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REPORT OF
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

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IN BLACK AND WHITE

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(_C_S'SI_ NUMBERL. - (THRU)

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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
REPRODUCED
BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U. S. DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE
\\ • SPRINGFIELD,VA. 22161

\

ILl ]t L
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

June 15, 1970

The Honorable Thomas O. Paine
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546

Dear Dr. Paine:

Pursuant to your directives of April 17 and April 21, 1970, I am
transmitting the final Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Concurrent with this transmittal, I have recessed the Board, subject
to call.

We plan to reconvene later this year when most of the remaining
special tests have been completed, in order to review the results
of these tests to determine whether any modifications to our
findings, determinations, or recommendations are necessary. In
addition, we will stand ready to reconvene at your request.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar M. Cortright
Chairman
°

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ii
PREFACE

The Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's third mission to explore
the surface of the Moon, is a harsh reminder of the immensedifficulty
of this undertaking.

The total Apollo system of ground complexes, launch vehicle, and
spacecraft constitutes the most ambitious and demandingengineering
development ever undertaken by man. For these missions to succeed, both
men and equipment must perform to near perfection. That this system has
already resulted in two successful lunar surface explorations is a tribute
to those menand womenwho conceived, designed, built, and flew it.

Perfection is not only difficult to achieve, but difficult to main-
tain. The imperfection in Apollo 13 constituted a near disaster, averted
only by outstanding performance on the part of the crew and the ground
control team which supported them.

The Apollo 13 Review Board was charged with the responsibilities
of reviewing the circumstances surrounding the accident, of establishing
the probable causes of the accident, of assessing the effectiveness of
flight recovery actions, of reporting these findings, and of developing
recommendations for corrective or other actions. The Board has made
every effort to carry out its assignment in a thorough, objective, and
impartial manner. In doing so, the Board madeeffective use of the
failure analyses and corrective action studies carried out by the Manned
Spacecraft Center and was very impressed with the dedication and objec-
tivity of this effort.

The Board feels that the nature of the Apollo 13 equipment failure
holds important lessons which, when applied to future missions, will
contribute to the safety and effectiveness of mannedspace flight.

ii
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iv
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ladder 3USradar antenna ental
control control system
system Command Module radiator
quad crew compartment
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steerable
power high gain antenna
inflight systemradiators
antenna reactioncontrol
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extension
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LM descent
engine

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Docking Aft heatshield

VHF windows

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LM overhead hatch

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Service module
.I
Apollo 13 space vehicle configuration.
r=.
CSM in ground test with bay 4 panel removed.

_V
Inflight photograph of service module showing damageto bay 4.

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viii
TABLEOF CONTENTS

Page
LETTEROF TRANSMITTAL

PREFACE............................ iii

TABLEOF CONTENTS....................... ix

CHAPTER
i - AUTHORITIES

Memorandum,April 17, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright ...... i-i

Memorandum,April 21, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright ...... I-4

Memorandum,April 20, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Dr. Charles D. Harrington,
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel ......... 1-6

Memorandum,April 20, 1970, from Administrator to
Mr. Dale D. Myers, Associate Administrator for
MannedSpaceFlight .................... 1-7

NASAManagementInstruction 8621.1, Subject:
Mission Failure Investigation Policy and Procedures,
April 14, 1966 ...................... i-8

NASAManagementInstruction 1156.14, Subject:
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, December7, 1967 ..... i-i0

CHAPTER
2 - BOARD
HISTORY
ANDPROCEDURES

Part i. Summaryof Board History and Procedures • • • . . , 2-1

Part 2. Biography of Board Members, Observers, and
Panel Chairmen • . • . . • , • . , • • • , • . • , • 2-3
Part 3. Board Organization and General Assignments
for Board Panels
• • • • , . • • • . , • • • , • • •

Part 4. Summary of Board Activities
Page

CHAPTER 3 - DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE AND MISSION

Part i. Apollo/Saturn V Space Vehicle .......... 3-2

Part 2. Apollo 13 Mission Description .......... 3-26

CHAPTER 4 - REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF APOLLO 13 ACCIDENT

Part i. Introduction .................. 4-1

Part 2. Oxygen Tank No. History ............. 4-2

Part 3. Apollo 13 Flight ................ 4-25

Part 4. Surm_ary Analysis of the Accident ........ 4-36

Part 5. Apollo 13 Recovery ............... 4-44

CHAPTER 5 - FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part i. Introduction ................. 5-1

Part 2. Assessment of Accident ............. 5-5

Part 3. Supporting Considerations ............ 5-12

Part 4. Recommendations ................. 5-40

APPENDIX A - BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND OPEBATIONS

APPENDIX B - REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL

APPENDIX C - REPORT OF MANUFAC_JRING AND TEST PANEL

APPENDIX D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL

APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT _G_NT PANEL

APPENDIX F - SPECIAL TESTS AND ANALYSES

APPENDIX G - BOARD ADMINISTRATIVE PRODECURES

APPENDIX H - BOkRD RELEASES AND PRESS STATEMEntS

II
CHAPTER i

AUTHORITIES

l-O

N N- N _ L E. E L l_ li
°
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
_iBI l_- _
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
April 17, 1970

TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright

SUBJECT : Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board

REFERENCES: (a) NMI 8621.1 - Mission Failure Investigation Policy
and Procedures

(b) NMI 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

i. It is NASA policy as stated in Reference (a) "to investigate and
document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the
conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take appropriate
corrective actions as a result of the findings and recommendations."

2. Because of the serious nature of the accident of the Apollo 13 space-
craft which jeopardized human life and caused failure of the Apollo 13
lunar mission, we hereby establish the Apollo 13 Review Board (hereinafter
referred to as the Board) and appoint you Chairman. The members of the
Board will be qualified senior individuals from NASA and other Govern-
ment agencies. After consultation with you, we will:

(a) Appoint the members of the Board and make any subsequent changes
necessary for the effective operation of the Board; and

(b) Arrange for timely release of information on the operations,
findings, and recommendations of the Board to the Congress, and, through
the NASA Office of Public Affairs, to the public. The Board will report
its findings and recommendations directly to us.

3. The Board will:

(a) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to the space-
craft which occurred during the flight of Apollo 13 and the subsequent
flight and ground actions taken to recover, in order to establish the
probable cause or causes of the accident and assess the effectiveness
of the recovery actions.

(b) Review all factors relating to the accident and recovery actions
the Board determines to be significant and relevant, including studies,
findings, recommendations, and other actions that have been or may be
undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and contractors
involved.

i-i
(c) Direct such further specific investigations as may be necessary.

(d) Report as soon as possible its findings relating to the cause or
causes of the accident and the effectiveness of the flight and ground
recovery actions.

(e) Develop recommendations for corrective or other actions, based
upon its findings and determinations or conclusions derived therefrom.

(f) Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations and
submit a final report.

4. As Chairman of the Board you are delegated the following powers:

(a) To establish such procedures for the organization and operation
of the Board as you find most effective; such procedures shall be part
of the Board's records. The procedures shall be furnished the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel for its review and comment.

(b) To establish procedures to assure the execution of your
responsibilities in your absence.

(e) To designate such representatives, consultants, experts, liaison
officers, observers, or other individuals as required to support the
activities of the Board. You shall define their duties and responsi-
bilities as part of the Board's records.

(d) To keep us advised periodically concerning the organization,
procedures, operations of the Board and its associated activities.

5. By separate action we are requesting the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel established by Reference (b) to review both the procedures and
findings of the Board and submit its independent report to us.

6. By separate action we are directing the Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight to:

(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space Flight
cooperate fully with the Board and provide records, data, and technical
support as requested.

(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews,
studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop recommenda-
tions to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14
mission with respect to hardware, operational procedures, and other
aspects of the Apollo program.

i-2
7. All elements of NASA will cooperate with the Board and provide full
support within their areas of responsibility.

George M. Low
Deputy Administrator T.O. Paine
Administrator

z-3
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
i:<¸
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR April 21, 1970

TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright

SUBJECT : Membership of Apollo 13 Review Board

Reference: Memorandum to you of April 17, subject: Establishment of
Apollo 13 Review Board

In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Reference (a), the membership of
the Apollo 13 Review Board is established as follows:

Members:

Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman (Director, Langley Research Center)
Mr. Robert F. Allnutt (Assistant to the Administrator, NASA Hqs.)
Mr. Neil Armstrong (Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center)
Dr. John F. Clark (Director, Goddard Space Flight Center)
Brig. General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (Director of Space, DCS/R&D,
Hqs., USAF)
Mr. Vincent L. Johnson (Deputy Associate Administrator-Engineering,
Office of Space Science and Applications)
Mr. Milton Klein (Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office)
Dr. Hans M. Mark (Director, Ames Research Center)

Counsel:

Mr. George Malley (Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center)

0MSF Technical Support:

Mr. Charles W. Mathews (Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of
Manned Space Flight)

Observers:

Mr. William A. Anders (Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics
and Space Council)
Dr. CharlesD. Harrington (Chairman,NASAAerospaceSafety
Advisory Panel)
Mr. I. I. Pinkel (Director, AerospaceSafety Researchand
Data Institute, Lewis ResearchCenter)
Congressional Liaison:

Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoff (Office of Legislative Affairs, NASA Hqs.

Public Affairs Liaison:

Mr. Brian Duff (Public Affairs Officer, Manned Spacecraft Center)

In accordance with applicable NASA instruction, you are authorized to
appoint such experts and additional consultants as are required for
the effective operations of the Board.

George M. Low T. O. Paine
Deputy Administrator Administrator

1-5

Ll 11 L: L_ L L
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

April 20, 1970
OFFIC r OF" THE ADMINISTRATOR

TO Dr. Charles D. Harrington
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

SUBJECT : Review of Procedures and Findings of Apollo 13 Review Board

Attachment: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M.
Cortright, subject: Establishment of Apollo 13
Review Board

References: (a) Section 6, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Authorization Act, 1968

(b) NMI 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

i. In accordance with References (a) and (b), the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (hereafter referred to as the Panel) is requested to
review the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13 Review Board (here-
after referred to as the Board) established by Attachment (a).

2. The procedures established by the Board will be made available to the
Panel for review and comment as provided in paragraph 4(a) of Attachment (a).

3. As Chairman of the Panel, you are designated an Observer on the Board.
In this capacity, you, or another member of the Panel designated by you,
are authorized to be present at those regular meetings of the Board you
desire to attend. You are also authorized to receive oral progress re-
ports from the Chairman of the Board or his designee from time to time to
enable you to keep the Panel fully informed on the work of the Board.

4. The final report and any interim reports of the Board will be made
available promptly to the Panel for its review.

5. The Panel is requested to report to us on the procedures and findings
of the Board at such times and in such form as you consider appropriate,
but no later than i0 days after the submission to us of the final report
of the Board.

George M. Low T. O. Paine
Deputy Administrator Administrator

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board
M/Mr. Dale Myers

i-6
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON,
D.C. 20546

April 20, 1970
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

TO Mr. Dale D. Myers
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight

SUBJECT : Apollo 13 Review

References: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M.
Cortright, subject: Establishment of Apollo 13
Review Board

(b) Memorandum dated April 20, 1970, to Dr. Charles
D. Harrington, subject: Review of Procedures
and Findings of Apollo 13 Review Board

i. As indicated in paragraph 6 of Reference (a), you are directed to:

(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space
Flight cooperate fully with the Board in providing records,
data, and technical support as requested.

(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews,
studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop
timely recommendations to us on corrective measures to be
taken prior to the Apollo 14 mission with respect to hard-
ware, operational procedures, flight crews, and other aspects
of the Apollo program.

2. The recommendations referred to in paragraph l(b) above should be
submitted to us in such form and at such time as you deem appropriate,
but a report should be submitted no later than ten days after the
Apollo 13 Review Board submits its final report.

3. The assignments to the Apollo 13 Review Board and to the Aero-
space Safety Advisory Panel by References (a) and (b), respectively,
in no way relieve you of your continuing full responsibility for the
conduct of the Apollo and other OMSF programs.

Deputy Administrator Administrator

cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board
Mr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

I-7

L L E 12 L I: L L,: L.; n n Li n L ,
NMI 862 i. i

April 14, 1966
_ec_h,e dc#e

Management
Instruction
SUBJECT: MISSION FAILURE INVESTIGATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Io P_P_E

This Instruction establishes the policy and procedures for investigating
and documenting the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the
conduct of NASA space and aeronautical activities.

2. APPLICABILITY

This Instruction is applicable to NASA Headquarters and field installations.

3. DEFINITION

For the purpose of this Instruction, the following term shall apply:

In general, a failure is defined as not achieving a major mission
objective.

POLICY


It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major
mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and aeronau-
tical activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a
result of the findings and recommendations.

b,
The Deputy Administrator may conduct independent investigations
of major failures in addition to those investigations required of
the Officlals-ln-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices as set
forth in paragraph 5a.

5. PROCEDURES

a. Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices are responsible,
within their assigned areas, for:

(l) Informing promptly the Deputy Administrator of each major
failure and apprising him of the nature of the failure, status
of investigations, and corrective or other actions which are
or will be taken.

1-8
NMI 8621.1 April 14, 1966

(2) Determining the causes or probable causes of all failures,
taking corrective or other actions, and submitting written
reports of such determinations and actions to the Deputy
Administrator.

Do
When the Deputy Administrator decides to conduct an independent
investigation, he will:

(i) Establish a (name of project) Review Board, comprised of appro-
priate NASA officials;

(2) Define the specific responsibilities of each Board, encompassing
such tasks as:

(a) Reviewing the findings, determinations and corrective or
other actions which have been developed by contractors,
field installations and the Official-in-Charge of cognizant
Headquarters Program Office and presenting the Board's
conclusions as to their adequacy to the Deputy Administrator.

(b) Reviewing the findings during the course of investigations
with cognizant field installation and Headquarters officials.

(c) Recommending such additional steps (for example additional
tests) as are considered desirable, to determine the techni-
cal and operational causes or probable causes of failure,
and to obtain evidence of nontechnical contributing factors.

(d) Developing recommendations for corrective and other actions,
based on all information available to the Board.

(e) Doc_nenting findings, determinations and recommendations
for corrective or other actions and submitting such documen-
tation to the Deputy Administrator.

c. Procedures for implementing the Board's reco_mnendations shall be
determined by the Deputy Administrator.

6. CANCELLATION

NASA Management Manual Instruction 4-1-7 (T.S. 760), March 24, 1964.

Deputy Administrator

DISTRIBUTION:
SDL I

1-9

L I/ E L L '
N_ n>6._4

December 7, 1967
C'ffectiv¢dole

Management
Instruction
SUBJECT: AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

i. PURPOSE

This Instruction sets forth the authority for, and the
duties, procedures, organization, and support of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.

2. AUTHORITY

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (hereafter called the
"Panel") was established under Section 6 of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act,
1968 (PL 90-67, 90th Congress, 81 Stat. 168, 170). Since
the Panel was established by statute, its formation and
use are not subject to the provisions of Executive Order
ll007 or of NMI 1150.2, except to the extent that such
provisions are made applicable to the Panel under tflis
Instruction•

3. DUTIES

aB The duties of the Panel are set forth in Section 6
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Authorization Act, 1968, as follows:

"The Panel shall review safety studies and
operations plans referred to it and s_all
make reports thereon, shall advise the
Administrator with respect to the hazards
of proposed or existing facilities and pro-
posed operations and with respect to the
adequacy of proposed or existing safety
standards, and shall perform such other
duties as the Administrator may request."

b • Pursuant to carrying out its statutory duties, the
Panel will review, evaluate, and advise on all
elements of NASA's safety system, including
especially the industrial safety, systems safety,

1-10
NMI1156.14 December
7, 1967

and public safety activities, and the managementof
these activities. These key elements of NASA's
safety system are identified and delineated as follows:
(1) Industrial Safety. This element includes those
activities which, on a continuing basis, provide
protection for the well being of personnel and
prevention of damage to property involved in NASA's
business and exposed to potential hazards
associated with carrying out this business.
Industrial safety relates especially to the
operation of facilities in the many programs of
research, development, manufacture, test, opera-
tion, and maintenance. Industrial safety
activities include, but are not limited to, such
functions as:

(a) Determination of industrial safety criteria.

(b) Establishment and implementation of safety
standards and procedures for operation and
maintenance of facilities, especially test
and hazardous environment facilities.

(c) Development of safety requirements for the
design of new facilities.

(d) Establishment and implementation of safety
standards and procedures for operation of
program support and administrative aircraft.

(2) Systems Safety. This element includes those
activities specifically organized to deal with the
potential hazards of complex R&D systems that
involve many highly specialized areas of tech-
nology. It places particular emphasis on
achieving safe operation of these systems over
their life cycles, and it covers major systems
for aeronautical and space flight activities,
manned or unmanned, including associated ground-
based research, development, manufacturing, and
test activities. Systems safety activities
include, but are not limited to, such functions
as:

(a) Determination of systems safety criteria,
including criteria for crew safety.

(b) Determination of safety data requirements.

(C) Performance of systems safety analyses.

1-11

ILl II ]J E L E L L l_ I_ L: A: _ n n m n L ' ,__
_cember 7, 1967 NMI i156.14

(d) Establishment and implementation of systems
safety plans.

(3) Public Safety. This element includes those
activities which, on a continuing basis, provide
protection for the well being of people and
prevention of damage to property not involved in
_ASA's business, but which may nevertheless be
exposed to potential hazards associated with carry-
in_ out this business. Public safety activities
include, but are not limited to, such functions as:

(a) Determination of public safety criteria.

(b) Establishment and control of public safety
hazards associated with facility and systems
tests and operations.

(c) Establishment and implementation, as required,
of emergency or catastrophe control plans.

(4) Safety Management. This element includes both the
program and functional organizations of NASA and
its contractors involved in the identification of
potential hazards and their elimination or control
as set forth in the foregoing description of
safety activities. It also includes the management
systems for planning, implementing, coordinating,
and controlling these activities. These management
systems include, but are not limited to, the
following:

(a) The authorities, responsibilities, and working
relationships of the organizations involved
in safety activities, and the assessment of
their effectiveness.

(b) The procedures for insuring the currency and
continuity of safety activities, especially
systems safety activities which may extend
over long periods of time and where manage-
ment responsibilities are transferred during
the life cycles of the systems.

(c) The plans and procedures for accident/Incident
investigations, including those for the follow-
up on corrective actions and the feedback of
accident/Incident information to other
involved or interested organizations.

(d) The analysis and dissemination of safety data.

1-12
NMI 1156.14 December 7, 1967

• PROCEDURES

a• The Panel will function in an advisory capacity to the
Administrator, and, through him, to those organizational
elements responsible for management of the NASA safety
activities.

b, The Panel will be provided with all information required
to Uischarge its advisory responsibilities as they
pertain to both NASA and its contractors' safety
activities. This information will be made available
through the mechanism of appropriate reports, and by
means of in situ reviews of safety activities at the
various NASA and contractor sites, as deemed necessary
by the Panel and arranged through the Administrator.
The Panel will thus be enabled to examine and evaluate
not only the general status of the NASA safety system,
but also the key elements of the _lanned and on-going
activities in this system.

• ORGANIZATION

a. [!embership

(l) The Panel will consist of a maximum of nine members,
who will be appointed by the Administrator.
Appointments will be for a term of six years,
except that, in order to provide continuity of
membership, one-third of the members appointed
originally to the Panel will be appointed for a
term of two years, one-third for a term of four
years, and one-third for a term of six years•

(2) Not more than four members of the Panel shall be
employees of NASA, nor shall such NASA members
constitute a majority of the composition of the
Panel at any given time.

(3) Compensation and travel allowances for Panel
members shall be as specified in Section 6 of the
NASA Authorizatfon Act, 1968.

b. Officers

(I) The Officers of the Panel shall be a Chairman and
a Vice Chairman, who shall be selected by the Panel
from their membership to serve for one-year terms.

(2) The Chairman, or Vice Chairman in his absence,
shall preside at all meetings of the Panel and shall
have the usual powers of a presiding officer.

1-13
December 7, 1967 NMI I156.14

Co Committees

(z) The Panel is authorized to establish special
committees, as necessary and as approved by the
Administrator, to carry out specified tasks within
the scope of duties cf the Panel.

(2) All such cc_:_mittee activities will be considered
an inseparable extension of Panel activities, and
will be in accordance with all applicable pro-
cedures and regulations set forth in this
Instruction.

(3) The Chairman of each special committee shall be a
member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. The
other committee members may or may not be members
of the Panel, as recommended by the Panel and
approved by the Administrator.

(4) Appointment of Panel members to committees as
officers or members will be either for one year,
for the duration of their term as Panel members, or
for the lifetime of the committee, whichever is the
shortest. Appointments of non-Panel members to
committees will be for a period of one year or for
the lifetime of the committee, whichever is shorter.

(5) Compensation and travel allowances for committee
members who are not members of the Panel'shall be
the same as for members of the Panel itself, except
that compensation for such committee members
appointed from outside the Federal Government shall
be at the rate prescribed by the Administrator for
comparable services.

dQ
Meetings

(l) Regular meetings of the Panel will be held as often
as necessary and at least twice a_ar. One meeting
each year shall be an Annual Meeting. Business
conducted at this meeting will include selecting
the Chairman and the Fice Chairman of the Panel,
recommending new committees and committee members
as required or desired, approving the Panel's
annual report to the Administrator, and such other
business as may be required.

(2) Special meetings of the Panel may be called by the
Chairman, by notice served personally upon or by
mall or telegraph to the usual address of each
member at least five days prior to the meeting.

1-14
-" NMI 1156.14 December 7, 1967

(3) Special meetings shall be called in the same
manner by the Chairman, upon the written request
of three members of the Panel.

(4) If practicable, the object of a special meeting
should be sent in writing to all members, and if
possible a special meeting should be avoided by
obtaining the views of members by mail or otherwise,
both on the question requiring the meeting and on
the question of calling a special meeting.

(5) All meetings of special committees will be called
by their respective qhairmen pursuant to and in
accordance with performing their specified tasks.

(6) Minutes of all meetings of the Panel, and of special
committees established by the Panel, will be kept.
Such minutes shall, at a minimum, contain a record
of persons present, a description of matters dis-
cussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all
reports received, issued, or approved by the Panel
or committee. The accuracy of all minutes will be
certified to by the Chairman of the Panel (or by
the Vice Chairman in his absence) or of the
committee.

e. Reports and Records

(1) The Panel shall submit an annual report to the
Administrator.

(2) The Panel will submit to the Administrator reports
on all safety reviews and evaluations with comments
and recommendations as deemed appropriate by the
Panel.

(3) All records and files of the Panel, including
agendas, minutes of Panel and committee meetings,
studies, analyses, reports, or other data compila-
tions or work papers, made available to or
prepared by or for the Panel, will be retained by
the Panel.

f. Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest

(l) Nongovernmental members of the Panel, and of
special committees establishea by the Panel, are
"Special Government Employees" within the meaning
of NHB 1900.2A, which sets forth guidance to NASA
Special Government Employees resarding the
avoidance of conflicts of interest and the
observance of ethical standards of conduct. A

1"19
_ceaber 7, i_? _ 1156.14

copy of NHB 1900.2A and related NASA instructions
on conflicts of interest will be furnished to each
Panel or committee member at the time of his
appointment as a NASA consultant or expert.

(2) Nongovernmental members of the Panel or a soecial
committee will submit a "NASA Special Government
Employees Confidential Statement of Employment
and Financial Interests" (NASA Form 1271) prior to
participating in the activities of the Panel or a
special committee.

. SUPPORT

a.
A staff, to be comprised of full-time NASA employees,
shall be established to support the Panel. The members
of this staff will be fully responsive to direction from
the Chairman or t_e Fanel.

be
The director of this staff will serve as Executive
Secretary to the Panel. The Executive Secretary of the
Panel, in accordance with the specific instructions from
the Chairman of the Panel, shall:

(1) Administer the affairs of the Panel and have general
supervision of all arrangements for safety reviews
and evaluations, and other matters undertaken by
the Panel.

(2) Insure that a written record is kept of all
transactions, and submit the same to the Panel for
approval at each subsequent meeting.

(3) Insure that the same service is provided for all
special committees of the Panel.

trator

CFR Title i_, Chapter 5, Subpart 1209.5.

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CHAPTER
2

BOARD
HISTORY
ANDPROCEDURES

Z-O
PART i. SUMMARY OF BOARD HISTORY AND PROCEDURES

The Apollo 13 Review Board was established on April 17, 1970, by
the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator under the authority of
NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966. In the letter
establishing the Board, Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Director of Langley
Research Center, was appointed as Chairman and the general responsibili-
ties of the Board were set forth. The seven additional members of the
Board were named in a letter from the Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator to the Chairman, dated April 21, 1970. This letter also
designated a Manned Space Flight Technical Support official, a Counsel
to the Board, several other supporting officials, and several observers
from various organizations. In addition, in a letter dated April 20,
1970, to Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman of the NASA Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, that Panel was requested to review the Board's
procedures and findings.

The Review Board convened at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston,
Texas, on Tuesday, April 21, 1970. Four Panels of the Board were formed,
each under the overview of a member of the Board. Each of the Panels
was chaired by a senior official experienced in the area of review
assigned to the Panel. In addition, each Panel was manned by a number
of specialists, thereby providing a nucleus of expertise for the review
activity. During the period of the Board's review activities, the
Chairmen of the four Panels were responsible for the conduct of evalua-
tions, analyses, and other studies bearing on their Panel assignments,
for preparing preliminary findings and recommendations, and for developing
other information for the Board's consideration. To overview these
Panel efforts, each member of the Board assumed specific responsibilities
related to the overall review.

In addition to the direct participants in the Board activity, a
number of observers and consultants also attended various meetings of
the Board or its constituent Panels. These individuals assisted the
Review Board participants with advice and counsel in their areas of
expertise and responsibilities.

While the Board's intensive review activities were underway, the
Manned Spacecraft Center Apollo 13 Investigation Team, under James A.
McDivitt, Colonel, USAF, was also conducting its own analysis of the
accident on Apollo 13. Coordination between the Investigation Team
work and the Apollo 13 Review Board activities was effected through the
MSF Technical Support official and by maintaining a close and continu-
ing working relationship between the Panel Chairmen and officials of
the MSC Investigation Team.

2-1
The Board Chairman established a series of administrative procedures
to guide the Board's activities. In addition, specific assignments of
responsibility were madeto all individuals involved in the Board's
activities so as to insure an efficient review activity. Overall logis-
tic and administrative support was provided by MSC.
The Board conducted both Executive and General Sessions. During
the Executive Sessions, plans were agreed upon for guiding the Board's
activities and for establishing priorities for tests, analyses, studies,
and other Board efforts. At the General Sessions, status of Panel
activities was reviewed by the Board with a view towards coordination
and integration of all review activities. In addition, Board members
regularly attended daily status meetings of the MannedSpacecraft Center
Investigation Team.
In general, the Board relied on MannedSpacecraft Center postmission
evaluation activities to provide the factual data upon which evaluation,
assessment, and analysis efforts could be based. However, the Board,
through a regular procedure, also levied specific data collection, re-
duction, and analysis requirements on MSC. Test support for the Board
was conducted primarily at MSCbut also included tests run at other
NASACenters. Membersof the Board and its Panels also visited a number
of contractor facilities to review manufacturing, assembly, and test
procedures applicable to the Apollo 13 mission.

The Chairman of the Board provided the NASADeputy Administrator
with oral progress reports. These reports summarizedthe status of
Review Board activities at the time and outlined the tasks still ahead.
All material used in these interim briefings was incorporated into the
Board's official files.

As a means of formally transmitting its findings, determinations,
and recommendations, the Board chose the format of this Final Report
which includes both the Board's Judgments as well as the reports of the
individual Panels.

A general file of all the data and information collected and examined
by the Board has been established at the Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia. In addition, the MSCInvestigation Teamestablished a file of
data at MSC.

2-2
PART2. BIOGRAPNT_S OF BOARDMEMBERS_ OBSERVERS_ AND PANEL CHAIRMEN

CHAIRMAN OF THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

EDGAR M. CORTRIGHT
NASA Langley Research Center

Edgar M. Cortright, 46, Director of the NASA Langley Research Center,
Hampton, Virginia, is Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Cortright has been an aerospace scientist and administrator for
22 years. He began his career at NASA's Lewis Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1948 and for the next i0 years specialized in research on high-
speed aerodynamics there.

In October 1958, Mr. Cortright was named Chief of Advanced Technology
Programs at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., where he directed ini-
tial formulation of NASA's Meteorological Satellite Program. In 1960, he
became Assistant Director for Lunar and Planetary Programs and directed
the planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner, Ranger, and
Surveyor.

Mr. Cortright became Deputy Director of the Office of Space Sciences
in 1961, and Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and Appli-
cations in 1963, in which capacities he served as General Manager of
NASA's space flight program using automated spacecraft. He joined the
Office of Manned Space Flight as Deputy Associate Administrator in 1967
and served in a similar capacity until he was appointed Director of the
Langley Research Center in 1968.

He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics and of the American Astronautical Society. He has received the
•Arthur S. Fleming Award, the NASA Medal for Outstanding Leadership, and
the NASA Medal for Distinguished Service.

Mr. Cortright is the author of numerous technical reports and
articles, and compiled and edited the book, "Exploring Space With a
Camera."

He is a native of Hastings, Pennsylvania, and served as a U.S. Navy
officer in World War II. He received Bachelor and Master of Science
degrees in aeronautical engineering from the Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute.

Mr. and Mrs. Cortright are the parents of two children.

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MEMBERS
OF THEAPOLLO
13 REVIEW
BOARD

ROBERT
F. ALLNUTT
NASAHeadquarters

Robert F. Allnutt_ 34, Assistant to the NASAAdministrator,
Washington, D. C., is a memberof the Apollo 15 Review Board.

Mr. Allnutt was namedto his present position this year. Prior to
that, he had been Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs since
1967.

He joined NASAin 1960 as a patent attorney at the Langley Research
Center, Hampton, Virginia. In 1961, he was transferred to NASAHead-
quarters, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Allnutt served as Patent Counsel for CommunicationsSatellite
Corporation from January to September1965, when he returned to NASA
Headquarters as Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters.

He is admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia
and the state of Virginia and is a memberof the American Bar Association
and the Federal Bar Association.

Mr. Allnutt was graduated from Virginia Polytechnic Institute with
a B.S. degree in industrial engineering. He received Juris Doctor and
Master of Laws degrees from George Washington University Law School.

Mr. and Mrs. Allnutt are the parents of two sons. The family lives
in Washington, D. C.

NEIL A. ARMSTRONG
NASA Astronaut

Nell A. Armstrong, 39, NASA astronaut, is a member of the Apollo 13
Review Board.

Commander of the Apollo ll mission and the first man on the Moon,
Mr. Armstrong has distinguished himself as an astronaut and as an
engineering test pilot.

Prior to joining the astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft Center,
Houston, Texas, in 1962, Mr. Armstrong was an X-15 rocket aircraft
project pilot at the NASA Flight Research Center, Edwards, California.

\
Mr. Armstrong joined NASA at the Lewis Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1955, and later transferred to the Flight Research Center as an
aeronautical research pilot.

His initial space flight was as command pilot of Gemini VIII,
launched March 16, 1966. He performed the first successful docking of
two vehicles in space. The flight was terminated early due to a mal-
functioning thruster_ and the crew was cited for exceptional piloting
skill in overcoming the problem and accomplishing a safe landing. He
has served on backup crews for both Gemini and Apollo.

Mr. Armstrong is a Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test
Pilots, Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, and member of the Soaring Society of America. He has re-
ceived the Institute of Aerospace Sciences Octave Chanute Award, the
AIAAAstronautics Award, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, the John F.
Montgomery Award, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

He is a native of Wapakoneta, Ohio, and received a B.S. degree in
aeronautical engineering from Purdue University and a M.S. degree from
the University of Southern California. He was a naval aviator from
1949 to 1952 and flew 78 combat missions during the Korean action.

Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong have two sons.

JOHN F. CLARK
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

Dr. John F. Clark, 49, Director of the NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

He is an internationally known authority on atmospheric and space
sciences, holds four patents in electronic circuits and systems, and has
written many scientific papers on atmospheric physics, electronics, and
mathematics.

Dr. Clark joined NASA in 1958 and served in the Office of Space
Flight Programs at NASA Headquarters until 1961 when he was named
Director of Geophysics and Astronomy Programs, Office of Space Sciences.
From 1962 until 1965, he was Director of Sciences and Chairman of the
Space Science Steering Committee, Office of Space Science and Applica-
tions.

In 1965, Dr. Clark was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for
Space Science and Applications (Sciences), and later that year, Acting
Director of Goddard. He was named director of the center in 1966.

2-5
Dr. Clark began his career in 19h2 as an electronics engineer at
the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. From 19h7 to 19h8 he
was Assistant Professor of Electronic Engineering at Lehigh University,
Bethelem, Pennsylvania. He returned to NRL in 1948; and prior to Join-
ing NASA, served as head of the Atmospheric Electricity Branch there.

He is a member of the American Association of Physics Teachers,
American Geophysical Union, Scientific Research Society of America,
Philosophical Society of Washington, the International Scientific Radio
Union, and the Visiting Committee on Physics, Lehigh University. He
received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Service, Outstanding Leadership,
and Distinguished Service.

Dr. Clark was born in Reading, Pennsylvania. He received a B.S.
degree in electrical engineering from Lehigh University, M.S. degree in
mathematics from George Washington University, and Ph.D. in physics
from the University of Maryland.

Dr. and Mrs. Clark have two children and live in Silver Springs,
Maryland.

WALTER R. HEDRICK, JR.
Headquarters, USAF

Brig. Gen. Walter R. Hedrick, Jr., h8, Director of Space, Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, Headquarters,
USAF, Washington, D.C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

He has participated in most of the Air Force's major nuclear test
projects and has extensive experience as a technical project officer
and administrator.

General Hedrick Joined the Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet in
1941 and flew in combat with the 86th Fighter Bomber Group during
World War II. After the War, he was assigned to the 19th Air Force, the
lhth Air Force, and as a project officer under Air Force Secretary
Stuart Symington. From 1952 to 1955, he was assigned to the Air Force
Office of Atomic Energy.

In 1955, he was assigned to the Technical Operations Division, Air
Force Special Weapons Command, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. In
1957, he was named Commander of the h951st Support Squadron, Eniwetok;
and the following year, he was reassigned to Kirtland AFB as Assistant
to the Group Commander and later as Air Commander of the h925th Test Group.

General Hedrick Joined the Special Systems Office, Air Force
Ballistics Division, Los Angeles, in 1960. He was named Commander of

2-6
-the Satellite Control Facility in 1965, and in 1966, he was appointed
Deputy Commander, Air Force Systems Command. He received his present
assignment in 1967.

General Hedrick is a Command Pilot and has received numerous Air
Force awards.

His home town is Fort Worth, Texas, and he attended Texas Techno-
logical College, Lubbock, prior to joining the service. He received
B.S. and M.S. degrees in physics from the University of Maryland.

General and Mrs. Hedrick are the parents of two sons.

VINCENT L. JOHNSON
NASA Headquarters

Vincent L Johnson, 51, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space
Science and Applications (Engineering), NASA Headquarters, is a member
of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Johnson was appointed to his present position in 1967. Prior
to that time, he had been Director of the Launch Vehicle and Propulsion
Programs Division, Office of Space Science and Applications, since 1964.
He was responsible for the management and development of the light and
medium launch vehicles used for NASA's unmanned earth orbital and deep
space programs. His division also directed studies of future unmanned
launch vehicle and propulsion system requirements.

Mr. Johnson joined NASA in 1960, coming from the Navy Department
where he had been an engineer with the Bureau of Weapons. His first
assignments with NASA were as Program Manager for the Scout, Delta, and
Centaur launch vehicles.

He was a naval officer during World War II, serving with the Bureau
of Ordnance. Prior to that, he was a physicist with the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory.

Mr. Johnson was born in Red Wing, Minnesota, and attended the
University of Minnesota.

He and Mrs. Johnson live in Bethesda, Maryland. They are the
parents of two children.

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L E L L I: L L "
MILTON KLEIN
NASA Headquarters

Milton Klein, 46, Manager, Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, NASA
Headquarters, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Klein has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to
that he had been Deputy Manager since 1960. The Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office is a joint activity of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The office conducts the
national nuclear rocket program. He is also Director of the Division of
Space Nuclear Systems of the AEC_ responsible for space nuclear electric
power activities.

Mr. Klein became associated with atomic energy work in 19467 when
he was employed by the Argonne National Laboratory. In 1950, he joined
the AEC's Chicago Operations Office as staff chemical engineer. Later,
he was promoted to Assistant Manager for Technical Operations. Generally
engaged in reactor development work for stationary power plants, he had
a primary role in the power reactor demonstration program.

Mr. Klein was born in St. Louis, Missouri. He served in the U.S.
Navy during World War II.

He has a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from Washington
University and a Master of Business Administration degree from Harvard
University.

Mr. and Mrs. Klein and their three children live in Bethesda,
Maryland.

HANS M. MARK
NASA Ames Research Center

Dr. Hans M. Mark, 40, Director of the NASA Ames Research Center,
Moffett Field, California, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Prior to being appointed Director of the Ames Research Center he
was, from 1964 to 1969, Chairman of the Department of Nuclear Engineering
at the University of California, Berkeley, California.

An expert in nuclear and atomic physics, he served as Reactor
Administrator of the University of California's Berkeley Research
Reactor, professor of nuclear engineering and _ research physicist at
the University's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California,

2-8
and consultant to the U.S. Army and the National Science Foundation.
He has written many scientific papers.

Except for 2 years as an Assistant Professor of Physics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1958 to 1960, Dr. Mark's
administrative, academic, and research career has been centered at the
University of California (Berkeley).

Dr. Mark received his A.B. degree in physics from the University
of California, Berkeley, in 1951, and returned there as a research
physicist in 1955, one year after receiving his Ph.D. in physics
from M.I.T.

He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and a member of the
American Geophysical Union, the American Society for Engineering Educa-
tion and the American Nuclear Society.

Dr. Mark was born in Mannheim, Germany, and came to the United
States when he was ll years old. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen
in 1945.

Dr. and Mrs. Mark are the parents of two children.

COUNSEL TO THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD
GEORGE T. MALLEY
NASA Langley Research Center

George T. Malley, 57, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center,
Hampton, Virginia, is the Legal Counsel to the Apollo 13 Review Board.
He also served as Counsel to the Apollo 204 Review Board.

Mr. Malley is the Senior Field Counsel of NASA and has been assigned
to Langley since 1959. He was with the Office of the General Counsel,
Department of the Navy, from 1950 to 1959, where he specialized in
admiralty and international law.

He is a retired Navy officer and served on active duty from 1939 to
1946, mainly in the South Pacific. His last assignment was commanding
officer of the U.S.S. Fentress.

Mr. Malley has an A.B. degree from the University of Rochester and
an LL.B. degree from Cornell University Law School. He is a native of
Rochester, New York, and is a member of the New York Bar and the Federal
Bar Association.

Mr. and Mrs. Malley and their two children live in Newport News,
Virginia.

2-9
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT TECHNICAL SUPPORT
CHARLES W. MATHEWS
NASA Headquarters

Charles W. Mathews, 49, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., directs the Office
of Manned Space Flight technical support to the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Mathews has been a research engineer and project manager for
NASA and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), since 1943. In his present assignment, he serves as general
manager of manned space flight.

Prior to his appointment to this position in 1968, he had been
Director, Apollo Applications Program, NASA Headquarters, since
January 1967.

Mr. Mathews was Gemini Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, from 1963 until 1967. Prior to that time, he
was Deputy Assistant Director for Engineering and Development and Chief
of the Spacecraft Technology Division at MSC@

Mr. Mathews transferred to MSC (then the Space Task Group) when
Project Mercury became an official national program in 1958. He served
as Chief of the Operation Division. He had been at the Langley Research
Center, Hampton, Virginia, since 1943 engaged in aircraft flight research
and automatic control of airplanes. He became involved in manned space-
craft studies prior to the first Sputnik flights, and he conducted early
studies on reentry. Mr. Mathews was chairman of the group which developed
detailed specifications for the Mercury spacecraft.

Mr. Mathews has been awarded the NASA Distinguished Service Medal
and the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal. He has received the NASA
Group Achievement Award - Gemini Program Team.

He is a Fellow of the American Astronautical Society and an Associate
Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He is
the author of numerous technical articles published by NASA.

Mr. Mathews, a native of Duluth, Minnesota, has a B.S. degree in
aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy,
New York.

Mr. and Mrs. Mathews live in Vienna, Virginia. They have two
children.

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iu I/ Ju E L L L h ' L E E ;
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD OBSERVERS

WILLIAM A. ANDERS
National Aeronautics and Space Council

William A. Amders, 36, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics
and Space Council, Washington, D.C., is an official observer of the
Apollo 13 Review Board.

Prior to being appointed to his present position in 1969, Mr. Anders
was a NASA astronaut and an Air Force lieutenant colonel. He was lunar
module pilot on the Apollo 8 lunar orbital mission, man's first visit
to the vicinity of another celestial body.

Mr. Anders joined the NASA astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, in 1963. In addition to his Apollo 8 flight, he
served as backup pilot for Gemini ll and backup command module pilot for
Apollo ll, the first lunar landing mission.

Mr. Anders was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Force
upon graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. After flight training, he
served as a pilot in all-weather interceptor squadrons of the Air Defense
Command. Prior to becoming an astronaut, he was a nuclear engineer and
instructor pilot at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force
Base, New Mexico.

He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and has been awarded
the Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Astronaut Wings, the NASA
Distinguished Service Medal, and the New York State Medal for Valor.

Mr. Anders was born in Hong Kong. He received a B.S. degree from
the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. degree in nuclear engineering from
the Air Force Institute of Technology.

Mr. and Mrs. Anders are the parents of five children.

CHARLES D. HARRINGTON
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc.

Dr Charles D Harrington, 59, President and General Manager,
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc., Richland, Washington, is an official
observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Dr. Harrington, who has been associated with all phases of the
chemical and nuclear industrial fields since 1941, is Chairman of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a statutory body created by Congress.

2-11
From 1941 to 1961, he was employed by the Mallinckrodt Chemical
Works, St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. Harrington started with.the company
as a research chemist and in 1960, after a procession of research and
managementpositions, was appointed Vice President, Mallinckrodt Nuclear
Corporation and Vice President, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works.

In 1961, when the fuel material processing plant of Mallinckrodt
becamethe Chemicals Division of United Nuclear Corporation, Dr. Harrington
was namedVice President of that division.

He becameSenior Vice President, United Nuclear Corporation,
Centreville, Maryland, in 1963.

In 1965, Dr. Harrington was appointed President and General Manager,
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc. The companymanagesproduction reactors
and fuels fabrication facilities at Hanford, Washington, for the Atomic
Energy Commission.
He is the co-author of a book, "Uranium Production Technology," and
has written numerous technical papers. He has received the Mid-West
Award of the American Chemical Society for contributions to technology
in the nuclear energy field.

He is director of several corporations, including United Nuclear,
as well as professional councils and societies.

Dr. Harrington has M.S., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees in chemistry from
Harvard University.

I. IRVINGPINKEL
NASALewis Research Center

I. Irving Pinkel, 57, Director, Aerospace Safety Research and Data
Institute at the NASALewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, is an
official observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Until recently, he directed research at Lewis Research Center on
rocket propellant and electric power generation systems for space
vehicles, compressors and turbines for advanced aircraft engines, and
lubrication systems for rotating machines for these systems.

Mr. Pinkel entered Governmentscientific service in 1935 as a
physicist with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In
1940, he joined the staff of the Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia, as a physicist. Whenthe Lewis Research Center was built in
1942, he transferred there.

2-12
He has been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, SigmaXi, honorary scientific
society, and Pi Mu Epsilon, honorary mathematics fraternity. He is an
Ohio Professional Engineer, served on the former NACAsubcommittees on
Meteorological Problems, Icing Problems, Aircraft Fire Prevention and
Flight Safety, and is a memberof the NASAResearch and Technology Advi-
sory Subcommitteeon Aircraft Operating Problems. He has been a Special
Lecturer, Case Institute of Technology Graduate School.

Mr. Pinkel has received the Flight Safety Foundation Award for con-
tributions to the safe utilization of aircraft, the Laura Taber Barbour
Award for development of a system for suppressing aircraft crash fires,
the NACADistinguished Service Medal, and the NASASustained Superior
Performance Award.

He was born in Gloversville, NewYork, and was graduated from the
University of Pennsylvania.

Mr. and Mrs. Pinkel live in Fairview Park, Ohio. They are the
parents of two sons.

JAMESE. WILSON,JR.
Committeeon Science and Astronautics
United States House of Representatives

JamesE. Wilson, Jr., 39, Technical Consultant, United States House
of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, is an official
observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Wilson has been technical consultant to the Committee since
1963. From 1961 to 1963, he was Director of Research and Development,
U.S. Naval Propellant Plant, Indian Head, Maryland. Mr. Wilson managed
the Polaris Program at Indian Head from 1956 to 1961.

From 1954 to 1956, Mr. Wilson served as an officer in the U.S. Army
Signal Corps. He was a development engineer with E. I. DuPont, Wilmington,
Delaware, from 1953 to 1954.

Mr. Wilson is a memberof Phi SigmaAlpha, a National Honor Society;
American Institute of Chemical Engineers; American Chemical Society; and
American OrdnanceAssociation.

Mr. Wilson is co-author of several publications of the House Commit-
tee on Science and Astronautics.

He received a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from the Univer-
sity of Maine and a Master of Engineering Administration degree from
George Washington University.

2-13
Mr. and Mrs. Wilson live in LaPlata, Maryland. They have two
children.
APOLLO13 REVIEW
BOARDPANEL
CHAIRMEN
SEYMOUR C. HIMMEL
NASALewis Research Center

Dr. SeymourC. Himmel, Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles,
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, heads the Design Panel of the
Apollo 13 Review Board.

Dr. Himmel joined Lewis in 1948 as an aeronautical research scien-
tist. He has occupied supervisory positions since 1953.

He has been awarded the NASAExceptional Service Medal and the NASA
Group Achievement Award as manager of the Agena Project Group. Dr. Himmel
has served on a number of advisory committees. He is an Associate Fellow
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member
of Tau Beta Pi and Pi Tau Sigma. He is the author of more than 25 tech-
nical papers.

Dr. Himmel has a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from the
College of the City of NewYork and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from Case
Institute of Technology.

Dr. and Mrs. Himmel live in Lakewood, Ohio.

EDWINC. KILGORE
NASALangley Research Center

Edwin C. Kilgore, 47, Deputy Chief, Engineering and Technical Serv-
ices, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, heads the Project
ManagementPanel of the Apollo 15 Review Board.

Mr. Kilgore joined the Langley science staff in 1944 and served in
a variety of technical and managementpositions until promotion to his
present position in 1968.

He has received the Honorary Group Achievement Award for his role
in achieving a record of 97 consecutive successes for solid propellant
rocket motors and the NASA-LunarOrbiter Project Group Achievement Award
for outstanding performance. He is a memberof Pi Tau Sigma, honorary
mechanical engineering society.

2-1h
Mr. Kilgore was born in Coeburn, Virginia. He was graduated from
Virginia Polytechnic Institute with a B.S. degree in mechanical engi-
neering.

Mr. and Mrs. Kilgore and their two daughters live in Hampton.

HARRIS M. SCHURMEIER
California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Harris M. Schurmeier, 45, Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for
Flight Projects, California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Lab-
oratory, Pasadena, California, heads the Manufacturing and Test Panel
of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Schurmeier was appointed to his current position in 1969. Prior
to that he was Mariner Mars 1969 Project Manager, Voyager Capsule System
Manager and Deputy Manager of the Voyager Project, and Ranger Project
Manager at JPL.

He has received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Scientific Achieve-
ment and Exceptional Service. In addition, he has received the Astro-
nautics Engineer Award, and the NASA Public Service Award.

He was born in St. Paul, Minnesota. He has received a B.S. degree
in mechanical engineering, M.S. degree in aeronautical engineering, and
a professional degree in aeronautical engineering from the California
Institute of Technology.

Mr. Schurmeier was a naval officer in World War II. He and his
wife and four children live in Altadena, California.

FRANCIS B. SMITH
NASA Headquarters

Francis B. Smith, 47, Assistant Administrator for University Affairs,
NASA Headquarters, is leader of the Mission Events Panel of the Apollo 13
Review Board.

Mr. Smith has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to
that he had been Assistant Director, Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia, since 1964. He joined the Langley science staff in 1947. He
is an expert in several fields, including radio telemetry, radar, elec-
tronic tracking systems, and missile and range instrumentation.

2-15

L L: E L L ' U. L: ig If 1_: L: L L_ L_
Mr. Smith was born in Piedmont, South Carolina, and received a B.S.
degree in electrical engineering from the University of South Carolina,
where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He remained at the University
as an instructor from 1943 to 1944 and then served in the U.S. Navy until
1946.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their three children live in Reston, Virginia.

2-16

i,i I.l 12 L L L U L L_ L '_ "" _'
PART 3. BOARD ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR BOARD PANELS

BOARD ORGANIZATION

After reviewing the scope of the Board's charter, the Chairman and
Board Members agreed upon the Panel and Support Office structure depicted
on the following organization chart. Each Panel was assigned specific
responsibilities for reviewing major elements of the overall Board task,
with particular emphasis upon establishing a sound and independent
technical data base upon which findings, determinations, and recommenda-
tions by the Board could be based. The Panels were staffed with in-
dividual NASA specialists and established working arrangements with the
Manned Space Flight line organization personnel working in analogous
areas.

The Board's support offices were structured to provide necessary
staff, logistics, and administrative support without duplication of
available MSC assistance.

In addition to this structure, the Board and Panels also utilized
the special assistance of expert consultants.

Panel assignments, complete Panel membership, and the official Board
organization approved by the Chairman are included in this part of the
Board report.

