory which would return it to the atmospheric Earth reentry corridor rather than the 2400-mile perigee. 79:28 - A 861 fps delta V burn using the DPS 2 hours after swinging around the Moon to speed up return to Earth by about 9 hours (143 versus 152 g.e.t.) and to move the landing point from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean where the primary recovery forces were located. 105:18 - A 7.8 fps delta V burn _-7 miles to about 21 miles. 137:40 - A 3.2 fps delta V final using DPS to lower perigee altitude

from

burn

using

LM

RCS

thruster that the

to

cor-

rect for small dispersions craft would reenter in the

in previous burns and assure center of its entry corridor.

space-

B-8

During the remainder of the flight there were several other unusual situations which the crew and Mission Control successfully contended with. The use of electrical power aboard the LM had to be managedvery carefully to conserve not only the LMbatteries but also the water supply, since water was used to dissipate heat generated by the electrical equipment. The LM LiOH was not adequate to remove carbon dioxide for three men for the duration of the return trip, so a method was devised to circulate the LM cabin oxygen through the CM's Li0H filters. Since the CMhad to be used for reentry, its main bus B had to be checked out very carefully to assure that there were no electrical shorts and the CMentry battery which had been used earlier to supply power for the ailing CMhad to be recharged from the LMbatteries. Several actions essential to reentry and landing were undertaken during the last 9 hours of the flight as illustrated in figure B6-10. The SMwas jettisoned a few minutes after the last midcourse correction, about 4-1/2 hours before reentry. In viewing and photographing the SM, the crew realized for the first time the extensiveness of the physical damage(panel blown off, Mylar strips hanging from antenna, etc.). At about 2-1/2 hours before reentry, the CM's inertial platform was powered up and aligned and the LMwas jettisoned about 1/2 hour later. Reentry was at 142:40 and splashdown at 142:54 g.e.t.

B-9

This

page

left

blank

intentionally.

B-IO

PART B4
PRELAUNCH AND MISSION EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

This the on and accident the ends

section with

of

the

report placed It

contains on the with events

significant spacecraft the of launch the

events and count

prior

to

emphasis system.

particularly (T 98:00:00)

cryogenic prior to

starts

the

significant

accident

(55:52:00).

LAUNCH

COUNTDOWN

Countdown and on lunar Monday, module April 8 of

operations (LM) 6, hours the LM countdown were 1970.

for

both

the at

command

service

module i0:00 was

(CSM)

started The start of

approximately of the clear helium shown countdown operation (SHe) in

a.m.e.s.t. delayed a

approximately special of test significant

because

a pad is

involving A B4-1.

supercritical milestones

system. figure

timeline

Mechanical

Build-up

and

Gas

Servicing

Following of the LM was SHe

completion operation, at

of

CSM

powerup, of 3:00 checks

water the CSM

servicing, heavy

and ordnance

securing initi-

installation approximately resistance by 9:30

ators

started and were delayed

p.m.e.s.t. of the launch April

The

ordnance rocket being (incorrect motor. was completed functional had hold. been the

operation initiators slightly thread Combined started by at LM noon T -

remote to LM

escape 6, after problem rocket servicing

completed correct the helium

p.m.e.s.t.,

a mechanical in April both the 7, and on time, point gaseous

interference launch oxygen and was and of escape (GOX)

depth) CSM at that 2:00

with and

initiator

a.m.e.s.t, At at this

successfully LM 12 were hours start,

day.

the

CSM hold late a

66:00:00, planned. CSM

which As a

a built-in of the only

originally and

result

countdown built-in

both

spacecrafts

experienced

6-hour

From mechanical stallation, were that this

noon

Tuesday,

April

7,

through

ii:00 closure,

a.m. LM

Thursday, thermal The CSM

April

9, incells

build-up etc.) and

operations were conducted

(panel on were oxygen the

blanket CSM fuel loading, Details LM SHe All with tank of the

CSM

and

LM. for

activated is, filling

preparations the cryogenic

completed and

cryo

hydrogen this period time

tanks. the

of was

operation loaded were

are and

covered a

below. cold a

During soak

initially operations

24-hour without

started. problem,

these

completed

significant

B-II

4_ U)

c_ .,..4 ,--4

-,-4 4_

> 0 +._

0 C)

C)

,--t

c! ,--t O_ I ,--t I

(D

b_ -,-I

J

B-12

spacecraft including planned

progressing functionally completion of the built-in built-in hold at

from T - 66:00:00 to hold at T - 66:00:00

T - 41:00:00; and another

16-hour

T - 48:00:00.

Cryogenic CSM scheduled cryo loading or to be performed

Servicing and liquid oxygen was through 7:00 p.m.e.s.t.

flowing liquid hydrogen from ii:OO a.m.e.s.t,

Thursday, April 9, 1970. preliminary preparations, Part A5 for a description configuration i. The of the fuel

A timeline of significant milestones, including is shown in figure B4-2. (See Appendix A, of the fuel cell and cryogenic systems.) The and fuel cell systems was systems as follows: were at a

cryogenic gaseous

cell

oxygen

and

hydrogen

pressure of 28 psia with oxygen been operated in the countdown pressurized tain system

and hydrogen demonstration

gases. The test (CDDT)

fuel cells had and were left to main-

with reactant gases (gaseous oxygen and integrity between CDDT and countdown.

hydrogen)

with

2. The oxygen and hydrogen oxygen and hydrogen gases.

tanks were at a pressure of The tanks had been evacuated CDDT, system

80 psia (less than

5mm Hg for 2 hours left in the system CDDT and countdown. 3. The ground

minimum) and serviced during after detanking to maintain

with reactant gas integrity between

support

equipment

(GSE)

lines

were

connected

to

the

spacecraft pressurized gases from disconnects checked at

and had been previously evacuated, pulse purged, and then with reactant gas to 80 psia. Purity samples taken of the the GSE were within specification. The pressure-operated (POD's) that connect the GSE to the spacecraft had been leak 80 psia with reactant gas and indicated no leakage.

4. The portable oxygen dewar used to service the spacecraft oxygen tanks was serviced on April 7, 1970. Liquid samples taken from the vent line of the dewar during servicing were within specification. All of the preceding The countdown The move activities were accomplished without undue delay or difficulty.

first activity for the fuel cell and cryogenic system in the started at approximately 3:00 p.m.e.s.t, on April 8, 1970. of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen dewars from the cryothe pad had been completed. The primary oxygen_ backup hydrogen dewars were located on the pad at service structure (MSS) while the primary hydrogen level 4A of the MSS. The hydrogen and oxygen GSE in figures B4-3 and B4-4, respectively. the

genic buildings to backup oxygen, and base of the mobile dewar was moved to configuration is

shown

B-13

o

bD

(P

_D

0

(D

o
4_

a_ >
4-> (D

r_

D_
! OJ I

bD

B-14

0 4o

m

tX)

o

E

0 0

0

_V

¢7

0

---iC'-f-Tu__. -_I

o_.-I "-' o

i

m

:-li---L[

__

I+-- -"

....

P bD ._

_

c D

.-_ o
tm

o.

_.'_

,.c_ o_

_-

i._

,

i

i

B-I_

e_

X

o

QJ

Q;

Q;

x o

_J

I I
• -I 0 0

L

U

LL

B-16

Pictures of the servicing are shown in figures B4-5

dewars, through

valve boxes, B4-10.

and

pressurizing

equipment

Dewpoint samples of the oxygen and hydrogen spacecraft tanks were obtained. This was accomplished by pressurizing the tanks with reactant gas to 80 psia through the vent line and then venting the tank back through the vent line and obtaining a moisture sample at the vent line sample valve. Both the oxygen and hydrogen tanks met the requirements that the moisture content be less than 25 parts per million (ppm). Oxygen tanks no. i and no. 2 read less than 2 ppm. were obtained, sample botThe sample bottles were by

tles

After the dev_oint were installed on

samples the tank

of the tanks vent lines.

flow purged with reactant gases at i0 pulse purges ranging in pressure The hydrogen line between dewar was the dewar

80 psia for 5 minutes, followed from 80 psia to 20 psia.

fill

then connected to and the spacecraft

the servicing GSE. The was flow purged with

55 psia of helium gas for 15 minutes, and a moisture sample taken from the fill line. A sample result of 2 ppm was obtained. An additional flow purge using gaseous hydrogen at 55 psia was then performed for i0 minutes, followed by 13 pulse purges ranging in pressure from 55 psia to 20 psia (Note: This cleans the dead-end areas at the manifold). The fuel cells were then pressurized Heat melt from was the GSE to their operating pressure

(62 psia oxygen and hydrogen). fuel cells from external GSE to cell 3 heater current, supplied

applied electrically to the potassium hydroxide. Fuel for heatup, was slightly low was adjusted completed. after the

(1.2 amps vs. 1.4 amps). This heater current heatup and calibration of the fuel cells was With the a calibration fuel test cells at operating on each fuel cell

temperature (420 ° F) and pressures, was performed. Fuel cells were lO-amp increments until a monitoring the output volt-

calibrated by applying maximum current of 60

loads in approximately amps was reached while

age. The fuel cell loads were supplied by GSE load banks. After calibration_ the fuel cells were connected to the spacecraft busses and 40-amp GSE load applied to each cell for fuel cell water conditioning (approximately 4 hours). After these loads were removed from each fuel cell, 6-amp in-line heater loads with a 50-percent duty cycle were applied. With the fuel cells in this configuration a visual engineering inspection of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen loading systems was performed with the exception of the liquid oxygen dewar_ not yet connected. Immediately prior and oxygen tank to flowing liquid fans and quantity hydrogen, the probe circuit spacecraft hybreakers were

drogen

B-17

Figure

B4-5.-

Liqnid

hydrogen

dewar.

B-18

Figure

B4-6.-

Liquid

oxygen

dewar.

B-19

Figure

B4-7.-

Hydrogen

valve

box at Launch

Complex

39.

B-20

!

Figure

B4-8.-

Oxygen

valve

box

at

Launch

Complex

39.

B-21

r.-i o o L) cu i-q c_

r_ c_ .._

bO 0

¥

i I ca i1) %

B-22

o o _D

°_

O ! O
!

(D

B-23

closed. (See Appendix A, Part A5, for description of the oxygen and hydrogen tanks.) The hydrogen dewar was pressurized to approximately 30 psia prior to servicing. Hydrogen was flowed through both tanks for i0 minutes (normal) prior to obtaining an increase in tank quantity. This period is required to chill the system. The flow rate during servicing was approximately 2.1 pounds per minute for 22 minutes (both tanks). The flow was stopped for 30 minutes when the tank quantity reached 85-percent and the dewar and spacecraft tanks vented to ambient pressure. The fans were turned off during this period. This time period is required to chill the hydrogen tank. The dewar was again pressurized to approximately 30 psia, and flow (at normal rates) began through the fill manifold detank line for 2 minutes to chill the GSE prior to then opening the spacecraft fill POD's. Whenthe quantity gage stabilized (about 98-percent) the dewar pressure was increased to approximately 35 psia and the vent POD's closed, followed closely by the closure of the fill POD's. The GSEvent valve was closed simultaneously with the closing of the spacecraft vent POD's. This operation traps cold gas between the spacecraft vent POD's and the GSEvent valve. As the cold gas warmsand expands, it is vented into the two sample containers connected to the vent line sample valve. The samples were analyzed for helium, nitrogen, and total hydrocarbons. Both samples were within specifications. The hydrogen dewar was removed and the prime oxygen dewar was brought up to level 4A of the MSS. The oxygen dewar was connected to the servicing GSE. The fill line between the dewar and the spacecraft was flow purged with 55 psia of oxygen gas for 15 minutes, and a moisture sample taken from the fill line. A sample result of less than 2 ppm was obtained. After sampling, 13 pulse purges from a pressure of 55 psia to a slight positive pressure to maintain flow were performed. The spacecraft oxygen tank fans were turned on prior to oxygen flow. The oxygen dewar was pressurized to approximately 45 psia. Oxygenwas flowed through both tanks for approximately 2 minutes (normal) before an indication was noted on the quantity probe. The flow rate during servicing was 25 pounds per minute for approximately 25 minutes (both tanks). After the tank quantity reached i00 percent, flow was continued for an additional i0 minutes, to further chill the tanks. The spacecraft vent POD's and the GSEvent were then closed, followed immediately by the closure of the fill POD's. The spacecraft tank fans were turned off at this time. The cold gas trapped in the vent line was sampled. The oxygen is sampled for helium, nitrogen, and total hydrocarbons. Both samples were within specification. The service module supply valve was opened to allow the CMsurge tank to pressurize for flight. While pressurizing the surge tank, fuel cell i was connected to dc bus A to minimize the usage of liquid hydrogen. A constant

B-24

flow from the liquid hydrogen tanks equal to the heat gained by the tank results in minimumliquid hydrogen usage. The load on the fuel cell was approximately 20 amps. This configuration was maintained until 4 hours before launch, at which time fuel cells 2 and 3 were connected to the busses. Fuel cells i and 2 were connected to bus A with fuel cell 3 supplying power to bus B. The fuel cells supplied power to the spacecraft from this time through launch. Ground electrical power was supplied to the tank heaters to bring the tanks to flight pressure. The liquid oxygen system pressurization to approximately 935 psia and the liquid hydrogen system to approximately 235 psia was completed by 6:40 p.m. on April 9, 1970. The fuel cells were supplied by onboard reactants from this period through launch. Fan motor checks were performed, and the GSEand airborne systems closed out for flight. The entire CSMcryo loading operation was normal except that liquid hydrogen tank no. i was loaded to 98.7 percent instead of the desired minimum99 percent (reason for this is still under study by both the MannedSpacecraft Center and the KennedySpace Center) and a slight leak developed through the liquid oxygen tank no. 2 vent quick disconnect. The leak was stopped by the installation of the flight cap prior to tank pressurization. These conditions were determined to be acceptable for flight. Spacecraft Closeout and Terminal Count Following completion of the cryo loading operation the countdown proceeded normally from T - 32:00:00 through such milestones as: LM crew provision stowage and final closeout; LM SHe servicing; launch vehicle battery installation and electrical systems checks; CSM crew provision stowage; backup astronaut crew checks; and ALSEPfuel cask installation. At 7:00 p.m.e.s.t, on April i0, 1970, the countdown clock was held at T - 9:00:00 for a planned built-in hold of 9 hours and 13 minutes. Following resumption of the countdown at 4:13 a.m.e.s.t, on April ii, 1970, final launch vehicle cryogenic loading preparations were completed and launch vehicle cryogenic loading was successfully conducted through 9:30 a.m.e.s.t. The remainder of the countdown activities, including flightcrew ingress_ final CSMcabin closeout, and the space vehicle terminal count, progressed normally with the exception of a minor problem with a broken key in the CSM pyro guard, and a stuck open no. 2 liquid oxygen vent valve in the S-IC stage. Both problems were satisfactorily resolved within the planned countdo_¢n time, v_hich included a final built-in hold of i hour at T - 3:30:00 minutes.

B-25

LAUNCH ANDTRANSLUNAR COAST PHASE PRIORTO THEACCIDENT Launch and Flight Summary

The space vehicle was launched at 2:13:00 e.s.t., April ii, 1970. The only unexpected occurrence during the boost phase was an early shutdown of the S-II inboard engine. Low frequency oscillations (approximately 16 hertz) occurred on the S-II stage, resulting in a 132-second premature center engine cutoff. Preliminary analysis indicates that an engine pressure sensor detected a varying engine thrust chamber pressure resulting from a large pressure oscillation in the liquid oxygen system and turned the engine off. The four remaining engines burned approximately 34 seconds longer than normal, and the S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approximately 9 seconds longer to achieve the required velocity. The cause of the liquid oxygen system oscillation is presently being studied by the Marshall Space Flight Center. A parking orbit with an apogeeof 100.2 nautical miles and a perigee of 98.0 nautical miles was obtained. After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems were verified and preparations were madefor translunar injection. The second S-IVB burn was initiated on schedule for translunar injection. All major systems operated satisfactorily and conditions were nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory. With the spacecraft in a free-return trajectory, and with no further major propulsion burns, the spacecraft would pass around the Moonand reenter the Earth's atmosphere. The command service module (CSM)separated from the service module LM adapter (SLA) at 3:06:39. The spacecraft was maneuveredand docked with the lunar module (LM) at 3:19:09 and the LM separated from the SLA at 04:01:00. The S-IVB was then maneuveredusing residual propellants to impact the lunar surface. The first midcourse correction (23.1 fps), performed at 30:40:50 using the service propulsion system, inserted the spacecraft into a non-free-return trajectory with a pericynthian altitude close to the planned value of about 60 miles. Under these conditions, with no further propulsion engine burns, the spacecraft would orbit the Earth in a highly elliptical orbit. These trajectories are discussed in more detail in Part B6 of this Appendix. The mission was routine and generally proceeded according to the timeline. Because the crew was ahead of schedule and midcourse correction number 3 was cancelled, an early entry into the lunar module was madeat 55:00:00. A scheduled television broadcast to the Earth was madebetween 55:15 and 55:46, and at the time of the accident,

B-26

both the Commander and Command Module Pilot were in the command module while the Lunar Module Pilot was just entering the command module from the lunar module. Spacecraft Systems Operation This section of the report will deal only with problems and events in the various systems encountered with the CSM during the powered phase, parking orbit, and translunar coast phase of the mission up to the time of the accident. The systems will be treated separately except that electrical current and voltage fluctuations associated with the operation of the fans to stir the supercritical oxygen and hydrogen will be covered under the cryogenic section.
CSM structural-mechanical.Structural loads during boost phases of the flight were within acceptable limits. Command module structural oscillations of less than 0.1g at 16 hertz in all directions were measured during the period of S-II longitudinal oscillations (POG0) prior to the center engine cutoff. The levels of these oscillations were comparable to those measured during ground test and on previous Apollo missions. At approximately 00:25:00 minutes, a computer program was entered into the computer to align the inertial measuring unit. During this alignment, the sextant is rotated, which in turn releases the external ablative optics covers. The optics covers are spring loaded, and held in place by clips. When the sextant is rotated, an arm located on the sextant engages a cam that releases the clips and jettisons both covers. Minor difficulty was experienced in jettisoning the two covers. The optics were rotated twice manually to 90 degrees according to the checklist, but the covers did not jettison. The optics were then rotated in the automatic mode (past 90 degrees) and the covers Jettisoned. The cause of the covers not jettisoning was that the sextant was not rotated far enough in the manual mode to completely engage the
cam.

After

CSM/LM

docking,

the

crew

reported

that

two

docking

latches

were not fully engaged. Both latches were opened and reset. There are 12 docking latches on the command module. Each latch has a trigger that is engaged when the lunar module docking ring comes in contact with the CSM docking ring. The handle has a red indicator that indicates when the latch is engaged. On several spacecraft during ground checkout one or two of the latches had to be reset manually, as in the case of Apollo 13. The prime cause is not having the two perfectly parallel at the time of engagement. The manual one or two of the latches is considered satisfactory. docking rings resetting of

B-27

The the CSM/LM

crew when

reported entering

a

slight the

"burnt"

smell is

in

the

tunnel

area

between

tunnel,

which

normal.

Electrical tial time fan system, of the turnon

power.except accident. for

The the The times

electrical fuel will cells, be electrical

power

distribution as in expected B9. associated Part

and

sequenuntil the the

operated parameters

with

and

turnoff

discussed

At pattern of The and i

about was

30:45:00 observed to

the

fuel

cell to

3

condenser

exit ripple amplitude

temperature with of then a frequency 6.2 ° F.

change and for been and

a sinusoidal

cycle

every

30

seconds

a peak-to-peak approximately 9 Apollo that of the

oscillations oscillations subsequent to

continued had analyses the

hours I0 the fuel

and during cells. the

stopped. orbit, were not tran-

Similar detrimental sients

observed tests or of showed life cold

on

lunar These condenser.

oscillations

performance to slugs

are

attributed

water

leaving

Instrumentation.tem in were oxygen noted. tank in suit boost cabin be the the At no. detail 2

Four 46:40:06 indicated in Part until the when

discrepancies the i00 B9. same the Oxygen percent. cabin of the

in

the This

instrumentation measurement anomaly will be 1/2 suits.) did

syslocated

quantity

discussed above (Should During follow of the the

The with cabin

pressure the crew CSM out the

indicated after of the the

psi

pressure phase, pressure This the 12

powerdown

incident. not

approximately

vented

transducer for the to Failure inside the

and

operated operation

erratically was on very Apollo

remainder the erratic

flight. of Apollo

erratic

similar 12.

operation of the transducer.

identical transducer

transducer indicated

analysis

contamination

Early transducer operated flight tiometer. wiper arm

in

the

mission erratically on

(22:38 for

and

37:38)

the

potable This ground

water instrument checkout transducer between

quantity has and potenthe

acted erratically

a brief

period. during

other of

spacecraft

due

to This and

oxidation oxidation the wiring

electrical causes

winding

on

the

intermittent potentiometer,

contact thus

on

the

giving

erratic

readings.

At craft were ground in in panel both

approximately meters

T

+

32

hours, fuel fuel

the cell cell

crew

reported versus

that

the

spaceflow the

panel not

indicating matched for

hydrogen 3. data All once the

oxygen on

exactly normal.

indications indicated instrumentation cause the was an

were

Prelaunch on fuel cell the

ground 2. most

a mismatch data inter-

indication cases fault were in

Since probable causing

correct, the meter

mittent

circuitry

shift.

B-28

Communications.operate attitude manually the narrow accident. secondary modes were the was high-gain modes. prescribed

At

55:05:32 (HGA)

the in

crew

reported

that

they auto control the tracking until primary

could track crew in the and

not or

antenna A maneuver and the mode. as

narrow passive

beamwidth thermal initiated, normally both and the was

reacquisition

to the and

the

(PTC)

maneuver acquired

positioned beamwidth When

antenna The

automatic

antenna (before the

operated lockup)

troubleshooting and both

electronics unsuccessfully existed beam radio or RF

automatic Analysis

reacquisition an and

tracking effective narrow by a

attempted. between (RF) A or the

indicates the have wide been cable, was not

misalignment beams. defective failure, antenna The

boresight

of could

effective frequency feed lines. testing

misalignment stripline boresight during KSC

caused mechanical indicated

coaxial shift ground

during

acceptance

checkout.

Service module 30:40:50 The The engine thrust

module

propulsion system the for was

and used

reaction only once

control.during the

The

service at

propulsion to place burned chamber but

mission

spacecraft 3.6 seconds, seemed

into and

a non-free-return all 4 parameters percent below

trajectory. were nominal. preflight

pressure

about limits. and small and 7:30:00 resulted that the in

prediction, Guidance satisfactory, shaft control in when

within and

acceptable Guidance

control.the zero

control

system

performance of the optic thermal

was

with in the At PTC. It out

exception optics mode

of

fluctuations establishing the in crew

passive

(PTC).

approximately The attempt

reported wide

difficulty and diverging inchecklist

establishing angle. loaded call late

a very

coning correctly did was not a

was and the

determined all roll correct change

digital not and

autopilot enabled. the thruster

was The

thrusters autopilot to the was

were load onboard

enabling the

pen-and-ink the

checklist. established.

Using

revised

procedure,

PTC

mode

successfuly

At of 0 the to

about optic data

40:00 shaft showed A

the when a

ground in zero test

controllers optics in was mode. the

noticed As on at

small Apollo 49 hours and

fluctuations 12, to the from verify

ground the

slight special The

jitter crew

optics the

shaft shaft

angle

0.6 shaft

degree.

conducted

oscillations.

compared the in

trunnion was only. the crew the to

angles evident The

to the mechanical from both sources jitter presented however, power to

counters on and occurred no at

optics. The oscillation the optics zero mode to the operation requested degradation of the of

optics

constraint the

optical turn system. off

system; optics

49:51:37 against

ground

guard

possible

B-29

Environmental control.control system operation.

No

anomalies

were

noted

in

the

environmental

Thermal control.The thermal normally until the incident.

control

system

of

the

CSM

performed

Cryogenic system.Both the liquid hydrogen and the liquid oxygen systems operated satisfactorily up to the time of the accident as far as the fuel cells and environmental control systems were concerned. Because of the unbalance in hydrogen quantities during loading, and unequal usage during launch pad operation, several hydrogen low-pressure master alarms were detected on the caution and warning system. (A description of the caution and warning system is contained in Appendix A, Part A2.10.) At 46:40:08 the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity measurement indicated i00 percent quantity and remained at this value until the pressure rise at 55:53:35. operations were normal to With the exception of the the time of the accident. above, system

The following sections will describe the master alarm and supercritical liquid hydrogen tion up to the time of the accident.

low hydrogen and oxygen

pressure destratifica-

Hydrogen The caution out-of-tolerance

Low

Pressure

Master

Alarm of a malfunction or the abnormal condi-

and warning system, upon receipt signal, simultaneously identifies

tion and alerts the crew to its existence. Each signal (both oxygen and hydrogen pressure are on one indicator) will activate the system status indicator, light the master alarm light, and place an audio tone in the crew's headsets. The crew can turn off or reset the master alarm; however, the particular system status malfunction indicators remain lit, blocking further the malfunction is cleared. master alarms on this indication, until

At lift-off, the quantity readings for the hydrogen tanks no. i and no. 2 were 91 percent and 93.4 percent, respectively. This was due to initial loading values (98.7 percent for tank no. i and 99.4 percent for tank no. 2) and the difference in usage during countdown. At approximately 32:00 g.e.t., a quantity unbalance of 2.38 percent existed between the hydrogen tanks, and a quantity balancing procedure was conducted to prevent tank no. i low-pressure master alarms during the sleep period. In the "auto" mode the tank heaters are turned on and off by either off. pressure switches connected tank reaches about 260 psi, The heaters remain off until in series. the heaters the opened When the pressure in both tanks are pressure switch in switched at

closes

B-30

approximately 225 psi. Since one tank pressure switch normally remains closed, the tank that controls the upper pressure will also control at the lower pressure. During the flight, tank no. 2 was controlling. Tank no. i pressure was almost reaching the caution and warning low pressure point (224.2 psia) prior to tank no. 2 reaching its pressure switch activation point of 233.6 psia to turn on the heaters. Since tank no. 2 had the greater quantity, at 32:00 the tank no. heaters were manually turned off by the crew while tank no. 2 re_[ned in auto. This condition would allow the fuel cells to obtain hydrogen from this tank change no. 2 because of its higher master and pressure alarms _4:32). and in turn reduce its after quantity of hydrogen. (33:10, Several _3:41, occurred immediately i

34:01,

At 36:48 the hydrogen tank no. i heater was placed back to auto for the sleep period. On the first "down" pressure cycle a master a_arm occurred (38:00) due to hydrogen tank no. i pressure dropping lower than 224.24 psia, awaking the crew. The crew reset the alarm, and no master alarms occurred through the sleep period although the heaters cycled several times. To obtain a balanced condition for the next sleep period, the ground controllers devised the following plan for the next day's operation: i. After crew wakeup, turn hydrogen tank no. 2 heater leave hydrogen tank no. i in auto for two to three pressure determine if this will transfer heater control to tank no. pation 2. of using If this configuration tank no. for sleep. will be turned off during unbalance the to off and cycles to i in antici-

successful,

i heaters in auto to

day and tank no. in favor of tank

2 heaters no. i.

left

create

a quantity

3. During the next sleep period, placing tank no. i heaters in auto and This plan was executed time of the accident, tank and the caution and warning

the tanks will be tank no. 2 heaters

balanced to off.

by

when the crew awoke the next day. At the no. i was in off and tank no. 2 was in auto, master alarm was reset with a low hydrogen low pressure of the increasing

pressure indication present at 55:52:30. This hydrogen indication locked out the master alarm during the time pressure in oxygen tank no. 2.

Cryogenic

Tank

Destratification and the hydrogen tanks, two oxygen tank showing

fans

To prevent stratification are located in each tank.

in the oxygen A diagram of

B-31

the two fans and quantity gaging probe is shown l.n

figure

B4-11.

The

flight plan called for the fans to be operated in both the hydrogen and oxygen tanks at the following times: 3:40, 12:09, 23:12, 29:40, 37:30, and 46:39 g.e.t. The ground controllers requested the oxygen tank no. 2 fans to be operated at 47:54 and both the oxygen and hydrogen fans be operated at 51:07. Review of cryogenic and electrical instrumentation data does not

indicate that the fans were switched on at 3:40 and at 29:40. No changes in cryogenic pressures and quantities, and no indications of an increase in spacecraft current were noted. The operation of the fans during the other destratification periods were normal; however, three oxygen tank no. 2 differences were noted: (i) transients on pitch and yaw thrust vector control gimbal command parameters at fan turnon and turnoff, (2) quantity gaging probe malfunctioned just after or at the time tive the fans transient came on, and (3) ac when the fans were main bus 2 indicated turned on at 47:54. a 1.8-volt nega-

The pitch and yaw thrust vector parameters are an excellent transient the stabilization and control system

control gimbal command (TVC command) detector on ac main bus 2 when is turned off because of its sensi-

tivity and high sampling rate (i00 samples per second). The sensitivity of the system is determined by the position of the rate high/low switch and the attitude deadband maximum/minimum switch. The TVC command signals are not transmitted to the ground when the instrumentation system is in low bit rate mode. The system was in the low sensitivity mode during two destratification periods. When oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on during tank destratification periods, a negative initial transient was detected and when the fans were turned off, a positive initial transient was detected on in the the TVC command parameters. These transients are readily detectable high sensitivity mode and barely detectable in the low sensitiv-

ity mode. Examination of the Apollo ii records indicates that the system was in the high sensitivity mode once during the fan destratification periods and a similar transient occurred when the Fans were turned on. The data indicate that the transients are normal for fan turnon and turnoff, bus 2. and only indicate a relatively large current change on ac main

At 47:40:08 the oxygen quantity changed from approximately 82 percent to i00 percent, or full-scale high. This change in reading or quantity system malfunction occurred just after or at the time the oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on. Because of the way the system recovered at the time of the accident, the data indicate that the probe or its associated wiring shorted. Since the instrumentation system was in low bit rate, it is possible to determine exactly when the oxygen

B-32

BLOWOUT

PL UG_I___AC

U UM TUBE

FEEDLINE

TEMPERATURE SENSOR

FEEDLINE

INSULATION QUANTITY GAGE_

VACUUM

TUBE

Figure

B4-11.-

Arrangement

of

components

within

oxygen

tank.

tank that

no. the

i and no. 2 fans were oxygen tank no. i and

turned on. no. 2 fans

The were

electrical data indicate turned on between the

times of 47:40:05 and 47:40:08. A plot of cryogenic pressures, quantities, total CSM current, and ac main bus 2 is shown in figure B4-12. Therefore, the oxygen tank no. i and no. 2 fans were turned on in a period of time between 3 seconds prior to the probe malfunction and the time that the probe malfunctioned. When the oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on the next time at

47:54:50, the ac main bus 2 decreased 1.8 volts for one sample (O.i second). At the same time the TVC command parameters indicated a negative initial transient. Because of the sampling rate (i0 samples per second) of the instrumentation system and the small number of fan cycles examined in the high bit rate mode, it cannot be determined if this negative initial transient is characteristic of other fan turnon's or is an indication of a deteriorating fan or wiring.

The complete oxygen and hydrogen tank destratifJcation history prior to the accident is shown in table B4-1. Changes in oxygen and hydrogen pressures and quantities indicate normal destratification of the tanks during all occurred at 55:53:18, References source report. of fan or cycles. when the 6 and data The next destratification period events started leading to the accident. records of were used as a

i through and

instrumentation in the preparation

information

this

part

of the

B-34

900
.,"o

89O _ _ r880 870

__.n

Tank 2

i._r-l

I___

_

86o
850 85 i i i

¢..-

_r_ Tank 1 N 80 75 75 t 70 250 c _ 240 Tank2 I r'L

off-scale high

_. Tank2 I I

=_

;
_-

23o
220 I 1 I ,

Tank 2 Tank 1 I

f--7 I 46:40:00 I 46:40:10 g. e.t. I 46:40:20 46:40:25

Figure

B4-12.-

Fan

cycle

at

46:40.

B-35

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c! O O 'H 4J O 'H % "H 4_ O .rl 4J h 4_ t_) O

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B-36

PART INCIDENT

B5 EVENTS

INTRODUCTION

This part of the report covers the significant events which took place at the time of the accident. The period covered is 55:52:00 g.e.t. to 56:00:05 g.e.t. Prior to this period, spacecraft operation had been essentially according to plan and neither the ground controllers nor the crew had any warning of the events about to occur. The first indication of a problem was a loud bang heard by all three crew members which was followed by a master caution and warning. The immediate indications in the spacecraft were that this warning had been triggered by an electrical transient. Several minutes later two fuel cells failed in the power system, and the crew became fully occupied trying to reconfig_ure the spacecraft electrical system. Fourteen minutes later they noticed venting and began to understand what had actually happened in the cryogenic oxygen system.

On the ground, the flight controllers first noticed that the spacecraft computer had been automatically restarted. Shortly afte_¢ards, indication of a master caution and warning caused the flight controllers to scan their data for a problem. Since many telemetry measurements had by this time departed from their nominal values, the immediate reaction was to suspect an instrumentation undertaken to sort the false telemetry readings from simultaneously, instructions were given to help lems. About an hour later the ground personnel sufficiently genic oxygen to know that would of the it would fail only be a system completely. events in the detail presented in the the had ground controllers' failure. Steps were the true ones; and, crew handle sorted out time before new probthe facts the cryo-

short

Reconstruction

mission

following pages has required several hundred man-days of data analysis. Consequently, the crew and mission controllers could not possibly have understood the situation in the same depth at the time the events were actually happening. The primary sources of data for the analysis have been telemetry records, transcripts of voice communications, crew debriefings, Table and B5-1 interviews with personnel chronology on duty in Mission events during Control. this time

is a detailed

of the

period_ and figure B5-1 shows the sequence of events grouped according to spacecraft systems. For events obtained from telemetry data, where time is shown to a fraction of a second_ this refers to the time at which the parameter discussed in in question Part B7 was actually sampled of this Appendix, the by the telemetry characteristics system. of the As

B-37

telemetry system place an uncertainty on the time of an event. certainty is a function of the telemetry system sampling rate.

The un-

The remainder of this section is a discussion of the events at the time of the accident, grouped according to the spacecraft systems involved.

B-38

TABLEB5-1.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THEACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THEACCIDENT
Time, g.e.t. Event

Events 55:52:31

During

52 Seconds Master

Prior and

to

First

Observed triggered

Abnormality by low off hydrogen after

caution

warning i.

pressure in tank 4 seconds. 55:52:58 55:53:06 55:53:18 55:53:19 55:53:20 55:53:20 Ground Crew Oxygen Oxygen Oxygen requests acknowledges tank tank tank no. no. no.

no.

Alarm

is

turned

tank

stir. stir. on. decreases on. electrical disturbance 8 psi.

tank 1 fans

I pressure 2 fans

turned

Stabilization control system indicates a power transient. Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure

55:53:21

decreases

_ psi.

Abnormal 55:53:22.718

Events

During

90

Seconds

Preceding

the

Accident disturbance

Stabilization control system indicates a power transient. 1.2-volt ll.l-amp sample. decrease rise in in fuel ac bus cell

electrical

55:53:22.757 55:53:22.772

2 voltage. 3 current for one

55:53:36

Oxygen tank no. for 24 seconds. ll-volt sample. decrease

2 pressure

begins

rise

lasting

55:53:38.057

in

ac bus

2 voltage

for

one

55:53:38.085

Stabilization indicates

control

system

electrical

disturbance

a power

transient.

B-39

2.5

MINUTES

BEFORE

TABLE THE

B5-1.DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE

ACCIDENT

- Continued

Time,

g.e.t.

Event

55:53:41.172 55:53:41.192

22.9-amp

rise

in

fuel

cell

3 current electrical

for

one

sample.

Stabilization control system indicates a power transient. Oxygen tank no. of 953.8 psia. Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure

disturbance

55:5h:00

rise

ends

at

a pressure

55:54:15 55:54:30

2 pressure

begins

to rise. scale

Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity drops from full for 2 seconds and then reads 75-3 percent. Oxygen tank rapidly. Flow rate of to decrease. no. 2 temperature begins to

55:54:31

rise

55:54:43

oxygen

to

all

three

fuel

cells

begins

55:54:45

Oxygen tank no. of 1008.3 psia. Oxygen sample. tank no.

2 pressure

reaches

maximum

value

55:54:48

2 temperature

rises

40 ° F

for

one

55:54:51

Oxygen tank no. and then begins loss. Oxygen Oxygen scale tank tank low. no. no.

2 quantity jumps to off-scale high to drop until the time of telemetry

55:54:52 55:54:52.70_

2 temperature 2 temperature

reads

-151.3 ° F. goes off-

suddenly

55:54:52.763

Last telemetered before telemetry Sudden

pressure from loss is 995.7 activity system

oxygen psia. on X, Y,

tank

no.

2

55:54:53.182 55:54:53.220

accelerometer control

and

Z axes.

Stabilization begin.

body

rate

changes

B-40

TABLEB5-1.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THEACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THEACCIDENT - Continued
Time, g.e.t. Event

55:54:53.323 55:54:53.5 55:54:53.542

Oxygen 2.8-amp X, Y, 0.65g

tank rise and and

no.

i pressure fuel

drops cell CM

4.2

psi.

in tota_

current. indicate 1.17g,

Z accelerations in 0.65g, respectively.

1.8-Second 55:54:53.555 55:54:53.555 + Loss of telemetry

Data

Loss

begins.

Master caution and warning triggered by dc main bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 6 seconds. All indications are that the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 lost pressure and the panel separated. in this time period

55:54:54.741

Nitrogen pressure indicating failed Recovery of

in fuel sensor. data.

cell

i is

off-scale

low

55:54:55.35

telemetry

Events 55:54:56

During Service perature

5 Minutes

Following

the

Accident

propulsion system begins a rise of

engine valve body tem1.65 ° F in 7 seconds. volt to 28.5 volts 0.9 volt to 29.0 volts. 15 amps loss. higher High than current the

55:54:56

Dc main bus and dc main Total fuel

A decreases 0.9 bus B decreases cell current is

55 :54 :56

final value before telemetry continues for 19 seconds. 55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. after telemetry 2 temperature recovery.

reads

off-scale

high

55:54:56

Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads following telemetry recovery.

off-scale

low

B-41

TABLEB5-1.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THEACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THEACCIDENT - Continued
Time, g.e.t. Event

55:54:56

Oxygen begins

tank no. i pressure to drop steadily.

reads

781.9

psia

and

55:54:57

Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity reads following telemetry recovery.

off-scale

high

55:5h:59

The reaction control system helium tank begins a 1.66 ° F increase in 36 seconds. Oxygen flow rates to fuel after steadily decreasing. cells I and

C temperature

55:55:01

3 level

off

55:55:02

The surface temperature of the service module oxidizer tank in bay 3 begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a 15-second period. The service propulsion system helium tank temperature begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a 32-second period. Dc main bus A voltage recovers to 29.0 main bus B recovers to 28.8 volts. Crew reports, here. " Crew reports, "I believe we've had volts; dc

55:55:02

55:55:09

55:55:20

a problem

55:55:35 55:55:h9

"We've

had

a main

B bus

undervolt." steady drop

Oxygen lasting Crew

tank no. 2 temperature 59 seconds. "Okay right now,

begins

55:56:10

reports,

IIouston.

The large there. had

voltage is looking good, and we had a pretty bang associated with the caution and warning And as I recall, main B was the one that had an amp spike on it once before." 55:56:38 Oxygen tank no. 2 69 seconds before quantity assuming becomes erratic an off-scale-low

for state.

B-42

TABLE 2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE

B5-1.ACCIDENT

DETAILED TO

CHRONOLOGY AFTER

FROM THE ACCIDENT - Concluded

5 MINUTES

Time_

_.e.t.

Event

55:57:04

Crew reports, "That jolt must have rocked the sensor on--see now--oxygen quantity 2. It was oscillating down around 20 to 60 percent. Now it's full-scale high again." Master caution and bus B undervoltage. 6 seconds. Dc to main fall bus bus B drops warning Alarm triggered is turned by dc main off in

55:57:39

55:57:40

below

26.25

volts

and

continues

rapidly. 2 fails within 2 seconds.

55:57:44 55:57:45 55:57:59 55:58:02

Ac

Fuel Fuel

cell cell

3 fails. i current begins to decrease. by ac bus 2 after 2 seconds. by dc main off in 13

Master caution and warning caused being reset. Alarm is turned off Master caution and bus A undervoltage. seconds. warning Alarm

55:58:06

triggered is turned

55:58:07

Dc main bus A drops below 26.25 volts and in next few seconds levels off at 25.5 volts. Crew Crew now, Main reports, "ac 2 is showing zip."

the

55:58:07 55:58:25

reports, "Yes, we got a main bus A undervolt too, showing. It's reading about 25-1/2. B is reading zip right now." triggered by high hydrogen Alarm is turned off in

56:00:06

Master caution and warning flow rate to fuel cell 2. 2 seconds.