2-17
APOLLO 13
REVIEW BOARD

E. M. CORTRIGHTo CHAIRMAN

OBSERVERS R. F. ALLNUTT V.L. JOHNSON CONSULTANTS

W. A. ANDERS N. A. ARMSTRONG M. KLEIN
C. D. HARRINGTON W. D. ERICKSON
J. F. CLARK H.M. MARK
I. I. PINKEL
t ................. R. VAN OOLAH
J. E. WILSON, JR. W. R. HEDRICK

I I I I I I

I-in
TECHNICAL

C, W. MATHEWS
SUPPORT

G.
COUNSEL

T. MALLEY
SECRETARIAT

E. P. SWIEDA R. G.
EDITORIAL

GROUP

ROMATOWSKI
I

B.
PUBLIC
AFFAIRS

M. DUFF
I G.
J.
LEG,SLAT,VE
MOSS
I
AFFAIRS

NGHOFF

r I I I I
MANUFACTURING PROJECT
DESIGN
& TEST MANAGEMENT

MISSION EVENTS I
F. B. SMITH H. M. SCHURMEIER S. C. HIMMEL E. C. KILGORE

ro
i I
R. D. GINTER I
(Do PRE-INCIDENT EVENTS

]
EVALUATION
ACCEPTANCE TESTING M. H. MEAD
R. N. LINDLEY
FABRICATION & ] DESIGN I
W. F. BROWN, JR. J. B. WHITTEN
J. J. WILLIAMS E. F. BAEHR

INCIDENT EVENTS & MECHANISMS
SYSTEM TESTING
SUBSYSTEM & I FAILURE MODES I
T. B. BALLARD K. L. HEIMBURG W. R. LUCAS

POST INCIDENT ELECTRICAL

EVENTS QUALITY ASSURANCE

t RELIABILITY &
M. P. FRANK B. T. MORRIS R. C. WELLS

APPROVED
E. M. CORTIIGHT

RELATED SYSTEMS

J. F. SAUNDERS, JR.

APOLLO 15 REVIEW BOARD ORGANIZATION
GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR BOARD PANELS
(AS DOCUMENTED IN THE BOARD'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES)

Panel i - Mission Events Panel

It shall be the task of the Mission Events Panel to provide a de-
tailed and accurate chronology of all pertinent events and actions
leading to, during, and subsequent to the Apollo 13 incident. This
information, in narrative and graphical time history form, will provide
the Apollo 13 Review Board an official events record on which their
analysis and conclusions may be based. This record will be published
in a form suitable for inclusion in the Review Board's official report.

The Panel will report all significant events derived from telemetry
records, air-to-ground communications transcripts, crew and control
center observations, and appropriate documents such as the flight plan,
mission technique description, Apollo Operation Handbook, and crew check-
lists. Correlation between various events and other observations related
to the failure will be noted. Where telemetry data are referenced, the
Panel will comment as appropriate on its significance, reliability,
accuracy, and on spacecraft conditions which might have generated the
data.

The chronology will consist of three major sections: Preincident
Events, Incident Events, and Postincident Events. The decision-making
process leading to the safe recovery, referencing the relevant contin-
gency plans and available alternates, will be included.

Preincident Events. - This section will chronicle the progress of
the flight from the countdown to the time of the incident. All action
and data relevant to the subsequent incident will be included.

Incident Events. - This section will cover that period of time be-
ginning at 55 hours and 52 minutes after lift-off and continuing so long
as abnormal system behavior is relevant to the failure.

Postincident Events. - This section will document the events and
activities subsequent to the incident and continuing to mission termina-
tion (Splash). Emphasis will be placed on the rationale used on mission
completion strategy.

Panel i Membership

Mr. F. B. Smith, Panel Chairman
Assistant Administrator for University Affairs
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

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N N-IJ I: E L L '"
Dr: Tom B. Ballard
Aerospace Technologist
Flight Instrument Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

Mr. M. P. Frank
Flight Director
Flight Control Division
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas

Mr. John J. Williams
Director, Spacecraft Operations
Kennedy Space Center
Florida

Mr. Nell Armstrong, Board Member and Panel Monitor
As t r on aut
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas

Panel 2 - Manufacturing and Test Panel

The Manufacturing and Test Panel shall review the manufacturing and
testing, including the associated reliability and quality assurance
activities, of the flight hardware components involved in the flight
failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the analysis
of the design. The purpose of this review is to ascertain the adequacy
of the manufacturing procedures, including any modifications, and the pre-
flight test and checkout program, and any possible correlation of these
activities with the inflight events.

The Panel shall consist of three activities:

Fabrication and Acceptance Testin6.- This will consist of reviewing
the fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing steps actually used
during the manufacturing of the specific flight hardware elements in-
volved. Fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing procedures and
records will be reviewed, as well as observation of actual operations
when appropriate.

Subsystem and System Testing.- This will consist of reviewing all
the flight qualification testing from the completion of the component-
level acceptance testing up through the countdown to lift-off for the
specific hardware involved. Test procedures and results will be reviewed

2-20
.- as well as observing specific tests where appropriate. Results of tests
on other serial number units will also be reviewed when appropriate.

Reliability and quality Assurance.- This will be an overview of both
the manufacturing and testing, covering such things as parts and material
qualification and control, assembly and testing procedures, and inspection
and problem/failure reporting and closeout.

Panel 2 Membership

Mr. Harris M. Schurmeier, Panel Chairman
Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena, California

Mr. Edward F. Baehr
Assistant Chief, Launch Vehicles Division
Deputy Manager, Titan Project
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

Mr. Karl L. Heimburg
Director, Astronautics Laboratory
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama

Mr. Brooks T. Morris
Manager, Quality Assurance and Reliability Office
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena, California

Dr. John F. Clark, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Director
Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland

Panel 3 - Design Panel

The Design Panel shall examine the design of the oxygen and asso-
ciated systems to the extent necessary to support the theory of failure.
After such review the Panel shall indicate a course of corrective action
which shall include requirements for further investigations and/or re-
design. In addition, the Panel shall establish requirements for review
of other Apollo spacecraft systems of similar design.

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.-
The Panel shall consist of four subdivisions:

Design Evaluation.- This activity shall review the requirements and
specifications governing the design of the systems, subsystems and com-
ponents, their derivation, changes thereto and the reasons therefor; and
the design of the system in response to the requirements, including such
elements as design approach, material selection, stress analysis, de-
velopment and qualification test programs, and results. This activity
shall also review and evaluate proposed design modifications, including
changes in operating procedures required by such modifications.

Failure Modes and Mechanisms.- This activity shall review the design
of the systems to ascertain the possible sources of failure and the m_mer
in which failures may occur. In this process, they shall attempt to
correlate such modes with the evidence from flight and ground test data.
This shall include considerations such as: energy sources, materials
compatibility, nature of pressure vessel failure, effects of environment
and service, the service history of any suspect systems and components,
and any degradation that may have occurred.

Electrical.- This activity shall review the design of all electrical
components associated with the theory of failure to ascertain their
adequacy. This activity shall also review and evaluate proposed design
modifications, including changes in operating procedures required by such
modi fi c ati ons.

Related Systems .- This activity shall review the design of all
systems similar to that involved in the Apollo 13 incident with the view
to establishing any commonality of design that may indicate a need for
redesign. They shall also consider the possibility of design modifica-
tions to permit damage containment in the event of a failure.

Panel 3 Membership

Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Panel Chairman
Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

Mr. William F. Brown, Jr.
Chief, Strength of Materials Branch
Materials and Structures Division
Administration Directorate
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

2-22

iu la lJ /_- /d L If L '
Mr. R. N. Lindley
Special Assistant to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

Dr. William R. Lucas
Director, Program Development
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama

Mr. J. F. Saunders, Jr.
Project Officer for Command and Service Module
Office of Manned Space Flight
NASA He adquarters
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Robert C. Wells
Head, Electric Flight Systems Section
Vehicles Branch
Flight Vehicles and Systems Division
Office of Engineering and Technical Services
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

Mr. Vincent L. Johnson, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Deputy Associate Administrator for Engineering
Office of Space Science and Applications
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

Panel 4 - Project Management Panel

The Project Management Panel will undertake the following tasks:

I. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management struc-
ture employed in Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13
incident. This review will encompass the organization, the responsi-
bilities of organizational elements, and the adequacy of the staffing.

2. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management systems
employed on Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13 incident.
This task will include the management systems employed to control the
appropriate design, manufacturing, and test operations; the processes
used to assure adequate communications between organizational elements;
the processes used to control hardware and functional interfaces; the
safety processes involved; and protective security.

2-23
3. Review the project managementlessons learned from the Apollo
13 mission from the standpoint of their applicability to subsequent
Apollo missions.
Tasks i and 2, above, should encompassboth the general review of
the processes used in Apollo 13 and specific applicability to the pos-
sible cause or causes of the mission incident as identified by the Board.

Panel 4 Membership

E. C. Kilgore, Panel Chairman
Deputy Chief, Office of Engineering and Technical Services
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
R. D. Ginter
Director of Special Programs Office
Office of AdvancedResearch and Technology
NASAHeadquarters
Washington, D.C.
Merrill H. Mead
Chief of Programs and Resources Office
AmesResearch Center
Moffett Field, California
JamesB. Whitten
Assistant Chief, Aeronautical and Space Mechanics Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Milton Klein, Board Memberand Panel Monitor
Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office
Washington, D.C.

Board Observers

William A. Anders
Executive Secretary
National Aeronautics and Space Council
Washington, D.C.

Dr. Charles D. Harrington
Chairman
NASAAerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Washington, D.C.

2-24
I. Irving Pinkel
Director
Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio
Mr. JamesE. Wilson
Technical Consultant to the Committeeon Science and Astronautics
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Apollo 13 Review Board Support Staff
Brian M. Duff
Public Affairs Officer
MannedSpacecraft Center
Houston, Texas

Gerald J. Mossinghoff
Director of Congressional Liaison
NASAHeadquarters
Washington, D.C.

Edward F. Parry
Counsel to Office of MannedSpaceFlight
NASAHeadquarters
Washington, D.C.

RaymondG. Romatowski
Deputy Assistant Director for Administration
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Ernest P. Swieda
Deputy Chief, Skylab Program Control Office
Kennedy Space Center, Florida

Consultants to the Board

Dr. WayneD. Erickson, Head Dr. Robert Van Dolah
Aerothermochemistry Branch Acting Research Director
Langley Research Center Safety Research Center
Hampton, Virginia Bureau of Mines
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

2-25
MSCSupport to the Board

These persons were detailed by MSCto support the Apollo 13 Review
Board during its review activity at MSC. They are identified by MSC
position title.
Roy C. Aldridge
Assistant to the Director of Administration

Mary Chandler Jamie Moon
Secretary Technical Editor

Rex Cline Dorothy Newberry
Technical Writer/Editor Administrative Assistant

Evon Collins Lettie Reed
Program Analyst Editorial Assistant

Leroy Cotton Charlene Rogozinski
Equipment Specialist Secretary
MaureenCruz Joanne Sanchez
Travel Clerk Secretary
Janet Harris Billie Schmidt
Clerk Stenographer Employee Development Specialist
Marjorie Harrison Frances Smith
Secretary Secretary
Phyllis Hayes George Sowers
Secretary ManagementPresentations Officer
William N. Henderson Elaine Stemerick
ManagementAnalyst Secretary
Sharon Laws Mary Thompson
Secretary Administrative Assistant

Carolyn Lisenbee Alvin C. Zuehlke
Secretary Electrical Engineer

Judy Miller
Secretary

2-26
PART 4. SUMMARY OF BOARD ACTIVITIES

APRIL 19, 1970

Chairman E. M. Cortright met with Langley officials to begin planning
the Apollo 13 Review Board approach. Tentative list of Panel Members and
other specialists were developed for consideration.

APRIL 20, 1970

Chairman Cortright met with the NASA Administrator, Deputy Adminis-
trator, and key NASA officials in Washington, D.C., to discuss Board
membership.

The Chairman met with NASA Office of Manned Space Flight top offi-
cials while enroute to MSC on NASA aircraft and discussed program organi-
zation plans for review of the accident, and coordination with Apollo 13
Review Board activity.

APRIL 21, 1970

Chairman Cortright met with MSC officials to discuss Apollo 13
Review Board support.

A formal MSC debriefing of the Apollo 13 crew was conducted for MSC
officials and Apollo 13 Review Board personnel already at MSC.

Detailed discussions between early arrivals on the Review Board and
the MSC Investigation Team were held to provide quick-look data on the
Apollo 13 accident and to develop detailed procedures for MSC support of
the Apollo 13 Board.

Chairman Cortright met with members of the Press to report on early
activity of the Board and to inform them of plans for keeping the Press
current on Board activities.

The first meeting of the Board was held at 8 p.m. to discuss Board
composition, structure, assignments, and scope of review. Preliminary
plans were developed for appointing various specialists to assist the
Board in its analysis and evaluation.

2-27
APRIL 22, 1970

The Board met with Colonel McDivitt's MSCInvestigation Teamto re-
view the progress madeby MSCin identifying causes of the accident and
in developing an understanding of sequences and relationships between
known inflight events. In addition, MSCofficials briefed the Board on
MSCInvestigation Teamstructure and assignments.

The Board met with Panel i of the MSCInvestigation Teamfor de-
tailed discussion of inflight events and consideration of early con-
clusions on implications of preliminary data analysis.

The Board held its second meeting to discuss MSCinvestigative
efforts and additional appointments of Panel specialists.

Board membersattended Panel i evening roundup of day's evaluation
activities, _nich included detailed discussions of specific studies,
data reductions, and support test activities already underway.

APRIL 23, 1970

The Apollo 13 Review Board established itself in proximity to the
MSCInvestigation Teamin Building 45, and arranged for all administra-
tive and logistics support to the Board.

A daily schedule of meetings, reviews, briefings, and discussions
was established, including preliminary plans for contractor meetings,
special support tests, and accumulation of accident-related information.

Initial task assignments and responsibilities were madeto Board
Panels as guidance for detailed review work. Individual Board members
were assigned Panel overview responsibilities or other special tasks.

Administrative procedures were developed for Board activity, par-
ticularly to provide efficient interface with MSCpersonnel.
Board and Panel Membersagain met with MSCofficials to further re-
view the sequence of events in the Apollo 13 mission and to examine early
hypotheses concerning causes of these events.

The Board convened for an evening meeting to discuss the progress to
date and to coordinate Panel activities for the next few days. Discussion
centered upon immediate requirements for data collection and analysis.
Chairman Cortright appointed additional NASAspecialists in order to
bring Panels up to strength.

2-28
APRIL 24, 1970

Board Members, Panel Chairmen, and MSC officials reviewed additional
data analysis made by MSC and contractor personnel with particular empha-
sis upon the service module (SM) cryogenic system.

The Board convened and reviewed the progress to date. Tentative
approvals were given for Board trips to North American Rockwell (NR),
Downey, California, Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, and other loca-
tions.

Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on progress to date.

Panel Chairmen and Members continued their detailed analysis of
failure modes, test histories, mission events, and other data bearing
upon the accident.

Board Members and Panel Chairmen met with Mr. Norman Ryker of NR on
NR's activities involving design, qualification, and tests of SM cryo-
genic oxygen tanks.

APRIL 25, 1970

The Board met to discuss details of onsite inspections of command
service module (CSM) flight hardware at principal contractor installa-
tions.

Panels examined in detail probable failure modes based on data
analyzed at that time.

Specific plans were discussed by the Board relating to evaluation
of oxygen tank assembly and checkout operations, including review of
component histories.

The MSC Investigation Team members briefed Board personnel on
Kennedy Space Center checkout operations of the service module cryogenic
and electric power systems, including a detailed briefing covering oxygen
tank detanking operations.

APRIL 26, 1970

Board and Panel Members traveled to North American Rockwell, Downey,
for detailed briefings by NR engineers and management. NR reviewed its

2-29

L
progress in an intensive analysis of the Apollo 13 malfunction, including
a review of approved special tests. Oxygen tank, fuel cell components,
assemblies, and other hardware were also inspected.

APRIL 27, 1970

An Executive Session of the Board met to discuss progress of specific
analyses required to verify tentative conclusions on oxygen tank failure
and service module EPS failure.

Additional Board specialists arrived at MSC and received detailed
briefings by MSC and Board personnel on selected aspects of the Apollo 13
data.

Panel Members received and assessed a preliminary MSC evaluation of
the Apollo 13 accident, including tentative conclusions on the most
probable failure modes.

Procedures were established to provide information flow on the status
of review to Board observers.

The Board reviewed work plans for the coming week with each Panel and
established review priorities and special task assignments.

APRIL 28, !970

Chairman Cortright outlined a plan for the Board's preliminary report
scheduled for presentation to the Deputy Administrator during his visit to
MSC on May i. Each Panel Chairman was to summarize the status of his
Panel's activities for Dr. George Low on Friday, April 29, 1970.

Board Member Neil Armstrong completed arrangements to provide each
Board Member and Panel Chairman an opportunity for detailed simulation of
the Apollo 13 inflight accident using MSC's CSM simulation equipment.

Board and Panel Members reviewed enhanced photographs of the
Apollo 13 service module at the MSC Photographic Laboratory.

Dr. yon Elbe of Atlantic Research Company briefed Board and Panel
Members on cryogenics and combustion phenomena.

A representative of the Manufacturing and Test Panel performed an
onsite inspection at Beech Aircraft, Boulder.

2-30
Manufacture and Test Panel personnel reviewed detanking procedures
followed at KSCduring the Apollo 13 countdowndemonstration test (CDDT).

Board and Panel personnel reviewed progress to date at a general
Board meeting involving all Review Board personnel.

APRIL 29, 1970

Dr. Charles Harrington, Board Observer and Chairman of the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, arrived for a 2-day detailed review of Board pro-
cedures and progress in the accident review.

The Board reviewed North American Rockwell preliminary recommenda-
tions involving oxygen tank redesign.

The Board continued to review and examine oxygen tank ignition
sources and combustion propagation processes with specialists from MSC,
other NASACenters, and contractor personnel.
The Mission Events Panel continued to examine and record details of
all significant mission events as a basis for other Panel evaluations and
study.

Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review Panel pro-
gress to date and to discuss work plans for the next several days.
The Project ManagementPanel visited North American Rockwell at
Downeyto review detailed procedures for acceptance tests, subcontractor
inspections, project documentation, and other managementinterface areas.

APRIL 30, 1970

The Safety Advisory Panel continued discussions with Board Chairman
and MSCofficials on progress of total Apollo 13 review efforts.

Panel Membersreviewed instrumentation used in Apollo 13 spacecraft
in order to establish the validity of telemetry data being used in Board
analysis.

Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review progress of
the work and to discuss preliminary findings of the Board.

Project Managementpersonnel visited BeechAircraft Corporation to
review procedures used for assembly of cryogenic oxygen tanks and to dis-
cuss communication and information systems within the Apollo Program.
Panels continued to review detailed data in their respective areas.

MAYi_ 1970

Board and Panel personnel participated in a joint MSC/Apo!!o 13
Review Board status presentation to the NASADeputy Administrator. The
meeting covered all significant Apollo 13 findings and early conclusions
on the cause of the accident and appropriate remedial actions.

The MSCstaff briefed Board Memberson initial evaluations of pro-
posed design changes in oxygen tank system.

Panel Memberscontinued to assess data accumulated from the Apollo 13
mission with particular emphasis upon the design and performance of elec-
tric power systems used in the service module.

Board Membersand Panel Chairmenreviewed specific test matrix being
proposed by Apo!lo 13 Review Board specialists covering most significant
unknownsinvolved in understanding failure mechanisms.

MAY2, 1970

Board Membersmet in General Session to discuss preparation of a com-
plete "failure tree" as an additional guide in conducting a complete re-
view and investigation. Specific aspects of this approach were reviewed.

The Project ManagementPanel reviewed oxygen tank reliability history
and quality assurance criteria used in assembly, test, and checkout of
these systems.

Panel specialists continued reviewing data from the mission with
emphasis upon integrating various data points into logical failure mode
patterns established by MSCand Board personnel.

MAY3, 1970

Chairman Cortright and Board Membersconducted a detailed review of
individual Panel status and progress and established milestones for
additional analytical work and preparation of preliminary findings.

The Board and Panel agreed to tentative report structure, including
required exhibits, tables, drawings, and other reference data.

2-32
The Board established a system for tabulating all significant mission
events and explanatory data, including the support tests required to
clarify questions raised by events.

Panel Membersworked on individual analyses with particular attention
to developing requirements for additional test activity in support of ten-
tative conclusions.

The Board agreed to strengthen its technical reviews of combustion
propagation and electrical design by adding specialists in these areas.

MAY4, 1970

The Design Panel continued its intensive review of the "shelf drop"
incident at NRinvolving the cryogenic oxygen flight tank used in
Apollo 13 in order to understand possible results of this event.

The Mission Events Panel continued to analyze telemetry data received
by MSC,with particular attention on data received in proximity to the
data dropout period during the Apollo 13 mission and on fan turnons during
the flight.

The Board transmitted a formal listing of 62 requests for data,
analyses, and support tests required for Board re_iew activity.

The Board continued to meet with individual Panels and support
offices to review the status of preliminary findings and work completed.

MAY5, 1970

The Board met in General Session to discuss the scope and conduct of
support test activity, including careful documentation of test methods and
application of test results.

MSCpersonnel briefed Panel Memberson availability of additional
telemetry data in the MSCdata bank in order to insure Board considera-
tion of all possible useful data.

Panels commencedinitial drafting of preliminary findings in specific
areas, including summarydescriptions of system performance during the
Apollo 13 flight.

The Board met with the MSCInvestigation Teamfor complete review of
the proposed test program.

2-33
. MAY6, 1970

Board Members,MSCpersonnel_ and Membersof NASA'sAerospace Safety
Advisory Panel met for detailed discussions and evaluation of accident
review status and progress. The review covered oxygen tank questions,
recovery operations, and a mission simulation by MSCastronauts.

Panel Memberscontinued to work on the preparation of preliminary
Panel drafts.

Chairman Cortright transmitted additional requests for tests to MSC
and modified procedures for control of overall test activity relating to
the Apollo 13 accident.

MAY7, 1970

The General Board Session reviewed complete analysis and test support
activities being conducted for the Board and MSCat various governmental
and contractor installations.

Board and Panel Membersmet to discuss Ameslaboratory tests con-
cerning liquid oxygen combustion initiation energies required in the
cryogenic oxygen tank used in the Apollo 13 SM.

Panel i Membersreviewed mission control equipment and operating
procedures used during the Apollo 13 mission and reviewed actual mission
events in detail.

The Panels continued to develop preliminary drafts of their reviews
and analyses for consideration by the Board.

MAY8, 1970

Dr. Robert Van Dolah, Bureau of Mines, joined the Board as a con-
sultant on combustion propagation and reviewed Apollo 13 Review Board
data developed to date.

The General Board Session convened to review proposed report format
and scope. An agreement was reached on appendices, on the structure of
the report, and on the degree of detail to be included in individual Panel
reports.

Chairman Cortright assigned additional specific test overview re-
sponsibilities to membersof the Apollo 13 Review activity.

2-34
Panel 1 conducted a formal interview with the MSCFlight Director
covering all significant mission events from the standpoint of ground
controllers.

Panels 2 through 4 continued developing preliminary reports. Panel 4
announceda formal schedule of interviews of MSC,contractors, and NASA
Headquarters personnel.

Board Membersexplored in detail possible failure modesequences
developed by MSCpersonnel involving ignition and combustion within the
SMcryogenic oxygen tank.

The Board recessed for 3 days, leaving a cadre of personnel at MSC
to edit preliminary drafts developed by the Panels and to schedule further
activity for the week of May ll.

MAY9, 1970

Board in recess.

MAYi0, 1970

Board in recess.

MAYii, 1970

Board in recess. MSCsupport personnel continued work obtaining
additional technical data for Board review.

MAY12, 1970

Board Membersreturned to MSC.

Board Membersattended a General Session to review progress and
status of the report.

Panel Chairmenreported on individual progress of work and estab-
lished schedules for completion of analyses and evaluations.

Chairman Cortright reported on the Langley Research Center support
test program aimed at simulation of SMpanel ejection energy pulses.

2-35
MAY13, 1970

Board Membersreviewed preliminary drafts of report chapter on Re-
view and Analysis and Panel i report on Mission Events.

Mission Events Panel Membersinterviewed Electrical, Electronic, and
CommunicationsEngineer (EECOM)and one of the Apollo 13 Flight Directors
on activities which took place in the Mission Control Center (MCC)during
and after the flight accident period.

Panel 4, Project ManagementPanel, conducted interviews with princi-
pal Apollo 13 program personnel from MSCand contract organizations.

Panel Memberscontinued drafting preliminary versions of Panel re-
ports for review by the Board.

Manufacturing and Test Panel representatives discussed program for
oxygen tank testing to be conducted at Beech Aircraft.

Board Membersmet in General Session to review report milestones and
required test data for the week ahead.

MAY14, 1970

Board met in General Session to review Panel report progress and to
agree to firm schedules for completion of all Review Board assignments.

Project ManagementPanel continued to interview key Apollo project
personnel from NASACenters and contractors.

Panel Memberscirculated first drafts of all Panel reports to Board
Membersfor review and correction.

MAY15, 1970

Mission Events Panel personnel interviewed Apollo 13 Command
Module
Pilot John Swigert to verify event chronology compiled by the Panel and
to review crew responses during Apollo 13 mission.

Project ManagementPanel continued interviewing key project personnel
with NASACenters and contractors.

2-36

MSC personnel provide Board Members and Panel Chairmen with a de-
tailed briefing on all support tests and analyses being performed in
connection with the MSC and Board reviews.

Board Members met in Executive Session to review preliminary drafts
of Panel reports and findings and determinations and to provide additional
instructions and guidance to Panel Chairmen.

Panel Members continued to review and edit early Panel drafts and to
compile reference data in support of findings.

MAY 16, 1970

Board met in General Session to review further revisions of prelimi-
nary findings and determinations and to establish working schedules for
completion of the Board report.

Panel Members continued to edit and refine Panel reports on basis of
discussions with MSC personnel and further analysis of Apollo 13 documen-
tation.

MAY 17, 1970

Draft material for all parts of Board report was reviewed by Panel
Members and staff. Changes were incorporated in all draft material and
recirculated for additional review and comment.

Board Members met in General Session to review report progress and
to examine results from recent support tests and analyses being conducted
at various Government and contractor installations.

The Apollo 13 Review Board discussed a continuing series of support
tests for recommendation to MSC following presentation of report and re-
cess of the Board.

MAY 18, 1970

Board Members reviewed Special Tests and Analyses Appendix of the
report and examined results of completed tests.

Board met in General Session to discuss control procedures for re-
production and distribution of Board report.

2-37
Mission Events Panel distributed a final draft of their report for
review by Board Members.

Board reviewed a preliminary draft of findings and determinations
prepared by Panel Chairmen, Board Members, and Board Chairman.

A Manufacture and Test Panel representative reviewed special oxygen
tank test programs at Beech Aircraft.

MAY19, 1970

Board Membersmet in Executive Session to continue evaluation and
assessment of preliminary findings, determinations, and recommendations
prepared by individual Board Membersand Panel Chairmen.

Board met in General Session to review final draft of Mission Events
Panel report.

Manufacture and Test Panel preliminary report was distributed to
Board Members for review and comment.

Design Panel preliminary report was distributed to Board Members for
review and comment.

Design Panel Members met with MSC Team officials to discuss further
test and analyses support for the Board.

MAY 20, 1970

Board Members met in Executive Session to review and evaluate reports
from the Design Panel and from the Manufacturing and Test Panel.

Project Management Panel distributed final draft of its report to
Board Members for review and comment.

Chairman Cortright met withMr. Bruce Lundin of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel to discuss progress of Board review and analysis.

MAY 21, 1970

Board Members met in Executive Session for final review of Project
Management Panel report.

2-38
Board Membersand others met with MSCofficials to review in detail
the activities and actions taken after the Apollo 204 accident concerning
ignition flammability for materials and control in the CSM.

A third draft of preliminary findings, determinations_ and recommen-
dations was developed and circulated by the Chairmanfor review and
comment.

Arrangements were madewith NASAHeadquarters officials for pack-
aging, delivery, and distribution of the Board's final report.
Mission Events Panel conducted an interview with Lunar Module Pilot
Haise to review selected mission events bearing on the accident.

MAY22, 1970

Mission Events Panel representatives met with MSCofficials to review
in detail several events which occurred during later flight stages.

Board met in Executive Session to assess latest drafts of findings,
determinations, and recommendations circulated by the Chairman.

Board met in General Session to review total progress in all report
areas and to establish final schedule for preparation of Board report.
Langley Research Center representative M. Ellis briefed the Board on
ignition and combustion of materials in oxygen atmosphere tests being con-
ducted in support of the Apollo 13 Review.

Board Observer I. I. Pinkel briefed the Board on Lewis Research
Center fire propagation tests involving Teflon.

MAY23, !970

Board Membersreviewed Chapter 4 of Board report entitled "Review
and Analysis."

Panel Chairmen reviewed draft findings and determinations prepared
by the Board.

2-39

N N L L K L.',"
. L . h 1_: L . _ I: _'" li /d< I:: L _ L
MAY 24, 1970

Board Members reviewed NASA Aerospace Safety Panel report covering
Apollo activities during the period of 1968-69.

Board met in Executive Session for detailed review of support test
status and progress and of documentation describing the results of test
activity.

Board met in Executive Sessicn for further review of findings,
determinations, and recommendations.

MAY 25, 1970

Board met in Executive Session to review test progress and decided
to postpone submittal of final report until June 8 in order to consider
results of Langley Research Center panel ejection tests.

Board Members continued to review MSC Investigation Team preliminary
drafts and refine Apollo 13 data in the various Board appendices.

Board met in Executive Session for further consideration of findings,
determinations, and recommendations.

MAY 26, 1970

Board met in General Session and interviewed Astronaut James Lovell
regarding crew understanding of inflight accident.

Board Members reviewed proposed MSC tank combustion test and agreed
to test methodology and objectives.

Panel Members continued preparation of individual Panel reports.

MAY 27, 1970

Board and Panel Members received a detailed briefing on thermostatic
switch failure during MSC heater tube temperature tests.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel met with Chairman Cortright, Board
Members, and Panel Chairmen to review Board progress and status of
findings and conclusions.

2-40
Board met in General Session to review status of Panel reports,
documentation of test data and results, and plans for report typing and
review.

Board agreed to recess for several days to accumulate additional
test information on panel separation and full scale tank ignition data.

MAY28, 1970

Board in recess.

_Y 29, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY30, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY31, 1970

Board in recess.

JUNEi, 1970

Board Membersreturned to MSC.

Board and Panel Membersmet in General Session to discuss revisions
of Panel reports in light of latest information regarding thermostatic
switch failure during CDDTat KSC.

Board approved new schedule for Board report calling for final
versions of Panel reports by Monday, June 8.

2-41
JUNE2, 1970

Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on the status of the Board's
work and future plans.

Board and Panel Membersparticipated in a detailed interview and
discussion with MSCand contractor personnel regarding specific coordina-
tion steps taken during oxygen tank no. 2 detanking operations at KSC.
Board Membersmet in Executive Session to review latest test results
and to assess status of Board findings and determinations.

JUNE3, 1970

Board and Panel Membersmet with MSCProgram Office personnel for a
detailed update of recent MSCinformation and analyses stemming from on-
going test programs.

Board Membersand Panel Chairmen completed final reviews of Panel
reports and also reviewed final draft of findings, determinations, and
recommendations.

Board and Panel Membersreceived a detailed briefing on thermostatic
switch questions with emphasis upon actions of various organizations
during and after detanking operations at KSC.

JUNE4, 1970

Board Membersmet in Executive Session and completed final revisions
of Chapter 4 of the Board summary.

Board and Panel Memberswitnessed a special full-scale tank ignition
test performed at MSC.

Panel Chairmen completed final revisions of individual Panel reports
and submitted copy to the Reports Editorial Office.

Board met in Executive Session and agreed to final schedule for re-
port printing and delivery to the Administrator on June 15, 1970.

2-42
- JUNE5, 1970

Board Members met in Executive Session and completed work on Chap-
ter 5 of the Board Summary Report (Findings, Determinations, and Recom-
mendations).

Board Members reviewed final version of Project Management Panel
report and authorized printing as Appendix E.

Board Members Hedrick and Mark completed final tabulation of test
support activities performed for the Board.

Board Members reviewed films of special test activities performed
at various NASA Centers.

JUNE 6, 1970

Board met in Executive Session throughout the day and completed
its review of Chapter 5 of its report (Findings, Determinations, and
Recommendations).

Board Members completed review of analyses to be incorporated in
Appendix F, Special Tests and Analyses.

JUNE 7, 1970

The Board met in Executive Session and approved plans and schedules
for final editorial review and publication of the Board report.

The Chairman recessed the Board until June 15 at which time the
Board is scheduled to reconvene in Washington, D.C., to present its
report to the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator.

2-43
This page left blank intentionally.

2-44
CHAPTER 3

DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE

AND MISSION SUMMARY

3-0
This chapter is extracted from Mission Operation Report
No. M-932-70, Revision 3, published by the Program and Special Reports
Division (XP), Executive Secretariat, NASA Headquarters, Washington,
D.C.

Discussion in this chapter is broken into two parts. Part 1 is
designed to acquaint the reader with the flight hardware and with
the mission monitoring, support, and control functions and capabilities.
Part 2 describes the Apollo 13 mission and gives a mission sequence
of events summary.

3-1
PART i APOLL0/SATURN V SPACE VEHICLE

The primary flight hardware of the Apollo Program consists of the
Saturn V launch vehicle and Apollo spacecraft (fig. 3-1). Collectively,
they are designated the Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle (SV). Selected
major systems and subsystems of the space vehicle may be summarized as
follows.

SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE

The Saturn V launch vehicle (LV) is designed to boost up to
300,000 pounds into a 105-nautical mile earth orbit and to provide for
lunar payloads of over 100,000 pounds. The Saturn V LV consists of
three propulsive stages (S-IC, S-II, S-IVB), two interstages, and an
instrument unit (IU).

S-IC Stage

The S-IC stage (fig. 3-2) is a large cylindrical booster, 138 feet
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant F-I
rocket engines. These engines develop a nominal sea level thrust total
of approximately 7,650,000 pounds. The stage dry weight is approximately
288,000 pounds and the total loaded stage weight is approximately
5,031,500 pounds. The S-IC stage interfaces structurally and electri-
cally with the S-II stage. It also interfaces structurally, elec-
trically, and pneumatically with ground support equipment (GSE) through
two umbilical service arms, three tail service masts, and certain
electronic systems by antennas. The S-IC stage is instrumented for
operational measurements or signals which are transmitted by its inde-
pendent telemetry system.

S-II Stage

The S-II stage (fig. 3-3) is a large cylindrical booster, 81.5 feet
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant J-2
rocket engines which develop a nominal vacuum thrust of 230,000 pounds
each for a total of 1,150,000 pounds. Dry weight of the S-II stage is
approximately 78,050 pounds. The stage approximate loaded gross weight
is 1,075,000 pounds. The S-IC/S-II interstage weighs 10,460 pounds.
The S-II stage is instrumented for operational and research and develop-
ment measurements which are transmitted by its independent telemetry
system. The S-II stage has structural and electrical interfaces with
the S-IC and S-IVB stages, and electric, pneumatic, and fluid interfaces
with GSE through its umbilicals and antennas.

3-2
Instrument unit

aunch escape system S-IVB
32 ft

1 Inter-stage

/_._Boost protective cover
r-
S-II

363 ft
L_ Commandmodule Inter-stage
I
L_J

r::. iiiiiiiill adapter

S-IC
Lunar module

r:. LAUNCH
VEHICLE

Spacecraft Space vehicle Launch vehicle

r- Figure 5-i.- Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle.

..,.

..
FLIGHT TERMINATION
RECEIVERS (2) FT

INSTRUMENTATI ON
FORWARD
.7 IN
SKIRT
GOX
DISTRIBUTOR

HELIUM
CYLINDERS (4)

LINE

IN OXIDIZER
TANK

BAFFLE
ANNULAR
BAFFLES 262.4 IN
INTERTANK
LINE SECTION

TUNNELS (5)

CENTER SUCTION
ENGINE LINES (5)
SUPP(
FUEL
IN TANK
TUNNEL
FUEL
SUCTION THRUST
RI NG

HEAT

LOWER
THRUST RIN

F-l ENGINES
(5)
HEA
INSTRUMENTATIC FLIGHT CONTROL
SERVOACTUATOR
RETROROCKETS

Figure 3-2.- S-IC stage.

3-4
T FORWARDSKI RT
11-I/2 FEET
;YSTEMS TUNNEL

VEHI CLE
STATION
2519

LIQUID HYDROGEN
TANK
(37,737 CU FT)

;EET

LH2/LOX COMMON
BULKHEAD
81-I/2
LIQUID OXYGEN
FEET
(12,745.5 CU FT)
22 FEET

AFT SKIRT

,____1 THRUST
STRUCTURE
14-I/2 FEET

_[ INTERSTAGE
18-I/4 FEET
VEHICLE
STATION
1541 33 FEET _I

Figure 3-3.- S-II stage.

3-5
S-IVB Stage

The S-IVB stage (fig. 3-4) is a large cylindrical booster 59 feet
long and 21.6 feet in diameter, powered by one J-2 engine. The S-IVB
stage is capable of multiple engine starts. Engine thrust is
203,000 pounds. This stage is also unique in that it has an attitude
control capability independent of its main engine. Dry weight of the
stage is 25,050 pounds. The launch weight of the stage is 261,700 pounds.
The interstage weight of 8100 pounds is not included in the stated
weights. The stage is instrumented for functional measurements or sig-
nals which are transmitted by its independent telemetry system.

The high performance J-2 engine as installed in the S-IVB stage
has a multiple start capability. The S-IVB J-2 engine is scheduled
to produce a thrust of 203,000 pounds during its first burn to earth
orbit and a thrust of 178,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of 4.5:1)
during the first i00 seconds of translunar injection. The remaining
translunar injection acceleration is provided at a thrust level of
203,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of 5.0:1). The engine valves are
controlled by a pneumatic system powered by gaseous helium which is
stored in a sphere inside a start bottle. An electrical control system
that uses solid stage logic elements is used to sequence the start and
shutdown operations of the engine.

Instrument Unit

The Saturn V launch vehicle is guided from its launch pad into
earth orbit primarily by navigation, guidance, and control equipment
located in the instrument unit (IU). The instrument unit is a cylindri-
cal structure 21.6 feet in diameter and 3 feet high installed on top of
the S-IVB stage. The unit weighs 4310 pounds and contains measurements
and telemetry_ command communications, tracking, and emergency detection
system components along with supporting electrical power and the environ-
mental control system.

APOLLO SPACECRAFT

The Apollo spacecraft (S/C) is designed to support three men in space
for periods up to 2 weeks, docking in space, landing on and returning
from the lunar surface, and safely entering the earth's atmosphere. The
Apollo S/C consists of the spacecraft-to-LM adapter (SLA), the service
module (SM), the command module (CM), the launch escape system (LES), and
the lunar module (LM). The CM and SM as a unit are referred to as the
command and service module (CSM).

3-6
ml-
I0.2 FEET

FORWARD SKIRT
L

i.-..--
21.6 FEET-I_

LH2 TANK

I0,418
CU FT-- 44.0 FEET

LOX TANK
2830 k/ \_J_
59.0
FEET

AFT SKIRT _"/!. _ " ]

THRUST STRUCTURE
(WITH ENGINE
ATTACHED) ) _'
5.2tFEET

, 33.0 FEET =I

19 FEET
AFT INTERSTAGE

Figure 3-4.- S-IVB stage.

3-7

ILl N _ E l/ E E L L 11. L.' L: U II g l: n L _.
Spacecraft-to-LM Adapter

The SLA (fig. 3-5) is a conical structure which provides a structural
load path between the LV and SM and also supports the LM. Aerodynami-
cally, the SLA smoothly encloses the irregularly shaped LM and transitions
the space vehicle diameter from that of the upper stage of the LV to that
of the SM. The SLA also encloses the nozzle of the SM engine and the high
gain antenna.

Spring thrusters are used to separate the LM from the SLA. After
the CSM has docked with the LM, mild charges are fired to release the
four adapters which secure the LM in the SLA. Simultaneously, four
spring thrusters mounted on the lower (fixed) SLA panels push against
the LM landing gear truss assembly to separate the spacecraft from the
launch vehicle.

Service Module

The service module (SM)(fig. 3-6) provides the main spacecraft pro-
pulsion and maneuvering capability during a mission. The SM provides
most of the spacecraft consumables (oxygen, water, propellant, and
hydrogen) and supplements environmental, electrical power, and propul-
sion requirements of the CM. The SM remains attached to the CM until
it is jettisoned just before CM atmospheric entry.

Structure.- The basic structural components are forward and aft
(upper and lower) bulkheads, six radial beams, four sector honeycomb
panels, four reaction control system honeycomb panels, aft heat shield,
and a fairing. The forward and aft bulkheads cover the top and bottom
of the SM. Radial beam trusses extending above the forward bulkhead
support and secure the CM. The radial beams are made of solid aluminum
alloy which has been machined and chem-milled to thicknesses varying
between 2 inches and 0.018 inch. Three of these beams have compression
pads and the other three have shear-compression pads and tension ties.
Explosive charges in the center sections of these tension ties are used
to separate the CM from the SM.

An aft heat shield surrounds the service propulsion engine to
protect the SM from the engine's heat during thrusting. The gap between
the CM and the forward bulkhead of the SM is closed off with a fairing
which is composed of eight electrical power system radiators alternated
with eight aluminum honeycomb panels. The sector and reaction control
system panels are 1 inch thick and are made of aluminum honeycomb core
between two aluminum face sheets. The sector panels are bolted to the
radial beams. Radiators used to dissipate heat from the environmental
control subsystem are bonded to the sector panels on opposite sides of
the SM. These radiators are each about 30 square feet in area.

3-8

ILl ILl 13 L L 1J ]2 L " _ L_ L _ _-_
CIRCUMFERENTIAL

I
UPPER (FORWARD)
LINEAR-SHAPED CHARGE

LONGITUDINAL
LINEAR-SHAPED CHARGE
21 ' JETTISONABLE
(4 PLACES)
PANELS
(4 PLACES)
PYROTECHN IC THRUSTERS
(4 PLACES)

CIRCUMFERENTIAL
LINEAR-SHAPED CHARGE
LOWER (AFT)
7' FIXED PANELS
THRUSTER/HINGE
(2) (4 PLACES)

IU

Figure 3-5.- Spacecraft-to-LM adapter.

3-9
RED ELECTRICAL
DOCKING POWER
LIGHT SUBSYSTEM
RADIATORS
SM REACTION
CONTROL FLYAWAY
SUBSYSTEM UMBILICAL
QUAD

FLOODLIGHT

GREEN
SCIMITAR DOCKING
ANT LIGHT

ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTR
EXTENSION
RADIATOR

UM TANKS

__RE'A OXIDIZER

TANKS
FUEL TANKS
CTION
\ _1 ICONTROL
FORWARD BULKHEAD INSTALL, J-_ ISUBSYSTEM

FUEL CELLS

PRESSURIZATION (_ [_
I _QUAOS 141

OXYGEN TANKS

HYDROGEN TANKS _

S-BAND HIGH GAIN ANTENNA AFT
BULKHEAD

12 FT 10 IN. . i SERVICE PROPULSION ENGINE

SECTOR 2 _ SERVICE PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM

SECTOR 3 _ OXIDIZER TANKS

SECTOR 4 OXYGEN TANKS, HYDROGEN TANKS, FUEL CELLS

SECTOR 5 _ SERVICE PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM

SECTOR6 J FUEL TANKS

CENTER SECTION- SERVICE PROPULSION ENGINE AND
HELIUM TANKS

Figure 3-6.- Service module.

3-10

ILl ILl [ L L L: LL L L I_ la L
' u
_' E E -
The SM interior is divided into six sectors, or bays, and a center
. -
section. Sector one is currently void. It is available for installation
of scientific or additional equipment should the need arise. Sector
two has part of a space radiator and a reaction control system (RCS)
engine quad (module) on its exterior panel and contains the service pro-
pulsion system (SPS) oxidizer sump tank. This tank is the larger of
the two tanks that hold the oxidizer for the SPS engine. Sector three
has the rest of the space radiator and another RCS engine quad on its
exterior panel and contains the oxidizer storage tank. This tank is
the second of two SPS oxidizer tanks and feeds the oxidizer sump tank
in sector two. Sector four contains most of the electrical power gener-
ating equipment. It contains three fuel cells, two cryogenic oxygen
and two cryogenic hydrogen tanks, and a power control relay box. The
cryogenic tanks supply oxygen to the environmental control subsystem
and oxygen and hydrogen to the fuel cells. Sector five has part of an
environmental control radiator and an RCS engine quad on the exterior
panel and contains the SPS engine fuel sump tank. This tank feeds the
engine and is also connected by feed lines to the storage tank in
sector six. Sector six has the rest of the environmental control radi-
tor and an RCS engine quad on its exterior and contains the SPS engine
fuel storage tank which feeds the fuel sump tank in sector five. The
center section contains two helium tanks and the SPS engine. The tanks
are used to provide helium pressurant for the SPS propellant tanks.

Propulsion.- Main spacecraft propulsion is provided by the
20500-pound thrust SPS. The SPS engine is a restartable, non-throttleable
engine which uses nitrogen tetroxide (N204) as an oxidizer and a 50-50
mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical-dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel.
(These propellants are hypergolic, i.e., they burn spontaneously when
combined without need for an igniter.) This engine is used for major
velocity changes during the mission, such as midcourse corrections,
lunar orbit insertion, transearth injection, and CSM aborts. The SPS
engine responds to automatic firing commands from the guidance and
navigation system or to commands from manual controls. The engine as-
sembly is gimbal-mounted to allow engine thrust-vector alignment with the
spacecraft center of mass to preclude tumbling. Thrust-vector alignment
control is maintained by the crew. The SM RCS provides for maneuvering
about and along three axes.

Additional SM systems.- In addition to the systems already described,
the SM has communication antennas, umbilical connections, and several
exterior mounted lights. The four antennas on the outside of the _ are
the steerable S-band high-gain antenna, mounted on the aft bulkhead; two
VHF omnidirectional antennas, mounted on opposite sides of the module
near the top; and the rendezvous radar transponder antenna, mounted in
the SM fairing.

3-11
Seven lights are mounted in the aluminumpanels of the fairing.
Four lights (one red, one green, and two amber) are used to aid the
astronauts in docking: one is a floodlight which can be turned on to
give astronauts visibility during extravehicular activities, one is a
flashing beacon used to aid in rendezvous, and one is a spotlight used
in rendezvous from 500 feet to docking with the LM.

SM/CM separation.- Separation of the SM from the CM occurs shortly
before entry. The sequence of events during separation is controlled
automatically by two redundant service module jettison controllers (SMJC)
located on the forward bulkhead of the SM.

Command Module

The command module (CM) (fig. 3-7) serves as the command, control,
and communications center for most of the mission. Supplemented by the
SM, it provides all life support elements for three crewmen in the mis-
sion environments and for their safe return to the earth's surface. It
is capable of attitude control about three axes and some lateral lift
translation at high velocities in earth atmosphere. It also permits LM
attachment, CM/LM ingress and egress, and serves as a buoyant vessel in
open ocean.

Structure.- The CM consists of two basic structures joined together:
the inner structure (pressure shell) and the outer structure (heat
shield). The inner structure, the pressurized crew compartment, is made
of aluminum sandwich construction consisting of a welded aluminum inner
skin, bonded aluminum honeycomb core, and outer face sheet. The outer
structure is basically a heat shield and is made of stainless steel-
brazed honeycomb brazed between steel alloy face sheets. Parts of the
area between the inner and outer sheets are filled with a layer of
fibrous insulation as additional heat protection.

Display and controls.- The main display console (MDC) (fig. 3-8)
has been arranged to provide for the expected duties of crew members.
These duties fall into the categories of Commander, CM Pilot, and LM
Pilot, occupying the left, center, and right couches, respectively. The
CM Pilot also acts as the principal navigator. All controls have been
designed so they can be operated by astronauts wearing gloves. The con-
trols are predominantly of four basic types: toggle switches, rotary
switches with click-stops, thumb-wheels, and push buttons. Critical
switches are guarded so that they cannot be thrown inadvertently. In
addition, some critical controls have locks that must be released before
they can be operated.

3-12
+X ÷y

_y ,_ __< --Z

/ COMBINED TUNNEL HATCH

ATTACHMENT (TYPICAL)
_ AUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

_ _"._'_'E7
P,TC.

(, ATTACH
POINT

(TYPICAL)

+X +y

-Y -X -Z

LEFT HAND
FORWARD COMPARTMENT FORWARD EQUIPMENT BAY COMBINED TUNNEL HATCH

CREW "
.OWER
, FORWARD " _ _ _ _OMPARTMENT

{TYPICAL)

HAND EQUIPMENT BAY RIGHT HAND EQUIPMENT /

AFT COMPARTMENT AFT COMPARTMENT

Figure 3-7.- Command module.

3-13
Cry°genics- 7 /--Service
/ / propulsion

Audio J r a C autai:nln-g-r_-__.> _ /.--Audio

control--_//_
F,'I coo''o'
RCS
mgmt ECS I I........._ i \
I c0_t,r__L_l I=';owre_'
"k________
\ I '
contro/-_/
7 Flightl

/ _E n vC_i;::ie nla i cJontr o i__
_f_'_--SCS
pane" ' power I

• Launch vehicle emergency detection • Propellant gauging
• Flight attitude • Environment control
• Mission sequence • Communications control
• Velocity change monitor • Power distribution
• Entry monitor • Caution and warning

I _ LIJJ
--':--: "--J'_-]-I

I Flight controls p. Systems controls
I --_l=-_,LII ,_--_ll . "'_JJaJJl_l ul'Irl
I_

/-J71 ', ," ', ," I\ ..X
• J • •

% • % •
% • • ••
•S
_o sx
• % S %
I •

Commander CM pilot LM pilot

Figure 3-8.- CM main display console,

3-14
Flight controls are located on the left center and left side of the
MDC, opposite the Commander. These include controls for such subsystems
as stabilization and control, propulsion, crew safety, earth landing,
and emergency detection. One of two guidance and navigation computer
panels also is located here, as are velocity, attitude, and altitude
indicators.

The CM Pilot faces the center of the console, and thus can reach
many of the flight controls, as well as the system controls on the right
side of the console. Displays and controls directly opposite him include
reaction control, propellant management, caution and warning, environ-
mental control, and cryogenic storage systems. The rotation and trans-
lation controllers used for attitude, thrust vector, and translation
maneuvers are located on the arms of two crew couches. In addition, a
rotation controller can be mounted at the navigation position in the
lower equipment bay.

Critical conditions of most spacecraft systems are monitored by a
caution and warning system. A malfunction or out-of-tolerance condition
results in illumination of a status light that identifies the abnormal-
ity. It also activates the master alarm circuit, which illuminates two
master alarm lights on the MDC and one in the lower equipment bay and
sends an alarm tone to the astronauts' headsets. The master alarm
lights and tone continue until a crewman resets the master alarm circuit.
This can be done before the crewmen deal with the problem indicated. The
caution and warning system also contains equipment to sense its own
malfunctions.

Lunar Module

The lunar module (LM) (fig. 3-9) is designed to transport two men
safely from the CSM, in lunar orbit, to the lunar surface, and return
them to the orbiting CSM. The LM provides operational capabilities such
as communications, telemetry, environmental support, transportation of
scientific equipment to the lunar surface, and returning surface samples
with the crew to the CSM.

The lunar module consists of two stages: the ascent stage and the
descent stage. The stages are attached at four fittings by explosive
bolts. Separable umbilicals and hardline connections provide subsystem
continuity to operate both stages as a single unit until separate ascent
stage operation is desired. The LM is designed to operate for 48 hours
after separation from the CSM, with a maximum lunar stay time of 44 hours.
Table 3-I is a weight summary of the Apollo/Saturn 5 space vehicle for
the Apollo 13 mission.

3-15
Overhead
S-band hatch
steerable Docking Ascent VHF EVA Docking
an window stage antenna antenna target

Rendezvous
equipment
radar antenna_ bay
S-band in-flight
antenna (2)
RCS thrust chamber
Docking assembly cluster
light (

Docking

Tracking I ight (3)

Forward hatch Landing gear

Forward,

Ladder Egress Descent Descent Landing
platform engine stage radar_
skirt antenna

Figure 3-9.- Lunar module.

3-]_6
TABLE 3-I.- APOLLO 13 WEIGHT SUMMARY (WEIGHT IN POUNDS)

Final
Total
Stage/module Inert weight Total weight separation
expendables
weight

S-IC 288OOO 4746870 5034870 363403

s-lc/s-ii 11464 11464
interstage

S-If stage 78050 996960 1075010 92523

S-II/S-IVB 8100 8100
interstage

S-IVB stage 25050 236671 261721 35526

Instrument unit 4482 4482

Launch vehicle at ignition 6,395,647

Spacecraft-LM 4o44 4044
adapter

Lunar module 9915 23568 33483 "33941

Service module 10532 40567 51099 **14076

Command module 12572 12572 **11269
(Landing)

Launch escape 9012 9012
system

* CSM/LM separation
** CM/SM separation

3-17
" TABLE 3-1.- APOLLO 13 WEIGHT SUMMARY (WEIGHT IN POUNDS) - Concluded

Final
Total
Stage/module Inert weight Total weight separation
expendables
weight

Spacecraft at ignition 110,210

Space vehicle at ignition 6505857

S-IC thrust buildup (-)84598

Space vehicle at lift-off 6421259

Space vehicle at orbit insertion 299998

Main propulsion.- Main propulsion is provided by the descent pro-
pulsion system (DPS) and the ascent propulsion system (APS). Each
system is wholly independent of the other. The DPS provides the thrust
to control descent to the lunar surface. The APS can provide the thrust
for ascent from the lunar surface. In case of mission abort, the APS
and/or DPS can place the LM into a rendezvous trajectory with the CSM
from any point in the descent trajectory. The choice of engine to be
used depends on the cause for abort, on how long the descent engine
has been operating, and on the quantity of propellant remaining in the
descent stage. Both propulsion systems use identical hypergolic pro-
pellants. The fuel is a 50-50 mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical-
dimethylhydrazine and the oxidizer is nitrogen tetroxide° Gaseous
helium pressurizes the propellant feed systems. Helium storage in the
DPS is at cryogenic temperatures in the super-critical state and in the
APS it is gaseous at ambient temperatures.

Ullage for propellant settling is required prior to descent engine
start and is provided by the +X axis reaction engines. The descent
engine is gimbaled, throttleable, and restartable. The engine can be
throttled from 1050 pounds of thrust to 6300 pounds. Throttle positions
above this value automatically'produce full thrust to reduce combustion
chamber erosion. Nominal full thrust is 9870 pounds. Gimbal trim of
the engine compensates for a changing center of gravity of the vehicle
and is automatically accomplished by either the primary guidance and
navigation system (PGNS) or the abort guidance system (AGS). Automatic
throttle and on/off control is available in the PGNS mode of operation.

3-18
The AGScommandson/off operation but has no automatic throttle control
capability. Manual control capability of engine firing functions has
been provided. Manual thrust control override may, at any time, com-
mandmore thrust than the level commanded by the LM guidance computer
(LGC).

The ascent engine is a fixed, non-throttleable engine. The engine
develops 3500 pounds of thrust, sufficient to abort the lunar descent
or to launch the ascent stage from the lunar surface and place it in
the desired lunar orbit. Control modes are similar to those described
for the descent engine. The APS propellant is contained in two spheri-
cal titanium tanks, one for oxidizer and the other for fuel. Each tank
has a volume of 36 cubic feet. Total fuel weight is 2008 pounds, of
which 71 pounds are unusable. Oxidizer weight is 3170 pounds, of which
92 pounds are unusable. The APS has a limit of 35 starts, must have a
propellant bulk temperature between 50 ° F and 90 ° F prior to start,
must not exceed 460 seconds of burn time, and has a system life of
24 hours after pressurization.

Electrical power system.- The electrical power system (EPS) con-
tains six batteries which supply the electrical power requirements of
the LM during undocked mission phases. Four batteries are located in
the descent stage and two in the ascent stage. Batteries for the
explosive devices system are not included in this system description.
Postlaunch LM power is supplied by the descent stage batteries until
the LM and CSM are docked. While docked, the CSM supplies electrical
power to the LM up to 296 watts (peak). During the lunar descent phase,
the two ascent stage batteries are paralleled with the descent stage
batteries for additional power assurance. The descent stage batteries
are utilized for LM lunar surface operations and checkout. The ascent
stage batteries are brought on the line just before ascent phase
staging. All batteries and busses may be individually monitored for
load, voltage, and failure. Several isolation and combination modes
are provided.

Two inverters, each capable of supplying full load, convert the
dc to ac for ll5-volt, 400-hertz supply. Electrical power is distributed
by the following busses: LM Pilot's dc bus, Commander's dc bus, and ac
busses A and B.

The four descent stage silver-zinc batteries are identical and have
a 400 ampere-hour capacity at 28 volts. Because the batteries do not
have a constant voltage at various states of charge/load levels, "high"
and "low" voltage taps are provided for selection. The "low voltage"
tap is selected to initiate use of a fully charged battery. Cross-tie
circuits in the busses facilitate an even discharge of the batteries
regardless of distribution combinations. The two silver-zinc ascent
stage batteries are identical to each other and have a 296 ampere-hour

3-19
_apacity at 28 volts. The ascent stage batteries are normally connected
in parallel for even discharge. Because of design load characteristics,
the ascent stage batteries do not have and do not require high and low
voltage taps.

Nominal voltage for ascent stage and descent stage batteries is
30.0 volts. Reverse current relays for battery failure are one of many
componentsdesigned into the EPSto enhance EPSreliability. Cooling
of the batteries is provided by the environmental control system cold
rail heat sinks. Available ascent electrical energy is 17.8 kilowatt
hours at a maximumdrain of 50 ampsper battery and descent energy is
46.9 kilowatt hours at a maximumdrain of 25 ampsper battery.

MISSIONMONITORING,
SUPPORT,
ANDCONTROL

Mission execution involves the following functions: prelaunch
checkout and launch operations; tracking the space vehicle to determine
its present and future positions; securing information on the status of
the flight crew and space vehicle systems (via telemetry); evaluation
of telemetry information; commandingthe space vehicle by transmitting
real-time and updata commandsto the onboard computer; and voice com-
munication between flight and ground crews.

These functions require the use of a facility to assemble and
launch the space vehicle (see Launch Complex), a central flight control
facility, a network of remote stations located strategically around the
world, a method of rapidly transmitting and receiving information
between the space vehicle and the central flight control facility, and
a real-time data display system in which the data are made available
and presented in usable form at essentially the sametime that the data
event occurred.

The flight crew and the following organizations and facilities
participate in mission control operations:

a. Mission Control Center (MCC), MannedSpacecraft Center (MSC),
Houston, Texas. The MCCcontains the communication, computer display,
and commandsystems to enable the flight controllers to effectively
monitor and control the space vehicle.

b. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), CapeKennedy, Florida. The space
vehicle is launched from KSCand controlled from the Launch Control
Center (LCC). Prelaunch, launch, and powered flight data are collected
at the Central Instrumentation Facility (CIF) at KSCfrom the launch
pads, CIF receivers, Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA), and the down-
range Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR)stations. These data are

3-20
transmitted to MCCvia the Apollo Launch Data"System (ALDS). Also
located at KSC(AFETR)is the Impact Predictor (IP), for range safety
purposes.

c. Goddard SpaceFlight Center (GSFC), Greenbelt, Maryland. GSFC
managesand operates the MannedSpace Flight Network (MSFN)and the
NASAcommunications (NASCOM) network. During flight, the MSFNis
under the operational control of the MCC.

d. George C. Marshall SpaceFlight Center (MSFC), Huntsville,
Alabama. MSFC,by meansof the Launch Information ExchangeFacility
(LIEF) and the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC)provides
launch vehicle systems real-time support to KSCand MCCfor preflight,
launch, and flight operations.

A block diagram of the basic flight control interfaces is shown
in figure 3-10.

Vehicle Flight Control Capability
Flight operations are controlled from the MCC. The MCChas two
flight control rooms, but only one control room is used per mission.
Each control room, called a Mission Operations Control Room(MOCR),is
capable of controlling individual Staff Support Rooms(SSR's) located
adjacent to the MOCR. The SSR's are mannedby flight control special-
ists who provide detailed support to the MOCR. Figure 3-11 outlines
the organization of the MCCfor flight control and briefly describes
key responsibilities. Information flow within the MOCRis shownin
figure 3-12.

The consoles within the MOCRand SSR's permit the necessary inter-
face between the flight controllers and the spacecraft. The displays
and controls on these consoles and other group displays provide the
capability to monitor and evaluate data concerning the mission and,
based on these evaluations, to recommendor take appropriate action on
matters concerning the flight crew and spacecraft.
Problems concerning crew safety and mission success are identified
to flight control personnel in the following ways:
a. Flight crew observations

b. Flight controller real-time observations

c. Review of telemetry data received from tape recorder playback
d. Trend analysis of actual and predicted values

3-21
e. Review of collected data by systems specialists

f, Correlation and comparison with previous mission data

g. Analysis of recorded data from launch complex testing

3-22,
LIEF
Goddard Houston Marshall

ALDS

Kennedy AFETR
r-

r=

r_
O0
I
h)
tO

r:

ALDS - Apollo Launch Data System
LIEF - Launch Information Exchange Facility

.m,
Figure 3-i0.- Basic telemetry, command, and communication
interfaces for flight control.
MISSION DIRECTOR )MD) ]

OVERALL
MISSION
CONDUCT OF

I
PUBLIC

MISSION
TO PUBLIC
AFFAIRS

STATUS
I I
RECOVERY AND
MISSIONOD MANAGER
SUPPORT
OTHER
I

DECISIONS/ACTIONS ON SPACE
VEHICLE SYSTE MS/DYNAMICS
I AND FLIGHT
MCC/MSFNDIRECTOR (FD)
OPERATIONS

I
FLIGHT DYNAMICS
MISSION COMMAND SYSTEMS OPERATIONS
GROUP GROUP
AND CONTROL GROUP

FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICER (FDO)
OPERATIONS & PROCEDURES (o&P)I ._BOOSTER SYSTEMS ENGINEERS (BSE_

MONITOR STATUS OF L._ iMONITORS PRE LAUNCH CHECKOUT
MCCIMSFN MISSION CON- I
S.IC, S-II, S-IVB FLIGHT I-_ POWERED FLIGHT EVENTS AND
TROL PROCEDURES; FLIGHT L_
CONTROL SCHE DU LING; MANNING; SYSTEMS / TRAJECTORIES; REENTRY EVENTS

CONTROL FORMAT; DISPLAYS; | I AND TRAJECTORIES

TELETYPE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS | I HUNTSVILLE OPERATIONS I
RETROFIRE OFFICER (RETRO)
NETWORK £ONTROL SUPPORT CENTER (HOSC) I
MAINTAINS UPDATED ABORT
MSFN CONTROL, RADAR AND AND REENTRY PLAN; UPDATES
COMMAND HAN DOVERS IMPACT POINT ESTIMATES
COMPUTE R UPDATE OF

CONSUMABLES DATA;
._ EMU ENGINEERS
SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATOR EVA DECISIONS

MONITORS GUIDANCE
COMMUNICATIONS FUNCTIONS DURING POWERED
WITH SPACECRAFT SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS ENGINEERS FLIGHT AND PREMANEUVER
t GUIDANCE OFFICER (GUIDO)
MONITOR STATUS OF PREPARATION

E LECTRICAL. COMMUNICATION,
INSTRUMENTATION. SEQUENTIAL,
FLIGHT ACTIVITIES (FAD)
LIFE SUPPORT. STABILIZATION
FLIGHT PLAN DETAILED AND CONTROL. PROPULSION. AND
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION
SYS'I_ MS

LIFE SYSTEMS (SURGEON)
SPACE RADIATION MONITORS PHYSIOLOGICAL AND
I SPACE ENVIRONMENT
ENVIRONMENT DATA (SEO) ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS OF
FLIGHT CREW

INF LIGHT EXPERIMENT
I XPERIMENT
IMPLEMENTATIONACTIVITIES MEAD)

I
I I I I
DIRECTOR
SSR
SSR SYSTEMS
SSR
LIFE 1
AND

I SSR
ANALYSIS

SC PLANNING I I VEHICLE
SYSTEMS
SSR II FLIGHT
DYNAMICS
SSR J
I I
PROGRAM
OFFICE
i.=,o,
i
EVALUATION
ROOM
KSCLAUNCH
OPERATIONS

Figure B-ll.- Mission Control Center organization.

3-2)4
MISSION
DI RECTOR

LAUNCH _L EQUIPMENT STATUS M AND 0
STAGE STATUS
VEHICLE SUPERVISOR
STAGES
f,Z)

FLIGHT FLIGHT

I
LU 0
I:C _-w
DYNAMICS
VEHI CLE u")

r'_ V') GROUP
SYSTEMS INFORMATION
I SYSTEMSSTATUS
FLIGHT DIRECTOR NETWORK
II: NETWORK
STATUS CONTROLLER
ASSISTANT
FLIGHT MCC/MSFN
STATUS I SlC DATA
DIRECTOR

MISSION MISSION PROCEDURESTATUS
PROCEDURE
STATUS i SPACECRAFT
COMMUN ICATOR
L FLIGHT
CREW Ji_ rl,

I OFFICER
0 AND P I

Figure 3-12.- Information flc_within the
Mission Operations Control Room.

3-25
PART 2. APOLLO 13 MISSION DESCRIPTION

PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES

The primary mission objectives were as follows:

Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials
in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro Formation.

Deploy and activate an Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package
(m_SEP).

Develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment.

Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites.

Table 3-II lists the Apollo 13 mission sequence of major events and
the time of occurrence in ground elapsed time.

TABLE 3-II. - APOLLO 13 MISSION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Ground elapsed time
Event
(hr:min:sec)

Range zero (02:13:00.0 p.m.e.s.t., April ll) 00:00:00
Earth parking orbit insertion 00:12:40
Second S-IVB ignition 02:35:46
Translunar injection 02:41:47
CSM/S-IVB separation 03:06:39
Spacecraft ejection from S-IVB 04:01:03
S-IVB APS evasive maneuver 04:18:01
S-IVB APS maneuver for lunar impact 05:59:59
Midcourse correction - 2 (hybrid transfer) 30:40:50
Cryogenic oxygen tank anomaly 55:54:53
Midcourse correction - 4 61:29:43
S-IVB lunar impact 77:56:40
Pericynthion plus 2-hour maneuver 79:27:39
Midcourse correction - 5 105:18:32
Midcourse correction - 7 137:39:49
Service module jettison 138:02:06
Lunar module jettison 141:30:02
Entry interface 142:40:47
Landing 142:54:41

3-26
Launch and Earth Parking Orbit

Apollo 1B was successfully launched on schedule from Launch Complex
39A, KennedySpace Center, Florida, at 2:13 p.m.e.s.t., April ll, 1970.
The launch vehicle stages inserted the S-IVB/instrument unit (IU)/
spacecraft combination into an earth parking orbit with an apogeeof
100.2 nautical miles (n. mi. ) and a perigee of 98.0 n. mi. (100-n. mi.
circular planned). During second stage boost, the center engine of the
S-II stage cut off about 132 seconds early, causing the remaining four
engines to burn approximately 3_ seconds longer than predicted. Space
vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 feet per second (fps) lower
than planned. As a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approx-
imately 9 seconds longer than predicted with cutoff velocity within
about 1.2 fps of planned. Total launch vehicle burn time was about
44 seconds longer than predicted. A greater than B-sigma probability of
meeting translunar injection (TLI) cutoff conditions existed with re-
maining S-IVB propellants.

After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems
were verified and preparation was madefor translunar injection (TLI).
Onboardtelevision was initiated at 01:35 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.)
for about 5.5 minutes. The second S-IVBburn was initiated on schedule
for TLI. All major systems operated satisfactorily and all end con-
ditions were nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory.

Translunar Coast

The CSMseparated from the LM/IU/S-IVB at about 03:07 g.e.t. On-
board television was then initiated for about 72 minutes and clearly
showedCSM"hard docking," ejection of the CSM/LMfrom the S-IVB at
about 0_:01 g.e.t., and the S-IVB auxiliary propulsion system (APS)
evasive maneuver as well as spacecraft interior and exterior scenes.
The SMRCSpropellant usage for the separation, transposition, docking,
and ejection was nominal. All launch vehicle safing activities were
performed as scheduled.

The S-IVBAPS evasive maneuverby an 8-secondAPS Ullage burn was
initiated at 04:18 g.e.t, and was successfully completed. The liquid
oxygen dumpwas initiated at 04:39 g.e.t, and was also successfully
accomplished. The first S-IVB APSburn for lunar target point impact
was initiated at 06:00 g.e.t. The burn duration was 217 seconds, pro-
ducing a differential velocity of approximately 28 fps. Tracking infor-
mation available at 08:00 g.e.t, indicated that the S-IVB/IU would impact
at 6°53' S., B0°5B' W. versus the targeted B° S., B0° W. Therefore, the
second S-IVB APS (trim) burn was not required. The gaseous nitrogen pres-
sure dropped in the IU ST-124-MBinertial platform at 18:25 g.e.t, and
the S-IVB/IU no longer had attitude control but began tumbling slowly.

3-27
At approximately 19:17 g.e.t., a step input in tracking data indicated a
velocity increase of approximately 4 to 5 fps. No conclusions have been
reached on the reason for this increase. The velocity change altered
the lunar impact point closer to the target. The S-IVB/IU impacted the
lunar surface at 77:56:40 g.e.t. (08:09:40 p.m.e.s.t. April 14) at
2.4 ° S., 27.9 ° W., and the seismometer deployed during the Apollo 12
mission successfully detected the impact. The targeted impact point was
125 n. mi. from the seismometer. The actual impact point was 74 n. mi.
from the seismometer, well within the desired 189-n. mi. (350-km) radius.

The accuracy of the TLI maneuver was such that spacecraft midcourse
correction No. 1 (MCC-1), scheduled for ll:41 g.e.t., was not required.
MCC-2 was performed as planned at 30:41 g.e.t, and resulted in placing
the spacecraft on the desired, non-free-return circumlunar trajectory
with a predicted closest approach to the moon on 62 n. mi. All SPS burn
parameters were normal. The accuracy of MCC-3 was such that MCC-3,
scheduled for 55:26 g.e.t., was not performed. Good quality television
coverage of the preparations and performance of MCC-2 was received for
49 minutes beginning at 30:13 g.e.t.

At approximately 55:55 g.e.t. (10:08 p.m.e.s.t.), the crew re-
ported an undervoltage alarm on the CSM main bus B. Pressure was rapid-
ly lost in SM oxygen tank no. 2 and fuel cells 1 and 3 current dropped
to zero due to loss of their oxygen supply. A decision was made to
abort the mission. The increased load on fuel cell 2 and decaying pres-
sure in the remaining oxygen tank led to the decision to activate the
LM, power down the CSM, and use the LM systems for life support.

At 61:30 g.e.t., a 38-fps midcourse maneuver (MCC-4) was performed
by the LM DPS to place the spacecraft in a free-return trajectory on
which the CM would nominally land in the Indian Ocean south of Mauritius
at approximately 152:00 g.e.t.

Transearth Coast

At pericynthion plus 2 hours (79:28 g.e.t.), a LM DPS maneuver was
performed to shorten the return trip time and move the earth landing
point. The 263.4-second burn produced a differential velocity of 860.5
fps and resulted in an initial predicted earth landing point in the mid-
Pacific Ocean at 1_2:53 g.e.t. Both LM guidance systems were powered
up and the primary system was used for this maneuver. Following the
maneuver, passive thermal control was established and the LMwas powered
down to conserve consumables; only the LM environmental control system
(ECS) and communications and telemetry systems were kept powered up.

The LMDPS was used to perform MCC-5 at 105:19 g.e.t. The 15-second
burn (at 10-percent throttle) produced a velocity change of about 7.8 fps

3-28
and successfully raised the entry flight path angle to -6.52 ° •

The CSM was partially powered up for a check of the thermal condi-
tions of the CM with first reported receipt of S-band signal at 101:53
g.e.t. Thermal conditions on all CSM systems observed appeared to be in
order for entry.

Due to the unusual spacecraft configuration, new procedures leading
to entry were developed and verified in ground-based simulations. The
resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction (MCC-7) at
entry interface (EI) -5 hours, Jettison of the SM at EI -4.5 hours, then
jettison of the LM at EI -1 hour prior to a normal atmospheric entry by
the CM.

MCC-7 was successfully accomplished at 137:40 g.e.t. The 22.4-second
LM RCS maneuver resulted in a predicted entry flight path angle of -6.49 °.
The SM was jettisoned at 138:02 g.e.t. The crew viewed and photographed
the SM and reported that an entire panel was missing near the S-band high-
gain antenna and a great deal of debris was hanging out. The CM was pow-
ered up and then the LM was Jettisoned at 141:30 g.e.t. The EI at 40,000
feet was reached at 142:41 g.e.t.

Entry and Recovery

Weather in the prime recovery area was as follows: broken stratus
clouds at 2000 feet; visibility l0 miles; 6-knot ENE winds; and wave
height 1 to 2 feet. Drogue and main parachutes deployed normally.
Visual contact with the spacecraft was reported at 142:50 g.e.t. Landing
occurred at 142:54:41 g.e.t. (01:07:41 p.m.e.s.t., April 17). The land-
ing point was in the mid-Pacific Ocean, approximately 21°40 ' S., 165°22 ' W.
The CM landed in the stable 1 position about 3.5 n. mi. from the prime
recovery ship, USS IWO JIMA. The crew, picked up by a recovery heli-
copter, was safe aboard the ship at 1:53 p.m.e.s.t., less than an hour
after landing.

3-29

U 1/- IL L: E. L L E L. ta U n n u L
I

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3-30
CHAPTER 4

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF APOLLO 15 ACCIDENT

4-0
ILl li It"., /_ IL 1: 12 L ' _: I_ L
'_ ,_
_' 13 E IL _ _
L..
PART i. INTRODUCTION

It became clear in the course of the Board's review that the acci-
dent during the Apollo 13 mission was initiated in the service module
cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2. Therefore, the following analysis centers
on that tank and its history. In addition, the recovery steps taken in
the period beginning with the accident and continuing to reentry are
discussed.

Two oxygen tanks essentially identical to oxygen tank no. 2 on
Apollo 13, and two hydrogen tanks of similar design, operated satisfac-
torily on several unmanned Apollo flights and on the Apollo 7, 8, 9, 10,
ll, and 12 manned missions. With this in mind, the Board placed particu-
lar emphasis on each difference in the history of oxygen tank no. 2 from
the history of the earlier tanks, in addition to reviewing the design,
assembly, and test history.

4-1
PART 2. OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 HISTORY

DESIGN

On February 26, 1966, the North American Aviation Corporation, now
North American Rockwell (NR), prime contractor for the Apollo command
and service modules (CSM), awarded a subcontract to the Beech Aircraft
Corporation (Beech) to design, develop, fabricate, assemble, test, and
deliver the Block II Apollo cryogenic gas storage subsystem. This was
a follow-on to an earlier subcontract under which the somewhat different
Block I subsystem was procured.

As the simplified drawing in figure 4-1 indicates, each oxygen tank
has an outer shell and an inner shell, arranged to provide a vacuum
space to reduce heat leak, and a dome enclosing paths into the tank for
transmission of fluids and electrical power and signals. The space be-
tween the shells and the space in the dome are filled with insulating
materials. Mounted in the tank are two tubular assemblies. One, called
the heater tube, contains two thermostatically protected heater coils
and two small fans driven by 1800 rpm motors to stir the tank contents.
The other, called the quantity probe, consists of an upper section which
supports a cylindrical capacitance gage used to measure electrically the
quantity of fluid in the tank. The inner cylinder of this probe serves
both as a fill and drain tube and as one plate of the capacitance gage.
In addition, a temperature sensor is mounted on the outside of the quan-
tity probe near the head. Wiring for the gage, the temperature sensor,
the fan motors, and the heaters passes through the head of the quantity
probe to a conduit in the dome. From there the wiring runs to a con-
necter which ties it electrically to the appropriate external circuits
in the CSM. The routing of wiring and lines from the tank through the
dome is shown in figure 4-2.

As shown in figure 4-2, the fill line from the exterior of the SM
enters the oxygen tank and connects to the inner cylinder of the capaci-
tance gage through a coupling of two Teflon adapters or sleeves and a
short length of Inconel tubing. The dimensions and tolerances selected
are such that if "worst case" variations in an actual system were to
occur, the coupling might not reach from the fill line to the gage cylin-
der (fig. 4-3). Thus, the variations might be such that a very loose
fit would result.

The supply line from the tank leads from the head of the quantity
probe to the dome and thence, after passing around the tank between the
inner and outer shells, exits through the dome to supply oxygen to the
fuel cells in the service module (SM) and the environmental control
system (ECS) in the command module (CM). The supply line also connects

4-2
• °

Closeout cap
Blowout disc

Fan

Supply motor
Temperature
line
sensor

"hermostat

Heater

To fuel
Insulation

ceil/ECS'_
Capacitance
gage

Fan
motor

Pressure
Pressure switch
transducer
Closeout cap
Relief
valve
Overboard

Figure &-l.- Oxygen tank no. 2 internal components.

tl !1 L .... ._ __ __
Fill tube conduit

Electrical
wiring

Oxygen
vent tube
Supply

Filter

O0
O0
fan 1

Temperature sensor _ /i

Quantity probe

Figure 4-2.- Oxygen tank wiring and lines.

4-4
Fill
Fill
\
tube
tube

I

r \
Adverse
tolerance case \ I I
Nominal
tolerance case
\

• Dimension a
\r I

I
depends on
e value of e

Part Max Nom Min
dim dim dim

a :_ 0.28 0.24 0.16

b 1.095!1.0801.065
Probe
c 0.26 0.20 0.14

d 1.45 1.43 1.41

e 18 ° 21 ° 24 °

Figure 4-3.- Nominal and adverse tolerance cases.
r-:

I"
to a relief valve. Under normal conditions, pressure in the tank is
measured by a pressure gage in the supply line and a pressure switch
near this gage is provided to turn on the heaters in the oxygen tank if
the pressure drops below a preselected value. This periodic addition of
heat to the tank maintains the pressure at a sufficient level to satisfy
the demand for oxygen as tank quantity decreases during a flight mission.

The oxygen tank is designed for a capacity of 320 pounds of super-
critical oxygen at pressures ranging between 865 to 935 pounds per
square inch absolute (psia). The tank is initially filled with liquid
oxygen at -297 ° F and operates over the range from -340 ° F to +80 ° F.
The term "supercritical" means that the oxygen is maintained at a temper-
ature and pressure which assures that it is a homogeneous, single-phase
fluid.

The burst pressure of the oxygen tank is about 2200 psi at -150 ° F,
over twice the normal operating pressure at that temperature. The relief
valve is designed to relieve pressure in the oxygen tank overboard at a
pressure of approximately i000 psi. The oxygen tank dome is open to the
vacuum between the inner and outer tank shell and contains a rupture
disc designed to blow out at about 75 psi.

The approximate amounts of principal materials within the oxygen
tank are set forth in table 4-1.

TABLE 4-1.- MATERIALS WITHIN OXYGEN TANK

Approximate Available
Mat eri al quantity, lb energy, Btu

Teflon-wire insulation 1.1 2,400
sleeving and solid

Aluminum (all forms ) 0.8 20,500

Stainless steel 2.4 15,000

Inconel alloys 1.7 2,900

Two oxygen tanks are mounted on a shelf in bay 4 of the SM, as
shown in figure 4-4. Figures 4-5 through 4-8 are photographs of portions

4-6

• _
:uel
cell
2

Fuel Fuel
cell cell
3 1

f

_Fuel cell

I

-Oxygen
Oxygen Il tank 1

tank 2"-_ - Oxygen valve
Oxygen subsystem module
shelf module
Oxygen servicing
panel

.Hydrogen
1

/drogen subs
_.she If module

tank 2

Fisure_-4. - Arrangement of fuel cells and cryogenic systems in bay h.

4-7

I1 N E :" E :I2 L L K I:: _". I: g. 1i _ t: iz L ± ,__
This page left blank intentionally.

_-8

ILl ILl 13 L L ld 12 k L _ '_ '_ "
/_.S _..... ., _._<.c

/ F t J -_

Figure 4=5.= Fuel cells shelf.

4-9
.,¢- _* _<-C - L -_C,2 / L, '

Figure 4-6.- Oxygen tank shelf.

Preceding
pageblank
4-11

L k E '_ k 'L. '
_ L" L" L_ /Li _ K L
FigureX_=_XX Hydrogen tank shelf.

Preceding
pageblank
4-13

ILl li E " L: E L L
. i_ E l.: : '
F

4_8° --

Figure _X_ Inside view of panel covering bay 4.

Preceding
pageblank
4-15
of the Apollo 13 service module (SM109) at the North American Rockwell
plant prior to shipment to KSC. Figure 4-5 showsthe fuel cell shelf,
with fuel cell 1 on the right, fuel cell 3 on the left, and fuel cell 2
behind cells 1 and 3. The top of oxygen tank no. 2 can be seen at the
lower left. Figure 4-6 showsthe oxygen tank shelf, with oxygen tank
no. 2 at left center. Figure h-7 shows the hydrogen tank shelf with
hydrogen tank no. 1 on top and hydrogen tank no. 2 below. The bottom
of the oxygen shelf shows someof the oxygen system instrumentation and
wiring, largely covered by insulation. Figure h-8 is a photograph of
the bay 4 panel, which was missing from the service module after the
accident.

A more detailed description of the oxygen tank design is contained
in Appendix D to this report.

MANUFACTURE

The manufacture of oxygen tank no. 2 began in 1966. Under subcon-
tracts with Beech, the inner shell of the tank was manufactured by the
Airite Products Division of Electrada Corporation; the quantity probe
was madeby SimmondsPrecision Products, Inc. ; and the fans and fan
motors were produced by Globe Industries, Inc.

The Beech serial number assigned to the oxygen tank no. 2 flown
in the Apollo 13 was 10024XTA0008. It was the eighth Block II oxygen
tank built. Twenty-eight Block I oxygen tanks had previously been built
by Beech.

The design of the oxygen tank is such that once the upper and lower
halves of the inner and outer shells are assembledand welded, the
heater assembly must be inserted in the tank, movedto one side, and
bolted in place. Then the quantity probe is inserted into the tank and
the heater assembly wires (to the heaters, the thermostats, and the fan
motors) must be pulled through the head of the quantity probe and the
32-inch coiled conduit in the dome. Thus, the design requires during
assembly a substantial amount of wire movementinside the tank, where
movementcannot be readily observed, and where possible damageto wire
insulation by scraping or flexing cannot be easily detected before the
tank is capped off and welded closed.

Several minor manufacturing flaws were discovered in oxygen tank
no. 2 in the course of testing. A porosity in a weld on the lower half
of the outer shell necessitated grinding and rewelding. Rewelding was
also required when it was determined that incorrect welding wire had
been inadvertently used for a small weld on a vacuumpumpmounted on

Preceding
pageblank
4-17
the outside of the tank dome. The upper fan motor originally installed
_as noisy and drew excessive current. The tank was disassembled and the
heater assembly, fans, and heaters were replaced with a new assembly
and new fans. The tank was then assembled and sealed for the second
time, and the space between the inner and outer shells was pumpeddown
over a 28-day period to create the necessary vacuum.

TANK TESTS AT BEECH

Acceptance testing of oxygen tank no. 2 at Beech included extensive
dielectric, insulation, and functional tests of heaters, fans, and vac-
ion pumps. The tank was then leak tested at 500 psi and proof tested
at 1335 psi with helium.

After the helium proof test, the tank was filled with liquid oxygen
and pressurized to a proof pressure of 1335 psi by use of the tank
heaters powered by 65 V ac. Extensive heat-leak tests were run at
R00 psi for 25 to 30 hours over a range of ambient conditions and out-
flow rates. At the conclusion of the heat-leak tests, about 100 pounds
of oxygen remained in the tank. About three-fourths of this was released
by venting the tank at a controlled rate through the supply line to
about 20 psi. The tank was then emptied by applying warm gas at about
30 psi to the vent line to force the liquid oxygen (LOX) in the tank out
the fill line (see fig. h-2). No difficulties were recorded in this
det anking operation.

The acceptance test indicated that the rate of heat leak into the
taukwas higher than permitted by the specifications. After some re-
working, the rate improved, but was still somewhat higher than specified.
The tank was accepted with a formal waiver of this condition. Several
other minor discrepancies were also accepted. These included oversized
holes in the support for the electrical plug in the tank dome, and an
oversized rivet hole in the heater assembly Just above the lower fan.
None of these items were serious, and the tank was accepted, filled with
helium at 5 psi, and shipped to NR on May 3, 1967.

ASSEMBLY AND TEST AT NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL

The assembly of oxygen shelf serial number 0632AAG3277, with Beech
oxygen tank serial number 10024XTA0009 as oxygen tank no. 1 and serial
number 1002_XTA0008 as oxygen tank no. 2, was completed on March ll, 1968.
The shelf was to be installed in SM 106 for flight in the Apollo l0
mission.

4-18
Beginning on April 27, the assembled oxygen shelf underwent stand-
ard proof-pressure, leak, and functional checks. One valve on the shelf
leaked and was repaired, but no anomalies were noted with regard to
oxygen tank no. 2, and therefore no rework of oxygen tauk no. 2 was
required. None of the oxygen tank testing at NR requires use of L0X
in the tanks.

On June _, 1968, the shelf was installed in SM 106.

Between August 3 and August 8, 1968, testing of the shelf in the
SM was conducted. No anomalies were noted.

Due to electromagnetic interference problems with the vac-ion
pumps on cryogenic tank domes in earlier Apollo spacecraft, a modifica-
tion was introduced and a decision was made to replace the complete
oxygen shelf in SM 106. An oxygen shelf with approved modifications was
prepared for installation in SM 106. On October 21, 1968, the oxygen
shelf was removed from SM 106 for the required modification and instal-
lation in a later spacecraft.

The oxygen shelf was removed in the manner shown in figure 4-9.
After various lines and wires were disconnected and bolts which hold
the shelf in the SM were removed, a fixture suspended from a crane was
placed under the shelf and used to lift the shelf and extract it from
bay h. One shelf bolt was mistakenly left in place during the initial
attempt to remove the shelf; and as a consequence, after the front of
the shelf was raised about 2 inches, the fixture broke, allowing the
shelf to drop back into place. Photographs of the underside of the
fuel cell shelf in SM 106 indicate that the closeout cap on the dome
of oxygen tank no. 2 may have struck the underside of that shelf during
this incident. At the time, however, it was believed that the oxygen
shelf had simply dropped back into place and an analysis was performed
to calculate the forces resulting from a drop of 2 inches. It now
seems likely that the shelf was first accelerated upward and then
dropped.

The remaining bolt was then removed, the incident recorded, and
the oxygen shelf was removed_ithout further difficulty. Following
removal, the oxygen shelf was retested to check shelf integrity, in-
cluding proof-pressure tests, leak tests, and functional tests of
pressure transducers and switches, thermal switches, and vac-ion pumps.
No cryogenic testing was conducted. Visual inspection revealed no
problem. These tests would have disclosed external leakage or serious
internal malfunctions of most types, but would not disclose fill line
leakage within oxygen tank no. 2. Further calculations and tests con-
ducted during this investigation, however, have indicated that the
forces experienced by the shelf were probably close to those originally

4-19
hoist

--- Fuel cell shelf

E

A

Sling
r-

|
ro
o

r_

Sling adapter _"

stment of ballance weights

Figure 4-9.- Hoist and sling arrangement - oxygen shelf.
calculated assuming a 2-inch drop only. The probability of tank damage
from this incident, therefore, is now considered to be rather low,
although it is possible that a loosely fitting fill tube could have
been displaced by the event.

The shelf passed these tests and was installed in SM 109 on
November 22, 1968. The shelf tests accomplished earlier in SM 106
were repeated in SM 109 in late December and early January, with no
significant problems, and SM 109 was shipped to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) in June of 1969 for further testing, assembly on the launch
vehicle, and launch.

TESTING AT KSC

At the Kennedy Space Center the CM and the SM were mated, checked,
assembled on the Saturn V launch vehicle, and the total vehicle was
moved to the launch pad.

The countdown demonstration test (CDDT) began on March 16, 1970.
Up to this point, nothing unusual about oxygen tank no. 2 had been
noted during the extensive testing at KSC. The oxygen tanks were
evacuated to 5mmHg followed by an oxygen pressure of about 80 psi.
After the cooling of the fuel cells, cryogenic oxygen loading and tank
pressurization to 331 psi were completed without abnormalities. At the
time during CDDT when the oxygen tanks are normally partially emptied
to about 50 percent of capacity, oxygen tank no. 1 behaved normally,
but oxygen tank no. 2 only went down to 92 percent of its capacity.
The normal procedure during CDDT to reduce the quantity in the tank is
to apply gaseous oxygen at 80 psi through the vent line and to open
the fill line. When this procedure failed, it was decided to proceed
with the CDDT until completion and then look at the oxygen detanking
problem in detail. An Interim Discrepancy Report was written and
transferred to a Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Discrepancy Report,
since a GSE filter was suspected.

On Friday, March 27, 1970, detanking operations were resumed, after
discussions of the problem had been held with KSC, MSC, NR, and Beech
personnel participating, either personally or by telephone. As a first
step, oxygen tank no. 2, which had self-pressurized to 178 psi and was
about 83 percent full, was vented through its fill line. The quantity
decreased to 65 percent. Further discussions between KSC, MSC, NR,
and Beech personnel considered thatthe problem might be due to a leak
in the path between the fill line and the quantity probe due to loose
fit in the sleeves and tube. Referring to figure _-2, it will be noted
that such a leak would allow the gaseous oxygen (G0X) being supplied
to the vent line to leak directly to the fill line without forcing any

4-21
significant amount of LOXout of the tank. At this point, a discrep-
ancy report against the spacecraft system was written.

A "normal" detanking procedure was then conducted on both oxygen
tanks, pressurizing through the vent line and opening the fill lines.
Tank no. 1 emptied in a few minutes. Tank no. 2 did not. Additional
attempts were madewith higher pressures without effect, and a decision
was madeto try to "boil off" the remaining oxygen in tank no. 2 by
use of the tank heaters. The heaters were energized with the 65 V tic.
GSEpower supply, and, about l-l/2 hours later, the fans were turned
on to add more heat and mixing. After 6 hours of heater operation,
the quantity had only decreased to 35 percent, and it was decided to
attempt a pressure cycling technique. With the heaters and fans still
energized, the tank was pressurized to about 300 psi, held for a few
minutes, and then vented through the fill line. The first cycle
produced a 7-percent quantity decrease, and the process was continued,
with the tank emptied after five pressure/vent cycles. The fans and
heaters were turned off after about 8 hours of heater operation.

Suspecting the loosely fitting fill line connection to the quantity
probe inner cylinder, KSCpersonnel consulted with cognizant personnel
at MSCand at NRand decided to test whether the oxygen tank no. 2
could be filled without problems. It was decided that if the tank could
be filled, the leak in the fill line would not be a problem in flight,
since it was felt that even a loose tube resulting in an electrical
short between the capacitance plates of the quantity gage would result
in an energy level too low to cause any other damage.

Replacement of the oxygen shelf in the CMwould have been difficult
and would have taken at least 45 hours. In addition, shelf replacement
would have had the potential of damaging or degrading other elements of
the SMin the course of replacement activity. Therefore, the decision
was madeto test the ability to fill oxygen tank no. 2 on March 30,
1970, twelve days prior to the scheduled Saturday, April ll, launch,
so as to be in a position to decide on shelf replacement well before
the launch date.

Accordingly, flow tests with G0Xwere run on oxygen tank no. 2
and on oxygen tank no. 1 for comparison. No problems were encountered,
and the flow rates in the two tanks were similar. In addition, Beech
was asked to test the electrical energy level reached in the event of
a short circuit between plates of the quantity probe capacitance gage.
This test showedthat very low energy levels would result. On the
filling test, oxygen tanks no. 1 and no. 2 were filled with LOXto
about 20 percent of capacity on March 30 with no difficulty. Tank no. 1
emptied in the normal manner, but emptying oxygen tank no. 2 again
required pressure cycling with the heaters turned on.

4-22
As the launch date approached, the oxygen tank no. 2 detanking
problem was considered by the Apollo organization. At this point,
the "shelf drop" incident on October 21, 1968, at NRwas not considered
and it was felt that the apparently normal detanking which had occurred
in 1967 at Beechwas not pertinent because it was believed that a
different procedure was used by Beech. In fact, however, the last
portion of the procedure was quite similar, although a slightly lower
G0Xpressure was utilized.

Throughout these considerations, which involved technical and
managementpersonnel of KSC,MSC,NR, Beech, and NASAHeadquarters,
emphasiswas directed toward the possibility and consequencesof a loose
fill tube; very little attention was paid to the extended operation of
heaters and fans except to note that they apparently operated during
and after the detanking sequences.

Many of the principals in the discussions were not aware of the
extended heater operations. Those that did know the details of the
procedure did not consider the possibility of damagedue to excessive
heat within the tank, and therefore did not advise managementofficials
of any possible consequencesof the unusually long heater operations.

As noted earlier in this chapter, and shownin figure 4-2, each
heater is protected with a thermostatic switch, mounted on the heater
tube, which is intended to open the heater circuit when it senses a
temperature of 80° F. In tests conducted at MSCsince the accident,
however, it was found that the switches failed to open when the
heaters were powered from a 65 V dc supply similar to the power used
at KSCduring the detanking sequence. Subsequentinvestigations have
shown that the thermostatic switches used, while rated as satisfactory
for the 28 V dc spacecraft power supply, could not open properly at
65 V tic. Qualification and test procedures for the heater assemblies
and switches do not at any time test the capability of the switches
to open while under full current conditions. A review of the voltage
recordings made during the detanking at KSCindicates that, in fact,
the switches did not open when the temperature indication from within
the tank rose past 80° F. Further tests have shown that the tempera-
tures on the heater tube may have reached as much as 1000° F during
the detanking. This temperature will cause serious damageto adjacent
Teflon insulation, and such damagealmost certainly occurred.

None of the above, however, Wasknown at the time and, after
extensive consideration was given to all possibilities of damagefrom
a loose fill tube, it was decided to leave the oxygen shelf and oxygen
tank no. 2 in the SMand to proceed with preparations for the launch
of Apollo 13.

4-23
.. The manufacture and test history of oxygen tank no. 2 is discussed
in more detail in Appendix C to this report.

4-24
PART 3. THE APOLLO 13 FLIGHT

The Apollo 13 mission was designed to perform the third manned
lunar landing. The selected site was in the hilly uplands of the Fra
Mauro formation. A package of five scientific experiments was planned
for emplacement on the lunar surface near the lunar module (LM) landing
point: (1) a lunar passive seismometer to measure and relay meteoroid
impact and moonquakes and to serve as the second point in a seismic net
begun with the Apollo 12 seismometer; (2) a heat flow device for measur-
ing the heat flux from the lunar interior to the surface and surface
material conductivity to a depth of 3 meters; (3) a charged-particle
lunar environment experiment for measuring solar wind proton and electron
effects on the lunar environment; (4) a cold cathode gage for measuring
density and temperature variations in the lunar atmosphere; and (5) a
dust detector experiment.

Additionally, the Apollo 13 landing crew was to gather the third
set of selenological samples of the lunar surface for return to earth
for extensive scientific analysis. Candidate future landing sites were
scheduled to be photographed from lunar orbit with a high-resolution
topographic camera carried aboard the command module.

During the week prior to launch, backup Lunar Module Pilot Charles
M. Duke, Jr., contracted rubella. Blood tests were performed to deter-
mine prime crew immunity, since Duke had been in close contact with the
prime crew. These tests determined that prime Commander James A. Lovell
and prime Lunar Module Pilot Fred Haise were immune to rubella, but that
prime Command Module Pilot Thomas K. Mattingly III did not have immunity.
Consequently, following 2 days of intensive simulator training at the
Kennedy Space Center, backup Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr.,
was substituted in the prime crew to replace Mattingly. Swigert had
trained for several months with the backup crew, and this additional
work in the simulators was aimed toward integrating him into the prime
crew so that the new combination of crewmen could function as a team
during the mission.

Launch was on time at 2:13 p.m., e.s.t., on April ll, 1970, from the
KSC Launch Complex 39A. The spacecraft was inserted into a lO0-nautical-
mile circular earth orbit. The only significant launch phase anomaly was
premature shutdown of the center engine of the S-II second stage. As a
result, the remaining four S-II engines burned 34 seconds longer than
planned and the S-IVB third stage burned a few seconds longer than plan-
ned. At orbital insertion, the velocity was within 1.2 feet per second
of the planned velocity. Moreover, an adequate propellant margin was
maintained in the S-IVB for the translunar injection burn.

4-25
Orbital insertion was at 00:12:39 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.).
The initial one and one-half earth orbits before translunar injection
(TLI) were spent in spacecraft systems checkout and included television
transmissions as Apollo 13 passed over the Merritt Island Launch Area,
Florida, tracking station.

The S-IVB restarted at 02:35:46 g.e.t, for the translunar injection
burn, with shutdown coming some5 minutes 51 seconds later. Accuracy of
the Saturn V instrument unit guidance for the TLI burn was such that a
planned midcourse correction maneuverat 11:41:23 g.e.t, was not neces-
sary. After TLI, Apollo 13 was calculated to be on a free-return trajec-
tory with a predicted closest approach to the lunar surface of 210
nautical miles.

The CSMwas separated from the S-IVB about 3 hours after launch,
and after a brief period of stationkeeping, the crew maneuveredthe CSM
to dock with the LMvehicle in the LM adapter atop the S-IVB stage. The
S-IVB stage was separated from the docked CSMand LM shortly after 4
hours into the mission.

In mannedlunar missions prior to Apollo 13, the spent S-IVB third
stages were accelerated into solar orbit by a "slingshot" maneuver in
which residual liquid oxygen was dumpedthrough the J-2 engine to pro-
vide propulsive energy. On Apollo 13, the plan was to impact the S-IVB
stage on the lunar surface in proximity to the seismometer emplaced in
the Oceanof Storms by the crew of Apollo 12.

Two hours after TLI, the S-IVB attitude thrusters were ground com-
mandedon to adjust the stage's trajectory toward the designated impact
at latitude 3° S. by longitude 30° W. Actual impact was at latitude
2.4 ° S. by longitude 27.9° W.--74 nautical miles from the Apollo 12
seismometer and well within the desired range. Impact was at 77:56:40
g.e.t. Seismic signals relayed by the Apollo 12 seismometer as the
30,700-pound stage hit the Moonlasted almost 4 hours and provided lunar
scientists with additional data on the structure of the Moon.

As in previous lunar missions, the Apollo 13 spacecraft was set up
in the passive thermal control (PTC) modewhich calls for a continuous
roll rate of three longitudinal axis revolutions each hour. During crew
rest periods and at other times in translunar and transearth coast when
a stable attitude is not required, the spacecraft is placed in PTCto
stabilize the thermal response by spacecraft structures and systems.

At 30:40:49 g.e.t., a midcourse correction maneuverwas madeusing
the service module propulsion system. The crew preparations for the
burn and the burn itself were monitored by the Mission Control Center
(MMC)at MSCby telemetered data and by television from the spacecraft.
This midcourse correction maneuverwas a 23.2 feet per second hybrid

4-26
transfer burn which took Apollo 13 off a free-return trajectory and
placed it on a non-free-return trajectory. A similar trajectory had been
flown on Apollo 12. The objective of leaving a free-return trajectory
is to control the arrival time at the Moonto insure the proper lighting
conditions at the landing site. Apollo 8, 10, and ll flew a pure free-
return trajectory until lunar orbit insertion. The Apollo 13 hybrid
transfer maneuverlowered the predicted closest approach, or pericyn-
thion, altitude at the Moonfrom 210 to 64 nautical miles.

From launch through the first 46 hours of the mission, the perform-
ance of oxygen tank no. 2 was normal, so far as telemetered data and
crew observations indicate. At 46:40:02, the crew turned on the fans in
oxygen tank no. 2 as a routine operation. Within 3 seconds, the oxygen
tank no. 2 quantity indication changed from a normal reading of about
82 percent full to an obviously incorrect reading "off-scale high," of
over 100 percent. Analysis of the electrical wiring of the quantity gage
shows that this erroneous reading could be caused by either a short cir-
cuit or an open circuit in the gage wiring or a short circuit between
the gage plates. Subsequentevents indicated that a short was the more
likely failure mode.

At 47:54:50 and at 51:07:44, the oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned
on again, with no apparent adverse effects. The quantity gage continued
to read off-scale high.

Following a rest period, the Apollo 13 crew began preparations for
activating and powering up the LM for checkout. At 53:27 g.e.t., the
Commander (CMR)and Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) were cleared to enter the
LM to commenceinflight inspection of the LM. Groundtests before launch
had indicated the possibility of a high heat-leak rate in the LM descent
stage supercritical helium tank. Crew verification of actual pressures
found the helium pressure to be within normal limits. Supercritical
helium is stored in the LM for pressurizing propellant tanks.

The LMwas powered down and preparations were underway to close the
LMhatch and run through the presleep checklist when the accident in
oxygen tank no. 2 occurred.

At 55:52:30 g.e.t., a master alarm on the CMcaution and warning
system alerted the crew to a low pressure indication in the cryogenic
hydrogen tank no. 1. This tank had reached the low end of its normal
operating pressure range several times previously during the flight.
At 55:52:58, flight controllers in the MCCrequested the crew to turn
on the cryogenic system fans and heaters.

The Command Module Pilot (CMP)acknowledgedthe fan cycle request
at 55:53:06 g.e.t., and data indicate that current was applied to the
oxygen tank no. 2 fan motors at 55:53:20.

4-27

ILl ]LJ:- L E L: L L: L. L: u n n z L L L
About l-l/2 minutes later, at 55:54:53.555, telemetry from the
spacecraft was lost almost totally for 1.8 seconds. During the period
of data loss, the caution and warning system alerted the crew to a low
voltage condition on dc main bus B. At about the same time, the crew
heard a loud "bang" and realized that a problem existed in the
spacecraft.