B-43

I

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s
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B-44

STATUS OF THESPACECRAFT PRIORTOTHEACCIDENT At 55:52:00, Just prior to the accident, the electrical system was configured as shownin figure B5-2. Fuel cells i and 2 were supplying main bus A; fuel cell 3 was supplying main bus B. The power for the fans in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 was being supplied by ac bus 2, as was power for the quantity sensor in that tank. The stabilization control system thruster vector control system was receiving its power from ac bus 2. Two quantities in this system, the pitch and yaw thrust vector control gimbal commands, though not intended for measurementof electrical system currents and voltages, are sensitive indicators of electrical transients on ac bus 2. These quantities are telemetered to the ground with a sampling rate of i00 samples per second. At 55:52:00 the telemetry system was operating in the high-bit-rate modeand the narrow beam antenna was in use. The cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage had failed to a 100percent reading in the 46th hour of the flight. (See Part B4, the subsection entitled "Spacecraft Systems Operation.") All other cryogenic oxygen instrumentation was operating normally. The cryogenic hydrogen tank i pressure decreased sufficiently to trigger the master caution and warning at 55:52:31. (For a description of the master caution and warning system, see Part 2.10 of Appendix A.) The ground then requested a fan cycle, and the crew acknowledgedthe request. A fan cycle consists of the crew turning on the stirring fans located in both the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tanks and allowing them to run for approximately I minute. Normally, the hydrogen fans are turned on first, followed by the fans in oxygen tank no. i and a few seconds later by the fans in oxygen tank no. 2. FANTURNON ANDASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL ANOMALIES At 55:53:18 when the two fans in cryogenic oxygen tank no. i were turned on by the crew, a drop in ac bus i voltage (fig. B5-3) and an increase of i amperein total command module current indicated that the fans had been electrically energized. (Total command module current, plotted in figure B5-4, is obtained by adding the current outputs of all three fuel cells and subtracting the current drain of the lunar module. ) A subsequent decrease in tank pressure and oscillations in the fuel cell flowmeters indicated that the fans had begun to stir the oxygen (fig. B5-3). At 55:53:20 the crew turned on the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 fans. An increase in fuel cell current of 1-1/2 amperes, a drop in ac bus 2

B-45

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B-47

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B-48

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B-49

voltage of 0.6 volt, and a glitch in the stabilization control system telemetry indicated that the fans had been electrically energized. These events are shown in figures B5-4 and B5-5. However, it is not certain that the fans began rotating at this time, since the tank no.

2

pressure showed a minimum observable drop and the fan motor stall current does not significantly differ from the running current. The quantity gage in tank no. 2 was already in a failed condition, and the fuel cell flowmeters were already being affected by the fan operation in tank no. so that neither of these instruments could positively veri_y rotation of the fans in tank no. 2. During the next 20 seconds a series of electrical anomalies occurred which cannot be explained as a result of known loads in the spacecraft. These anomalies are shown in figure B5-4. The first, at 55:53:23 was an ll-amp positive spike in the output current of fuel cell 3. Several events were associated with this spike: (a) The command immediately afterward. module current decreased approximately 1/2 ampere i

(b) The ac bus 2 voltage had a transient decrease and then began to alternate between 115.7 and 116.3 volts, whereas it had been maintaining a steady value of 115.7 volts since fan turnon. These events indicate have been disconnected fan motors in cryogenic that at the time of the ll-amp spike, a load from ac bus 2. This could have been one of oxygen tank no. 2.

may the

3-amp

At 55:53:38 another abnormal electrical disturbance occurred, a spike of current and variations in ac bus 2 voltage. The ac bus

2

voltage first increased 2 volts and then dropped suddenly from 116 to 105 volts. The ac bus 2 is a three-phase electrical system, although the only voltage telemetered is phase A. The operation of the inverter which generates ac bus 2 is such that it attempts to maintain a constant average voltage among the three phases ; if one phase becomes heavily loaded, the inverter will increase the voltages of the other two phases. Consequently, it is possible that the voltage rise in ac bus 2 at 55:53:37.8 was caused by a heavy load applied to phase B or phase C. The decrease in voltage loading of phase A. immediately afterward was probably caused by

At 55:53:41 a 23-amp spike occurred on fuel cell 3 output current, after which the total command module current returned to a steady value within 0.3 ampere of the value prior to turnon of cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 fans. Also, the voltage of ac bus 2 returned to the value it had shown prior to fan turnon. At the same time transients appeared in the stabilization control system, as shown in figure B5-5. The 55:53:22 most probable and 55:53:42 cause of the electrical is that a short circuit disturbances between occurred in the electrical

B-50

system of the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 fans. The short circuit was sufficiently severe to result in loss of part of the fan load at 55:53:22 and the remainder at 55:53:41. Reduction of the load could have been caused by fuses blowing or by wires opening. It should be noted that the nature of the telemetry records makes it difficult to define the exact parameters of the electrical disturbances. Since the value of fuel cell 3 current is sampled by the telemetry system at i0 times per second, the duration of the observed current spikes is in question by 0.2 second. Also, the peak values of the spikes may well have exceeded the maximum recorded values. For similar reasons a large current spike could possibly have occurred at 55:53:38 simultaneous with the ll-volt decrease of ac bus 2. If the spike were very short, less than 0.i second duration, it could have occurred between the times of successive telemetry samples and thus not have been recorded. The electrical anomalies ended by 55:53:42 and no further disturbances were observed for the next minute. OXYGEN TANKPARAMETERS FROM 55:53:30 UNTIL LOSS OF TELEMETRY Thirteen seconds after the ll-amp spike and 6 seconds before the 23-amp spike, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 began a steady increase at an abnormally rapid rate. The increase began at 55: 53:35 and lasted 19 seconds before the pressure reached a plateau of 954 psia for 21 seconds. At 55:54:15 the pressure rise resumed, reaching a maximum value of 1008 psia 9 seconds before loss of telemetry. During this rise the master caution and warning trip level of 975 psia was exceeded, but a master alarm was not generated because of the existing cryogenic pressure warning occasioned by low hydrogen pressure. After reaching 1008 psia, the pressure decreased to 996 psia Just before loss of telemetry. The oxygen flow rate for all three fuel cells declined for about I0 seconds and then began to rise just before loss of telemetry. The pressure transducer for cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 is not located in the tank but is connected to the tank along with a pressure relief valve through 19 feet of tubing. The relief valve is set to open fully at 1008 psia. (See figure B7-4 for a diagram of this portion of the cryogenic oxygen system and Part B7 of this Appendix for a more complete description of the cryogenic oxygen pressure sensing system). The remote location of the oxygen pressure transducer causes sometime lag in the telemetered pressure data but unless there are unknown restrictions, such as clogging of the filter at the tank end of the line, this lag will not cause serious errors in the pressure reading under the conditions observed. electrical

B-51

This page left

blank intentionally.

B-52

1.0--

10 0.5=
E o

2

5 Pitch rate

o
E

__

._ _

_

,

= -0.5 -5-I.0

Pilch gimbal command

t--

I--

-10 1.0--

100.5
_5-

E

o 0<=-o.5 5-1.0 -I0 1.0-

Yaw rate

8

._
E _,

Yaw gimbal command

_
> I---

20.5Roll rate 0

_: -o,5 -1.0 -

• 55:53:15

I 55:53:17

I 55:53:19

I 55:53:21

I 55:53:23

The quantity gage for oxygen tank no. 2, which had been in a failed state ever since the 46th hour, suddenly dropped to 6.6 percent and then to off-scale low at 55:54:30. These readings do not correlate with other telemetered data and are, consequently, thought to be erroneous. The gage then jumped to a 75-percent reading, which may be reliable data since it is about the value to be expected. Afterwards the quantity decreased gradually for 19 seconds until 3 seconds before telemetry loss, at which time an erratic gage output occurred. The behavior of this type of gage when a short across the capacitor probe is removed is to drop to zero for several seconds and then return to a correct reading. However, the gage has other failure modes which result in a wandering false indication. See Part B7 of this Appendix for a discussion of the quantity gage. Because of the gage's erratic behavior, 75-percent it cannot be stated with at complete confidence that the reading obtained 55:54:32 is reliable. F than

The temperature in +2 ° until 55:54:31 when 55:54:48 a single data

cryogenic a steady sample

oxygen tank no. 2 remained at -190o rise in temperature commenced. At a reading 40 degrees higher

indicated

the adjacent readings. The last data sample before loss of telemetry was off-scale low, probably indicating a short circuit in the gage or wiring. As discussed in Part B7 of this Appendix, the time constant of the temperature sensor is in the order of at least tens of seconds, which means that the 40-degree Jump in reading at 55:54:48 and the final offscale reading were both due to sensor failure or telemetry system errors. Also, because of the the temperature rose by an actual The slow gage response, the indicated rate at which between 55:54:31 and 55:54:52 could have been caused rise of greater of magnitude. oxygen tank no. i remained

temperature and

temperature

quantity

cryogenic

steady until telemetry loss. 0.2 second prior to telemetry

The pressure remained nominal loss, when a slight drop was

until observed.

LOSS

OF TELEMETRY

At

the

time

of

the

accident

the

spacecraft

telemetry

signal

was

being received on both a 210-ft-diameter and an 85-ft-diameter antenna at the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility in Goldstone, California. The carrier level on the Goldstone 85-ft antenna was -i00 dBm. At 55:54:53 the limit of the signal signal strength strength dropped abruptly below recorder, and began an -160 dBm, the lower erratic increase.

Figure B5-6 is a plot of the carrier strength received at the 85-ft antenna, corrected by 8 dB to show the carrier strength received at the 210-ft antenna. The 210-ft antenna was not equipped with a signal strength recorder.

B-54

Pitch rate

....

--_ ....... ._._,,,..,.., __._ Pitch gimbal command

Yaw rate

Yaw gimbal command

Roll rate

Note time scale change _1 55:53:25 I 55:53:35 55:53:37

I 55:53:39

I 55:53:41

I 55:53:43

Time, hr:min:sec

Pitch rate
IT

Pitch gimml

+%-_-

#_L

Yaw rate

Yaw gimbal command

Roll rate ",M

Note ti me scale change __J 55:53:45 I 55:54:45 I 55:54:47 I 55:54:49 I 55:54:51 I 55:54:53

Figure

BS-_.-

Disturbances observed on thrust control gimbal command signals.

vector

B-53

>-

//

/ _'"

o P_ J4 .r-i

I1)

o _d

I1)

E

_o I to _d ¢] b

.<-> _ E
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Telemetry data recovered completely carrier power. Sporadic telemetry data 1.8-second period.

1.8 seconds are available

after the loss within the

of

The recorded input signal to the PCM bit detector provides an indication of the rapidity with which the telemetry signal was lost. There appears to be some degradation in signal-to-noise ratio in the time period from 55:54:53.51 to 55:54:53.555. This may have been the result of high-gain attitude antenna. changes of the At 55:54:53:555 spacecraft an abrupt causing change mispointing of the in the character of in loss

the signal occurred, and the signal-to-noise a period of i millisecond. The limitations make it impossible to definitely determine occurred, but an estimate is I millisecond.

ratio rapidly decreased in the available records the speed with which the

Although figure B5-6 indicates that the signal required to decrease 60 dB, the actual time was probably much shorter. decrease of 60 dB in 0.3 second is the same as that obtained input signal is caused by When the switched from is abruptly removed long time constant from the circuitry receiver. This in the automatic

0.3 second The when the

slow response gain control.

telemetry signal was reacquired, the spacecraft had the narrow-beam antenna to the wide-beam antenna. This

has been verified by signal-strength calculations and comparisons of antenna patterns with spacecraft attitude. The spacecraft is designed to automatically switch to the wide-beam antenna if the pointing error of the narrow-beam antenna exceeds 3 degrees. If a power supply interruption larger than 0.4 second occurs in output

the communication system, the system design is such that the power will automatically drop 19 dB for a 90-second period. This power reduction cannot be observed in the received signal strength after recovery of telemetry.

SPACECRAFT

EVENTS

AT

THE

TIME

OF

TELEMETRY

LOSS

the

A large number of spacecraft events took time of telemetry loss. These events are

place approximately discussed in detail

at in

the following sections This section describes interrelationship. Within the last

as they relate to the various spacecraft systems. the events as an aid in understanding their

second

prior

to

telemetry

loss,

several

indications

of spacecraft motion appeared on the telemetry records of body accelerometers, and roll, pitch, and yaw rate. The total fuel cell current increased by 3 amperes at the last data sample.

B-56

When telemetry data were restored at 55:54:55.35, a large number of channels associated with the electrical system, stabilization control system, and cryogenic system showed marked changes (fig. B5-3). Both dc main A and main B had dropped 0.9 volt and the master caution and warning had been triggered because of an undervoltage on main bus B. The undervoltage triggering level is 26.25 volts and the initial voltage on main B registered 28.1 volts. All three fuel cell currents had increased by 5 amperes over the values before telemetry loss. Both ac bus voltages had maintained their previous values. All telemetry readings from cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 showed off-scale readings. The temperature was off-scale in the high temperature direction, the quantity gage read i00 percent, and the pressure gage read off-scale low. The capability of the gage is to read pressures as low as 19 psia. Cryogenic oxygen tank no. i had not changed temperature or quantity. However, the pressure had decreased from 879 psia to 782 psia. The regulated nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i dropped to zero during telemtry loss and remained at zero. The continued operation of this fuel cell indicates a sensor malfunction. As shown in figure B5-7, the wires from the nitrogen pressure sensor to the telemetry system pass along the front of the shelf which supports the fuel cells, in close proximity to the panel covering bay 4. It is quite possible that damage to these wires caused the change observed in the nitrogen pressure reading. Approximately at the time of telemetry loss all three crew members

heard a single loud bang. One or two seconds later they noted the master caution and warning caused by main bus B undervoltage and at 55:55:00 turned off the alarm. They also verified that fuel cell currents were normal at this time. Figure B5-8 is a photograph of the command module control panel showing the type of displays provided the crew. At 55:55:20 the crew reported, "! believe we've had a problem here," and at 55:55:35, "We've had a main B bus under_olt." Later they reported that a computer restart had occurred at the time of the bang, which had already been noted in Mission Control. Photographs later taken by the crew show the panel covering bay 4, the bay containing the cryogenic oxygen tanks, cryogenic hydrogen tanks, and fuel cells, to be missing. One of these photographs is reproduced in figure B5-9 and a photograph prior to launch is shown in figure B5-10. The high-gain antenna located adjacent to bay 4 shows a misalignment of one of the four dishes. The photographs also show that the axes of fuel cells I and 3 have shifted 7 degrees in such a way that the tops of the fuel cells point outward. It is not possible to determine conclusively from the photographs whether or not cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 is present, partially missing, or totally missing. It is probable that the loud bang heard by the crew was caused by the separation of the panel loss. from the spacecraft approximately at the time of telemetry

B-57

Fuel cell 3

Fuel cell I

Wires ---_to pressure n i trogen sensor

'i

Figure

B5-7.-

Location sensor in

of

wirlng cell

to I.

nitrogen

pressure

fuel

S-58

+_

r-_ o

o r_) i cO I u_ ID %

B-59

Figure

B5-9.-

Photograph

of

service

module

taken

by

crew.

B-60

Figure

Bg-IO.-

Bay

4

of

service

module.

B-61

CHANGES

IN

SPACECRAFT

DYNAMICS

the

At 55:54:53.182, less than half body-mounted linear accelerometers

a second in the

before telemetry command module,

loss, which

are sampled at i00 times per second, began indicating spacecraft motions. These disturbances were erratic but reached peak values of 1.17g, 0.65g, and 0.65g in the X, Y, and Z directions, respectively, about 13 milleseconds before data loss. At 55:54:53.220 the low-amplitude variations the command module, have are sampled i00 times per indication of spacecraft pitch, roll, and yaw rate gyros indicated in output. These gyros are body mounted in a full-scale range of +I degree per second_ second, and provide a fairly sensitive motions. They are also sensitive to electrical associated with at 55:54:53.220 the gyros; however, the are believed to have the spacecraft. along with all all three rate

disturbances not necessarily characteristics of the output

resulted from low-amplitude dynamic forces acting on These channels were, of course, lost at 55:54:53.555, other telemetered data. Figure B5-11 is a record of gyro outputs. When definitely The total telemetry was recovered at 55:54:55.35, indicated that moments had been applied change in angular moment was:

these channels to the spacecraft.

Roll Pit ch Yaw

-1535 -6482 -5919

ft-lb-sec ft-lb-sec ft-lb-sec

The the

roll, pitch, and attitude control

yaw rates were automatically system, as shown in figure

compensated B5-11.

for

by

The inertial platform on the command module contains three mutually orthogonal integrating accelerometers, whose outputs are telemetered with an increment value of 0.2 fps. After telemetry was recovered, a change of two increments was observed in one axis, one increment in the second axis, and zero increments in the third axis.

B-62

Pitch rate

Yaw 9imbal command

Roll tale

I _I I 55:55:15 55: 55: 55: 55:25

Figure

BS-II.-

Roll,

pitch, and yaw rates.

8-63

Pitch 9imbal command _

Yaw gimbal command

.L 1 ----J 55:55:00 55:55:05 Time, hr:min:sec 55: 55:10

+p -p -P

0ff "---IF 0fl "-'-'F 0It "-'-'

0n 0n 101:3

1.0

I
_L _,, ,

..---_--

0 E

o
E

0

§
13-

+Y Off ._..mp0n On -10 +Y 0ff __r-.-Y oft On On tO
....... -." %

.¥ o.--J-

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>-

Yaw rate

0
).-

S +R Off +R Off--

On j--0n

-10

_

lOI -_,'v*. ._ Roll rate

--

/

_
q.O -R Off -.-_F -R Off-"-' 0n On I 55:54:50
\ ..........

i//

When

transformed

from

platform

coordinates

to

spacecraft

coordinates,

this represents a velocity change of 0.4 to 0.6 fps. The uncertainty in this measurement is due to the fact that the PCM system has an increment value of 0.2 fps. The velocity change was combined with the pulse are: observed acting roll, on the pitch, and yaw rates; and a single The impulse equivalent components imspacecraft calculated.

X Y Z

500 800 -900

!b-sec ib-sec ib-sec

This indicates that the force was directed generally normal to the panel covering bay 4 of the service module. The extremely coarse data upon which this calculation is based makes it impossible to better define the force acting upon the spacecraft.

After recovery of data, the integrating accelerometer on the spacecraft stable platform also began to show an abnormal output. Calculations show that the force producing the acceleration amounted to about 60 pounds in the -X direction (retro thrust) over a period of about 8 minutes. At about the same time Commander Lovell reported seeing extensive venting of gases from the service module which definitely was not a normal or expected part of the spacecraft operation at that time. He later described the venting as continuous, looking like, " ...... a big sheet with the sun shining on it--very heavy--like fine spray from a water hose," unlike gases and liquids vented during other planned spacecraft operations.

The radial velocity of the Apollo spacecraft relative to the Earth can be accurately determined by measuring the doppler shift of the S-band signal transmitted to Earth. Spacecraft velocity components normal to the line between the spacecraft and Earth cannot be determined by this method. The doppler velocity measurement is routinely made every i0 seconds and has an equivalent noise level of 0.015 fps. Between 55:5L:45 and 55:55:05 doppler measurements indicated a

radial velocity Following this

increment of abrupt change

0.26 fps. in velocity

This is shown in at approximately

figure B5-12. the time of

telemetry loss, additional velocity changes were observed, as shown in figure B5-13. These velocity increments were caused in part by venting from the spacecraft and in part by firings of reaction control system jets.

B-64

O O

o a c ) o o o o o c c c ) 0 ) 0 o o _o o o 0 0 0 C O: ( (

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B-65

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^

B-66

The Jet firings caused velocity increments rather than pure rotation rate changes because the jets did not always fire in opposedpairs. This resulted from the power system configuration in the spacecraft and closure of the quad C valves. (See Part B6 of this Appendix. ) TEMPERATURE CHANGES OBSERVED IN SERVICE MODULE Following the recovery of telemetry data there were a number of temperature changes observed at various locations in the service module. The locations of all temperature sensors in the service module are shown in figure B5-14, and telemetered records from these sensors for the time period of 55:53:40 to 55:56:10 are shown in figure B5-15. Fromthese temperature records the following conclusions can be drawn: i. Both temperature measurementsin bay 3, the bay adjacent to bay 4, increased after 55:54:55, whereas they had been steady prior to that time. 2. The corresponding temperature measurementsin bay 5 showed much smaller increases. Bay 5 is adjacent to bay 4. 3. A changewas observed in the service propulsion valve body temperature. This sensor, unlike manytemperature sensors in the lower part of the service module, is not covered by multiple layers of insulation. 4. Four sensors located in close proximity on the separator between bay 4 and bay 5 showedrapid temperature rises of small magnitude immediately after the recovery of telemetry data. These sensors measure the temperatures of fuel cells i and 3 radiator inlets and outlets. 5. The temperature of quad C and D reaction control engines continued the samerate of rise after data loss as before data loss. FAILURE OF CRYOGENIC OXYGEN SYSTEM The telemetered quantities from cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 were all off-scale following the recovery of telemetry at 55:54:55. Since no accurate assessment of the damageto this tank has been possible, the readings of the sensors within it are in doubt. The temperature was reading full-scale high and continued this way until 55:55:49,

B-67

This

page

left

blank

intentionally.

B-68

Service

module

temperature

ineasurements Remarks

Number

Measurement number

Title

I 2 3 4 5 6 7a 8

91o a
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 a 18 19 a 20 a 21 22 23 a 24 a 25 26 27 28 29 30 51 32 33 34 55 36 57 a 38 39 40 41

SC2090 SC2091 SC2092 SC2087 SC2088 SC2089 SA2377 SA2378 SA2379 SA2380 SPO002 SP0045 SP0048 SP0049 SPO054 SP0057 SPO061 SP0062 SR5013 SR5014 SR5015 SR5016 SR5065 SR5066 SR5067 SR5068 SC0043 SC0044 SC2084 SC2085 SC2086 SC2081 5C2082 SC2083 SF0260 SF0262 SF0263 ST0840 ST0841 SC0041 SC0042

--uel celt 1 radiator inlet --uel cell 2 radiator inlet --uel cell 5 radiator inlet --uel cell 1 radiator outlet Fuel cell 2 radiator outlet Fuel cell 3 radiator outlet Bay 2 oxidizer tank surface Bay .3 oxidizer tank surface Bay 5 fuel tank surface Bay 6 fuel tank surface Helium tank Service propulsion valve body Service propulsion fuel feed line Service propulsion oxidizer feed line Service propulsion oxidizer line Service propulsion fuel line Service propulsion injector flange 1 Service propulsion injector flange 2 Reaction control helium tank quad A Reaction control helium tank quad B Reaction control helium tank quad C Reaction control helium tank quad D Reaction control engine package quad Reaction control engine package quad Reaction control engine package quad Reaction control engine package quad Hydrogen tank 1 Hydrogen tank 2 Fuel cell 1 skin Fuel cell 2 skin Fuel cell 3, skin Fuel cell 1 condenser exhaust Fuel cell 2 condenser exhaust Fuel cell 5 condenser exhaust Environmental control primary radiator inlet Environmental control secondary radiator inlet Environmental control secondary radiator outlet Nuclear particle detector Nuclear particle analyzer Oxygen tank lOxygen tank 2

Opposite

9

Opposite

8

, Opposite Bay Bay Bay Bay Bay Bay Bay Bay 6 2 5 5 6 2 3 5

18 on flange 21 22

opposite opposite

A B C D

opposite opposite

25 26

Internal Internal Internal nternal Internal nternal

Bay 6 opposite

a Located

on opposite side of vehicle

and not shown in the view.

Figure

B5-14.-

Temperature

sensor

location

in Apollo

service

modu

B-69

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B-70

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B-71

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B-72

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B-76

B-77

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B-78

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B-79

when it began a steady decrease which ended at 55:56:48 in an off-scalelow reading. This behavior is a possible result of a failure of the sensor. For an explanation of possible failure modesof this sensor, see Part B7 of this Appendix. The pressure of cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2, sensed remotely, read off-scale low and continued to showthis reading. Off-scale low for this sensor represents a pressure of 19 psia or below. The quantity gage read full-scale high after telemetry recovery and continued in this state until 55:56:38 when it began oscillating in an erratic manner. The oscillation continued until 55:57:47 when the gage assumedan off-scale-low reading. The quantity gage and its failure modesare described in Part B7 of this Appendix. The pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank no. i had dropped from 879 psia to 782 psia during telemetry loss. This pressure continued to drop at a slow rate for about 2 hours until it was insufficient for operation of the last remaining fuel cell. The heaters in both cryogenic oxygen tanks were off prior to telemetry loss as a result of the high pressure in tank no. 2. After telemetry recovery the total fuel cell current indicated an increase of about 5 amperes after known loads had been accounted for. The low pressure levels in both oxygen tanks should have caused both heaters to be on at this time. The total current drain by the heaters in any one tank is about 5 amperes. It therefore appears that the heaters in one tank had comeon since telemetry loss and were operating at this time. It is possible that the heaters in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 were either physically open-circuited before or at the time of the bang. Additional evidence that the heaters in only one tank were on can be obtained by observing that at 56:19:03 the spacecraft dc current decreased 5 amperes. This is the time at which the crew began to power down the spacecraft according to the emergencypowerdownchecklist. If heaters in both oxygen tanks had been on at that time, the current should have decreased approximately ii amperes instead of the observed 5 amperes. OPERATION OF THEELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Following the period of telemetry loss, a high-current condition existed on the fuel cell outputs for 19 seconds. In the sametime period, the two dc main voltages were approximately 0.9 volt lower than their previous values. By 55:55:14 the voltages and currents had become normal. The observed currents during the 19-second period have been

B-80

correlated with reaction control system jet firings and an inertial measurementunit heater cycle. The excellent correlation indicates that no unaccountable loads were added to the power system during this time period. The crew observed a master caution and warning signal i or 2 seconds after the bang, along with an indication of undervoltage on dc bus B. The master caution and warning was turned off at 55:55:00. Within 5 seconds after the resumption of telemetry data, the oxygen flow rates to fuel cells I and 3 had decreased to approximately 20 percent of their prior values. These flow rates remained at a sufficiently low level to cause failure of fuel cells i and 3 at approximately 55:58. The most probable explanation for the reduced oxygen flow rates is that at the time of the bang a sufficiently intense shock occurred to close the valves in the oxygen lines feeding fuel cells i and 3. There is sufficient
valves served by the closed. will that and time the of fuel about cells volume in the oxygen lines between the supply to maintain fuel cell operation for the obThe intensity of the shock is indicated quad C were i0 milliseconds shown

3 minutes.

fact that the reaction control system valves on Tests on these valves have shown that 80g for to close. Tests on the 86g for ii milliseconds

cause them a shock of

oxygen supply valves have will cause them to close.

The crew was not alerted to the abnormally low flow rate of oxygen to fuel cells i and 3 because the hydrogen supply valves had not been closed. The valve closure indicator is only activated when both the oxygen and hydrogen supply valves to a fuel cell indication to the crew that the power system was when the master caution and warning was triggered voltage, dropped to zero occasioned by to an unusable at 55:57:45. are closed. The first failing came at 55:57:39 by a main bus B under-

the failure of fuel cell 3. Main bus B voltage level within 5 seconds, causing ac bus 2 to drop

The crew quickly checked the ac and dc voltage levels, recognized that ac bus 2 had failed, and responded by switching ac loads from ac bus 2 to ac bus i. This heavier load on ac bus i was reflected as a heavier load on dc main A, causing it to drop in voltage. At 55:58:O6_ a dc main A undervoltage master caution and warning was triggered as the main voltage dropped to between 25 and 26 volts. Shortly afterwards, at approximately 55:58:06, fuel cell i failed, placing the entire load of dc main A on fuel cell 2. Fuel cell 2 was now called upon to supply a current of 50 amperes. 2 remained the major for the next 2 hours. source of electrical During this time, power in telemetry the

Fuel cell command module

B-81

continued to indicate a decreasing cryogenic oxygen pressure in tank no. i. At 58:04 battery A was connected to main bus A and fuel cell 2 was removed from operation when oxygen flow becameinsufficient.

B-82

PART POSTINCIDENT

B6 EVENTS

The

The description first, entitled

of postincident events is presented "Immediate Recovery," describes the

in two sections. flightcrew and

flight controller actions during the 2-1/2-hour period following the incident. This section is primarily concerned with actions of the flightcrew and flight controllers during this period in response to the immediate problems caused by the spacecraft failures. The long-term problems addressed by Mission Control are described in the second section, entitled "Plans and Actions Taken to Return the Crew to Earth."

IMMEDIATE

RECOVERY

The first indication in the Mission Control Center of any problem in the spacecraft came from the Guidance Officer who reported that he had observed a "hardware restart." This term describes the action of the onboard computer when certain computer electrical problems occur, such as a reference voltage or an oscillator frequency getting out of tolerance. When this occurs, the computer stops its computations and recycles to a specified location in the program. Computations will not resume until the out-of-tolerance condition is cleared. At 55:55 this event occurred so rapidly they only that the flight controllers saw that it had occurred. restart we've did not observe the computer halt;

by

The report of the hardware the crew's report, "I believe

was followed had a problem

almost here."

immediately This was

followed quickly by a statement from the crew that they had a main bus B undervolt indication from the master caution and warning (MC&W) system. Flight controllers responsible for the electrical, environmental control, and instrumentation systems immediately searched their displays, but at that time there were no indications of any electrical problems, all voltages and fuel cell currents appeared normal. Apparently, the main bus B undervolt problem was a transient that had cleared up, for the crew next reported the bus voltages were "looking good." However, the flight controllers knew that all was not well because the oxygen tank measurements indicated some major problems in this system, or its instrumentation. The next report in Mission Control was from the flight controller responsible for the communication systems. He stated that the high-gain antenna on the spacecraft had unaccountably switched from narrow beam width to wide beam width at approximately the same time the problem had occurred.

B-8]

In sorting out these pieces of information, the flight controllers initially suspected that there had been an instrumentation failure. However, with the subsequent failure of main bus B and ac bus 2 it became more obvious that a serious electrical problem existed. The flight controllers considered the possibility that a short had occurred, and that this was in some way related to the unusual behavior of the high-gain antenna. The rapid rate at which so many parameters in the electrical and cryogenic system had changed state made it impossible to tell which were causes and which were effects. The Mission Control Center response to the situation is described in this section of the report. The time interval covered is from 55 hours 58 minutes ground elapsed time (55:58 g.e.t.) to 58:40 g.e.t., when all power was removed from the command module (CM). The major portion of the activities of both the flightcrew and the flight controllers in this time period was directed toward (i) evaluation and management of the electrical and cryogenic oxygen problems; (2) maintenance of attitude control; and (3) activation of the lunar module (LM). A chronological listing of all significant actions is presented first. This is followed by a more detailed description of the three categories of activities mentioned above.

Chronology

of

Spacecraft

Reconfiguration

Actions

This listing was obtained from transcripts of air-to-ground voice records (ref. 2) and the "Flight Director" loop in the Mission Control Center. Additional information was obtained from interviews with members of the flight control team. Some editing has been done to eliminate the description of routine actions which obviously have no significance to this investigation: examples are omni antenna switching and the loading of weight and inertia information in the digital autopilot. The times at which specific (±i minute) since actions are listed are only approximately correct, there was no precise time correlation available. connection.to main bus Mission Control A and fuel cell requested 3 to main

the

55:59 - Fuel cell main bus crew to connect fuel cell i

bus B. Although there was no direct evidence the crew had changed the fuel cell and main bus configuration, the flight controller believed that this _ight be the case. The configuration prior to the loss of main bus B was as follows: fuel cell i, main A; fuel cell 2, main A; and fuel cell 3, main B. 56:03 - Entry battery main bus A to increase the to ask that this be done. which is about 1-1/4 volts on line.The crew placed entry battery A on bus voltage. Mission Control was just about The bus voltage was approximately 25 volts, below the MC&W trip limit.

B-84

56:08

- Open

circuit

fuel

cell

i.-

Mission

Control

requested

the

crew

to open circuit fuel cell i. Flight controllers did not understand the problems with the fuel cells; the data were confusing and incomplete. In an effort to get some new information, the controllers decided to take all loads off fuel cell i to see if it would behave any differently. It was nected not putting to the main - Power out any bus. RCS jets power so there was no reason to leave it con-

56:11 the crew to of the quad

from

main

bus

A.-

Mission

Control

requested All bus B the least axis.

position some RCS jet select switches to main A power. C jets and B-3 and B-4 jets had been powered from main

and since that bus had no power on it, they could not fire except by "Direct" coils. By switching these jets to main bus A, there was at one jet available for automatic control in each direction about each

56:14 - Start emergency powerdown.Mission Control advised the crew to use page i-5 of their Emergency Powerdown Checklist, part of the Flight Data File (ref. 7) carried by the crew. Mission Control wanted to get the current on main bus A reduced by at least i0 amps, and then take the entry battery A off-line. The list down to "BMAG #2-off" was to be turned off; it included the following: all cryo tank heaters and fans, G&N optics power, potable water all fuel cell pumps, motors. heater, SPS line heater, SPS gaging, SMRC heaters, ECS radiator heaters, suit compressor, and SPS gimbal

56:23 - Power AC bus 2 with inverter (INV) i.- The crew was requested to power both ac busses with inverter no. i. The primary purpose was to get telemetry data from oxygen tank no. 2 which is powered by ac bus 2 only. 56:24 - Turn fuel cell no. 2 pump on.- The crew had turned the pumps off in following the emergency powerdown list. The pumps circulate glycol and hydrogen for internal cooling in the fuel cells. They could have been left off for an hour or more, but fuel cell performance would have been degraded. 56:30 - Select main bus A power to RCS jet A-3.The spacecraft was drifting in pitch without any apparent control. Quad C, which should have been controlling pitch, did not seem to be firing at all. To try to regain control in pitch, the quad A-3 jet was switched to main bus A power. 56:33 - O_en circuit fuel cell no. i. fuel cell no. 3.Same reason as for open cir-

cuit

56:33 - Regonfi_ure quad B and D thrusters.a quad B thruster might be causing the spacecraft asked the crew to take off all power to the quad

Flight control felt that attitude deviations, and B jets. To compensate

B-85

for quad main bus

B being A.

off,

all

jets

in quad

D were

selected

to be

powered

from

56:34 - Battery A taken off line.The bus loads had been reduced sufficiently to allow fuel cell 2 alone to keep the bus voltage up. It was highly desirable to use the battery as little as possible, because there was no guarantee it could be recharged. 56:35 - Isolate CM oxygen surge reentry. Control requested no. I in an effort to increase about later, on the since there fans in this the surge tank. The tank.purpose The crew was directed to isolate was to preserve an oxygen supply

the for

56:38 - Oxygen tank no. I heaters and fans.Mission the crew to turn on the heaters in cryogenic oxygen tank to build up the tank pressure. The current was observed 5 amperes, indicating they did come on. About 2 minutes was no increase in pressure, the crew was asked to turn tank. 56:45 - BMAG 2 off.In an effort BMAG was powered down. 56:51 - Turn off thruster C-I.to further

conserve

power,

the

second

Thruster

C-I

seemed

to be

firing

very

frequently without any apparent reason. The off all power to this thruster. The attitude have been virtually ended at about 56:40. 56:57 - Fuel circuited earlier cell no. 3 shutdown.because they were not at its present a short time.

crew was requested disturbances were

to turn noted to

Fuel cells I and 3 had putting out any power.

been open With the

cryogenic oxygen leaking for the fuel cells within

rate, there would be no reactants Because there was a possibility fuel cell effort to because reactant save the it had

that the oxygen was leaking down stream of one of the valves, it was decided to shut off these valves in an oxygen remaining in tank no. been the first of the two to i. Fuel fail. cell 3 was

selected

57:03 - Main bus A power to thruster A-4.The crew was told to put power to thruster A-4 by connecting to main bus A. The spacecraft had a positive pitch rate and the crew was unable to stop it with quad C thrusters. With A-4 activated, pitch control was regained. 57:18 - Fuel cell no. i shutdown.Shutting down fuel to cell fuel 3 did cell i

not effect the were closed in

oxygen leak rate, so the an effort to try to stop battery A.maintaining charger. The crew main bus Mission

reactant valves the leak. was directed to A voltage at an Control decided

The to

57:22 - Charge fuel cell 2 was support the

charge battery adequate level to charge

A. A

battery

battery

B-86

for as long as vious that all

possible. fuel cell

Since the oxygen was still leaking, operation would be lost within about

it was oban hour.

57:29 - Disable power to _ua d C.- It appeared that quad C was not thrusting, although it was receiving firing signals. The explanation of this was that the propellant isolation valves had been closed by the "bang" at 55:55 and no propellant was being fed to the thrusters. Since these valves are powered by the main bus B, they could not be opened without getting power useless drain the thrusters to this bus. The firing signals of power on bus A, and the crew from it. to was quad C therefore were directed to disconnect a

57:39 - Fans on in oxygen tank no. 2.increase the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2, on the fans in that tank. 57:40 - LM power on.The crew reported,

In a final effort to the crew was directed

try to

to turn

"I've

got

LM

power

on."

57:49 - Stopped charging battery A.- In order to be ready to bring battery A on-line when fuel cell 2 failed, it was decided to terminate the charge. A total of about 0.75 amp-hours had been restored. 57:53 - CSM glycol pump off.- To reduce the main bus A crew was directed to turn off the glycol pump and to bypass mental control system radiators. 57:55 - Turn off oxygen tank no. on main bus A, the pumps in fuel cell were turned off. loads, the the environ-

2 fans.To further reduce the load 2 and the fans in oxygen tank no. 2

in

57:57 - LM data received.Low-bit-rate the Mission Control Center at this time.

telemetry

data

were

received

58:04 - Battery A on.- The crew powered main bus A with battery A in anticipation of the loss of fuel cell 2. The pressure in oxygen tank no. was approximately 65 psi at this time. 58:07 - CSM communication reconfiguration.The Command Module Pilot (CMP) was directed to turn off the CSM S-band primary power amplifier and to select low bit rate and down-voice backup. This was to reduce the load on battery A and maintain adequate circuit margins on the communication downlink. 58:18 - CSM _uidance and navigation powerdown.The CSM inertial platform (IMU) alignment had been transferred to the LM and verified Mission Control. The crew was directed to turn off the CSM computer, IMU, and the IMU heaters.

i

by the

B-S7

58:21

- Powerdown

CM

attitude

control.-

In

an effort

to reduce

elecoff This

trical power requirements in the CM, the CMP was directed to turn "SCS Electronics Power," and "all Rotational Control Power Off." completely removed all attitude control capability from the CM. _8:22 the RCS, system. - LM on RCS the activation.thruster The heaters, LM crew and was advised up the

to pressurize attitude reference

turn

power

58:27 neither way to troller

- Activate

"Direct"

attitude

control.-

It was

discovered

that

module was configured to provide attitude regain it was to have the C_ power up the and the Direct coils.

control. rotational

The quickest hand con-

58:36 - Fuel cell 2 shutdown.The pressure of the oxygen being fed to this fuel cell had dropped below the operating level at 58:15 and it had stopped supplying current. As part of the CSM "safing," the fuel cell was disconnected from the bus and the reactant valves were closed. 58:40 - CSM powered down.Battery A this time, removing all power from the was disconnected CSM. from main bus A

at

Evaluation The failure power to

of

Electrical

and

Cryogenic

Oxygen

Problems

trical

of fuel cell 3 resulted in the interruption of elecseveral components in the spacecraft, including part of

the telemetry signal conditioning. Main dc bus B was being powered only by fuel cell 3, so when its output dropped from about 25 amperes to less than 5 amperes, the bus voltage dropped from the normal 28 volts to less than 5 volts (fig. B5-2). Inverter no. 2, supplying power to ac bus 2, was being driven by main bus B and dropped off the line when the bus B voltage fell below about 16 volts. The bus failures, coupled with the cryogenic oxygen tank indications and some questionable instrumentation readings in fuel cells i and 3 (nitrogen and oxygen pressures)_ caused some initial uncertainty in the Mission Control Center. The initial reaction was that there possibly had been a problem with major related instrumentation discrepancies. It was not clear that the telemetry quantities of cryogenic oxygen tank measurements or the fuel cell parameters were valid indications indication of no reactant flow and no with fuel cells i and _ having become Therefore, there was nected. The lack of plained by fuel cells the had of conditions. For instance, the fuel cell currents was compatible disconnected from the main busses.

no reason to believe that they could not be reconpower output from the fuel cells could not be exinformation, An additional i.e., the rapidity with which the factor that had to be considered

available failed.