The events between fan turnon at 55:53:20 and the time when the
problem was evident to the crew and Mission Control are covered in some
detail in Part 4 of this chapter, "Summary Analysis of the Accident."
It is now clear that oxygen tank no. 2 or its associated tubing lost
pressure integrity because of combustion within the tank, and that ef-
fects of oxygen escaping from the tank caused the removal of the panel
covering bay 4 and a relatively slow leak in oxygen tank no. i or its
lines or valves. Photos of the SM taken by the crew later in the mis-
sion show the panel missing, the fuel cells on the shelf above the
oxygen shelf tilted, and the high-gain antenna damaged.

The resultant loss of oxygen made the fuel cells inoperative, leav-
ing the CM with batteries normally used only during reentry as the sole
power source and with only that oxygen contained in a surge tank and
repressurization packages (used to repressurize the CM after cabin vent-
ing). The LM, therefore, became the only source of sufficient electri-
cal power and oxygen to permit safe return of the crew to Earth.

The various telemetered parameters of primary interest are shown
in figure 4-10 and listed in table 4-11.

4-28
e',:_',', !_'_ _l::t_4 _.

--_- t+-

d
o
¥ 0

0.)
+m_. i

b
I1)

O)

O)

:.i:ili:_2
I
c;
::=: :4: ,-4
!
.-=t

_0
oH

_,_
,_td:,!

N N
............... ,_ _E;_ _,_
o o_

I I I 1 I

_. =. _. =

Im,l Ji1_ I_ I III,I roll I" "_J I_I_ _rl:l

4-29
0_-_

Htiium la_ lJmi*r_url
AC_s I and 2v_ta_
Bay3 mWItzlr tank surfacm Ox_m rank I and 2 qulntlty, ten_afllt ure and pressure
Dc i_s A ancl II v_t_
t_ure
TABLE 4-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT

Time_ 6.e.t. Event

Events During 52 Seconds Prior to First Observed Abnormality

55:52:31 Master caution and warning triggered by low hydrogen
pressure in tank no. 1. Alarm is turned off after
4 seconds.

55:52:58 Ground requests tank stir.

55:53:06 Crew acknowledges tank stir.

55:53:18 Oxygen tank no. 1 fans on.

55:53:19 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure decreases 8 psi.

55:53:20 Oxygen tank no. 2 fans turned on.

55:53:20 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance
indicates a power transient.

55:53:21 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure decreases 4 psi.

Abnormal Events During 90 Seconds Preceding the Accident

55:53:22.718 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance
indicates a power transient.

55:53:22.757 1.2-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage.

55:53:22.772 ll.l-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one
sample.

55 :53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins rise lasting
for 24 seconds.

55:53:38.057 ll-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage for one
sample.

55:53:38.085 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance
indicates a power transient.

4-31
TABLE4-11.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGY
FROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT
- Continued

Time, g.e.t. Event

55:53:41.172 22.9-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one sample.

55:53:41.192 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance
indicates a power transient.

55:54:00 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise ends at a pressure
of 953.8 psia.

55:54:15 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise.

55:54:30 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity drops from full scale
for 2 seconds and then reads 75.3 percent.

55:54:31 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins to rise
rapidly.

55:54:43 Flow rate of oxygen to all three fuel cells begins
to decrease.

55:54:45 0xygen. tank no. 2 pressure reaches maximum value
of 1008.3 psia.

55:54:48 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature rises 40 ° F for one
sample (invalid reading).

55:54:51 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity Jumps to off-scale high
and then begins to drop until the time of telemetry
loss, indicating failed sensor.

55:54:52 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads -151.3 ° F.

55:54:52.7O3 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature suddenly goes off-
scale low, indicating failed sensor.

55:54:52.763 Last telemetered pressure from oxygen tank no. 2
before telemetry loss is 995.7 psia.

55:54:53.182 Sudden accelerometer activity on X, Y, and Z axes.

55:5_:53.220 Stabilization control system body rate changes
begin.

4-52
TABLE 4-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Continued

Time, _. e. t. Event

55:54:53.323 Oxygen tank no. i pressure drops h.2 psi.

55:54:53.5 2.8-amp rise in total fuel cell current.

55:54:53.542 X, Y, and Z accelerations in CM indicate 1.17g,
0.65g and 0.65g, respectively.

1.8-Second Data Loss

55:54:53.555 Loss of telemetry begins.

55:54:53.555+ Master caution and warning triggered by dc main
bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 6
seconds. All indications are that the cryogenic
oxygen tank no. 2 lost pressure in this time period
and the panel separated.

55:54:54.741 Nitrogen pressure in fuel cell 1 is off-scale low
indicating failed sensor.

55:54:55.35 Recovery of telemetry data.

Events During 5 Minutes Following the Accident

55:54:56 Service propulsion system engine valve body tempera-
ture begins a rise of 1.65 ° F in 7 seconds.

55:54:56 Dc main bus A decreases 0.9 volt to 28.5 volts and
dc main bus B decreases 0.9 volt to 29.0 volts.

55:5h:56 Total fuel cell current is 15 amps higher than the
final value before telemetry loss. High current
continues for 19 seconds.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads off-scale high
after telemetry recovery, probably indicating failed
s ens ors.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads off-scale low fol-
lowing telemetry recovery, indicating a broken supply
line, a tank pressure below 19 psi, or a failed sensor.

4-33
. TABLE4-II.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGY
FROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT
- Continued

Time s g.e.t. Event

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. I pressure reads 781.9 psia and
begins to drop steadily.

55:54:57 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity reads off-scale high
following telemetry recovery indicating failed sensor.

55:54:59 The reaction control system helium tank C temperature
begins a 1.66 ° F increase in 36 seconds.

55:55:01 Oxygen flow rates to fuel cells i and 3 approached
zero after decreasing for 7 seconds.

55:55:02 The surface temperature of the service module oxi-
dizer tank in bay 3 begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a
15-second period.

55:55:02 The service propulsion system helium tank temperature
begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a 32-second period.

55:55:09 Dc main bus A voltage recovers to 29.0 volts; dc
main bus B recovers to 28.8 volts.

55:55:20 Crew reports, "I believe we've had a problem here."

55:55:35 Crew reports, "We've had a main B bus undervolt."

55:55:29 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins steady drop
lasting 59 seconds, probably indicating failed sensor.

55:56:10 Crew reports, "Okay right now, Houston. The voltage
is looking good, and we had a pretty large bang
associated with the caution and warning there. And
as I recall, main B was the one that had had an amp
spike on it once before."

55:56:38 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity becomes erratic for 69
seconds before assuming an off-scale-low state,
indicating failed sensor.

4-34
TABLE 4-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Concluded

Time, g. e. t. Event

55:57:04 Crew reports, "That jolt must have rocked the
sensor on--see now--oxygen quantity 2. It was
oscillating down around 20 to 60 percent. Now
it's full-scale high again."

55:57:39 Master caution and warning triggered by dc main
bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in
6 seconds.

55:57:40 Dc main bus B drops below 26.25 volts and continues
to fall rapidly.

55:57:44 Ac bus 2 fails within 2 seconds

55:57:45 Fuel cell 3 fails.

55:57:59 Fuel cell 1 current begins to decrease.
/

55:58:02 Master caution and warning caused by ac bus 2
being reset. Alarm is turned off after 2 seconds.

55:58:06 Master caution and warning triggered by dc main
bus A undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 13
seconds.

55:58:07 Dc main bus A drops below 26.25 volts and in the
next few seconds levels off at 25.5 volts.

55:58:07 Crew reports, "ac 2 is showing zip."

55:58:25 Crew reports, "Yes, we got a main bus A undervolt
now, too, showing. It's reading about 25-1/2.
Main B is reading zip right now."

56:00:06
Master caution and warning triggered by high hydrogen
flow rate to fuel cell 2. Alarm is turned off in
2 seconds.

4-35

1/ N E '" L L L '
PART 4. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

Combustion in oxygen tank no. 2 led to failure of that tank, damage
to oxygen tank no. i or its lines or valves adjacent to tank no. 2,
removal of the bay 4 panel and, through the resultant loss of all three
fuel cells, to the decision to abort the Apollo 13 mission. In the
attempt to determine the cause of ignition in oxygen tank no. 2, the
course of propagation of the combustion, the mode of tank failure, and
the way in which subsequent damage occurred, the Board has carefully
sifted through all available evidence and examined the results of spe-
cial tests and analyses conducted by the Apollo organization and by or
for the Board after the accident. (For more information on details of
mission events, design, manufacture and test of the system, and special
tests and analyses conducted in this investigation, refer to Appendices
B, C, D, E, and F of this report.)

Although tests and analyses are continuing, sufficient information
is now available to provide a reasonably clear picture of the nature of
the accident and the events which led up to it. It is now apparent that
the extended heater operation at KSC damaged the insulation on wiring
in the tank and thus made the wiring susceptible to the electrical short
circuit which probably initiated combustion within the tank. While the
exact point of initiation of combustion may never be known with cer-
tainty, the nature of the occurrence is sufficiently understood to per-
mit taking corrective steps to prevent its recurrence.

The Board has identified the most probable failure mode.

The following discussion treats the accident in its key phases:
initiation, propagation of combustion, loss of oxygen tank no. 2 system
integrity, and loss of oxygen tank no. i system integrity.

INITIATION

Key Data

55:53:20* Oxygen tank no. 2 fans turned on.

55:53:22.757 1.2-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage.

*In evaluating telemetry data, consideration must be given to the
fact that the Apollo pulse code modulation (PCM) system samples data in
time and quantitizes in amplitude. For further information, reference
may be made to Part B7 of Appendix B.

4-56
55:53:22.772 ll.l-ampere "spike" recorded in fuel cell 3 current
followed by drop in current and rise in voltage typ-
ical of removal of power from one fan motor--indicat-
ing opening of motor circuit.

55:53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise.

The evidence points strongly to an electrical short circuit with
arcing as the initiating event. About 2.7 seconds after the fans were
turned on in the SM oxygen tanks, an ll.l-ampere current spike and
simultaneously a voltage-drop spike were recorded in the spacecraft
electrical system. Immediately thereafter, current drawn from the fuel
cells decreased by an amount consistent with the loss of power to one
fan. No other changes in spacecraft power were being made at the time.
No power was on the heaters in the tanks at the time and the quantity
gage and temperature sensor are very low power devices. The next anom-
alous event recorded was the beginning of a pressure rise in oxygen
tank no. 2, 13 seconds later. Such a time lag is possible with low-
level combustion at the time. These facts point to the likelihood that
an electrical short circuit with arcing occurred in the fan motor or its
leads to initiate the accident sequence. The energy available from the
short circuit was probably iO to 20 joules. Tests conducted during
this investigation have shown that this energy is more than ade-
quate to ignite Teflon of the type contained within the tank. (The
quantity gage in oxygen tank no. 2 had failed at 46:40 g.e.t. There
is no evidence tying the quantity gage failure directly to accident
initiation, particularly in view of the very low energy available
from the gage.)

This likelihood of electrical initiation is enhanced by the high
probability that the electrical wires within the tank were damaged dur-
ing the abnormal detanking operation at KSC prior to launch.

Furthermore, there is no evidence pointing to any other mechanism
of initiation.

PROPAGATION OF COMBUSTION

Key Data

55:53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins rise (same event
noted previously).

55:53:38.057 ll-volt decrease recorded in ac bus 2 voltage.

4-37

N N E '
L L L: L h L N_ 1: L,: L: Lt n J..: L .
55:53:41.172 22.9-ampere "spike" recorded in fuel cell 3 current,
followed by drop in current and rise in voltage typ-
ical of one fan motor -- indicating opening of another
motor circuit.

55:54:00 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure levels off at 954 psia.

55:54:15 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise again.

55:54:30 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage reading drops from
full scale (to which it had failed at 46:40 g.e.t.)
to zero and then read 75-percent full. This behav-
ior indicates the gage short circuit may have cor-
rected itself.

55:54:31 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins to rise rapidly.

55:54:45 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reading reaches maximum
recorded value of 1008 psia.

55:54:52.763 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reading had dropped to
996 psia.

The available evidence points to a combustion process as the cause
of the pressure and temperature increases recorded in oxygen tank no. 2.
The pressure reading for oxygen tank no. 2 began to increase about 13
seconds after the first electrical spike, and about 55 seconds later the
temperature began to increase. The temperature sensor reads local tem-
perature, which need not represent bulk fluid temperature. Since the
rate of pressure rise in the tank indicates a relatively slow propaga-
tion of burning, it is likely that the region immediately around the
temperature sensor did not become heated until this time.

There are materials within the tank that can, if ignited in the
presence of supercritical oxygen, react chemically with the oxygen in
exothermic chemical reactions. The most readily reactive is Teflon
used for electrical insulation in the tank. Also potentially reactive
are metals, particularly aluminum. There is more than sufficient Tef-
lon in the tank, if reacted with oxygen, to account for the pressure and
temperature increases recorded. Furthermore, the pressure rise took
place over a period of more than 69 seconds, a relatively long period,
and one which would be more likely characteristic of Teflon combustion
than metal-oxygen reactions.

While the data available on the combustion of Teflon in supercrit-
ical oxygen in zero-g are extremely limited, those which are available
indicate that the rate of combustion is generally consistent with these

4-38
observations. The cause of the 15-second period of relatively constant
pressure first indicated at 55:53:59.763 has not been precisely deter-
mined; it is believed to be associated with a change in reaction rate as
combustion proceeded through various Teflon elements.

While there is enough electrical power in the tank to cause ignition
in the event of a short circuit or abnormal heating in defective wire_
there is not sufficient electric power to account for all of the energy
required to produce the observed pressure rise.

LOSSOF OXYGEN
TANKNO. 2 SYSTEM
INTEGRITY

Key Data

55:54:52 Last valid temperature indication (-151 ° F) from
oxygen tank no. 2.

55:54:52.763 Last pressure reading from oxygen tank no. 2 before
loss of data--996 psia.

55:54:53.182 Sudden accelerometer activity on X_ Y, and Z axes.

55:54:53.220 Stabilization control system body rate changes begin.

55:54:53.555* Loss of telemetry data begins.

55:54:55.35 Recovery of telemetry data.

55:54:56 Various temperature indications in SM begin slight
rises.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads off-scale high.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads off-scale low.

After the relatively slow propagation process described above took
place, there was a relatively abrupt loss of oxygen tank no. 2 integ-
rity. About 69 seconds after the pressure began to rise, it reached the
peak recorded, 1008 psia, the pressure at which the cryogenic oxygen
tank relief valve is designed to be fully open. Pressure began a decrease
for 8 seconds, dropping to 996 psia before readings were lost. Virtually

*Several bits of data have been obtained from this "loss of teleme-
try data" period.

4-39
all signals from the spacecraft were lost about 1.85 seconds after the
last presumably valid reading from within the tank, a temperature read-
ing, and 0.8 second after the last presumably valid pressure reading
(which may or may not reflect the pressure within the tank itself since
the pressure transducer is about 20 feet of tubing length distant).
Abnormal spacecraft accelerations were recorded approximately 0.22 sec-
ond after the last pressure reading and approximately 0.38 second before
the loss of signal. These facts all point to,a relatively sudden loss
of integrity. At about this time, several solenoid valves_ including
the oxygen valves feeding two of the three fuel cells, were shocked to
the closed position. The "bang" reported by the crew also probably
occurred in this time period. Telemetry signals from Apollo 13 were
lost for a period of 1.8 seconds. When signal was reacquired, all instru-
ment indicators from oxygen tank no. 2 were off-scale, high or low. Tem-
peratures recorded by sensors in several different locations in the SM
showed slight increases in the several seconds following reacquisition
of signal. Photographs taken later by the Apollo 13 crew as the SM was
jettisoned show that the bay 4 panel was ejected, undoubtedly during
this event.

Data are not adequate to determine precisely the way in which the
oxygen tank no. 2 system lost its integrity. However, available infor-
mation, analyses, and tests performed during this investigation indicate
that most probably the combustion within the pressure vessel ultimately
led to localized heating and failure at the pressure vessel closure. It
is at this point, the upper end of the quantity probe, that the 1/2-inch
Inconel conduit is located, through which the Teflon-insulated wires
enter the pressure vessel. It is likely that the combustion progressed
along the wire insulation and reached this location where all of the
wires come together. This, possibly augmented by ignition of the metal
in the upper end of the probe, led to weakening and failure of the
closure or the conduit, or both.

Failure at this point would lead immediately to pressurization of
the tank dome, which is equipped with a rupture disc rated at about 75
psi. Rupture of this disc or of the entire dome would then release
oxygen, accompanied by combustion products, into bay 4. The accelera-
tions recorded were probably caused by this release.

Release of the oxygen then began to pressurize the oxygen shelf
space of bay 4. If the hole formed in the pressure vessel were large
enough and formed rapidly enough, the escaping oxygen alone would be
adequate to blow off the bay 4 panel. However, it is also quite possi-
ble that the escape of oxygen was accompanied by combustion of Mylar and
Kapton (used extensively as thermal insulation in the oxygen shelf com-
partment, figure 4-11, and in the tank dome) which would augment the

4-40
4-11.-
Figure X_-_X_ Closeup view of oxygen tank shelf.

4-41

N N L. ,. ,.....
M_
pressure caused by the oxygen itself. The slight temperature increases
recorded at various SM locations indicate that combustion external to
the tank probably took place. Further testing may shed additional light
on the exact mechanism of panel ejection. The ejected panel then struck
the high-gain antenna, disrupting communications from the spacecraft for
the 1.8 seconds.

LOSS OF OXYGEN TANK NO. i INTEGRITY

Key Data

55:54:53.323 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure drops 4 psia (from 883 psia
to 879 psia).

55:54:53.555 to Loss of telemetry data.
55:54:55.35

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure reads 782 psia and drops
steadily. Pressure drops over a period of 130 min-
utes to the point at which it was insufficient to
sustain operation of fuel cell no. 2.

There is no clear evidence of abnormal behavior associated with
oxygen tank no. 1 prior to loss of signal, although the one data bit
(4 psi) drop in pressure in the last tank no. 1 pressure reading prior
to loss of signal may indicate that a problem was beginning. Immediately
after signal strength was regained, data show that tank no. 1 system had
lost its integrity. Pressure decreases were recorded over a period of
approximately 130 minutes, indicating that a relatively slow leak had
developed in the tank no. 1 system. Analysis has indicated that the
leak rate is less than that which would result from a completely rup-
tured line, but could be consistent with a partial line rupture or a
leaking check or relief valve.

Since there is no evidence that there was any anomalous condition
arising within oxygen tank no. l, it is presumed that "the loss of oxygen
tank no. 1 integrity resulted from the oxygen tank no. 2 system failure.
The relatively sudden, and possibly violent, event associated with loss
of integrity of the oxygen tank no. 2 system could have ruptured a line
to oxygen tank no. l, or have caused a valve to leak because of mechani-
cal shock.

Preceding
pageblank
4-43
PART 5. APOLLO 13 RECOVERY

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM

In the period immediately following the caution and warning alarm
for main bus B undervoltage, and the associated "bang" reported by the
crew, the cause of the difficulty and the degree of its seriousness
were not apparent.

The i. 8-second loss of telemetered data was accompanied by the
switching of the CSM high-gain antenna mounted on the SM adjacent to
bay 4 from narrow beam width to wide beam width. The high-gain antenna
does this automatically 200 milliseconds after its directional lock on
the ground signal has been lost.

A confusing factor was the repeated firings of various SM attitude
control thrusters during the period after data loss. In all probability,
these thrusters were being fired to overcome the effects that oxygen
venting and panel blowoff were having on spacecraft attitude, but it
was believed for a time that perhaps the thrusters were malfunctioning.

The failure of oxygen tank no. 2 and consequent removal of the bay 4
panel produced a shock which closed valves in the oxygen supply lines to
fuel cells 1 and 3. These fuel cells ceased to provide power in about 3
minutes, when the supply of oxygen between the closed valves and the
cells was depleted. Fuel cell 2 continued to power ac bus 1 through dc
main bus A, but the failure of fuel cell 3 left dc main bus B and ac
bus 2 unpowered (see fig. 4-12). The oxygen tank no. 2 temperature and
quantity gages were connected to ac bus 2 at the time of the accident.
Thus, these parameters could not be read once fuel cell 3 failed at
55:57:44 until power was applied to ac bus 2 from main bus A.

The crew was not alerted to closure of the oxygen feed valves to
fuel cells 1 and 3 because the valve position indicators in the CM were
arranged to give warning only if both the oxygen and hydrogen valves
closed. The hydrogen valves remained open. The crew had not been
alerted to the oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise or to its subsequent drop
because a hydrogen tank low pressure warning had blocked the cryogenic
subsystem portion of the caution and warning system several minutes be-
fore the accident.

When the crew heard the bang and got the master alarm for low dc
main bus B voltage, the Commander was in the lower equipment bay of the
command module, stowing a television camera which had Just been in use.

4-4
Fuel cell
1

DC main A AC bus i l
Fuel cell
2
r

-L-
I

%I1

Fuel cell
J DC main B : 2 AC bus 2
3 II l Inverter

I I
m
Cryo 0 2
tank 2
pressure
gage
Cryo 0 2
tank 2
fan
Cryo 0 2
tank 2
quantity,
temperature
gages
[ SCS
telemetry
channels

Figure 4-12.- Electrical configuration at 55:54:53 g.e.t.

it.
The Lunar Module Pilot was in the tunnel between the CSMand the LM,
returning to the CSM. The Command Module Pilot was in the left-hand
couch, monitoring spacecraft performance. Because of the master alarm
indicating low voltage, the CMPmovedacross to the right-hand couch
where CSMvoltages can be observed. He reported that voltages were
"looking good" at 55:56:10. At this time, main bus B had recovered and
fuel cell 3 did not fail for another l-l/2 minutes. He also reported
fluctuations in the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity, followed by a return
to the off-scale high position. (See fig. 4-13 for CMpanel arrange-
ment).

Whenfuel cells 1 and 3 electrical output readings went to zero,
the ground controllers could not be certain that the cells had not some-
howbeen disconnected from their respective busses and were not otherwise
all right. Attention continued to be focused on electrical problems.
Five minutes after the accident, controllers asked the crew to
connect fuel cell 3 to dc main bus B in order to be sure that the config-
uration was known. Whenit was realized that fuel cells 1 and 3 were
not functioning, the crew was directed to perform an emergencypowerdown
to lower the load on the remaining fuel cell. Observing the rapid decay
in oxygen tank no. 1 pressure, controllers asked the crew to switch power
to the oxygen tank no. 2 instrumentation. Whenthis was done, and it
was realized that oxygen tank no. 2 had failed, the extreme seriousness
of the situation became clear.

During the succeeding period, efforts were madeto save the remain-
ing oxygen in the oxygen tank no. 1. Several attempts were made, but
had no effect. The pressure continued to decrease.

It was obvious by about l-l/2 hours after the accident that the
oxygen tank no. 1 leak could not be stopped and that shortly it would be
necessary to use the LM as a "lifeboat" for the remainder of the mission.

By 58:40 g.e.t., the LMhad been activated, the inertial guidance
reference transferred from the CSMguidance system to the LM guidance
system, and the CSMsystems were turned off.

RETURN
TOEARTH

The remainder of the mission was characteriz_ d by two main activ-
ities--planning and conducting the necessary propulsion maneuvers to
return the spacecraft to Earth, and managing the use of consumables in
such a way that the LM, which is designed for a basic mission with two
crewmenfor a relatively short duration, could support three men and serve
as the actual control vehicle for the time required.

4-46

ILl L L
One significant anomaly was noted during the remainder of the
mission. At about 97 hours 14 minutes into the mission, the IAfP
reported hearing a "thump" and observing venting from the LM. Subsequent
data review shows that the LM electrical power system experienced a
brief but major abnormal current flow at that time. There is no evidence
E that this anomaly was related to the accident. Analysis by the Apollo
organization is continuing.

A number of propulsion options were developed and considered. It
was necessary to return the spacecraft to a free-return trajectory and
to make any required midcourse corrections. Normally, the service pro-
pulsion system (SPS) in the SM would be used for such maneuvers. How-
ever, because of the high electrical power requirements for using that
engine, and in view of its uncertain condition and the uncertain nature
of the structure of the SM after the accident, it was decided to use
the LM descent engine if possible.

The minimum practical return time was 133 hours g.e.t, to the
Atlantic Ocean, and the maximum was 152 hours g.e.t, to the Indian
Ocean. Recovery forces were deployed in the Pacific. The return path
selected was for splashdown in the Pacific Ocean at 142:40 g.e.t. This
required a minimum of two burns of the LM descent engine. A third burn
was subsequently made to correct the normal maneuver execution variations
in the first two burns. One small velocity adjustment was also made with
reaction control system thrusters. All burns were satisfactory. Figures
4-14 and 4-15 depict the flight plan followed from the time of the acci-
dent to splashdown.

The most critical consumables were water, used to cool the CSM and
LM systems during use; CSM and LM battery power, the CSM batteries being
for use during reentry and the LM batteries being needed for the rest

[ of the mission;
filter cannisters
LM oxygen for breathing;
used to remove carbon
and lithium
dioxide
hydroxide
from the spacecraft
(Li0H)

cabin atmosphere. These consumables, and in particular the water and
LiOH cannisters, appeared to be extremely marginal in quantity shortly
after the accident, but once the LM was powered down to conserve electric
power and to generate less heat and thus use less water, the situation
improved greatly. Engineers at MSC developed a method which allowed the
crew to use materials on board to fashion a device allowing use of the
CM Li0H eannisters in the LM cabin atmosphere cleaning system (see
fig. 4-16). At splashdown, many hours of each consumable remained
U
available (see figs. 4-17 through 4-19 and table 4-111).

4-48
m ii

I

!

1:

I
_A_J

,i*];

ILl IJ E .2L
_Ad

E

!

iJ

Figure 4-13.- _in display panel.

/

4-47 fi
;tart of
problem
(55:55)
to
free-return
r_
(61:30)

\

F_
I

kO

MCC-5 ]
r_ MCC-2 PC + 2 hr
for entry for entry for Pacific
corridor corridor landing
(137:40) (105:18) (79:28)

Figure 4-14.- Translunar trajectory phase.
CM power up
G.E.T. 140:10

r_
MCC-7
G.E.T. 137:40
r
Entry altitude

P_
I
kJ3
0
_ G. E.T. 142:30

LM jettison
G.E.T. 141:30
L SM jettison
G.E.T. 138:01
LM power up
(3.E.T. 133:35

r

E

/--- Landing
G.E.T. 142:54

Figure 4-15.- Final trajectory phase.
r_

r

,
Figure 4-16.- Lithium hydroxide canister modification.

4-51
300

250

200

r

-k-
I
k.n
Po
r
Anomaly55:54
I LM jettison (141:30)
100 I I
I

r
!few
II
enters LM (57:43) I
I
I
Behind moon(77:09) I
50 II I
II I
I I
II I
II I
II I 28.2 Ibs remaining-
0 I I I I I I I I
50 60 70 80 90 I00 Ii0 120 130 140 150
Time, hours

Figure 4-17.- Usable remaining water.

r ..
....
j

•snqe_s saIq_mnsuoo ma_sXs _a_od leOI_Oal_ -'@I-_ a_L_I_

s_noq 'atoll

0_I ONI 0£I Ogl 011 001 06 08 OL 09 O_
II _ I I I I I I I I I II 0
I _ 5UlUlgLUa_S_udraw n'_OT I II
I; ......... I II

,I_
_ (60:L/) uoom pu,qa_ IllI -
', \ II
00t7

tTcj_;c_;,_l_zmouv _
>

i
(0£:It71)
_ 008
Lf_
uosq I
(I)
9_
E2-
m

3
00_I
--.

v

0091

O00g
70

60

50
r

40

e-
_J

>,
X
! o 30

Anomaly 55:54
I
r 2O I
ICrew enters LM (57:43) 28.53 Ibs
II remaining
I
10

0
-

50
I
II
II
II
II j
60
I
70
Behind moon (77:09)
j
I
I
I
I

i
80
_
90
I
i00
I
II0
i
120
LM jettison (141:30)

i
130
I
I
I
I
II
140
J 150

Time, hours

Figure _-19.- Usable remaining oxygen.
TABLE4-III.- CABINATMOSPHERE
CARBON
DIOXIDE
REMOVALBY LITHIUMHYDROXIDE

Requi re d 85 hours

Available in LM 53 hours

Available in CM 182 hours

A more detailed recounting of the events during the Apollo 13
launch countdown and mission will be found in Appendix B to this report.

4-55
This page left blank intentionally.

4-56

NASA-- MSC-- Coral., Houston, Texas
CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5-0
PART I. INTRODUCTION

The following findings, determinations, and recommendations are the
product of about 7 weeks of concentrated review of the Apollo 13 accident
by the Apollo 13 Review Board. They are based on that review, on the
accident investigation by the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) and its con-
tractors, and on an extensive series of special tests and analyses per-
formed by or for the Board and its Panels.

Sufficient work has been done to identify and understand the nature
of the malfunction and the direction which the corrective actions must
take. All indications are that an electrically initiated fire in oxygen
tank no. 2 in the service module (SM) was the cause of the accident. Ac-
cordingly, the Board has concentrated on this tank; on its design, manu-
facture, test, handling, checkout, use, failure mode, and eventual effects
on the rest of the spacecraft. The accident is generally understood, and
the most probable cause has been identified. However, at the time of this
report, some details of the accident are not completely clear.

Further tests and analyses, which will be carried out under the over-
all direction of MSC, will continue to generate new information relative
to this accident. It is possible that this evidence may lead to conclu-
sions differing in detail from those which can be drawn now. However, it
is most unlikely that fundamentally different results will be obtained.

Recommendations are provided as to the general direction which the
corrective actions should take. Significant modifications should be made
to the SM oxygen storage tanks and related equipments. The modified
hardware should go through a rigorous requalification test program. This
is the responsibility of the Apollo organization in the months ahead.

In reaching its findings, determinations, and recommendations, it was
necessary for the Board to review critically the equipment and the organi-
zational elements responsible for it. It was found that the accident was
not the result of a chance malfunction in a statistical sense, but rather
resulted from an unusual combination of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat
deficient and unforgiving design. In brief, this is what happened:

a. After assembly and acceptance testing, the oxygen tank no. 2
which flew on Apollo 13 was shipped from Beech Aircraft Corporation to
North American Rockwell (NR) in apparently satisfactory condition.

b. It is now known, however, that the tank contained two protective
thermostatic switches on the heater assembly, which were inadequate and
would subsequently fail during ground test operations at Kennedy Space
Center (KSC).

5-1
c. In addition, it is probable that the tank contained a loosely
fitting fill tube assembly. This assembly was probably displaced during
subsequent handling, which included an incident at the prime contractor's
plant in which the tank was jarred.

d. In itself, the displaced fill tube assembly was not particularly
serious, but it led to the use of improvised detanking procedures at KSC
which almost certainly set the stage for the accident.

e. Although Beech did not encounter any problem in detanking during
acceptance tests, it was not possible to detank oxygen tank no. 2 using
normal procedures at KSC. Tests and analyses indicate that this was due
to gas leakage through the displaced fill tube assembly.

f. The special detanking procedures at KSCsubjected the tank to an
extended period of heater operation and pressure cycling. These proce-
dures had not been used before, and the tank had not been qualified by
test for the conditions experienced. However, the procedures did not
violate the specifications which governed the operation of the heaters at
KSC.

g. In reviewing these procedures before the flight, officials of
NASA,NR, and Beech did not recognize the possibility of damagedue to
overheating. Many of these officials were not aware of the extended
heater operation. In any event, adequate thermostatic switches might
have been expected to protect the tank.

h. A number of factors contributed to the presence of inadequate
thermostatic switches in the heater assembly. The original 1962 specifi-
cations from NR to Beech Aircraft Corporation for the tank and heater
assembly specified the use of 28 V dc power, which is used in the space-
craft. In 1965, NRissued a revised specification which stated that the
heaters should use a 65 V dc power supply for tank pressurization; this
was the power supply used at KSCto reduce pressurization time. Beech
ordered switches for the Block II tanks but did not change the switch
specifications to be compatible with 65 V dc.

i. The thermostatic switch discrepancy was not detected by NASA,NR,
or Beech in their review of documentation, nor did tests identify the in-
compatibility of the switches with the ground support equipment (GSE)at
KSC, since neither qualification nor acceptance testing required switch
cycling under load as should have been done. It was a serious oversight
in which all parties shared.

j. The thermostatic switches could accommodatethe 65 V dc during
tank pressurization because they normally remained cool and closed. How-
ever, they could not open without damagewith 65 V dc power applied. They
were never required to do so until the special detanking. During this

5-2
procedure, as the switches started to open when they reached their upper
temperature limit, they were welded permanently closed by the resulting
arc and were rendered inoperative as protective thermostats.

k. Failure of the thermostatic switches to open could have been
detected at KSCif switch operation had been checked by observing heater
current readings on the oxygen tank heater control panel. Although it
was not recognized at that time_ the tank temperature readings indicated
that the heaters had reached their temperature limit and switch opening
should have beenexpected.
i. As shownby subsequent tests, failure of the thermostatic switches
probably permitted the temperature of the heater tube assembly to reach
about i000 ° F in spots during the continuous 8-hour period of heater
operation. Such heating has been shownby tests to severely damagethe
Teflon insulation on the fan motor wires in the vicinity of the heater
assembly. From that time on, including pad occupancy, the oxygen tank
no. 2 was in a hazardous condition when filled with oxygen and electri-
cally powered.
m. It was not until nearly 56 hours into the mission, however, that
the fan motor wiring, possibly movedby the fan stirring, short circuited
and ignited its insulation by meansof an electric arc. The resulting
combustion in the oxygen tank probably overheated and failed the wiring
conduit where it enters the tank_ and possibly a portion of the tank it-
self.

n. The rapid expulsion of high-pressure oxygen which followed,
possibly augmentedby combustion of insulation in the space surrounding
the tank, blew off the outer panel to bay 4 of the SM, caused a leak in
the high-pressure system of oxygen tank no. i, damagedthe high-gain an-
tenna, caused other miscellaneous damage, and aborted the mission.
The accident is judged to have been nearly catastrophic. Only out-
standing performance on the part of the crew, Mission Control, and other
membersof the team which supported the operations successfully returned
the crew to Earth.

In investigating the accident to Apollo 13, the Board has also
attempted to identify those additional technical and managementlessons
which can be applied to help assure the success of future space flight
missions; several recommendationsof this nature are included.

The Board recognizes that the contents of its report are largely of
a critical nature. The report highlights in detail faults or deficiencies
in equipment and procedures that the Board has identified. This is the
nature of a review board report.

5-3
It is important, however, to view the criticisms in this report in
a broader context. The Apollo spacecraft system is not without short-
comings, but it is the only system of its type ever built and success-
fully demonstrated. It has flown to the Moon five times and landed
twice. The tank which failed_ the design of which is criticized in this
report, is one of a series which had thousands of hours of successful
operation in space prior to Apollo 13.

While the team of designers, engineers_ and technicians that build
and operate the Apollo spacecraft also has shortcomings, the accomplish-
ments speak for themselves. By hardheaded self-criticism and continued
dedication_ this team can maintain this nation's preeminence in space.

5-4
PART 2. ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT

FAILURE OF OXYGEN TANK NO. 2

l. Findings

a. The Apollo 13 mission was aborted as the direct result of
the rapid loss of oxygen from oxygen tank no. 2 in the SM,
followed by a gradual loss of oxygen from tank no. i, and
a resulting loss of power from the oxygen-fed fuel cells.

b. There is no evidence of any forces external to oxygen tank
no. 2 during the flight which might have caused its failure.

Co Oxygen tank no. 2 contained materials, including Teflon and
aluminum, which if ignited will burn in supercritical
oxygen.

d.
Oxygen tank no. 2 contained potential ignition sources:
electrical wiring, unsealed electric motors, and rotating
aluminum fans.

e. During the special detanking of oxygen tank no. 2 following
the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) at KSC, the thermo-
static switches on the heaters were required to open while
powered by 65 V dc in order to protect the heaters from over-
heating. The switches were only rated at 30 V dc and have
been shown to weld closed at the higher voltage.

f.
Data indicate that in flight the tank heaters located in
oxygen tanks no. i and no. 2 operated normally prior to the
accident, and they were not on at the time of the accident.

g° The electrical circuit for the quantity probe would generate
only about 7 millijoules in the event of a short circuit and
the temperature sensor wires less than 3 millijoules per
second.

h.
Telemetry data izmnediately prior to the accident indicate
electrical disturbances of a character which would be caused
by short circuits accompanied by electrical arcs in the fan
motor or its leads in oxygen tank no. 2.

i.
The pressure and temperature within oxygen tank no. 2 rose
abnormally during the 1-1/2 minutes immediately prior to the
accident.

5-5
Determinations

(i) The cause of the failure of oxygen tank no. 2 was combustion
within the tank.

(2) Analysis showed that the electrical energy flowing into the
tank could not account for the observed increases in pressure
and temperature.

(3) The heater, temperature sensor, and quantity probe did not
initiate the accident sequence.

(4) The cause of the combustion was most probably the ignition
of Teflon wire insulation on the fan motor wires, caused by
electric arcs in this wiring.

The protective thermostatic switches on the heaters in
oxygen tank no. 2 failed closed during the initial portion
of the first special detanking operation. This subjected
the wiring in the vicinity of the heaters to very high tem-
peratures which have been subsequently shown to severely
degrade Teflon insulation.

(6) The telemetered data indicated electrical arcs of sufficient
energy to ignite the Teflon insulation, as verified by sub-
sequent tests. These tests also verified that the 1-ampere
fuses on the fan motors would pass sufficient energy to ig-
nite the insulation by the mechanism of an electric arc.

(7) The combustion of Teflon wire insulation alone could release
sufficient heat to account for the observed increases in
tank pressure and local temperature, and could locally over-
heat and fail the tank or its associated tubing. The possi-
bility of such failure at the top of the tank was demon-
strated by subsequent tests.

(8) The rate of flame propagation along Teflon-insulated wires
as measured in subsequent tests is consistent with the in-
dicated rates of pressure rise within the tank.

SECONDARY EFFECTS OF TANK FAILURE

o Findings

a. Failure of the tank was accompanied by several events in-
cluding:

5-6
A %ang" as heard by the crew.

Spacecraft motion as felt by the crew and as measured by
the attitude control system and the accelerometers in the
command module (CM).

Momentary loss of telemetry.

Closing of several valves by shock loading.

Loss of integrity of the oxygen tank no. i system.

Slight temperature increases in bay 4 and adjacent sectors
of the SM.

Loss of the panel covering bay 4 of the SM, as observed and
photographed by the crew.

Displacement of the fuel cells as photographed by the crew.

Damage to the high-gain antenna as photographed by the crew.

b ° The panel covering of bay 4 could be blown off by pressuri-
zation of the bay. About 25 psi of uniform pressure in bay 4
is required to blow off the panel.

Co The various bays and sectors of the SM are interconnected
with open passages so that all would be pressurized if any
one were supplied with a pressurant at a relatively slow
rate.

d. The CM attachments would be failed by an average pressure of
about i0 psi on the CM heat shield and this would separate
the CM from the SM.

Determinations

(1) Failure of the oxygen tank no. 2 caused a rapid local
pressurization of bay 4 of the SM by the high-pressure
oxygen that escaped from the tank. This pressure pulse may
have blown off the panel covering bay 4. This possibility
was substantiated by a series of special tests.

(2) The pressure pulse from a tank failure might have been
augmented by combustion of Mylar or Kapton insulation or
both when subjected to a stream of oxygen and hot particles
emerging from the top of the tank, as demonstrated in sub-
sequenttests.

5-7
(3) Combustion or vaporization of the Mylar or Kapton might
account for the discoloration of the SM engine nozzle as
observed and photographed by the crew.

(4) Photographs of the SM by the crew did not establish the
condition of the oxygen tank no. 2.

(5) The high-gain antenna damage probably resulted from striking
by the panel_ or a portion thereof, as it left the SM.

(6) The loss of pressure on oxygen tank no. i and the subsequent
loss of power resulted from the tank no. 2 failure.

(7) Telemetry, although good, is insufficient to pin down the
exact nature, sequence, and location of each event of the
accident in detail.

(s) The telemetry data, crew testimony, photographs, and special
tests and analyses already completed are sufficient to under-
stand the problem and to proceed with corrective actions.

OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 DESIGN

3. Findings

a,
The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks contained a combination
of oxidizer, combustible material, and potential ignition
sources.

b ,
Supercritical oxygen was used to minimize the weight,
volume, and fluid-handling problems of the oxygen supply
system.

c. The heaters, fans, and tank instrumentation are used in the
measurement and management of the oxygen supply.

Determinations

(i) The storage of supercritical oxygen was appropriate for the
Apollo system.

(2) Heaters are required to maintain tank pressure as the oxygen
supply is used.

(3) Fans were used to prevent excessive pressure drops due to
stratification, to mix the oxygen to improve accuracy of

5-8
quantity measurements, and to insure adequate heater input
at low densities and high oxygen utilization rates. The
need for oxygen stirring on future flights requires further
investigation.

(4) The amount of material in the tank which could be ignited
and burned in the given environment could have been reduced
significantly.

(5) The potential ignition sources constituted an undue hazard
when considered in the light of the particular tank design
with its assembly difficulties.

(6) NASA, the prime contractor, and the supplier of the tank
were not fully aware of the extent of this hazard.

(7) Examination of the high-pressure oxygen system in the service
module following the Apollo 204 fire, which directed atten-
tion to the danger of fire in a pure oxygen environment,
failed to recognize the deficiencies of the tank.

PREFLIGHT DAMAGE TO TANK WIRING

0
Findings

a. The oxygen tank no. 2 heater assembly contained two thermo-
static switches designed to protect the heaters from over-
heating.

b. The thermostatic switches were designed to open and interrupt
the heater current at 80 ° ± i0 ° F.

c. The heaters are operated on 28 V dc in flight and at NR.

d. The heaters are operated on 65 V ac at Beech Aircraft Cor-
poration and 65 V dc at the Kennedy Space Center. These
higher voltages are used to accelerate tank pressurization.

e. The thermostatic switches were rated at 7 amps at 30 V dc.
While they would carry this current at 65 V dc in a closed
position, they would fail if they started to open to inter-
rupt this load.

fo Neither qualification nor acceptance testing of the heater
assemblies or the tanks required thermostatic switch opening
to be checked at 65 V dc. The only test of switch opening

5-9
was a continuity check at Beech in which the switch was
cycled open and closed in an oven.

g. The thermostatic switches had never operated in flight be-
cause this would only happen if the oxygen supply in a tank
were depleted to nearly zero.

hi
The thermostatic switches had never operated on the ground
under load because the heaters had only been used with a
relatively full tank which kept the switches cool and closed.

i.
During the CDDT, the oxygen tank no. 2 would not detank in
a normal manner. On March 27 and 28, a special detanking
procedure was followed which subjected the heater to about
8 hours of continuous operation until the tanks were nearly
depleted of oxygen.

j. A second special detanking of shorter duration followed on
March 30, 1970.

k. The oxygen tanks had not been qualification tested for the
conditions encountered in this procedure. However, speci-
fied allowable heater voltages and currents were not exceeded.

i.
The recorded internal tank temperature went off-scale high
early in the special detanking. The thermostatic switches
would normally open at this point but the electrical records
show no thermostatic switch operation. These indications
were not detected at the time.

m. The oxygen tank heater controls at KSC contained ammeters
which would have indicated thermostatic switch operation.

Determinations

(i) During the special detanking of March 27 and 28 at KSC, when
the heaters in oxygen tank no. 2 were left on for an extended
period, the thermostatic switches started to open while
powered by 65 V dc and were probably welded shut.

(2) Failure of the thermostatic switches to open could have been
detected at KSC if switch operation had been checked by
observing heater current readings on the oxygen tank heater
control panel. Although it was not recognized at the time,
the tank temperature readings indicated that the heaters had
reached their temperature limit and switch opening should
have been expected.

5-10
(3) The fact that the switches were not rated to open at 65 V dc
was not detected by NASA, NR, or Beech in their reviews of
documentation or in qualification and acceptance testing.

(4) The failed switches resulted in severe overheating. Subse-
quent tests showed that heater assembly temperatures could
have reached about i000 ° F.

(5) The high temperatures severely damaged the Teflon insulation
on the wiring in the vicinity of the heater assembly and set
the stage for subsequent short circuiting. As shown in
subsequent tests_ this damage could range from cracking to
total oxidation and disappearance of the insulation.

(6) During and following the special detanking, the oxygen tank
no. 2 was in a hazardous condition whenever it contained
oxygen and was electrically energized.

5-ii
PART 3. SUPPORTING CONSIDERATIONS

DESIGN, MANUFACTURING, AND TEST

5. Finding

The pressure vessel of the supercritical oxygen tank is con-
structed of Inconel 718, and is moderately stressed at normal
operating pressure.

Determination

From a structural viewpoint, the supercritical oxygen pressure
vessel is quite adequately designed, employing a tough material
well chosen for this application. The stress analysis and the
results of the qualification burst test program confirm the
ability of the tank to exhibit adequate performance in its in-
tended application.

6. Findings

a. The oxygen tank design includes two unsealed electric fan
motors immersed in supercritical oxygen.

b.
Fan motors of this design have a test history of failure
during acceptance test which includes phase-to-phase and
phase-to-ground faults.

Co
The fan motor stator windings are constructed with Teflon-
coated, ceramic-insulated, number 36 AWG wire. Full phase-
to-phase and phase-to-ground insulation is not used in the
motor design.

d. The motor case is largely aluminum.

Determinations

(i) The stator winding insulation is brittle and easily fractured
during manufacture of the stator coils.

(2) The use of these motors in supercritical oxygen was a ques-
tionable practice.

7. Findings

a. The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks contained materials that
could be ignited and which will burn under the conditions

5-12
prevailing within the tank, including Teflon, aluminum,
solder, and Drilube 822.

b. The tank contained electrical wiring exposed to the super-
critical oxygen. The wiring was insulated with Teflon.

c. Somewiring was in close proximity to heater elements and
to the rotating fan.
do
The design was such that the assembly of the equipment was
essentially "blind" and not amenable to inspection after
completion.

e. Teflon insulation of the electrical wiring inside the cryo-
genic oxygen storage tanks of the SM was exposed to rela-
tively sharp metal edges of tank inner parts during manu-
facturing assembly operations.

f. Portions of this wiring remained unsupported in the tank on
completion of assembly.

Determinations

(i) The tank contained a hazardous combination of materials and
potential ignition sources.

(2) Scraping of the electrical wiring insulation against metal
inner parts of the tank constituted a substantial cumulative
hazard during assembly, handling, test, checkout, and opera-
tional use.

(5) "Cold flow" of the Teflon insulation, when pressed against
metal corners within the tank for an extended period of
time, could result in an eventual degradation of insulation
protection.

(4) The externally applied electrical tests (500-volt Hi-pot)
could not reveal the extent of such possible insulation
damage but could only indicate that the relative positions
of the wires at the time of the tests were such that the
separation or insulation would withstand the 500-volt po-
tential without electrical breakdown.

(5) The design was such that it was difficult to insure against
these hazards.

(6) There is no evidence that the wiring was damaged during man-
ufacturing.

5-13
9. Findings

a. Dimensioning of the short Teflon and Inconel tube segments
of the cryogenic oxygen storage tank fill line was such that
looseness to the point of incomplete connection was possible
in the event of worst-case tolerance buildup.

b, The insertion of these segments into the top of the tank
quantity probe assembly at the point of its final closure
and welding was difficult to achieve.

c. Probing with a hand tool was used in manufacturing to com-
pensate for limited visibility of the tube segment positions.

Determination

It was possible for a tank to have been assembled with a set of
relatively loose fill tube parts that could go undetected in
final inspection and be subsequently displaced.

i0. Findings

a. The Apollo spacecraft system contains numerous pressure
vessels, many of which carry oxidants, plus related valves
and other plumbing.

b. Investigation of potential hazards associated with these
other systems was not complete at the time of the report,
but is being pursued by the Manned Spacecraft Center.

C. One piece of equipment, the fuel cell oxygen supply valve
module, has been identified as containing a similar combina-
tion of high-pressure oxygen, Teflon, and electrical wiring
as in the oxygen tank no. 2. The wiring is unfused and is
routed through a lO-amp circuit breaker.

Determination

The fuel cell oxygen supply valve module has been identified as
potentially hazardous.

ll. Findings

a. In the normal sequence of cryogenic oxygen storage tank in-
tegration and checkout, each tank undergoes shipping,
assembly into an oxygen shelf for a service module, factory
transportation to facilitate shelf assembly test, and then
integration of shelf assembly to the SM.

5-14
b. The SMundergoes factory transportation, air shipment to KSC,
and subsequent ground transportation and handling.

Determination

There were environments during the normal sequence of operations
subsequent to the final acceptance tests at Beech that could
cause a loose-fitting set of fill tube parts to become displaced.

12. Findings

a. At North American Rockwell, Downey, California, in the
attempt to remove the oxygen shelf assembly from SM 106,
a bolt restraining the inner edge of the shelf was not re-
moved.

b. Attempts to lift the shelf with the bolt in place broke the
lifting fixture, thereby jarring the oxygen tanks and valves.

C. The oxygen shelf assembly incorporating S/N XTAO008 in the
tank no. 2 position, which had been shaken during removal
from SM 106, was installed in SM 109 one month later.

d. An analysis, shelf inspection, and a partial retest empha-
sizing electrical continuity of internal wiring were accom-
plished before reinstallation.

Determinations

(i) Displacement of fill tube parts could have occurred, during
the "shelf drop" incident at the prime contractor's plant,
without detection.

(2) Other damage to the tank may have occurred from the jolt,
but special tests and analyses indicate that this is un-
likely.

(3) The "shelf drop" incident was not brought to the attention
of project officials during subsequent detanking difficulties
at KSC.

13. Finding

Detanking, expulsion of liquid oxygen out the fill line of the
oxygen tank by warm gas pressure applied through the vent line,
was a regular activity at Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, in
emptying a portion of the oxygen used in end-item acceptance
tests.

5-15
Determination

The latter stages of the detanking operation on oxygen tank
no. 2 conducted at Beech on February 3, 1967, were similar to
the standard procedure followed at KSC during the CDDT.

14. Findings

a.
The attempt to detank the cryogenic oxygen tanks at KSC
after the CDDT by the standard procedures on March 23, 1970,
was unsuccessful with regard to tank no. 2.

b,
A special detanking procedure was used to empty oxygen tank
no. 2 after CDDT. This procedure involved continuous pro-
tracted heating with repeated cycles of pressurization to
about 300 psi with warm gas followed by venting.

c. It was employed both after CDDT and after a special test to
verify that the tank could be filled.


There is no indication from the heater voltage recording
that the thermostatic switches functioned and cycled the
heaters off and on during these special detanking procedures.

e.
At the completion of detanking following CDDT, the switches
are only checked to see that they remain closed at -75 ° F as
the tank is warmed up. They are not checked to verify that
they will open at +80 ° F.

fo
Tests subsequent to the flight showed that the current
associated with the KSC 65 V dc ground powering of the
heaters would cause the thermostatic switch contacts to
weld closed if they attempted to interrupt this current.

g.
A second test showed that without functioning thermostatic
switches, temperatures in the 800 ° to i000 ° F range would
exist at locations on the heater tube assembly that were in
close proximity with the motor wires. These temperatures
are high enough to damage Teflon and melt solder.

Determinations

(i) Oxygen tank no. 2 (XTA 0008) did not detank after CDDT in a
manner comparable to its performance the last time it had
contained liquid oxygen, i.e., in acceptance test at Beech.

(2) Such evidence indicates that the tank had undergone some
change of internal configuration during the intervening
events of the previous 3 years.

5-16
(3) The tank conditions during the special detanking procedures
were outside all prior testing of Apollo CSM cryogenic oxygen
storage tanks. Heater assembly temperatures measured in sub-
sequent tests exceeded i000 ° F.

(4) Severe damage to the insulation of electrical wiring internal
to the tank, as determined from subsequent tests, resulted
from the special procedure.

(5) Damage to the insulation, particularly on the long un-
supported lengths of wiring, may also have occurred due to
boiling associated with this procedure.

(6) MSC, KSC, and NR personnel did not know that the thermostatic
switches were not rated to open with 65 V dc GSE power
applied.

15. Findings

a, The change in detanking procedures on the cryogenic oxygen
tank was made in accordance with the existing change control
system during final launch preparations for Apollo 13.

b. Launch operations personnel who made the change did not have
a detailed understanding of the tank internal components, or
the tank history. They made appropriate contacts before
making the change.

C, Communications, primarily by telephone, among MSC, KSC, NR,
and Beech personnel during final launch preparations re-
garding the cryogenic oxygen system included incomplete and
inaccurate information.

d, The MSC Test Specification Criteria Document (TSCD) which
was used by KSC in preparing detailed tank test procedures
states the tank allowable heater voltage and current as 65
to 85 V dc and 9 to 17 amperes with no restrictions on time.

Determinations

(l) NR and MSC personnel who prepared the TSCD did not know that
the tank heater thermostatic switches would not protect
the tank.

(2) Launch operations personnel assumed the tank was protected
from overheating by the switches.

5-17
b) Launch operations personnel at KSC stayed within the
specified tank heater voltage and current limits during the
detanking at KSC.

16. Findings

ao After receipt of the Block II oxygen tank specifications
from NR, which required the tank heater assembly to operate
with 65 V dc GSE power only during tank pressurization_ Beech
Aircraft did not require their Block I thermostatic switch
supplier to make a change in the switch to operate at the
higher voltage.

b. NR did not review the tank or heater to assure compatibility
between the switch and the GSE.

c. MSC did not review the tank or heater to assure compati-
bility between the switch and the GSE.

d. No tests were specified by MSC, NR, or Beech to check this
switch under load.

Determinations

(i) NR and Beech specifications governing the powering and the
thermostatic switch protection of the heater assemblies were
inadequate.

(2) The specifications governing the testing of the heater
assemblies were inadequate.

17. Finding

The hazard associated with the long heater cycle during detanking
was not given consideration in the decision to fly oxygen tank
no. 2.

Determinations

(i) MSC, KSC, and NR personnel did not know that the tank heater
thermostatic switches did not protect the tank from over-
heating.

(2) If the long period of continuous heater operation with failed
thermostatic switches had been known, the tank would have
been replaced.

5-18

L . z,.-,,_ A-_
18. Findings

a° Management controls requiring detailed reviews and approvals
of design, manufacturing processes, assembly procedures,
test procedures, hardware acceptance, safety, reliability,
and flight readiness are in effect for all Apollo hardware
and operations.

b° When the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen system was originally
designed, the management controls were not defined in as
great detail as they are now.

Determination

From review of documents and interviews, it appears that the
management controls existing at that time were adhered to in
the case of the cryogenic oxygen system incorporated in
Apollo 13.

19. Finding

The only oxygen tank no. 2 anomaly during the final countdown
was a small leak through the vent quick disconnect, which was
corrected.

Determination

No indications of a potential inflight malfunction of the oxygen
tank no. 2 were present during the launch countdown.

MISSION EVENTS THI_OUGH ACCIDENT

20. Findings

a. The center engine of the S-If stage of the Saturn V launch
vehicle prematurely shut down at 132 seconds due to large
16 hertz oscillations in thrust chamber pressure.

b. Data indicated less than O.ig vibration in the CM.

Determinations

(i) Investigation of this S-If anomaly was not within the purview
of the Board except insofar as it relates to the Apollo 13
accident.

5-19
(2) The resulting oscillations or vibration of the space vehicle
probably did not affect the oxygen tank.
21. Findings

a. Fuel cell current increased between 46:40:05 and 46:40:08
indicating that oxygen tank no. i and tank no. 2 fans were
turned on during this interval.

b. The oxygen tank no. 2 quantity indicated off-scale high at
46:40:08.

Determinations

(i) The oxygen tank no. 2 quantity probe short circuited at
46:40:08.

(2) The short circuit could have been caused by either a com-
pletely loose fill tube part or a solder splash being carried
by the moving fluid into contact with both elements of the
probe capacitor.

22. Findings

a. The crew acknowledged Mission Control's request to turn on
the tank fans at 55:53:06.

b. Spacecraft current increased by i ampere at 55:53:19.

c. The oxygen tank no. i pressure decreased 8 psi at 55:53:19
due to normal destratification.

Determination

The fans in oxygen tank no. i were turned on and began rotating
at 55:53:19.

23. Findings

a. Spacecraft current increased by 1-1/2 amperes and ac bus 2
voltage decreased 0.6 volt at 55:53:20.


Stabilization and Control System (SCS) gimbal command telem-
etry channels, which are sensitive indicators of electrical
transients associated with switching on or off of certain
spacecraft electrical loads, showed a negative initial tran-
sient during oxygen tank no. 2 fan turnon cycles and a posi-
tive initial transient during oxygen tank no. 2 fan turnoff

5-20
cycles during the Apollo 13 mission. A negative initial
transient was measuredin the SCSat 55:53:20.

c. The oxygen tank no. 2 pressure decreased about 4 psi when
the'fans were turned on at 55:53:21.

Determinations

(i) The fans in oxygen tank no. 2 were turned On at 55:53:20.

(2) It cannot be determined whether or not they were rotating
because the pressure decrease was too small to conclusively
show destratification. It is likely that they were.

24. Finding

An ll.l-amp spike in fuel cell 3 current and a momentary
1.2-volt decrease were measured in ac bus 2 at 55:53:23.

Determinations

(i) A short circuit occurred in the circuits of the fans in
oxygen tank no. 2 which resulted in either blown fuses or
opened wiring, and one fan ceased to function.

(2) The short circuit probably dissipated an energy in excess
of i0 joules which, as shown in subsequent tests, is more
than sufficient to ignite Teflon wire insulation by means
of an electric arc.

25. Findings

a. A momentary ll-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage was
measured at 55:53:38.

b. A 22.9-amp spike in fuel cell 3 current was measured at
55:53:41.

C. After the electrical transients, CM current and ac bus 2
voltage returned to the values indicated prior to the turn-
on of the fans in oxygen tank no. 2.

Determination

Two short circuits occurred in the oxygen tank no. 2 fan cir-
cuits between 55:53:38 and 55:53:41 which resulted in either
blown fuses or opened wiring, and the second fan ceased to
function.

5-21
26. Finding

Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure rise from 887 to
954 psia between 55:53:36 and 55:54:00. It then remained nearly
constant for about 15 seconds and then rose again from 954 to
1008 psia, beginning at 55:54:15 and ending at 55:54:45.

Determinations

(i) An abnormal pressure rise occurred in oxygen tank no. 2.

(2) Since no other known energy source in the tank could produce
this pressure buildup, it is concluded to have resulted from
combustion initiated by the first short circuit which started
a wire insulation fire in the tank.

27. Findings

a. The pressure relief valve was designed to be fully open at
about i000 psi.

b. Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure drop from
1008 psia at 55:54:45 to 996 psia at 55:54:53, at which time
telemetry data were lost.

Determination

This drop resulted from the normal operation of the pressure
relief valve as verified in subsequent tests.

28. Findings

ao At 55:54:29, when the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2 exceeded
the master caution and warning trip level of 975 psia, the CM
master alarm was inhibited by the fact that a warning of low
hydrogen pressure was already in effect, and neither the crew
nor Mission Control was alerted to the pressure rise.

b •
The master caution and warning system logic for the cryogenic
system is such that an out-of-tolerance condition of one
measurement which triggers a master alarm prevents another
master alarm from being generated when any other parameter in
the same system becomes out-of-tolerance.

Co The low-pressure trip level of the master caution and warning
system for the cryogenic storage system is only i psi below
the specified lower limit of the pressure switch which con-
trols the tank heaters. A small imbalance in hydrogen tank

5-22
pressures or a shift in transducer or switch calibration can
cause the master caution and warning to be triggered pre-
ceding each heater cycle. This occurred several times on
Apollo 13.
d. A limit sense light indicating abnormal oxygen tank no. 2
pressure should have come on in Mission Control about
30 seconds before oxygen tank no. 2 failed. There is no way
to ascertain that the light did, in fact, come on. If it
did come on, Mission Control did not observe it.

Determinations

(i) If the pressure switch setting and master caution and warning
trip levels were separated by a greater pressure differential,
there would be less likelihood of unnecessary master alarms.

(2) With the present master caution and warning system, a space-
craft problem can go unnoticed because of the presence of a
previous out-of-tolerance condition in the same subsystem.

Although a master alarm at 55:54:29 or observance of a limit
sense light in Mission Control could have alerted the crew
or Mission Control in sufficient time to detect the pressure
rise in oxygen tank no. 2_ no action could have been taken
at that time to prevent the tank failure. However_ the in-
formation could have been helpful to Mission Control and the
crew in diagnosis of spacecraft malfunctions.

(4) The limit sense system in Mission Control can be modified to
constitute a more positive backup warning system.

29. Finding

Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a temperature rise of 38 ° F
beginning at 55:54:31 sensed by a single sensor which measured
local temperature. This sensor indicated off-scale low at
55:54:53.

Determinations

(i) An abnormal and sudden temperature rise occurred in oxygen
tank no. 2 at approximately 55:54:31.

(2) The temperature was a local value which rose when combustion
had progressed to the vicinity of the sensor.

(3) The temperature sensor failed at 55:54:53.

5-23
30. Finding

Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry indicated the following changes:
(i) quantity decreased from off-scale high to off-scale low in
2 seconds at 55:54:30, (2) quantity increased to 75.3 percent at
55:54:32, and (3) quantity was off-scale high at 55:54:51 and
later became erratic.

Determinations

(i) Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity data between 55:54:32 and
55:54:50 may represent valid measurements.

(2) Immediately preceding and following this time period, the
indications were caused by electrical faults.

31. Findings


At about 55:54:53, or about half a second before telemetry
loss, the body-mounted linear accelerometers in the command
module, which are sampled at i00 times per second, began
indicating spacecraft motions. These disturbances were
erratic, but reached peak values of 1.17g, 0.65g, and 0.65g
in the X, Y, and Z directions, respectively, about 13 milli-
seconds before data loss.

b. The body-mounted roll, pitch, and yaw rate gyros showed low-
level activity for 1/4 second beginning at 55:54:53.220.


The integrating accelerometers indicated that a velocity
increment of approximately 0.5 fps was imparted to the space-
craft between 55:54:53 and 55:54:55.


Doppler tracking data measured an incremental velocity com-
ponent of 0.26 fps along a line from the Earth to the space-
craft at approximately 55:54:55.

e. The crew heard a loud "bang" at about this time.


Telemetry data were lost between approximately 55:54:53 and
55:54:55 and the spacecraft switched from the narrow-beam
antenna to the wide-beam antenna.

g. Crew observations and photographs showed the bay 4 panel to
be missing and the high-gain antenna to be damaged.

5-24

ILl II E E E E k L '" " ' "
Determinations

(i) The spacecraft was subjected to abnormal forces at approxi-
mately 55:54:53. These disturbances were reactions resulting
from failure and venting of the oxygen tank no. 2 system and
subsequent separation and ejection of the bay 4 panel.

(2) The high-gain antenna was damaged either by the panel or a
section thereof from bay 4 at the time of panel separation.

32. Finding

Temperature sensors in bay 3, bay 4, and the central column of
the SM indicated abnormal increases following reacquisition of
data at 55:54:55.

Determination

Heating took plac e in the SM at approximately the time of panel
separation.

33. Findings

a. The telemetered nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i was off-
scale low at reacquisition of data at 55:54:55.

b. Fuel cell I continued to operate for about 3 minutes past
this time.

Co The wiring to the nitrogen sensor passes along the top of
the shelf which supports the fuel cells immediately above
the oxygen tanks.

Determinations

(i) The nitrogen pressure sensor in fuel cell i or its wiring
failed at the time of the accident.

(2) The failure was probably caused by physical damage to the
sensor wiring or shock.

(3) This is the only known instrumentation failure outside the
oxygen system at that time.

34. Finding

Oxygen tank no. i pressure decreased rapidly from 879 psia to
782 psia at approximately 55:54:54 and then began to decrease
more slowly at 55:54:56.

5-25
Determination

A leak caused loss of oxygen from tank no. i beginning at approxi-
mately 55:54:54.

35. Findings

a. Oxygen flow rates to fuel cells I and 3 decreased in a
5-second period beginning at 55:54:55, but sufficient volume
existed in lines feeding the fuel cells to allow them to
operate about 3 minutes after the oxygen supply valves were
cut off.

b° The crew reported at 55:57:44 that five valves in the reaction
control system (RCS) were closed. The shock required to close
the oxygen supply valves is of the same order of magnitudeas
the shock required to close the RCS valves.

c. Fuel cells i and 3 failed at about 55:58.

Determination

The oxygen supply valves to fuel cells i and 3, and the five RCS
valves, were probably closed by the shock of tank failure or panel
ejection or both.

MISSION EVENTS AFTER ACCIDENT

36. Findings


Since data presented to flight controllers in Mission Control
are updated only once per second, the 1.8-second loss of data
which occurred in Mission Control was not directly noticed.
However, the Guidance Officer did note and report a "hardware
restart" of the spacecraft computer. This was quickly
followed by the crew's report of a problem.

b.
Immediately after the crew's report of a "bang" and a main
bus B undervolt, all fuel cell output currents and all bus
voltages were normal, and the cryogenic oxygen tank indica-
tions were as follows:

5-26
Oxygentank no. i: Pressure: Several hundred psi below
normal

Quantity: Normal

Temperature: Normal

Oxygentank no. 2: Pressure: Off-scale low

Quantity: Off-scale high

Temperature: Off-scale high

C. The nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i indicated zero, which was
incompatible with the hydrogen and oxygen pressures in this
fuel cell_ which were normal. The nitrogen pressure is used
to regulate the oxygen and hydrogen pressure, and hydrogen
and oxygen pressures in the fuel cell would follow the nitro-
gen pressure.

d. Neither the crew nor Mission Control was aware at the time
that oxygen tank no. 2 pressure had risen abnormally just
before the data loss.

e° The flight controllers believed that a probable cause of
these indications could have been a cryogenic storage system
instrumentation failure, and began pursuing this line of in-
vestigation.

Determination

Under these conditions it was reasonable to suspect a cryogenic
storage system instrumentation problem, and to attempt to verify
the readings before taking any action. The fact that the oxygen
tank no. 2 quantity measurement was known to have failed several
hours earlier also contributed to the doubt about the credita-
bility of the telemetered data.

37. Findings

a. During the 3 minutes following data loss, neither the flight
controllers nor the crew noticed the oxygen flows to fuel
cells i and 3 were less than 0.i ib/hr. These were unusually
low readings for the current being drawn.

b. Fuel cells i and 3 failed at about 3 minutes after the data
loss.

5-27
C° After the fuel cell failures, which resulted in dc main
bus B failure and the undervoltage condition on dc main bus A,
Mission Control diverted its prime concern from what was
initially believed to be a cryogenic system instrumentation
problem to the electrical power system.

d.
Near-zero oxygen flow to fuel cells i and 3 was noted after
the main bus B failure, but this was consistent with no power
output from the fuel cells.

e .
The flight controllers believed that the fuel cells could
have been disconnected from the busses and directed the crew
to connect fuel cell i to dc main bus A and fuel cell 3 to
dc main bus B.

f. The crew reported the fuel cells were configured as directed
and that the talkback indicators confirmed this.

Determinations

(1) Under these conditions it was logical for the flight con-
trollers to attempt to regain power to the busses since the
fuel cells might have been disconnected as a result of a short
circuit in the electrical system. Telemetry does not indicate
whether or not fuel cells are connected to busses, and the
available data would not distinguish between a disconnected
fuel cell and a failed one.

(2) If the crew had been aware of the reactant valve closure,
they could have opened them before the fuel cells were starved
of oxygen. This would have simplified subsequent actions.

38. Finding

The fuel cell reactant'valve talkback indicators in the space-
craft do not indicate closed unless both the hydrogen and oxygen
valves are closed.

Determinations

(l) If these talkbacks were designed so that either a hydrogen
or oxygen valve closure would indicate "barberpole," the
Apollo 13 crew could possibly have acted in time to delay
the failure of fuel cells i and 3, although they would never-
theless have failed when oxygen tank no. i ceased to supply
oxygen.

5-28
(2) The ultimate outcome would not have been changed, but had the
fuel cells not failed, Mission Control and the crew would not
have mad to contend with the failure of dc main bus B and ac
bus 2 or attitude control problems while trying to evaluate
the situation.

Reaction Control System

39. Findings

a. The crew reported the talkback indicators for the helium
isolation valves in the SM RCS quads B and D indicated closed
shortly after the dc main bus B failure. The secondary fuel
pressurization valves for quads A and C also were reported
closed.

b° The SM RCS quad D propellant tank pressures decreased until
shortly after the crew was requested to confirm that the
helium isolation valves were opened by the crew.

C° During the l-i/2-hour period following the accident, Mission
Control noted that SM RCS quad C propellant was not being
used, although numerous firing signals were being sent to it.

d. Both the valve solenoids and the onboard indications of valve
position of the propellant isolation valves for quad C are
powered by dc main bus B.

e ° During the l-i/2-hour period immediately following the
accident, Mission Control advised the crew which SM RCS
thrusters to power and which ones to unpower.

Determinations

(i) The following valves were closed by shock at the time of
the accident:

Helium isolation valves in quads B and D

Secondary fuel pressurization valves in quads A and C

(2) The propellant isolation valves in quad C probably were
closed by the same shock.

(3) Mission Control correctly determined the status of the RCS
system and properly advised the crew on how to regain auto-
matic attitude control.

5-29
Managementof Electrical System

40. Findings

a.
After fuel cell I failed, the total dc main bus A load was
placed on fuel cell 2 and the voltage dropped to approxi-
mately 25 volts, causing a caution and warning indication
and a master alarm.

b.
After determining the fuel cell 2 could not supply enough
power to dc main bus A to maintain adequate voltage, the crew
connected entry battery A to this bus as an emergency measure
to increase the bus voltage to its normal operating value.

C. Mission Control directed the crew to reduce the electrical
load on dc main bus A by following the emergency powerdown
checklist contained in the onboard Flight Data File.


When the power requirements were sufficiently reduced so that
the one remaining fuel cell could maintain adequate bus
voltage, Mission Control directed the crew to take the entry
battery off line.

e o
Mission Control then directed the crew to charge this battery
in order to get as much energy back into it as possible,
before the inevitable loss of the one functioning fuel cell.

Determinations

(i) Emergency use of the entry battery helped prevent potential
loss of dc main bus A, which could have led to loss of com-
munications between spacecraft and ground and other vital CM
functions.

(2) Available emergency powerdown lists facilitated rapid re-
duction of loads on the fuel cell and batteries.

Attempts to Restore Oxygen Pressure

41. Findings

a° After determining that the CM problems were not due to in-
strumentation malfunctions, and after temporarily securing
a stable electrical system configuration, Mission Control
sought to improve oxygen pressures by energizing the fan
and heater circuits in both oxygen tanks.

5-30
b. When these procedures failed to arrest the oxygen loss,
Mission Control directed the crew to shut down fuel cells i
and 3 by closing the hydrogen and oxygen flow valves.

Determinations

(i) Under more normal conditions oxygen pressure might have been
increased by turning on heaters and fans in the oxygen tanks;
no other known actions had such a possibility.

(2) There was a possibility that oxygen was leaking downstream
of the valves; had this been true, closing of the valves
might have preserved the remaining oxygen in oxygen tank
no. i.

Lunar Module Activation

42. Findings

a° With imminent loss of oxygen from oxygen tanks no. i and
no. 2, and failing electrical power in the CM, it was
necessary to use the lunar module (LM) as a "lifeboat" for
the return to Earth.

b. Mission Control and the crew delayed LM activation until
about 15 minutes before the SM oxygen supply was depleted.

C° There were three different LM activation checklists contained
in the Flight Data File for normal and contingency situations;
however, none of these was appropriate for the existing situa-
tion. It was necessary to activate the LM as rapidly as
possible to conserve LM consumables and CM reentry batteries
to the maximum extent possible.

d. Mission Control modified the normal LM activation checklist
and referred the crew to specific pages and instructions.
This bypassed unnecessary steps and reduced the activation
time to less than an hour.

e ° The LM inertial platform was aligned during an onboard check-
list procedure which manually transferred the CM alignment to
the LM.

5-31
Determinations

(i) Initiation of LM activation was not undertaken sooner because
the crew was properly more concerned with attempts to conserve
remaining SM oxygen.

(2) Mission Control was able to make workable on-the-spot modifi-
cations to the checklists which sufficiently shortened the
time normally required for powering up the LM.

45. Findings


During the LM powerup and the CSM powerdown, there was a brief
time interval during which Mission Control gave the crew di-
rections which resulted in neither module having an active
attitude control system.

bo
This caused some concern in Mission Control because of the
possibility of the spacecraft drifting into inertial platform
gimbal lock condition.

C.
The Command Module Pilot (CMP) stated that he was not con-
cerned because he could have quickly reestablished direct
manual attitude control if it became necessary.

Determination

This situation was not hazardous to the crew because had gimbal
lock actually occurred, sufficient time was available to re-
establish an attitude reference.

44. Findings

a.
LM flight controllers were on duty in Mission Control at the
time of the accident in support of the scheduled crew entry
into the LM.


If the accident had occurred at some other time during the
translunar coast phase, LM system specialists would not have
been on duty, and it would have taken at least 30 minutes to
get a fully manned team in Mission Control.

Determination

Although LM flight controllers were not required until more than
an hour after the accident, it was beneficial for them to be
present as the problem developed.

5-52
LM Consumables Management

45. Findings

a,
The LM was designed to support two men on a 2-day expedition
to the lunar surface. Mission Control made major revisions
in the use rate of water, oxygen, and electrical power to
sustain three men for the 4-day return trip to the Earth.

b. An emergency powerdown checklist was available in the Flight
Data File on board the LM. Minor revisions were made to the
list to reduce electrical energy requirements to about
20 percent of normal operational values with a corresponding
reduction in usage of coolant loop water.


Mission Control determined that this maximum powerdown could
be delayed until after 80 hours ground elapsed time, allowing
the LM primary guidance and navigation system to be kept
powered up for the second abort maneuver.

d. Mission Control developed contingency plans for further re-
duction of LM power for use in case an LMbattery problem
developed. Procedures for use of CM water in the LM also
were developed for use if needed.

e. Toward the end of the mission, sufficient consumable margins
existed to allow usage rates to be increased above earlier
planned levels. This was done.

f. _hen the LM was jettisoned at 141:30 the approximate remaining
margins were:

Electrical power 4-1/2 hours

Water 5-1/2 hours

Oxygen 124 hours

Determinations

(i) Earlier contingency plans and available checklists were
adequate to extend life support capability of the LM well
beyond its normal intended capability.

(2) Mission Control maintained the flexibility of being able to
further increase the LM consumables margins.

5-33
Modification of LM Carbon Dioxide Removal System

46. Findings

a.
The lithium hydroxide (LiOH) cartridges, which remove water
and carbon dioxide from the LM cabin atmosphere, would have
become ineffective due to saturation at about i00 hours.

b,
Mission rules set maximum allowable carbon dioxide partial
pressure at 7.5mm Hg. LiOH cartridges are normally changed
before cabin atmosphere carbon dioxide partial pressure
reaches this value.

C.
Manned Spacecraft Center engineers devised and checked out a
procedure for using the CM LiOH cannisters to achieve carbon
dioxide removal. Instructions were given on how to build a
modified cartridge container using materials in the space-
craft.

do
The crew made the modification at 93 hours, and carbon
dioxide partial pressure in the LM dropped rapidly from
7.5mm Hg to O.imm Hg.

e.
Mission Control gave the crew further instructions for
attaching additional cartridges in series with the first
modification. After this addition, the carbon dioxide partial
pressure remained below 2mm Hg for the remainder of the Earth-
return trip.

Determination

The Manned Spacecraft Center succeeded in improvising and checking
Out a modification to the filter system which maintained carbon
dioxide concentration well within safe tolerances.

LM Anomaly

47. Findings

a.
During the time interval between 97:13:53 and 97:13:55, LM
descent battery current measurements on telemetry showed a
rapid increase from values of no more than 3 amperes per
battery to values in excess of 30 amperes per battery. The
exact value in one battery cannot be determined because the
measurement for battery 2 was off-scale high at 60 amperes.

5-34
b. At about that time the Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) heard a
"thump" from the vicinity of the LM descent stage.

c. When the LMP looked out the LM right-hand window, he observed
a venting of small particles from the general area where the
LM descent batteries i and 2 are located. This venting con-
tinued for a few minutes.

d. Prior to 97:13 the battery load-sharing among the four
batteries had been equal, but immediately after the battery
currents returned to nominal, batteries i and 2 supplied 9
of the ii amperes total. By 97:23 the load-sharing had re-
turned to equal.

e. There was no electrical interface between the LM and the CSM
at this time.

f. An MSC investigation of the anomaly is in progress.

Determinations

(I) An anomalous incident occurred in the LM electrical system
at about 97:13:53 which appeared to be a short circuit.

(2) The thump and the venting were related to this anomaly.

(9) The apparent short circuit cleared itself.

(4) This anomaly was not directly related to the CSM or to the
accident.

(5) This anomaly represents a potentially serious electrical
problem.

CM Battery Recharging

48. Findings

a.
About one half of the electrical capacity of reentry
battery A (20 of 40 amp-hours) was used during emergency
conditions following the accident. A small part of the
capacity of reentry battery B was used in checking out dc
main bus B at 95 hours. The reduced charge remaining in the
batteries limited the amount of time the CM could operate
after separation from the LM.

5-35
b.
Extrapolation of LM electrical power use rates indicated a
capacity in excess of that required for LM operation for the
remainder of the flight.

C.
Mission Control worked out a procedure for using LM battery
power to recharge CM batteries A and B. This procedure used
the electrical umbilical between the 154 and the CM which
normally carried electrical energy from the CM to the LM.
The procedure was nonstandard and was not included in check-
lists.

d. The procedure was initiated at 112 hours and CM batteries A
and B were fully recharged by 128 hours.

Determination

Although there is always some risk involved in using new, untested
procedures, analysis in advance of use indicated no hazards were
involved. The procedure worked very well to provide an extra
margin of safety for the reentry operation.

Trajectory Changes For Safe Return to Earth

49. Findings


After the accident, it became apparent that the lunar landing
could not be accomplished and that the spacecraft trajectory
must be altered for a return to Earth.

b.
At the time of th@ accident, the spacecraft trajectory was
one which would have returned it to the vicinity of the Earth,
but it would have been left in orbit about the Earth rather
than reentering for a safe splashdown.

c. To return the spacecraft to Earth, the following midcourse
corrections were made:

A 38-fps correction at 61:30, using the LM descent propulsion
system (DPS), required to return the spacecraft to the Earth.

An 81-fps burn at 79:28, after swinging past the Moon, using
the DPS engine, to shift the landing point from the Indian
Ocean to the Pacific and to shorten the return trip by
9 hours.

A 7.8-fps burn at 105:18 using the DPS engine to lower Earth
perigee from 87 miles to 21 miles.

5-36
A 3.2-fps correction at 137:40 using LM RCSthrusters, to
assure that the CMwould reenter the Earth's atmosphere at
the center of its corridor.

d. All course corrections were executed with expected accuracy
and the CM reentered the Earth's atmosphere at 142:40 to
return the crew safely at 142:54, near the prime recovery
ship.

e. Without the CM guidance and navigation system, the crew could
not navigate or compute return-to-Earth maneuver target param-
eters.

Determinations

(1) This series of course corrections was logical and had the
best chance of success because_ as compared to other options_
it avoided use of the damaged SM; it put the spacecraft on a
trajectory, within a few hours after the accident, which had
the best chance for a safe return to Earth; it placed splash-
down where the best recovery forces were located; it shortened
the flight time to increase safety margins in the use of elec-
trical power and water; it conserved fuel for other course
corrections which might have become necessary; and it kept
open an option to further reduce the flight time.

(2) Mission Control trajectory planning and maneuver targeting
were essential for the safe return of the crew.

Entry Procedures and Checklists

50. Findings

a. Preparation for reentry required nonstandard procedures be-
cause of the lack of SM oxygen and electrical power supplies.

b. The SM RCS engines normally provide separation between the
SM and the CM by continuing to fire after separation.

c. Apollo 13 SM RCS engines could not continue to fire after
separation because of the earlier failure of the fuel cells.

d. The CM guidance and navigation system was powered down due to
the accident. The LM guidance and navigation system had also
been powered down to conserve electrical energy and water. A
spacecraft inertial attitude reference had to be established
prior to reentry.

5-37
et
The reentry preparation time had to be extended in order to
accomplish the additional steps required by the unusual situa-
tion.

fe

In order to conserve the CM batteries, LM jettison was de-
layed as long as practical. The LM batteries were used to
supply part of the power necessary for CM activation.

g.
The procedures for accomplishing the final course correction
and the reentry preparation were developed by operations
support personnel under the direction of Mission Control.


An initial set of procedures was defined within 12 hours
after the accident• These were refined and modified during
the following 2 days, and evaluated in simulators at MSC and
KSC by members of the backup crew.

i. The procedures were read to the crew about 24 hours prior to
reentry, allowing the crew time to study and rehearse them.

j •
Trajectory evaluations of contingency conditions for LM and
SM separation were conducted and documented prior to the
mission by mission-planning personnel at MSC.

k. Most of the steps taken were extracted from other procedures
which had been developed, tested, and simulated earlier•

Determinations

(i) The procedures developed worked well and generated no new
hazards beyond those unavoidably inherent in using procedures
which have not been carefully developed, simulated, and
practiced over a long training period.

(2) It is not practical to develop, simulate, and practice pro-
cedures for use in every possible contingency.

51. Findings

ao

During the reentry preparations, after SM jettison, there was
a half-hour period of very poor communications with the CM
due to the spacecraft being in a poor attitude with the LM
present•

b. This condition was not recognized by the crew or by Mission
Control.

5-38
Determination

Some of the reentry preparations were unnecessarily prolonged by
the poor communications, but since the reentry preparation time-
line was not crowded, the delay was more of a nuisance than an
additional hazard to the crew.

52. Findings

a° The crew maneuvered the spacecraft to the wrong LM roll
attitude in preparation for LM jettison. This attitude put
the CM very close to gimbal lock which, had it occurred, would
have lost the inertial attitude reference essential for an
automatic guidance system control of reentry.

b° If gimbal lock had occurred, a less accurate but adequate
attitude reference could have been reestablished prior to
reentry.

Determination

The most significant consequence of losing the attitude reference
in this situation would have been the subsequent impact on the
remaining reentry preparation timeline. In taking the time to
reestablish this reference, less time would have been available
to accomplish the rest of the necessary procedures. The occur-
rence of gimbal lock in itself would not have significantly in-
creased the crew hazard.

5-39
PART 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

i. The cryogenic oxygen storage system in the service module should be
modified to:

a. Remove from contact with the oxygen all wiring, and the unsealed
motors, which can potentially short circuit and ignite adjacent materials;
or otherwise insure against a catastrophic electrically induced fire in
the tank.

b. Minimize the use of Teflon, aluminum, and other relatively com-
bustible materials in the presence of the oxygen and potential ignition
sources.

2. The modified cryogenic oxygen storage system should be subjected to
a rigorous requalification program, including careful attention to po-
tential operational problems.

3. The warning systems on board the Apollo spacecraft and in the Mission
Control Center should be carefully reviewed and modified where appropriate,
with specific attention to the following:

a. Increasing the differential between master alarm trip levels and
expected normal operating ranges to avoid unnecessary alarms.

b. Changing the caution and warning system logic to prevent an out-
of-limits alarm from blocking another alarm when a second quantity in the
same subsystem goes out of limits.

c. Establishing a second level of limit sensing in Mission Control
on critical quantities with a visual or audible alarm which cannot be
easily overlooked.

d. Providing independent talkback indicators for each of the six
fuel cell reactant valves plus a master alarm when any valve closes.

4. Consumables and emergency equipment in the LM and the CM should be re-
viewed to determine whether steps should be taken to enhance their po-
tential for use in a "lifeboat" mode.

5. The Manned Spacecraft Center should complete the special tests and
analyses now underway in order to understand more compl@tely the details
of the Apollo 13 accident. In addition, the lunar module power system
anomalies should receive careful attention. Other NASA Centers should
continue their support to MSC in the areas of analysis and test.

5-40
6. Wheneversignificant anomalies occur in critical subsystems during
final preparation for launch, standard procedures should require a presen-
tation of all prior anomalies on that particular piece of equipment, in-
cluding those which have previously been corrected or explained. Further-
more, critical decisions involving the flightworthiness of subsystems
should require the presence and full participation of an expert who is
intimately familiar with the details of that subsystem.

7. NASAshould conduct a thorough reexamination of all of its spacecraft,
launch vehicle, and ground systems which contain high-density oxygen, or
other strong oxidizers, to identify and evaluate potential combustion
hazards in the light of information developed in this investigation.
8. NASAshould conduct additional research on materials compatibility,
ignition, and combustion in strong oxidizers at various g levels; and on
the characteristics of supercritical fluids. Whereappropriate, new NASA
design standards should be developed.

9. The MannedSpacecraft Center should reassess all Apollo spacecraft
subsystems, and the engineering organizations responsible for them at
MSCand at its prime contractors, to insure adequate understanding and
control of the engineering and manufacturing details of these subsystems
at the subcontractor and vendor level. Wherenecessary, organizational
elements should be strengthened and in-depth reviews conducted on selected
subsystems with emphasis on soundness of design, quality of manufacturing,
adequacy of test, and operational experience.

5-41
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2
5-42

b

NASA -- MSC
.

REPORT OF
- APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

-

APPENDIX A
BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13
l

. FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS

- VATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
c
CONTENTS

Part Page

APPENDIX A - BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT
SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-l

Al APOLLO SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATION .......... A-3

LAUNCH ESCAPE ASSEMBLY .............. A-3

COMMANDMODULE.................. A-3

SERVICE MODULE ................... A-8

SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER .............. A-9

A2 SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION DATA .............. A-11

INTRODUCTION ................... A-11

A2.1 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL ............... A-12

Guidance and Control Systems Interface . . . . . A-12

Attitude Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-12

Attitude Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14

Thrust and Thrust Vector Control . . ...... A-16

A2.2 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM (G&N) . ...... A-18

A2.3 STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM (SCS) ...... A-20

A2.4 SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM (SPS) . . . ...... A-22

A2.5 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS). . . . . ...... A-24

SM RCS Functional Description . . . ...... A-24

CM RCS Functional Description . . . ...... ~-26

~2.6 ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEM . . . . . . . ...... A-28

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-28

iii

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-- ---. -..*---_l----... --.-.--~ --.. -~
___-___o__ll_. -__Y._--
--

Part Page

Functional Description .............. A-30

Major Component/Subsystem Description ...... A-32

Performance and Design Data ........... A-66

Operational Limitations and Restrictions ..... ~-67

Systems Test Meter ................ A-70

Command Module Interior Lighting ......... A-72

A2.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM ............ A-81

Introduction ................... A-81

Functional Description .............. A-83

Oxygen Subsystem ................. A-86

A2.8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ............. A-88 -
Introduction ................... A-88

Functional Description .............. A-89

~2.9 SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS ................. A-90

Introduction ................... A-90

Sequential Events Control Subsystem ....... A-90

Origin of Signals ................ ~-92

A2.10 CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM ............. A-93

Introduction ................... A-93

Functional Description .............. A-93

Major Component Subsystem Description ...... A-93

Operational Limitations and Restrictions ..... A-97

iv

..-l ,....-- _-__---_____- -,.. -..- -_ -
Part Page

A2.11 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-?9

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-99

Timers ...................... A-99

Accelerometer (G-meter) ............. A-99

Command Module Uprighting System . . . . . . . . . A-99

A2.12 CREWPERSONAL EQUIPMENT .............. A-103

A2.13 DOCKING AND TRANSFER ................ A-106

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-106

Functional Description .............. A-109

A3 LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION ........... A-111

INTRODUCTION .................... A-111

LM CONFIGURATION .................. A-111

Ascent Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-114

Descent Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-119

IN - SLA - S-IVB Connections ........... A-119

LM-CSM Interfaces ................ A-119

Stowage Provisions ................ A-122

A4 MISSION CONTROL CENTER ACTIVITIES .......... A-123

INTRODUCTION .................... A-123

MISSION OPERATIONS CONTROLROOM .......... A-128

MCC SUPPORT ROOMS ................. A-131

MISSION SUPPORT AREAS ............... A-133

Communications, Command, and Telemetry
System (CCATS) ................. A-133

Y

__~-_-_.-, .._ . ..----- .I.,. .__ ,.-__- -~--_ .-.. --l----l--l-..--- _-“--l_-.
Part Page

Real-Time Computer Complex (RTCC). . . . . . . . . A-134

A5 EXCERPTS FROM APOLLO FUEL CELL AND CRYOGENIC GAS
STORAGE SYSTEM FLIGHT SUPPORT HANDBOOK . . . . . . . A-139

__.^.

vi

.,___--.-....__I..^
,111- .._^x_-..-l _..l..-^..l-I_ -__ -.-.--~- -__~,-- *-_. ---.-
BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT

SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS

Appendix A is divided into five parts. Part Al briefly describes
the Apollo spacecraft configuration; Part A2 provides a systems descrip-
tion of the Apollo spacecraft configuration with special emphasis on the
electrical power system (EPS); Part A3 describes the lunar module systems;
Part A4 briefly describes the Mission Control Center at Houston, Texas,
and its interface with the spacecraft during the mission; and Part A5
gives a detailed description of the fuel cells and cryogenic gas storage
systems aboard the Apollo spacecraft. This baseline material may not
always represent the precise Apollo 13 configuration in every case, since
there is a continuous updating which is documented periodically. For ex-
ample, Fuel Cell 2 on Apollo 13 was normally connected to bus A in the
distribution system, rather that as described in Part ~2.6.

The data were extracted from the following sources:

APPENDIX A

PART Al Technical Manual SM2A-03-Block II-(l)
and A2 Apollo Operations Handbook Block II Spacecraft,
Volume 1, dated January 15, 1970.

PART A3 Technical Manual LMA790-3-L&l, Apollo Operations
Handbook, Lunar Module, Volume 1, dated February 1,
1970.

PART A4 Manned Spacecraft Center Flight Operations Plan -
H Missions, dated August 31, 1969.

PART A5 Apollo Fuel Cell and Cryogenic Gas Storage System
Flight Support Handbook, dated February 18, 1970,
prepared by Propulsion and Power Division, Manned
Spacecraft Center.

A-l

I~.. I .,. .__ ".----. -.. . _.---.-l-__-l.~ ---- 1--- _l.-l--l__
This page left blank intentionally.

.-

A-2
PART Al

APOLLO SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATION

The Apollo spacecraft consists of a launch escape assembly (LEA),
command module (CM), service module (SM), the spacecraft lunar module
adapter (SLA), and the lunar module (LM). The reference system and
stations are shown in figure Al-l.

LAUNCH ESCAPE ASSEMBLY

The LEA (fig. Al-2) provides the means for separating the CM from
the launch vehicle during pad or first-stage booster operation, This
assembly consists of a Q-ball instrumentation assembly (nose cone),
ballast compartment, canard surfaces, pitch control motor, tower jetti-
son motor, launch escape motor, a structural skirt, an open-frame tower,
and a boost protective cover (BPC). The structural skirt at the base
of the housing, which encloses the launch escape rocket motors, is
secured to the forward portion of the tower. The BPC (fig. Al-31 is
attached to the aft end of the tower to protect the CM from heat during
boost, and from exhaust damage by the launch escape and tower jettison
motors. Explosive nuts, one in each tower leg well, secure the tower
to the CM structure.

COMIWNDMODULE

The CM (fig. Al-b), the spacecraft control center, contains neces-
sary automatic and manual equipment to control and monitor the space-
craft systems; it also contains the required equipment for safety and
comfort of the flight crew. The module is an irregular-shaped, primary
structure encompassed by three heat shields (coated with ablative mater-
ial and joined or fastened to the primary structure) forming a trun-
cated, conic structure. The CM consists of a forward compartment, a
crew compartment, and an aft compartment for equipment. (See fig. Al-b.)

The command module is conical shaped, 11 feet 1.5 inches long, and
12 feet 6.5 inches in diameter without the ablative material. The
ablative material is nonsymmetrical and adds approximately 4 inches to
the height and 5 inches to the diameter.

A-3
.

_...

Figure Al-l.- Block II spacecraft reference stations.

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.-__. I. -.. .I --.lr _.. -- ._ ...--“-_l_*._“. .-~~. -.
Q-MLL (NOSE CONE)
PITCH CONTROL MOTOR

CANARDS JETTISON MOTOR

LAUNCH ESCAPE ASSEMBLY
LAUNCH ESCAPE MOTOR --“. jj/

STRUCTURAL SKIRT
A..

LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

TOWER ATTACHMENT (4) COMMAND MODULE

BOOST PROTECTIVE

CM-SM FAIRING

REACTION CONTR
SYSTEM ENGINES

SERVICE MODULE

EC5 RADIATOR MI

SPS ENGINE EXPANSION NOZZLE

SPACECRAFT LM
ADAPTER (SLA) \

NOTE: LM IS NOT UTILIZED
SOME MISSIONS
ON \
c S-IV8 INSTRUMENT UNIT
(SHOWN AS REFERENCE)

Figure Al-2.- Block II spacecraft configuration.

A-5

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Figure Al-b.- Block II command module.
SERVICE MODULE

The service module (fig. Al-51 is a cylindrical structure formed
by l-inch-thick aluminum honeycomb panels. Radial beams, from milled
aluminum alloy plates, separate the structure interior into six unequal
sectors around a circular center section. Equipment contained within

’ccgq
Sector 4

-Y
1 and 4 are 50-degree sectors
Fuel cell power plant (three)
Helium servicing panel
Super-critical
Super-critical
oxygen tank (two)
hydrogen tank (two)
Reaction control system control unit
2 and 5 are 70-degree sectors Electrical power system power control relay box
3 and 6 are 60-degree sectors Service module jettison controller sequencer (two)

Service module items Sector 5
Environmental control system space radiator
Sector 1
Service propulsion system fuel sump tank
Empty NASA equipment Reaction control system package C-Y axis)
Sector 2
Environmental system space radiator Sector 6
Service propulsion system Environmental control system space radiator
Reaction control system package (+Y -axis) Reaction control system package (-Z axis)
Service propulsion system oxidizer sump tank Service propulsion system fuel storage tank
Sector 3 Center Section
Service propulsion system Service propulsion system helium tank (two)
Reaction control system package (+Z -axis) Service propulsion system engine
Environmental system space radiator Fairing
Service propulsion system oxidizer storage tank Electrical power system space radiator’s (eight)

Figure Al-5.- Service module.

id-8
the service module is accessible through maintenance doors located around
the exterior surface of the module. Specific items, such as propulsion
systems (SPS and RCS), fuel cells, and most of the SC onboard consumables
(and storage tanks) contained in the SM compartments, are listed in
figure Al-5. The service module is 12 feet 11 inches long (high) and
12 feet 10 inches in diameter.

Radial beam trusses on the forward portion of the SM structure
provide a means for securing the CM to the SM. Alternate beams one,
three, and five have compression pads for supporting the CM. Beams two,
four, and six have shear-compression pads and tension ties. A flat
center section in each tension tie incorporates redundant explosive
charges for SM-CM separation. These beams and separation devices are
enclosed within a fairing (26 inches high and 13 feet in diameter) be-
tween the CM and SM.

SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER

The spacecraft LM adapter (SLA) (fig. Al-6) is a large truncated
cone which connects the CSM and S-IVB on the launch vehicle. It houses
the lunar module (LM), the nozzle of the service propulsion system, and
the high-gain antenna in the stowed position. The adapter, constructed
of eight 2-inch-thick aluminum panels, is 154 inches in diameter at the
forward end (CM interface) and 260 inches at the aft end. Separation
of the CSM from the SLA is accomplished by means of explosive charges
which disengage the four SLA forward panels from the aft portion. The
individual panels are restrained to the aft SLA by hinges and acceler-
ated in rotation by pyrotechnic-actuated thrusters. When reaching an
angle of 45 degrees measured from the vehicle's X-axis, spring thrusters
(two per panel) jettison the panels. The panel jettison velocity and
direction of travel is such as to minimize the possibility of recontact
with the spacecraft or launch vehicle.

A-9
Panel separation by
explosive charges

FAM-1503F

Figure Al-6.- Spacecraft LM adapter.
PART A2

SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION DATA

INTRODUCTION

Systems description data include description of operations, compo-
nent description and design data, and operational limitations and restric-
tions. Part 2.1 describes the overall spacecraft navigation, guidance,
and control requirements and the resultant systems interface. Parts A2.2
through A2.10 present data grouped by spacecraft systems, arranged in the
following order: guidance and navigation, stabilization and control, serv-
ice propulsion, reaction control, electrical power, environmental control,
telecommunications, sequential, and caution and warnings. Part A2.11 deals
with miscellaneous systems data. Part A2.12 deals with crew personal
equipment. Part A2.13 deals with docking and crew transfer.

These data were extracted from the technical manual SM2A-03BLOCK II-
(l), Apollo Operations Handbook, Block II Spacecraft, Volume 1, dated
January 15, 1970.

A-11
PART A2.1

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

Guidance and Control Systems Interface

The Apollo guidance and control functions are performed by the
primary guidance, navigation, and control system (PGNCS), and stabili-
zation and control system (SCS). The PGNCS and SCS systems contain
rotational and translational attitude and rate sensors which provide
discrete input information to control electronics which, in turn, inte-
grate and condition the information into control commands to the space-
craft propulsion systems. Spacecraft attitude control is provided by
commands to the reaction control system (RCS). Major velocity changes
are provided by commands to the service propulsion system (SPS).
Guidance and control provides the following basic functions:

a. Attitude reference

b. Attitude control

C. Thrust and thrust vector control.
-
The basic guidance and control functions may be performed automat-
ically, with primary control furnished by the command module computer
(CMC) or manually, with primary control furnished by the flight crew.
The subsequent paragraphs provide a general description of the basic
functions.

Attitude Reference

The attitude reference function (fig. A2.1-1) provides display of
the spacecraft attitude with reference to an established inertial ref-
erence. The display is provided by two flight director attitude indi-
cators (FDAI) located on the main display console, panels 1 and 2. The
displayed information consists of total attitude, attitude errors, and
angular rates. The total attitude is displayed by the FDAI ball. Atti-
tude errors are displayed by three needles across scales on the top,
right, and bottom of the apparent periphery of the ball. Angular rates
are displayed by needles across the top right, and bottom of the FDAI
face.

Total attitude information is derived from the IMU stable platform
or the gyro displ~ coupler (GDC). The IMU provides total attitude by
maintaining a gimbaled, gyro-stabilized platform to an inertial reference
orientation. The GDC provides total attitude by updating attitude infor-
mation with angular rate inputs from Qyro assembly 1 or 2.

A-12

.___^.-.__-.
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ye-------------- -_---L---- -,--v--q
1
I ' GIMBAL - ' GIMBAL
I
ANGLES
I INERTIAL TOTAL ATTITUDE
INERTIAL
COUPLING
ANGLES COMMAND
MODULE
+ DISPLAY
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DATA UNIT
(ICDUl
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ATTITUDE
ERRORS
CREW INPUTS
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PGNCS
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ATTITUDE
RATE -1,

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ATTITUDE ERROR-2
w DIRECTOR
ATTITUDE
ASCP ATTITUDE
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ATTITUDE-2
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I
I I I
I I I
DISPLAY ANGULAR RATES MAIN
I L _____ I ----
' SWITCHING DISPLAY

I I CONSOLE
(MDC)

I I c
scs - 1

Figure A2.1-1.- Guidance and control.
Attitude error information is derived from three sources, The
first source is from zhe II.L? through the coupling Jata unit (CDU) which
c-spares I;?J gimbai angiea with CLIC commanded angles set into the CDU.
Any angular difference between the IMU gimbals and the CDU angles is
sent to the FDAI for display on the attitude error- needles. The second
source is from gyro assembly 1 which contains three (one for each of the
;i, Y, and Z axes) single-degree-of-freedom attitude gyros. Any space-
craft rotation about an axis will offset the case of a gyro from the
float. This rotation is sensed as a displacement off null, and a signal
is picked off which is representative of the magnitude and direction of
rotation. This signal is sent to the FDA1 for display on the attitude
error needles. The third source is from the GDC which develops attitude
errors by comparing angular rate inputs from gyro assembly 1 or 2 with
an internally stored orientation. These data are sent to the FDA1 for
display on the attitude error needles.
Angular rates are derived from either gyro assembly 1 or 2. Nor-
mally, the no. 2 assembly is used; however, gyro assembly 1 may be
switched to a backup rate mode if desired. For developing rate informa-
tion, the gyros are torqued to null when displaced; thus, they will
produce an output only when the spacecraft is being rotated. The output
signals are sent to the FDA1 for display on the rate needles and to the -.
GDC to enable updating of the spacecraft attitude.

Attitude Control

The attitude control function is illustrated in figure A2.1-2. The
control may be to maintain a specific orientation, or to command small
rotations or translations. To maintain a specific orientation, the
attitude error signals, described in the preceding paragraph, are also
r\,uted to the control reaction jet on-off assembly. These signals are
conditioned and applied to the proper reaction jet which fires in the
direction necessary to return the spacecraft to the desired attitude.
The attitude is maintained within specified deadband limits. The dead-
band is limited within both a rate and attitude limit to hold the
spacecraft excursions from exceeding either an attitude limit or angular
rate limit. To maneuver the spacecraft, the reaction jets are fired
automatically under ccmmand of the CMC or manually by flight crew use of
the rotation control, In either case, the attitude control function is
inhibited until the maneuver is completed, Translations of small magni-
tude are performed along the +X axis for fuel settling of SPS propellants
prior to burns, or for a backup deorbit by manual commands of the trans-
lation control. An additional control is afforded by enabling the mini-
mum impulse control at the lower equipment bay. The minimum impulse
control produces one directional pulse of small magnitude each time it is
moved from detent. These small pulses are used to position the spacecraft
for navigational sightings.