B-88

_as that the high-gain antenna wide beam width at about this earlier in possibility The

had same

unaccountably time. Some

switched from narrow to trouble had been experienced width, and the be ruled out. return the bus

getting this antenna to "lock on" in narrow beam of a short in the antenna electronics could not direction given to the crew was at 56:00 to

first

power configuration to the normal operating mode; that is, fuel cell i powering bus A and fuel cell _ powering bus B. The primary purpose of this direction was to get the spacecraft in a known configuration and determine if the fuel cells could be reconnected to the main busses. There are no telemetry parameters which show which fuel cells power to which busses, but the flight controllers were of the some reconfiguration might have been done by the crew. are supplying opinion that

In operating with split busses, that is, with two fuel cells powering main bus A and one fuel cell powering main bus B, the amount of equipment tied to bus A represents approximately twice the load as that to bus B. When fuel cell i failed, fuel cell 2 had to take up the additional load on bus A. In doing so, the voltage dropped to about 25 volts, which is low enough to cause a caution and warning indication. There was no particular harm in the bus voltage being this low, but if it dropped any lower the performance of some of the telemetry equipment would be affected and the flight controllers and crew were concerned. Normal bus voltage is above 27 volts, and the master caution and warning indication is triggered at 26-1/4 volts or less. Had fuel cell 2 been tied to both main busses as on previous missions, the total spacecraft current of 73 amperes would have driven both busses as low as 21 volts. The crew put entry battery A on bus A at 56:03 in this action. to bring the bus voltage up. Mission Control concurred

the

In an effort to obtain more data for crew was asked to read out the onboard

troubleshooting indications of

the situation, oxygen pressure

and nitrogen pressure in fuel cells 3 and i, respectively. At 56:08 the crew was requested to disconnect fuel cell i. This fuel cell was not supplying any power, so to disconnect it should have no effect on the bus voltage, but there was a possibility that it might give some different indications in the fuel cell telemetry parameters. There was no change in the fuel cell parameters when it was disconnected and the onboard readouts of nitrogen and oxygen pressure were the same as those on the ground, which did not add to the understanding of the situation. Efforts to sort out the various telemetry indications and crew reports continued for the next several minutes. The next direction given to the crew was to proceed with the emergency powerdown of the electrical system, using page EMER 1-5 of the CSM Emergency Checklist which is part of the Flight Data File carried in the CSM (ref. 7). It was important to reduce the electrical loads to a low enough value for the single operating fuel cell to be able to supply all the necessary power. Mission Control

B-89

was anxious to get hours as possible.

entry

battery

A back

off

line

to preserve

as many

amp-

get bus

The next step in the attempt to determine power back to ac bus 2. Flight controllers 2 with inverter 3 driven from main bus A.

what was happening was to considered powering ac Further consideration,

however, led to the decision to simply tie ac bus 2 to inverter no. i which was already powering ac bus i. Mission Control was interested in getting power to ac bus 2, since this is the only bus that powered the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 quantity and temperature telemetry. A temperature measurement was needed to confirm the zero pressure indication. The indications from oxygen tank no. i were that pressure and quantity were decreasing at a relatively high rate and it was imperative to immediately establish the condition of tank no. 2. It was not until after ac bus 2 had been powered up and oxygen tank no. 2 indicated empty, that the extreme seriousness of the situation was clear. In proceeding through the emergency powerdown, the crew had placed the fuel cell pump switch to the "off" position in the one remaining good fuel cell; however, the pumps actually went off with loss of main bus B/ac bus 2 power. At 56:24, the Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) pointed this out to Mission Control, who in turn directed him to turn the pump back on. The only problem associated with leaving it off as much as an hour is that the fuel cell power output would start to degrade and no harm was done. But in the situation that existed, it is not inconceivable that had the crew not advised Mission Control of the fuel cell pump being off it would have been overlooked until a rise in the fuel cell 2 loop temperatures gave this indication. direction in the management of the electrical system was not

Further

given until about 56:33. At this time the crew was directed to open circuit fuel cell _ for the same reason as fuel cell i was open circuited earlier. At 56:35 the crew was requested to isolate the surge tank and at approximately to remove battery sulted in a load bus voltage above this same time Mission Control also directed the crew A from main bus A. The emergency powerdown had rereduction such that the fuel cell alone could maintain 27 volts.

It had become apparent that the operation of fuel cells I and 3 probably could not be regained under any condition, and that with oxygen tank i quantity decreasing at its then present rate, the service module would soon become incapable of providing any life support or electrical power. The heaters and fans in this tank were turned on at 56:38 in an effort to increase the pressure, but to no avail. Because there was a possibility that a rupture had occurred in one of the inoperative fuel cells and the oxygen was leaking through it, Mission Control decided to shut down the cryogenic inputs to fuel cell 3 to see if this would stop

B-90

the leak, and the reactant valves to it were closed at 57:00. It should be pointed out that this is an irreversible step; once a fuel cell is shut down, it cannot be restarted in flight. Fuel cell 3 was shut down first since its internal oxygen pressure indication was zero; there was no change in the oxygen tank pressure decay rate, however, and the reactant valves to fuel cell i were closed at 57:18, with equally negative results. Mission Control madeone last attempt to increase oxygen pressure by directing the crew to turn on the fans in tank no. 2. At about 57:22, the crew was directed to initiate charging of battery A. By this time it becameclear, with the leaking oxygen tank no. I, that fuel cell 2 could continue to operate only for a short period of time. Since the fuel cell was maintaining an adequate bus voltage and could provide the additional power to operate the battery charger, it was decided to charge battery A as long as possible. The charging of battery A was stopped after 22 minutes. At this time the oxygen tank no. i pressure had decayed to a point where continued operation of fuel cell 2 was questionable. Battery A was to be connected to main bus A at the first indication that the output of the fuel cell was decaying. Since the battery cannot be connected to power a bus while it is being charged, it was necessary to terminate the charging in anticipation of the fuel cell failure. In preparation for using the entry battery to power main bus A, a further reduction of the loads on this bus was performed. The following equipment was turned off: glycol pump, oxygen tank no. 2 fans, and fuel cell no. 2 pumps. The pressure in oxygen tank no. i was approximately 65 psi at 58:04 when the crew connected battery A to main bus A. This is below the minimum operating pressure for the fuel cell. This battery continued to power main bus A until about 58:40. By this time, the LMhad been activated and the inertial platform alignment transferred from the command module. The attempts to determine the cause of the problem in the electrical power system were confused by the misleading symptomsthat resulted from the cryogenic tank failure. The failure in the electrical power system and cryogenic oxygen was so massive that by itself it would have created someinitial confusion and madethe flight controllers skeptical of the data, but in addition to fuel cell output dropping to zero and bus voltages dropping to zero, there were other indications that had to be considered. The attitude excursions (now presumedto have been caused by escaping oxygen) and the peculiar RCSthruster firings added to the confused situation. The RCSproblems are discussed in more detail in the following section, but regardless of how quickly the problem in the electrical power system was resolved, there was nothing that could have been done to correct it. The only thing the crew and Mission Control could do under the circumstances was to preserve as much capability as possible for reentry and to power down in an orderly manner to allow time for LM activation.

B-91

Maintenance of Attitude

Control

Within 3 minutes after reporting the large bang, the Commander (CDR) reported someof the "talkback" indicators for the service module reaction control system (SMRCS) were showing "barberpole." His report indicated that the helium isolation valves to quads B and D were closed, and the secondary propellant fuel pressurization valves to quads A and C were closed (fig. B6-1). These valves have a history of inadvertant closure when the spacecraft is subjected to a large "jolt" in flight, such as the spacecraft separation from the S-IVB. This phenomenon was first encountered on Apollo 9. To reopen a valve that has closed in this manner, it is necessary to cycle the position selector switch to "close" and then back to the "open" position. All of the switches in this system have momentary"open" and "close" positions, and are springloaded to a center neutral position. The valve position indicators in the spacecraft are the flag type which show gray when the valve is open and gray-and-white stripe ("barberpole") when closed; there is no telemetry indication of the valve position. Each valve and its respective indicator are powered from the samemain dc bus and cannot be selected to the other bus. The valves in the propellant system for quads B and D are powered from main bus A and quads A and C are powered from main bus B. Therefore, there was no way to determine the status of the RCSpropellant and pressurization systems of quads A and C, and there was no way to reposition the valves without powering up main bus B. The ability to open the isolation valves in quads B and D was not affected by the loss of main bus B. Jet-firing signals, received at each individual thruster, open fuel and oxidizer valves by energizing a coil. There are two coils at each thruster. One, called "Auto," receives its signal from either the computer or the two rotational hand controllers (RHC's) and can be powered from either main dc bus, selected by the "Auto RCSSelect" switches. There are 16 switches; one for each individual thruster that can be positioned to "off," "main A," or "main B." The other coil at the thruster is called "Direct" and receives its signal from the rotational hand controllers when they are rotated sufficiently far from the null detent. There are several ways of configuring the RHC's to power the Direct coils. Each RHCis limited as to which main bus and thruster combination it can be tied. Typically, the RHC's are powered so that half the jets are fired by main bus B and the other half by main bus A. As per normal procedure, the auto RCSselect switches were configured so that single-jet authority in roll, pitch, and yaw attitude control would be available without reconfiguring if either main bus were lost. This protection can only be obtained if all four quads are functional. The loss of capability resulting from the failure of a main bus would be compounded by the concurrent closing of propellant isolation valves. Control about one or more axes would be lost

B-92

Secondary

(,He)

4150

psi

f uPerQp_i__nutr -_ e

__

x,_

/i

_

sHv°! ii!!n

-_}_1

I

I

i
H

I _
Oxidizer

IFueltanks_

_,c 3

Pri

_tanks ,m _ Primal Primary i s o_rat_oe_l a:tl yes

I
Auto coils Thrusters

Direct

coils

Figure

B6_I.-

Service module quad (typical

reaction control of all four).

system

one

B-93

until some reconfiguration talkback indicators would termine the status of the

could be accomplished. also be lost, it would control system.

Because take some

power to the effort to de-

At the time of the controlled roll maneuver

accident, the spacecraft was performing and maintaining pitch and yaw attitude

a computerhold. The

digital autopilot began firing RCS thrusters to counteract the attitude perturbations presumably caused by the oxygen tank no. 2 failure, and attitude was completely controlled until main bus B was lost. Soon after the loss of main bus B, Mission Control noted the spacecraft began to rotate about the pitch and yaw axes. It was also noted that the fuel and oxidizer pressures in quad D were decreasing and the crew was asked to verify that they had opened the helium isolation valves which had previously been reported as closed. Although the crew did not acknowledge this request, the pressures were observed to increase to the normal operating values shortly thereafter. The pressures had decreased in this quad because the helium pressurization valves had been jolted closed and subsequent firings of the thrusters had used some of' the propellant. This increased the ullage volume and resulted in a noticeable decrease in tank pressures. The flight controllers correctly diagnosed the cause and were not mislead into thinking the tanks were leaking. At 56:07 Mission Control noted that the crew had turned off all Auto RCS Select switches, because they were concerned that unwanted thruster firings were causing the continuing spacecraft attitude excursions. At about 56:19 the spacecraft was observed to be approaching gimbal lock of the inertial platform. Gimbal which the inertial platform loses its reference a gimbal lock, the spacecraft attitude relative must be kept out of certain regions. Mission of this situation, and in an effort to achieve axes of the spacecraft, the crew was directed Select switches for thrusters 3 and 4 in quad quad C to be powered trol authority about switched to main bus voltage toward At lock is a condition in alignment. To prevent to the inertial platform Control advised the crew positive control about all to reconfigure the RCS Auto B and all thrusters in

from main bus A. This would provide single-jet coneach axis (fig. B6-2). The other jets were not A power in order not to drag down the main bus A The LMP although that the acknowledged all rotations was and the drift were not stopped. being subjected the rotaincrease to

any more than necessary. gimbal lock was arrested, 56:22 the CMP reported

spacecraft

pitch and yaw rates and that he had to use direct control with tional hand controller to stop them. The rates would start to

again as soon as he stopped the direct control. He asked if the ground could see any spurious jet firings that might be causing the rates. Although the data available in Mission Control were not complete (the position of the propellant system valves in quads A and C was unknown and firing signals to the Direct coils are not on telemetry), it appeared to the flight controllers that the jet firings were not causing the

B-94

Quad A o 15'_ All 4 quads

_fm_tang le

4

i

I Service module

__ --

/

/! ,

3/_ __._ "" 1

Quad 4

D

+Roll + Pitch Quad C 1

+ Yaw Axis Direction + + + * Autopilot A-I, A-2, A-3, A-4, B-3, B-4, Thruster B-I, B-2, C-3 C-4 D-3 D-4 to use quads C-l, C-2, D-I D-2

Roll Pitch

*

Yaw

can be configured roll or A

B and D for

and C.

Figure

B6-2.-

SM RCS quad location n_mbering system.

and

thruster

B-95

spurious rates. It was observed that thruster 3 in quad C was receiving firing signals almost continuously, but was having no success in stopping the negative pitch rate. In an effort to gain control over the negative pitch rate, at 56:32 Mission Control requested the crew to put the Auto RCS Select switch of thruster 3 of quad A on main bus A. It was suspected that C-3 thruster was not really firing because there was no }erceptable reduction in quad C propellant. At about 56:35 the crew was requested to remove all power from the quad B thrusters auto coils and to power all quad D thrusters from main bus A. This request was made in an effort to determi_le if quad B thrusters were causing the unwanted pitch and yaw rates. Mission Control continued to monitor the RCS thruster firings and the spacecraft attitude response, trying to determine the status of the system. During the next IO minutes, the crew pointed out that the quad temperature indications for A and B were out of the normal operating range, and Mission Control assured the crew that they were within acceptable operating limits. In this same time period the ground had noticed numerous firing signals of thruster C-I. Since the flight controllers could se{_ no explanation for this, the crew was requested to remove all power from the C-I auto coil at 56:53. About i0 minutes later, the CMP reported no negative pitch capability, and requested clearance to enable thruster A-4. Mission Control responded immediately to "bring A-4 on," and t_e pitch rate was stopped within a few seconds. At 57:20, Mission Control noted a discrepancy in the roll control jet configuration. _e autopilot was configured to use quads A and C ['or roll control, but the auto coils for these jets were turned off. ;Fne crew was directed to configure the autopilot to use quads B and D for roll control. Based on a close observation of firing signals to q_ad C and the resulting spacecraft response, the flight controllers thought that the quad C propellant isolation valves had been jolted closed by the incident that caused the loud bang. lhe computer was still sending firing signals to the auto coils, but they were apparently having no effect and propellant was not being used by this quad. Therefore, to save the small amount of electrical power that was being spent to the coils, at 57:29 Mission Control directed auto coils to this quad. Complete attitude control appeared all further attitude control support by sending firing signals the crew to turn off the

and

to be establlshed at this time to the CSM was directed toward support is establishment follows: the the LM

transferring control to the LM. The overall LM activation described in more detail in the following section; however, of the attitude control of the LM is briefly summarized as i. Mission Control referred Activation Checklist (part of the the crew to Flight Data

specific pages in FSle, ref. 7) for

g-96

procedure the LM. 2. tion, and

to

transfer

the

inertial

platform

alignment

from

the

CSM

to

The

CMP

was

directed after

to power the

down

all

of had

the

guidance, properly

navigaaligned. control to be

control

systems

LM platform

been

9. Mission Control assisted the LM crew in getting attitude established by pointing out specific circuit breakers that needed closed and switches that needed to be positioned.

It was appro_imagely 1-1,/2 hours after the initial incident before complete automatic attitude control was established, although the crew had manual control capability at all times. The information on the ground was incomplete and was confused by the intermixing of automatic control and manual direct control. Furthermore, the major concern was the electrical and oxygen problems_ control system area was to maintain avoid gimbal lock. These mandatory time complete attitude control was and the only mandatory a safe posture in the tasks were accomplished established. action in the systems and and in due

Lunar

Module

Activation

It was recognized at about 45 m_nutes after the accident that the LM might have to be used to provide the necessary life support, and the 154 activation was started about 1-9/4 hours after the crew first reported the loud bang in the CSM. The first hour and 45 minutes were spent in regaining positive attitude control in the CSM, in troubleshooting the electrical problems in the CSM, and in attempting to halt the loss of oxygen from the service module. Since LM activation did not begin until the lifetime of the one functioning fuel cell was predicted to be about 15 minutes, there was a strong motivation to complete the LM activation and CSM powerdown as soon as possible. The first order of business for LM activation was to get electrical power and the communications sytems operating. A specific procedure for this was read to the LMI° at 57:_7. Although three checklists for LM activation were available as part of the Flight Data File in the spacecraft, Mission Control did not direct the crew to follow any of them. These checklists were designed for three different situations at LM activation. The first, entitled "Apollo XIII LM-7 Activation Checklist" (contained in ref. 7), contains the nominal mission sequences from initial LM manning to undocking prior to the lunar landing. The other two activation checklists are in the "LM Contingency Checklist" (contained in ref. 7). They were written to cover the situations of having to use the LM to perform an Earth-return abort maneuver for the docked CSM/LM configuration. One checklist includes activation of the primary and navigation system (inertial platform alignment, etc.) and guidance is called

B-97

the "2-Hour Activation List" because it was designed to be completed at a comfortable pace in time to execute a descent propulsion system maneuver in 2 hours elapsed time. The other contingency list is called the "_O-Minute Activation List," and serves the samepurpose, except that many steps, including the GANactivation, are omitted. There was no LM activation checklist available which was designed to cover the specific situation resulting from this incident. The features that were different are as follows: i. The need to get the LM totally activated as soon as possible-including attitude control as well as supplying life support, communications, and electrical power. 2. The desire to power down the CSM as soon as possible in order to preserve all available battery power for reentry. 9. The LM was to serve as a "lifeboat" supplying oxygen, water, electrical power, and attitude control for 80 or 90 hours. This presented a paradoxical situation in which almost total LM capability was required, but at the sametime its consumableshad to be conserved as much as possible. In responding to the situation, the flight controllers referred the crew to specific pages in the normal "194Activation Checklist," augmentedwith additional instructions. The purpose was to bypass all steps that were not absolutely necessary for getting the LM power, communication, and environmental control system in operation. The total instructions given to the crew referred to only _ pages of the 59 in the checklist. 'I_ere were three single instruction additions to this shortly afterward which completed the 154configuration for supplying oxygen to the cabin. Although this particular contingency had never been simulated in the training exercises in preparation for the mission, similar cases had been considered, and Black Teampersonnel_ including the Flight Director, Glynn Lunney, had prepared procedures and criteria for using the LM to augment the CSM. The simulations had been limited to cases where the LM ascent stage was to be retained following rendezvous in lunar orbit. These samepersonnel had participated in these simulations for the preceeding missions of Apollo iO, ii, and 12, and therefore were familiar with the problems. The next procedure given to the crew was designed to get the LM guidance and navigation system operating and to get the LM inertial platform aligned to a known reference. Again, Mission Control referred the crew to specific pages in the "LMActivation Checklist," along with certain necessary circuit breaker closures which were not listed on those pages. Although the necessary circuit-breaker panel configuration for LM activation is shown on two pages in the checklist, the crew was not referred to those pages by Mission Control. In order to save time, only

B-98

the necessary instructions. caused some

circuit breakers The omission of delay in establishing

were given a necessary

as part circuit

of each breaker

set of special closure later

194 attitude

control.

Throughout this period of LM powerup, the CMP was given frequent instructions on the CM configuration to reduce power requirements. The crew completed an alignment of the LM IMU to the CSM IMU at 58:09. The platform gimbal angles for both spacecraft were read to the ground for computation of the fine-align torquing angles for the LM. As soon as the LM IMU was aligned, the CMP was directed to power down the CM computer and the IMU, including the IMU heaters. At about 58:17 the temperature of the coolant loop in the 194 began to rise and the LM crew was advised to activate the sublimator, referring to the appropriate page in the "LM Activation Checklist." During the next 2- to 3-minute period there was an unusually high density of conversation, both in the Mission Control Center and on the air-to-ground frequency between the CAPCOM and crewmen in both spacecraft modules. The CMP reported powering down the CM control system; the CDR reported he had no attitude reference system and requested permission to "close the FDAI circuit breakers so we could have a ball to see if we go to gimbal lock"; both the CMI° and the LMP reported conditions and asked question, s regarding configuration items; and on the ground the CSM flight controllers were trying to get their systems powered down as much as possible while the LM flight controllers were trying to "get through" to the LMP to pressurize the LM RCS and to turn the thruster heaters on. At approximately 58:21, the CMI° was told to continue his powerdown by turning off the power to the rotational hand controller almost simultaneously with the LM crew being directed to power up the FDAI and the RCS heaters, pressurize the RCS, and open the main shutoff valves. After about 5 minutes, when it became clear that neither spacecraft had control of the attitude, the CMI ° was directed to reactivate the CSM Direct attitude control capability. This was done and the LM crew then proceeded, following instructions from the ground, to pressurize the RCS and to perform the steps necessary to get the attitude reference system operating in the LM. Mission Control at 58:32 gave the LM crew the inputs for the onboard computer which set the proper system gains for the LM autopilot to control the docked spacecraft configuration. The LM achieved complete automatic attitude control capability at 58:34, when the crew received direction from Mission Control to close an essential circuit breaker that had been previously overlooked. dicated on telemetry, problem when the crew at 58:33. After it was CMP was given The position of this circuit breaker is not inbut the flight controller correctly diagnosed the stated they still did not have automatic control

the

definitely established final instructions for

that the LM had attitude completely powering down

control, the CM,

B-99

and work toward getting the LM configured for the long trip home proceeded. Mission Control gave the crew the LM IMU torquing angles to get the platform fine aligned to the reference orientation. Discussions were held between the ground and the spacecraft concerning the ability of the crew to use the stars as a reference for platform realignment. It was concluded that this would be difficult if not impossible to do, and the current alignment should be preserved until after the abort maneuver.

An abnormally high pressure reading was noted in one of the LM ascent stage oxygen tanks shortly after telemetry data were received in Mission Control, and the crew was directed to use oxygen from this tank instead of the descent tank. Later it was diagnosed that the shutoff valve leaked, allowing the higher pressure oxygen from the manifold to leak into this ascent tank. The condition in itself was not a problem_ the net effect was that this ascent tank was raised to a slightly higher than normal pressure which was well within the tank limits. 'Fmis degraded the system redundancy, however, and had a subsequent leak developed in this tank, the LM oxygen supply would have been depleted (fig. B6-_). The next phase of activity was devoted to reducing the power drain from the LM batteries to as low a value as practical. This included turning off many of the displays in the LM and put Mission Control in the position of monitoring system parameters for the crew. The crew was also given all the information required to execute a return-to-Earth abort maneuver 2 hours after passing the point of closest approach to the Moon (pericynthion). Providing this data well in advance is a normal procedure which gives the crew the capability to perform the abort if communications are lost with the ground.

PLANS

AND ACTIOI',JS

TAKt_N TO RETURN

r_

C_W

TO EARTH

After the crew immediate situation full resources The first item lifetime to Earth penditure and to within to of

had had

powered down the CM and stabilized, and Mission

activated the Control could

LM, the direct its

the long-term problem of getting the concern was to determine an expected plan that would it was mandatory as much

crew safely home. LM consumables spacecraft the ex-

develop a trajectory this lifetime. Also power and water

return the to reduce

of battery

as practical.

Subsequent efforts by Mission Control in support of the crew were varied and extensive. Much of this activity, however, is normally part of the routine functions of Mission Control. Such items as monitoring systems performance via telemetry parameters; keeping accurate records of consumables usage, and predicting future consumption rates; scheduling crew rest periods; and orbit determination are only some of the examples of this normal activity. However, only the special activities which were unique to this mission failure or which were of major importance to the

B-IO0

Shutoff

valve

Descent

shutoff

valve To cabin press

regulator

"_

O0

"

IX]

Ascent 854

tank 2 psi

Leaking

ASC

tank

2 shutoff

valve

Figure

B6-3.-

Schematic

of

LM

oxygen

storage

system.

B-lOl

successful return of the crew will be described. These activities are grouped in three categories in this report and described as independent subjects. These categories are consumables and system management,returnto-Earth trajectory control, and definition of procedures and checklists for reentry preparation. No attempt is madeto describe the events chronologically. The Mission Operation Report (ref. 5) contains a comprehensive documentation of these events. Consumablesand SystemsManagement Actions vital Consumablesand systems management of both the LM and the CMwere of importance and generated much activity in Mission Control.
Lunar module.system: All LM electrical four in the descent stage power is supplied with a total rated by ca-

Electrical power batteries. There are

pacity of 1600 amp-hours and two in the ascent stage with a total rated capacity of 592 amp-hours. After the LM activation, analyses of power requirements and lifetime capability were completed. These analyses showed that after the abort maneuver at 61:30, the LM could be powered down to a total current requirement of about 27 amps and still keep the inertial platform aligned. This was extremely important because it made it possible to perform a guidance-controlled abort maneuver at 79:30 which could be used to reduce the return time back to Earth from 152 hours to 143 hours g.e.t. The analyses also indicated that if the guidance system was completely powered down after 79:30, the total power requirement could be reduced to about 17 amps_ stretching the battery lifetime to approximately 165 hours g.e.t. This was a comfortable margin, even if the return time could not be reduced below 155 hours. The flight controllers provided the crew with a list of specific switches to close and circuit breakers to open which would reduce the electrical load to the minimum possible consistent with safe operation. The fact that virtually all of the onboard displays were turned off is an indication of how extensively the spacecraft was powered down. Mission Control kept an accurate account of the switch and circuit breaker configuration, and was able to insure that the necessary equipment was powered up again when the subsequent trajectory maneuvers were made. The full powerdown configuration actually required only 12 amperes, instead of 17. The basis for this powerdown was contained in the LM Contingency Checklist (ref. 7). The Emergency Powerdown Checklist the LM in lunar orbit awaiting rescue by the listing As of turned-off as the equipment electrical were power made by was developed for the case of CSM. Some additions to this Mission Control. was established for what p_ans

soon

system

configuration

and apparently performing well, actions to take if a LM battery

Mission failure

Control began planning were to occur. _ese

B-f02

included listing the few remaining items of equipment which could be taken off line in the powered-downcondition. Since the current was already down to less than 17 amperes, there was not muchleft that could be removed except the communications equipment, but certain equipment could have been operated on a periodic, basis rather than continuously. A schedule for this kind of operation was planned in case it became necessary. At 97:14:26 the LMPcalled Mission Control to report an anomaly that he had observed in the LM. This anomaly was a "little thump" that was heard but not felt, and it seemedto comefrom the vicinity of the LM descent stage. The LMPalso observed a "new shower of snowflakes comeup that looked like they were emitted from dow_that way." The venting appeared to be going radially outward, perpendicular to the X-axis in the +Y, +Z quadrant, and it continued for approximately 2 minutes. Neither the flight controllers nor the LMPobserved any anomalous behavior in the data. The LMPclosed the essential display circuit breakers in order to scan his instruments. The flight controllers searched the various displays of telemetry data. Since no unusual readings were noted, the investigation of the "thump" incident was not pursued further at that time. A postflight review of the data indicates that at about the time of the "thump," a large, momentaryincrease in LM battery output occurred. The surge was of 2 to 3 seconds duration, and was experienced by all four descent batteries. The behavior of the four battery currents is summarizedin the table:

Current

output, Peak

amps After surge

Battery I 2
3 4

Before surge

37.5 2 Off-scale high 60 amps

3 6

3 3

36.8 30.5

Z 1

The MSC investigation of this anomaly exact cause of the current increase, not known. It does appear that they with the previous service module

is still in progress, and the the "thump," and the venting :is were all related, but not connected

failure. 2 malfunction warning light board was powered down except of the problem was done

At 99:51 g.e.t, illuminated. Because for the caution and

a descent battery no. the display system on warning panels, the

analysis

B-I03

in Mission Control where telemetry was available. There were three possible valid causes of the warning light: an overcurrent, a reverse current, or a battery overtemperature condition. The troubleshooting systematically eliminated all three, and Mission Control concluded the problem was a faulty temperature sensor. The crew was advised to reconnect the battery about an hour later. No problems with the battery ever developed_ but the sensor indication later became erratic, causing several MC&W alarms. A plot of total usable amp-hours remaining in the LM batteries is contained in figure B6-4. Coolant system: It was as essential to power down the LM as much as possible in order to reduce the cooling requirements as it was to reduce the battery amp-hours expended. The LM coolant loop uses the action of ice sublimination to take heat away from the spacecraft. Feed water for the sublimator is stored in tanks, and the rate of water usage to provide this cooling is proportional to the amount of electrical power expended because of the heat generated. The analysis showed that for the abovementioned electrical power requirements, the LM water supply was most critical and would be depleted about 155 hours g.e.t. This analysis was based on data obtained several hours after the initial LM activation. Estimates based on the usage rate the LM would be depleted of water rate reduced drastically, however, accomplished. During the mission period before the postpericynthion abort, when immediately after by 94 hours g.e.t. after the initial activation indicated As expected, the cooling down was

the spacecraft was on a trajectory with a 155-hour g.e.t, landing time, efforts were made to find a method of increasing the _ water margin by means other than a further powerdown. Two procedures were developed as a result of this effort. The first allowed the crew to get drinking water from the CM potable water tank, and the second was a method of transferring water to the LM tanks for use in the LM coolant loop. _e latter procedure involved the use of the portable life support systems (PLSS) water tanks as an intermediate container for transporting the water from the CM waste tank. Although it did not become necessary to use the second procedure, it was tested on the ground by engineering personnel at MSC, and was available in Mission Control. A plot of the usable water remaining in the LM is shown in figure B6-5. Oxygen supply and carbon dioxide removal: The oxygen supply in the LM was adequate for more than 200 hours g.e.t., and was of no concern (fig. B6-6). This included a supply in the systems normally used for the lunar extravehicular activity (EVA). The initial problem with the ascent oxygen tank 2 had stabilized to the condition that the pressure in the tank was about i00 psi above the normal operating range. Engineering support personnel had advised Mission Control that this was no problem, and no further actions were taken in this area.

B-104

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B-f07

The problem a serious one.

of removing The LM, like

carbon dioxide the CSM, uses

from the cabin oxygen was lithium hydroxide (Li0H)

cartridges to scrub the recirculated oxygen to remove odors and carbon dioxide. The Li0H cartridges are rated for a specified total man-hours capacity, and eventually must be replaced when they become saturated. The LM cartridges were not adequate for carbon dioxide removal for three men for the duration of the Earth-return trip. There were more than adequate cartridges in the CM, but they would not fit in the LM canisters. There were several methods suggested for solving the problem, including powering up the CM system to circulate cabin oxygen through its LiOH canisters. The method that was actually used was developed by Crew Systems Division personnel at MSC. It consisted of using tape, flight data file cards, and plastic bag material to connect the CM Li0H canisters to the LM oxygen circulation system. The crew implemented the modification and it worked very well. The partial pressure of carbon dioxide reading indicated by the onboard gage dropped rapidly from 8mm Hg to 0.1mm Hg soon after the rig was completed at 94 hours g.e.t. The modification was not tried until this time in order to get maximum use from the LM cartridges. About 20 hours later, the carbon dioxide partial pressure reading had increased to l. Smm Hg, and a procedure for putting two additional cartridges in series to those in the CM canisters was given to the crew. This procedure was also developed by engineers at MSC (fig. B6-7). After this second modification was completed, the carbon dioxide partial pressure remained below 2mm Hg for the rest of the mission, without any further modifications necessary. The modifications to the oxygen circulation systems were evaluated in the simulators at MSC before they were accepted by mission operations personnel. This included tests in the pressure chamber. As mentioned earlier, there were other methods one proved to be unacceptable. that could have been adopted had this

Reaction control system: The LM reaction control system (LMRCS) propellants were another consumable that had to be managed carefully. Maintaining attitude control of both the CSM and the 154, with a total weight in excess of 90,000 pounds, can be done by the LMRCS, but is a particularly taxing job. The 154 control system was not designed to perform this task, and does not do it efficiently in terms of propellant expenditure. This was aggravated by the fact that there is some control moment loss and some cross coupling when the LM is in control due to thrust plume deflectors designed to protect the LM descent stage from extended thruster firings.

Shortly after the LM assumed attitude control, Mission Control gave the crew a procedure which increased the attitude excursion tolerance in the computer. This increased the attitude error tolerance and caused

B-iO8

Figure B6-7.-

View of CM LiOH cannister modification installed in the I/4.

as

B-109

less

thruster

firings

to be

commanded

by

the

computer

which

was

maintain-

ing automatic attitude control. The simulators at KSC and MSC were used to evaluate different techniques for maneuvering the spacecraft under manual control as well as automatic. Manual maneuvers became necessary after the LM inertial platform and computer were powered down after the post-pericynthion abort maneuver. Backup and support crews performed the evaluations and recommended certain techniques. Mission Control kept a close watch on the RCS propellant consumption and was prepared to have the crew revert to an uncontrolled, drifting flight mode if necessary. This would have been requested if the RCS propellant decreased below the "red line" value. The flight controllers had computed a "red line" which provided enough propellant for meeting the midcourse correction maneuver requirements and the requirements to maneuver in preparation service system for module.management the reentry the could sequence. CM be powerdown or needed at 58:40 there was The

Command very little

After that

to be

done.

electrical power system, however, did require some attention. The first action was to get the CM into a known configuration. So much had happened so quickly during the period following the accident, that neither the crew nor Mission Control had a complete knowledge of the switch configuration in the CM. Therefore, a checklist was developed which listed the desired position of every switch, circuit breaker, and actuator handle in the spacecraft. The lift-off configuration in the CSM launch checklist portion of the Flight Data File served as the baseline for this list, and the modifications were read to the crew. The crew then configured the CM as defined by this list. The next task was to determine the status of main dc bus B.

Because power had not been applied to the bus since the failure of fuel cell 3 at 55:58, it was not certain that a major short did not exist on it. Mission Control defined a procedure which used entry battery B to apply power to displays the crew indications. The the bus. The procedure contained 12 steps, and the should monitor were defined, along with the expected baseline configuration described in the preceding all loads were isolated 94:21 hours and verified from the bus. The procedthat there were no shorts

paragraph insured that ure was implemented at on the bus.

After the CM had been powered down for about 24 hours, it began to cool down to a temperature well below the minimum expected operating temperatures. Engineering support personnel became concerned about the motor switches which are normally used to connect the battery busses to the main dc busses. _en it was realized that the CM was going to get unusually cold before the initiation of the entry sequence, the of the batteries to provide sufficient potential to drive these ability switches

B-IIO

was questioned. The analysis of the situation was difficult because of the uncertainty as to how cold the battery compartment would get, and it could not be proven that a problem would exist. However, to circumvent the situation, it was decided to close the bus tie motor switches after the main bus B checkout. Subsequently, the appropriate circuit breakers would have to be used as switches to connect and disconnect the batteries from the busses (fig. B6-8). A step-by-step procedure was defined and read to the crew and the bus tie switches were closed at 94:21 g.e.t. A procedure was also developed for charging the CMentry batteries with the LM electrical power system. Approximately 20 amp-hours of tl_ 40 amp-hours capacity had been used from entry battery A during the period immediately following the accident; a much smaller amount had been taken from battery B since that time. Since the 124battery capacity provided a comfortable power margin for the return to Earth, Mission Control decided to invest someof that power in charging the CMbatteries. Preliminary examinations of an entry preparation sequence indicated that in order to not rush the crew, the CMpowerup should be initiated about 6 hours before entry. To do this demanded that all three CMbatteries be fully charged. The procedure to charge the CMbatteries was defined in complete detail by Mission Control. In its most basic terms, it was simply a procedure that used the LM/CM electrical umbilical to get power to the CMmain bus B. Then the CMbattery charger was tied to this bus and the battery to be charged. The procedure as read to the crew consisted of four typewritten pages of notes and a step-by-step switch position definition. The battery charging was initiated at about 112 hours g.e.t, to demonstrate that it could be done and was completed at 128 hours after 18 of the 20 amp-hours had been replaced. This was done well before the reentry preparation, to allow the entry planning to proceed with the assurance that all batteries would be fully charged at the beginning of the entry preparations. Return to Earth Trajectory Control

All trajectory determination and maneuver targeting for getting the crew back to Earth was performed by the Mission Control Center. This is the normal procedure, but usually the crew also has the capability to do this. This serves as a backup in case communications are lost with the ground. However, with the command module G&Nsystem completely shut down, the crew was totally dependent on Mission Control for navigation, and abort and midcourse correction maneuver targeting. There was no backup. There were four trajectory change maneuversperformed to return the spacecraft to the recovery area in the mid-Pacific Oceanfollowing the command module powerdown(fig. B6-9). The first, performed at 61:_0 g.e.t., placed the spacecraft on a safe reentry trajectory. The second_ performed at 79:28 g.e.t._ adjusted the Earth landing point to

B-Ill

__0

tPowered

from

Entry battery A

-0

7.,
l--l--

battery

bus A

•---0

0 Z Mo or switch

EBatLery

bus A Main bus A j

Entry battery C -0 0----

Main --Battery
t

bus B

bus B !

-Motor Entry battery B -0 0-------0 0

switch

7 °
battery
showLng

Powered

from bus B

-Circuit 0 0

breakers

Figure

B6-8.-

Simplified power

wiring to main

diagram busses.

battery

B-II2

o

I I I

0 ¢..J

I
I I / / / / / / / / / ,/ / / / / / / I /
I

b
0 o _J
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B-II3

the mid-Pacific recovery area. The last two maneuvers, performed at 105:18 and at 137:40 g.e.t., were course corrections which adjusted the entry conditions to be in the middle of the safe entry corridor. These maneuvers and the decisions related to the choice of specific course changes are described in the following paragraphs.
Abort maneuver at 61:30 hours.Soon after the failure in the CSM it became obvious that the lunar landing mission could not be achieved and that all effort would have to be focused on getting the crew back to Earth as soon as possible. At the time, the spacecraft was not on a trajectory that would return to a safe reentry of the Earth's atmosphere --so a trajectory change was mandatory. The following questions needed to be answered: What path should be followed back to Earth? When should the trajectory-changing maneuver be executed? Because the spacecraft was on its way to the Moon, there were two basic types of abort paths that could have been followed: (i) a direct abort in which the trajectory would be turned around and the spacecraft returned to Earth without circumnavigating the Moon; and (2) a circumlunar before abort in which the spacecraft would follow a path around the Moon it returned to Earth. The disadvantage of the circumlunar abort

path is that the flight back to Earth takes a longer time than for direct aborts. However, circumlunar aborts require much less velocity change and consequently much less propellant to perform, and part of the flight time can be made up by executing an additional "speedup" maneuver after the spacecraft has passed the Moon. The direct abort was ruled out for Apollo 13 because the propellant requirements were so large. It would have been necessary to jettison the LM in order to reduce the spacecraft weight so that the service propulsion system (SPS) engine could make the necessary velocity change. The LM was essential to the crew's survival, and must not be jettisoned. Therefore, the choice was narrowed to the circumlunar abort which could be executed with the LM descent propulsion system (DPS), but there were still some decisions to be made. The options were as follows: i. execute Do nothing until to place after it the on an spacecraft Earth-return passed the Moon; then

a maneuver

trajectory. to place the spacecraft LM immediately there-

2. Execute on an Earth-return after.

a maneuver as soon as practical trajectory and power down the

3. The combination of both trajectory as soon as practical, Moon, perform a maneuver to speed

the and up

above: after the

Get on an Earth-return the spacecraft passed the to Earth.

return

B-II4

Option 2 was selected. The principal reason was that the LM systems necessary for executing the maneuverwere working at the time, and they might not be working 20 hours from then when the spacecraft was in position to do option i. Another consideration was the fact that the velocity requirement to get on an Earth-return trajectory would increase from 40 fps to 160 fps, making it impossible to perform with the RCSsystem if this becamenecessary. So even though option i would have allowed an immediate partial LM powerdown, saving someelectrical power and water, it was decided that the risk was not worth the savings. Also, option 2 left option 3 available if the guidance and navigation system could be powered up to perform the second maneuver. The decision having been madeto perform a circumlunar abort, and to perform as soon as possible the maneuverto place the spacecraft on a safe reentry trajectory, the only question remaining open was what Earth landing point to target for. Because of the LM consumablesstatus, getting back to Earth as soon as possible was the overriding factor. The quickest return resulted in a landing in the Indian Oceanat 152 hours g.e.t. This meant giving up the ability to bring the spacecraft down in the vicinity of the prime recovery force in the Pacific, although at least a water landing was provided. This was considered to be acceptable because the abort maneuverafter passing the Moonprobably could be used to decrease the flight time and to land in the prime recovery area.
placed Post-pericynthion abort maneuver.Although the on a reentry trajectory by the abort maneuver spacecraft was at 61:30 with a

landing at 152 hours g.e.t, in the Indian Ocean, it was decided that a post-pericynthion abort maneuver (PC + 2) should be performed. There were two reasons: (i) to reduce the return time to increase the LM consumable margin (the prediction at the time indicated only a 3-hour margin); and (2) to change the landing point to the mid-Pacific where the recovery force could be on station. During the consumable first few hours after usage had shown that LM activation, detailed analysis the guidance and navigation system

of

LM

could be kept powered up until after the PC + 2 abort maneuver at 79:30 g.e.t. It was predicted that all consumables would last at least until 155 hours g.e.t, even if the LM powerdown to 15 amperes total current were delayed until after 80 hours g.e.t. There were several three options listed available in the for decreasing table the flight a landing

time, but only the in the mid-Pacific.

following

provided

B-if5

Option

Delta fps

V,

Engine used

Landing time, hours g.e.t.

i 2

85O 4OOO 4OOO

DPS DPS SPS

142
118 118

3

Option i was selected even though it resulted in the longest flight time, because of some very undesirable characteristics of options 2 and 3. The problem with option 2 was that it would be necessary to jettison the service module in order to be able to get a 4000 fps velocity change with the 124 descent propulsion system. Such a maneuver would almost deplete the descent propellant, leaving a very limited capability should subsequent maneuvers be necessary. There was a high probability that a large course correction would have to be made later. Option 2 was seriously considered, but eventually rejected because it left the CM heat shield exposed to the space environment for such a long period of time, and the possible thermal degradation that might result from this was an unknown risk. The heatshield capability to withstand reentry might be compromised by the prolonged period of cold temperature it would experience. Option 3 was rejected because of the unknown status of the SPS; it was thought that the SPS or the SM might have been damaged by whatever had caused the "bang" and that the SPS should not be used unless absolutely necessary. Since option allowed retention also allowed mately i000 i provided a comfortable consumables margin and of the service module, it was selected. Option propulsion system retained after the delta abort V capability maneuver. of

i

a descent fps to be

approxi-

Part of the preparation for each mission is the establishment of "ground rules" and maneuver monitoring criteria for each planned maneuver. The "ground rules" are general statements which define what should be done if certain events occur. The maneuver monitoring criteria define explicitly the conditions under which the crew will deliberately same for all terminate maneuvers the maneuver early. The criteria because there is a wide variation are not the in the serious-

ness of the effect of dispersions, and in the seriousness of the effects of early or late engine shutdown. The trajectory and mission situations for the post-pericynthion abort burn were different from any of those for which criteria had been defined; therefore, Jt was necessary to establish these "rules."