A-14
ENERGY STORAGE POWER GENERATION

ENTRY AND ’
POST LANDING
BATTERY A

FUEL CELL

a’I FUEL CELL 1
1 I . 1A 1 Oh - R/C
CRYOGLNtC
SUBSYSTEM i- 1,mz-l No-2 I \ 1 SENSE CKT

ENTRY AND
POST LANDING -
BATTERY B
I
ENTRY AND
POST LANDING I
BATTERY C
4
I I
f
PYRO
BATTERY A

PYRO
BATTERY B
I
INERATION 7 I POWERCONVERSION I POWER DISTRIBUTION

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I I

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-’
SENSE
II
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INVERTER
3M4lNB
PWR

I -A-
(RHE5275j

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I
‘II I I
POWER DISTRlBUTION

MAIN BUS
I SWITCH
F-l (BATA/c)
(MDC-5) I

Motor switches 51 and 52
CIOIC when main bus tic
witches 54 and 55 ore set to
Bat A/C and Bet B/C.

2 FCI coon be connected to
0
SMbusB6 FC3foSMbusA

DC bus cantlot circuit
0
breoksn ore illurtmted in
I MAIN BUS I battety charger ond CM DC
TIE SWITCH bus contml circuits schematic
(BAT B / C)
I 55 (MDC-5)

Figure A2.6l.- Electrical power subsystem block diagram.

A-29

_ -- .
..~ --

( I-

- .-
Functional Description

Energy storage.- The primary source of energy is the cryogenic gas
storage system that provides fuel (H2) and oxidizer (02) to the power
generating system. Two hydrogen and two oxygen tanks, with the asso-
ciated controls and plum.bing, are located in the service module. Storage
of reactants is accomplished under controlled cryogenic temperatures and
pressures; automatic and manual pressure control is provided. Automatic
heating of the reactants for repressurization is dependent on energy de-
mand by the power generating and/or envircnmental control subsystems.
Manual control can be used when required.

A secondary source of energy storage is provided by five silver
oxide-zinc batteries located in the CM. Three rechargeable entry and
postlanding batteries supply sequencer logic power at all times, supple-
mental dc power for peak loads, all operating power required for entry
and postlanding, and can be connected to power either or both pyro cir-
cuits. Two pyro batteries provide energy for activation of pyro devices
throughout all phases of a mission.

Power generation.- Three Bacon-type fuel cell power plants, gener-
ting power through electrochemical reaction of H2 and 02, supply primary
dc power to spacecraft systems until CSM separation. Each power plant is
capable of normally supplying from 400 to 1420 watts at 31 to 27 V dc (at
fuel cell terminals) to the power distribution system. During normal
operation all three power plants generate power, but two are adequate to
complete the mission. Should two of the three malfunction, one power
plant will insure successful mission termination; however, spacecraft
loads must be reduced to operate within the limits of a single power-
plant.

Normal fuel cell connection to the distribution system is: fuel
cell 1 to main dc bus A; fuel cell 2 to main dc busses A and B; ax-&fuel
cell 3 to main dc bus B. Manual switch control is provided for power
plant connection to the distribution system, and manual and/or automatic
control for power plant isolation in case of a malfunction.

During the CSM separation maneuver, the power plants supply power
through the SM buses to two SM jettison control sequencers. The sequen-
cers sustain SM RCS retrofire during CSM separation and fire the SM
positive roll RCS engines 2 seconds after separation to stabilize the SM
during entry. Roll engine firing is terminated 7.5 seconds after separa-
tion. The power plants and SM buses are isolated from the umbilical
through a SM deadface. The sequencers are connected to the SM buses when
the CM/SM SEP switch (MDC-2) is activated; separation occurs 100 milli-
seconds after switch activation.

L

A-30
Power conversion.- Primary dc power is converted into ac by solid
state static inverters that provide 115/200-volt 400-cps 3-phase ac power
up to 1250 volt-amperes each. The ac power is connected by motor switch
controls +Uo twc ac buses for distribution to the ac loads. One inverter
has the capability of supplying all spacecraft primary ac power. One
inverter can power both buses while the two remaining inverters act as
redundant sources. However, throughout the flight, each bus is powered
by a separate inverter. Provisions are made for inverter isolation in
the event of malfunctions. Inverter outputs cannot be phase synchro-
nized; therefore, interlocked motorized switching circuits are incor-
porated to prevent the connection of two inverters to the same bus.

A second conversion unit, the battery charger, assures keeping the
three entry and postlanding batteries in a fully charged state. It is a
solid state device utilizing dc from the fuel cells and ac from the in-
verter to develop charging voltage,

Power distribution.- Distribution of dc power is accomplished via
two redundant dc buses in the service module which are connected to two
redundant buses in the command module through a SM deadface, the CSM
umbilical, and a CM deadface. Additional buses provided are: two dc
buses for servicing nonessential loads: a flight bus for servicing in-
flight telecommunications equipment; two battery buses for distributing
power to sequencers, gimbal motor controls, and servicing the battery
relay bus for power distribution switching; and a flight and postlanding
bus for servicing some communications equipment and the postlanding loads.

Three-phase ac is distributed via two redundant ac buses, providing
bus selection through switches in the ac-operated component circuits.

Fower to the lunar module is provided through two umbilicals which
are manually connected after completion of transposition and docking,
An average of 81 watts dc is provided to continuous heaters in the abort
sensor assembly (ASA), and cycling heaters in the landing radar, rendez-
vous radar, S-band antenna, and inertial measurement unit (IMU). Power
consumption with all heaters operating simultaneously is approximately
309 watts. LM floodlighting is also powered through the umbilical for
use during manned lunar module operation while docked with the CSM.

A dc sensing circuit monitors voltage on each main dc bus, and an
ac sensing circuit monitors voltage on each ac bus. The dc sensors pro-
vide an indication of an undervoltage by illuminating a warning light.
The ac sensors illuminate a warning light when high- or low-voltage limits
are exceeded. In addition, the ac sensors activate an automatic discon-
nect of the inverter from the ac bus during an overvoltage condition.
The ac overload conditions are displayed by illumination of an overload
warning light and are accompanied by a low voltage light. Additional

A-31

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sensors monitor fuel cell overload and reverse current conditions, pro-
viding an automatic disconnect, together with visual indications of the
disconnect whenever either condition is exceeded.

Switches, meters, lights, and talk-back indicators are provided for
controlling and monitoring all functions of the EPS.

Major Component/Subsystem Description

The subsequent paragraphs describe the cryogenic storage subsystem
and each of the various EPS components.

Cryogenic storage.- The cryogenic storage subsystem (figs. ~2.6-2
and ~2.6-3) supplies hydrogen to the EPS, and oxygen to the EPS, ECS, and
for initial LM pressurization. The two tanks in the hydrogen and oxygen
systems are of sufficient size to provide a safe return from the furthest
point of the mission on the fluid remaining in any one tank. The physical
data of the cryogenic storage subsystem are as follows:

Approximate
Minimum Approximate --
Weight Design quantities at
allowable flow rate
of usable storage minimum heater
operating at min dq/dm
cryogenics pressure
pressure (+li;5',F e;viro;m;nt: an~pef~nt~~$ing
(lb/tank) bia>
(psi4 lb hr- an s
(min dq/dm)

O2 320 (min) 900235 150 1.71 45 to 25%
H2 28 (min) 245 (+15, 100 0.140 53 to 33%
-20)

Initial pressurization from fill to operating pressures is accom-
plished by GSE. After attaining operating pressures, the cryogenic fluids
are in a single-phase condition, therefore, completely homogeneous. This
avoids sloshing which could cause sudden pressure fluctuations, possible
damage to internal components, and prevents positive mass quantity gaug-
ing. The single-phase expulsion process continues at nearly constant
pressure and increasing temperature above the 2-phase region.

-

A-32
.
+28 VDC CAUTIC
c‘""'"'" FILL VENTtGSEI (OV-1) WARN11
SYSTEh
- 02 CRYOPRESS(MDC-2) .

;OXYCEN FILL VALVE (GSE) (OF-l)
1 I 07 4 09 -
L 02 PRESS
IND WC-2 1
S"R0E FROM:SURGE TANK

K
DENSITY TANK PRESSURE
SIGNAL DENSITY
CONDITIONER SENSOR
PROBE rWK1
Q -I I

FAN MOTORS

,
I HEATERS t I

-J
L -C
-
I -
, OXYGEN RELIEF VENT (ORI
,-, n
"2 - "2
/ I -;(
HEATERS,

'I 1 9 2
4.
CRYOGENIC TAMS

DENSITYSIGNAL
CONDITIONER

,-OXYGEN FILL VALVE IGSEI (OF-Z)
II I
I - 07L II II L I, L
I
I- -
02 02 - 0
~z OXYGEN FILLVENT IGSE) (OV-2)

I, - 1
02
I
I
L
OXYGEN PUPGE VALVE IGSE) (OP) I
- 02 02 o2 - 0.
I I ,

Figure ~2.6-2.- Cryogenic stcrage subsystem (oxygen).

A-34
& TANK 1 & TANK 2
PRESS XDUCERS
ZRYO PRESS[MDC- 2)

I I I I I I
D-
02 TANK NO. 1 MOTOR SWITCH CONTACTS 0
02 TANK NO. 2
MOTOR SWITCH
CONTACTS

I I CONTACTS

AL
SM MAIN DC BUS Bl p ~ ’
F ” OF

II C

1
m MAIN D-C t
I I I I

I I I I
I
TO. FUEL CELL SHUTOFF VALVES

02 VAC ION PUMPS
A MN A (RHEB 229)
5A”

A MN 8 IRHEB 229)
05A0
:ENIC TAMS 02 HEATERS -2 j
CRYOGENIC 02 HTR-2 (MDC- 2)
MNB tRHEB-226) AUTO ( rl’
I L

OFF

ON
0 PRESSURE AND MOTOR
SWITCHES ARE SHOWN
02 IN LOW PRESSURE POSITION ON
TO
ECS

I
H? TAN-K 2
DiNSlTY 8 TEhtP
5 IGNAL COND

1 i

. . .
I . .-._
1\ H2TANK 1

-L
0, TANK NO. 2
~TOR sw lTcH
DENSITY & TEh4P
SIGNAL COND

QTY AMPL 1
AC I (RHER-2261
‘\TACTS @ CONTACTS

CRYOGENIC
FAN MOTORS
02 FANS -1 TANK 1
1MDC-2 I A-C BUS
AC2 (RHEB-2261
NO. 1

II OFF c.+o-
- 2A -

:RYOGENIC FAN MOTORS
TANK 2 A-C BUS
AC2 (RHEB-226)

ON
I

I
I
-l H2 TANK 2
DENSITY C TEMP H2FANS - 2 SWITCH
IMDC - 21 -
SIGNAL COND I
4
H2FANS - 1 SWITCH d
IMDC - 21
r, HYDROGEN FILL VENT IGSE) IHV-1)
1

HYDROGEN FILL VALVE (GSE) (HF-1)

C H2
I
I

CONDITIONER

I iMPL 1

\ HYDROGEN RELIEF! VENT (FLYAWAY UMBILICAL) (HR)
H2 - H2
/

CRYOGENIC TANKS

c HYDROGEN FILL VALVE (CSE) (HF-21 ION
PUMP
H2 - H2
r\ HYDROGEN FILL VENT IGSE) IHV-2) H2

I, - I
Li
HYDROGEN PURGE VALVE IGSE) (HP)
H2 - H2 9

FROM CB
CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS TANK 2 AC2 (RHEE-226)
CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS TANK 1 AC1 (RHEB-2261
H2

TEMP
TEMP SIGNAL
‘OGEN SENSOR CONOITIONFR ITT” I

SM MAIN DC
I I
-I I- CM r)-CMAlN

l-

VAC PS/,.q I;;y= II
ION
KiNAD” VALVE
PUMP

A
- H2

Hz -

CRYOGENIC H2 HTR 2 -
q$F//glm ._ ._. TANKsm ,
D-&IN MN B (RHEB-226)
BUS B
[
I-
IRE TANK NO. 2 0
PRESSURE
SWITCH

1 FILTER

I
Hz - H2 H2 - H2 H2
Ii2 TANK NO. 2
MOTOR SWITCH
Ii2 TANK NO. 1 MOTOR tiITCH CONTACTS (j) , CONTACTS
_ 1

H FANS -1
L DC-2)
AUTO
- 6C
OFF v
/
-C MAIN
BUS A \
H2 HEATERS - 1
CRYOGENIC H2 HTR l- (MDC-2)
MN A IRHEB-226)
AUTO
\
w OFF - H2 HEATERS -
\ - H2 FANS --,
0

H2 FANS -2
(MDC-2)
AUTO
- *A
OFF wT+
CRYOGENIC H2 HlR 2-
MN B (RHEB-22%) 71
---A
- OFF
0 -1
ON
---

01 PRESSUREAND MOTOR SWITCHES ARE
SHOWN IN LOW PRESSUREPOSITION

02 VAC ION PUMP FUSES OPENED
DURING PRELAUNCH COUNTDOWN

Figure ~2.6-3.- Cryogenic storage subsystem (hydrogen)

A-35
Two parallel dc heaters in each tank supply the heat necessary to
maintain design pressures. Two parallel 3-phase ac circulating fans
circulate the fluid over the heating elements to maintain a uniform den-
sity and decrease the probability of stratification. A typical heater
and fan installation is shown in figure A2.6-4. Relief valves provide
overpressure relief, check_valves provide tank isolation, and individual
fuel cell shutoff valves provide isolation of malfunctioning power plants.
Filters extract particles from the flowing fluid to protect the ECS and
EPS components. The pressure transducers and temperature probes indicate
the thermodynamic state of the fluid. A capacitive quantity probe in-
dicates quantity of fluid remaining in the tanks.

FAN &MOTOR

CAPYl1lvE
PRORE- ‘I
v

ENCASED
INTERNALLY

Figure A2.6-4.- Cryogenic pressurization and quantity
measurement devices.
c

,

A-36
Repressurization of the systems can be automatically or manually
controlled by switch selection. The automatic mode is designed to give
a single-phase reactant flow into the feed lines at design pressures.
The heaters and fans are automatically controlled through a pressure
switch-motor switch arrangement. As pressure in the tanks decreases,
the pressure switch in each tank closes to energize the motor switch,
closing contacts in the heater and fan circuits. Both tanks have to de-
crease in pressure before heater and fan circuits are energized. When
either tank reaches the upper operating pressure limit, that respective
pressure switch opens to again energize the motor switch, thus opening
the heater and fan circuits to both tanks. The 02 circuits are energized
at 865 psia minimum and de-energized at 935 psia maximum. The H2 circuits
energize at 225 psia minimum and de-energize at 260 psia maximum. The
most accurate quantity readout will be acquired shortly after the fans
have stopped. During all other periods partial stratification may de-
grade quantity readout accuracy.

When the systems reach the point where heater and fan cycling is at
a minimum (due to a reduced heat requirement), heat leak of the tank is
sufficient to maintain design pressures, provided flow is within the min
dq/dm values shown in the preceding tabulation. This realm of operation
is referred to as the min dq/dm region. The minimum heat requirement
region for oxygen starts at approximately 45-percent quantity and ter-
minates at approximately 25-percent quantity. Between these tank quan-
tities, minimum heater and fan cycling will occur under normal usage.
The amount of heat required for repressurization at quantities below
25-percent starts to increase until below the j-percent level practically
continuous heater and fan operation is required. In the hydrogen system,
the quantity levels for minimum heater and fan cycling are between ap-
proximately 53 and 33 percent, with continuous operation occurring at
approximately the 5 percent-level.

Assuming a constant level flow from each tank (02 - 1 lb/hr,
0.09 lb/hr) each successive repressurization period is of longer
H2 -
duration. The periods between repressurizations lengthen as quantity
decreases from full to the minimum dq/dm level, and become shorter as
quantity decreases from the minimum dq/dm level to the residual level.
Approximate repressurization periods are shown in table A2.6-I, which
also shows the maximum flow rate in pounds per hour from a single tank
with the repressurization circuits maintaining minimum design pressure.

The maximum continuous flow that each cryogenic tank can provide at
minimum design pressure is dependent on the quantity level and the heat
required to maintain that pressure. The heat required to maintain a con-
stant pressure decreases as quantity decreases from full to the minimum

A-37
dq/dm point. As quantity decreases beyond the minimum dq/dm region, the
heat required to maintain a constant pressure increases. As fluid is
withdrawn, a specific amount of heat is withdrawn. When the withdrawal
rate exceeds the heat that can be supplied by the heaters, fan motors,
and heat leak, there is a resultant pressure decrease below the minimum
design operating level.

The ability to sustain pressure and flow is a factor of the amount
of heat required versus the heat provided by heaters, fan motors, and
heat leak. Since heat leak characteristics of each tank vary slightly,
the flow each tank can provide will also vary to a small degree. Heat
input from heaters, fan motors, and heat leak into an 02 tank is
595.87 Btu/hour (113.88-watt heaters supply 389.67 Btu, 52.8-watt fan
motors supply 180.2 Btu, and heat leak supplies 26 Btu). Heat input from
similar sources into a H2 tank is 94.6 Btu/hr (18.6-watt heaters supply
63.48 Btu, 7-watt fan motors supply 23.89 Btu, and heat leak supplies
7.24 Btu). These figures take into consideration the line loss between
the power source and the operating component.

TABLE ~2.6-I.- OXYGENAND HYDROGENREPRESSURIZATION AND FLOW.

Wren
Quantity Repressurization
Flow at
(percent) time, minutes
(865 to 935 psia) 865 psia
100 4.0 3.56 20.0 0.38
4.3 21.0 0.42
:z 4.6 '4.;:
. 22.0 0.46
85
80
75
5:: I 5.27
6.02
7.01
23.0
24.5
26.5
0.49
0.52
0.65
2:; 7.94 28.5 0.76
:p 7.4 9.01 31.0 0.80
60 8.7 10.80 33.5 0.87
55 9.6 12.54 36.0 0.93
10.8 14.19 39.0 0.97
z; 11.5 15.69 41.0 0.98
40 12.4 17.01 41.0 0.97
12.6 17.56 41.0 0.94
52 13.0 17.56 40.5 0.91
25 13.1 16.55 40.5 0.83
20 42.0 0.71
1.5 47.0 0.54
10 58.0 0.37
'I . 5 71.0 0.23
5 Continuous 0.16

A-38

-. --.. I..-.-- -I_i_^-----_-.--~ll~-IIII1l~. __;__-. __.I.~- --.-
.I____ I__ -
To avoid excessive temperatures, which could be realized during con-
tinuous heater and fan operation at extremely low quantity levels, a
thermal sensitive interlock device is in series with each heater element.
The device automatically opens the heater circuits when internal tank
shell temperatures reach +9G" F., and closes the circuits at +7G" F.
Assuming normal consumption, oxygen temperature will be approximately
-157" F., at mission termination, while hydrogen temperature will be
approximately -385" F.

The manual mode of operation bypasses the pressure switches, and
supplies power directly to the heaters and/or fans through the individual
control switches. It can be used in case of automatic control failure,
heater failure, or fan failure.

Tank pressures and quantities are monitored on meters located on
MIX-2. The caution and warning system (CRY0 PRESS) will alarm when
oxygen pressure in either tank exceeds 950 psia or falls below 8GG psia.
The hydrogen system alarms above 270 psia and below 220 psia. Since a
common lamp is provided, reference must be made to the individual pressure
and quantity meters (MDC-2) to determine the malfunctioning tank. Tank
pressures, quantities, and reactant temperatures of each tank are telem-
etered to MSFN.

Oxygen relief valves vent at a pressure between 983 and 1010 psig
and reseat at 965 psig minimum. Hydrogen relief valves vent at a pressure
between 273 and 285 psig, and reseat at 268 psig minimum. Full flow
venting occurs approximately 2 pounds above relief valve opening pressure.

All the reactant tanks have vat-ion pumps to maintain the integrity
of the vacuum between the inner and outer shell, thus maintaining heat
leak at or below the design level. SM main de bus A distributes power
to the H2 tank 1 pump and bus B to the H2 tank 2 pump. Fuses provide
power source protection. These fuses are removed during prelaunch to
disable the circuit for flight. Circuit breakers, G2 VAC ION PUMPS -
MNA- MJTB (m-29), Provide power source protection for the CM main
buses, which distribute power to the O2 vat-ion pumps. The circuit
breakers allow use of the O2 vat-ion pump circuits throughout flight, and
provide a means of disabling circuit if necessary. The O2 circuit breakers
are opened on the launch pad, and closed at 90 percent tank quantity.

The most likely period of overpressurization in the cryogenic system
will occur during operation in the minimum dq/dm region. The possibility
of overpressurization is predicted on the assumption of a vacuum break-
down, resulting in an increase in heat leak. Also, under certain con-
ditions, that is, extremely low power levels and/or a depressurized cabin,

A-39

~*-_....
-- __ ‘.__”-.,.. _.-.--. --. . _...,“.---. __cI_ -- .-__..
- --.x_I-
demand may be lower than the minimum dq/dm flow necessary. Any of the
preceding conditions would result in an increase of pressure within a
tank.

In the case of hydrogen tank overpressurization, prior to reaching
relief valve cracking pressure, tank pressure can be decreased by per-
forming an unscheduled fuel cell hydrogen purge. A second method for
relieving overpressure is to increase electrical loads, thus increasing
fuel cell demand. However, in using this method, consideration must be
given to the fact that there will be an increase in oxygen consumption,
which may not be desirable.

Several procedures can be used to correct an overpressure condition
in the oxygen system. One is to perform an unscheduled fuel cell purge.
A second is to increase oxygen flow into the command module by opening
the ECS DIRECT O2 valve. The third is to increase electrical loads,
which may not be desirable because this method will also increase hydro-
gen consumption.

A requirement for an overpressure correction in both reactant sys-
tems simultaneously is remote, since both reactant systems do not reach
the minimum dq/dm region in parallel.
.
During all missions, to retain a single tank return capability, there
is a requirement to maintain a balance between the two tanks in each of
the reactant systems. When a 2- to b-percent difference is indicated on
the oxygen quantity meters (MIX-2), the O2 HEATERS switch (MDC-2) of the
lesser tank is positioned to OFF until tank quantities equalize. A
3-percent difference in the hydrogen quantity meters (MDC-2) will require
positioning the H2 BEATERS switch (MDC-2) of the lesser tank to OFF until
tank quantities equalize. This procedure retains the automatic operation
of the repressurization circuits, and provides for operation of the fan
motors during repressurization to retain an accurate quantity readout in
all tanks. The necessity for balancing should be determined shortly after
a repressurization cycle, since quantity readouts will be most accurate at
this time.

Batteries.- Five silver oxide-zinc storage batteries are incorporated
in the EPS. These batteries are located in the CM lower equipment bay.

Three rechargeable entry and postlanding batteries (A, B, and C)
power the CM systems after CSM separation and during postlanding. Prior
to CBI separation, the batteries provide a secondary source of power while
the fuel cells are the primary source. The entry batteries are used for
the following purposes:

A-40
a. Provide CM power after CSM separation

b. Supplement fuel cell power during peak load periods (Delta V
maneuvers)

C. Provide power during emergency operations (failure of two fuel
cells)

d. Provide power for EPS control circuitry (relays, indicators,
etc.)

e. Provide sequencer logic power

f. Provide power for recovery aids during postlanding

g* Batteries A, B, or C can power pyro circuits by selection.

Each entr;{ and postlanding battery is mounted in a vented plastic
case and consists of 20 silver oxide-zinc cells connected in series.
The cells are individually encased in plastic containers which contain
relief valves that open at 35 + 5 psig, venting during an overpressure
into the battery case. The three cases can be vented overboard through
a common manifold, the BATTERY VENT valve (RHEB-252), and the ECS waste
water dump line.

Since the BATTERY VENT is closed prior to lift-off, the interior of
the battery cases is at a pressure of one atmosphere. The pressure is
relieved after earth orbit insertion and completion of cabin purge by
positioning the control to VENT for 5 seconds. After completion the
control is closed, and pressure as read out on position 4A of the System
Test Meter (LEB-101) should remain at zero unless there is battery out-
gassing. Gutgassing can be caused by an internal battery failure, an
abnormal high-rate discharge, or by overcharging. If a pressure increase
is noted on the system test meter, the BATTERY VENT is positioned to VENT
for 5 seconds, and reclosed. Normal battery charging procedures require
a check of the battery manifold after completion of each recharge.

Since the battery vent line is connected to the waste water dump
line, it provides a means of monitoring waste water dump line plugging,
which would be indicated by a pressure rise in the battery manifold line
when the BATTERY VENT control is positioned to VENT.

Each battery is rated at 40-ampere hours (AH) minimum and will de-
liver this at a current output of 35 amps for 30 minutes and a subsequent
output of 2 amps for the remainder of the rating.

A-41
At Apollo mission loads, each battery is capable of providing 45 AH
and will provide this amount after each complete recharge cycle. How-
ever, 40 AH is used in mission planning for inflight capability, and
45 AH for postlanding capability of a fully charged battery.

Open circuit voltage is 37.2 volts. Sustained battery loads are
extremely light (2 to 3 watts); therefore, a battery bus voltage of
approximately 34 V dc will be indicated on the spacecraft voltmeter, ex-
cept when the main bus tie switches have been activated to tie the battery
outputs to the main dc buses. Normally, only batteries A and B will be
connected to the main de buses. Battery C is isolated during prelaunch
by opening the MAIN A-BAT C and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers (RHEB-275).
Battery C will therefore provide a backup for main dc bus power in case
of failure of battery A or B or during the time battery A or B is being
recharged. The two-battery configuration provides more efficient use of
fuel cell power during peak power loads and decreases overall battery
recharge time. The M&IN A- and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers are closed
prior to CSM separation or as required during recharge of battery A or B.

Battery C, through circuit breakers BAT C to BAT BUS A and BAT C to
BAT BUS B (RHEB-250), provides backup power to the respective battery bus
in the event of failure of entry battery A or B. These circuit breakers
are normally open until a failure of battery A or B occurs. This circuit -
can also be used to recharge battery A or B in the event of a failure in
the normal charging circuit.

The two pyrotechnic batteries supply power to initiate ordnance de-
vices in the SC. The pyrotechnic batteries are isolated from the rest of
the EPS to prevent the high-power surges in the pyrotechnic system from
affecting the EPS, and to insure source power when required. These
batteries are not to be recharged in flight. Entry and postlanding
oattery A, B, or C can be used as a redundant source of power for ini-
tiating pyro circuits in the respective A or B pyro system, if either
pyro battery fails, This can be performed by proper manipulation of the
circuit breakers on RHEB-250. Caution must be exercised to isolate the
failed pyro battery by opening the PYRO A (B) SE& A (B) circuit breaker,
prior to closing the yellow colored BAT BUS A (B) to PYRO BUS TIE circuit
breaker.

-

A-42
Performance characteristics of each SC battery are as follows:

Rated open Ambient
capacity circuit Nominal Minimum
Battery battery
per voltage voltage voltage
temperature
battery (max.)
Entry and 40 amp-hrs 37.8 V dc mar 29 V dc 27 V dc 50” to
Postlanding (25 ampere (37.2 V dc i; (35 amps (35 amps 110" F
A, B, and rate) flight) load) load)
c (3)

Pyre A and 0.75 amp- 37.8 V dc max 23 v dc 20 v dc 60” to
B (2) hrs (75 (37.2 V dc ir (75 amps (75 amps 110" F
amps for flight) load) load)
36 seconds) (32 V dc
open
circuit)

NOTE: Pyro battery load voltage is not measurable in the SC due to the
extremely short time they power pyro loads.

Fuel cell power plants.- Each of the three Bacon-type fuel cell
power plants is individually coupled to a heat rejection (radiator) sys-
tem, the hydrogen and oxygen cryogenic storage systems, a water storage
system, and a power distribution system. A typical power plant schematic
is shown in figure A2.L5.
The power plants generate dc power on demand through an exothermic
chemical reaction. The by-product water is fed to a potable water stor-
age tank in the CM where it is used for astronaut consumption and for
cooling p'zposes in the ECS. The amount of water produced is equivalent
to the power produced which is relative to the reactant consumed. (See
table ~2.6-11.)
TABLE ~2.6-II.- REACTANTCONSWTIOPJurn WATERPRODUCTION

Load
(amps 1

0.5
O2 lb/hr

0.0102
T H2 lb/hr

0.001285
H2°
Ib/hr

0.01149
T x/hr

5.21
1 0.0204 0.002570 0.02297 10.42
2 0.0408 0.005140 0.04594 20.84
3 0.0612 0.007710 0.0689i 31.26
4 0.0816 0.010280 0.09188 41.68
5 0.1020 0.012850 0.11485 52.10
6 0.1224 0.015420 0.13782 62.52
7 0.1428 0.017990 0.16079 72.94
8 0.1632 0.020560 0.18376 83.36
9 0.1836 0.023130 0.20673 93.78
10 0.2040 0.025700 0.2297 104.20
15 0.3060 0.038550 0.34455 156.30
20 0.4080 0.051400 0.45940 208.40
25 0.5100 0.064250 0.57425 260.50
30 0.6120 0.077100 0.68910 3~2.60
35 0.7140 0.089950 0.80395 364.70
40 0.8160 0.10280 0.91880 416.80
'15 0.9180 0.11565 I.03365 448.90
50 1.0200 0.12850 1.1485 521.00
55 1.1220 0.14135 1.26335 573.10
60 1.2240 0.15420 1.3782 625.20
65 1.3260 0.16705 1.49305 677.30
70 i .4280 0.17990 1.6079 729.40
75 1.5300 0.19275 1.72275 781.50
80 1.6320 0.20560 1.83760 833.60
85 1.7340 0.21845 1.95245 885.70
90 1.8360 0.23130 2.06730 937.90
95 1.9380 0.24415 2.18215 989.00
100 2.0400 0.25700 2.2970 1042.00
XMIJLAS:
O2 = 2.04 x lO-2 I H20 = 10.42 cc/amp/hr
H = 2.57 x 10 -3 I H20 = 2.297 x 10m2 lb/amp/hr
2

A-44

-----.“.~ .._. ---~~--___-
I 1111II I I I I I I I
IIIII I I I
1111II I I I I I I I
I

uxYGEN GAS PURITY LEVEL (% BY VOLUME)

1,i e;ure AZ. 6- '(.- O2 gas purity effect on purge interval.

A-49
I
tiiii i i i I I
/ /Ml I I

/ //
///: I
/‘A%’
SPiC I-klRIfY

HYDROGEN GAS INERT LEVEL (P;hl)
II I
10,000 libb 100 10
0.1 11 1 I
99.0 99.9 99.99 99.999
HYDROGEN GAS PURITY LEVEL f% BY VOLUME)

Figure A2.6-8.- H2 gas purity effect on purge interval.

-

A-50

I - . ..-.... 1 . __l_"-^"--.- .---..-_.
voltage, resulting from a decreased load, is followed by a gradual de-
crease in fuel cell skin temperature which causes a decrease in terminal
voltage.

The range in which the terminal voltage is permitted to vary is de-
termined by the high and low voltage input design limits of the compo-
nents being powered. For most components the limits are 30 volts dc and
25 volts de. To remain within these design limits, the dc bus voltage
must be maintained between 31.0 and 26.2 volts dc. To compensate for
cyclic loads, it is recommended sustained bus voltage be maintained be-
tween 26.5 and 30.0 V dc. Bus voltage is maintained within prescribed
limits by the application of entry and postlanding batteries during load
increases (power up). Load increase or decrease falls well within the
limits of power supply capability and, under normal conditions, should
not require other than normal checklist procedures.

Power up.- Powering Up SpaCeCraft systems is performed in one con-
tinuous sequence providing the main bus voltage does not decrease below
26.5 volts. If bus voltage decreases to this level, the power up sequence
can be interrupted for the time required for fuel cell temperatures to
increase with the resultant voltage increase or the batteries can be con-
nected to the main buses thus reducing the fuel cell load. In most cases,
powering up can be performed in one continuous sequence; however, when
starting from an extremely low spacecraft load, it is probable that a
power up interruption or earlier battery coupling may be required. The
greatest load increase occurs while powering up for a delta V maneuver.

Power down.- Powering down spacecraft systems is performed in one
continuous sequence providing the main bus voltage does not increase
above 31.0 volts. Powering down from relatively high spacecraft load
levels, that is, following a delta V, the sequence may have to be inter-
rupted for the time required for fuel cell temperature, and as a result,
bus voltage to decrease. To expedite power down, one fuel cell can be
disconnected from the buses increasing the loads on the remaining fuel
cells and decreasing bus voltage, thus allowing continuation of the power
down sequence.

Fuel cell disconnect.- If the requirement arises to maintain a
power plant on open circuit, temperature decay would occur at an average
rate of approximately 6 deg/hr, with the automatic in-line heater cir-
cuit activating at a skin temperature of 385’ F and maintaining power
plant temperature at 385” F. In-line heater activation can be confirmed
by a 4.5- to 6-amp indication as observed on the dc amps meter (MDC-3)
with the de indicator switch positioned to the open circuited fuel cell
position. Reactant valves remain open. Fuel cell pumps can be turned
off until the in-line heater circuit activates, at which time they must
be on.

A-51
Closing of reactant valves during a power plant disconnect is de-
pendent on the failure experienced. If power plant failure is such as
to allow future use, that is, shutdown due to partially degraded output,
it is recommended the reactant valves remain open to provide a positive
reactant pressure. The valves should be closed after power-plant skin
temperature decays below 300" F. The reactant valves are closed during
initial shutdown, if the failure is a reactant leak, an abnormally high
regulator output pressure, or complete power-plant failure.

Prior to disconnecting a fuel cell, if a single inverter is being
used, each of the remaining power plants is connected to both main de
buses to enhance load sharing since bus loads are unbalanced. If two
inverters are being used, main de bus loads are relatively equal; there-
fore, each of the remaining power plants is connected to a separate main
dc bus for bus isolation. If one power plant had been placed on open
circuit for an extended period of time , prior to powering up to a con-
figuration requiring three power plants, reconnecting is accomplished
prior to the time of heavy load demands. This permits proper conditioning
of the power plant which has been on open circuit. The time required for
proper conditioning is a function of skin temperature increase and the
load applied to the power plant.

Inverters.- Each inverter (fig. ~2.6-9) is composed of an oscillator, ._
an eight-stage digital countdown section, a de line filter, two silicon
controlled rectifiers, a magnetic amplifier, a buck-boost amplifier, a
demodulator, two dc filters, an eight-stage power inversion section, a
harmonic neutralization transformer, an ac output filter, current sensing
transformers, a Zener diode reference bridge, a low-voltage control, and
an overcurrent trip circuit. The inverter normally uses a 6.bkHz square
wave synchronizing signal from the central timing equipment (CTE) which
maintains inverter output at 400 Hz. If this external signal is com-
pletely lost, the free running oscillator within the inverter will provide
pulses that will maintain inverter output within f7 Hz. The internal os-
cillator is normally synchronized by the external pulse. The subsequent
paragraphs describe the function of the various stages of the inverter.

The 6.4-kHz square wave provided by the CTE is applied through the
internal oscillator to the eight-stage digital countdown section. The
oscillator has two divider circuits which provide a 1600-Hz signal to the
magnetic amplifier.

The eight-stage digital countdown section, triggered by the 6.4-kHz
signal, produces eight 400-Hz square waves, each mutually displaced one
pulse-time from the preceding and following wave. One pulse-time is
156 microseconds and represents 22.5 electrical degrees. The eight square
waves are applied to the eight-stage power inversion section.

..-
25-30 VOCTS

r - I--- ------ ------
D-C INPUT
I

7 BlAS
r 1

TRANSFORMER

VOLTAGE

DEMODULATOR A-C
FILTER

I .6 KH, VOLTAGE'& L-L 30
CURRENT
REGULATION I BUS 2
--s--- -I

r ---OSCILLATOR
CONTROL
1 I
I I

I-
I COUNTDOWN

I WI
EMP HI4-
I
:aw
I I
I -- -I
I
I 4.4 KHz

r- ------- --
1
NEGATIVE
If--
SQUARE WAVE

NOTE: Unless othcwiw specified:
I. hetier 1 is shown.
2. A denotes input voltage.

Figure ~2.6-9. - Inverter block diagram.

A-53
The eight-stage power inversion section, fed a controlled voltage
from the buck-boost amplifier, amplifies the eight 400-Hz square waves
produced by the eight-stage digital countdown section. The amplified
square waves, still mutually displaced 22.5 electrical degrees, are next
applied to the harmonic neutralization transformer.

The harmonic neutralization section consists of 31 transformer
windings on one core. This section accepts the 400-Hz square-wave output
of the eight-stage power inversion section and transforms it into a
?-phase 400-Hz 115-volt signal. The manner in which these transformers
are wound on a single core produces flux cancellation which eliminates
all harmonics up to and including the fifteenth of the fundamental fre-
quency. The 22.5" displacement of the square waves provides a means of
electrically rotating the square wave excited primary windings around the
3-phase, wye-connected secondary windings, thus producing the 3-phase
400-Hz sine wave output. This 115-volt signal is then applied to the ac
output filter.

The ac output filter eliminates the remaining higher harmonics.
Since the lower harmonics were eliminated by the harmonic neutral trans-
former, the size and weight of this output filter was reduced. Circuitry
in this filter also produces a rectified signal which is applied to the
Zener diode reference bridge for voltage regulation. The amplitude of
this signal is a function of the amplitude of ac output voltage. After
filtering, the 3-phase 115-volt ac 400-Hz sine wave is applied to the ac
buses through individual phase current-sensing transformers.

The current-sensing transformers produce a rectified signal, the
amplitude of which is a direct function of inverter output current magni-
tude. This dc signal is applied to the Zener diode reference bridge to
regulate inverter current output: it is also paralleled to an overcurrent
sensing circuit.

The Zener diode reference bridge receives a rectified de signal,
representing voltage output, from the circuitry in the ac output filter.
A variance in voltage output unbalances the bridge, providing an error
signal of proper polarity and magnitude to the buck-boost amplifier via
the magnetic amplifier. The buck-boost amplifier, through its bias volt-
age output, compensates for voltage variations. When inverter current
output reaches 200 to 250 percent of rated current, the rectified signal
applied to the bridge from the current sensing transformers is of suf-
ficient magnitude to provide an error signaL,causing the buck-boost am-
plifier to operate in the same manner as during an overvoltage condition.
The bias output of the buck-boost amplifier, controlled by the error sig-
nal, will be varied to correct for any variation in inverter voltage or a
beyond-tolerance increase in current output. When inverter current output
exceeds 250 percent of rated current, the overcurrent sensing circuit is
activated.

A-54

------__1_1-^-".---. ___..--- -_. -I_ _--
The overcurrent sensing circuit monitors a rectified dc signal rep-
resenting current output. When total inverter current output exceeds
250 percent of rated current, this circuit will illuminate an overload
lamp in 15+5 seconds. If current output of any single phase exceeds
300 percent of rated current, this circuit will illuminate the overload
lamp in 5-+1 seconds. The AC BUS 1 OVERLOADand AC BUS 2 OVERLOADlamps
are in the caution/warning matrix on MDC-2.

The de power to the inverter is supplied from the main dc buses
through the de line filter. The filter reduces the high-frequency ripple
in the input, and the 25 to 30 volts de is applied to two silicon-
controlled rectifiers.

The silicon-controlled rectifiers are alternately set by the 1600-Hz
signal from the magnetic amplifier to produce a de square wave with an
on-time of greater than 90" from each rectifier. This is filtered and
supplied to the buck-boost amplifier where it is transformer-coupled with
the amplified 1600-Hz output of the magnetic amplifier, to develop a fil-
tered 35 volts dc which is used for amplification in the power inversion
stages.

The buck-boost amplifier also provides a variable bias voltage to
the eight-stage power inversion section. The amplitude of this bias
voltage is controlled by the amplitude and polarity of the feedback sig-
nal from the Zener diode reference bridge which is referenced to output
voltage and current. This bias signal is varied by the error signal to
regulate inverter voltage and maintain current output within tolerance.

The demodulator circuit compensates for any low-frequency ripple
(10 to 1000 Hz) in the dc input to the inverter. The high-frequency
ripple is attenuated by the input filters. The demodulator senses the
35-volt dc output of the buck-boost amplifier and the current input to
the buck-boost amplifier. An input dc voltage drop or increase will be
reflected in a drop or increase in the 35-volt dc output of the buck-
boost amplifier, as well as a drop or increase in current input to the
buck-boost amplifier. A sensed decrease in the buck-boost amplifier
voltage output is compensated for by a demodulator output, coupled through
the magnetic amplifier to the silicon-controlled rectifiers. The demod-
ulator output causes the SCR's to conduct for a longer time, thus in-
creasing their filtered dc output. A sensed increase in buck-boost am-
plifier voltage output, caused by an increase in dc input to the inverter,
is compensated for by a demodulator output coupled through the magnetic
amplifier to the silicon-controlled rectifiers, causing them to conduct
for shorter periods, thus producing a lower filtered dc output to the
buck-boost amplifier. In this manner, the 35-volt dc input to the power
inversion section is maintained at a relatively constant level irrespec-
tive of the fluctuations in de input voltage to the inverter.

A-55
The low-voltage control circuit samples the input voltage to the
inverter and can terminate inverter operation. Since the buck-boost
amplifier provides a boost action during a decrease in input voltage to
the inverter, in an attempt to maintain a constant 35 volts dc to the
power inversion section and a regulated 115-volt inverter output, the
high boost required during a low-voltage input would tend to overheat
the solid state buck-boost amplifier. As a precautionary measure, the
low-voltage control will terminate inverter operation by disconnecting
operating voltage to the magnetic amplifier and the first power inversion
stage when input voltage decreases to between 16 and 19 volts dc.

A temperature sensor with a range of +32O to +248' F is installed
in each inverter and provides an input to the C&WSwhich will illuminate
a light at an inverter overtemperature of 190" F. Inverter temperature
is telemetered to MSFN.

Battery charger.- A constant voltage, solid-state battery charger
(fig. A2.6-lo), located in the CM lower equipment bay, is incorporated
into the EPS. The BATTERY CHARGERselector switch (MDC-3) controls power
input to the charger, as well as connecting the charger output to the
selected battery (fig. A2.6-14). When the BATTERY CHARGERselector
switch is positioned to entry battery A, B, or C, a relay (Kl) is acti-
vated completing circuits from ac and dc power sources to the battery
charger. Battery charger output is also connected to the selectedbattery -
to be charged through contacts of the MAIN BUS TIE motor switch. Posi-
tioning the MAIN BUS TIE switch (A/C or B/C) to OFF for battery A or B,
and both switches to OFF for battery C will disconnect main bus loads from
the respective batteries and also complete the circuit from the charger to
the battery.

The battery charger is provided 25 to 30 volts from both main!dc
buses and 115 volts 400-Hz T-phase from either of the ac buses. All three
phases of ac are used to boost the 25- to TO-volt de input and produce
40 volts dc for charging. In addition, phase A of the ac is used to
supply power for the charger circuitry. The logic network in the charger,
which consists of a two-stage differential amplifier (comparator), Schmitt
trigger, current sensing resistor, and a voltage amplifier, sets up the
initial condition for operation. The first stage of the comparator is
in the on mode, with the second stage off, thus setting the Schmitt
trigger first stage to on with the second stage off. Maximum base drive
is provided to the current amplifier which turns the switching transistor
to the on mode. With the switching transistor on, current flows from the
transformer rectifier through the switching transistor, current sensing
resistor, and switch choke to the battery being charged. Current lags
voltage due to switching choke action. As current flow increases, the
voltage drop across the sensing resistor increases, and at a specific
level sets the first stage of the comparator to off and the second stage

A-56

I_ . _--II _.-._I..
_..-4-_"1"e._-
.-II _l-.l..-_-~~,-"--
r --w--m r-- 1 I-
---
1
i
I I
t-[ i
I

i CURRENT
AMPLIFIER
i

I[ I-- I

L- .---- J
DC INDICATORS
SW (MDC-3) +
VOLTMETER

TELEMETRY
DC INDICATORS
SW (MDC-3) AMMETER
_ _
1
BATTERY
CHARGE
(MDC-3)

C
B

.I1
:
BATTERY CHARGER b
r- BAT A CHG
(MDC-5)

I BATTERY
BUS A
* I
BAT A PWR
SWITCHING
ENTRY/POST LANDING BOA
DIODE
(RHEB 250)
m- J
CB41
(ON BATTERY)

40 VDC

BATTERY A

DC NEG
_-
MNDC -

.,

Figure ~2.6-ILO.- Battery charger block diagram.

A-57
to on. The voltage amplifier is set off to reverse the Schmitt trigger
to first stage off and second stage on. This sets the current amplifier
off, which in turn sets the switching transistor off. The switching
transistor in the off mode terminates power from the source, causing the
field in the choke to continue collapsing, discharging into the battery,
then through the switching diode and the current sensing resistor to the
opposite side of the choke. As the EMF in the choke decreases, current
through the sensing resistor decreases, reducing the voltage drop across
the resistor. At some point, the decrease in voltage drop across the
sensing resistor reverses the comparator circuit, setting up the initial
condition and completing one cycle of operation;. The output load current,
due to the choke action, remains&relatively constant except for the small
variation through the sensing resistor. This variation is required to set
and reset the switching transistor and Schmitt trigger through the action
of the comparator.

Battery charger output is regulated by the sensing resistor until
battery voltage reaches approximately 37 volts. At this point, the bi-
ased voltage sensor circuit is unbiased, and in conjunction with the
sensing resistor, provides a signal for cycling the battery charger. As
battery voltage increases, the internal impedance of the battery increases,
decreasing current flow from the charger. At 39.8 volts, the battery is
fully charged and current flow becomes negligible. Recharging the bat-
teries until battery amp hour input equates amp hours previously dis- __-.
charged from the battery assures sufficient battery capacity for mission
completion. The MSFN will monitor this function. If there is no contact
with the MSFN, battery charging is terminated when the voltmeter indicates
39.5 V dc with the DC INDICATORS switch set to the BAT CHARGERposition.

Charger voltage is monitored on the DC VOLTS METER (MDC-3). Current
output is monitored on the inner scale of the DC AMPS meter (MDC-3) by
placing the DC INDICATORS switch (MIX-3) to the BAT CHARGERposition.
Battery charger current output is telemetered to the MSFN.

When charging battery A or B, the respective BAT RLY BUS-BAT A or B
circuit breaker (MDC-5) is opened to expedite recharge. During this
period, only one battery will be powering the battery relay bus. Relay
bus voltage can be monitored by selecting positions 4 and B on the Systems
Test Meter (LEB-101) and from the couches by the Fuel Cell-Main Bus B-l
and Fuel Cell - Main Bus A-3 talk-back indicators (MDC-3) which will be
barber-poled. If power is lost to the relay bus, these indicators will
revert to the gray condition, indicating loss of power to the relay bus
and requiring remedial action.

Recharge of a battery immediately after it is exposed to any appre-
ciable loads requires less time than recharge of a battery commencing
30 minutes or more after it is disconnected from these loads. Therefore,
it is advantageous to connect batteries to the charger as soon as possible

A-58
after they are disconnected from the main buses since this decreases
overall recharge time.

Power distribution.- The dc and ac power distribution to components
of the EPS is provided by two redundant buses in each system. A single-
point ground on the spacecraft structure is used to eliminate ground loop
effects. Sensing and control circuits are provided for monitoring and
protection of each system.

Distribution of dc power (fig. ~2.6-11) is accorr,plished with a two-
wire system and a series of interconnected buses, switches, circuit
breakers, and isolation diodes. The dc negative buses are connected to
the vehicle ground point (VGP). The buses consist of the following:

a. Two main de buses (A and B), powered by the three fuel cells
and/or entry and postlanding batteries A, B, and C.

b. Two battery buses (A and B), each powered by its respective
entry and postlanding battery A and B. Battery C can power either or
both buses if batieries A and/or B fail.

C.Flight and postlanding bus, p owered through both main dc buses
and diodes, or directly by the three entry and postlanding batteries A,
B, and C, through dual diodes.

d. Flight bus, powered through both main dc buses and isolation
diodes.

e. Nonessential bus, powered through either dc main bus A or B.

f. Battery relay bus, powered by entry and postlanding batteries
through the individual battery buses and isolation diodes.

g- Pyro b?Lzes, isolated from the main electrical power system when
powered by the pyre batteries, A capbility is provided to connect either
entry battery to the A or B pyro system in case of loss of a pyro battery.

h. SM jei;tison controllers, completely isolated from the main
electrical power system until activated during CSM separation, after
which they are powered by the fuel cells.

Power from the fuel cell power plants can be connected to the main
de buses through six motor switches (part of overload/reverse current
circuits in the SM) which are controlled by switches in the CMlocated
on MDC-3. Fuel cell power can be selected to either or both of the main
de buses. Six talk-back indicators show gray when fuel cell output is
connected and striped when disconnected. When an overload condition
occurs, the overload-reverse current circuits in the SM automatically

A-59

I I-. _.__I.. __-__---.-_.I-__..--
_“.,_,..-_.___._._...._
____I I^_I-^. .-_---.-___.-.-
disconnect the fuel cell power plants from the overloaded bus and provide
visual displays (talk-back indicator and caution and warning lamp illumi-
nation)(FC BUS DISCONNECT) for isolation of the trouble. A reverse current
condition will disconnect the malfunctioning power plant from the dc sys-
tem. The de undervoltage sensing circuits (fig. ~2.6-12) are provided to
indicate bus low-voltage conditions. If voltage drops below 26.25 volts
dc, the applicable de undervoltage light on the caution and warning panel
(MDC-2) will illuminate. Since each bus is capable of handling all EPS
loads, an undervoltage condition should not occur except in an isolated
instance; if too many electrical units are placed on the bus simul-
taneously or if a malfunction exists in the EPS. A voltmeter (MDC-3) is
provided to monitor voltage of each main dc bus, the battery charger, and
each of the five batteries. An ammeter is provided (MDC-3) to monitor
current output of fuel cells 1, 2, 3, batteries A, B, C, and the battery
charger.

During high power demand or emergencies, supplemental power to the
main de buses can be supplied from batteries A and B via the battery buses
and directly from battery C (fig. ~2.643). During entry, spacecraft
power is provided by the three entry and postlanding batteries which are
connected to the main dc buses prior to CSM separation; placing the
MAIN BUS TIE switches (MDC-5) to BAT A/C and BAT B/C provides this
function after closing the MAIN A-BAT C and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers
(MB-275). The switches are manually placed to OFF after completion of
RCS purge and closing the FLIGHT AND POST LDG-BAT BUS A, BAT BUS B, and
BAT C circuit breakers (RHEB-275) during main chute descent. The AUTO
position provides an automatic connection of the entry batteries to the
main dc buses at CSM separation. The auto function is used only on the
launch pad after the spacecraft is configured for a LES pad abort.