B-II6

The pertinent follows:

characteristics

that would affect

the rules were as

(a) The spacecraft was on a safe reentry trajectory, although small course corrections probably would be required before reentry. (b) The primary purpose of the maneuver was to place the landing point in the vicinity of the recovery force. (c) The secondary purpose of decreasing the flight major importance. (d) The LM inertial approximately 20 hours. time was of

platform had not been fine aligned for

(e) The maneuver could be delayed for 2 hours with an increase in delta V of only 24 fps. (f) The LM descent propulsion system was to be used.

The following ground rules based on these characteristics were established by the Mission Control team and were given to the crew: (a) If the engine does not light, start procedures. do not attempt any emergency

(b) If the primary guidance and navigation system (PGNS)has failed, do not perform the maneuver. (c) Do not attempt to null the indicated velocity engine shutdown. errors after

(d) If an engine shutdown occurred, a subsequent midcourse correction would be performed no sooner than 2 hours later. The criteria follows: i. for early termination of the maneuver were defined as

Propulsion SystemParameters (a) Engine chamberpressure
_77

psi (TM)
percent thrust (on board)

(b)

Inlet

pressure

<i o psi
_160 psi psi (on board) (ground monitored)

(c)

Delta P fuel/oxidizer

>25

B-II7

2.

Guidance and Control SystemParameters (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Attitude Attitude rate error >i0 deg/sec (except during start transient) >i0 degrees

Engine gimbal light Inertial platform failure with a program alarm

Computer warning light Control electronics system dc fail light

A final rule that was defined stated that if an early engine shutdown was experienced not due to any of the above, a relight should be attempted, using the engine-start pushbutton and the Descent Engine Command Override switch. A contingency LM activation checklist had been defined prior to the mission and was part of the crew's Flight Data File. This checklist was designed to prepare the LM for a docked descent propulsion system burn from a completely dormant state. The majority of this checklist had been accomplished with the initial LM powerup at 58 hours g.e.t. The flight controllers reviewed the list in detail and defined a modified list of steps necessary to prepare the 124for the abort maneuver. The modification was basically a deletion of steps already accomplished or not necessary; however, there was one change which revised the time at which the helium regulator shutoff valve was to be closed. This was done to preclude the possibility of a shift in the regulator operating pressure causing a freezing of the propellant lines after this burn. Such an event would prevent further use of the descent engine and it was mandatory to maintain this engine for probable subsequent trajectory changes.
that Midcourse correction maneuver.Postmaneuver tracking data the second abort maneuver had placed the spacecraft grossly indicated on the

right path. However, because the LM inertial platform could not be fine aligned prior to the maneuver, the execution errors were larger than normal and the spacecraft was not on a safe reentry trajectory. This was expected and subsequent corrections were planned for in the LM consumables budget. The correction delta V magnitude was projected to be about 7 fps if executed at 104 hours g.e.t. Unlike the abort maneuver, the course correction maneuvers are not extremely sensitive to pointing accuracy, and with the delta V of only 7 fps with sufficient accuracy without the inertial it could guidance probably system. be executed A special

B-il8

team_ composedof off-duty flight controllers and membersof the backup flightcrew_ was formed to define the maneuverground rules and procedures to be followed for the course correction maneuver. A detailed crew checklist was to be developed also. None of the procedures or checklists in the Flight Data File were applicable because of the unique situation that existed for this case. The major issues addressed by this team were as follows: i. Howto get the spacecraft aligned in the proper direction for the maneuver? Wasit necessary to power up the inertial platform? 2. RCS? 3. 4. Which engine should be used, descent propulsion system or LM W%lat burn monitoring criteria _at attitude should be used?

control modesshould be used?

The team determined that it was unnecessary to use the inertial platform for the maneuver. The spacecraft could be oriented in the proper pitch direction by sighting on the center of the Earth with the Crew Optical Alignment System (COAS)fixed along the LM +Z axis. The approximately correct azimuth could be achieved by aligning the sunset terminator parallel to the LM Y-axis. This procedure had been developed in the preparation for Apollo 8 when it was discovered that course correction maneuvers could best be madein a local horizontal attitude (that is, perpendicular to a vector from the center of the Earth to the spacecraft). It could easily be applied to the LH-active maneuver, and would give adequate thrust pointing accuracy, so it was not necessary to power up the LM G&Nsystem and try to align its inertial platform. It was decided to use the descent propulsion system for the maneuver instead of the RCS engines, because the engine-on time for an RCS maneuver would exceed a constraint which protects the LM RCS plume deflectors. The engine was to be left at the low throttle point (about 12.6 percent of full thrust) to give the crew more time to monitor the burn and the lower acceleration should increase the shutdown accuracy. The engine
shutdown decided ometers, Mission criteria were the same as for the previous burn. It was to monitor the delta V with the backup guidance system accelerbut to shut the engine down at a fixed delta time specified by Control. Studies had shown that the burn time computed by

Mission Control was very accurate. Since the accelerometers had not been maintained at their proper temperature (heaters had been turned off to reduce consumables expenditure), their status was questionable and the team decided to not use the backup guidance system as an engine shutdown cue. However, if this system appeared to perform nominally

B-119

during the maneuver, it would be used to null the velocity residuals in the X direction. Velocity errors in either Y or Z direction had an insignificant effect on the entry conditions and were not to be nulled. Attitude control of the docked vehicle with the backup system required both the CDR and the LMP to actively participate, and Y- and Zaxis translation thrusters had to be used to get adequate control torque. The team defined the modes and procedures to be used in getting the spacecraft in the correct attitude and in controlling the attitude during the engine burn. A procedure to return the spacecraft to the passive thermal control condition was also defined. All the plans were completed after two lengthy team defined a detailed crew checklist sessions. A subgroup to be followed in

from

preparing for the maneuver and in preparing for the coasting flight following the maneuver. The checklist was evaluated by members of the backup crew in mission simulators at MSC and some minor modifications were made as a result. The checklist and the procedures were reviewed by the on-duty Mission Control team and then read to the crew approximately 5 hours prior to the scheduled course correction. This allowed the crew ample time to study them and to rehearse their roles. Entry Procedures and Checklist Definition

After the situation in the spacecraft was stabilized, one of the several parallel activities that was initiates _as the definition of procedures for the pre-reentry phase. The total loss of electrical power in the service module forced some major revisions to the activities and the crew procedures for this part of the mission. The most significant consequences of this loss were the following: (i) SM RCS engines would not continue to fire to separate it from the CM after jettison; and (2) LM electrical power and RCS should be used to conserve the CM batteries and RCS propellant as much as possible. This meant that the LM should be retained through as much of the pre-entry sequence as possible, and that a plan for jettisoning the SM and the LM had to be worked out. A first iteration plan for the pre-entry phase was available as early as 12 hours after the LM activation. This plan called for CM powerup 2 hours before arrival at the entry interface (El - 2 hours), and required the total remaining capacity from the CM entry batteries, 98 amp-hours. After the plan was thoroughly reviewed by all elements of the operations team, including mission planning and flight crew support personnel, several modifications and additions were considered necessary. The principal difficulty was that the crew would probably be rushed, and there was little or no extra time allowed for contingencies. It was evident that the timeline needed to be extended and the CM

B-120

batteries would have to be recharged to at least 115 amp-hours. The recharging was accomplished and the procedure is described in Part A2 of Appendix A. The White Team, one of the four flight control teams assigned to the mission, was taken off its normal rotation of duty in order to devote full attention to developing the reentry preparation sequence of events, crew procedures, and checklists. With this flight control team as the lead element, all MSC organizations normally involved in this type of premission activity were enlisted in this effort. In the course of defining the procedures, extensive use was madeof the spacecraft simulators at MSC and KSC. These simulations_ performed by members of the backup crews, served two essential purposes. The first was simply to evaluate them--to determine if they were practical, safe, efficient, and adequate. The second purpose was to determine the time required to complete certain parts of the procedures. The latter was important because a completely defined timeline had to be given to the crew in order to insure that everything was accomplished on time. It was essential that this timeline be realistic because the crew could not afford to get behind and fail to complete it, but neither could they start too early and use too much power from the CM batteries.
Another source of data used to develop the procedures was a series of contingency separation studies that was performed prior to the flight by mission planning personnel. These studies had examined the trajectoryrelated considerations for several different methods of jettisoning the SM and the LM. They had defined the effects of different attitudes, time, and velocity of jettison on the subsequent separation distances. It was only necessary to verify that these studies were valid for the Apollo 19 conditions, characteristics. and then select the one with the most optimum

The planning and evaluation of the pre-entry activities continued for approximately 2 days. At the end of this time, a complete plan had been defined and thoroughly reviewed. It was read to the crew at about 120 hours g.e.t., which gave them about a day to study and rehearse their procedures. The pre-entry sequence plan (fig. B6-10) called for initiating the

powerup at El - 6½ hours, with the LM supplying power to main bus B in the CM and entry battery C supplying power to main bus A. A total of 115 amp-hours was required of the CM entry batteries, including a 2] amphour allowance for contingency after splashdown. A detailed expected battery current profile was plotted and used during the actual preparation to verify that a safe power margin was maintained throughout the reentry preparations. Battery utilization was planned so that all three entry batteries would be available throughout the entry phase. It

B-121

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(1)

+._ q) I (1) h
!

d
I

b.O
.f-I

r_

B-122

was predicted main chutes, two batteries

that battery C would be depleted after deployment of the and in fact it was. This left the redundant capability of available to inflate the uprighting bags after splashdown. LM powerup, was crew was not resting there was ample decided to turn on

The initial part of the reentry preparations, performed about _ hours earlier than planned. The comfortably due to the cold environment, and sin_e margin in the LM batteries and water tanks, it was some equipment to try to warm up the spacecraft.

After activating the LM guidance and control system, the first major milestone in the entry sequence was to execute the final course correction to place the spacecraft on a trajectory that was in the center of the safe entry corridor. Prior to the final course correction, the trajectory had an entry angle error of about +0.5 degree, which is a safe condition, but slightly shallow (fig. B6-11). It is a standard practice to perform a final trim maneuver a few hours prior to entry to try to course whether remove any entry angle error greater than ±0.i degree, correction was incorporated in the timeline before it or not it could be required. procedures earlier one and this was known

same

The planned as for the

for the final course correction were performed at about 104 hours g.e.t.,

the

including the alignment procedure which only required sighting the Earth through the COAS. Manual control of the actual delta V maneuver was also planned. However, since the LM powerup was started 3 hours earlier than originally expected, it was decided to use part of this time to align the LM inertial platform. This was done with the crew sighting on the Moon and the Sun for orientation determination. A further modification to the planned procedures of using the primary guidance system to perform the course correction had to be abandoned, because the attitude error indications did not behave properly. It was suspected that there might be something wrong with the guidance computer, so the crew performed the maneuver manually, following the original plan. Subsequent analysis has shown that the attitude error indications were not indicative of a system problem, but were a result of the guidance system activation procedures. These same indications did not show up in the simulator evaluations performed before the crew was given the procedures because of the limitations of simulator initialization. The service module jettison was the next major milestone in the pre-entry sequence. It was performed at about 4-1/2 hours prior to reentry. The techniques used and the attitude and delta V requirements for it were obtained from premission studies. Basically, the technique was very similar to that used by a railroad switch engine to get rid of the end boxcar. The spacecraft was given an impulse with the LM RCS that caused a velocity change in the desired direction of about 0.5 fps; the CM/SM separation pyrotechnics were fired, physically disconnecting

B-123

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f-I o

o

4_ 4o •H ,-t _) h

I ko _q

/
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B-!2_

the two modules; and a velocity change of the LM and CM was accomplished by reverse thrust from the LM RCS. The service module continued to translate relative to the manned modules, and separated from them at a rate of 0.5 fps. The normal method of using SM RCS jets to drive the SM away would not work because there was no way to get electrical power to keep normally the jets perform firing after this function CM/SM were separation. inoperative. The fuel cells which

The next major step was to get the CM inertial platform aligned. An automatic guidance controlled reentry was planned, which meant that the platform needed to be aligned to a known reference direction. There were several methods that could have been used to accomplish this, and a considerable amount of time was spent by the White Team in determining the best one. The selected plan used the docked align transfer procedure to get the CM platform coarsely aligned to the LM platform. The CM platform was then very accurately aligned to the desired direction by optical sightings with the CM sextant. Mission Control was standing by with an alternate procedure in case stars could not be seen through the CM optics; however, this was not necessary. There was much interference on the voice and telemetry communication signals during this time period, which was later diagnosed to be due to the spacecraft attitude. Apparently the spacecraft was oriented so that the LM structure was blocking the signal from all of the omni antennas arrayed around the CM, and the received signal strength was very low. The antenna blockage problem was not recognized and several reconfigurations of the communication equipment were made to try to correct the problem, none of which were successful. In order to maintain adequate signal strength, it was necessary to receive data at the low bit rate only. This was not a major handicap, delay in completing the preparation of the CM but it guidance did cause some system for reentry.

The LM jettison from the CM was accomplished at about i hour prior to reentry. The attitude was based on premission studies, but no technique had been defined for achieving the actual separation with LM jettison from the CM only (no service module). The technique was defined by the White Team and consisted of using pressure in the LM/CM tunnel to impart a relative velocity to the two modules when the final separation pyrotechnics were fired. This method of separation had inadvertantly occurred at the LM final jettison on Apollo i0 and was known to give sufficient separation velocity. It was planned to jettison the LM in a direction 45 degrees south

of the spacecraft plane of motion; however, the crew maneuvered the spacecraft to an attitude 65 degrees north of this plane. Mission Control was monitoring the spacecraft attitude, but did not realize the mistake until the crew was in the process of final closeout of the LM. Flight controllers quickly analyzed the situation and determined that,

B-125

although the 65 degrees north attitude did not give as much separation, it was acceptable. The major problem in being in error by ii0 degrees was that it placed the CMin an attitude much closer to gimbal lock than is normally done. The crew had to be especially alert during the jettison and to use manual control of the CMto avoid gimbal lock. The remainder of the sequence, from LM jettison to splashdown, followed normal procedures. The only difference was that the CMwas completely independent of other spacecraft componentsat i hour prior to reentry instead of the usual 15 minutes.

B-126

PART INSTRUMENT SYSTEM

B7 CHARACTERISTICS

and

Part 7 provides characteristics

additional technical information of _hich are pertinent to interpretation of this Appendix. The following

systems design of data presystems are

sented in earlier discussed: Oxygen Oxygen Oxygen Apollo Mission Tank Tank Tank PCM

parts

Temperature Quantity Pressure Telemetry

Instrumentation Instrumentation Instrumentation System

Control

OXYGEN

TANK

TEMPERATURE

MEASUREMENT

The temperature measurement is made with a platinum resistance thermometer (R/T) encased in an Inconel sheath attached to the Teflon insulator part of the quantity probe (fig. B7-1). The resistance of the The R/T and the transducer output voltage increase signal conditioner which serves as a reference is located transducer on the oxygen tank shelf. is shown in figure B7-2. and performance parameters with temperature. voltage generator An electrical sche-

and amplifier matic of the

as

The system follows: Data Range Corresponding Output Accuracy Output sample

electrical

can

be

summarized

rate

one

per

second to +80 ° F ohms dc or ±ii ° F

-320 ° F R/T values 71 to 0 to ±2.68 impedance 5000

553 5 V

voltage

percent ohms

B-127

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B-129

Power Time constant or in liquid

1.25

watts,

115 20

V

ac,

400

cps

Approximately

seconds

nitrogen The

alcohol time constant was measured by plunging the sensor

20-second

first into liquid nitrogen at -317 ° F and then into dry ice/alcohol at -91 ° F. Tests were made under one-g and i atmosphere and are not applicable to supercritical oxygen and zero-g. Telemetry would indicate the temperature of the sensor itself, but under rapidly changing conditions the sensor could remain almost unaffected by local temperature changes in other parts of the tank. The effect of various failure modes on the transducer and its output signal are presented in table B7-1.

OXYGEN

TANK

QUANTITY

INSTRUMENTATION

The oxygen tank quantity gage is senses the average dielectric constant annular volume between two concentric

shown in figure B7-1. This gage of oxygen in the cylindrical aluminum tubes. The dielectric

constant is proportional to density, which in turn is proportional to the quantity of oxygen in the tank. The gage is approximately 2 feet long; the outer tube is about 0.85-inch ID and the inner tube is about O.65-inch OD to form two plates of a capacitor with O.lO-inch spacing. The gage mounts in the center of the tank. The gage capacitance is connected in series with a reference capacity to form a capacitive 400-cycle ac voltage divider as shown in figure B7-3 and is adjusted to apply zero volts input to the amplifiers when the tank is empty. As the tank is filled, the gage capacity increases, applying a voltage to the amplifier input. This voltage is amplified and rectified to provide an output signal voltage which increases to 5 volts dc when the tank is full. The reactive voltage developed across the probe capacitance will

change as rapidly as capacitance changes. output of the signal conditioner introduces 0.022 second in the instrument response.

The rectifier filter on the a time constant of about

B-130

TABLEB7-1.- FAILURE MODES OF THEOXYGEN TANKTEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER

_Failure mode Any of the four temperature sensor leads shorted to 115 V ac line (i, 2, 3, 4) Temperature sensor shorted to the density probe element Temperature sensor shorted to ground (either side) Dc power shorted to temperature sensor Either or both sensor leads open 400 Hz power input to power supply disconnected.

Indication Full scale output followed by zero output *No change in output *Zero output signal Full scale output Full scale output Output drifts to zero as charge in power supply filter capacitors discharge. *Zero output Zero output

Resulting damage Would fail signal conditioner amplifier, sensor element, and pulse code modulation gate Probably no circuit element damage No circuit damage

Would fail signal conditioner output None None

Temperature sensor leads shorted to each other Any one of leads i, 3, or 4 broken (open) (fig. B7-2) Openlead 2 (fig. B7-1)

None No circuit damage damage

* Immediate rise No circuit to full scale followed by a linear decay to zero in approx, i0 msec

*Indication

verified

by test

B-131

T__T

._

h bB c_ .,-I

oLPl
co © "_ 0

m t"_l O',_i

bD bO

-'-C
G) 0 0
® bD 0 I

.4

bO

0..

"-0

o._,

0 :)0

cOO

B-132

Gage

parameters Tank

are

as

follows: Empty 0 Full 69.5 ib/ft 3

condition

Density Dielectric Constant Capacitance Output Output Power Supply Accuracy Value of fixed voltage voltage impedance

1.0 121 0 500 2-1/2 115 2.68 V, ohms watts 400

1.45 175 picofarads

5 V dc

cycles full scale

percent

capacitance Data sampled

i000 Once

picofarads per second

This method of gaging works well for single-phase fluids in any gravity environment so long as the fluid is uniformly mixed with no significant density variations. But under zero-g, density and temperature variations can exist in the fluid, especially when heat is added without any fluid movement (convection). measures the average density of the may or may not be representative of Under these conditions, the gage oxygen between the two tubes which the average density in the tank. the signal quantity is conditioner indicated.

If the gage is either opened or shorted, is overdriven and a greater-than-lOO-percent Other malfunction characteristics follow.

B-155

Failure

Mode shorted to Full

Effect scale output

lJ

Elements of probe each other Wire to either

e

element from probe

Full

scale

output

disconnected Outside or its to
o

o

element of probe lead wire shorted

ground element of probe lead shorted to

Measurement indicates some value between zero and full scale Random towards output zero tending

Inside or its ground

5.

Clear

shorted

probe

Output decreases to zero, remains 0.7 second, then increases to correct value in about 1-1/2 second

6.

Clear

open

probe

fault

Output assumed correct value within 1/2 second any Output becomes sawtooth irregular

e

Intermittent combination

shorts,

OXYGEN

TANK

2 PRESSURE

INSTRUMENTATION

The location of is shown schematically tanks are located in

the oxygen tank pressure measuring instrumentation in figure B7-4. Pressure transducers for both a valve module assembly along with the pressure valves to the as shown in figure B7-5. The valve oxygen tanks by 19-foot lengths of

switches and pressure relief module assembly is connected i/4-inch and 3/16-inch OD

tu0ing.

The pressure transducer consists of a diaphragm 0.2 inch in diameter and O.015 inch thick to which are attached 4 chips of strain-sensitive semi-conductor materials electrically connected into a bridge circuit. When pressure cal resistance is applied, deflection of the semi-conductor of the diaphragm changes the clips to unbalance the bridge pressure. 1050 psia panel and electriand gives tele-

develop an electrical output proportional to the applied This output is amplified so that full-scale pressure of a 5 V dc output which is indicated on the CM instrument metered to the ground through the PCM telemetry system.

B-134

4J rj_ u]

hO

o
I

I b--

X

t_
X

x

,,.--I

X

X

X

g
X

g
x oo

B-135

Relief

value

Pressure tran

Pressure for cycling heaters

switch

Figure

B7-5.-

Pressure

transducer_

relief

valve,

and

pressure

switch.

B-136

Other

pressure Range Accuracy Output Output Power Voltage Data

transducer

parameters 19

are

as

follows:

to 1080

psia fuel range

±2.68 voltage impedance 0 to 500 1.5 supply 28

percent 5 V dc ohms watts

V dc per second

sampled

Once

Under normal operating conditions of tubing is about 1.5 pounds per hour the line is negligible.

oxygen flow through the 19 feet and the pressure drop through

The physical dimensions and electronic characteristics of the pressure transducer are such that its time lags are negligible as compared with acoustical lags of the tubing. If the relief valve opens (normally set at 1008 psia) or if the pressure in the tank changes suddenly, the delta P is communicated through the tube at sonic velocity (813 fps at 288 ° R) so that a delay of about 23 msec would be expected exclusive of pressure drops due to flow through the tubing. Tests run at MSC show that when a step pressure increase is applied at the tank end of the system, pressure in about 16 msec and reaches 40 msec. indicated by the transducer 63 percent of the pressure begins change to change in about

PULSE

CODE

MODULATION

SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION

The instrumentation system on the Apollo spacecraft interfaces with a pulse code modulation (PCM) telemetry system. In such a system, measurements are not presented continuously, but are sampled in time and quantitized in amplitude. Signal conditioners standardize the outputs from all sensors to a range of O to 5 volts. This voltage is fed into the PCM system where it is sampled and encoded for transmission to the ground. The switches PCM and system basically consists of a number of electronic input an analog-to-digital encoder, all of which are controlled

by a programmer. The analog switches, through programmer control, are sampled sequentially with a sample period of 40 microseconds for each

B-137

input. The sampled voltage is then converted by the encoder into an $-bit binary word which is subsequently transmitted to the ground. The sampling rate for each channel is selected on the basis of the rapidity with which that channel value changes under normal operation. Programmer sampling rates are 200, i00, 50, i0, and I sample per second. The end result of this operation when the system is in the high-bit-rate mode is a serial stream of data consisting of 128 eight-bit words in each frame with 50 frames transmitted each second. This corresponds to a bit rate of 51,2OObits per second. In the low-bit-rate mode, 1600 bits per second are transmitted and the measurementsare madeat a reduced sampling rate. In evaluating telemetry data, consideration must be given to the fact that the system samples data in time and quantitizes in amplitude. Figure B7-6 depicts an analog signal and its equivalent digital representation to illustrate several limitations of PCM telemetry systems. will !. Fast transients not be recorded. which happen to occur between the sample times

2. A long transient whose peak amplitude occurs between sample times will be recorded with an incorrect peak amp]itude. 3. A low-amplitude transient may go completely unrecorded even if its peak amplitude occurs at a sample time. 4. A change of one count in a parameter does not necessarily mean that the analog quantity has changedby an amount equal to the difference in count values. If the analog quantity happens to be very close
to the switchover count to change. point between counts, a small change can cause the

5. If the analog quantity remains for a long time close to the switchover point from one count to the next, the output may toggle (jump back and forth) from one count to another. This does not indicate that the analog value is actually changing this rapidly but is characteristic 6. of In the system to when the noise is present. illustrated in figure B7-6, it

addition

phenomena

must be recognized that noise in be received on the ground. Such values which differ greatly from Table BT-II lists the

the RF link may cause errors usually appear adjacent outputs from telemetered their ranges,

erroneous data to in the data as the same channel. the Apollo rates, 13

measurements as well as

from

command and service modules and value of one count.

sampling

B-138

_5 c_ bD
u_

o

bO 0 ,--t

ZD

CH 0 0
.,-I

o _1 _ r_ c_ 0 o

(u

E

b8
.,-I

o o ,-I

I

-,-I

I

,d
!

b-I1)

hO
.el

Illl
0 _ _ _0000000000 _ _ _ _ _ _

Jl
_ 0

_oooooooooo

B-139

TABLE

BT-II.-

CI)MMAND

AND

SERVICE

MODULE

TEI_IMET_Y

IZTA

DE_$Fd_Y

Meas uremen t

Samples/Second Un it s/Count Approx. Range High +850 +850 +85C +850

Number

Title

Unit Low

High Bit Rate i 1 i i

Low Bit }{ate 4 - *NL 4 - NL 4 - NL 4 - NL

CAI820T CAI821T CAI822T CA1823T

TEMP CREW SUR LOC TEMP CREW SUR LOC TEMP CREW SUR LOC TEMP CREW SUR LOC TEMP SM SURF TEMP SM SURF

HS ABL IA HS ABL 4A HS ABL 7A HS ABL 10A

°F °F °F °F

-300 -_00 -300 -300

SAI830T SAI831T SAI832T SAI833T SA2377T SA2378T SA2379T SA2380T

SKIN LOC IA SKIN LOC 4A

OF °F' °F °F °F' °F °F °F

-120 -120 -120 -120 -i00 -i00 -i00 -i00

+2'/0 +270 +270 4270 +200 +200 +200 +200

i i i I i 1 1 1

1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2

- NL - NL - NL - NL

TEMP SM SKIN SURF LOC 7A TEMP SM SKIN SURF LOC IOA TEMP BAY 20X TANK SURFACE TEMP BAY 30X TANK SURFACE TEMP BAY 5 FUEL TANK SURFACE TE_4P BAY 6 FUEL TANK SURFACE QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY PREss 02 PRESS 02 PRESS H2 PRESS TEMP TEMP TEMP TEMP H2 02 02 H2 H2 }{2 TANK H2 TANK 02 TANK 02 TANK TANK i TANK 2 TANK i TANK TANK TANK TANK TANK 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2

SC0030Q SC0031Q SC0032Q SC0033Q sco037P SC0038P SC0039P SC0040P SCO041T SC0042T SC0043T SC0044T CC0175T CC0176T CC0177T CC0200V CC0203V CC0206V CC0207V

PCT PCT PCT PCT PSIA PSIA PSIA PSIA °F OF °F °F °F °F °F VAC VAC VDC _)C

0 0 0 0 20 20 © 0 -325 -325 -425 -425 +32 +32 +32 0 0 0 0

i00 i00 i00 i00 1080 1080 JSO 550 +80 +80 -200 -200 +248 +248 +248 +150 +150 +45 +45

i i i 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 i0 i0 i0 i0

1 i i 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 l 1

o.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 4.0 4.o 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 i.o 1.0 1 1 1 - NL

TEMP STATIC INVERTER i TEMP STATIC INVERTER 2 TEMP STATIC INVERTER 3 AC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS i PHASE A AC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS 2 PHASE A DC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS A DC VOLTAGE BUS B MAIN

1 1 i 1

0.6 0.6 0.18 0. i8

NL

- Non

Linear

B-140

TABLE

B7-11.-

CO_,_4AND AND

SERVICE

MODULE

TEn.EMEry

DATA

SUMMARY-

Continued.

Measurement

Samples/Second [ Units/Count Approx. Low Range Low High +45 +45 +5 +100 +i00 +i00 +45 High Bit Rate i0 i0 i0 i0 i0 l0 l0 Bit Rate 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.18

Number

Title

Unit

I

CC0210V CC0211V CC0215C CC0222C CC0223C CC0224C CC0232V

DC VOLTAGE TERY BUS DC VOLTAGE TERY BUS DC DC

BATA BATB

VDC VDC AMP AMP AMP

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CURRENT BATT CHARGER OUT CURRENT BATTERY A B

DC CURRENT BATTERY DC CURRENT BATTERY

AMP C VDC

DC VOLTAGE BATTERY RELAY BUS N2 PRESSURE REGULATED N2 PRESSURE REGULATED N2 PRESSURE REGULATED 02 PRESSURE REGULATED 02 PRESSURE REGULATED 02 PRESSURE REGULATED H2 PRESSURE REGULATED }{2 PRESSURE REGULATED FC i FC 2 FC 3

SC2060P SC2061P SC2062P SC2066P SC2067P SC2068P SC2069P SC2070P SC2071P SC2081T SC2082T SC2083T SC2084T SC2085T SC2086T SC2087T SC2088T SC2089T SC2090T SC2091T SC2092T SC2113C

PSIA PSIA PSIA PSIA PSIA PSIA PSIA PSIA PSIA °F °F °F °F OF °F OF OF °F OF OF °F AMP

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +145 +145 +145 +80 +80 +80 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 0

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 +250 +250 +250 +550 +550 +550 +300 +300 +300 +300 +300 +300 +I00

l0 l0 lO i0 i0 l0 I0 i0 i0 1 I 1 i i 1 1 i i i i I i0

0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 2 2 2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0._

FC i FC 2 FC 3 FC 1 FC 2 3

H2 PRESSURE FC REGULATED T_P FC 1 COND EXHAUST TEMP FC 2 EXHAUST TEMP FC 3 EXHAUST i TEMP FC i TEMP FC 2 TEMP FC 3 TEMP FC i OUTLET TEMP FC 2 OUTLET THUMP FC 3 OUTLET COND COND

SKIN SKIN SKIN RADIATOR RADIATOR RADIATOR

BAD INLET TEMP FC i RAD INLET TEMP FC 2 RAD INLET TEMP FC 3 DC CURRENT FC 1 OUTLET

B-141

TABLE

BT-II.-

<70f_[v_Al_LA_ib

S!_<V[CE

MODULE

TELE_TRy

[_%qy_ g'_;AAY

-

Continued.

Measurement

Samples/Second Units/Count Approx. Range Hi gh +i00.0 High Rate Low Bit Low Bit Rate

Number

Title

Unit

SC2114C

DC

CURRENT OUTPUT

FC

2

AMP

0

i0

i

O.4

SC2115C

DC

CURRENT OUTPUT

FC

3

A]_

0

+i00.0

i0

i

0._

SC2139R SC2140R SC2141R SC2142R SC2143R SC2144R SC2160X

FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW PH

RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE FACrOR

H2 H2 }{2 02 02 02

FC FC FC FC FC FC

i 2 3 1 2 3

LB/HR LB/HH LB/HR LB/tIR LB/HR [_/HR

0 0 0 0 0 0 NORM i.?

.2 .2 .2

i0 i0 i0 i0 i0 i0 i0 1

..001 .001 .001 .005 .005 .005

-

NL NL NL NL NL NL

1.7 i.'_ HIGH

WATER i WATER 2 WATER FC 3 CURRENT A_

COND SC2161X PH

FC

FACTOR COND FC

NoRM

HIGH

i0

1

SC2162X

PH

FACTOR COND

NORM

HIGH

i0

1

CC2962C

CSM

TO MONITOR

LEM

0

+i0

i0

]

O.Oh

CDOOO5V

DC

VOLTAGE BUS A

PYRO

VDC

0

+40

i0

O.15

CDO006V

DC

VOLTAGE BUS B RELAY SEP B

PYRO

VDC

0

+40

i0

o.15

CDOO23X CDOO24X

CM-SM CM-SM CLOSE

CLOSE RELAY

A

SEP SEP

i0 i0

] 1

CD0123X

SLA

SEPARATION RELAY A

SEP

i0

I

CDOI24X

SLA

SEPARATION RELAY B

SEP

i0

]

CDOI30X

HAND

CONTROLLER A

ABORT

i0

1

INPUT CD0131X HAND

CONTROLLER B LOGIC NO i LOGIC NO 2 LOGIC NO 3 LOGIC A LOGIC B SIG SIG SIG SIG LOGIC A B A B VDC 0 i VOTE/ OFF VOTE/ ,OFF VOTE/ i OFF

ABORT

I0

1

INPUT CD0132X EDS ABORT INPUT CDOI33X EDS ABORT INPUT CD0134X EDS ABORT INPUT CDOI35X EDS ABORT OUTPUT CD0136X EDS ABORT OUTPUT CD0170X CD0171X CD0173X CD0174X CDO200V RCS RCS CM CM DC

ARM

i0

1

ARM

i0

1

ARM

i0

I

ABORT

i0

]

ABORT

I0

]

ACTIVATE ACTIVATE RCS RCS PRESS PRESS

ENABLE ENABLE PRESS PRESS +40

i0 i0 i0 i0 i0

1 1 1 1 o.15

VOLTAGE BUS A

NL

-

Non

Linear

B-142

TABLE

B7-11.-

C0}_ND

AND

S_VICE

MODULE

TELF}_ETRY

DA'I_{

SU_},9_RY

-

Continued.

Measurement

Samples/Second

I
Number Title Unit

Units/Count Range High Bit Low Bit Rate High + 40 Rate

Approx. Low 0

!
CDO2OIV DC VOLTAGE BUS CDO230X CDO231X CDII54X FWD FWD HS HS B JETTISON JETTISON LOCK RELAY LOCK RELAY DEPLOY A DEPLOY B DEPL A DEPL B DISCONA DISCONB PSIA °F SUIT DIFF CO2 SURGE SUIT PARTIAL TANK SUPPLY TO IN H20 MM PSIA °F HG DRG DRG RELAY B RELAY A RING RING A B LOGIC VDC

i0

0.15

JETr JETT SEP

i0 i0 i0

i 1 i

CSM-LEM SEP

CDII55X

CSM-LEM SEP

SEP

i0

i

CEOOOIX

DROGUE CLOSE

DEPLOY

i0

i

CEOOO2X

DROGUE CLOSE

DEPLOY

i0

i

CEOOO3X

MAIN REL

CHafE RLY CHU'?E RLY CHUTE RELAY CHUTE RELAY

DEPLOY

i0

i

CE0004X

MAIN REL

DEPLOY

i0

i

CE0321X

MAIN NECT

DISC

i0

i

CE0322X

MAIN NECT

DISC

i0

i

CF0001P CF0002T CF0003P

PRESSURE TEMP PRESS CABIN CABIN 02

CABIN

0 +40 -5

17 +]25 +5

] 1 i0

1 i

0.067 0.3 NL

o.o_
i 1 1 0.3 O. 12 NL

CF0005P CFO006P CF0008T

PRESS PRESS TEMP

0 %0 +20

30.00 !080 +95

1 i0 1

MANIF CFOOO9Q QUANTITY WATER CFOOIOQ QUAN TANK CFOOI2P PRESS REG CF0015P PRESS SUIT SENSE SUIT COMDIFF PUMP PSIG 0 60 i0 i PSID 0 1.00 i0 i 0.0035 NL DEMAND PSIA 0 i7 i0 i O.07 WASTE TANK H20 PCT 0 i00 1 1 O.3 NL PCT 0 i00 i 1 0.4 NL

POTABLE

PRESSOR CFOO16P PRESS OUTLET CFOOI7T TEMP GLYCOL GLYCOL

O.24
0.3

EVAP STEAM EVAP LIQUID GLYCOL RADI-

°F

+20

+95

i

OUTLET CFOO18T TEMP SLY

°F

+25

+75

i

1

0.2

OUTLET CF0019Q QUANTITY ACCUM CFOO20T TEMP ATOR CFOO34P BACK SPACE

PCT °F -50

0

107 +i00

I0

i

0.5

-

NL

1

1

0.6 - NL
0. 0008

OUTLET PRESS GLYCOL PSIA 0 0.25 1

EVAPORATOR CFOO35R CFOO36P FLOWRATE PRESS REG ECS OUTLET SUPPLY 02 02 LB/H]_ PSIG 0.16 0 I 150 i0 i0 1 0.003 0.6 NL

NL

-

Non

Linear

B-143

TF_BLE

B7-II.-

COMMAND

AND

SERVICE

MODULE

TELEKW/_Y

DA'_

SU_@@d_Y

-

(;ontD:ued.

Measurement

Samples/Second Units/Count Approx. Range Hi gh 6O

Number

Title

Unit Low

High Rate

Bit

I,ow

Bit

Rat_

CFO070P

PRESS Pt_P

SEC

GLYCOL

P[;IG

0

i0

I

0.24

OUTLET SEC EVAP LIQUID SEC GLYCOL FCT 0 I00 10 i 0.8 NL °F +25 +75 10 i 0.2

CF007IT

TEMP

OUTLET CF0072Q QUANTITY ACCUM CF0073P PR

SECONDARY OUT STEAM H20 AND TANKS

EVAP

t>:;IA

0.05

0.25

i

0.0008

CFOI20P

PRESS GLYCOL

PSIA

0

5O

i

0.2

CF0157R

RATE

GLYCOL

FROM LOAD EVAP

LB/HR °F

45

330

i0

0.9

-

NL

THERMAL CF0181T TEMP GLYCOL

+ _5

+i00

i

0.3

INLET SF0260T TEMP ATOR SF0262T TEMP PRIMARY INLET SECONDARY INLET RADIATOR °F +30 +70 1 i 0.Z5 °F +55 +120 i i 0.25 RADI°F +55 +120 i i 0.25

RADIATOR SFO263T TEMP SEC

OUTLET SFO266X RADIATOR SYS CFO460T TEMP 1 FLOW OR 2 DUMP o F 0 +i00 i ] O.4 CONT SYS I SYS 2 I0 I

URINE

NOZZLE CF0461T TEMP DUMP CGI040V 120 DC CGIIIOV 2.5 VDC WASTE NOZZLE PIPA SUPPLY VDC +84 +135 i 0.2 WATER ° F 0 +i00 1 i 0.4

LEVEL VDC TM BIAS '_)C 0 5 0.02

CGI2OIV

IMU

28V

.8KC

i

PCT

VRMS

0

30

i

0.12

-

NL

CGI331V

3.2KC

28V

SUPPLY

VRMS

0

30

1

0.12

-

NL

CG1513X CGI523X CGI533X CG2112 V

28V 28V 28V IG

IMU CMC OPTX 1X PUT

STANDBY OPERATE OPERATE O_fVRMS

OFF OFF OFF -21 +21

:','i'BY OPR OPR

10 i0 i0 I0

I 1 i 0.17

RESOLVER SIN RESOLVER COS

CG2113V

IG

1X PUT

OUT-

FRMS

-2 ]

+21

i0

0.17

CG2117V

IGA

SERVO

ERROR

IN

VRMS

-3

+3

i00

0.025

PHASE CC2142V MG IX PUT CG2143V MG IX PUT CG2147V MGA RESOLVER SIN RESOLVER COS SERVO PHASE CG2172V OG IX PUT RESOLVER SINE OUTVRMS -21 +21 i0 o.]6 ERROR IN VRMS -J +3 lO0 O. 024 oUTVRMS -20 +40 i0 0.16 OUTVRMS -2] +21 I0

o.16

NL

-

Non

Linear

B-144

IABLE

B7-11.-

CO_@ZND

AND

SERVICE

MODULE

TELE_I]{y

DATA

St_94%RY

-

Continued.

Measurement

Samples/Second Units/Count Approx. Range High Low High +2 ] Rate 10 Bit Low Bit Rate 0.16

Number

Title

Unit

CG2173V

OG

IX PUT

RESOLVER COS

OUT-

VRMS

-2 ]

CG2177V

OGA IN

SERVO PHASE

ERROR

VRMS

-3

+3

I00

O.O25

CG2300T

PIPA

TEMPERATURE

oF

+119

+140

i

i

O.08

CG3721V

SHAP_ PUT

CDU

DAC

O_F-

VRMS

-12

+12

i0

O.09

CG3722V

TRUNNION OUTPUT

CDU

DAC

VRMS

-] 2

+12

i0

O.09

CG5040X CH3500H

CMC FDAI

WARNING CM/SM ATT DEG

WARN

i0

i

50
-15 _15 _5 +15 -5 -i5

ERROR CH350IH FDAI

PITCH ATT DEG

CM/SM YAW

5o
IO0

MM MM

ERROR CH3502H FDAI

CM/SM ROLL

ATT

DEG

ERROR CH3503R FDAI SCS

-5 - 50
-]

_5 _5o
_i

BODY

RATE

DEG/ SEC

i00

PITCH

-5
-10 -i

_5
+] 0 +l i00 MM

CH3504R

FDAI YAW

SCS

BODY

HATE

DEG/ SEC

-5
-i0 -!

+5
+i0 MM +i i00

CH3505R

FDAI ROLL

SCS

BODY

RATE

DEG/ SEC

-5
- 50 -5

_5
_ 50 +5 i00 0.04

CH3517H

GIMBAL PITCH

POSITION 1 OR 2

DEG

CH3518H

GIMBAL YAW i

POSITION OR 2 ACT

DEG

-5 FIRE/ OFF

+5 ARM

i00

o.oh

CH3546X

RCS

SOLENOID C3/13/X

200

CH3547X

RCS

SOLENOID

ACT

FIRE/ OFF

ARM

200

A41Z_/X
CH35hSX RCS SOLENOID A3/23/-X CH3549X RCS SOLENOID ACT ACT

FIRE/ OFF FIRE/ OFF

ARM

2O0

ARM

2O0

c_/e4/-x
CH3550X RCS SOLENOID D3/25/X CH3551X RCS SOLENOID Bh/261X CH3552X RCS SOLENOID B3/15/-X CH3553X RCS SOLENOID D4/16/-X CH355hX RCS SOLENOID BI/II/Z CH3555X RCS SOLENOID D2/22/Z ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT

FIRE/ OFF FIRE/ OFF FIRE/ OFF

ARM

2O0

ARM

2OO

ARM

2O0

_IRE/
OFF FI RE OFF

AP_
ARM

200

2OO

FIRE/ OFF

ARM

2OO

MM

-

Multiple

Mode

Calibration

B-145

'U_I:LE

BT-fi.-

Cu]_?,Z.ND

AII[/

_:F_,V_CE

}4C,I)[JLE

TELEME'I_Y

bATA

S[$94ARY

-

Continued.

Measurement

Samples

/ S_cond Units/Count

Approx. Number Title []nit Low ACT ACT

Range High

High Rate

Bit

Low

Bit Rate

CH355oX CHJ55'(X
CH3558X

RCS RCS

SOLENOID

F1 t{Et
OFF

ARM ARM
ARM

200

D1/21/-Z
SOLENOID

FIRE/
O _T FIRE/ OFF

200

B2/Z2/-Z
RCS SOLENOID ACT A1/Y CH3559× RCS RCS SOLENOID ACT ACI'

200

c2/Y
CH35b0X SOLENOlb CI/-Y CH3561X RCS SOLENOID ACI'

FI_/ o_T
FIRE/ 0 FF FIRE/ OFF 0 FF

ARM
ARM

200

200

ARM

200

A2/-Y
CHB574X TRANSLATIONAL CONTROLLER CH3575X TRANSLATIONAL CONTROLLEH-XC CH3576X TRANSLATIONAl, CONTROLLER CH3577X TRANSLNfIONAL CONTROLLER CH3578X TRANSLATIONAL CONTROLLER CH3579X TRANSLATIONAL CY)NTROLLER CH3582V SCS TVC _t_D CH3583V SCS TVC AUTO PITCH AUTO PITCH YDC G)M-SC COM_) VDC ZC MD -YC Y/) YC MD M]] XC MD

ON

I0

i i

OFF

ON

i0

OFF

ON

I0

I

0 FF

ON

i0

1

0 FF

ON

I0

i

OFF -10

ON

i0

i

+i0

i00

0.08 0.08
0.078

-10

+i0

i00

MAND CH3585H ROT

CONTEOL/MTVC PITCH

-i0 -10

+i0

50

CH3586H

ROT YAW

CONTROL/Mff_C CMC

VDC

+i0

50

0.08 0.087
i

CH3587H

ROT

CONTROL/MTVC ROLL CMC DFADBAND

DEG

-li

+ii

50

CH3588X

ATTITUDE MINIMUM

.MAX I/) W OFF

MIN

i0

CH3590X CH3592X

HIGH FDAI RATE

PRO SCALE 5 SCALE

RATE

LIMIT 5,

H I GH ON

i0 l0

1 i

ERROR

CH3593X

FDAI

ERROR

<)FF

ON

IO

1

5o/15, RT50/10
CH3600X SCS DELTA CG-LM/CSM CH360IX DIR RCS SW V POS NO 1 I OFF CSM 124/ CSM ENABLE i0 1 I0 i

CH3602X

DIRENABLE RCS ENABLE

POS SW NO POS

2

()FF

ENABLE

i0

i

CH3604X

SPS

SOLENOID DRIVER NO i

_'i_/
() FF

ARM

i0

1 i

CH3605X

SPS

SOLENOID DRIVER NO 2

FI_/
OFF

ARM

i0

B-146

TABLE

B7-11.-

COMMAND

AND

SERVICE

MODULE

TELEbGTTRY

DATA

SUMM_RY

-

Continued.

Me as ur ement

Samples/Second Units/Count Approx. Range High Rate Low H i @h OFF i0 i Bit Low Bit Rate

Number

Title

Unit

CH3606X

LIMIT OFF

CYCLE POS

SW

ON

CH3607X

SC

CONTROL SWITCH

SOUHCE

CMC

SCS

i0

i

CH3609X

ROLL

MAN

ATT CMD

SW P0S

OFF

ON

i0

i

ACCEL CiI3610X R MAN IMP CH36i2X PITCH ACCEL CH3613X P MAN IMP CH3615X YAW MAN ACCEL CH3616X YAW MIN CH3623X GYRO _fRS CH 3624 X GYRO MTRS CH3635X BMAG ATT CH3636X BMAG RATE CH3638X BMAG ATT CH3639X BMAG RATE CH3641X BMAG ATT CI13642X BMAG HATE C_13666C TVC 2 i MAN ATT CMD ATT

SW

MIN

OFF

ON

i0

i

CZ_I) POS MAN ATT CIMD SW POS ATT CMD ATT IMP SW POS SW CMI) POS LOW NORM i0 i OFF ON i0 i OFf' ON i0 i POS MIN OP}' ON i0 i SW OFF ON i0 I

COM]3 RUN COMB RUN

SPIN DET SPIN DET

LOW

NORM

i0

I

MODE i MODE 2 MODE i MODE 2 MODE i MODE 2 RT RT

SW-ROLL 2 SW-ROLL

OFF

ON

I0

OFF

ON

i0

SW-PITCH F{P 2 SW-PITCH

OFF

ON

i0

OFF

ON

i0

SW-YAW 2 SW-YAW

OFF

ON

i0

OFF

ON

i0

PITCH CURRENT

DIFF

MA_

-800

+800

200

CR3667C

TVC

YAW CURRENT

DIFF

MAMP

-800

+800

i00

CJ0060J

EKG

COMMANDER COUCH

LH

MV

NA

NA

200

CJO061J

EKG

CO_94ANDER COUCH

CTR

MV

NA

NA

200 200

CJ 0062J

EKG RH

LM

PILOT

MV

NA

NA

COUCH RATE CMD, PILOT CM OTR LM COUCH PILOT OHM NA NA 50 OHM NA NA 50 OHM HA NA 50

CJO200R

RESP

CM/1/_ CJO201R RESP RATE

PILOT CJO202R RESP RH CKOO26A CKOO27A BATE

COUCH X-AXIS Y-AXIS G G -2 -2 +i0 +2 i00 i00 0.05 0.016

(]M ACCEL CM ACCEL

B-i47

'IZBLE By-11.-

COMMAND

AND

S_IVICE

MODULE

TELEME'IgY

DA'IF; S[}g,g_iQ[- ('ont[nu{_d.

Measurement

Samples/Second Units/Count Approx. Range High +2 5 5 5 ON ON 5000 +200 250 250 pO 90 90 9O +200 L+200 +200 +200 +200 600 6OO 5000. 5OOO. 5O 6o 5o 6o 150 300 300 100 i0 i0 i i00 i00 i0 1 I0 lO I0 I0 i0 i0 I 1 1 i 1 I 1 i i i I i 1 i00 i0 i0 21 1.2 1 0.016 0.02 0.02 0.02

Number

Title

Unit Low

High Bit Rate

l,ow Bit Rate

CK0028A CKI051K CKI052K CKIO53R CKI043 CKI044 SPOOOIP SP0002T SPOOO3P SPOO06P SPO022H SP0023H SPO024H SP0025H SPOO45T SP0048T SP0049T SP0054T SPO057T SPOO61T SPO062T SP0600P SP0601P SP0655Q SP0656Q SP0657Q SP0658Q SP0661P SPO930P SP0931P

CM ACCEL Z-AXIS RADIATION DOSIMETER i RADIATION DOSIMETER 2 DOSIMETER RATE CHANGE 70mm HASSELBLAD 70mm LUNAR PHOTOGRAPHY HE PRESS TANK HE TEMP TANK PRESS OXIDIZER TANKS PRESS _IJEL TANKS POSITION FUEL/OX VLV 1 POT B POSITION FUEL/OX VLV 2 POT B POSITION FUEL/OX VLV 3 POT B POSITION FUEL/OX VLV 4 POT B TEMP ENG VALVE BODY TEMP ENG FUEL FEED LINE TEMP ENG OX FEED LINE TEMPi OX DISTRIBUTION LINE TE_P i FUEL DISTRIBtrf ION LINE ENG INJEC'rOR FLANGE TEMP NO i ENG INJECTOR TEMP NO 2 FLANGE

G VDC VbC VDC

-2 0 0 0 OFF OFF

- NL - NL - NL

PS i A
o ],

o. -io@ o o 0 0 o o 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 o 0

PSIA PSIA DEC DEG DFG DEG
° F ° F

0.h6 0.46 0._6 o.46 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 2.3 2.3 21 21 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.3 1.3

op

oF oF
Op

oF PSIA PSIA PCT PCT PCT PCT PSIA PSIA PSIA

ENG VLV ACT SYS TANK PR PRI ENG VLV ACT SYS TANK PR SEC QUAN OX TANK i PRI-TOTAL AUX QUAN 0X TANK 2 QUAN FUEL T,MIK i PHI-TOTAL AUX QUAN FUEL TANK 2 PRESS ENGINE CttAMBER PRESS FUEL SM/ENG INTERFACE PRESS 0X SM/ENG INTERFACE

B-z48

TABLE

B7-11.-

cOMMAND

AND

sF/IVICE

M(IDUI_

TELEMETRY

DATA

SUMMARY

- Continued.

Measurement

Samples/Second Units/Count Approx. Range High 5000 5000 +300 +300 400 bOO

Number

Title

Unit Low

High Bit Rate i i i0 I0 i0 iO

Low Bit Rate i i 1 i 1 i 21 21 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.7

CR00OIP CR0002P CR0003T CR0004T CR0035P CR0036P

HE PRESS TANK HE PRESS TANK HE TEMP TANK HE TEMP TANK PRESS CM-RCS MANIFOLD i PRESS CM-RCS MANIFOLD 2 HE HE HE HE HE HE HE HE PRESS PRESS PRESS PRESS TEMP TEMP TEMP TEMP TANK TANK TANK TANK TANK TANK TANK TANK

A B A B HE HE

PSIA PSIA °F °F PSIA PSIA

0. O. 0 0 0 0

SRS001P SR5002P SR5003P SR500hP SR5013T SR501hT SR5015T SR5016T SRS025q SR5026Q SR5027Q SR5028Q SR5065T SR5066T SR5067T SR5068T SR5729P SR5733P SR5737P SR5776P SR5780P SR578hP SR5817P SR5820P SR5821P

A B C D A B C D

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C 0 O

5000 5000 5000 5000 +i00 +iO0 +i00 +i00

QUAN S_ RCS SYS A QUAN SM RCS SYS B QUAN SM RCS SYS C QUAN SYS TEMP AGE TEMP AGE TEMP AGE TEMP AGE A HE SM RCS D ENGINE A ENGINE B ENGINE C ENGINE D MANIFOLD

PRO PRO PRO PRO PACKPACKPACKPACKPRESS

i i 1 1 i0 lO i0 i0 i 1 1 i 1 1 1 i i0 i0 i0 i0 i0 i0 i0 i0 i0

i i 1 1 i 1 1 1 i i 1 1

21 21 21 21 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2

5 5 5 +300 +300 +300 +300 400 300 400 400 300 400 400 300 300

1

OX MANIFOLD PR SYS A FJEL MANIFOLD PR SYS A B HE MANIFOLD PRESS OX MANIFOLD PR SYS B FUEL MANIFOLD PR SYS B C HE MANIFOLD OX MANIFOLD SYS C OX MANIFOLD SYS D PR PR PRESS

1.7 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.3

1 1

1 1

B-149

TABLE

B7-I]7.-

COM},IANb

i\ND

LU,_<V[CE

MODULE

TE_{Y

DATA

gUb_%¾RY

-

Continued.

Measurement

Samples/Second Units/Count Approx. Range High Low High 400 Rate Bit Low Bit Rate

Number

Title

Unit

SR5822P

_UEL SYS

MM_IFOLD C MA]_IFOLD D MANIFOLD ABORT ABORT

PI_

PSIA

0

i0

i

1.7
1.7

SR5823P

FUEL SYS

PR

PSIA

0

400

i0

i

SR5830P BS0080X BS0081X CS0150X

D EDS EDS

HE

PRESS A B

PSIA

0 NORM NORM WARN/ OFF

400 ABORT ABORT NORM

i0 i0 i0 i0

1 1 i i

1.7

REQUEST REQUEST

MASTER WARNING

CAUTIONON ATTACK PROBE PSID °F

LS0200H CS0220T CT0012X

ANGLE TEMP DSE

OF

C_ -i00 OFF

5 +300 MOTION

i0 i i0 i

0.017 1.7

DOCKING TAPE MOTION

MONITOR crOOl5V SIG COND VOLTS crool6v SIG OOND VOLTS ur0017V SENSOR 5 CT0018V SENSOR i0 ur0120X PCM 8 CT0125V PCM EXCITATION VDC O 5-P l0 i 0.02 NEG SUPPLY VDC -22 C, i0 I 0.09 POS SUPPLY VDC _ 22 10 i 0.09

VOLTS EXCITATION VOLTS BIT BIT HI LEVEL REF LEVEL REF SIG NA NA 50 iO 15 VDC (, +5 i0 i O. 02 85 VI)C 0 +5 i0 1 0.02 RATE CHANGE LOW HIGH i 1 VDC 0 ii. l0 1 0.04

PERCENT OT0126V PCM HI PERCENT C_0262V UDL VALIDITY 4-BIT CTO340X PCM OR CT0620E S-BAND VOLTAGE fff0640F S-BAND STATIC STO820K PROTON CHANNEL STO821K PROTON CHANNEL STO822K PROTON CHANNEL STO823K PROTON CHANNEL STO830K ALPHA COUNT RCVR SYNC INT REC

SOURCE

EXT

INT

EXT

i0

1-2

AGC

COUNTS

i

254

i0

I

i

-

NL

1-2 ERR RATE

COUNTS

i

254

i0

i

-

NL

PH COUNT 1 COUNT 2 COUNT 3 COUNT 4

K]iz

0

!©0

i0

0.015

-

NL

RATE

K]iz

0

1,<

i0

0.0015

-

NL

RATE

Kiiz

0

J0

i0

0.0015

-

NL

RATE

KHz

0

1%

i0

0.0015

-

NL

RATE I RATE 2

KHz

0

l_

IO

0.0016

-

NL

CHANNEL STO831K ALPHA COUNT

KHz

0

lO

i0

0.0015

-

NL

CHANNEL

B-150

'iTdtLE

BY-

fl •-

<;(3,_,_,_r,, _) AI'gD S]_{VICE

MOD]

ILE

TELEMf_{Y

DATA

NL_,g@,I{Y

-

C, on,::lud _'<].

Measurement

Samples/Second Un i t s / Count Approx. Range High Rate LOW High 10 i0 0.0015 NL Bit Low Bit Rate

Number

Title

Unit

ST0832K

ALPHA

COUNT 3

RATE

KHz

0

CHANNEL ST0838K PHOTON-ALPHA C_UNT ST08hOT TEMP

INTEGH RATE PAR-

KHz

0

i00

i0

0.015

-

NL

NUCLEAR bET

oF

-120

+200

1

1.2

-

NL

TICLE

ST0841T

TEMP

NUCLEAR

PAR-

oF

-120

+200

1

1.2

-

NL

TICLE

ANALYZER

NL

-

Non

Linear

B-151

MISSIONCONTROL The Flight Director in Mission Control is supported by a team of specialists who are responsible for different aspects of spacecraft operation. These specialists are located in Mission Control and sit in front of console displays which provide real-time telemetry data. Each specialist is in voice contact with a group of support personnel in adjacent rooms who also have access to real-time telemetry data. See Appendix A, Part A4 for a description of the organization of Mission Control. The display console for the CSM Electrical and Environmental Engineer (EECOM) is shownin figure B7-7 and is representative of the type of displays available to all the specialists in the Mission Control Center. The two television monitors on the console are used to display real-time telemetry data. Although various data formats are available to the EECOM_ the two displays most frequently in use are shown in figures B7-8 and B7-9. These displays are updated once per second. As an aid in recognizing out-of-tolerance parameters and spacecraft events, three groups of event indicators are provided at the top of the console. The lights on these panels which alert the EECOM to out-of-tolerance parameters are referred to as limit sense lights. A limit sense light comeson whenever the parameter in question falls outside of high and low limits which are manually set by the EECOM for that particular parameter. Amongthe 72 lights on panel 3, there are a total of 12 limit sense lights for pressure, temperature, and quantity in each cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tank. In normal operation, the EECOM sets fairly tight limits on the limit sense lights in order to get an immediate indication of parameter variations. Consequently, it is not unusual for several limit sense lights to be burning. Besides the limit sense lights, there are lights which indicate spacecraft events. One of these_ located in the _pper row of panel 9, indicates the presence of a master caution and warning in the spacecraft. The following is a list of the system specialists in Mission Control:

(a) Retrofire Officer (RETRO)- responsible for abort planning, deorbit/entry times, and landing point prediction. (b) Flight Dynamics Officer (FIDO) - responsible for coordinating and participating in mission planning and the control of the trajectory aspects of the mission, including powered flight trajectory, abort, and orbital GO/NO GOdecision.

B-152

_ I]W[_I I (il i[ 1!I Ii t tl ]i_!I[ iI"_BN BII[]I 1I1,[!!1 tlt BUD!Jl ![I I1!t I111 i:l 1.4o 12111I]1 t[lll_I111 t IIII [] B [] fljl ii! [ti t I111
t

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B-154

0

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B-155

the and

(c) Guidance Officer (GUIDO) - responsible for the utilization of guidance and navigation system_ correlation of inertial alignment, evaluation of terminal phase actions in support of rendezvous.

(d) CSM Electrical, Environmental, and Communications Engineer (EECOM) - responsible for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the electrical power, environmental control, instrumentation, and sequential systems of the command and service modules. (e) CSM Guidance and Navigation Officer (GNC) - responsible for

monitoring and evaluating the propulsion, and stabilization service modules. (f) LM Electrical,

performance and control

of the guidance systems of the

and navigation, command and

Environmental,

and

EMV

Officer

(TELMU)

- respon-

sible for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the primary guidance and navigation, abort guidance, control electronics, ascent propulsion, descent propulsion_ and reaction control systems of the lunar module. (g) LM evaluating mentation, module. Control Officer (CONTROL) - responsible for monitoring and

the performance sequential, and

of the electrical, communications, instruenvironmental control systems of the lunar

(h) Instrumentation and for monitoring and evaluating tions systems.

Communication Officer (INCO) the performance of spacecraft

responsible communica-

(i) Procedures Officer (PROCEDURES) responsible procedures implementation of Mission Control. (j) Flight implementation Activities of the flight Officer plan (FA0) and its - responsible revision. all

for

the

detailed

for

the

detailed

(k) Aeromedical activities concerned

Officer (SURGEON) with the mission.

- directs

operational

medical

B-156

The following table lists the membersof the White and Black Mission Control teams. The White Teamwas on duty at the time of the accident_ and manyof the Black Teammembers were in Mission Control preparatory to their going on duty about an hour later.

Position Flight Director Dir.

White E. F. Kranz J. M. Leeper B. T. Spencer W. M. Stoval W. E. Fenner S. A. Liebergot B. N. Willoughby R. H. Heselmeyer L. W. Strimple G. B. Scott J. R. Fucci E. B. Pippert W. R. Hawkins

Black G. S. Lunney L. W. Keyser T. E. Weichel W. J. Boone J. G. Renick W. C. Burton J. A. Kamman W. M. Merritt H. A. Loden T. L. Hanchett E. W. Thompson T. R. Lindsey G. F. Humbert

Asst. Flt. RETRO FIDO GUIDO EECOM GNC TELMU CONTROL INCO

PROCEDURES FAO SURGEON

B-157

REFERENCES
Anon.: Center,
.

.

Apollo April

13

Mission

5-Day

Report.

MSC-02429,

Manned

Spacecraft

1970. Air-to-Ground 1970. Voice Transcription, Manned

Anon.: Apollo 19 Technical Spacecraft Center, April Anon.: tion. Anon.: craft Anon.: April Anon.: April

3.

Spacecraft Operations for S.V. Countdown/Countdown FO-K-O007-SCI09, North American Rockwell Corp., Mission Center, Director's April 20, Summary 1970. Operations Report. Manned Report, Apollo 13.

DemonstraFeb. 5, 1970. Manned Space-

.

.

Apollo 13 Mission 28, 1970. Saturn 22, AS-505 M

Spacecraft

Center,

.

+ 5 Day

Report.

Marshall

Space

Flight

Center,

1970. complete set of and flight plan

.

Manned Spacecraft Center: Flight Data File. (The checklists, procedures, activity timeline books, carried on board the spacecraft).

NASA

--

MSC

B-158

APPEN REPORT OF AND

DIX

C

MANUFACTURING TEST PANEL

CONTENTS Part APPENDIX PANEL CI C2 TASK C - REPORT OF MANUFACTURING AND TEST Page

ASSIGNMENT

AND

IMPLEMENTATION

........

C-I C-3 C-5 C-9

ORGANIZATION SUMMARY REVIEW

...................

C3 C4

...................... AND ANALYSIS ................ TESTING TANKS OF THE ........

MANUFACTURE CRYOGENIC

AND ACCEPTANCE OXYGEN STORAGE

C-9

Summary of the Standard Tank Process ................... Acceptance Summary of Testing Significant

Manufacturing c-9 c-63 the

.............. Aspects of

Manufacture and Acceptance Test of Cryogenic Oxygen Storage Tank Serial No. 10024XTA0008 .............. Investigation Supporting of Manufacturing Analysis Process and

C-65

............. AND PRELAUNCH OXYGEN STORAGE

C-66

INTEGRATION, SYSTEM TESTING, CHECKOUT OF THE CRYOGENIC TANKS .....................

C-72

Summary of Nominal Processes and Procedures ................. Summary of No. 0008 Test and Investigation Significant Aspects of Serial Tank Prelaunch Integration Checkout History .......... and Supporting Work .......

C-72

C-77 C-94

iii

This

page

left

blank

intentionally.

iv

PART TASK ASSIGNMENT

CI IMPLEMENTATION

AND

Panel 2 was assigned the responsibility of reviewing manufacturing and testing associated with spacecraft equipment involved in the flight failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the analysis of the design. In particular, the Panel was to examine discrepancies noted during the fabrication, assembly, and test of components of the oxygen portion of the cryogenic gas storage system within the service module in order to determine discrepancies and the actual any correlations inflight events. between such preflight

Members of the Panel observed actual assembly of an oxygen tank and the oxygen shelf at various stages of assembly at the contractor facilities and reviewed documentation relating to the course of Apollo 13 equipment from manufacturing through test to launch. In addition, the Panel reviewed parts and material qualification data, inspection reports, reliability and quality control records_ and preflight test and checkout procedures and results. Throughout the course of its review, Panel 2 concentrated on determining whether manufacturing or test procedures could adversely affect reliable conduct of flight. The steps in the manufacturing and testing of the suspected components were studied so as to evaluate various equipment acceptance procedures. Finally, the Panel attempted to relate observed flight events back to individual points in the manufacturing and testing process in order to determine if any correlation was probable.

C-I

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blank intentionally.

C-2

PART

C2

ORGANI ZAT I ON

Panel

2 was

chaired

by

Mr.

H.

M.

Schurmeier, Dr. J. F.

Jet Clark,

Propulsion Goddard Space

Laboratory, and Flight Center. Mr. Mr. Mr.

the Board Monitor was Panel members were:

E. F. Baehr, Lewis Research Center K. L. Heimburg, Marshall Space Flight Center B. T. Morris, Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Specific assignments covering such areas as subsystem testing, fabrication process, and reliability and quality assurance were given to each Panel Member. In reaching Panel conclusions, however, all Members participated in the weighing and evaluation of data.

This page left

blank intentionally.

c-4

PART

C3

SUMMARY

ture

The basic tank provides a thermally that is relatively straightforward has reasonable controls and

isolated pressure vessel structo manufacture. The manufacturprovides tanks of high structural

ing process quality.

The manufacture of the internally mounted equipment is somewhat more complex because of the large number of parts that are required to make these assemblies. The careful use of jigs, fixtures, and the detailed Manufacturing Operations Procedures (MOP) adequately controls these steps and provides hardware fully meeting the structural design requirements as stated on the engineering drawings. The most noteworthy manufacturability shortcoming of the design is the routing of the wires from the electrical devices within the tank. The passageways are small, adjacent metal corners are relatively sharp, and the condition of the insulation cannot be inspected after assembly. The assembly process is very difficult and even though detailed MOP's are provided and the technicians are skilled and experienced in these operations, the resultant product the many opportunities to damage the assembled condition_ of support and restraint tanking, detanking_ and the and is the of questionable insulation on quality because the wires. Even of in

wires can be the exposure operations.

damaged because of the lack to turbulent fluid during

purging

Another notable shortcoming of the design is the very loose tolerances specified for the tank fill tube connecting parts. The tolerance range permitted by the engineering drawings can result in a fill tube assembly that can fall out of place if the parts are at or near the low tolerance limits. The parts cannot be assembled if their size averages much larger than nominal. Even with all parts of the fill tube assembly near the nominal sizes specified, adequate diametral clearance exists for a sizable gas leakage path. The Globe Industries, Inc., fan motors have had a history ous problems. Many design changes were introduced to overcome problems. The most prevalent problem was dielectric breakdown the stator windings. Process changes and the addition of 300 phase-to-phase the incidence The dielectric tests during rate of this problem. acceptance procedures stator assembly greatly of numerthese within volts rms reduced

standard

adequately not to

cover

all

functional the

requirements for normal flight use but do heater thermostats (thermostatic switches)

check the ability of function under load,

C-5

nor do they state a requirement for proper functioning of the fill tube assembly, which must function as a dip tube during detanking operations. The manufacturing (10024XTA0008) before history delivery of tank no. 2 of Service Module 109 from Beech was unusual only to the extent

that the tank was reworked twice after initial closure, once to replace a heater tube assembly including both motor fans and once to replace pinch-off tube assemblies used in evacuation of the annulus volume between the tank shells. The test history was unusual only to the extent that the high but

acceptable heat leak characteristic caused months of delay in tank acceptance. No direct evidence of any particular characteristic of this tank at delivery from Beech, as distinguished from any other Block II oxygen tank, was found that would correlate with the Apollo flight accident.

13

The normal procedure at the conclusion of the heat leak tests at Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder_ Colorado, calls for expelling the last 25 pounds of the remaining liquid oxygen through the "fill" line by applying pressure to the vent line with gaseous nitrogen. Although the tank assembly is on a weighing system which has a resolution of 0.3 pound, and the procedure calls for continuing the application of vent line pressure until both the weighing system and quantity probe indicate the tank is empty, no data were recorded that verify that remaining oxygen was expelled as a liquid. At the time no one indicated that the response of the tank to the procedures was anything but normal, and today careful review of existing data, discussions Beech Aircraft and North American Rockwell personnel, at Beech Aircraft indicates that the detanking of the probably The grating detailed normal. manufacturing and test procedures and activities for intewith the responsible and a special test 0008 tank was most

the oxygen storage tanks into the service module were thoroughly and closely monitored with respect to procedures. They involved cryogenic oxygen reaches the test (CDDT) at Kennedy Space tanks Center (KSC)

checkouts with dry gas only, until during the countdown demonstration

a few weeks before launch. Between the tank acceptance and CDDT only pressure vessel integrity and electrically observable phenomena of the inner tank elements are tested. No tests are performed to check the ability of the thermostats to interrupt either the spacecraft-supplied heater power (about 2.8 amps at 28 V dc) or the GSE power (about 6 amps at 65 V dc). In August 1968, oxygen shelf assemblies at North American Rockwell (NR), Downey, were scheduled to be modified to add potting to the dc-to-dc converters of oxygen tank v_-ion pumps for electromagnetic interference prevention. During factory procedures with the oxygen

c-6

shelf assembly incorporating tank 10024XTA0008 in Service Module 106 at NR, Downey, a handling tiated by failure to remove an unnoticed shelf to of unexpected Jolts. the tank with the These included fuel cell shelf the and

in the tank no. 2 position fixture incident (inibolt) subjected this tank

apparent shelf damaging contact drop of the tank with the shelf

to the normal oxygen mounts. Such elements as the fill tube segments appear vulnerable to this incident. No record of investigation into the internal condition of the tank other than pressure and electrical circuit test could be ing assistance found. Manufacturing related to conditions and test internal records to the do not oxygen show engineerstorage tank.

Service Module 106 was promptly repaired and fitted with a different oxygen shelf already modified (ultimately it flew as Apollo I0). The tank and the oxygen shelf now under review were re-inspected and retested during the first 3 weeks of November 1968. They were then installed in Service Module 109 (used in the Apollo 13 flight). This service module was the completed, tested, oxygen system was and checked out normally concerned, and transported thereafter, so far as to KSC in mid-1969.

During integrated test and checkout occurred until the tank-emptying phase of After this first cryogenic oxygen loading of liquid oxygen through the "fill" line through the vent line was not achieved. assumptions of leakage or dislodgment of Teflon elbows and one short Inconel tube) probe assembly of within emptying the the oxygen tank. tank was processes

at KSC, no major anomaly the CDDT, March 23, 1970. since February 1967, expulsion under gas pressure applied Evidence supporting the the fill line segments (two in the top of the quantity produced at KSC in the

Special methods used for emptying on March 27 and 28, 1970, and again on March 30, involved protracted operation of the tank heaters and fans for many hours and at maximum heater voltage. In conjunction with this heating, cyclic gas pressurization and blowdown was used to achieve rapid boiling to remove oxygen from the tank. Analyses of data taken during the early portion of these procedures confirm boiling as sufficient to detank the observed quantities. These methods were not supported by previous comparable operations

with any other Apollo CSM cryogenic oxygen storage tank. not demonstrated separately that such operation could be without degradation of all or hazard in the subsequent flight

Thus it was accomplished of the tank.

use that

A review

the

evidence

available

indicates

this

tank

(at least the fill line segments) most probably a different condition than that in which it was Aircraft Corporation.

arrived at the CDDT in last tested at Beech

c-7

Tests were conducted at the Manned Spacecraft Center to evaluate the effects of the sustained heater operation during the special detanking operation at KSC on March 27, 1970. These tests demonstrated that the thermostats would weld closed when they attempted to interrupt the 5.9 amps, 65 volts dc GSE power (a condition for which they were neither designed nor qualified) resulting in their failing to limit the temperature inside the tank. The tests also showed that with the heaters on continuously and as the cryogenic liquid boiled away, temperatures in the 700 ° to i000 ° F range would exist on portions of the heater tube in contact with the motor wires. These temperatures severely damaged the Teflon insulation even in the nitrogen atmosphere of these tests. Small-scale tests subjecting Teflon insulated wires to 700 ° to i000 ° F temperature oxygen atmosphere indicated even more severe damage to the Teflon insulation. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that procedures employed on tank 0008 at KSC prior to severely damaged the insulation of the motor the special detanking launch of Apollo 13 inside the tank.

wiring

A more complete test is being conducted at Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, to simulate the special detanking operations used at KSC on March 27-28 and 30, 1970. This test will utilize a flight configuration be conducted tank, simulated using oxygen. KSC ground support equipment, and will

c-8

PART REVIEW AND

C-4 ANALYSIS

OF

MANUFACTURE AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING THE CRYOGENIC OXYGEN STORAGE TANKS

The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks are manufactured by the Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder Division_ located north of Boulder, Colorado. The tank consists of a spherical high-pressure inner vessel wrapped with multiiayer insulation contained within a thin external metal vacuum jacket. Inside the pressure vessel are a heater and fan assembly (two heaters and two fans), a quantity measuring probe_ and a temperature sensor. Many of the parts and subassemblies that comprise this tank are purchased by Beech from subcontractors and vendors located throughout the United States. The detailed instructions and their subassemblies for the at Beech manufacture and assembly of these are controlled by Manufacturing

tanks

Operations Procedures (MOP). In addition to instructing the technicians_ the MOP also calls out the presence and activities of the inspectors.

Summary

of

the

Standard

Tank

Manufacturing

Process of supplied and of

The inner pressure !nconel 718 alloy. The

vessel is made rough-machined

from two forged hemispheres heat-treated forgings are

by the Cameron Iron Works, Houston, Texas. metallurgical properties (X-ray, ultrasonic

The physical, chemical, scan, and microstructure)

these forgings are tested and certified by Cameron. The Airite Division of Electrodata Corp., Los Angeles, California_ does the final machining and electron beam welding. Prior to welding a very thorough inspection is made of each hemisphere. About 430 thickness checks are made to assure compliance to dimensional accuracy requirements. Each hemisphere is thoroughly X-rayed and dye-penetrant inspected for defects. The internal parts that support the heater probe assembly are made by Beech and supplied to Airite for installation prior to making the electron beam equatorial weld. A rather elaborate five-step welding process is used in making this equatorial weld (figs. C4-I and C4-2). The first step is a series of tack welds. The second step is a seal weld of shallow penetration. The third step is a deep-penetration weld. The fourth step is a shallower and wider weld to blend surfaces. The fifth weld is called a cover pass which is still wider and shallower for final surface blending. The completed vessel is X-rayed and then pressure tested. A hydrostatic proof pressure of +00 i_51 psig -55 is applied for _ minutes using water. The volumetric expansion weight during increase the proof-pressure of water contained test is within determined by measuring the the test specimen. A leak test

c°9

Joint

configuration

_

_. I I

020+'005 -_O.D. surface

-- ....

P//'I_TX .111_.oo2, .

- .... .1_±.oo2

T+ o_jl 0o2

1:. o04_+.oOoO
.012 • L "I . Weld reinforcement P/M L 1.000 2.000 3.000 th ickness T +.002 ,084 +,002 .067 + .059_ 004 000 14.808 12.587 refar c refarc 12.528 12.528 14.808 refar c 12.528 Tank radius O,D, Dimensions I.D. +005 -0 +005 -0 +005 -0 Sphrad Sphrad Sphrad

s ,, ce

Weld

schedule

(Electron

beam weld)

Parameter VoltageKv - in. hg

1-tack 80 1.5 0.012 18 2 X I O- 4 Notes: (1) (2) (15)

2-seal 80 1.5 0.012 --"__,0.002"

Pass sequence 3-pene. 1 115 6.0 .024/.036 --"--_gap, 0,00_3" offset

4-pene 95

.2

5-c over 85 3.0 0.110 II

Amperes - MA Beam deflection TravelVacuum in./min -mm

4.0 .040/.080 _" I_ (maxtyp) on attached

No weld repairs allowed Typical weld sequence shown

sketch

Figure

C4-i,-

Girth

weld

joint

configuration

and

schedule.

C-IO

O.D.

surface

___ass

1 and 2 (tack

and seal)

!
.112 ref weld reinf

|

L

t
surface eld joint 3 (penetration 1) zofle . ass

I.D.

Fusion

t
Fusion zone _ IF Pass

t
4 (penetration)

Fusion

zone__

Figure

C4-2.-

Weld

sequence.

C-II

is madeat 925 psig ±15 using helium. These tests are performed by the Beech Test Department before acceptance. The completed vessels, along with substantiating data, are shipped to Beech for assem01y. The inner pressure vessel is cleaned for oxygen service and sealed in plastic. Whenscheduled for application of insulation, the vessel, the insulation, and the other necessary piece parts and supplies are moved to a small room annex to an area known as the Respectable Room. (The Respectable Room, its annexes, a_d the Ultra Clean Roomtogether are known as the Apollo Assembly Area.) All assembly operations performed in these rooms are in accord with standard clean room techniques, _.e., lint-free gowns, caps, and gloves. A simple entrance airlock has a motorized shoe brush and vacuumcleaner but the brushes are disabled so as not to rotate under motor power. There is no air scrub. The insulation is applied to the inner vessel in gore panels, a layer at a time. The insulation consists of many layers of Dexiglas Insulation paper (C. H. Dextar & Son, Inc.), fiberglass, mats, aluminum foil, and aluminized Mylar. Each layer is carefully applied to the vessel, temporarily held in place with tape, trimmed for fit, and then finally held in place by thin nylon threads. After the threads are in place the tape is removed. The joints in succeeding layers are shifted so as to effectively block the flow of heat. _he aluminum foil layers are checked with an ohmmeterto assure no electrical contact with inner vessel or adjacent foil layers. About halfway thro_gh the insulation process, a tube is installed which goes from the vacuumdomearea to the equator, around the equator, and back to the domearea. This is called the vapor cool shield (VCS). (See fig. C4-3.) After all the insulation is applied, the external metal jacket is installed. These parts are madeby Chemtronics, Inc. The main upper and lower hemispheres are deep drawn and chem-milled. The equatorial flange is machined from a ring forging (fig. C4-4). All parts are madeof Inconel 750 alloy. An assembly of the lower hemisphere and equatorial flange is madeby Heli-arc welding. A shield is placed over the insulation in the region of the final closure weld between the lower hemisphere-flange assembly and t_Leupper hemisphere shell. After these parts are positioned over the in;ulated pressure vessel, the circumferential weld to join them is madeby the automatic Heli-arc welding process using argon gas for iner_ing the weld zone. The welds in the vacuumjacket are then X-ray inspected to insure integrity. Figure C4-5 shows the major subassemblies required to complete the oxygen tank assembly. A]I componentsand piece parts required to build subassemblies are cleaned for liquid oxygen service, grouped as required

C-12

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I

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I I I
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C-I}

Install I

upper shell assembly

I

I

Install

heat shield assembly

I I

I I
• .,o

X-ray

weld

Install

lower shell assembly

Figure

C4-4.-

Installation

of

vacut_m

jacket.