A nonessential bus, as shown on fig. ~2.6-11, permits isolating non-
essential equipment during a shortage of power (two fuel cell power
plants out). The flight bus distributes power to inflight telecommuni-
cations equipment. The flight and postlanding bus distributes power to
some of the inflight telecommunications equipment, float bag No. 3 con-
trols, the ECS postlanding vent and blower control, and postlanding com-
munications and lighting equipment. In flight, the postlanding bus re-
ceives power from the fuel cells and/or entry and postlanding batteries
through the main de buses. After completion of RCS purge during main
chute descent, the entry batteries supply power to the postlanding bus
directly through individual circuit breakers. These circuit breakers
(FLIGHT & POST LANDING-BAT BUS A, BAT BUS B, and BAT C - RHEB-275) are
normally open in flight and closed during main chute descent just prior
to positioning the MAIN BUS TIE switches to OFF.

Motor switch contacts which close when the MAIN BUS TIE switches are
placed to ON, complete the circuit between the entry and postlanding
batteries and the main dc buses, and open the connection from the battery

A-60
charger to the batteries. The battery relay bus provides dc power to the
ac sensing units, the fuel cell and inverter control circuits, fuel cell
reactant and radiator valves, and the fuel cell+nain BUS A and B talk-back
indicators on MDC-3. The pyrotechnic batteries supply power to ordnance
devices for separation of the LES, S-IVB, forward heat shield, SM from
CM, and for deployment_and release of the drogue and main parachutes
during a pad abort, high-altitude abort, or normal mission progression.
The three fuel cell power plants supply power to the SM jettison con-
trollers for the SM separation maneuver.

Distribution of ac power (fig. A2.6-14) is accomplished with a four-
wire system via two redundant buses, ac bus 1 and ac bus 2. The ac neu-
tral bus is connected to the vehicle ground point. The ac power is pro-
vided by one or two of the solid-state ll5/200-volt 400-Hz 3-phase in-
verters. The dc power is routed to the inverters through the main dc
buses. Inverter No. 1 is powered through dc main bus A, inverter No. 2
through dc main bus B, and inverter No. 3 through either de main bus A
or B by switch selection. Each of these circuits has a separate circuit
breaker and a power control motor switch. Switches for applying power
to the motor switches are located on MDC-3. All three inverters are
identical and are provided with overtemperature circuitry. A light in-
dicator, in the caution/warning group on MDC-2, illuminates at 190" to
indicate an overtemperature situation. Inverter output is routed through
a series of control motor switches to the ac buses. Six switches (MDC-3)
control motor switches which operate contacts to connect or disconnect
the inverters from the ac buses. Inverter priority is 1 over 2, 2 over
3, and 3 over 1 on any one ac bus. This indicates that inverter 2 cannot
be connected to the bus until the inverter 1 switch is positioned to OFF.
Also, when inverter 3 switch is positioned to ON, it will disconnect in-
verter 1 from the bus before the inverter 3 connection will be performed.
The motor switch circuits are designed to prevent connecting two invert-
ers to the same ac bus at the same time. The ac loads receive power from
either ac bus through bus selector switches. In some instances, a single
phase is used for operation of equipment and in others all three. Over-
undervoltage and overload sensing circuits (fig. ~2.6-12) are provided
for each bus. An automatic inverter disconnect is effected during an
overvoltage. The ac bus voltage fail and overload lights in the caution/
warning group (MDC-2) provide a visual indication of voltage or overload
malfunctions. Monitoring voltage of each phase on each bus is accom-
plished by selection with the AC INDICATORS switch (MDC-3). Readings are
displayed on the AC VOLTS meter (MDC-3). Phase A voltage of each bus is
telemetered to MSFN stations.

Several precautions should be taken during any inverter switching.
The first precaution is to completely disconnect the inverter being taken
out of the circuit whether due to inverter transfer or malfunction. The
second precaution is to insure that no more than one switch on AC BUS 1
or AC BUS 2 (MIX-3) is in the up position at the same time. These
k

~-64
, 1

P
+ INVERTER NO. 1 L INVERTER NO. 1
ONLY ONE INMRTER
ONLY ONE INMRI~K
+ INVERTER NO. 2 CAN POWEF BUS AT 4- INVERTER NO. 2 CAN POWER BUS AT
ANY ONE TIME ANY ONE TIME
+ INMRTER NO. 3 - INVERTER NO. 3

EPS SENSOR

Ib AC SENSE UNIT
AND
AC SENSE UNIT
AND AC

I ;NDI~TORS sw INDICATORS SW
(VOLTMETER)
-1 (VOLTMETER)

FUEL CELL PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 1

pH SENSOR (+A) c pH SENSOR (+A)

PUMP MOTORS - F&L CELL 2 PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 2

-c pH SENSOR (d)A) c ptl SENSOR (CA)

PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 3 PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 3

-c pH SENSOR ( +A) c pH SENSOR (‘+A)

4 CRYOGENIC FUEL 0TY AMPL 1 (6 C) + CRYOGENIC FUEL OTY AMPL 2 (CC)

4 CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS - S% 1 ----) CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS - SYS 2

--) BATTERY CHARGER ----, PATTERY CHARGER

- TELECOMMUNICATIONS ----, TELECOMMUNICATIONS

-----, ENVlRONLNNTAL CONTROL SYSTEM (+ 6. * --) ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM @AA.$‘C, %?

---, STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM * STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
NOTE:
----, SPS GAUGING (CC) + SPS GAUGING (+O
1. For complerc
_3 EXTERIOR LIGHTING (+A) --k EXTERIOR LIGHTING (‘#B) AC distribution
bm&out rchr
d INTERIOR LIGHTING @A, 98) 4 INTERIOR LIGHTING (#A) to individwl
d GCN AC POWER ($4) system section
_3 GLN AC POWER ( $0)
+ ORDEAL 1661

Figure A2.6-lb.- Alternating current power distribution.
precautions are necessary to assure positive power transfer since power
to any one inverter control motor switch is routed in series through the
switch of another inverter. A third precaution must be exercised to pre-
clude a motor switch lockout when dc power to inverter 3 is being trans-
ferred from dc main bus A to dc main bus B, or vice versa. The AC
INSERTER 3 switch (MIX-3) should be held in the OFF position for 1 second
when performing a power transfer operation from one main dc bus to the
other.

Performance and Design Data

Alternating; current and direct current data.- The ac and dc per-
formance and design data for the EPS is as follows:

Alternating current

Phases 3

Displacement 120 * 2"

Steady-state voltage 115.5 (+L -1.5) V ac (average
3 phases)

Transient voltage 115 (+35, -65) V ac

Recovery To 115 * 10 V within 15 ms, steady
state within 50 ms

Unbalance 2 V ac (worst phase from average)

Frequency limites
Normal (synchronized 400 f 3 Hz
to central timing
equipment)

Emergency (loss of 400 f 7 Hz
central timing
equipment)

Wave characteristics
(sine wave)
Maximum distortion 5 percent
Highest harmonic 4 percent
Crest factor 1.414 f 10 percent

Rating 1250 V ac
Direct current

Steady-state voltage
limits
Normal 29 * 2.0 V dc

Minimum CM bus 26.2 V dc
Min Precautionary CM 26.5 V dc (allows for cyclic loads)
bus

Maximum CM bus 31.0 v dc
Max Precautionary CM 30.0 V dc (allows for cyclic loads)
bus

During postlanding and 27 to 30 V dc
preflight checkout
periods

Ripple voltage 1 V peak to peak

Operational Limitations and Restrictions

Fuel cell power plants.- Fuel cell power plants are designed to
function under atmospheric and high-vacuum conditions. Each must be able
to maintain itself at sustaining temperatures and minimum electrical loads
at both environment extremes. To function properly, fuel cells must op-
erate under the following limitations and restrictions:

External nonoperating -20" to +140" F.
temperature

Operating temperature +30" to 145" F.
inside SM

External nonoperating Atmospheric
pressure

Normal voltage 27 to 31 V dc

Minimum operating voltage
at terminals
Emergency operation 20.5 V dc at 2295 watts (gross Power
level)

Normal operation 27 v ac

. ._ .._-., .._ . ..- _~...--- .-.. -.“--_~- _*.l
-“pi._._ ..---.- ^ “~- ____il_-
Maximum operating voltage 31.5 V dc
at terminals

Fuel cell disconnect 75 amperes no trip, 112 amperes
overload disconnect after 25 to 300 seconds

Maximum reverse current 1 second minimum before disconnect

Minimum sustaining power/ 420 watts
fuel cell power plant
(with in-line heater OFF)

In-line heater power 160 watts
(sustain F/C skin temp (5 to 6 amps)
above 385" F min)

Maximum gross power 2295 watts at 20.5 V dc min.
under emergency
conditions

Nitrogen pressure 50.2 to 57.5 psia (53 psia, nominal)

Reactant pressure
Oxygen 58.4 to 68.45 psia (62.5 psia,
nominal)

Hydrogen 57.3 to 67.0 psia (61.5 psia,
nominal)

Reactant consumption/fuel
cell power plant

Hydrogen PPH = Amps x (2.57 x lo-')
Oxygen PPH = Amps x (2.04 x 10m2)

Minimum skin temperature +385” F
for self-sustaining
operation

Minimum skin temperature +360° F
for recovery in flight

Maximum skin temperature +500" F

Approximate external -260” to +400" F
environment temperature
range outside SC (for
radiation)

A-68
Fuel cell power plant +385” to +450" F
normal operating
temperature range

Condenser exhaust normal +150" to +175" F
operating temperature

Purging nominal frequency Dependent on mission load profile
and reactant purity after tank fill

O2 purge duration 2 minutes

H2 purge duration 80 seconds

Additional flow rate
while purging
Wwn Up to 0.6 lb/hr
Hydrogen Up to 0.75 lb/hr ( nominal 0.67 lb/hr)

Cryogenic storage subsystem.- The cryogenic storage subsystem must
be able to meet the following requirements for proper operation of the
fuel cell power plants and the ECS:

Minimum usable quantity
Oxygen 320 lbs each tank (min)
Hydrogen 28 lbs each tank (min)

Temperature at time of
fill
Oxygen -297" F. (approx.)
Hydrogen -423" F. (approx.)

Operating pressure range
@men
Normal 865 to 935 psia
Minimum 150 psia
Hydrogen
Normal 225 to 260 psia
Minimum 100 psia

Temperature probe range
Oxygen -325” to +80° F
Hydrogen -425" to -200" F

Maximum allowable
difference in quantity
balance between tanks

A-69

,. . - - _..- ,. ._..-.-.-.
..___I"._.-__"_ _I___,___cI_ --~..-~~-----~~~~- p__,p_-- ._._._I__I- .I...__--.
Oxygen tanks No. 1 and 2 to 4 percent
Hydrogen tanks No. 1 3 percent
and 2

Pressure relief valve
operation
Crack pressure
Oxygen 983 psig min.
Hydrogen 273 psig min.
Reseat pressure
Oxygen 965 psig min.
Hydrogen 268 psig min.
Full flow, maximum
relief
Q-vge n 1010 psig max.
Hydrogen 285 psig max.
Additional data.- Additional data about 1imitatiOnS and restrictions
may be found in the CSM/LM Spacecraft Operational Data Book SNA-8-D-027,
vol I, (CSM ~1168-447).

Systems Test Meter

The SYSTEMS TEST meter and the alphabetical and numerical switches
located on panel 101 in the CM LEB, provide a means of monitoring vario&s
measurements within the SC, and verifying certain parameters displayed
only by event indicators. The following can be measured using the
SYSTEMS TEST meter, the respective switch positions, and the range of
each sensor. Normal operating parameters of measurable items are covered
in the telemetry listing.

Conversion of the previously listed measurements to the SYSTEMS TEST
meter indications are listed in Table A2.6-IV. The XPNDR measurements
are direct readouts and do not require conversion.

A-70

.l_l - - ~~-I- . . ~"--.. "l.--__l^.-.. _-.._-L;- __l_-.,_l
TABLE &Z.&III.- SYSTEMSTEST DATA

Systems test Switch >sitions
indicatioafid(";yT identity Numerical Alphabetical Sensor range
select select
v2 pressure, psia 0 to 75 psia
F/C 1 SC 206OP 1 A
F/C 2 SC 2061~ 1 B
F)C 3 SC 2062~ 1 C

o2 pressure, psia 0 t0 75 psia
F/C 1 SC 2066~ 1 D
F/C 2 SC 2067P 2 A
F'/C 3 SC 2068P 2 B

92 pressure, psia 0 to 75 Pia
F/C 1 SC 2069~ 2 C
F/C 2 SC 2070P 2 D
F'/C 3 SC 2071P 3 A

<pS radiator outlet temperature -50" to t300" F
F/C 1 SC 208~ 3 B
F'/C 2 SC 20881 3 C
F~C 3 SC 2089~ 3 D

3attery manifold
pressure, psia A 0 t0 20 psia

Bat7; relay bus CCO232V B o to +45 V dc

LM power D 0 to t10 amps

SpS oxidizer line temperature 5 A o to +200e F
SP 0049T
CM-RCS oxidize~y~a~eCRte2;l~Tature -50" to ~50" F
-P engine, 6 B
+Y engine, sys B CR 2116~ 5 D
-P engine, sys B CR 2110T C
CWengine, sys B CR 2119T 2 D
CCWengine, sys A CR 2114T 6 A
-Y engine, sys A CR 2103T 6 C

pwr output XPNDR A >I.0 V dc (nornina

AGC signal XPNDR B Test A.0 V ac
Operate 0.0 to
4.5 v ac

Phase lockup XPNDR C Locked A.0 V
Unlocked 4.8

position 7 on the numerical selector switch .
is an off Fosltlon*
NOTE:

A- 71
___---..---------- -___ .---
_.---.c_--- __^__1__--
Command Module Interior Lighting

The command module interior lighting system (fig. A2.6-15) furnishes
illumination for activities in the couch, lower equipment bay and tunnel
areas, and back-lighted panel lighting to read nomenclature, indicators,
and switch positions. Tunnel lighting is provided on SC which will be
concerned with LM activity.

Floodlighting for illumination of work areas is provided by use of
fluorescent lamps. Integral panel and numerics lighting is provided by
electroluminescent materials. Tunnel lights are incandescent. Pen
flashlights are provided for illuminating work areas which cannot be
illuminated by the normal spacecraft systems, such as under the couches.

Electroluminescence (EL) is the phenomena whereby light is emitted
from a crystalline phosphor (Z#) placed as a thin layer between two
closely spaced electrodes of an electrical capacitor. One of the elec-
trodes is a transparent material. The light output varies with voltage
and frequency and occurs as light pulses, which are in-phase with the
input frequency. Advantageous characteristics of EL for spacecraft use
are an "after-glow" of less than 1 second, low power consumption, and
negligible heat dissipation.

RAL AND NUMERICS (PANEL tlctm

FLOODLIGHT FIXTURES

Figure ~2.6-15.- CM interior 1.ighting.

A-72
TABLE .42.6-m.- SYSTEMSTEST METER INDICATIONS

Systems EPS CM-R%
test radiator Oxidizer LM SPS Battery Batter:
meter Outlet valve Power temperature manifold relay
display temperature tawerature (amps) (" F.) Pressure bus
(" F.) (” F.) @=A) ('J dc
0.0 -50 -50 0 0.00 0
0.2
0.4 6
; -36
-22
-46
-4;
0.4 8” 0.80 1.8
0.8 16 1.60 3.6
0.6 9 -8 -33 1.2 24 2.40 5.4
0.8 12 +6 -34 1.6 3.20 7.2
1.0 15 +20 -30 2.0 4’: 4.00 9.0
1.2 18 +34 -26 2.4
1.4 21 4.80 lo.8
+4a -22 2.8 5.60
1.6 24 +62 12.6
-18 3.2 6.40 14.4
1.8 27 +76 -14
2.0 30 7.20 16.2
+90 -10 5:: 8.00 18.0
2.2 33 +104 4.4
2.4 88 8.80 19.8
2.6
36 +118
+I32
1;
0
4.8
5.2
96 9.60 21.6
2.8 104 10.40 23.4
529 t146 +4
3.0 112 11.20 25.2
45 +16o +10 21: 120 12.00 27.0

,':c
48
51
+174
+188
+14
+18
6.4
6.8
128 12.80 28.8
3.6 136 13.60 30.6
54 +202 +22 7.2 144
+216 14.40 32.4
+26 7.6 152 15.20
43:: 2 +230 34.2
+30 8.0 160 16.00 36.0
4.2 63 +244 t34 8.4 x8 16.80 37.8
1258 +38 8.8 176 17.60
t:: 6”: +272 +4-i? 39.6
9.2 184 18.40 41.4
4.8 72 e86 +46 9.6
5.0 75 192 19.20 43.2
+300 t50 10.0 200 20.00 45.0
Floodlight system.- The interior floodlight system consists of six
floodlight fixture assemblies and three control panels (fig. ~2.6-16).
Each fixture assembly contains two fluorescent lamps (one primary and
one secondary) and converters. The lamps are powered by 28 V dc from main
de buses A and B (fig. A2.6-17). This assures a power source for lights
in all areas in the event either bus fails. The converter in each flood-
light fixture converts 28 V dc to a high-voltage pulsating dc for operation
of the fluorescent lamps.

Floodlights are used to illuminate three specific areas: the left
main display console, the right main display console, and the lower
equipment bay. Switches on MDC-8provide control of lighting of the
left main display console area. Switches on MDC-5provide control of
lighting of the right main display console area. Switches for control
of lighting of the lower equipment bay area are located on LEB-100.
Protection for the floodlight circuits is provided by the LIGHTING - MN A
and MN B circuit breakers on FXEB-226.

Each control panel has a dimming (DIM-l-2) toggle switch control, a
rheostat (FLOOD-• FF-BRT) control, and an on/off (FIXED-OFF) toggle switch
control. The DIM-l position provides variable intensity control of the
primary flood lamps through the FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat, and on-off control
of the secondary lamps through the FIXED-OFF switch. The DIM-2 position
provides variable intensity control of the secondary lamps through the
FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat, and on-off control of the primary lamps through
the FIXED-OFF switch. When operating the primary lamps under variable
intensity control (DIM-l position), turn on of the lamps is acquired after
the FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat is moved past the midpoint. In transferring
variable intensity control to the secondary lamps, the FLOOD-OFF-BRT
rheostat should first be rotated to the OFF position before placing the
DIM switch to the DIM-2 position. The rheostat is then moved to the full
bright setting and should remain in this position unless dimming is de-
sired. Dimming of the secondary flood lamps should not be used unless
dimming control of the primary floodlights is not available. Dimming of
the secondary lamps results in approximately a go-percent reduction in
lamp life. The range of intensity variation is greater for the primary
than the secondary floodlights.

The commander's control panel (MIX-~) has a POST LANDING-OFF-FIXED
switch which connects the flight and postlanding bus to his floodlights
(fig. A2.6-17). The POST LANDING position provides single intensity
lighting to the commander's primary or secondary lamps as selected by the
DIM-l or DIM-2 position, respectively. It is for use during the latter
stages of descent after main dc bus power is disconnected, and during
postlanding.

A-74

_ .__._...-
-...a-- =.-
-FLOOOT
DIM FIXED
1
COUCH LIGHT
ASSEMBLIES MDC-5 2
- POST LDG
__^.._

COMPONENTS
6 LIGHT ASSEMBLIES
3 CONTROLPANELS
LH SIDE DISPLAY MDC-8
RH SIDE DISPLAY MDC-5
LEB 100
3 CIRCUIT BREAKERS
RHEB 226

Figure A2.6-16.- CM floodlight configuration.
+ 7 POST LANDING BUS + DC MAIN BUS B DC MAIN BUS A 9)
f
I

i
RHEB 226 FLOOD, MNA $
I 7.5A i
I-- _-------------------------------- ---------------------- -___i
1 I , T -
I t 1

DIM

II t I I
+
I
I
,
MDC 8
:----~~~~-~~~E!!---- c------ I I---C---- ---!E-----J ______
I
I II I I
, I I

LIGHT LIGHT LIGHT
1
0
I
NEGATIVE DC BUS

Figure
I
63
P I

~2.6~17.- CM floodlight
NEGATIVE DC BUS

system
q
P

schematic.
L--=+-t
NEGATIVE DC BUS
Integral lighting system.- The integral lighting system controls the
EL lamps behind the nomenclature and instrument dial faces on all MDC!
panels, and on specif'ic panels in the lower equipment bay, left hand
equipment bay, and right hand equipment bay (figs. ~2.6-18 and ~2.6-19).
The controls (fig. ~2.6-18) are rotary switches controlling variable
transformers powered through the appropriate ac bus. Each rotary control
switch has a mechanical stop which prevents the switch being positioned
to OFF. Disabling of a circuit because of malfunctions is performed by
opening the appropriate circuit breaker on RHEB-226. The INTEGRAL switch
on MIX-~ controls the lighting of panels viewed by the commander, MD&l,
7, 8, 9, 15, and the left half of 2. The INTEGRAL switch on MDC-5 con-
trols the lighting of panels viewed by the LM pilot, MDC-3, 4, 5 and 6,
16, RHEB-229 and 275, and the right half of MIX-2. The INTEGRAL switch
on LEB-100 controls the lighting of MDC-10, LEB-100, 101, 122 and the
DSKY lights on 140, RHEB-225, 226 and LHEB 306. Intensity of the lighting
can be individually controlled in each of the three areas.

Numerics lighting system.- Numerics lighting control is provided
over all electroluminescent digital readouts. The NUMERICS rotary switch
on MDC-8 controls the off/intensity of numerals on the DSKY and Mission
Timer on MIX-2, and the range and delta V indicators of the Entry Monitor
System of MDC-1. The switch on LEB-100 controls the off/intensity of the
numerals on the LEB-140 DSKY and the Mission Timer on LHEB-306. Protec-
tion for the integral and numerics circuits is provided by the LIGHTING-
NUMERICS/INTEGRAL-LEB AC 2, L MIX AC 1, and R MIX AC 1 circuit breakers
on RHEB-226. These circuit breakers are used to disable a circuit in
case of a malfunction. The L MDC AC 1 circuit breakers also feed the
EMS roll attitude and scroll incandescent lamps.

Tunnel lighting.- The six light fixtures in the CM tunnel provide
illumination for tunnel activity during docking and undocking. Each of
the fixtures, containing two incandescent lamps, is provided 28 V dc
through a TUNNEL LIGHTS-OFF switch on MIX-2 (fig. ~2.6-20). Main dc bus A
distributes power to one lamp in each fixture,.and main dc bus B to the
other lamp. Protection is provided by the LIGHTING/COAS/TUNNEL/RNDZ/
SPOT MN A and MN B circuit breakers on RKEB-226.

A-77

-.-- -.
-. . _.._. _- -_ ..L--.
.:.:.>:
cls;$;:1Nj’EGRAL
.-.
B-: NUMERICS

INTERIOR LIGHTS
INTEGRAL

(MDC 81
r LED LIGHTS t
NUMRICS FLOOD INTEGRAL

OFF BIT OFF RRT OFF BRT

(LEB 100)

Figure ~2.6-18.- CM integral/numerics illuminat ,ion system.
LIGHTING NUhlERlCS'lNTCGRAL lRHEB 2261
+?BUSl dB) BUS 2 QA 7)
NOMFN '
< P AC NEUT p ) +AC,NEUl )
I tEB-A?$
I
I I I I I I

hlECHANICA1
STOP
110 PLACES,
INTERIOR LIGHTS - INTERIOR

L
LIGHTS
NOMEN
,
MDC 5

LHEB 306 I

EMS (INCANDESCENT1

hlDC 1
1 MDC 3 I ROLL ATT IND 141
L SCROLL (6)

Figure A2.6-lg.- Integral and numerics panel lighting schematic.
TUNNEL
LIGHT I
ASSEMBLIES I
--- r -- iI
T
r 1
I I I
MN DC1 I I TUNNEL
6
BUS B
I I LIGHTS

t --c-
o+
I I
I I
I MN B I
INITIATORI
I I

II
I
I I i I
I I i I
MN DC I I I 1 DC NEG
BUS A I CB28 1 LH COAS 1 1 I

Figure ~2.6-20.- Tunnel lighting schemat .c.
PART A2.7

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

Introduction

The environment control system (ECS) is designed to provide the
flight crew with a conditioned environment that is both life-supporting,
and as comfortable as possible. The ECS is aided in the accomplishment
of this task through an interface with the electrical power system,
which supplies oxygen and potable water. The ECS also interfaces with
the electronic equipment of the several Apollo systems, for which the
ECS provides thermal control, with the lunar module (LM) for pressurizing
the LM, and with the waste management system to the extent that the
water and the urine dump lines can be interconnected.

The ECS is operated continuously throughout all Apollo mission
phases. During this operating period the system provides the following
three major functions for the crew:

a. Spacecraft atmosphere control

b. Water management

c. Thermal control.

Control of the spacecraft atmosphere consists of regulating the
pressure and temperature of the cabin and suit gases; maintaining the
desired humidity by removing excess water from the suit and cabin gases;
controlling the level of contamination of the gases by removing CO*,
odors, and particulate matter; and ventilating the cabin after landing.
There are provisions for pressurizing the lunar module during docking
and subsequent CSM/LM operations.

Water management consists of collecting, sterilizing, and storing
the potable water produced in the fuel cells, and delivering chilled and
heated water to the crew for metabolic consumption, and disposing of the
excess potable water by either transferring it to the waste water system
or by dumping it overboard. Provisions are also made for the collection
and storage of waste water (extracted in the process of controlling
humidity), delivering it to the glycol evaporators for supplemental
cooling, and dumping the excess waste water overboard.

A-81
Thermal control consists of removing the excess heat generated by
the crew and the spacecraft equipment, transporting it to the cab heat
exchanger (if required) , and rejecting the unwanted heat to space,
either by radiation from the space radiators, or in the form of steam
by boiling water in the glycol evaporators.

Five subsystems operating in conjunction with each other provide
the required functions:

a. Oxygen subsystem

b. Pressure suit circuit (PSC)

c. Water subsystem

d. Water-glycol subsystem

e. Postlanding ventilation (PLV) subsystem.

The oxygen subsystem controls the flow of oxygen within the command
module (CM); stores a reserve supply of oxygen for use during entry
and emergencies; regulates the pressure of oxygen supplied to the sub- -
system and PSC components; controls cabin pressure in normal and
emergency (high flow-rate) modes; controls pressure in the water tanks
and glycol reservoir; and provides for PSC purge via the DIRECT 02
valve.

The pressure suit circuit provides the crew with a continuously
conditioned atmosphere. It automatically controls suit gas circulation,
pressure, and temperature; and removes debris, excess moisture, odors,
and carbon dioxide from both the suit and cabin gases.

The water subsystem (potable section) collects and stores potable
water; delivers hot and cold water to the crew for metabolic purposes;
and augments the waste water supply for evaporative cooling. The waste
water section collects and stores water extracted from the suit heat
exchanger, and distributes it to the water inflow control valves of the
evaporators, for evaporative cooling.

The water-glycol subsystem provides cooling for the PSC, the
potable water chiller, and the spacecraft equipment; and heating or
cooling for the cabin atmosphere.

The postlanding ventilation subsystem provides a means for
circulating ambient air through the command module cabin after landing.

a-82
Functional Description

The environmental control system operates continuously throughout
all mission phases. Control begins during preparation for launch and
continues through recovery. The following paragraphs describe the
operating modes and the operational characteristic of the ECS from the
time of crew insertion to recovery.

Spacecraft atmosphere control.- During prelaunch operations the
SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed; and the DIRECT O2 valve is opened
slightly (approximately 0.2 pound per hour flowrate) to provide an
oxygen purge of the PSC. Just before prime crew insertion the 02
flowrate is increased to 0.6 pound per hour. This flow is in excess of
that required for metabolic consumption and suit leakage. This excess
flow causes the PSC to be pressurized slightly above the CM cabin. The
slight overpressure maintains the purity of the PSC gas system by
preventing the cabin gases from entering the PSC.

Any changes made in the pressure or composition of the cabin gas
during the prelaunch period is controlled by the ground support equipment
through the purge port in the CM side hatch.

As soon as the crew connects into the PSC, the suit gas becomes
contaminated by C02, odors, moisture, and is heated. The gases are
circulated by the suit compressor through the CO2 and odor absorber
assembly where a portion of the CO2 and odors are removed; then through
the heat exchanger, where they are cooled and the excess moisture is
removed. Any debris that might get into the PSC is trapped by the
debris trap or on felt pads on the upstream side of each LiOH cartridge.

During the ascent, the cabin remains at sea level pressure until
the ambient pressure decreases a nominal 6 psi. At that point the CABIN
PRESSURE RELIEF valve vents the excess gas overboard, maintaining cabin
pressure at 6 psi above ambient. As the cabin pressure decreases, a
relief valve in the O2 DEMAND REGULATORvents suit gases into the cabin
to maintain the suit pressure slightly above cabin pressure.

Sometime after attaining orbit it will be necessary to close the
DIRECT 02 valve to conserve oxygen. (Refer to Volume 2, Apollo Operations
Handbook for the procedure.) After the DIRECT O2 valve is closed,
makeup oxygen for the PSC is supplied by the DEMANDREiGULATORwhen the
SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed or from the cabin via the cabin
pressure regulator when the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is open.

A-83
Before changing from a suited to a shirtsleeve environment it is
necessary to open the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE, for the following
reasons. When a suit is vented (by removing helmet, gloves, etc.) some
of the PSC gases flow into the cabin, which results in contaminating the
cabin gas, and in lowering suit pressure relative to cabin pressure.
Opening the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE allows cabin gas to circulate
through the PSC for scrubbing, and tends to equalize the pressure
differential between the PSC and cabin. If the valve is not opened,
the resultant pressure differential will cause the suit DEMANDREG
to dmp oxygen into the PSC at a flowrate that will turn on the 02
FLOW HI warning light. Opening the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE will
correct this situation.

During normal space operations, the cabin pressure is maintained
at a nominal 5 psia by the cabin pressure regulator, at flowrates up to
1.4 pounds of owgen per hour. In the event a high leak rate develops,
the EMERGENCYCABIN PRESSURE regulator will supply oxygen at high flow
rates to maintain the cabin pressure above 3.5 psia for more than 5 min-
utes, providing the leak is effectively no larger than a l/2-inch hole.

When performing depressurized operations the suit circuit pressure
is maintained above 3.5 psia by the O2 DEMANDREGULATOR; the cabin
pressure regulator shuts off automatically to prevent wasting oxygen.

Prior to entry SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed, isolating
the suit circuit from the cabin; the O2 DEMAND REGULATORthen controls
suit pressure. Cabin pressure is maintained during the descent by
the cabin pressure regulator until the ambient pressure rises to a
maximum of 0.9 psi above cabin pressure. At that point the cabin relief
valve will open, allowing ambient air to flow into the cabin. As the
cabin pressure increases, the 02 DEMANDREGULATOR admits oxygen into
the suit circuit to maintain the suit pressure slightly below the cabin,
as measured at the suit compressor inlet manifold.

After spacecraft landing, the cabin is ventilated with ambient air
by postlanding ventilation fan and valves. When the CM is floating
upright in the water, the POST LANDING VENT switch is placed in the HIGH
(day) or LOW (night) position. Either of these positions will supply
power to open both vent valves and start the fan. In the HIGH position,
the fan will circulate 150 cubic feet per minute (cfm); LOW, 100 cfm.
An attitude sensing device automatically closes both valves and removes
power from the fan motor when the CM X axis rotates more than 60 degrees
from vertical. Once the device is triggered, it will remain locked up
until the CM is upright, and the POST LANDING VENT switch is placed in
the OFF position. This action resets the control circuit for normal
system operation. The PLVC switch on panel 376 provides an override

~-84
control for opening the PLV valves and turning on the fan in case the
attitude sensor is locked up and cannot be reset; or when the CM is
inverted and egress must be made through the tunnel hatch. In either
case the POST LANDING VENT switch must be in the LOW or HIGH position.

Water management.- In preparing the spacecraft for the mission,
the potable and waste water tanks are partially filled to insure an
adequate supply for the early stages of the mission. From the time the
fuel cells are placed in operation until CSM separation, the fuel cells
replenish the potable water supply. A portion of the water is chilled
and made available to the crew through the drinking fixture and the
food preparation unit. The remainder is heated, and is delivered through
a separate valve on the food preparation unit.

From the time the crew connects into the suit circuit until entry,
the water accumulator pumps are extracting water from the suit heat
exchanger and pumping it into the waste water system. The water is
delivered to the glycol evaporators through individual water control
valves. Provision is made for dumping excess waste water manually
when the tank is full.

A syringe injection system is incorporated to provide for periodic
injection of bactericide to kill bacteria in the potable water system.

Thermal control.- Thermal control is provided by two water-glycol
coolant loops (primary and secondary). During prelaunch operations
ground servicing equipment cools the water-glycol and pumps it through
the primary loop, providing cooling for the electrical and electronic
equipment, and the suit and cabin heat exchangers. The cold water-glycol
is also circulated through the reservoir to m&e available a larger
quantity of coolant for use as a heat sink during the ascent. Additional
heat sink capability is obtained by selecting maximum cooling on the
CABIN TEMP selector, and placing both cabin fans in operation. This
cold soa?ss the CM interior structure and equipment. Shortly before
launch, one of the primary pmps is placed in operation, the pump in
the ground servicing unit is stopped, and the unit is isolated from the
spacecraft system.

During the ascent, the radiators will be heated by aerodynamic
friction. To prevent this heat from being added to the CM thermal load,
the PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS valve is placed in the PULL TO BYPASS
position at approximately 75 seconds before launch. The coolant then
circulates within the CM portion of the loop.

The heat that is generated in the CM, from the time that the ground
servicing unit is isolated until the spacecraft reaches 1lOK feet, is
absorbed by the coolant and the prechilled structure. Above 1lOK feet

~-85

__111-__.“.“-11141-.1-
___-_..--._ .~..--
I____ _-.- ,.--”
Il------l_l
_ ..-- -.... .-. _“.^_.---_. ~._.
it is possible to reject the excess heat by evaporating water in the
primary glycol evaporator.

After attaining orbit the reservoir is isolated from the loop to
maintain a reserve quantity of coolant for refilling the primary loop
in case of loss of fluid by leakage. The PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS
valve is placed in the position (control pushed in) to allow circulation
through the radiators end the radiator outlet temperature sensors. If
the radiators have cooled sufficiently (radiator outlet temperature is
less than the inlet) they will be kept on-stream; if not, they will be
bypassed until sufficient cooling has tsken place. After the radiators
have been placed on-stream, the glycol temperature control is activated
(GLYCOL EVAP TEMP IN switch in AUTO); and the CABIN TEMP selector is
positioned as desired.

The primary loop provides thermal control throughout the mission
unless a degradation of system performance requires the use of the
secondary loop.

Several hours before CM-SM separation the system valves are
positioned so that the primary loop provides cooling for the cabin heat
exchanger, the entire cold plate network, and the suit heat exchanger.
The CABIN TEMP control valve is placed in the MAX COOL position, and -
both cabin fans are turned on to cold-soak in the CM interior structure.

Prior to separation t'ne PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS, and the
GLYCOL TO RADIATORS SEC valves are placed in the BYPASS position to
prevent loss of coolant when the CSM umbilical is cut. From that time
(until approximately 1lOK feet spacecraft altitude) cooling is provided
by water evaporation.

Oxygen Subsystem

The oxygen subsystem shares the oxygen supply with the electrical
power system. Approximately 640 pounds of oxygen is stored in two
cryogenic tanks located in the service module. Heaters within the tanks
pressurize the oxygen to 900 psig for distribution to the using equipment.

Oxygen is delivered to the command module through two separate
supply lines, each of which is connected to an oxygen inlet restrictor
assembly. Each assembly contains a filter, a capillary line, and a
spring-loaded check valve. The filters provide final filtration of gas
entering the CM. The capillaries which are wound around the hot glycol
line serve two purposes; they restrict the total O2 flow rate to a
maximum of 9.0 pounds per hour, and they heat the oxygen entering the
CM. The check valves serve to isolate the two supply lines.

A-86
Downstream of the inlet check valves the two lines tee together
and a single line is routed to the OXYGEN-S/M SUPPLY valve on panel
326. This valve is used in flight as a shutoff valve to back up the
inlet check valves during entry. It is closed prior to CM-SM separation.
PART A2.8

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Introduction

The communications subsystem is the only link between the space-
craft and the manned space flight network (MSFN). In this capacity, the
communications subsystem provides the MSFN flight controllers with data
through the pulse code modulated (PCM) telemetry system for monitoring
spacecraft parameters, subsystem status, crew biomedical data, event
occurrence, and scientific data. As a voice link, the communications
subsystem gives the crew the added capability of comparing and evalua-
ting data with MSFN computations. The communications subsystem, through
its MSFN link, serves as a primary means for the determination of space-
craft position in space and rate of change in position. CM-I.&l rendezvous
is facilitated by a ranging transponder and an active ranging system.
Through the use of television camera, crew observations and public infor-
mation can be transmitted in realtime to MSFN. A means by which CM and
IM telemetry and voice can be stored in the spacecraft for later play-
back, to avoid loss because of an interrupted communications link, is
provided by the communications subsystem in the form of the data storage
equipment (DSE). Direction-finding aids are provided for postlanding
location and rescue by ground personnel.

The following list summarizes the general telecormn functions:

a. Provide voice communication between:

(1) Astronauts via the intercom

(2) CSM and MSFN via the unified S-band equipment (USBE)
and in orbital and recovery phases via the VHF/AM

(3) CSM and extravehicular astronaut (EVA) via VHF/AM

(4) CSM and L&l via VHF/AM

(5) CSM and launch control center (LCC) via PAD COMM

(6) CSM and recovery force swimmers via swimmers umbilical

(7) Astronauts and the voice log via intercomm to the data
storage equipment

A-88

.-I~ .._-. .-_.... -x ,...-._-
b. Provide data to the MSFN of:

(1) CSM system status

(2) Astronaut biomedical status

(3) Astronaut activity via television

(4) EVA personal life support system (PISS) and biomed status

(5) I.&4 system status recorded on CSM data storage equipment

C. Provide update reception and processing of:

(1) Digital information for the command module computer (CMC)

(2) Digital time-referencing data for the central timing
equipment (WE)

(3) Real-time commands to remotely perform switching functions
in three CM systems

d. Facilitate ranging between:

(1) MSFN and CSM via the USBE transponder

(2) LM and CSM via the rendezvous radar transponder (RRT)

(3) CSM and LM via the VHF/AM ranging system

e. Provide a recovery aid VHF for spacecraft location.

f. Provide a time reference for all time-dependent spacecraft sub-
systems except the guidance and navigation subsystem.

Functional Description

The functional description of the telecommunications system is
divided into four parts: intercommunications equipment, data equipment,
radio frequency equipment, and antenna equipment. All of these functional
groups of equipment interface with each other to perform the system
tasks. In the functional descriptions of these parts, such interfaces
will be apparent.
-

PART A2.9

SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS

Introduction

Sequential systems include certain detection and control subsystems
of the launch vechicle (LV) and the Apollo spacecraft (SC). They are
utilized during launch preparations, ascent, and entry portions of a
. .
rmssion, preorbital aborts, early mission terminations, docking maneu-
vers, and SC separation sequences. Requirements of the sequential
systems are achieved by integrating several subsystems. Figure AZ!.%1
illustrates the sequential events controlsubsvstem (SECS), which is the
nucleus of sequential systems, and its interface with the following
subsystems and structures:

a. Displays and controls

b. Emergency detection (EDS)

c. Electrical power (EPS)

d. Stabilization and control (SCS)

e. Reaction control (RCS)

f. Docking (DS)

g* Telecommunications (T/C)

h. Earth lauding (ELS)

1. Launch escape (LES)

J- Structural

Sequential Events Control Subsystem

The SECS is an integrated subsystem consisting of 12 controllers
which may be categorized in seven classifications listed as follows:

a. Two master events sequence controllers (MESC)

b. Two service module jettison controllers (SMJC)

-

A-90
c. One reaction control system controller (RCSC)

d. Two lunar module (LM) separation sequence controllers (LSSC)

e. Two lunar docking events controllers (LDEC)

f. Two earth landing sequence controllers (ELSC)

65. One pyro continuity verification bGX (PCVB)

Five batteries and three fuel cells are the source of electrical
power. The SMJC is powered by fuel cells; however, battery power is
used for the start signal. The RCSC is powered by the fuel cells and
batteries. The remaining controllers of the SECS are powered by batteries
exclusively.

DISPLAYS
AND STRUCTURES
CONTROLS
.

EMERGENCY LAUNCH
DETECTION - SEQUENTIAL ESCAPE
SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM
4 EVENTS
CONTROL
ELECTRICAL EARTH
SUBSYSTEM LANDING
POWER
SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM

Figure A2.9-l.- SECS interface.

A-91

_~ . ". ~.__ .___-".,.~ _---" _"- ~...
....-.I_"._.__C_"-.-- ~.-__.-..---_--- _-_-.-_-_ll_l .^... -.---,
Origin of Signals

The SECS receives manual and/or automatic signals and performs
control functions for normal mission events or aborts. The manual
signals are the result of manipulating switches on the main display
console (MDC) or rotating the Commander's translation hand control
counterclockwise, which is the prime control for a manual abort.
Automatic abort signals are relayed by the emergency system (EDS).

-

A-92
FART A2.10

CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM

Introduction

The caution and warning system (C&WS) monitors critical parameters
of most of the systems in the CM and SM. When a malfunction or out-of-
tolerance condition occurs in any of these systems, the crew is
immediately alerted in order that corrective action may be taken.

Functional Description

Upon receipt of malfunction or out-of-tolerance signals, the C&WS
simultaneously identifies the abnormal condition and alerts the crew
to its existence. Each signal will activate the appropriate systems
status indicator and a master alarm circuit. The master alarm circuit
visually and aurally attracts the crew's attention by alarm indicators
on the MDC and by an audio tone in the headsets. Crew acknowledgment
of an abnormal condition consists of resetting the master alarm circuit,
while retaining the particular systems status malfunction indication.
The capability exists for the crew to select several modes of observing
systems status and master alarm indicators and of monitoring CM or SM
systems.

Major Component Subsystem Description

The C&WS consists of one major component, the detection unit. It
is located behind MDC-3, and therefore is neither visible nor accessible
to the crew during the mission. The balance of the system is made u-p
of visual indicators, aural alerting and associated circuits, and those
switches required to control the various system functions. Visual
indicators include the two uppermost fuel cell electromechanical event
devices on MDC-3, as well as all systems status and master alarm lights.

The detection unit circuits consist of comparators, logic, lamp
drivers, and a master alarm and tone generator. Also incorporated are
two redundant power supplies, a regulated +12 and a -12 V dc for the
electronics.

Inputs to the detection unit consist of both analog and event-type
signals. The analog signals are in the 0 to 5 V dc range. Alarm limits
for these signals trigger voltage comparators, which, in turn, activate
logic and lamp-driver circuits, thus causing activation of the master

A-93

^- .__ _. . . . .‘_ __. . __I___~ __.__- _- -_.-. “--. . .__-_..-_ms....m---- _.---- ~--- .-,_,^._ -.._ I.-
alarm circuit and tone generator, illumination of applicable systems
status lights on MDC-2, and for certain measurements, activation of
applicable electromechanical event indicators on MDC-3. Several event
inputs are monitored by the C&WS detection unit. These signals originate
from solid state and mechanical switch closures in malfunction sensing
devices. These signals will directly illuminate applicable system status
lights and, through logic circuitry, activate the master alarm lights
and tone generator. One event signal, originating within the detection
unit, directly illuminates the C/W light, but activates only the MASTER
ALARM switch lights of the master alarm circuit. One event signal,
"CRRW ALERT," originates from MSFYNstations through the UDL portion of
the communications system. This system status light can only be
extinguished by a second signal originating from the MSFN.

The master alarm circuit alerts crew-members whenever abnormal
conditions are detected. This is accomplished visually by illumination
of remote MASTER ALARM switch-lights on MDC-1, MDC-3, and LEB-122. An
audio alarm tone, sent to the three headsets, aurally alerts the crew.
The output signal of the tone generator is a square wave that is
alternately 750 and 2000 cps, modulated at 2.5 times per second. Although
the tone is audible above the conversation level, it does not render
normal conversation indistinct or garbled. When the crew has noted the
abnormal condition, the master alarm lights and the tone generator are
deactivated and reset by depressing any one of the three MASTER ALARM
switch-lights. This action leaves the systems status lights illuminated
and resets the master alarm circuit for alerting the crew if another
abnormal condition should occur. The individual systems status lights
will remain illuminated until the malfunction or out-of-tolerance
condition is corrected, or the NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch (MIX!-3) is
positioned to ACK.

The C!&WSpower supplies include sensing and switching circuitry
that insure unit self-protection should high-input current, or high- or
low-output voltage occur. Any of these fault conditions will cause the
illumination of the master alarm lights and the C/W system status light.
The tone generator, however, will not be activated because it requires
the 12 V dc output from the malfunctioned power supply for its operation.
The crew must manually select the redundant power supply to return the
C&WSto operation. This is accomplished by repositioning the CAUTION/
WARNING-POWERswitch on MDC-2. In so doing, the C/W status light is
extinguished, but the master alarm circuit remains activated, requiring
it to be reset.

Incorporated into the C&WSis the capability to test the lamps of
systems status and master alarm lights. Position 1 of the CAUTION/
WARNING-LAMP TEST switch tests the illumination of the left-hand group
of status lights on MDC-2 and the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-1.

A-9 4

___-___(,__
_-__-_-.., --1__1 ~^ ~---.---l--.---....-..I .__I-
__ ,..- ..__ _--._,__-,..--l.--=/~~- .I I "I. -- -""." .~
Position 2 tests the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-3 and the right-
hand group of status lights on MDC-2. The third MASTER ALARM light,
located on LEB-122, is tested by placing the CONDITION LAMPS switch
on LEB-122 to TEST.

The position of the CAUTION/WARNING - CSM-CM switch (MIX-2)
establishes the systems to be monitored. Before CM-SM separation,
systems in both the CM and SM are monitored for malfunction or out-of-
tolerance conditions with this switch in the CSM position. Positioning
the switch to CM deactivates systems status lights and event indicators
associated with SM systems.

The CAUTION/WARNING - NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch (MDC-2) permits
variable modes of status and alarm light illumination. For most
of the mission, the switch is set to the NORMAL position to give
normal C&WSoperation; that is, upon receipt of abnormal condition
signals, all systems status lights and master alarm lights are
capable of illumination. During the ascent phase, the switch is set to
the BOOST position, which prevents the MASTER ALARM switch-light on
MDC-1 from illuminating. This prevents possible confusion on MDC-1
between the red MASTER ALARM light and the adjacent red ABORT light.
The ACK switch position is selected when the crew desires to adapt
their eyes to darkness, or if a continuously illuminated systems status
light is undesirable. While in this mode, incoming signals will activate
only the master alarm lights and the tone generator. To determine the
abnormal condition, the crew must depress either MASTER ALARM switch-
light on MDC-1 or -3. This illuminates the applicable systems status
light, and deactivates and resets the master alarm circuit. The systems
status light will remain illuminated as long as the switch-light is
depressed. However, it may be recalled as long as the abnormal
condition exists by again pressing either switch-light.

A stowable tone booster is added to the caution and warning system
to allow all three astronauts to sleep simultaneously with the headsets
removed. Stowage of this unit during non-use periods is under locker
A3.

The unit consists of a power plug, tone booster, and a photo-
sensitive device which can be used on the left or right side of the
command module. The power connection is made to the UTILITY receptacle
on MDC-15 or 16. The tone booster, which provides an audible signal,
is mounted by velcro pad to the left-hand or right-hand girth shelf.
The photo-sensitive device is mounted by velcro over the MDC-1 or
MDC-3 MASTER ALAP&J lamp.

Since the MASTER ALARM is triggered by any caution/warning
monitored symptom, it will activate the tone booster until the

A-95
MASTER ALARM is extinguished by a manual reset.
In the event of a
caution/warning system power supply failure, this unit will provide
the audio alarm.

Electrical power distribution .- The C&WSreceives power from
the MNA & MNB buses (see fig. A2.10-1).
Two circuit breakers, located
on MDC-5, provide circuit protection. Closure of either circuit
breaker will allow normal system operation.

Figure A2.10-l.- C&WSpower distribution diagram.
Operational Limitations and Restrictions

With the CAUTION/WARNING - NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch in the
BOOST position during ascent, the MASTER ALARM switch-light on
MDC-1 will not illuminate should a malfunction occur. The master alarm
circuit reset capability of the light is also disabled during this
time. This requires the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-3 to be
used exclusively for monitoring and resetting functions during boost.
Several peculiarities should be noted in regard to the CAUTION/WARNING -
POWERswitch. Whenever this switch is moved from or through the OFF
position to either power supply position, the master alarm circuit is
activated, requiring it be reset. Also, switching from one power supply
to another (when there is no power supply failure) may cause the C/W
system status light to flicker as the switch passes through the OFF
position.

Should both power supplies fail, the C&WSis degraded to the extent
that the complete master alarm circuit, as well as those system status
lights that illuminate as the result of analog-type input signals, are
rendered inoperative. This leaves only those status lights operative
that require event-type input signals. They include the following SM
and CM lights: CMC, ISS, BMAG 1 TEMP, BMAG 2 TEMP, SPS ROUGHECO,
PITCH GMBL 1, PITCH GMBL 2, YAW CMBL 1, YAW GMBL 2, 02 FLOW HI,
FC BUS DISCONNECT., AC BUS 1, AC BUS 1 OVERLOAD, AC BUS 2, AC BUS 2
OVERLOAD, MN BUS A UNDERVOLT, MN BUS B UNDERVOLT, and CREWALERT. The
C/W light will be operative only while the CAUTION/WARNING - POWER
switch is in position 1 or 2.

The CAUTION/WARNING - CSM-CM switch must be in the CSM position
in order to conduct a lamp test of those system status lights associated
with SM systems. The status lights of CM systems may be tested with the
switch in either position. Circuit design permits a complete lamp
test to be conducted with the CAUTION/WARNING switch in the NORMAL or
ACK position only. In the BOOST position, all lamps except the MASTER
ALARM light on MDC-1 may be tested.

Normally, each abnormal condition signal will activate the C&WS
master alarm circuit and tone generator, and illuminate the applicable
systems status light. However, after initial activation of any status
light that monitors several parameters, and reset of the MASTER ALARM,
any additional out-of-tolerance condition or malfunction associated with
the same system status light will not activate the MASTER ALARM until
the first condition has been corrected, thus extinguishing the status
light.