C-14

Upper

coil

assembly

Electrical

connector

Quantity

probe

Heater ,/'_'fan

and

assembly

I

I"

j

Figure

C4-5.- Major

subassemblies

required

for tank assembly.

C-15

for each subassembly (kitted), and sealed in a clear nylon plastic bag which is then sealed in a clear polyethylene bag. These kits are stored for the subassembly and assembly operations which are performed in various rooms of the Apollo Assembly Area. small parts welded, first operation in-

The heater brazed, riveted,

and fan assembly is made from numerous or bolted together (fig. C4-6). The

stalls the lower pump nozzle assembly into the lower motor housing. These parts are positioned in a jig and then fusion welded in place. After this weld is X-rayed, the part is turned to trim the inside diameter and to assure roundness. The lower motor housing is then positioned and welded to the central tube. The weld zone is X-rayed and the entire assembly is pickled nichrome heaters motor tube. and passivated. The two helically preformed stainless-tube-encased heating elements are then slid in place. Before proceeding the are tested for resistance and isolation from ground. The upper tube is then positioned and welded to the central heater this weld is X-rayed, the heaters are positioned and silver

housing After

soldered in position. After the heater tube is thoroughly cleaned to remove any silver solder flux, the tube (conduit) that routes the wires from the lower motor past the heater elements is installed by riveting the two small clips to the inside of the central tube. Small aluminum shims are riveted to the inner surface of the heater tube to provide a flat surface for the mounting of the thermostats. The unit is then vacuum baked at 200 ° F to remove any moisture from the heater assembly. The resistance and insulation tests are again run to assure that the brazing has not damaged the heaters and that the units are thoroughly dry. At this point the heater tube is ready for the installation of the thermostats. The thermostats are purchased from the Spencer Thermostat Division of Metals and Controls, Inc., Attleboro, Massachusetts. Each thermostat is subje_'ted to detailed acceptance testing by Metals and Controls, Inc., and these data are supplied to Beech with the serialized switches. The acceptance testing consists of a I000 V ac dielectric test for I minute, a visual check for workmanship, a dimensional check to drawing size callouts, a 5-rminute soak in liquid nitrogen, the opening temperature, the closing temperature, a second 5-minute soak in liquid nitrogen, a recheck of the opening temperature, a recheck of the closing temperature, a leak test to check hermetic seal, a megohm test, the final inspection marking, a recording of number of cycles on the unit as shipped, the actual weight of unit, and visual packing and shipping inspection. Throughout all testing by Metal and Controls, the thermostats are checked by using 6.5 V ac and a small lamp drawing approximately I00 milliamps. Incoming inspection at Beech is limited to a visual examination. The thermostats are inserted into the tube with their hook-type in future

terminals extending place. This heater assembly operations.

to the outside tube assembly

of the is then

heater tube cleaned and

and bolted bagged for

C-16

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C-17

The electric motor fans are purchased from Globe Industries, Inc. These motors go through a thorough acceptance test at Globe before delivery to Beech. In addition to the normal visual and mechanical inspection, the motors are functionally tested at both ambient and cryogenic conditions. A i000 V dc dielectric strength test is applied between the windings and case. The isolation must be at least 2 megohms. The motor is then operated on 115 V ac 400 cycles, and the following characteristics are measured and recorded: (i) speed and current of motor when operating with a calibrated test fan, and (2) line current and total power both running and still. The motors are then operated in liquid nitrogen. These checks are limited to assuring that the motor starts and runs smoothly and that coastdown time is at least 30 seconds. At Beech the normal visual incoming then these parts were stored until ready heater and fan assembly. inspection was performed to be incorporated into and the

The kits of parts and components required for the heater and fan assembly are moved to an annex room of the Respectable Area where this assembly operation is performed on a laminar flow bench. The necessary tools are cleaned and laid out for ease in the assembly process. An assembly aid is used to support the fan and heater tube in the horizontal position. The lower electric motor is now installed. The electrical leads

are provided by the motor supplier (four 26-gage nickel with Teflon insulation twisted i0 turns to the foot with a 2-inch-long Teflon sleeve adjacent to the motor) (fig. C4-7). These leads are routed parallel to the motor shaft through a shallow cap and half in the motor support this channel the wires are routed groove milled half in the motor end tube (figs. C4-8 and C4-9). From against the inner surface of the

motor tube in the region of the impeller. The wires then emerge through a hole in the motor housing tube (ungrommeted). The motor is inserted in the end of the tube (fig. C4-I0) and the motor end plate is installed. Shims are used as required under this motor end cap to provide 0.090-inch to O.040-inch end clearance between the impeller and the nozzle. _en ti_e proper shims are selected and installed, the four end cap screws are torqued to the required value (fig. C4-II). The end cap is bolted to the support tube by four radial countersunk machine bolts, small segment-shaped shims, and self-locking nuts (all metal). When the location of the lower motor is verified as having the correct impeller-to-nozzle clearance, the wire routing task continues. The wires travel axially about 2 inches (fig. C4-12) where they go inboard through a Teflon grommet into the inner conduit and travel the length of the heater section to a symmetrical location where they again emerge to the exterior through wire is used to pull the motor a Teflon grommet. leads through this A single insulated conduit route.

C- 18

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except heater Teflon

The installation of the upper motor follows the same general sequence that once the leads emerge from the tube they do not reenter the tube but remain as a twisted bundle of four wires encased in a sleeve. Next a small copper band is formed around the upper and lower motor bundles in the areas where the impellers of the fans are located to clearance with the impellers C4-1h). The ends of these the wires. The motor leads

wire

assure that the wires maintain the required (approximately 0.030 inch) (figs. C4-13 and bands are sweat soldered together to retain

external to the heater tube are then encased in Teflon shrink tubing. White tubing is used for the lower motor leads and clear tubing is used for the upper motor leads. The leads are then installed for the heaters. One wire from each

heater is soldered to its plated copper with Teflon terminal of the thermostat nichrome heater) heater element. are provided to

thermostat. The lead wires (20-gage silverinsulation) are soldered, one to the other and the other wire to the second lead of the leads (four total; two the electrical connector for each fitted outoperation and

Separate extend to

side the dome at the top of the vacuum jacket. Again a cleaning is performed to remove any solder flux. Standard 60-percent tin 40-percent lead solder is used for all electrical connections.

The entire heater and fan probe assembly is subjected to a detailed component acceptance test to assure proper operation. The unit is placed in a controllable temperature oven. Starting from about i00 ° F, the oven temperature is slowly lowered until the closing of each heater thermostat is noted by means of a Wheatstone bridge. While in this closed position, the resistance value of each heater element is measured and recorded. The oven temperature is then slowly raised to detect the opening temperature for each thermostat. With the unit removed from the oven, the resistance value of each motor winding is measured and recorded. The heaters and motors are subjected to a dielectric strength test at 500 V dc with a maximum allowable leakage current of 0.25 milliamps permitted. The insulation resistance of both heaters and both motors is measured and must indicate a minimum of 2 megohms isolation. The proper operation of the motors is verified in two vertical orientations at full voltage and at two vertical and one horizontal orientations at reduced voltage (80 + 2 Vac). The time in tenths of hours and number of motor starts are recorded for each test sequence and this is added to for continuity. The entire assembly is then cleaned service, bagged, and stored for future use. The upper coil assembly as shown on figure C4-5 the for previous history liquid oxygen

consists

of

five

coiled tubes to provide the necessary resistance in the heat flow path, an adapter to fit the tank neck, a seal-off plate for the side of the coil housing (vacuum dome), end fittings for the feed lines (that connect

C-25

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C-27

to the vapor cool shield), and a connector adapter fitting. These tubes are formed by a subcontractor in Denver. The material for all tubes is Inconel 750. All bending is performed using a flexible chain mandrel of Ampcobronze and Ucon lubricant (water soluble). The various piece parts are carefully cleaned and Jigged for Heli-arc welding into an assembly. The supply line filter is installed and safety wired. The assembly is X-rayed, recleaned, and bagged for future use. The quantity probe is a purchased item which is procured from Simmonds Precision complete with leads and temperature sensor installed with leads attached (fig. C4-15). This unit is madeof two concentric aluminumtubes for the capacitance-type quantity (density) probe with Teflon spacer buttons located in drilled holes in the inner tube to provide centering action. The lower ends of the concentric tubes terminate in a glass-filled Teflon bushing. This bushing acts as a lower pilot support and also provides a nonconducting extension of the inner tube which is also utilized as a dip tube for the filling and detanking operations. The axial relationship of the inner and outer aluminum tubes is controlled by a single rivet installed through Teflon bushings near the upper end of the assembly. The upper end of the outer aluminum tube is supported in a large glass-filled Teflon bushing which is riveted to an Inconel tube for final support to the tank adapter. This upper bushing has two axial holes to provide routing for the motor and heater leads. The temperature sensing element is mounted on the side of this bushing. Axially aligned pins through two 0.44-inch cross-drilled holes are used as Junction points between the short leads from the temperature sensor and the 48-inch-long extension leads. Two 22-gage wires are used for each extension lead of the sensor (a total of four wires). The capacitance element leads consist of a shielded 20-gage wire for the inner tube and an unshielded 20-gage wire for the outer. Two channel-shaped clips are riveted to the upper ends of the aluminum tubes to solder the lead wires on. The quantity sensor leads are encased in a clear Teflon shrink sleeve. The temperature sensor leads are encased in a separate clear Teflon shrink sleeve. All solder Joints are madewith 60-percent tin, 40-percent lead solder. After incoming inspection of this Simmonds-manufacturedassembly verifies conformance to the purchase specifications, the unit is cleaned for liquid oxygen service, bagged, and stored for future use. The parts required for the complete assembly of the quantity probe are then drawn from storage. The first operation is the installation of two insulated pull wires through the holes provided in the quantity probe to route the heater and motor leads. The quantity probe wires, temperature sensor wires, and two pull wires are pulled through the electrical conduit by first pushing a single wire through. All wires are attached to this pull wire to be pulled into the conduit (figs. C4-16 through C4-19). The

C-28

Vent line and electrical conduit also pass

Fill Adapter cap inconel

Inconel

Teflon

adapte_

t

)erattlre and quantity

serisor probe

Inconel tube__ Teflon adapter

II Tubular elements of capacitor (_lunfinum)

.224 .232

dia holes,

two Hole for temperature sensor wiring

places for heaterJ and motor wiring

Glass Probe is manufactured by Simmonds Products Inc. Precision teflon

filled insulator

Temperature sensor element is mounted on this insulator

Fixed

insulator

-_[__

_ _

Figure

Cl4-15.-

gross

seetion

of

quantity

probe.

C-29

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C4-17.- Feeding quantity probe into upper coil assembly.

wires

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next items to install are the Teflon adapters for the fill tube (figs. C4-20 through C4-22). place, the quantity tube adapter (fig. assure through that the they side probe C4-23). is bottomed The fill

and the connecting With these parts of the checked

tube in tank to

in the counter-bore tube parts are then use of C4-2_).

are in the proper position by holes in the outer tube (fig.

a blunt probe The electrical

feedthrough holes are aligned by eye with the electrical conduit and the entire unit is clamped into a jig for welding (figs. C4-25 through C_-27). Four i/4-inch-long welds are positioned away from wires and the Teflon fill tube adapter to secure the assembly (figs. C4-28 and C4-29). The Unit is then inspected, cleaned, and bagged for future assembly into the tank. Prior to final assembly of the tank, all major subassemblies are subjected to component acceptance tests. Specifically these major components are the following: pressure vessel, motor heater fan assembly, coil assembly, probe assembly, and the electrical connector. These tests check all functional aspects that are possible at that level of assembly, electrical isolation, pressure integrity, etc., as appropriate for particular components. These components are then moved to an area referred to as the Ultra Clean Room (a class I00,000 laminar flow clean room) for the final assembly. Operations in this area are performed in full lint-free nylon suits, boots, caps, and rubber gloves. Entry to this clean room is from the Apollo Assembly Area with a simple dressing out room airlock for changing clothes. of the area through airlocks. All equipment moves into and

The actual final assembly starts with opening the tank by removing the temporary shipping plug from the tank neck (fig. C_-30). Throughout the entire assembly operation, a vacuum cleaner nozzle is positioned adjacent to the tank to help reduce the possibility of dust or lint entering the tank. The heater assembly is then lowered part way into the tank (figs. C4-31 and C4-32). With the assembly held about halfway into the tank, the wires are fed in beside the heater until they are completely inside the tank. The heater is then lowered until the lower motor adapter pin is in the lower support bracket (fig. C_-33). The last portion of this lowering is accomplished by use of duckbill pliers (fig. C4-34). The top portion is then positioned for the upper bolt to be installed. The bolt is inserted by means of a wire holding loop and started by hand (figs. C4-35 and C4-36). This bolt is tightened with an open-end wrench with final torquing achieved by a combination of the open-end wrench and a standard torque wrench. The torque value is adjusted to account for the combined lever arm effect of the wrenches. At this point the wires are fished from the tank with hook (fig. C4-37). The wires are then checked and any tangles are removed. A small stainless safety wire is attached to the wires and they are lowered into the tank again (fig. C4-38). Next a probe support fixture is lowered about two thirds is of attached the way to the tank neck and the into the tank (fig. C4-39).

probe

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Figure

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I_iserting

fan

and

heater

probe.

C-46

Figure C4-32.- Feec_i_<_ .... wires into tank beside heater _mobe.

C-4T

Figure

C4-33.-

View r)robe in

inside lower

tank

showin_

heater

support.

C-_8

Figure

C4-34.-

Fina_

lowering

of heater

probe.

C-49

Figure

C4-35.heater

Wire probe

loop retaining

used

to ]_olt.

_stall

C-50

_igure C4-36.-

View inside tank showing heater upper retaining bolt.

probe

C-51

Figure C_-37.-

Pulling

wires

from tank.

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Figure and

CI_-39.heater

Quantity probe wires

probe being

being

installed from the

in

fixture tank.

pulled

C-5_

At amy The

this

point

the

wires are are are

are

once

again Then to wire the the

withdrawn the and each pull taped

from wires and bundle one to

the

tank.

Again inbundles.

possible in solder

tangles the from bundles probe each joints

removed. soldered pull into at

previously lead a six at in the made of smooth leads. a time

stalled transition These with probe pull until elevated into is

the to

motor

heater

thoroughly single

cleaned

wire one and wire the

are

pulled wires pulling through out 9

conduit feedthrough

bundle hole

man the

feeding other is

the man taken (about

quantity on in the this into fixture tank

approximately C4-42). of the of wire slack the probe then then The bundle when

25 bundles

to with probe

35 are

pounds pulled probe lowered the

(figs. slack position (fig. from

C4-L0

through

the is

inches Then

tank) removed C4-L4).

C4-43). the The tank probe turn. quadruple at does is

holding and the is is

probe is rotated very

assembly, lowered into

neck

the

(fig.

assembly The unit thread the not

counterclockwise carefully rotated end the the of probe supply to the clockprobe

approximately wise into in then to the the start ring

one the

and of

pilot the

the tank.

lower If of

provided position assembly

bottom result

assembly tube, achieve

tight probe

in in

alignment 90-degree out of to a

the

re-indexed are

increments specific control of wires

alignment. Operations (Figures heater and

These Procedure CL-45 fan and

procedures and C4-46 in show

carried presence typical the

Manufacturing inspectors. from the

the

quality

the into

routing quantity

probe

assembly

probe.)

The checkout are point in with the cut a

electrical can about 3-inch be 3 of i

connector on beyond of

is the the About into and

then

installed

so

that

a

complete The lead At wires this

performed inches length the

electrical connector 2 inches

operations. adapter is slid

flange. is into The the wires

large-diameter

Teflon

sleeving

installed conduit are After with black isolaslid in a

neck about

conduit. protruding tinned, with

inch

connector soldered the of into

space. the is After the

thermally thorough light tion, place process Even heat. so, to and and by

stripped, cleaning assure

connector. inspected the

alcohol, removal are

connector flux.

complete tests The of is

resistance, sleeve during in liquid to is

functional welded. a set weld

completed, proper which of is

metal

connector chills in a

protected cooled

the

welding

copper made

have short

nitrogen. the

the

series

segments

limit

The the using tion tank

next neck

operation adapter. spectrometer checks,

is A

the helium leak

welding leak detector. are all

of test

feed is After

line run on

connections the weld

and joints comple-

a mass of these

satisfactory

the

welds

X-rayed.

Next, of aluminized extends layers with

insulation Mylar the dome.

is are

installed applied The tank All over

in

the the

vacuum outer flange in in the

dome shell is

area. material covered area nylon

Two that with are

layers four wrapped

under of 1-inch

adapter the tubes held

aluminized aluminized

Mylar. Mylar

dome with

strips

place

thread.

C-55

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Figure

C4-43.routing

Heater into

and

fan

motor

lead

quantity

probe.

c-59

Figure

C:4-44.- Lowerimg assembly into

quantity tank.

probe

C-60

Figure

C-4.45

- View inside of tank of typical wire from heater probe to quantity probe_

routing

C-61

Figure C-4.46 - View inside of tank of typical wire routing of heater ?robe v_ires into quantity probe.

C-62

The coil housing (dome) cover is now welded in place. The housing contains the vacuumpumpdown tube, the blowout disc, and the vac-ion pumpbracket (fig. C4-47). In addition, a pumpdown tube is welded to the lower hemisphere to speed the pumping process. After the welds are Xrayed, a preliminary pumpdown is made. After a check is madeto insure vacuumintegrity, the vacuumis broken and additional insulation is stuffed into the domearea through the vacuum pumpdown tube. This insulation consists of 40 square feet of 0.0005-inch gold-coated Kapton which has been crinkled and cut into small pieces with pinking shears. (This represents about 5760 individual pieces approximately 1-inch square with pinked edges. This represents 2.3 ounces of Kapton.) The actual pumpdown is accomplished in an oven at 190° to 220° F to speed the pumping and to assure a low final pressure. Because of the many layers of insulation, a complete pumpdown requires 20 to 28 days. At the completion of the pumpdown,the vacuumpumpdown tubes are pinched and sealed and protective caps are installed. The installation of the vac-ion pumpcompletes the fabrication process of the tank assembly. Acceptance Testing End-item acceptance testing is a long and elaborate process controlled by a detailed written test procedure. The sequence consists of the following: (i) A dielectric strength test of the following wires or groups of wires shorted together. The test is run at 500 V dc and leakage current to ground (tank assembly) shall not exceed 0.25 milliamp; the four temperature sensor wires, the quantity gage outer tube lead, the quantity gage inner tube lead, the quantity gage inner tube lead shield, the eight wires from the two fan motors, the four wires from the two heaters, and the low-voltage input wires to the vac-ion pump; (2) Dielectric strength test of vac-ion converter output to ground (tank assembly) at 400 V dc. Leakageshall be no more than 0.8 milliamp; (3) Insulation resistance test to check that every wire or group of wires that should be isolated from other wires or ground shows a minimumof 2 megohms isolation at 500 V dc; (4) The isolation between the vac-ion pumpelectrical terminals and ground is tested at 500 V dc and must be at least 50 megohms;(5) The isolation between the vac-ion converter electrical output terminals and the tank assembly (ground) is tested at 500 V dc and must be 50 megohms or greater; (6) The vac-ion pumpis functionally tested; (7) The inner vessel is pumpeddown for 4 hours to assure that the inner vessel is dry; (8) Helium leak test at 500 psi and a helium proof-pressure test at 1335 + 20 psi; (9) A heater pressurization
test and heat-leak test (vessel filled with liquid oxygen and 65 V ac psi supplied (heaters to heaters); (i0) Cryogenic powered by 65 V ac to raise proof-pressure test at 1335 pressure of liquid oxygen); -+ 20

C-65

Weld

seal-off

assemblies

_,_,_..._
I I I I I I I i i I I I i

Install

and

weld

coil

housing

cover

Install

elect

conn

sleeve

I

i

Weld

seal-off

assemblies

Figure

C4-47,-

Final

vacuum

closure

operations.

C-64

(ii) Heat-leak test; (12) Inerting of the vessel with iOO ° to 160 ° F nitrogen gas; (13) Check to see that thermostats are open when nitrogen purge temperature of iOO ° to ii0 ° F flows from exit of tank (30 V ac applied momentarily to verify that thermostats are open); (14) Vac-ion pump final functional test; and (15) Final motor run coastdown. The heat-leak tests consist of many runs ambient conditions and outflow rates. Total testing verification and to cover a range of involves 40 to 60

hours with liquid or supercritical oxygen in the tank. Data sheets on cryogenic performance specified in the procedure are furnished to North American Rockwell in the end-item acceptance data package which accompanies each tank on delivery to North American Rockwell.

At

the

conclusion

of the

heat-leak

test,

approximately

i00

pounds

of oxygen remain in the tank which must be emptied and purged for delivery. Approximately three-fourths of the mass of oxygen in the tank is released from the tank through the supply line in the process of reducing tank pressure from the initial 925-935 psia to the final pressure of 25-35 ps_a. To complete emptying, the portion of this oxygen which remains liquid after the pressure bleeddown is expelled through the fill l_ne. The application of warm gas at 30 psia through the vent line to accomplish this expulsion approximates the normal detanking procedure used by KSC at the completion of the CDDT. The CDDT is the next time, after del_very of the tank by Beech Aircraft to North American, that cryogenic oxygen is loaded into and expelled from each tank.

Summary of Significant Aspects of Test of Cryogenic Oxygen Storage The manufacturing no. IO024XTAO008 is the brought on by and is motor

the Manufacture Tank Serial No.

and Acceptance IO024XTAO008

serial

test flow for cryogenic shown in figure C4-48. that was required in failures.

oxygen storage tank The item of particular the manufacturing

significance process

recycle

The manufacturing during 1966 contains tests which resulted failure (a) (b) (c) (d) modes

history of the fan motors installed before or many incidents of failures encountered in motor The in design or fabrication process changes. were failures (stator laminations) failures categorized as:

experienced

Contamination Bridge Bearing ring

failures (stator windings) dielectric breakdown or shorts

Phase-to-phase

C-65

(e) (f) (g) (h)

Grounds (of stator wiring) Lead wire damage(primarily (Motor fan) speed Coastdownfailures (less than 30 seconds in air or gas) at Beech)

Design and manufacture process changes to minimize the effect of some of these failure modeswere initiated during Block I motor manufacture. Most others were initiated before the motors used in tank 10024XTA0008 were assembled at Globe Industries. Failure mode (d) was the basis for the most recent changes affecting these particular motors. Corrective actions to employ extreme care in stator winding and to use phase-tophase dielectric checks at 300 V rms were incorporated in the winding process. These were followed by a phase-to-phase dielectric check at 250 V rms after the winding was complete and before the terminals were soldered. Effectivity of these actions caught the lower motor in rework and the upper motor in original stator winding. After installation of the heater tube assembly, including the motor fans, Beech tested the motor wiring, shorted together, with 500 V dc to ground. A listing of the inspection discrepancies issued against serial no. 10024XTA0008 are listed in table C4-I. In the Beech nomenclature these discrepancies are known as Withholding Forms. As stated previously, the motor problem is considered the significant item. The heat-leak problem was not considered serious because manymissions required use rates above the minimumflow capability of tank 0008. The oxygen storage tank assembly is normally handled and tested at Beech Aircraft in the upright position. Vertical motions may compact the tube set to minimumlength so as to contribute to dislodgment by minimizing overlap with the upper stub tube nipple of the tank adapter. Shortly before shipment from Beech, the tank is rotated (tumbled) while in a handling fixture, "to determine if all parts are secure." Since this is the only known source of side forces applied to the fill tube components and since the detanking was apparently normal in the Beech tests, it lends evidence to the assumption that the fill tube componentswere in the proper position at that time. Investigation of Manufacturing Process and Supporting Analysis

To gain a first-hand appreciation of the manufacturing process, a visit was arranged to the Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder Division, to observe key assembly operations. In addition to a detailed discussion

C-66

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C-68

of the step-by-step process, three assembly examples were witnessed within the clean room areas. Specifically, the installation of a lower motor into the heater tube was observed. The assembly of the quantity probe to the tank tube adapter fitting was witnessed. In this particular case, two attempts were required to properly position the small fill tube parts. The entire wire routing process was witnessed. A tank with a large hole in the side provided visibility to the witnesses but not to the assembly technicians. The installation of the heater fan assembly and then the quantity probe provided an appreciation of the real challenge to workmen, that of avoiding damage to the insulation of the wires. This could not have been learned from a study of the drawings alone. A lO-times-size layout was made of the fill tube connection situation with the parts at the various limits of size permitted by the engineering drawings. In addition to the length tolerances permitted by the drawing dimensions, the diametral clearance also permits the parts to assume angles beyond the ranges stated on the drawings. As an aid to check all the various positions to which these parts could move, individual cutout paper parts were made for the two Teflon bushings and the interconnecting Inconel tube. Figure C4-49 shows that the worst-case short tolerance parts can fall out of position as the tank is moved about. At the other extreme, parts that are at the high end of the permitted tolerances will not assemble. This is shown on the left-hand view. The nominal case provided little or no axial clearance but still does not provide gas-tight seals at the various diameters. In addition to the tolerance condition that can exist for the fill

tube connecting parts, the center tube of the quantity probe could move downward due to Teflon cold flow. The center tube is supported in the axial position by two Teflon bushings installed in the center tube and a semi-tubular rivet. Prolonged heating, such as the vacuum pumpdown cycles (three cycles for this tank assembly resulting in a total of 1532 hours at 190 to 220 ° F), could result in the thin walls of the center tube slowly cutting into the Teflon bushings. Table ambient C4-II shows the range of diametral conditions (73 ° F) and at a typical clearances detanking that can condition exist

at

(-278 ° F, which corresponds to the saturation temperature of liquid oxygen at 40 psia). The fit between the Teflon bushing and the tank adapter fitting can result in a maximum O.O03-inch interference. The only other clearance that results in an interference fit occurs if the minimum size holes are provided where the Teflon bushings slide on the 3/8-inch Inconel tube. Tests at liquid nitrogen temperature (-320 ° F) indicate that the Teflon is not overstressed and does not crack when subjected to interference fits of this type.

C-69

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Throughout the normal manufacture and test of a cryogenic oxygen storage tank_ no intentional procedure calls for the thermostats to interrupt a load. The acceptance testing by the thermostat vendor uses approximately 6.5 V ac to power a small lamp bulb which draws about i00 milliamperes. The fan and heater assembly componentacceptance test by Beech uses the thermostats to complete the circuit of Wheatstone bridges to measure the heater resistance values. All other testing by Beech
applies power (65 V ac) when tank conditions are such that should be closed and remain closed_ or momentarily applies (90 ± i0 V ac) to verify that thermostats are open. the thermostats a lower power

INTEGRATION_ SYSTEM TESTING_ AND PRELAUNCH CHECKOUT OF TH_ CRYOGENIC OXYGEN STORAGE TANKS

Summary

of Nominal

Processes

and

Procedures

North American Rockwell_ Downey_ California.The build-up of an oxygen shelf assembly at NR begins* many weeks before insertion of the cryogenic oxygen tanks with the fabrication of a pie-shaped aluminum honeycomb sandwich structural the equatorial girth rings of shelf with large circular the spherical tanks. On cutouts matching this shelf are

next mounted the valves, pressure transducers, flowmeters, and tubing to interconnect these with the fill and vent panel and the storage tanks. Then the tanks are inserted_ no. i inboard and no. 2 in the outboard position to the left of the fill panel and the valve module (fig. C4-50). To complete the shelf assembly_ more tubes and the electrical cabling are added. The Beech signal conditioner assembly for each tank is mounted underneath the shelf. All oxygen system inspection and reheated Pressure and leak tubing joints if necessary checks are brazed by NR are subjected to X-ray to achieve satisfactory joints. as are electrical checks of

conducted

tank circuit elements_ i.e._ the vac-ion pump_ the heater_ motor fans_ thermostats_ and temperature sensor under dry gas conditions within the oxygen tanks. The thermostats are tested for both opening and closing temperatures by use of nitrogen gas purge with variable temperature control and monitoring each thermostat with a digital volt meter. Essentially no current is interrupted in these tests. Such tests are repeated in accordance with detailed Operational Checkout Procedures (OCP's) until all gas leaks or electrical wiring problems have been isolated and corrected and the oxygen shelf assembly is ready for installation in the

*Use of the present implies current practices

tense in this section as of 1967-68.

of

the

Panel

report

C-72

Figure C4-50.- Oxygenshelf with tanks IOO24XTAO005 and IOO24XTAOOO9 installed.

C-7._

service module. A proof gas pressure of 1262 psi is used, followed by leak testing at 745 psi. The vac-ion pumps of the oxygen storage tank vacuum jackets are turned on at least twice during typical oxygen shelf checkout and oxygen system checkout at NR. These tests are conducted with an NR test engineer, manufacturing test conductor, technicians, and quality control personnel, and a NASA quality control representative present. No cryogenic oxygen is used in any of these tests. After the oxygen shelf assembly is installed in the service module, various gas tubing and electrical connections are completed. The oxygen tank, tubing, and valves thereafter participate in oxygen subsystem testing of the service module, fuel cell simulator tests, and fuel cell interface verification in accordance with Detail Checkout of Systems (DCS's) requirements. Liquid nitrogen is used to introduce a cold nitrogen gas into the oxygen tank to cause the thermostats to close so that heater circuit continuity test can be conducted. Spacecraft bus power (30 V dc) is applied to the heater circuits and an increase in current is used to verify thermostat closure. After water/glycol system test and final shelf inspection, cryogenic oxygen System Summary Acceptance is accomplished with NASA/MSC participation and recorded in the System Summary Acceptance Document ("SSAD book"). The discipline at NR, Downey, is that of controlled procedures and hardware traceability from the controlled material and equipment stores through assembly and test operations. This discipline produces requests for review or assistance from design engineering for instances of quality or test discrepancy considered to be significant. Transportation the service module axis horizontal in (fig. C4-51). The from North American Rockwell to KSC.Shipment of from NR, Downey, is made on a pallet which holds the the fore and aft direction of trucks and aircraft sector in which the oxygen shelf is installed is on a

the underside in this orientation so that the shelf centerline points vertically down. Shock and vibration instrumentation of various service module flights in the Pregnant Guppy and Super-Guppy special aircraft of Aero Spacelines have shown no peak vibration loads exceeding one-g for vibration-isolated movements of the service module. Kennedy Space Center.After command and service module mating, at the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building-KSC, the oxygen shelf assembly as a part of the service module participates in combined system test, altitude chamber test, systems integrated test, and flight readiness test in accordance with established Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP's). These tests are conducted as dry gas pressure and electrical function verifications No specific the conduct the 28 V dc similar to those of the factory OCP's and DCS's at Downey. test is run to verify thermostat operation; however, during of a pressure switch test sequence, the thermostats may open heater load.

C-74

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C-75

The

vac-ion

pumps

of

the

oxygen

storage

tank

vacuum

jackets

are

normally turned on during three test periods at KSC The circuit breakers to the vac-ion pumps are opened

including countdown. before launch. in the 39. As

After integration of the CSM with the Saturn launch vehicle Vertical Assembly Building, the complete vehicle is moved to Pad

a part of the CDDT_ which normally occurs 14 days before launch_ the CSM storage tanks are fully loaded with liquid oxygen. The functioning of the fans is checked and heater operation verified by using a ground supply of 65 V dc to raise the tank pressure to about 900 psi. Shortly thereafter it is necessary to partly empty the oxygen tanks through a process known as "detanking." Two or three days later, at the conclusion of the CDDT, detanking is again used to empty the tank. Initial detanking consists of two sequences. First_ the internal pressure of the tank (residual to the CDDT) is vented through the vent. Next, warm gaseous oxygen is fed through the tank vent lines at 80 psia to expel liquid through the fill lines down to 50-percent full. Detanking for tank emptying proceeds similarly at the end of CDDT. Then warm gas is blown through to verify that at least -75 ° F. This step employs V dc to the heater circuit. This loading_ genic functions of acceptance test at The to oxygen prepare the the thermostats application remain closed up of only i0 to 15 to

checkout, and detanking is the first time the cryothe oxygen storage tanks are evaluated since the Beech Aircraft_ Boulder, Colorado. to capacity during actual countdown in

order

tanks are filled for launch.

During the CDDT and during the final Mobile Service Structure (MSS) is connected Tower (LUT), the heaters are powered from power distribution station from where the at the base of the LUT. The voltage from

countdown, as long as the to the launch Umbilical the ground supply system. The heaters are powered is located this power supply is automatiV dc

cally regulated at 78 _ 2 V dc and recorded. There is approxi_tely 13 volts line drop along the connecting leads, resulting in about 65 across the heaters, producing a current of about 6 amps through each heater element. This higher power operation is used to more rapidly raise the tank pressure to the operating range.

The MSS is disconnected from the LUT at about 18 hours before in both the CDDT and the final countdown. For operational reasons power supply to the heaters is switched at this time to the busses

T - 0 the of the

spacecraft with 28 to 30 V dc (about 2.8 amperes through each heater element) which are powered through the umbilical from the ground supply system. At T - 4 hours, during the launch preparation, the busses of the spacecraft are switched to the fuel cells. The destratification fans are independent from the heaters and at all times powered from the spacecraft.

C-76

Summary of Significant Aspects of Serial No. 0008 Tank Prelaunch Integration Test and Checkout History
North American Rockwell, Downey, IO024XTAO008 was installed in the no. shelf S/N 06362AAG3277 at North soon after receipt in May 1967. California.2 (outside) Oxygen position storage tank of oxygen

American Rockwell, Downey, California, Two disposition reports were written

during October 1967 to require reheat and reinspection of brazed tubing joints on the oxygen shelf found unacceptable in reading of X-rays. These joints were reheated and accepted. Completion of oxygen tank installation, including tank IO024XTAO009 in the no. i position, was accomplished March Ii, 1968. Manufacturing and test flow for the oxygen shelf is displayed chronologically in figure C4-52. a "ding" in March and the

tank April

Two disposition reports outer shell were filed 1968.

noting an "indentation" and and accepted--use as is--in

During April and May 1968, ii disposition reports were written to log tank no. 2 anomalies found during proof-pressure, leak-check, and functional checkout of the assembled oxygen shelf. Eight of these were ascribed to test procedure problems, two to a valve module (check valve) tubing leak and one to an electrical connector pin. The leak was rewelded by a Parker technician and passed leak test. The pin was repaired by NR and checked. In accordance with the normal OCP and after leak and electrical re-

pairs, the shelf assembly was completed and tested. It was installed in CSM 106 June 4, 1968. Thereafter, in compliance with several DCS's for subsystem test, a fuel cell simulator test, verification, the oxygen shelf participated checkout steps. and fuel cell interface in service module detailed

After installation of this oxygen shelf in SM 106, eight disposition reports were written during installation, additional tubing connection and subsystem line proof-pressure and leak check, and electrical cabling checking. Of these, two problems with a hydrogen relief line mounted adjacent to the oxygen shelf were solved by making up new tubing and later reheating a brazed joint to meet X-ray control requirements. Three oxygen subsystem leaks were solved by retorquing caps and a "B" nut on oxygen lines leading to fuel cell no. 2. The three remaining disposition records expressed questions concerning leak and electrical function testing of the oxygen shelf assembly which were held open pending the next opportunity for shelf assembly testing. On October 21, 1968, vac-ion pump dc-to-dc in response converters to directives requiring to reduce electromagnetic rework of

the

C°77

mm
E
u_ b'/ Qj _

o

__

_--E--_

-_j

--

O--

E------_

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_

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--"

_

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C-78

interference problems (a supplementary potting operation Beech personnel at North American Rockwell), an attempt move the oxygen shelf from SM 106. In preparation for the adjacent beams were troduced from underneath

performed by was made to re-

this attempt, the i0 bolts attaching the removed. The existence of a small, llth and behind tank no. i was overlooked by

shelf to bolt inall

persons involved. The factory crew brought into position particularly dew[sed for inserting tanks and shelves into service module (fig. C4-53).

a lifting fixture sectors of the

This fixture is composed of two parts joined at a bolted flange. The universal part is an adjustable counterbalance. The weights of this counterbalance are movable from the factory floor through endless chains. The particular part for handling to the oxygen shelf is a two-tined fork welded together from large thick-walled aluminum tubes. The tine tips are padded where they contact the underside of the shelf to support its inner portion. The outer edge of the shelf is fastened to the lifting fork by means of two screws passing through tabs on the top of the fork cross-member. Under the bolt into particular the shelf circumstances of October 21_ 1968, the unnoticed served as a tie-down beyond the tips of the lifting produced rotation of the entire assembly, The llth bolt still was unobserved. fixture by moving a weight and to lift the bridge crane. In these steps sufficient break it above the cross-arm of the fork. supporting beams drop" Observation of including a dent in

llth

fork such that raising the fixture most noticeably the counterbalance. Attempts were made to balance the assembly by operating the overhead load was placed on the fixture to

The oxygen shelf moved and came to rest on the through what was at the time described as a "2-inch adjacent portions of SH 106 identified minor damage_ the underside of the fuel cell shelf above.

Figure C4-54 shows the repair patch over this dent immediately above the vacuum pinch-off cover can of tank no. 2 in the oxygen shelf that replaced the one undergoing the "shelf drop" incident in SM 106. Further attention in the no. 2 position quality_ position through to the oxygen shelf containing tank IO024XTAO008 after its removal from SM 106 involved a number

of

test_ and repair actions. These were logged on ii separate DisRecords (NR numbered forms recording discrepancies observed manufacturing inspection and test activities at Downey). One

other such form was initiated at the time of the "shelf drop" and was treated primarily as a requirement to inspect, repair, and re-inspect the adjacent portions of SM 106, including specifically the dented fuel cell shelf.

c-79

I

0 .H v. z z ,-I

,Q

CO z I

I r._) (I)

b_) .,-I

z

C-80

Fi6ure C4-54.Replacement oxygen shelf installed Service Module 106. Note repairs to fuel cell shelf over oxygen tank no. 2.

in

C-SI

Of the ii DR's, five report anomalous conditions of detailed portions of the shelf assembly observed and recorded from Novemberi to November19, 1968. In response to these DR's, EMI tests and leakage tests were conducted, results were accepted, and somerepairs were made. The leak tests of bent tubing carrying tank no. i pressure, upstream from valves, were accepted in material review. The latter involved polishing out tank outer shell scratches, adjusting several electrical connectors, replacing damagedcable clamps, and coating damagedpotting. It is not certain but it is possible that someof these conditions relate to the "shelf drop" incident. The remainder of the DR's of the period relate to testing the oxygen shelf to revalidate it for installation into SM109. A shortened version of the normal pre-installation OCP,including pressure and external leak testing and verification of electrical functions of most of the tank elements, was conducted. Fan motor, heater, fuel cell reactant valve, relief valve, pressure switch, and motor switch functional checks were omitted. Coupling leak checks and check valve internal leak valve checks were omitted. Signal conditioner checks, for density and temperature signals, were omitted. Verification of these matters was left for and accomplished in oxygen system tests at higher levels of CMand SMintegration. The shelf was then installed (fig. C4-55). The upper one of the two accepted bent tubes shows at the extreme right of the figure. The lower one, bent 7 degrees as it joins the back of the fuel cell valve-module, is in the lower right corner. In December1968, after concern for a possible oil contamination of facility lines, GSEhose connections were checked for contamination and found acceptable. Vent line samples taken later, at KSCduring cryogenic tanking, verified that no contaminants reached the spacecraft interfaces. Engineering requests for recalibration of the oxygen system pressure instrumentation and the oxygen quantity signal conditioner of the assembly were responded to in January and February, 1969. Final inspection and cleanup of the shelf in the service module was accomplished on May 27, 1969. The oxygen SSAD book was signed off June 6, 1969, and SM109 was shipped to KSC.
Transportation from North American Rockwell to KSC.Shipment of SM 109 from Downey to KSC was accomplished by the normal means, horizontal mounting on a vibration isolating pallet carried on ground vehicles and a Super-Guppy aircraft. No shock was observed in the instruments carried. Kennedy Space Center.The oxygen tank and shelf assembly participated in normal service module tests beginning with the Combined Systems Test. Test and checkout flow at KSC are shown chronologically in figure C4-56.

C-82

@ ,H

O

@ o b @ o9

@ ,--t 4_

,-4 @ _X

S9

O I

E\ I O 611

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C-S9

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CO

®

b9

0

0

4-_ 0

I M_ I r.D 0

t-,-,I

bl? .,-4

c-84

in

A leak check was performed oxygen tank no. 2. Tank no.

July 18, 1969, using helium at 2 was pressurized to 1025 psia

94 to

psia estab-

lish the relief operation. The 954 psia during

valve cracking pressure and to verify the pressure switch pressure was decreased to 870 psia and then increased to the first integrated test with the launch vehicle simu2 were evacuated to about 80 psia was verified and to less than 5mm with reactant fan motors were

lator. The oxygen tanks no. i and no. Hg, to dry the tanks, then pressurized grade gaseous oxygen. Instrumentation checked out. A progress photograph shows the visible condition and cables.

(fig. C4-57) taken at KSC of the oxygen shelf with

on November 14, 1969, tanks, valves, tubing,

During the Flight Readiness Test surization cycle was repeated; vacuum about 80 psia.

in to

early February 1970, the pres5mm Hg and oxygen pressure to

At the CDDT in March after activation of the fuel cells, the same cycle was followed: vacuum of the oxygen tanks to 5mm Hg followed by a gaseous oxygen pressure of about 80 psi. After the cooling of the fuel cells, cryogenic oxygen loading was normal and tank pressurization to 331 psia by using heaters powered from 65 V dc ground power supply was completed without abnormalities.

During these CDDT operations on March 23, tank no. i was detanked to the normal 50 percent within less than i0 minutes. Over the space of 45 minutes, tank no. 2 did not detank normally but was observed to retain more than 90 percent of its oxygen. Detanking was suspended until the completion of CDDT. On March 27, detanking of tank no. 2 was again attempted. The tank had self-pressurized to 178 psia with a quantity of 83 percent indicated. By opening the fill line valve the pressure was depleted to approximately 36 psia in about 13 minutes. The quantity indication went down to about 65 percent (see fig. C4-58).

Next, during detanking attempts for both tanks, a comparison of tank no. i and tank no. 2 performance was made. The indicated oxygen quantity of tank no. I depleted from 48 percent to zero in less than i0 minutes. The indicated quantity in tank no. 2 remained above 60 percent over a 20-minute period.

Attempts were made over an 80-minute period to deplete the oxygen content of tank no. 2 by cycling up to various pressures and down, but did not reduce the indicated quantity below 54 percent (fig. C4-59). An attempt was made to expedite oxygen expulsion through the use of the tank heaters operated at maximum voltage and the fans. These were turned on for nearly 6 hours while the vent port remained open (fig. C4-60). Still the indicated quantity remained above 30 percent.

C-85

C-8d

E

60

O'

20

0 -220

-230
E -240

-25O 200

160

\

\

no

_-

120

\
\

4O

1352

1354

1356

1358

1400

1402

1404

1406

1408

1410

1412

1414

1416

Time, e.s.t., March 27,1970

Figure

C4-58.-

Oxygen decay

tank through

2

detanking the fill

characteristics line CDDT).

(pressure

C-87

SO

40
80

o_ _- -80

E -160
I-...-

-240

-320 24O
°__

_- 160

"-

80

e-

2000

2030

2100

2130

2200

2230

Time,e.s.t., March 27,1970
Figure C4-59.Oxygen detanki_g attempt varying purge pressure. using

C-88

8O

"E

60

I-20

0 160

8O

0 J

/

/

"_ -80
E

-1_

/ /

-240

-320 160
50

/
-\
Fill valve open Venivalveopen Heaterson :ans on

_Q-

80

0

I
2200 2300 March27,1970 24_X) 0100 Time, e.s.t. 0200 0300 March28,1970

Figure

Ch-60.-

Oxygen

detanking

attempt

using

tank

heaters.

C-89

Then a pressure cycling technique period with maximum power being applied heaters and fan circuits (fig. C4-61).

was employed over a 2-1/2 hour continuously to both tank This technique involved raising

the tank pressure by external gaseous oxygen to approximately 300 psia and then opening the fill line to induce rapid boil-off. After five cycles, the oxygen tank quantity indicated zero. Fan responses were observed to be normal throughout these opera-

tions. The temperature sensor on the quantity probe reached its indicating limit (+84 F) halfway through the 6-hour heating period. No observations of whether the heaters cycled on and off were made and subsequent review of the power supply voltage recording showed no indication of heater cycling. Concern developed over two alternate ditions, a leakage path in the fill line fill line. Gaseous flow tests were tank no. i and tank no. hypothetical tank within the tank or no. 2 cona clogged

Both

used in one attempt 2 were pressurized lines with

to evaluate the to approximately no significant

latter. 240

psia and blown down through the fill ences in blowdown time (fig. C4-62).

differ-

A check of the Wintec filter in the GSE for oxygen made by the Wintec Corporation. No significant foreign found. The alternate hypothesis, that the short segments the top of the quantity probe of tank no. 2 had large come dislodged, was considered as were the operational associated with the use of a tank in this condition. was that the loading fill line parts. It

tank no. material

2 was was

of fill tube in gaps or had bedifficulties The concern here of the the CDDT.

process might be hampered by the position was noted that the filling was normal for

To verify this judgment and to assure countdown operability, both tanks were filled on March 30 to about 20 percent in approximately 2.5 minutes. Tank no. i detanked normally; tank no. 2 did not. Again the procedure of applying heat at maximum voltage and the cyclic application of gas pressure of approximately 250 psia and then venting was used. Five cycles were applied in a 1-1/4 hour period and tank no. 2 was emptied (fig. C4-63). The fan responses were observed to be normal and no indications of heater cycling were observed. During the countdown, April 8_ 1970, the pressurization of oxygen tank no. 2 was hampered by a leak through the vent line pressure-operated disconnect. Installation of the first cap stopped the leak and the pressurization of tank no. 2 was normal with no anomalies noticed during the completion of the countdown.

C-90

40
r

20
c

__m\

1
0 160

\

Cr

80 o'-'-

/,
J

\

P

,\
E -80 \ XI -160

-240 400

320

240
l,.--

/
I

'//
ilia n m

/

/
L __

l,.. r'i

160

80

Or

1
Fill valve open
I l im

Vent valve open I Heaters on Fans on

0330

0400

0430

0500

0530

0600

0630

Time, e.s.t., March 28, Igl0

Figure

C4-61.-

Oxygen and

detanking tank

using

pressure

cycles

heaters.

C-91

o H

¢..)

_,_

r_

J

o
_D

o c_ ___ I kD !

.r-t

SlUaA3 E!sd 'aJnssaj d

0-92

40
¢(p

20
t-.

(_

0 80

-80 E
I--

-160

-240

-320 320

240

I,._

160

r,

80

I Heaters on [ Fans on

1530

1600

1630

1700

1/30

1800

Time, e.s.t.,

March30, 19/0

Figure

C4-63.Oxygen detanking using cycles and tank heaters.

pressure

C-93

Several noted.

items

of

overall

tank

test

and

checkout

experience

should

be

Contaminants: Liquid, as well as gaseous, oxygen which entered tank no. 2 was verified by sample analysis. Nothing indicates that contaminants did enter the oxygen tanks. The samples taken from the vents during the servicing met the specification requirements and did not give an indication of tank contamination. Quantity probe: Throughout all tests, during a period of ii months resulting in 167 hours 8 minutes operating time including 28 fan on/off cycles over the 17-day period of CDDT and launch count, the quantity gaging system in tank no. 2 exhibited less sensitivity to noise and transients than that of tank no. i. Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure oxygen tank no. 2, in systems limitations or allowable cycling: At no and subsystems, tank cycles time during the testing were the specified

of

pressure

exceeded.

Testing of oxygen tank fans: Test records were reviewed of all fan motor operations at KSC for any indications of ac bus transients. Tank no. 2 fans were powered _O times. No electrical transients were found except those normally connected with fan starting or stopping. Fan motor performance was considered normal.

Investigation Causes of detanking

and

Supporting Review

Work of information from the

difficulties.-

Beech acceptance test logs and review with the Beech personnel in charge of these tests does not indicate that the detanking was abnormal. Contrarywise, the data are not substantive to prove that the liquid was expelled through the fill line. No weight or quantity measurement is recorded at the completion of the liquid expulsion; however, the procedure calls for continuing the application of vent line pressure until both the weighing system and the quantity probe indicate the tank is empty. The final tank empty condition is based on the final exit temperature of the warm nitrogen gas purge. At the time, no one indicated that the response of the tank to the procedures was anything but normal, and today careful review of existing data, discussions with the responsible Beech Aircraft and North American Rockwell personnel, and a special test at Beech Aircraft indicate that the detanking of the 0008 tank was most probably normal.

Each oxygen storage tank is stored at NR, Downey, in its shipping container until removal for installation in the assigned oxygen shelf. Thus it is retained in a vertical position until any motion takes place in the shelf assembly fixture.

c-94

The

shelf

assembly

fixture

used

at

Downey

(fig.

C4-50)

aligns

tank

no. i so that the fill tube segments in the top of the quantity probe assembly lie nominally in a plane transverse to the axis of fixture rotation. Thus the fixture in the normal position holds the tubes upright but otherwise can rotate them through a full circle, exposing them to dislodging forces in the plane of their nominal location. The situation for tank no. 2 is nearly a right angle to the tank no. i situation so that the tube segment plane is nominally parallel to the trunnion axis of the assembly fixture. Thus in all positions other than vertical or inverted, a lateral dislodging force exists relative to the plane of their nominal location. The highest contact with elevation of the underside the tank assembly, and of the fuel cell shelf thus the first area at the time of the

of

lifting fixture breakage and the shelf dent, was the cover over the upper vacuum pinch-off tube (fig. C4-55). This point was to the left of the mass centers and lifting forces involved as the counterbalance rotated and broke away from the fork portion of the lifting fixture. (See Appendix D.) Some rotation to lift the outer right corner of the shelf (lower right in fig. C4-55) higher than the outer left would be expected from this configuration. An uneven fall to the shelf supports would follow. In figure C4-55, showing the installation of the oxygen shelf in SM 109, the condition of the farthest right tubing in the lower part of the picture reflects the comments of two DR's that one tube had a "slight bend" at the valve module and another (lower) was "badly bent." As the highest no. 2, Neither tubes, farthest from the llth bolt and the high point of tank these two may have participated in the "shelf drop" incident. was found to be in need of repair after leak check.

No mention could be found in review of these DR's of any concern for the condition of the tubes, wires, or motors internal to the oxygen storage tank except as verifiable through routine external gas and electrical testing with NR factory 0CP's. with the SM axis horizontal during the next major opportunity for

Shipment of SM 109 from NR/Downey, ground and air transporation, afforded fill tube segment lateral dislodgment.

It appears pertinent to this review to note that during SM transportation the fill tube segments within the upper portion of the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity probe assembly lay with the tank-exit end of the fill tube segments about 20 degrees above the horizontal, if they were still in place after previous handling and the "shelf drop." Neither the wires nor the feed line filter were below it to restrict rotation of the fill tube about the central tube of the quantity probe (fig. C4-64).

C-95

o

@

_o
o

I I I

I I l I J I I

o_ O

bD

._ 40 O [D H I kO I _D

h0

C-96

This history of exposure of the tank fill tube segments to an unusual dislodgment environment sequence was not recorded during the detanking incidents at KSC nor during the presentation of CSM 109 history reviews to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager through either reliability and quality assurance or engineering channels at MSC. However, it does corroborate the recorded real-time judgment of Beech_ MSC, and KSC engineers that the tank fill tank !O024XTAO008 during the Since the fill tube parts line parts may have been out of place in detanking problems of March 23-30, 1970. have dimensional tolerances that could

allow these parts to fall out of place_ a calculation was made to attempt to establish the configuration of the tank during the detanking operations at KSC. The data from the first detanking attempt of March 27 were used to test the hypothesis that the fill tube parts were disconnected that no liquid was expelled from the tank. A simple heat balance of the tank from the initial condition to the end condition shows the mass lost by the tank can be ly that no liquid was expelled. data upon point the indicated. explained by Figure C4-58 vaporization and and table C4-III such equation that all

it is likeshow the

which these calculations were based. At the initial and final temperature indicated in the data is too warm for the pressure The saturation temperature was used for each case. of

Possible effects of special detanking procedures at KSC.The use special detanking procedures at KSC to empty tank no. 2 of CSM 109 has created concern these special procedures may have altered significantly the condition of the oxygen tank. A number of special tests have been run and other tests are yet to be run in an attempt to determine the nature and degree of degradation that may be expected to occur to the tank internal components and wiring resulting from exposure of this type. The most significant finding to date is the fact that the thermostats fail by welding closed almost immediately when attempting to interrupt 65 V dc.

Several tests were run to determine the temperature that would occur at various points on the heater tube as a result of operation at ground power level as the liquid in the tank is boiled off. These tests were run at MSC using a similar sized tank with an actual flight-type heater fan assembly. The test setup is shown on figure C4-65. Liquid nitrogen was used in the tank for safety reasons. The initial run was made with a later model heater fan assembly that does not utilize thermostats; however, it was felt that as long as liquid nitrogen _as present it _as not likely that the thermostats would be called upon to operate. During this test very high temperatures were encountered on many locations on the heater tube (figure C4-66). These conditions were considered to be very unrealistic, so the test was rerun using a heater fan assembly equipped with thermostats. When the test was started_ one thermostat indicated an open circuit at the initial fill condition. It was decided that a satisfactory test could be run since an extra lead had been extended from the heater elements so that the heaters could be manually operated to coincide with the functioning of the operable thermostat.

C-97

TABLE

C4-III.-

THERMODYNAMIC

BALANCE

CALCUlaTIONS

Initial Quantity, Pressure, Temperature, Temperature, Density Volume Volume Weight Weight of of of of of ib psia ° F ° R liquid, liquid, gas, ft 3 ib ib/ft 3 ft 3 274 178

condition (83_ indic.)

Final 212

condition (65_ indic.)

36
-280 179.7

-236.5
223.2

58.4 4.7o .05 2?3.85 o,15

68.0
_.lO 1.65 210.9 1.1

liquid, gas, ib

Enthalpy Btu/ib Enthalpy Total

of

liquid,

88

68

of

gas, of

Btu/ib

158
24,112

155 14,341

enthalpy Btu

liquid, Total Btu Heat 44 sp.

enthalpy

of gas,

24

171

capacity Ib ht.

of

metal,

AT ° = 43.5° F,
0.086 of boil0 24,136 24,051 (Reference Cond.) -164

Heat capacity off gas 62 ib at 156.5

Btu/ib Btu/ib

Total

enthalpy,

C-98

e..-

o.

o_

t/_

e-

-xa

E_
e-

4-_

40 t/] e0 +_

b_

4.0

.+a

a_
! t.r'N ',D

_.4
!

e"

I
¢M Z .._1

°,_

)

C-99

24_

O;C O;C
20-Thermocouple 1 and 2 7 • Tilermocouple 23 Gas temperature

Thern_ocouple

_3 and 4

r_!l

__Thermocouple

7

16

n

_ _ ../,_..._

_-_

Tllerlnocou!)le

8

___Ttlermoco_Jp, e 25 Inside lower fan wire conduit

(latter
.B

Lest only) 9 21 22 on 400 Hz conduit

Z __Thermocouple

o 12 g

__Ttlern/ocouple __Thermocouple lns i de heater _Thermocouple

.i ...1

sheath environment 10

8

--

Thernlocoul)le

11

Thermocouple

15 and 16 Z

4

_Thermocouple "*_-_"_'--_T I _,,_

12 h ermoc o up I e 13 24 14

Thermocouple _._Thermocouple

D
I

Thermocouple

17 and 18

I

(a) Figure C4-66.-

Temperature Heater tube

sensor assembly

locations. temperature test.

C- i00

1100

1000

900

32 _-

800

28

lO0

24

600

• 20
C I_-

500

"-1

-_ 16
.__

_
E

400

"_ 12

_'- 300

8

20O

4

100

0

0

-I00

-200

-300 0

1

2

3 Time, hr

4

5

6

7

(b)

Typical

test

results.

Figure

C4-66.-

Concluded.

C-101

The test was started and after a few cycles in this modethe previously nonfunctioning (oDen) thermostat started indicating normal function. At this time it was decided to revert to the originally intended test configuration, i.e., the thermostats directly controlling the heaters. Data from that point on indicated that the thermostats were not cycling the heaters. The heater tube temperature data looked Just like the nonthermostat test run. The test terminated at this point and the thermostats were removed and X-rayed. The X-rays indicated that the contact gap was bridged. Onethermostat had its case carefully removed to examine the conditions of the contacts (fig. C4-67). A review of the thermostat design and the manufacturer's ratings indicate that the thermostats are severely overloaded in currentinterrupting capability at the ground power condition. Open contact spacing at 65 V dc is such that a sustained arc can be established and the contacts melted at this first attempt to interrupt power of this magnitude. Inasmuch as thermostat failure would be expected at the first attempt to interrupt the ground power level, the conditions of heater tube temperature measured during the first test of this series would be indicative of those experienced during the KSCspecial detankings of March 27, 28, and 30. Since a review of the heater ground power supply voltage recordings madeduring the special detanking operations showedno indication of heater cycling, a special postflight test was conducted at KSC which showedthat the cycled load equivalent to the heaters would cause a cycling in the voltage recording. Figure C4-68 shows sections of motor lead wire removed from the heater tube conduit. Other tests run at AmesResearch Center (see Appendix F) indicate that Teflon-insulated wires run at similar temperatures in an oxygen atmosphere result in even more severe degradation. A test is being
and detanking run at Beech Aircraft to simulate all the tanking conducted on XTA-0008 at KSC. A Block I tank modified to

the Block II configuration with the fill tube connecting parts rotated out of position is being used for this test. Temperature measurements on the electrical conduit in the vacuum dome area and posttest inspection will be utilized to evaluate the effects on the wiring of the special det anking operations. At no time are these during standard checkout, prelaunch, and thermostats required to interrupt the 65 launch operaV dc ground

tions

power supply current. As far as could be determined, the special detanking operation was the only time that any thermostats were ever called upon to interrupt this load.

C- 102

(b)

Welded

contacl.s

after

test..

Figure

C4-67.-

Thermostat

configuration

and

welded

contacts.

c- lo3

.,o

O)

o'/

0

! 00 ',D ! r..)

C-iO_

NASA

--

MSC

APPENDIX REPORT OF DESIGN

D PANEL

CONTENTS Part APPENDIX DI D2 D3 TASK PANEL REVIEW SYSTEM D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL D-I D-3 D-5 D-5 Page

ASSIGNMENT ORGANIZATION AND

................... ................. ................. ................ AT TIME

ANALYSIS

DESCRIPTION

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM CONFIGURATION OF ACCIDENT ................... STRUCTURAL Materials EVALUATION and Welding Program OF THE

D-II TANK ..... D-13 D-13 D-20 D-23 D-24 ......... Apollo 13 D-30 D-30 D-30 D-25

OXYGEN

.............. ..............

Qualification FRACTURE Failure

MECHANICS Modes

................ .................

Effectiveness Possibility Mission DYNAMIC Oxygen

of the

Proof

Test

of Tank Failure ....................

During

TESTING Tank

.................. Assembly Dynamic Testing Test ......

Apollo CSM Acoustic and Vibration Program .................... SHOCK TESTING ................... ................

D-31 D-35 D-35 D-35 D-37

INTERNAL Quantity Heaters

COMPONENTS Gage

.................

.....................

iii

Part

Page
Fans , , , . , ° , . . , , o , • • • , , , , , .

D-41 D-43 D-43

Temperature Wiring Discussion COMPATIBILITY Classification Materials OTHER DESIGN

Sensor

...............

..................... ................... OF MATERIALS Methods to WITH OXYGEN ......

D-48
D-48 D-h9 D-49 D-59 D-59 D-61 D-6h D-70 ......... OF THE OXYGEN D-71 .......... D-71 D-72 D-74 D-78 D-78 D-85 D-70 "

............. the Tank ......... ......

Internal AND

SYSTEM Relief

CONSIDERATIONS Valves of Tank ........... ...........

Oxygen

System at

Arrangement Dome Filter Caution ABNORMAL TANK Oxygen Assembly

Head

..................

..................... and Warning Provisions

EVENTS IN THE HISTORY ...................... "Shelf at Drop" KSC Incident

Detanking Discussion RELATED

................

................... .................. ................ ................. Systems ........... .......

SYSTEMS

Pressure Line Low

Vessels

Components Pressure

Oxygen Power

D-86 D-86

Electrical

System--Batterles

iv

Part GroundSupport Equipment ............ Certi fi cation .................. Apollo J-Missions ................ Lunar Module "Lifeboat" DISCUSSION.................... 04 D5
SUMMARY REFERENCES ....................... .....................

Page D-86 D-87 D-87 D-87 D-87 D-89 D-93

.............

v

This page left blank

intentionally.

vi

PART TASK

DI

ASSIGNMENT

The Design Panel was assigned the task of reviewing the design of the systems involved in the Apollo 13 accident, including their qualification history. The service history of the specific components flown on Apollo 13 was also to be examined from a design point of view to ascertain whether any abnormal usage experienced might have had a detrimental effect on the functional integrity of the components. The Panel was also charged with review of other spacecraft systems of similar design or function to ascertain whether they contained potential hazards. Finally, the Panel was to analyze, as required by the Board, proposed failure mechanisms to the extent necessary to support the theory of failure. The Panel conducted its activities by reviewing design documentation and drawings, historical records, and test reports; analyzing data; examining specimens of hardware; and consulting with other Board Panels and with members of the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Investigation Team and the contractors.

D-I

This page left blank intentionally.

D-2

PART PANEL

D2

ORGANIZATION

Panel 3 was tl_e Board Monitor Applications,

chaired L,v Dr. was Mr. V. L. ]{eadquarters.

S. C. Hilmnel, Le<,Jis Research Center, Johnson, Office of Space Science and Panels Members were:

and

NASA

Mr. W. F. Bro<_n, Jr. T ewis Research Center Mr. R. Office NASA Dr. N. Lindley of Manned

Space

Flight

Headquarters W. R. Lucas Space Flight Center

Marshall

Mr. J. F. Saunders, ,Jr. OFfice of Manned Space Flig]_t NASA IIeadquarters Mr. R. C. Wells Research Center

Langley

Specific assignments coverin£ such areas as materials selection, fracture mechanics, materials compatibility, failure mechanisms, related systems, and electrical systems were given to each Panel Member. All Panel Members participated in the preparation of this report.

n-3

This

page

left

blank

intentionally.

D-4

PART REVIEW AND

D3 ANALYSIS

Early in the proceedings failure was centered in the

of the cryogenic

Board, it became oxygen subsystem

evident of the

that the electrical

power system of the spacecraft, and, more specifically, in the no. 2 cryogenic oxygen tank. For this reason, detailed examinations of the Panel were limited to this subsystem. Interfacing systems were examined only to the extent required to understand system and/or to relate data from flight design of the system. the Panel had one of its members present at the the MSC Panel on Related Systems which conducted spacecraft pressurized systems. the function of the oxygen or test to the operation or

In addition, deliberations of on other Apollo

reviews

SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION

The

cryogenic

storage

subsystem

supplies

reactants

to

the

fuel

cells

that provide electric power for the spacecraft. The oxygen supplies metabolic oxygen for the crew, command module (CM) ization, and the initial pressurization of the lunar module

system also cabin pressur(LM). The

cryogenic storage and fuel cell subsystems are located in bay 4 of the service module (SM). Figure D3-1 shows the geometric arrangement of these subsystems within this portion of the SM. The system comprises two oxygen tanks, two hydrogen tanks, and three fuel cells with their associated plumbing, control valves, regulators, pressure switches, and instrumentation. The uppermost shelf contains the three fuel cells; the center shelf contains the two oxygen tanks, the oxygen system valve modules, the fuel cell oxygen valve module, and a ground service interface panel. The lower shelf contains the two hydrogen tanks, one above and one below the shelf, oxygen and a set of valve modules analagous in function to those of the

system. is contained in Appendix A of the operating and design parameters of etc. in figure DB-2. The ground Figure D3-3 is a photograph lines. The two tanks and

A description of these components Board's report. Also provided are the the components, materials of

construction,

A schematic of the oxygen system service lines are capped off prior to of the panel showing the terminations

is shown flight. of these

D-5

\

cell 2 I

I

Fuel cell 3

Fuel cell 1

_uel

cell

t
Oxygen tank Oxygen subsystem shelf ,Oxygen len valve module tgen fuel cell shutoff valve module

panel jgen •Hydrogen

servicing •

/

rclrogen subs module

tanlr _

Figure

D3-1.-

Arrangement

of

fuel

cells

and

cryogenic

systems

in

bay

_.

o-6

.E E c_ m

X E .E

X X

.S
c: X

E o

,,_ EE

g_

z

0_ .lJ o)

E)

C) I

I Cv"l

,r-I

x

D-T

Figure

D3-3.-

SM

oxygen

system

ground

service

panel.

D-8

their plumbing are identical except for one point in the feed line from tank no. 2, at which a ground service line tees into the feed line downstream of a check valve. This ground service line permits the operation of the fuel cells and the environmental control system (ECS) oxygen system from a ground source of oxygen without requiring the use of the flight tankage. This line terminates at the fitting designated 0P in figure D3-3. The check valve prevents the pressurization of tank no. 2 from this ground
S our ce.

The pressure transducer, pressure cated in an oxygen system valve module of the module is shown in figure D3-4. plus the check valve comprise the module. are approximately 19 the valve module. The going lines feed line for tank no. Figure D3-4 feet of feed

switch, external Two of to top the

and relief valve are loto the tank. A photograph each of these components in the previous paragraph of the oxygen shelf. There tank pressure vessel to

2 referred shows the line from

exits

the

oxygen

system

valve

module

and branches,

one

to the ECS from tanks

and no.

the other 1 and no.

to the fuel cell 2 are manifolded

valve module where within the body of

the this

assembly. points and

This module contains the check three solenoid shutoff valves, electrical system

valves at the feed line entrance one for each of the fuel cells. consists of the following

items

The cryogenic oxygen for each tank:

i. Two electrical heaters, rated at 77.5 watts each, 28 V dc. For ground operation, the heaters are rated at 415 watts each, 65 V dc. Four wires exit the tank connector. The wiring of the heater leads at the pressure control assembly is such that the two heaters are connected in parallel to a single power source. Power to the tank no. 2 heaters is provided from main bus B through a circuit breaker and through an on-off automatic switch. Automatic operation is provided through the pressure control assembly actuated by the pressure switches. The control logic requires that both oxygen tank pressure switches be below the low setpoint to energize the heaters. Either switch sensing pressure above the high set-point will deenergize the heaters. 2. Two motor-driven fans rated at 28.4 watts each (three-phase,

200/115 V ac). Eight wires, one for each of the three power phases plus a neutral for each motor, exit the tank at the tank connector. They proceed to a fuse box assembly where each of the leads (except for the grounded neutrals) is individually fused by a 1-ampere fuse. Upon the fuses, the leads from like phases of the two motors as well as neutrals are Joined within the fuse box, and four wires leave this The three power leads then pass through individual switch contacts thence to individual circuit breakers. Each breaker is rated at 2 The fans can be operated in either a manual or automatic mode. leaving the assembly. and amperes.

D-9

i!! ¸

Fuel cell shutoff ,m, valve

Note: Ground protective covers installed on tanks

Figure

D3-4.-

Plan

view

of

the

top

of

the

oxygen

shelf.

D-IO

in

an

3. A temperature Inconel sheath.

sensor, a platinum It is attached to

resistance the outside

thermometer encased of the quantity

probe. The resistance of the thermometer and consequently the voltage drop across the unit changes with temperature. The signal conditioner which serves as the reference voltage generator and amplifier is located on the oxygen shelf and its input to a maximum of i.i milliamperes. Four are connected to the signal the resistor is current-limited wires exit the tank connector The signal conditioner is load with is provided to and

conditioner.

powered from ac bus 2 through a circuit breaker as a parallel the quantity gage signal conditioner. Additional description in Appendix B. 4. A quantity gage, a capacitor tubes submerged in the oxygen. consisting of The dielectric

minum

two concentric aluconstant of the

oxygen, and consequently the measured capacitance, changes in proportion to its density. The signal conditioner, which serves as the reference voltage shelf. generator, Two wires rectifier, and amplifier, is located on exit the tank connector and are connected the oxygen to the signal a

conditioner. The signal conditioner is powered from ac bus 2 through circuit breaker as a parallel load with the temperature sensor signal conditioner. Additional description is provided in Appendix B. 5. A vac-ion pump assembly, only in prelaunch activities attached to the to maintain the dome tank of the tank, is annulus at the

used

required cathode

vacuum level. The pump functions with ionized gas molecules and ion

by bombarding a titanium pumping results from the

gettering action of sputtered titanium particles. The high-voltage power supply of the pump is an integral part of the pump assembly. Leads for the vac-ion pump do not penetrate the pressure vessel and pump is not normally powered in flight.

the

ELECTRICAL

SYSTEM

CONFIGURATION

AT

TIME

OF ACCIDENT

The electrical power system, in general, provides multiple power busses with switching options for selecting an operating configuration. At 55:53:21, the electrical system was configured in accordance with reference i, as shown in figure D3-5, with fuel cells i and 2 connected to main bus A and fuel cell 3 connected to main bus B. Inverter i was connected to main bus A and powering ac bus i. Inverter 2 was connected to main bus tery busses controlling B and powering ac bus 2. A and B were not connected heater operation for both Inverter 3 was not connected. Batto main bus A or B. The switches oxygen tanks were in the "autothrough were at the pressure levels which condid

matic" position, trol assembly.

controlling heater operation Pressures in the oxygen tanks

not demand operation of the heaters. on oxygen tank no. 2 were energized

Temperature and quantity sensors from ac bus 2. The quantity gage

D-II

Pressure Oxygen tank 1 :)Open

control

assembly

Oxygen tank 2 PS

l
i'*--0 ver current reverse voltage Main B

iI

, Main A CB1 RHEB

]

I

f 27S RHEB 229 5 amps c _CB18 I RHEB

CB19

"T

CB51 RHEB 5 amps 229 _')

CB2 RHEB 27S 70 amps

70 amps

RHEB 2260 c_I 15 amps 226 T J

I 15 amps CB50 0

_,
-_ 0 Y

s14
MDC2 On-off-auto (in auto) Pressure 0

j,

sls

Vac-ion pump Oxygen
7 _

_ MDC2 0 I _On-off-autol (in auto) -

I _L, I l
I Vac-ion pump 7-"

tank 1

_-_

controlassembly

;-_ <

Over Oxygen tank 2 voltage under voltage tank 2 AC 2

_i)

Heaters AC
a

oxygen

tank 1

Heaters

oxygen

i

7,
? 2amps (lY 2amps

t,
'F 2amps

c,,o "
MDC2 amps8 'A

s226

Fc
/ |
I__L_I RHEB (_ 220

2_s_
_'o o On-off-auto MDC 2 I 0
-I RHEB (in 226 on)

_

S20

o o MDC 2 On-off-auto
,.JRHEB226 (in on)

l_,,-JRHEmB p
A

Quantity
temperature sensors

L__J
0

I
]

('_ _

I

FU/IA
Fan motors
I \ V'

Quantity temperature sensors

_

SCS-TVC servo motors

T T _ T

Fan motors
V

I

Oxygen tank 1

Oxygen tank 2

Figure

D3-5.-

Electrical power

schematic system

of at

relevant 55:53:21.

portions

of

electrical

D-12

had remained off-scale high from 46:40:06, indicating a probable short circuit either on the leads or the probe assembly. Operation of the fan motors in the oxygen tanks was accomplished throughout the mission using manual control in lieu of the automatic operation afforded by the logic of the pressure control assembly. A routine operation of the fans was requested by the ground at 55:52:58 and acknowledged by the crew at 55:53:06. Energizing of the fans in oxygen tank no. i is confirmed by a drop in voltage of ac bus i and an increase in total fuel cell current at 55:53:18. Energizing of the fans in oxygen tank no. 2 is confirmed by a drop in voltage of ac bus 2 and an increase in total fuel cell current at 55:53:20. Data substantiating operation and operation times are presented in Appendix B.

STRUCTURAL

EVALUATION

OF

THE

OXYGEN

TANK

The oxygen tank consists of two concentric shells, an inner shell (the pressure vessel) and an outer shell (fig. D3-6). The space between the two shells is evacuated during normal operation and contains the thermal insulation system, fluid lines, and the conduit which houses all of the electrical wires entering the pressure vessel. The oxygen tank is discussed from the standpoint of materials, processing, welding, qualification program, stress levels, fracture analysis, and environmental testing.

Materials,

Processing,

and

Welding

Inner shell.The pressure vessel is made from Inconel 718, a precipitation hardenable nickel base alloy having good strength, ductility, and corrosion resistance over the range of temperatures from -300 ° F to above 1400 ° F. The nominal composition of Inconel 718 is 19 percent chromium, 17 percent 0.6 percent aluminum, specified for Inconel Hold Air at cool iron, 0.8 percent titanium, 5 percent columbium, and the remainder nickel. The heat treatment 718 for this application was the following: 1800 ° F ± 25 ° F to cool 1325 to for i hour hold hold for for 8 hours 8 hours

± 25 ° F and 1150 ° F and

Furnace Air cool

This treatment should produce 198,000 psi and yield strength of

typical ultimate tensile strength of 170,000 psi at 70 ° F. Ultimate and

D-13

Dome assembly

i

Outer shell

i

I

i

Inner shell

Tank mounting

I
I

Outer shell

Insulation

Figure

D3-6.-

Oxygen

pressure

vessel

schematic.

D-14

yield-strength values increase with decreasing temperature and reach 228,000 psi and 189,000 psi, respectively, at -190 ° F. These values exceed those assumed in the design of the vessel, which were 180,000 psi ultimate tensile strength and 150,000 psi yield strength at room temperatest temture (ref. 2). After burst tests, vessels PV-I and PV-4, and strength perature. Inconel Each 718 specimen is exceeded tensile specimens were cut measurements were made at minimum requirements. selection properly for use at is from room

considered

to be

an excellent and when

the temperatures compatible with

required by this liquid oxygen.

design

cleaned

The pressure vessel is made by electron beam welding two hemispheres at a weld land (fig. D3-7) that is 0.139 ± 0.002 inch thick. The weld land is faired to a membrane of O.059-inch thickness over a distance of about 2 inches. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., forges the hemispheres to a wall thickness of 0.75 inch, and applies the complete heat treatment. The hemispheres are X-rayed following forging. The Airite Company machines the hemispheres to dimension and welds them together from the outside. First, an intermittent tack weld pass is made, followed by a complete tack weld. The third pass provides complete penetration, and a fourth pass penetrates about one-third of the thickness. Finally, a cover pass is made. Figure D3-8 illustrates the welding sequence. The weldments are X-rayed and dye-penetrant inspected from the outside. Inspection of the inside of the pressure vessel is by visual means only and dye penetrant is not used. Use of one of the available liquidoxygen-compatible dye penetrants would enhance the detection of cracks or similar weld defects inside the vessel. The literature has very little data on electron-beam welding of

Inconel 718. However, and there is no reason potential problem is micro-fissuring

it is frequently to question the

used in the aerospace industry practice in this instance. One this nickel-base alloy is welded zone. Such fissures either do

sometimes found when in the heat-affected

not propagate to the surface, or are very difficult to detect. Unfortunately, high-contrast X-rays of this material are difficult to obtain, particularly in the configuration of this tank. No evidence of a weld cracking problem has been found in the manufacture of these pressure vessels. Thus there is no justification for postulating that microfissuring was a factor in the accident being investigated.

and

A total of 59 data packages it was ascertained that only

on oxygen pressure vessels were reviewed 12 vessels had had weld discrepancies. their disposition. (S/N lOO24XTAO008 no recorded and dis-

Table DS-1 Neither of

describes the weld discrepancies and the two Apollo 13 oxygen tanks flown appear on this the manufacture

S/N lO024XTAO009) crepancies during

list. There were of these tanks.

weld

D-15

Joint configuration

_'1 I

_. I

020:1:'005

• 002

test

__L L130r ,i'!t_, L_+.00a
.+:

coupons

K'::o+O.. oo.ura
° Weld reinfor cement L -I P/M L 1.000 2.000 3.000 thickness T +.002 .084 .067 +'002 14.808 14.808 12.587 refar c refar c refarc 12.528 12.528 12.528 Tank radius O.D. D linens ions I.D. +005 -0 +005 -0 +005 -0 Sph rad Sph rad 5ph rad + 004 .059_ 000

___,.0.

Weld schedule (Electron Parameter Voltage - Kv - in.

beam weld)

1-tack 80 1.5 0.012 18 2x10-4 Notes: (1) (2) (3)

2-seal 80 1.5 0.012 _ _

Pass sequence 3-pene. 1 115 6.0 .024/.036 _ _

4-pene.2 95 4.0 .040/.080 _ ----.-,.

5-cover 85 3.0 0.110

Amperes - MA Beam deflection Travelin./min Vacuum -mm hg

0.002" gap, 0.003" offset (,_ax typ) No weld repairs allowed Typical weld sequence shown on attached

sketch

Figure

D3-7.-

Girth

weld

Joint

configuration

and

schedule.

D-Z6

ass 1 and 2 (tack and seal)

l
.i12 ref weld reinf t O.D. surface

l
Ll.D. surface _ Weld joint

t
,_Pass 3 (penetration l)

t
>

Fusion zone-_

t
ss 4 (penetration)

Fusion zone

I
Fusion zone _s Figure D3-8.Weld sequence.

t
5 (cover) (Completed weld)

D-17

TABLE

D3-1.-

AIRITE

PRESSURE

VESSEL

WELD

DISCREPANCIES

Serial XTAO005

no.

Spacecraft i01 Weld bead 0.005

Discrepancy inch concave by 0.600-inch inch below upon in

length.

Remainder

undercut

0.002

weld land parent metal. X-ray and comparison to burst. Beech MRR. XTAO010 103 Undercut below weld land

Accepted based qual. unit used

in one

area

0.0015

inch deep by 0.750 upper hemisphere. through. NR MRD. XTAO013 1o6 Accepted

inch length adjacent to Due to heavy weld dropfor unrestricted use by

Hemisphere dimensional characteristics resuited in excessive weld mismatch. Units were successfully welded after NR vessel met all requirements. MRD. Finished

XTA0016

107

Four areas of concavity in center of weld bead: no. i, 0.0025 inch depth; no. 2, 0.0055 inch depth; 0.0025 inch drop-through. weld After cavity parent metal; Warpage Accepted based passes rework in of no. 5, depth. 0.0045 inch depth; no. 4, Concavity due to excessive using with three two 360-degree NR MRD. of con-

Rewelded accordance above,

areas

remained: metal; no.

no. l, 0.0025 2, 0.004 inch

inch below below parent

no. 3, 0.0015 occurred due for upon positive

inch below parent metal. to lack of constraint. usage per NR MRD margins of safety.

unrestricted

XTA0022

ii0

Borescope showed entire weld land visible and not consumed through 360-degree circumference due MRD to lack of penetration. instructions. Rewelded per NR

XTAO017

ii0

Borescope area 1/2 degree

revealed lack of drop-through inch in length. Rewelded by per NR MRD.

in an one 360-

pass

Edge of weld on upper hemisphere undercut from O.OO1 inch to 0.003 inch into parent material for 360 degrees following rewelding per above-reworked and accepted stress analysis. by NR MRD based upon

D-18

TABLE

D3-1.-

AIRITE

PRESSURE

VESSEL

WELD

DISCREPANCIES

- Concluded

Serial XTAO024

no.

Spacecraft iii

Discrepancy Hemisphere dimensional specification. Units certification ditions were consumed characteristics out of successfully welded after conwere

test specimens duplicating acceptable. Discrepancies welding. penetration Rewelded per Beech for MRR.

during weld

XTA0021

iii

Incomplete 17-3/8

a distance

of

inches.

NR MRD.

XTAO033

Unassigned

Upper hemisphere dimensions out of specification. Accepted for welding with fit up with another hemisphere. Beech MRR. Borescope inch) revealed complete weld welded land per (0.012 NR MRD.

XTAO019

Unassigned

still

visible--repair

XTAO003

Unassigned

Borescope and tration major Airite

X-ray revealed incomplete penedistance of weld. Rewelded per Beech MER.

procedure.

Weld concavity on drop-through phere. Maximum for unrestricted XTAOO32 Unassigned Borescope

from 0.001 to 0.0055 inch deep side of weld on upper hemiswidth is 0.003 inch--accepted use by NIR MRD. area approximately 0.600

revealed

inch long with incomplete consumption of weld lands. X-ray indicated complete penetration. Rewelded by Airite procedure. Beech MIqR.

D-19

Outer

shell.-

The

outer

shell

is made

of

Inconel

750,

also

a nickel

base alloy having the following nominal composition: 15 percent chromium, 7 percent iron, 2.5 percent titanium, 1 percent columbium, 0.7 percent aluminum, and the remainder outer shell can be annealed. nickel. According Typical strength to references 3 and 4, values for the annealed the

alloy are 130,000 psi ultimate strength and 60,000 psi yield strength. This is more than adequate for this application. The wall thickness of the outer shell is 0.020 ± 0.002 inch. When the space between the two shells is evacuated, the outer shell preloads the insulation between the two shells. to vent the differential The dome of the outer shell contains a burst disc designed space between the shells to ambient pressure at a pressure of 75 ± 7.5 psi. Three fluid lines (fill line, vent line, and conduit are fusion welded to the close-out into the top of the pressure vessel by a circumferential vessel. seal weld. two The

feed cap The

Cryogenic tank tubing.line), and an electrical (tube adapter) cap is secured

that is screwed to the pressure

The four lines are made of Inconel 750, annealed Aerospace Materials Specification (AMS) 5582. The tubes traverse the space between the shells and exit the outer shell at the side of the tank coil cover.

nominal strength of the annealed tubing is 140,000 psi ultimate, and 80,000 psi yields, which is more than adequate for the application, as the stress level in the tubing is only about 17,000 psi. After the tubes are welded to the cap, a visual leak test (3 psi), and proof-pressure tests are used quality of these welds (ref. 5). This is reasonable inspection, helium to assess the because of the low

stress levels involved. Liquid-oxygen-compatible dye penetrant inspection and subsequent cleaning would enhance the possibility of finding surface cracks. X-rays of these welds would be difficult to obtain and should be of dubious value. The four lines extend only a few inches from the tank dome. When the tank is assembled on the oxygen subsystem shelf, the fluid tubes are joined by brazing to the 304L annealed corrosion resistant steel tubes of the spacecraft systems. Although joining Inconel 750 and 304L steel constitutes because of a bimetallic couple, it the dry environment that is satisfactory is maintained. in this application

Qualification

Program by Beech to burst

The pressure vessel qualification program was conducted Aircraft Corporation. Four pressure vessels were subjected tests as described in references 6 through 12. Prior to each burst test, pressure test at 1357 psig and

the vessel was subjected to an acceptance checks were made for leaks. No leaks were

D-20

observed in any of the vessels. In Appendix F of reference 9, there is an analysis of the proof test of vessel PV-4. _ne following table lists someof the strain gage readings taken during the qualification testing. _ASURED STRESS LEVELSIN KSI Internal pressure, psig 1020 1357 I020
value value ii0 145

Tank Tank PV-4 70° F Tank PV-I -320° F
aDesign bDesign

2.8 inches from upper pole

2.0 inches Lower Membrane from (0.061-inch pole thick) girth weld area 106.1 139.4 97,7 128.9
105.8

116.7
ksi ksi

i13

For the cryogenic burst tests, the vessels were filled with liquid nitrogen and placed in an open dewar of liquid nitrogen. The ambient temperature burst tests used water as the pressuring medium. The burst pressures of the qualification vessels were as follows: Tank Test condition Burst pressure, psig

PV-I PV-2 PV-3 PV-4

Cryogenic Cryogenic Ambient Ambient

(LN2, (LN2,

-320 ° F) -320 ° F) (70 ° F) (70 ° F)

2233 2235 1873 1922

temperature temperature

All ruptures were similar; the failures apparently started about 2 or 3 inches from the pole of the tank on the top at the transition from the heavier section to the membrane section. The fractures progressed around the boss area, proceeded essentially perpendicular to the girth weld, and then crossed the girth weld in both ambient tests and in one of the cryogenic tests. In the other cryogenic temperature test vessel, a large fragment came out of the upper hemisphere. In no case was there violent fragmentation. After the burst of PV-1 at 2233 psig, initial failure was judged to have occurred at the end of the neck taper around the top pole. The rupture progressed downward, branching into a Y. After coming into contact with the weld, the rupture followed the weld fusion zone.

D-21

The following "2.3.7

is a quotation from reference 9:
- Based on the above analysis the following conclusions are and made:

Conclusions evaluation_

(i) Burs_ failure initiated at the end of the boss taper in the upper hemisphere and resulted from plastic deformation beyond the tensile strength of the base material at _ent temperature. (2) Rupture was of a hydrostatic type. areas was of the base

(3) The appearance of all failed judged to indicate good ductility metal and weldments. (4) the (5) No significant mismatch was

observed

on

specimens All

investigated. across the weld nature. were shear

fractures and

fractures (6) fine

of a secondary

The grain size throughout the vessel was (ASTM-5 to 8) and relatively equiaxed.

(7) The ambient burst test was judged to be completely successful by Beech Aircraft Corporation Engineering, and the results of the test indicate approximately i00 percent efficiency for the material at the test temperature." The data from these pressure vessel tests satisfy the qualification requirement for an ultimate factor of safety of 1.5 at ambient temperature with adequate margins. In 1967 North American Rockwell verified analytically the structural integrity of the oxygen tank (ref. 13). An MSC structural analysis report (ref. 14), also issued in 1967, confirmed the structural integrity of these tanks and compared the analysis with the results of the burst tests. This comparison showed good correlation between analytical and test results. The MSC calculations were based on minimum guaranteed sheet thicknesses and minimum material properties. Even better correlation is obtained by using the actual thicknesses and material properties of the test items.

D-22

These analyses showthe maximum stresses in the tank during pressurization to be in the upper spherical shell at the transition from the constant thickness shell to the thickened area adjacent to the penetration port. Actual stresses determined from strain gage readings during burst tests are consistent with the analyses. FRACTURE MECHANICS The design of the supercritical oxygen tank was based on conventional elastic stress analysis which assumesa homogenous material and uses the conventional tensile properties for the calculation of safety factors. In reality, all fabricated materials contain crack-like flaws which may be associated with weld defects or with metallurgical segregations which can transmit only negligible loads across their boundaries. The load-carrying capacity of high-strength materials, particularly in thick sections, may be severely reduced by the presence of even small flaws which can trigger a brittle catastrophic failure at loads well below those considered safe by conventional design procedures. Furthermore, in many cases the type of flaw present cannot be found by nondestructive inspection techniques and, for this reason, a proof test must be dependedupon to identify those structures which might fail in service• At the outset it should be appreciated that linear elastic fracture mechanics and the associated American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) Standard Method of Test for Plane Strain Fracture Toughness, Klc, are not directly applicable to an analysis of the fracture of the oxygen pressure vessel material in the thicknesses employed, or for that matter in very much larger thicknesses. The evidence for this lies in early results from a fracture test program nowunderway at Boeing. These results indicate that specimens containing deep cracks in parent metal, or in electron beamweld metal representative of the oxygen pressure vessel, fail at net stresses very close to or slightly above the corresponding yield strength whether they are tested at 70° F or -190° F. While the plane strain fracture toughness, Klc, cannot be determined from the data available, a lower bound estimate may be madefrom test results reported on 2-3/4 inch diameter notched round bar specimens (ref. 15). These large specimens were cut from forgings of Inconel 718 and tested at -ii0 ° F. The corresponding yield strength was about 172 ksi and the notch strength was 40 percent above the yield stren__h. Formal calcula• W! fT •

tions as

glve

an

apparent for

Klc

value

of

190

ksl

-_/ ksi.

in.

which

may

be

taken

a lower

bound

a yield

strength

of 172

This

is approximately

equal to the 70 ° F parent metal vessel. Properly made electron

yield strength beam weldments

of the should

oxygen pressure have at least this

D-23

high a Klc value since they are not heat treated after welding and therefore have a lower yield strength than the parent metal. At -190° F the yield strength of the parent and weld metal will increase about iO percent: however, for this austenitic alloy the corresponding change in toughness would be expected to be negligible. Failure Modes While "apparent KIt" values should not be used to develop relations between tank wall stress and critical flaw size, the lower bound value of Kic can be used to showthat the pressure vessel would not fail in a brittle manner. Whenthe parameter _Ic' the ratio of crack tip plastic zone size factor to specimen thickness, is greater than l-l/2, brittle fracture is very unlikely. This parameter is given by K2 1 Ie BIc = B 2 Fty For the oxygen tank B the effective weld land thickness after welding is 0.111 inch; the yield strength of the weld Fty is ll0 ksi at -190° F (table D3-II), and the lower bound of KIe is 190 ksi - Vq-_. TABLE D3-II.TYPICALPARENT METAL ANDWELD TENSILE PROPERTIES a Parent metal Ftu - ksi Fty - ksi
228 198 189 170
Weld Ftu - ksi 187 metal Fty - ksi

Temperature, o F -190 70
aDetermined by

bllo

158

ioo

Boeing

on

inconel

718 vessel

forgings and

using

same

heat weld-

treatment given the ments given no heat bGage length

oxygen pressure treatment. to weld

on electron

beam

equal

width.

D-24

Using in the

these

values,

_Ic

= 27. _Ic

A similar

calculation basis, the

for

the of

parent

metal

membrane

yields

= 16.

On this

mode

failure

of the pressure vessel would be expected to be ductile tearing rather than shattering. However, it is not known whether this mode would lead to a stable through-thickness crack, and a consequent slow leak into the space between the pressure vessel and the outer shell, or to a rapid tearing fracture with consequent destruction of the outer shell and the quick release of a large volume of oxygen. Which of these two possibilities is most likely depends in part on the flaw size giving rise to the final fracture and on the rate of depressurization as compared with the rate of crack propagation. To settle this matter would require burst tests on intentionally flawed tanks.

If a local area of the pressure vessel wall or the tube adapter were heated to a sufficiently high temperature by some internal or external source, the tank would blow out at this local area. According to data furnished by Boeing under contract to NASA, the strength of Inconel 718 would degrade rapidly if the metal temperature exceeded about 1200 ° F. At lh00 ° F the tensile strength would be about 50 percent of the room temperature value, and at 1600 ° F would be less than 30 percent of this value. At a tank pressure of 1008 psi, the parent metal wall stress based on membrane theory is about 108 ksi. A ductile rupture at this stress would likely occur if the tank were at a uniform temperature of 1400 ° F. The restraining effect of the cool surrounding metal would raise the temperature required for a local blowout and this situation is best evaluated by suitable experiments.

Effectiveness The proof test is the last,

of the and

Proof be

Test the best, flaw detection

should

procedure applied to a pressure vessel. Ideally, the proof test should cause failure if there are any flaws present that could grow to a critical size during subsequent pressurization. For the oxygen tanks in question, a fracture mechanics analysis cannot be made to assess the adequacy of the proof test because of the high thin sections used. These factors toughness of the material in themselves, of course, and the contribute

to the confidence that can be placed in the integrity of the pressure vessel and, as discussed in the previous section, essentially rule out the possibility of brittle failure. However, it is worthwhile to estimate the effectiveness of the proof test in identifying those pressure vessels which might develop leaks during pressure cycles subsequent to proof. The failure model proposed considers the plastic instability fracture of a ligament of material produced by incomplete fusion during electron beam welding. The main features of this model are illustrated in figure D3-9. It essentially represents a long flaw in the tank wall at the

D-25

I'
Area of lack of fusion produces an effective crack of depth A & length 2C in tank wall thicknessB. 2C_'>A of

'1
_L

Figure

D3-9.-

Ligament

model

for

ductile

fracture

of

pressure

vessel.

D-26

equatorial weld. It is postulated that the ligament will fail when its stress reaches the tensile strength of the material. Calculations show that the ligament stress _£ is related to the average wall stress as follows : g B _£ = _g B - A where the dimensions are defined in figure D3-9.
flaw depth that can be sustained without cI failure is

The maximum relative
then

a _ : 1- _z_
B Ftu

(1)

where

Ftu

is

the

ultimate

tensile

strength.

Failure

will

occur

by

tearing of the ligament accompanied by rapid decompression of the tank. It should be appreciated that this is a rather crude model of ductile fracture, and will probably overestimate the failure stresses in a spherical vessel. However_ it should be useful in assessing the effectiveness of the proof tests in light of subsequent service_ because of tl_(:very large margins between proof and operating pressures. The pressure cycles applied to the Apollo 13 oxygen tank no. 2 are shown in table D3-111. It should be noted that the oxygen tank no. had several extra pressure cycles in addition to those normally applied. These were associated with rechecks for heat leaks and with the "shelf drop" incident. have The additional the cycles integrity do of not the affect tank this during analysis mission nor should they s ervi ce. reduced

2

The ratio of tank pressures necessary to cause ligament failure for a given relative flaw size A/B at two temperatures will be equal to the ratio of the tensile strength this basis, the maximum flaw lished by the last high of the material size that could helium proof at these temperatures. On exist before CDDT is estabspecified as 1260 +50 0 psi

pressure

at ambient temperature (1276 psi for oxygen tank no. 2). From equation (i), the corresponding value of A/B for the weld metal is 0.55, based on a weld tensile strength of 158 ksi at room temperature, a weld land thickness of about 0.Iii inch, and a nominal weld land stress of 71 ksi. The question now arises as to whether a flaw of this size coul_ propogate through the wall during subsequent pressurization and produce a leak. Flaw growth could occur by sustained loads or cyclic loads. In the absence of an aggressive environment, it is generally recognized that sustained load flaw growth will not occur at loads less than 90 percent of that necessary to produce failure in a continuously rising

D-27

TABLE

D3-III.-

HISTORY OF PRESSURE CYCLES SUPERCRITICAL OXYGEN TANK from North American Rockwell

APPLIED NO. 2 Space

TO APOLLO

13

[ Record

Division

I

Peak Organization Test media Date

pressure, psi (a), (b) 1336

Time, hr:mln

Test

name

Beech

H20

+ He

6-20-66

00:24

Pressure vessel, acceptance Internal on leak check

Beech

GN 2

7-15-66

134o

0o:56

complete shock

assembly

Beech Beech Beech Beech Beech Beech Beech Beech Beech Beech NAR-SD NAR-SD NAR-SD StAR- sD NAR-SD NAR- SD NAR-SD NAR-SD NAR-SD NAR-SD

LN 2 GN 2 LN 2 Helium Helium LOX LOX Helium LOX LOX Helium Helium Helium Helium Helium Helium Helium Helium Helium LOX

7-15-66 9-15-66 9-15-66 lO-19-66 lO-19-66 12-20-66 10-24 -66 1-31-67 222-67 3-67

92o c1333 c918 1303 888 1333 922 C13o 5 c1321 c920 1262 1002 968 1104 c,d1262 cliO2 d1276 1002 1025 925

00:51 00:54 OO:51 09:49 01:00 40:05 25:04 09:07 28:39 22:16 06:45 01:00 13:13 08:02 02:54 01:07 02:24 01:40 01:39 43:53

Cold

Internal Cold Proof Proof dq/dm dq/dm Proof dq/dm dq/dm Leak Leak Leak Leak Leak Leak Leak Leak Leak Launch and

leak

check

shock and and leak leak

leak

4-29-68 5- 1-68 5- 1-68 5- 2-68 5-27 -68 5-28-68 i1-18-68 ii-18-68 7-17-69 49-7o

loading

apressure bit could Cpressure d1260

cycles below 400 psi not recorded not be determined whether pressure cycles not normally applied specification

measurements

represented

psia

or psig

+50 - 0 psi

D-28

load test. Following the 1276 psi helium proof test, no subsequent pressurization exceeds 85 percent of this pressure, and consequently sustained load flaw growth is extremely unlikely. Confidence in this conclusion can be obtained from the test results of a Boeing program now underway. These results apply to specimens containing small but deep cracks in both parent metal and electron beam weld metal of Inconel 718 forgings heat treated in the same way as the oxygen tank material. The early data show no crack growth in 20 hours at -190 ° F for specimens subjected to 160 percent of the nominal operating stress. Cyclic loads during operation of the heaters the flight operation would be caused (about once per one-half hour). The by cyclic associated

pressure cycles are very small with a minimum-to-maximum of about 0.95. Flaw growth due to these small cyclic sidered extremely unlikely during the mission for the maximum nominal operating stress in the weld land (at

stress ratio loads is confollowing reason: 935 psi) is about

28 percent of the weld tensile strength at -190 ° F. Therefore, with a flaw size of A/B = 0.55, the ligament stress would be only about 63 percent of the weld tensile strength. On the basis of the known fatigue behavior of Inconel 718 welds (ref. 16), it would be expected that ligament failure due to cyclic loads induced by heater operation would not be a consideration until hundreds of cycles had been accumulated. Confidence in this conclusion can be obtained from the early results of the previously mentioned on-going Boeing program. These results indicate that parent and electron beam weld metal specimens of Inconel 718 containing small but deep cracks do not show crack growth at -19 O° F after 15,000 cycles at minimum-to-maximum stress ratio of 0.95 and a mean stress of about 170 percent of the nominal operating value. While the conclusions based on the ligament model are consistent with the Boeing data obtained from specimens with small flaws, these test results cannot be used to prove the validity of the model because it applies to large flaws. Therefore, it is planned to check the conclusions reached on the basis of this model by testing specimens at MSC which will contain large, deep cracks. Specimens of both electron beam welds and parent metal will be subjected at -190 ° F to the mean and cyclic stresses encountered in flight operation of the oxygen tank. In assessing the effectiveness of the proof test, no consideration was given to the possibility of failure in regions remote from the welds (e.g., the main membrane or neck of the vessel). Conventional stress analysis (ref. lh) shows that the highest stresses occur in the transition region between the weld lands and the uniform thickness membrane. Stresses in the neck region are very low and comparable to those in the weld land. The ligament model is not applicable to these regions of the vessel remote from the weld since there is no clear mechanism by which a large flaw could be introduced into the parent metal. Experience shows that

0-29

crack-like but these forging.

imperfections are sometimes introduced by the forging process, are relatively small and confined to the surface layers of the Such defects are easy to detect and are usually removed by process. It is the standard practice of the aerospace reject forgings that have cracks that cannot be removed by With this in mind, there is no reason to doubt the effectivefinal high-pressure helium proof test insofar as the pressure membrane area is concerned.

the machining industry to machining. ness of the vessel main

Possibility

of

Tank

Failure

During

Apollo

13 Mission

On the basis of the foregoing information, it is extremely unlikely that the oxygen tank no. 2 pressure vessel ruptured at the maximum recorded flight pressure of 1008 psi and temperature of -160 ° F because of crack propagation. Based on the previously described ligament model, a pressure vessel passing the last high-pressure helium proof test should withstand a pressure load nearly twice that of the maximum flight pressure at -160 ° F. As described previously, a high-temperature blowout of the pressure vessel is entirely possible, and if this occurred the fluid released could have caused rupture of the dome or of the outer shell.

DYNAMIC

TESTING

During the development and qualification of the command and service modules (CSM), a series of dynamic tests was conducted on major vehicle elements as well as subassemblies. The following sections describe those tests applicable to the cryogenic oxygen tank.

Oxygen Dynamic testing

Tank was

Assembly

Dynamic during

Testing September 1966. Flight-type successfully

accomplished

oxygen tank assembly hardware, selected completed this testing as documented in

as a test reference

specimen, 17.

in

Vibration testing.The test specimen was each of three axes, and the vibration level specified and space

subjected to vibration was maintained for 15 the combined as follows:

minutes envelope

in each axis. The of the atmospheric

test levels, representing flight conditions, were

D-50

Frequency, i0

Hz 0.OO3 0.003 0.025 0.025 0.015 to 0.015 at 3 riB/octave to 0.025 at 3 dB/octave

lO-9O
90-250 250-400 400-2000

The test spectrum is shown as the solid line in cant anomalies were recorded during these tests. the oxygen tank assembly for the The launch oxygen and tank space

figure D3-i0. These tests flight used

No signifiqualified

conditions. in the vibra-

Acceleration

testing.-

assembly

tion testing mentioned in the preceding paragraph was also tested for acceleration in each of three axes for at least 5 minutes in each direction. The acceleration was 7g in the launch axis direction and 3g in the other two orthogonal axes. These accelerations are greater than those expected during normal ground handling or during flight. No anomalies were recorded during these tests.

Apollo

CSM

Acoustic

and

Vibration

Test

Program described, the oxygen were tested as part of

tank

In addition to the dynamic testing previously and shelf assemblies plus other CSM subsystems

the Block II, Spacecraft 105/AV Certification Test Program conducted during February and March 1968 (ref. 18). These tests qualified the Block II CSM hardware against the acoustic and vibration criteria, and confirmed the structural integrity of the CSM for vibration inputs which enveloped specified the complete in reference ground 19. and flight environmental requirements as

tic

Figure D3-11 and vibration tank was as

shows the testing. follows: Oxygen Oxygen Oxygen Oxygen

transducer locations Test instrumentation

used for both the acousin the area of the

oxygen

SA n0

(+x)

shelf shelf shelf shelf

on bracket, on bracket, on bracket, on centerline

18

inches

from from from

beam beam beam

4 4 4

SA iii (-R) SA 112 (-T) SA n3
Note:

18 inches 18 inches

(+x)
R =

radial,

T = tangential

D-31

1.0

N

0.I

0

L) L)

00l

0.001 10 20 100 Frequency, Hz (cps)
Figure D3-10.Service module data overlays and specified test spectrum.

1000

2000

D-32

÷y

_.__ I _

-Z "Y

÷Z ""_

SAII41 SAIl5 SAI16

EAM

4

FUEL BEAM 3

CELL

.OSA104 SA105 SAI06

FUEL

CELL

SAI32 O2

LINE BRACKET

DSAI10 5AIll SAIl2 SA107 SA108 SAIO9 AFT HELIUM

LINE SUPPORT BRACKET

H2 TANI_

AFT

BULKHEAD

A •
Figure D3-11.Spacecraft

UNIAX TRIAX
I05/AV

ACCELEROMETER ACCELEROMETERS
service module instrumentation, bay 4.

D-33

Vibration testing consisted of sinusoidal sweeps in the 4- to 30-Hz range, followed by sinusoidal dwells at the prominent resonance frequencies. CSM vibration response was controlled to O.075-inch double amplitude for the 4- to 8-Hz frequency range and 0.1g peak for the Tto 30-Hz frequency range. Acoustic tests were performed to measure the vibratory response in the 20- to 2000-Hz frequency range. The acoustic spectrum of interest for the oxygen tank was adjusted to obtain a test spectrum shown in figure D3-10. The vibration and acoustic tests were completed without failures or any pertinent anomalies in the oxygen tank or tank shelf. The maximum observed accelerations during the tests are given in the following table:

as

Vibration X-axis Inst. no. 4to 30-Hz sweep, 4- to Z-axis 30-Hz sweep, 4-

Acoustic X-axis to 30-Hz sweep,

g (rms)

g (rms)

g (rms)

SA SA SA SA

ii0 iii 112 113

0.02

0.05

O.OO5 .35 .6
.17

.5 .5
•15

.5 .6 .4

SA

The responses ll3) are shown The tests

of four transducers in figure D3-10. the following:

(SA

107

through

SA

109

and

confirmed

i. Structural integrity of Block II CSM wiring, plumbing, bracketry, and installed subsystems when subjected to the dynamic loads resulting from spacecraft exposure to the aerodynamic noise environment expected during atmospheric flight. 2. experiencing Structural the low integrity of the Block II by CSM when it is flight.

vibratory

motions

produced

atmospheric

D-34

Based upon the results, it is concluded that quate to qualify the CSM for flight on the Saturn qualification would not necessarily cover abnormal mishandling.

the tests were adeV. Of course, this conditions such as

SHOCK

TESTING

Although NR specification (ref. 20) requires qualification testing of the oxygen tank assembly inside its shipping container for ground handling and transportation conditions, further investigation revealed that this requirement was deleted on January 8, 1965. This deletion is documented in paragraph 3.8.4.3 of reference 21, which states, "Revised Apollo Test Requirements, no testing of transportation and ground handling environments (shall be required). Packaging is designed to preclude exposure of components to environments beyond transportation levels." The shipping container (ref. 22) was reportedly shock tested during the development program in 1964 test environment described in reference concluded that the shock attenuation and successfully 23. From these in the for shock container. sustained tests it of the was

system

shipping testing

container the

was acceptable. There was no requirement oxygen tank assembly outside its shipping

INTERNAL

COMPONENTS

These

There are a number of components internal to are individually discussed in the following

the oxygen sections.

tank.

Qaantity

Gage

The quantity gage capacitor (fig. D3-12) consists of two concentric aluminum tubes which are adequately mounted and supported. The inner tube of the capacitor constitutes the extension of the fill line. The outer tube is perforated to insure access of the oxygen to the space between the capacitor plates. The relative position of the two plates is maintained by insulating Teflon separators. Shorting of the capacitor at the plates within the tank requires bridging of the gap between the tubes by a conductive material. Shorting could also be induced by the contact of bare lead wires resulting from insulation damage. The power input to the quantity gage is regulated and limited by the high impedance source of the signal conditioner. The spark that could be

D-35

Vent line and electrical conduit also pass

Fill Feed Adapter cap inconel

through

this

ada_

i_. I

Teflon

adapte

-_

_erature sensor /

Inc°nel tube_,_ Teflon adapter

II
II

and quantity

probe

capacitor

elements of (aluminum)

.224 .232

dia holes, two Hole for temperature sensor wiring

places for heaterj and motor wiring

Glass-filled Probe is manufactured by Simmonds Products, Inc. Precision teflon insulator

Temperature sensor element is mounted on this insulator

Fixed

insulator

Inner tank_

Figure

D3-12.-

Quantity

gage.

D-36

generated is at the 7- to lO-millijoule level. The evidence by the data can be construed to indicate that the effects of failure during flight were limited to data loss.

provided the probe

Heaters The two electrical heaters (fig. D3-13) are mounted to the heater

fan support tube. The heaters are nichrome resistance wire imbedded in magnesium oxide insulation encased within a sheath of stainless steel. The stainless steel sheath is spiralled and brazed to 12.0 inches of the support tube length. The specifications established by North American Rockwell for the Block II EPS cryogenic storage system (ref. 24) provide a requirement for operation of the heater circuit at 65 V dc from a GSE source for initial pressurization of the oxygen tank. For flight the specification calls for operation from a 28 V dc source. The specifications established by Beech Aircraft Corporation for the heater (ref. 25) stipulate standby operation from an ac source, later established as 65 V ac, for 50 minutes. While the heater is apparently satisfactory for its intended use, the specifications are not compatible with the intended use. The heater circuit is protected by a 15-ampere circuit breaker. Individual thermostats for each heater are also mounted The on the inside of were the support tube. in the heater circuit to prevent

thermostats

included

raising the pressure temperature for the reaching temperature if there was a very desired to maintain mostats ever having A cross section

vessel wall temperatures above 90 ° F, the design vessel walls. Such a condition (i.e., walls above 90 ° F under operating pressure) might occur low quantity of oxygen left in the tank and it was pressure. There is no known instance of the therhad to operate in flight. of a thermostat is shown with the contacts in the

open position in figure D3-14. The contacts would assume this position when the temperature of the thermostat reached 80 ° ± i0 ° F. When the thermostat temperature is reduced to 60 ° ± 7 ° F, the differential contraction of the two metals of the bimetallic disc causes the disc to snap through, assuming a convex up configuration. This forces the wave washer and the attached thrust pin to move upward. The movable arm containing the lower contact is pushed up by the thrust pin and the contacts are closed. The wave washer acts as a spring to keep the thrust pin bearing against the bimetallic disc. All of parts of the thermostat are enclosed in an hermetically The thermostats are rated by the manufacturer as the moving sealed case.

follows.

D-37

CURRENT

RATING

OF THERMOSTAT

Applied Number of cycles 30 V i00,000 50,000 25,000 i0,000 ac or amp dc

voltage 125 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 V ac amp amp amp amp amp 250 V ac

5.0

i. 0 amp 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 amp amp amp amp

5.5 amp
6.0 amp

6.5 amp
7.0 amp

5,OOO

The specifications established by North American Rockwell for the Block II EPS cryogenic storage system (ref. 24) provide a requirement for operation of the heater circuit at 65 V dc from a GSE source for initial pressurization of the oxygen tank. For flight, the specification calls for operation from a 28 V dc source. The specifications established by Beech Aircraft Corporation for the thermostat (ref. 26) stipulate a current-carrying requirement of 7 amperes without specifying voltage level or type of source (i.e., ac or dc). Acceptance test requirements imposed on the supplier by this latter document include dielectric testing, thermal shock, verification of operating temperatures of the thermostat_ helium leak test, insulation resistance test, and visual and dimensional inspection. No requirement is imposed for acceptance test verification of the operational characteristics of the thermostat with respect to current-carrying capability or ability to open under load at any of the several voltages (65 V dc, 65 V ac, or 28 V dc) to which the thermostat will normally be subjected. Qualification testing of the thermostats was accomplished as part of the overall testing of the assembled oxygen tanks. These tests included vibration, acceleration, and mission simulation. Operation of the heater circuit at Beech during the oxygen tank qualification program and for all normal acceptance testing is accomplished using 65 V ac for initial pressurization. Since this is done only when the tank is filled with liquid oxygen, it is highly unlikely that temperatures would be raised to levels that would cause operation of the thermostats. One instance of a single thermostat operating to open a heater was experienced in the First Mission Subsystem Qualification Test (ref. 27). At this time, heaters were being energized from a 28 V dc bus.

D-38

Moveable contact

lass _ase

seal

assembly

Thrust
I

contact nsulator

\

I

I

Wave

washer Bi-metal

Cup disc

Figure

D3-14.-

Cross

section

of

thermostat.

D-40

__m

010 010 ][D£
° [o .__
' '! ._ _u -7"

Upper fan motor

27

elements ----Heater

26. 743 26. 113

27. 043 27. 103 12 n,

_.

75

i
Figure

I
r

Lower fan motor

0 I0 010__

2.963

D3-13.-

Heater

fan support.

I)-39

All qualification and acceptance tests identified were primarily concerned with the repeatability of the thermostat actuation at the specified temperatures. No qualification or acceptance tests have been identified which would verify the ability of the thermostats to open the heater circuit when energized at 65 V dc. The combination of incomplete, unclear, and therefore inadequate

specifications of the thermostat with respect to voltage type and level and a test program that does not verify the ability of the switch to operate satisfactorily under service conditions constitutes a design deficiency. The fact that the ratings for the thermostat by the manufacturer (preceding table) contains no entry for 65 V dc indicates that service at this voltage was not intended. At KSC, the heater circuits were intended to be operated at 65 V dc

only when the tanks were full of liquid oxygen. Under this condition, the thermostats would not be required to actuate. A discussion of the possible consequences of actuation of the thermostat under load at 65 V dc is presented in a later section of this Appendix.

Fans At the time the tanks were first designed, the knowledge of the

behavior of fluids in zero-g ficant stratification of the these circumstances a number

was limited. It was believed that signifluid would occur during flight. Under of difficulties could arise: a rapid

pressure drop in the tank would be induced by the acceleration resulting from an SPS burn; the heaters might not be able to transfer heat uniformly to the oxygen; and, finally, serious errors in quantity measurement could result. The occurrence of any of these conditions could jeopardize flight safety or mission were provided with two motor-driven and insure its homogeneity. The two oxygen fan motors (fig. success. For this reason, the tanks centrifugal fans to mix the fluid

D3-15)

are

three-phase,

four-wire,

200/l15-volt, 400-hertz, miniature, open induction motors, driving centrifugal flow impellers. The minimum speed of the motors is 1800 revolutions per minute at a torque output of 0.9 ounce-inches. The motors are mounted at each end of the motor-heater support tube by a cantilevered attachment joined to the motor back plate. The motor clearance within the support tube wall is a nominal 0.01 inch. The stator windings and bearings of the motors are exposed to oxygen. The stator windings are fabricated with number 36 American Wire

Gage (AWG) wire, using a Teflon-coated ceramic insulation. The ceramic insulation is brittle and subject to breakage if proper tension is not used in fabricating windings or if sharp bends are made at the winding

D-41

Stator slot-._ Stator teeth--_ Terminal-_ _ _ _

Spider-_

____.,,

.-_-, _ ',.

_ J/

. ___

2• 943 max

-:,I

.523 max /

/ /- Stator retainer rRecessedslot

I"-(°vertabs)_..----_
_l

1.

_ia -I--TII]___I

_J-"-----

"_I'd!_y_L J__
max _

/_,'tt'_"J 11_ II_-Ii

/

in retainer

,

_¢AI

'//Stator'

J_"_'%_ /---Hous ng

_xh--Fan impeller' Bearings l relief

/---Rotor L--Bea rings

End of terminal_/_

Strain

//____,_

Leadwire mmet

Figure

D3-15.-

Oxygen

fan

motor.

D- 42

end turns. Acceptance testing of the wire is conducted on the first i00 feet of each reel. The wire is considered acceptable if no more than i0 breaks in insulation are exhibited in the sample whenpulled through mercury at 25 feet per minute. The rejection rate for stator winding faults for motors processed early in the production run was substantial. Improved yield was achieved only by rigid adherence to the winding tension process control used in fabricating the windings, proper assembly techniques, and frequent in-process dielectric testing. Phase-to-phase short circuits or shorted turns within a single phase are more likely than phase-to-ground faults. A limited amount of insulation is provided between windings and ground. Phase-to-phase insulation is limited to the end turns. Considerable improvement was accomplished in the acceptance rate of motors built after the fabrication control techniques were developed (Appendix C). No problem was exhibited in the testing of the two motors finally installed for flight in oxygen tank S/N XTAO008. The motor design uses an insulation system in the windings which is subject to failure unless carefully controlled. The individual power leads to each fan motor are protected by 1-ampere fuses. Temperature Sensor The temperature sensor is a calibrated resistor, the resistance of which is proportional to temperature. The sensor is mounted to the upper glass-filled Teflon fitting of the capacitor probe. Since the calibrated input to the resistor is current limited to i.i milliamperes under fault conditions of the sensor, no problem would be anticipated with this unit. Wiring Wire sizes and types of wire used within the oxygen tank are shown in table D3-1V. The insulation used in all cases is Teflon with a nominal thickness of 0.010 inch. Distribution and arrangement of the wires is shownin figure D3-16. The insulation on all wires within the tank is specified by reference 28 to conform to MIL-W-16878, Type E. The insulation thickness requirements of this specification establish the following:
Insulation Condition Nominal With out-of-center tolerance Minimum 0.008 Thickness Nominal 0.010 I in. Maximum 0.012

0.007

0.010

0.014

D-43

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D-45

The mechanical design of the tank with respect to provisions for wiring is considered deficient. Damage to the wiring may be either insulation damageor conductor damage,portions of which cannot be inspected or adequately tested during or after assembly. The four number 26 AWG wires for the fan motors are encased in 0.012-inch-thick shrink-fit Teflon tubing from the motor housing to a point 0.3 inch outside the heater-fan tube. The 0.012-inch shrink-fit tubing provides the protection for the wires at the point where the four-wire bundle crosses the machined sharp edges of the access hole in the heater tube (fig. D3-17). The shrink-fit tubing does not, however, alleviate the strain on the 90-degree bend of the wires at the motor housing. During assembly of the fan to the support tube, the four-wire bundle in the shrink-fit tubing maybe forced against the machined sharp edges of the support tube at point "A" of figure D3-17. Two specimens of the support tube that have been examined showno removal of burrs at this point. Betweenthe motor and the access hole in the support tube, the wire bundle is restrained by a 0.010-inch thick soldered copper clip. The twisted lower fan motor leads (without shrink-fit tubing) reenter the support tube and traverse a 3/16-inch-diameter conduit for 12.0 inches before again exiting the support tube. No specification restraint on slack left in the bundle contained within the heater tube conduit was noted. The motor leads are in contact with the conduit, at least at the ends of the conduit, and exposed to local heat conditions of the heater elements. Design changes were madebetween Block I and Block II configurations to provide independent circuits to each motor and heater within the oxygen tanks. Provision was madein the glass-filled Teflon separator on the quantity probe for access of the extra six wires to the upper end of the probe assembly. The conduit (i/2-inch 0D x 0.015-inch wall) in the domefor wiring to the connector was not, however, increased in size. During assembly of the tank, three bundles of six wires each are sequentially pulled through the conduit. The first bundle, consisting of the two quantity gage wires and the four temperature sensor wires, is pulled through the conduit along with the pull wires for the other bundles. The second and third bundles each consist of one set of motor leads encased in 0.012-inch shrink-fit tubing and one set of heater leads. The pull wires have a break-strength of 65 pounds. Since the third bundle of wire must be forceably pulled through the conduit, damageto wires in this bundle or the others may result which may not be detectable without physical inspection. Physical inspection cannot be accomplished with this design.

D-46

¢_
Four no. 26 nickel wires in no. 14 heat shrink sleeve _ 0.218 J _,, \

in. × 0.230

in.

motor lead access (no bushing)

Fan

0.05 Copper clip

in,

Teflon grommet Fan motor

Figure

D3-17.-

Typical

wire

routing

for

fan

motor

(four

times

full

size).

D-47

The II pounds

calculated and

break

strength of

of

a number can be

26 AWG

nickel

wire

is break.

elongation

28 percent

experienced

before

If the number 26 AWG wires do not share the load associated the bundle through the conduit, damage to the wire(s) will fore the pull wire breaks. Stretching of the wire results

with pulling result bein local operation local

neck-down of both the conductor and insulation. In subsequent of the circuit, the locally smaller gage conductor can produce hot spots and progressive deterioration of the insulation.

Discussion All electrical power system wiring is protected by fuses or circuit breakers specified on the basis of wire size. Such devices will transmit their rated current without opening the circuit to either the load or a fault. The opening of the device to protect the circuit on overload is determined by an inverse time to over-current ratio that will open a large current fault in a short time, and a smaller over-current fault in a longer time. The protection afforded is to the wire and power system rather than to the connected end item. The wiring in the oxygen tank has inherent potential for damage in assembly due to inadequate support, inadequate clearances, and thin Teflon insulation. It is well known (refs. 29 and 30) that Teflon insulation cold flows when subject to mechanical stress. The design of the tank internal installation exposes the insulation to potential progressive damage by cold flow where the wiring is placed near or at bends around sharp corners.

COMPATIBILITY

OF MATERIALS

WITH

OXYGEN

It is well known that virtually all materials except oxides will react with liquid oxygen (LOX) under specific conditions. The tendencies to react and the rates of reaction vary widely. Most organic materials and the more active metals are sufficiently reactive with LOX to require careful attention to the condition under which they are used. Spontaneous reaction does not usually occur upon contact between a material and LOX; however, the sudden application of energy in the form of mechanical shock or electrical spark to the combination of LOX and a chemically active material will often result in violent reaction or rapid burning.

D-48

Classification A method commonly materials with LOX is this method, used to described

Methods reactivity 32. Based "Testing of upon Com-

classify the relative in references 31 and MSFC specification

a specification,

106B,

patibility of Materials for Liquid Oxygen Systems ," was developed to establish acceptance criteria of materials for use in L0X and gaseous oxygen (GOX) systems. Materials meeting the requirements of paragraph 3.3 of the specification are said to be compatible with LOX. In this context it must be recognized that the term "compatible" describes only the relative reactivity of a material and does not describe an absolute s it uati on. Materials references for use with LOX are selected 33 to 36 under the additional from the "compatible" list stipulation that the level

of

of any potential mechanical shock is less than that associated with the impact test and/or that potential electrical energy sources are less than the ignition energy of the material in LOX. If a material is used with oxygen and a potential energy source, it must be determined by test that the energy available is less than that required to initiate the reaction. Furthermore, the test should represent the circumstances of use as nearly as possible. For example, the pressures and temperatures of the oxygen to which the material will be exposed should be duplicated in the tests. Additionally, thickness and surface area of the material, as well as that of any backing material (such as may act as a heat sink, for example) should be duplicated. The latter is important because there are examples of materials changing from an acceptable rating to an unacceptable rating solely because of a change in the thickness used in a particular application. For some proprietary materials and composites whose composition may vary from batch to batch, it is necessary to repeat the compatibility tests for each batch. Elastomers are a good example of the latter category. In summary, the methodology for determining compatibility must be adhered to scrupulously to preclude selfdeception.

Materials

Internal

to the

Tank of the oxygen pressure (ref. 37) and assessed

vessel

The materials of the internal components have been identified from the records

as

to suitability for use in the high-pressure types and estimated quantities of materials within the oxygen tank are listed in tables Of the materials used in the tank, most

oxygen environment. The in each of these components D3-V through D3-1X. have been subjected the previ-

ously to compatibility of references 31 and

testing 32.

in LOX

in accordance

with

methodology

D-49