A-97

__=I . ..“.-_ _..“... ,.,, “‘ ..--. -~-___ -- -----^1
Each crewmember's audio control panel has a power switch which
will allow or inhibit the tone signal from entering his headset. The
AUDIO-TONE position allows the signalto pass on to the headset,
while the AUDIO position inhibits the signal.
PART A2.11

MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS DATA

Introduction

Miscellaneous systems data pertain to items that are not covered
in other systems. These items consist of timers, accelerometers
(G-meter), and uprighting system.

Timers

Two mission timers (electrical) and two event timers (electrical/
mechanical) are provided for the crew in the command module. One
mission timer is located on panel 2 of the MDC and the other on panel
306 in the left-hand forward equipment bay. Each mission timer has
provisions for manually setting the readout (hours, minutes, and
seconds), and the capability of starting, stopping, and resetting to
zero. The numerical elements are electroluminescent lamps and the
intensity is controlled by the NUMBRICS light control on panels MDC-8
and LEB-100. The event timers are located on MDC-1 and -306 in the
left-hand forward equipment bay, and provide the crew with a means of
monitoring and timing events. Ali timers reset and start automatically
when lift-off occurs, and the timer located on MDC-1 will be automatically
reset and restarted if an abort occurs. The event timers are integrally
illuminated by an internal electroluminescent lamp and controlled by the
INTEGRAL light controls located on MDC-8 and LEB-100.

Accelerometer (G-meter)

The accelerometer or G-meter @DC-l) provides the crew with a
visual indication of spacecraft positive and negative G-loads. This
meter is illuminated by an internal electroluminescent lamp and controlled
by the INTEGRAL light control on MDC-8.

Command Module Uprighting System

The CM uprighting system is manually controlled and operated after
the CM has assumed a stable, inverted floating attitude. The system
consists of three inflatable air bags, two relays, three solenoid-control
valves, two air compressors, control switches, and air lines. The inflat-
able bags are located in the '34 forward compartment and the air compressors
in the aft compartment. The control switches and circuit breakers are
located in the crew compartment. The switches control relays which
are powered by the postlanding bus and the relays control power to the
compressors which are powered by battery buses A and B. (See figure
A2.11-1.)
EATTLRV
FLTIPL BUS B
BUS
CT
c

EPS BAT 25A
UPRIGHT svs
2CA
I )BUSBEPS BAT 2%
CWPR 1
xLA > BUSA EAT A WEB-2??I
IRHLE-2N IAHEB-ml
I FLOAT BAG R
I FLOAT BAG 1 5A ) BAT B
5A )' BAT A P iMDC~81
Y IMDC-8)

FLOAT BAG
L WC-81

------

/
----- 1
I
I
----- 1

I
i
Q,
VfNl
I

!
I
I Pizmid----
NORMCLOSED MRM CIOSED
_---e-m- ,----m-m
_--m---e
COMROLVALVf
CONTRNVALVL 4 CONTROL VALVE
NO.Z+VBAG r
M. l-V BAG W.3+ZBAG
1

T
COMPRtSSOR COlvTROt
52 MOTOR SWITCHLS
IRHLB-2981

Figure A2.11-l.- Sequential systems operational/functional diagram.
Functional description.- FLOAT BAG 1L switch controls inflation
of the air bag on -Y axis, switch 2R controls inflation of the air
bag on the +Y axis, and switch 3 CTR controls inflation of the air bag
on the +Z axis of the CM (see fig. A2.11-1). Two of the bags are
45 inches in diameter; the other bag is 24 inches in diameter. If the
CM becomes inverted after landing, the crewmember at station 1 initiates
filling of the three bags by setting the FLOAT BAG lL, 2R, and 3 CTR
switches to FILL. When the CM is uprighted, the three FLOAT BAG switches
will be set to OFF. A 4.25f0.25-psi relief valve is located in the inlet
of each bag. Backup relief valves set at 13.5 psi are located in the
outlet of each compressor.

-.

A-102

___l.s^_.--..-" .--..^..._I -.-. "."._
FART A2.12

CREWPERSONAL EQUIPMENT

This section contains the description and operation of Contractor-
and NASA-furnished crew personal equipment and miscellaneous stowed
equipment that is not described in other sections of the handbook. All
mador items are identified as Contractor-furnished equipment (CFE) or
Government-furnished (NASA) property (GFP - synonymous with GFE).

The crew equipment is presented in the general order of operational
usage in SM2A-03-BLOCK. A brief outline is as follows:

a. Spacesuits

(1) Intravehicular Spacesuit Assembly

(a) Biomedical Harness and Belt
(b) Constant Wear Garment (CWG)
(c) Flight Coveralls
(d) Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA)
(e) Associated Umbilicals, Adapters, and Equipment

(2) Extravehicular Spacesuit Assembly

(a) Liquid-Cooled Garment (LCG)
(b) PGA with Integrated Thermal Meteroid Garment (ITMG)
(c) Associated Equipment

b. G-Load Restraints

(1) Crewman Restraint Harness

(2) Interior Handhold and Straps

(3) Hand Bar

C. Zero-g Restraints

(1) Rest Stations

(2) Velcro and Snap Restraint Areas

(3) Straps

A-103
d. Internal Sighting and Illumination Aids

(1) Window Shades

(2) Mirrors

(3) Crewman Optical Alignment Sight (COAS)

(4) LM Active Docking Target

(5) Window Markings

(6) Miscellaneous Aids

e. External Sighting and Illumination Aids

(1) Exterior Spotlight

(2) Running Lights

(3) EVA Floodlight

(4) EVA Handles with RL Disks

(5) Rendezvous Beacon

f. Mission Operational Aids

(1) Flight Data File

(2) Inflight Toolset

(3) Cameras

(4) Accessories & Miscellaneous

(a) Waste Bags
(b) Pilot's Preference Kits (PPKs)
(c) Fire Extinguishers
(d) Oxygen Masks
(e) Utility Outlets
(f) Scientific Instrumentation Outlets

63. Crew Life Support

(1) Water

(2) Food

A-104

(...._.__--. .-_.-_.-^ -------.-
(3) The Galley System

(4) Waste Management System

(5) Personal Hygiene

h. Medical Supplies and Equipment

1. Radiation Monitoring and Measuring Equipment

ii. Postlanding Recovery Aids

(1) Postlanding Ventilation Ducts

(2) Swimmer Umbilical and Dye Marker

(3) Recovery Beacon

(4) Snagging Line

(5) Seawater Pump

(6) Survival Kit

k. Equipment Stowage
PART AZ.13

DOCKING AND TRANSFER

Introduction

This section identifies the physical characteristics of the docking
system and the operations associated with docking and separation.

Docking operational sequence .- The following sequence of illustra-
tions and text describe the general functions that are performed during
docking. These activities will vary with the different docking modes.

After the spacecraft and third stage have orbited the earth, pos-
sibly up to three revolutions, the third stage is reignited to place the
spacecraft on a translunar flight.

Shortly after translunar injection, the spacecraft transposition and
docking phase takes place (fig. A2.13-1). When the CSM is separated
from the third stage, docking is achieved by maneuvering the CSM close
enough so that the extended probe (accomplished during earth orbit) -
engages with the drogue in the LM. When the probe engages the drogue
with the use of the capture latches, the probe retract system is activated
to pull the LM and CSM together.

Upon retraction, the LM tunnel ring will activate the 12 automatic
docking ring latches on the CM and effect a pressure seal between the
modules through the two seals in the CM docking ring face. After the
two vehicles are docked, the pressure in the tunnel is equalized from
the CM through a pressure equalization valve. The CM forward hatch is
removed and the actuation of all 12 latches is verified. Any latches
not automatically actuated will be cocked and latched manually by the
crewman. The LM to CM electrical umbilicals are retrieved from their
stowage position in the LM tunnel and connected to their respective
connectors in the CM docking ring.

The vehicle umbilicals supply the power to release the L&J from the
SLA. Once the hold-down straps are severed, four large springs located
at each attachment point push the two vehicles apart, and the combined
CSM/LM continues towards the moon.

A-106
H

A-107

. _..-_ _. _. ..~- - ..._”..--_ _.._.-
1-- I-__~ _-__..^_.__
~,l_____~ __--- ~-s_--.--
Once in lunar orbit, the tunnel is repressurized. The probe assem-
bly and drogue assembly are removed from the tunnel and stowed in the
CM. The pressure in the LM is equalized through the LM hatch valve,
With the pressure equalized, the IM hatch is opened and locked in the
open position to provide a passageway between the two modules.

After two crewmen transfer to the LM, the CM crewman retrieves the
drogue from its stowage location in the CM, passes it through the
tunnel, and helps to install and lock it in the tunnel. The drogue may
be installed and locked by the LM crewmen, if they choose. The probe
assembly is then retrieved from its stowage location in the CM and
installed and preloaded to take all the load between the modules. This
accomplished, the LM hatch is closed by the I.&l crewmen. The 12 docking
latches are released and cocked by the crew-man in the CM so that the
latches are ready for the next docking operation. The CM forward hatch
is reinstalled and checked to assure a tight seal. The modules are now
prepared for separation.

The probe EXTEND RELEASE/RETRACT switch in the CM (MDC-2) is placed
in the EXTEND position, energizing the probe extend latch. The probe
extends and during extension will activate a switch energizing an enter-
nal electrical motor to unlock the capture latches. After the probe
extends, the I.M pulls awsy from the CM and descends to the lunar surface.
If the switch is not held until the probe reaches f'ull extension, the
capture latches will reengage to hold the two vehicles together. The
switch would then have to be reactivated and separation performed with
the RCS.

After landing, it will be several hours before the first man steps
foot on the moon. The first few hours are spent checking the IM ascent
stage and resting. This completed, the cabin is depressurized and one
of the crewmen descends to the lunar surface. Following a short period,
the se'cond crewman descends to the surface. Lunar surface activities
will vary for each mission.

Following completion of the lunar surface exploration the ascent
engine is fired using the depleted descent stage as a launch platform,

After rendezvous and docking in lunar orbit, the LM crewmen trans-
fer back to the CM, After the CSM and I&i pressures have equalized, the
LM crew opens the LM hatch while the CM pilot removes the tunnel hatch.
The drogue and probe are removed and stowed in the LM. Lunar samples,
film, and equipment to be returned to earth are transferred from the LM
to the CM. Equipment in the CM that is no longer needed is put into the
LM, and the LM hatch is closed, the CM hatch is replaced, and the seal
checked.

A-108
The IN is then released by firing the separation system (detonating
cord) located around the circumference of the docking ring, thus serving
the ring and abandoning the I&I (fig. A2.13-1). This completed, the CM
SPS engine is fired, placing the spacecraft in a return trajectory toward
the earth.

Functional Description

The docking system is a means of connecting and disconnecting the
LM/CSM during a mission and is removable to provide for intravehiclular
transfer between the CSM and L&l of the flight crew and transferrable
equipment.

The crew transfer tunnel, or CSM/LM interlock area, is a passageway
between the CM forward bulkhead and the LM upper hatch. The hatch
relationship with the docking hardware is shown in fig. AZ.l3-2. (The
figure does not show the installed positions.) For descriptive purposes
that portion of the interlock area above the CM forward bulkhead to the
docking interface surface is referred to as the CM tunnel. That portion
of the interlock outboard of the L&I upper hatch extending to the docking
interface surface is referred to as the I&l tunnel. The CM tunnel incor-
porates the CM forward hatch, probe assembly, docking ring and seals, and
the docking automatic latches. The L&I tunnel contains a hinged pressure
hatch, drogue support fittings, drogue assembly, drogue locking mechanism,
and L&f/CM electrical umbilicals.

A-109
A- 110

-.-- . ..- -- . ..--. --. .-. .._ _... “... /.. -__- -.“.” ,,..--, -.~, .__ 1-1--1- - -~-~---~
PART A3

LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION

INTRODUCTION

This part includes descriptions of the LM, the LM - spacecraft-to-
lunar module adapter (SLA) - S-IVB connections, the LM-CSM interfaces,
and LM stowage provisions are included in this chapter. These data were
extracted from the technical manual LMA 790-3-I&I, Apollo Operations Hand-
book, Lunar Module, Volume 1, dated February 1, 1970.

LM CONFIGURATION

The LM (fig. A3-1) is designed for manned lunar landing missions.
It consists of an ascent stage and a descent stage; the stages are
joined together at four interstage fittings by explosive nuts and bolts.
Subsystem continuity between the stages is accomplished by separable
interstage umbilicals and hardline connections.

Both stages function as a single unit during lunar orbit, until
separation is required. Stage separation is accomplished by explosively
severing the four interstage nuts and bolts, the interstage umbilicals,
and the water lines. All other hardlines are disconnected automatically
at stage separation. The ascent stage can function as a single unit to
accomplish rendezvous and docking with the CSM. The overall dimensions
of the LM are given in figure A3-2. Station reference measurements
(fig. Al-l) ar e established as follows:

a. The Z- and Y-axis station reference measurements (inches)
start at a point where both axes intersect the X-axis at the vehicle
vertical centerline: the Z-axis extends forward and aft of the
intersection; the Y-axis, left and right. The point of intersection
is established as zero.

b. The +Y-axis measurements increase to the right from zero; the
-Y-axis measurements increase to the left. Similarly, the tZ- and
-Z-axis measurements increase forward (+Z) and aft (-Z) from zero.

C. The X-axis station reference measurements (inches) start at a
design reference point identified as station +X200.000. This reference
point is approximately 128 inches above the bottom surface of the
footpads (with the landing gear extended); therefore, all X-axis station
reference measurements are +X-measurements.

A-111

. ,.-.____,,.-__._.
-. .,",..
__._---. -___ --ll~--ll-".-----*l __Xsll_---_~-. ~-^_-l_-_--ll--_
Figure A3-l.- LM configuration.

::- 112
(--14, I”-=

7

28’ a 2”

19’ 10.65”
t
Y 8.86”

1 d FORWARD

Figure A3-2.- LM overall dimensions.

A-113
.-

Ascent Stage

The ascent stage, the control center and manned portion of the
IN, accommodates two astronauts. It comprises three main sections:
the crew compartment, midsection, and af't equipment bay. The crew
compartment and midsection make up the cabin, which has an approximate
overall volume of 235 cybic feet. The cabin is climate-controlled,
and pressurized to 4.8 - 0 .2 psig. Areas other than the cabin are
unpressurized.

Crew Compartment. - The crew compartment is the frontal area of
the ascent stage; it is 92 inches in diameter and 42 inches deep. This
is the flight station area; it has control and display panels, armrests,
body restraints, landing aids, two front windows, a docking window,
and an alignment optical telescope (AOT). Flight station centerlines
are 44 inches apart; each astronaut has a set of controllers and arm-
rests. Circuit breaker, control, and display panels are along the
upper sides of the compartment. Crew provision storage space is
beneath these panels. The main control and display panels are canted
and centered between the astronauts to permit sharing and easy scanning.
An optical alignment station, between the flight stations, is used in
conjunction with the AOT. A portable life support system (PLSS) donning
station is also in the center aisle, slightly aft of the optical align-
ment station.

Control and display panels: The crew compartment has 12 control
and display panels (fig. A3-3): two main display panels (1 and 2)
that are canted forward 10 degrees, two center panels (3 and 4) that
slope down and aft 45 degrees towards the horizontal, two bottom side
panels (5 and 6), two lower side panels (8 and 12), one center side panel
(14), two upper side panels (11 and 161, and the orbital rate display -
earth and lunar (ORDEAL) panel aft of panel 8.

A-114

-- ._-. - ___I__ -."111..-- -_-- ---. - .-I_^_
Figure A3-3.- Cabin interior (looking forward).
Panels 1 and 2 are located on each side of the front face assembly
centerline, at eye level. Each panel is constructed of two 0.015-inchi
thick aluminum-alloy face sheets, spaced 2 inches apart by formed
channels. The spacer channels are located along the sheet edges;
additional channels, inboard of the edge channels, reinforce the sheets.
This forms a rigid box-like construction with a favorable strength-to-
weight ration and a relatively high natural frequency. Four shock mounts
support each panel on the structure. Panel instruments are mounted to
the back surface of the bottom and/or to the top sheet of the panel.
The instruments protrude through the top sheet of the panel. All dial
faces are nearly flush with the forward face of the panel. Panel1
contains warning lights, flight indicators and controls, and propellant
quantity indicators. Panel 2 contains caution lights, flight indicators
and controls, and Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS) and Environmental
Control Subsystem (ECS) indicators and controls.

Panel 3 is immediately below panels 1 and 2 and spans the width
of these two panels. Panel 3 contains the radar antenna temperature
indicators and engine, radar, spacecraft stability, event timer, RCS
and lighting controls.

Panel 4 is centered between the flight stations and below panel 3.
Panel 4 contains attitude controller assembly (ACA) and thrust trans-
lation controller assembly (TTCA) controls, navigation system indicators,
and LM guidance computer (I&C) indicators and controls. Panels 1 through
4 are within easy reach and scan of both astronauts.

Panels 5 and 6 are in front of the flight stations at astronaut
waist height. Panel 5 contains lighting and mission timer controls,
engine start and stop pushbuttons, and the X-translation pushbutton.
Panel 6 contains abort guidance controls.

Panel 8 is at the left of the Commander's station, The panel is
canted up 15 degrees from the horizontal; it contains controls and
displays for explosive devices, audio controls, and the TV camera
connection.

Panel 11, directly above panel 8, has five angled surfaces that
contain circuit breakers. Each row of circuit breakers is canted
15 degrees to the line of sight so that the white band on the circuit
breakers can be seen when they open.

A-116
Panel 12 is at the right of the LM Pilot's station. The panel is
canted up 15 degrees from the horizontal; it contains audio, communica-
tions, and communications antennas controls and displays.

Panel 14, directly above panel 12, is canted up 36.5 degrees from
the horizontal. It contains controls and displays for electrical power
distribution and monitoring.

Panel 16, directly above panel 14, has four angled surfaces that
contain circuit breakers. Each row of circuit breakers is canted
15 degrees to the line of sight so that the white band on the circuit
breakers can be seen when they open.

The orbital rate display - earth and lunar (ORDEAL) panel is
immediately aft of the panel 8. It contains the controls for obtaining
I,M attitude, with respect to a local horizontal, from the LCC.

Windows: Two triangular windows in the front face assembly provide
visibility during descent, ascent, and rendezvous and docking phases of
the mission. Both windows have approximately 2 square feet of viewing
area; they are canted down to the side to permit adequate peripheral
and downward visibility. A third (docking) window is in the curved
overhead portion of the crew compartment shell, directly above the
Commander's flight station. This window provides visibility for
docking maneuvers. All three windows consist of two separated panes,
vented to space environment. The outer pane is made of Vycor glass with
a thermal (multilayer blue-red) coating on the outboard surface and an
antireflective coating on the inboard surface. The inner pane is made
of structural glass. It is sealed with a Race seal (the docking
window inner pane has a dual seal) and has a defog coating on the
outboard surface and an antireflective coating on the inboard surface.
Both panes are bolted to the window frame through retainers.

All three windows are electrically heated to prevent fogging.
The heaters for the Commander's front window and the docking window
receive their power from 115-volt ac bus A and the Commander's 28-volt
dcbus, respectively. The heater for the LM Pilot's front window receives
power from 115-volt ac bus B. The heater power for the Commander's front
window and the docking window is routed through the AC BUS A: CDR WIND
HTR and HEATERS: DOCK WINDOWcircuit breakers, respectively; for the
LM Pilot's front window, through the AC BUS B: SE WIND HTR circuit
breaker. These are 2-ampere circuit breakers on panel 11. The tempera-
ture of the windows is not monitored with an indicator; proper heater
operation directly affects crew visibility and is, therefore, visually
determined by the astronauts. When condensation or frost appears on a
window, that window heater is turned on. It is turned off when the
abnormal condition disappears. When a window shade is closed, that
window heater must be off.
Midsection.- The midsection structure (fig. A3-4) is a ring-stiffened
semimonocoque shell. The bulkheads consist of aluminum-alloy, chemically
milled skin with fusion-welded longerons and machined stiffeners. The
midsection shell is mechanically fastened to flanges on the major
structural bulkheads at stations +'Z27,OO and -Z27.00. The crew compart-
ment shell is mechanically secured to an outboard flange of the +Z27.00
bulkhead. The up-per and lower decks, at stations +x294.643 and +X233.500,
respectively, are made of aluminum-alloy, integrally stiffened and
machined. The lower deck provides structural support for the ascent
stage engine. The upper deck provides structural support for the docking
tunnel and the overhead hatch.

Figure A3-A.- Cabin interior (looking aft).
Two main beams running fore and aft, integral with those above
the crew compartment, are secured to the upper deck of the midsection;
they support the deck at the outboard end of the docking tunnel. The
aft ends of the beams are fastened to the aft bulkhead (-Z27.000)
which has provisions for bolting the tubular truss members that s&port
both aft interstage fittings. Ascent stage stress loads applied to the
front beam are transmitted through the two beams on the upper deck to
the aft bulkhead.

Descent Stage

The descent stage is the unmanned portion of the LM. It contains
the descent engine propellant system, auxiliary equipment for the
astronauts, end scientific experiment packages to be placed on the
lunar surface. The descent stage structure provides attachment and
support points for securing the LN within the spacecraft-lunar module
adapter (SLA).

LM - SLA - S-IVB Connections

At earth launch, the LM is within the SLA, which is connected to
the S-IVB booster. The SLA has an upper section and a lower section.
The outriggers, to which the landing gear is attached, provide attachment
points for securing the IN to the SLA lower section. The LM is mounted
to the SLA support structure on adjustable spherical seats at the apex
of each of the four outriggers; it is held in place by a tension holddown
strap at each mounting point. Before the IN is removed, the upper
section of the SLA is explosively separated into four segments. These
segments, which are hinged to the lower section, fold back and are then
forced away from the SLA by spring thrusters. The IN is then explosively
released from the lower section.

LM-CSM Interfaces

A ring at the top of the ascent stage provides a structural interface
for joining the LM to the CSM. The ring, which is compatible with the
clamping mechanisms in the CM, provides structural continuity. The
drogue portion of the docking mechanism is secured below this ring.
The drogue is required during docking operations to mate with the
CM-mounted probe. See figure A3-5 for orientation of the LM to the
CSM.

Crew transfer tunnel.- The crew transfer tunnel (LPI-CM interlock
area) is the passageway created between the I&I overhead hatch and the
CM forward pressure hatch when the I&l and the CSM are docked. The

A-119

..- .--. * _- -.--- --l_--_“.“.l..- I... .-_--.-__ll-___ll_“_~
tunnel permits intervehicular transfer of crew and equipment without
exposure to space environment.

Final docking latches: Twelve latches are spaced equally about the
periphery of the CM docking ring. They are placed around and within the
CM tunnel so that they do not interfere with probe operation. When
secured, the latches insure structural continuity and pressurization
between the LM and the cT4, and seal the tunnel interface.

Umbilical: An electrical umbilical, in the IX portion of the
tunnel, is connecCed by an astronaut to the CM. This connection can
be made without drogue removal.

CREWMAN OPTICAL STANDOFF CROSS LM ACQUISITION LM -Y-AXIS
ALIGNMENT SIGHT ;CSM-ACTIVE DOCKING
ALIGNMENT TARGET)
\

CH

LM COAS LINE
OF SIGHT POST
PITCHOVER POSITION

CSM
\
ACOUISITION
STANDOFF
ALIGNMENT
CROSS ANU
STRIPS
AND ORIENTATION (LM -ACTIVE DOCKlnv.I.-.
LIGHT (TIP) ALIGNMENT TARCEll

Figure A3-5.- LM-CSM reference axes.

A-120
Docking hatches.- The IN has a single docking (overhead) hatch;
the CSM has a single, integral, forward hatch. The LM overhead hatch
is not removable. It is hinged to open 75 degrees into the cabin.

Docking drogue.- The drogue assembly is a conical structure with
provisions for mounting in the LM portion of the crew transfer tunnel.
The drogue may be removed from either end of the crew transfer tunnel
and may be temporarily stowed in the CM or the LM, during Service
Propulsion System (SPS) burns. One of the three tunnel mounts contains
a locking mechanism to secure the installed drogue in the tunnel.

Docking probe.- The docking probe provides initial CM-LM coupling
and attenuates impact energy imposed by vehicle contact. The docking
probe assembly consists of a central body, probe head, capture latches,
pitch arms, tension linkages, shock attenuators, a support structure,
probe stowage mechanism, probe extension mechanism, probe retraction
system, an extension latch, a preload torque shaft, probe electrical
umbilicals, and electrical circuitry. The assembly may be folded for
removal and stowage from either end of the transfer tunnel.

The probe head is self-centering. When it centers in the drogue
the three capture latches automatically engage the drogue socket. The
capture latches can be released 'oy a release handle on the CM side of
the probe or by depressing a probe head release button from the I&l
side, using a special tool stowed on the right side stowage area inside
the cabin.

Docking aids.- Visual alignment aids are used for final alignment
of the IN and CSM, before the probe head of the CM makes contact with
the drogue. The LM +Z-axis will align 50 to 70 degrees from the
CSM -Z-axis and 30 degrees from the CSM +Y-axis. The CSM position
represents a 180-degree pitchover and a counterclockwise roll of
60 degrees from the launch vehicle alignment configuration.

An alignment target is recessed into the LM so as not to protrude
into the launch configuration clearance envelope or beyond the LM envelope.
The target, at approximately stations -~46.30O and -20.203, has a
radioluminescent black standoff cross having green radioluminescent
disks on it and a circular target base painted fluorescent white with
black orientation indicators. The base is 17.68 inches in diameter.
Cross members on the standoff cross will be aligned with the orientation
indicators and centered within the target circle when viewed at the
intercept parallel to the X-axis and perpendicular to the Y-axis and
Z-axis.

A-121
Stowage Provisions

The IM has provisions for stowing crew personal equipment. The
equipment includes such items as the docking drogue; navigational
star charts and an orbital map; umbilicals; a low-micron antibacteria
filter for attachment to the cabin relief and dump valve; a crewman's
medical kit; an extravehicular visor assembly (EWA) for each astronaut;
a special multipurpose wrench (tool B); spare batteries for the PLSS
packs; and other items.

-_

A-122
PART A4

MISSION CONTROL CENTER ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

The Mission Control Center (MCC) is located at the Manned Spacecraft
Center in Houston, Texas. The MCC contains the communications, computer
display and command systems to effectively monitor and control the
Apollo spacecraft. These data were extracted from information furnished
by Flight Operations Directorate, Manned Spacecraft Center.

Flight operations are controlled from the MCC. The MCC contains
two flight control rooms, but only one control room is used per mission.
Each control room, called a Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR),
is capable of controlling individual Staff Support Rooms (SSR) located
adjacent to the MOCR. Both the MOCR's and the SSR's operate on a
24-hour basis. To accomplish this, the various flight control functions
and consoles are staffed by three g-hour shifts. Figures A4-1 and A4-2
show the floor plans and locations of personnel and consoles in the
MOCR and the SSR's. Figure Ah-3 shows MOCR activity during the Apollo
13 flight, and figure Ah-4 shows the MOCR and SSR organizational
structure.
1. Flight Operations Director: Responsible for 9. Flight Surgeon: Directs all operational med-
successful completion of mission flight operations ical activities concerned with the mission, including
for all missions being supported. the status of the flight crew.
2. Mission Director: Overall mission respon- 10. Spacecraft Communicator: Voice communi-
sibility and control of flight test operations, which cations with the astronauts, exchanging information
include launch preparation. In Project Mercury there on the progress of the mission with them.
were no alternative mission objectives that could 11. Flight Dynamics Officer: Monitors and
be exercised other than early termination of the evaluates the flight parameters required to achieve
mission. The Apollo missions, however, offer many a successful orbital flight; gives “GO” or “ABORT”
possible alternatives which have to be decided in recommendations to the Flight Director.
real time. 12. Retrofire Officer: Monitors impact pre-
3. Public Affairs Officer: Responsible for pro- diction displays and is responsible for determination
viding information on the mission status to the of retrofire times.
public. 14. Booster Systems Engineer: Monitors pro
4. Flight Director: Responsible for detailed pellant tank pressurization systems and advises the
control of the mission from lift-off until conclusion Bight crew and/or Flight Director of systems ab-
of the flight. normalities.
5. Assistant Flight Director: Responsible tothe 15. Guidance Officer: Detects Stage I and
Flight Director for detailed control of the mission Stage II slowrate deviations and other programmed
from lift-off through conclusion of the flight; assumes events, verifies proper performance of the Inertial
the duties of the Flight Director during his absence. Guidance System, commands onboard computation
6. Experiments and Flight Planning: Plansand function and recommends action to the Flight
monitors accomplishment of flight planning and Director.
scientific experiment activities. 16. Network Controller: Hasdetailedoperation-
7. Operations and Procedures Officer: Respon- al control of the Ground Operational Support System
sible to the Flight Director for the detailed imple- network.
mentation of the MCC/Ground Operational Support 17. DepartmentofDefenseRepresentative: Over-
Systems mission control procedures. all control of Department of Defense forces supporting
8. Vehicle Systems Engineers: Monitor and the mission, including direction of the deployment
evaluate the performance of all electrical, mech- of recovery forces, the operation of the recovery
anical and life support equipment aboard the space- communications network, and the search, location
craft (this includes the Agena during rendezvous and retrieval of the crew and spacecraft.
missions).

Figure Ah-l.- Personnel and console locations.

A-124

-__ ~. _ _---_l----_l_- --
Legend of symbols

0 Clock

i Zone fire alarm panel

lg “A” power panel

[Bi “6” power panel

8 Frre extinguisher

[XI Air duct

m Ozone exhaust

Room no. Room name

310 Flight dynamtcs SSR
311 Vehicle systems SSR
312 Life systems SSR
312A Flight crew SSR
313 Operation and procedures SSR
314 AiSEP SSR
316 Control and display terminal
319 Display and timing
324
324A Meteaological center
3248 1
327 Recovery control
::;A Recovery control display projection
Simulation control
329 Summary display projection
330 Mission operations control room no. 1
zz:“, f Comm booth
332 Visitors viewing area

Figure Ab-2.- Floor plan of MOCKand SSR's.
I I 1 I
Spacecraft Network
Fliyht Act~wt~fs CCWllOlli?l
DfflCU Commll,~Icator
AD I
IST

l I I I
CSM Systeiw LM Systems EMU Booster Systeins
Retrofire Flight Dynalu~cs Guidance / Yaw
Engineers Engineers E”iJlWXS
Officer officer Dff1cer ;
EECDM : GNC TELCDM ! CONTROL ’ -J
1
t

Figure A4-4.- NOCR and SSR organizational structure.
MISSION OPERATIONS CONTROL ROOM

The MOCR was the center for mission control operations. The prime
controlpositions were stationed in this area. The MOCRwas broken
down into three operations groups. Responsibilities of the groups were
as follows :

a. Mission Command and Control Group

(I) Mission Director (MD)
The MD was responsible for overall conduct of the mission.

(2) Flight Operations Director (FOD)
The FOD was responsible for the interface between the Flight
Director and management.

(3) Flight Director (FD)
The FD was responsible for MOCR decisions and actions
concerning vehicle systems, vehicle dynamics, and MCC/MSFN
operations.

(4) Assistant Flight Director (AFD)
The AFD was responsible for assisting the Flight Director
in the performance of his assigned duties.

(5) Flight Activities Officer (FAO)
The FAO was responsible for developing and coordinating
the flight plan.

(6) Department of Defense Representative (DOD)
The DOD Representative was responsible for coordination
and direction of all DOD mission support forces and sites.

(7) Assistant DOD Representative
The Assistant DOD Representative was responsible for assist-
ing the DOD Representative in the performance of his task.

(8) Network Controller (NC) (NETWORK)
The Network Controller was responsible to the Flight
Director for the detailed operational control and failure
analysis of the MSFN.

(9) Assistant Network Controller
The Assistant Network Controller assisted the Network
Controller in the performance of his duties and was respon-
sible for all MCC equipment and its ability to support.

~-128

-.__ -_“~ i_ .,l----.l.. -.-.._-_ . .._- - .-..- -.~_l_- l____.-_ll_l__~-,-“,~-.~..l_-- -.-
(10) Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
The PA0 was responsible for keeping the public informed
on the progress of the mission.

(11) Surgeon
The Flight Surgeon was responsible to the Flight Director
for the analysis and evaluation of all medical activities
concerned with the flight.

(12) Spacecraft Communicator (CAPCOM)
The Spacecraft Communicator was responsible to the Flight
Director for all voice communications with the flight
crew. The CAPCOMalso served in conjunction with FAO as
a crew procedures advisor. This position was manned by
a member of the backup flight crew.

(13) Experiments Officer (EO) (EXPO)
The primary function of the EO was to provide overall opera-
tional coordination and control for the Apollo Lunar Surface
Experiment Package (ALSEP), and the Lunar Geology Experi-
ment (LGE). The coordination was with the various MOCR
operational positions and the ALSEP SSR; the Principal
Investigators, Management, the Program Officer, Goddard,
and the Manned Space Flight Network. The EO was also
responsible to the Flight Director for providing ALSEP
and LGE status and any ALSEP or LGE activities that could
have an effect on the Apollo mission.

b. Systems Operations Group (MOCR)

(1) Environmental, Electrical, and Communications (EECOM)
The CSM EECOM Engineer was responsible to the FD for
monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM environmental,
electrical, and sequential systems.

(2) Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC)
The GNC Engineer was responsible to the Flight Director
for monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM guidance,
navigation, control, and propulsion systems.

(3) TELCOM
The LM Environmental and Electrical Engineer was respon-
sible to the FD for monitoring and troubleshooting the
LM environmental, electrical, and sequential systems.

A-129

._ . ."- -" _..-. ...._..---- ~I.*ll _--. l.--".- _-- .*----1.--1".1_1_..
(4) CONTROL
The LM Guidance, Navigation, and Control Engineer was
responsible to the Flight Director for monitoring and
troubleshooting the LM guidance, navigation, control,
and propulsion systems.

(5) Booster Systems Engineer (BSE)
The Booster Systems Engineers' responsibilities were
delegated as follows:

(a) BSE 1 had overall responsibility for the launch ve-
hicle including command capability. In addition,
BSE 1 was responsible for all S-IC and S-II stage
functions.

(b) BSE 2 had prime responsibility for all S-IVB stage
functions with the exception of command.

(c) BSE 3 had prime responsibility for all instrument
unit (IU) functions with the exception of command.

(6) Apollo Communications Engineer (ACE) (INCO) and Operations .-
and Procedures Officer (O&P) (PROCEDURES)
The INCO and O&P shared a console and responsibility.
The INCO's prime responsibility to the Flight Director
was for monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM, LM, TV,
PLSS, and erectable antenna communication systems. He
was also responsible for execution of all commands asso-
ciated with the communication systems. The O&P's prime
responsibility to the Flight Director was for the detailed
implementation of the MCC/MSFN/GSFC/KSC mission control
interface procedures. The O&P was also responsible for
scheduling and directing all telemetry and DSE voice
playbacks. He also developed all communication inputs
and changes to the ground support timeline.

C. Flight Dynamics Group

(1) Flight Dynamics Officer (FIDO)
The Flight Dynamics Officer participated in prelaunch
checkout designed to insure system readiness, monitored
powered flight events and trajectories from the stand-
point of mission feasibility; monitored reentry events
and trajectories, and updated impact point estimates as
required.

A-130

._- ",__,_
^ _,._,._
- _._____________
_-_l_l._ ,_--, *-II.-L.I"._._
".---.--+-- ..---_ - _,........._ __ ,__~..,. - _;..II~
._.. .------ ...- ^_._
--III
(2) Retrofire Officer (REPRO)
The Retrofire Officer participated in prelaunch checkout
designed to insure system readiness and maintained an
updated reentry plan throughout the mission.

(3) Guidance Officer (GUIDO) and YAW
The Guidance Officer participated in prelaunch checkout
designed to insure system readiness and performed the
guidance monitor functions during power flight and space-
craft initialization. The GUIDO was also responsible for
CSM and LM display keyboards (DSKY) as well as CMC and LGC
command updates. The second Guidance Officer (YAW) had
the same duties except that he was not responsible for
command functions.

MCC SUPPORT ROOMS

Each MOCR group had a staff support room (SSR) to support all activ-
ities required by each MOCR position. These SSR's were strategically
located in areas surrounding the MOCR's and were manned by the various
personnel of a given activity.

a. Staff Support Room

(1) Flight Dynamics SSR
The Flight Dynamics SSR was responsible to the Flight
Dynamics Group in the MOCR for providing detailed analysis
of launch and reentry parameters, maneuver requirements,
and orbital trajectories. It also, with the assistance of
the Mission Planning and Analysis Division (WAD), provided
real-time support in the areas of trajectory and guidance
to the MOCR Flight Dynamics team on trajectory and guidance
matters. An additional service required provided interface
between the MOCR Flight Dynamics team and parties normally
outside the Flight Control team such as Program Office
representatives, spacecraft contractor representatives,
et cetera.

(2) Flight Director's SSR
The Flight Director's SSR was responsible for staff support
to the Flight Director, AFD, Data Management Officer., and
FAO. This SSR was also responsible to the Apollo Communi-
cations Engineer in the MOCR for monitoring the detailed
status of the communication systems. The SSR was also
responsible for two TV channel displays: Ground Timeline
and Flight Plan.

A-131
(3) Vehicle Systems SSR
The Vehicle Systems SSR was responsible to the Systems
Operations Group in the MOCR for monitoring the detailed
status and trends of the flight systems; avoiding, correct-
ing, and circumventing vehicle equipment failures; and
detecting and isolating vehicle malfunctions. After the
S-IVB was deactivated, the portable life support system
engineer and the Experiments Officer occupied the two
booster consoles in the Vehicle Systems SSF.

(4) Life Systems SSR
The Life Systems SSR was responsible to the Life Sy-stems
Officer for providing detailed monitoring of the physio-
logical and environmental data from the spacecraft concern-
ing the flight crew and their environment.

(5) Spaceflight Meteorological Room
The Spaceflight Meteorological Room was responsible to the
Mission Command and Control Group for meteorological and
space radiation information.

(6) Space Environment Console (SEC) (RADIATION)
The Space Environment Console was manned jointly by a Space
Environment Officer (SEO) from the Flight Control Division
and a Space Environment Specialist from the Space Physics
Division. During mission support, the SE0 was responsible
for the console position, the proper operation of the con-
sole, and the completion of all necessary activities and
procedures. The SEC was the central collecting and coordi-
nating point at MSC for space radiation environment data
during mission periods.

(7) Spacecraft Planning and Analysis (SPAN) Room
The SPAN Room was the liaison interface between the MOCR,
the data analysis team, vehicle manufacturers, and KSC
Launch Operations. During countdown and real-time opera-
tions, the SPAN team leader initiated the appropriate action
necessary for the analysis of spacecraft anomalies.

(8) Recovery Operations Control Room (ROCR)
The Recovery Operations Control Room was responsible for
the recovery phase of the mission and for keeping the Flight
Director informed of the current status of the recovery
operations. Additionally, the Recovery Operations Control
Room provided an interface between the DOD Representative
and the recovery forces.

A-132

.^ - .-.-_-.- . __..-__ ,-___ _.-_
_..--~.-.--- .._.... __-.v- .~--l~ -..-.,.-l__ll_l__l__l__ll_l(".~."--".~------
(9) ALSEP SSR
The ALSEP SSR was responsible to the Experiments Officer,
Lunar Surface Program Office, and Principal Investigators
for providing detailed monitoring of ALSEP central station
and experiments data. The SSR was also responsible for all
scheduling of activities, commanding, and data distribution
to appropriate users.

MISSION SUPPORT AREAS

The two primary support areas for the MOCR flight control team were
the CCATS area and the RTCC area located on the first floor of the MCC.
These two areas of support and their operational positions interfaced
with the MOCR flight control team.

Communications, Command, and Telemetry System (CCATS)

The CCATS was the interface between the MCC and MSFN sites.
CCATS was a hardware/software configuration (Univac 494 computer) having
the capability to provide for the reception, transmission, routing,
processing, display and control of incoming, outgoing, and internally
generated data in the areas of telemetry, command, tracking, and admin-
istrative information. The CCATS consoles were augmented with various
high-speed printers (HSP) and TTY receive-only (RO) printers adjacent
to the consoles. Figure Ah-5 illustrates the CCATS operational organi-
zation. CCATS personnel interfaced with the MOCR flight control team
were as follows:

a. Command Support Console
This console was a three-position support element whose opera-
tors were concerned with the total command data flow from the generation
and transfer of command loads from the RTCC to the verification of space
vehicle acceptance following uplink command execution. The three com-
mand positions were:

(1) Real-Time Command Controller (RTC)

(2) Command Load Controller (LOAD CONTROL)

(3) CCATS Command Controller (CCATS CMD)

A-133

II, ,_ t.__,.._
..*,...,- . ..-."I____".x.
..-..-.. - .--- -.--l.l---
b. Telemetry Instrumentation Control Console
This console was a two-position support element whose operators
were concerned with the telemetry control of incoming data from the MSFN.
Certain telemetry program control was exercised on the incoming data.
The two telemetry positiozis were:

(1) Telemetry Instrumentation. Controller (TIC)

(2) CCATS Telemetry Controller (CCATS TM)

C. Instrumentation Tracking Controller Console
This console was a two-position support element whose operators
were concerned with the tracking radar support involving the spacecraft
and ground systems operations and configurations. The two tracking
positions were:

(1) Instrumentation Tracking Controller (TRK)

(2) USB Controller

a. Central Processor Control Console
This console was a two-position support element and provided
the facilities for monitoring and controlling selected software and
hardware functions applicable to the configuration of the CCATS computer
complex. The two positions were:

(1) Central Processor Controller (CPC)

(2) Central Processor Maintenance and Operations (M&O)

e. Communications Controller Console
The operators of this console provided overall communications
management between MCC and MSFN elements.

Real-Time Computer Complex (RTCC)

The RTCC provided the data processing support for the MCC. It
accomplished the telemetry processing, storage and limit sensing, tra-
jectory and ephemeris calculations, command load generation, display
generation, and many other necessary logic processing and calculations.
The RTCC supported both MOCR's and as such had two divisions known as
computer controller complexes, each capable of supporting one MOCR.
Each complex was supported by two IBM 360 computers, known as the mis-
sion operations computer (MOC) and the dynamic standby computer (DSC).
The DSC served as backup to the MOC. Figure Ah-6 illustrates the RTCC
operational organization for each complex. A brief description of the
RTCC positions f'~llo~~.

A-134

._". _ . ."--., -, ...---fl"..."Li ",._-II .._^
-..-_.-.-.I^--.-_-I_-- .."-.-l-.-_-."--‘.~l-.--.--
Flujilt
D,rector

Network
Colltroller

Figure A&?.- WATS operational organization.
Flight Director

+

Flight Dynamics Tracking Data Telemetry Network and Command
Processing Controller Selection Controller Processing Controller Processing Controller

Figure ~4-6.- RTCC operational organization.
a. RTCC Director
Controlled and coordinated the activities of the two computer
complexes.

b. RTCC Computer Supervisor (Computer Sup)
Responsible for the operational control of the complex.

c. Tracking Data Selection Controller (Data Select)
Monitored the tracking data being processed in the RTCC and
insured the data used as input to the MOCR and SSR displays was the
best obtainable. Evaluated the quality of tracking data received during
the launch phase and selected the source of data. Evaluated the trajec-
tory determinations and was responsible for the various related displays.
Informed the MOCR Flight Dynamics Officer concerning the quality and
status of the data.

d. Flight Dynamics Processing COntrOller (COIIIPUter WnmiCS)
Controlled and monitored all trajectory computing requirements
requested by MOCR flight dynamics personnel and MOCR recovery activities.
Performed evaluation and analysis of the predicted trajectory quantities
as they related to the mission plan.

e. Network and Command Processing Controller (Computer Command)
Coordinated with MOCR personnel who had command responsibility
and directed the generation, review, and transfer of requested command
loads.

f. Telemetry Processing Controller (Computer TM)
This position had access to all telemetry data entering and
leaving the RTCC and interfaced with the MOCR and SSR positions using
telemetry data. Duties included monitoring telemetry input data, coor-
dinating input requests, monitoring computer generated telemetry dis-
plays, and keeping the MOCR aware of the telemetry processing status.

NOTE

From ALSEP deployment to splashdown TRK and
TIC will be re.sponsible for scheduling sites
to support the scientific package. This will
include calling up of sites and data/command
handling to MCC.

A-137

I .. . . _,.. -.I---... ,.__-_-
._..-
-I _..I".-.- -.-11..~. .- _I-.^ ..__ _^^..-.-_l-"____
This page left blank intentionally.

A-138

(1. ..-.,- ._..~. I--- ..-- ~--..- -..- _--__l__l- .-l-t_l----,--- . . - “. _ ^... . _. . .._ - _.-l-l.- .-__.- - .I -_,,.- -_.
PART A5

EXCERPTSFROMAPOLLO FUEL CELL AND

CRYOGENICGAS STORAGESYSTEMFLIGHT SUPPORTHANDBOOK

The information contained in this part was extracted from the
Apollo Fuel Cell and Cryogenic Gas Storage System Flight Support Handbook,
dated February 18, 1970. It was prepared by the Propulsion and Power
Division of the Manned Spacecraft Center. The text was taken from Sec-
tion 2.0 Fuel Cell Operation and Performance, Section 3.0 Cryogenic Gas
Storage System Operation and Performance, Section 4.0 Instrumentation
and Caution and Warning, Section 5.0 Fuel Cell/Cryogenic Subsystem Mal-
function Procedures, Section 7.0 Fuel Cell/Cryogenic Subsystem Hardware
Description.
2.0 FUEL CELL OPERATION AND PERFORMANCE

The fuel cell operation and performance are described by nominal
system performance and operational data for both ground and flight
environments and fuel cell response to a variety of component mal-
functions.

Nominal system performance and operational data are presented in
curve and table format to assist in rapid reference. The data
include procedures and curves for making rough estimates of radiator
performance. Apollo 10 and 11 flight data were used to generate a
portion of the curves used for evaluating radiator performance.

Fuel cell response of measured parameters (temperature, voltage, etc.)
to specific component malfunctions make up the remainder of the data
presented. The curves are adequately noted to allow application
without written procedures.

The fuel cell operation and performance data assist the user in
evaluating fuel cell performance, identification of flight anomalies
and provide a basis for developing corrective'actions.

The sources of the data were the original'NASA Apollo Elock II Fuel
Cell, Cryogenic Gas Storage System,and Flight Batteries Flight Support
Handbook','dated September 1968, NASA-MSC, North American Rockwell,
Pratt and Whitney, Beech Aircraft and Boeing-Houston. These data were
reviewed and found to be accurate as of December 1969.

A-140

_I ..,,.. -ill_--.- -__..... _ “.-.-----ill-.- --.,__I .-----
..-- -..“... ,------mm .__--._l”-.-.--l_l..-
2.1 FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

NOMINAL FUEL CELL PRESSURIZED SYSTEM VOLUMES

Hydrogen Loop 250 in3
Oxygen Loop 88 in3
Nitrogen Loop 3098 in3
Glycol Loop (Fuel Cell) 107 in3
Glycol Accumulator (Fuel Cell) 30 in3
Net Fuel Cell Glycol Volume 117 in3 (20 in3 water
66 in3 -glycol removed
Average NR Glycol Plumbing and Radiator
from accumu-
Volume lator)
Estimated Fuel Cell Glycol Loop Volume 183 in3 = 0.79 gallons
TOTAL SYSTEM SPEC LEAKAGE INTO BAY IV
Hydrogen System, Oxygen System, and Fuel
Cells (3)
5.3 x 10-j scc/sec of Helium
Fuel Cell (3) nitrogen system
1.6 x lO-4 scc/sec of Helium

SYSTEM PRESSURESUMMARY

SUPPLY PRESSURES
SUPPLY PRESSURES REGULATEDPRESSURES
(PSIA) S/N 650769 AND ON
ABOVE DEAD
ABSOLUTE NITROGEN BAND
NOMINAL MINIMUM PSIA PRESSURE PSI
PSI

Hydrogen 245 + 15 100 57.90 - 67.60 6.20 - 11.35 .2-.4

Oxygen 900 + 35 150 57.90 - 67.95 6.20 - 11.7 .5-.?
Nitrogen 1500 165 50.20 - 57.75 --- 2.0-
2.15

DEL IVERY PRESSURE
Water 62 psia

PRESSURELIMITS
Maximum water system discharge back pressure 59.55 psia
Maximum reactant vent back pressure 16 psia

A-142
2.1 FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLSYSTEM WATER SYSTEM PRESSURES

Potable Water Tank 25 psia + 2, Plus cabin pressure
Water Relief Valve 5.5 psid ?r 1
Water Tank Vent Valve 44 psia + 4
Cabin Relief Valve 6 . 0 +'24
-.

FUEL CELL GROUNDHEATER POWERSETTINGS

STARTUP HEAT SCHEDULE

1 ZONE 1 AMPERES 1

NORMALOPERATION HEAT SCHEDULE

1 ZONE 1 SEA LEVEL OPERATION 1 VACUUMOPERATION 1

1 1.2 - 1.6 amperes 0 amperes
2 8.0 - 12.0 amperes 0 amperes
3 1 1.2 - 1.6 amperes I 0 amperes
1

DRYOUT HEAT SCHEDULE

ZONE SEA LEVEL OPERATION VACUUMOPERATION

1 1.75 - 2.05 amperes 1.5 - 1.65 amperes
2 As required
460°F to maintain
to 485'F skin 21.0 - 22.5 amperes

temperature. Approxi-
mately 23.9 amps.
3 1.75 - 2.05 amperes 1.5 - 1.65 amperes

A-143
2.1 FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

FUEL CELL DISCONNECT OVERLOADDATA

OVERLOADCURRENT DATA

Required Test Transfer
Disconnect Delay Time
Delay (set) (se4 (set)

100 minimum No transfer
25 - 300 0.046
8- 150 i"8 0.046
2-8 5.81 0.046

:, 622 - 1.2 0.776
1.07 0.046
0:42 - 0.76 0.572 0.046
0.24 - 0.55 0.470 0.046

FUEL CELL DISCONNECT REVERSE CURRENTDATA

REVERSE CURRENT DATA

Load Required Test Transfer
Disconnect Delay Time
':%j Delay (set) (set) (set)

4 No trip No transfer
20 i - 10 2.10 0.046

:i 1 - 1.3 1.11
1.22 0.046
2.1 FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

REACTANT CONSUMPTIONAND WATER PRODUCTION

LOAD O2 lb/hr H2 lb/hr H2°
AMps lb/hrs cc/hr

0.5 0.0102 .001285 .01149 5.21
1 0.0204 .002570 .02297 10.42
2 0.0408 .005140 .04594 20.84
3 0.0612 .007710 .06891 31.26
4 0.0816 .010280 .09188 41.68
5 0.1020 .012850 .11485 52.10
6 0.1224 .015420 .13782 62.52
7 0.1428 .017990 .l6079 72.94
8 0.1632 .020560 .18376 83.36
9 0.1836 .023130 .20673 93.78
10 0.2040 .025700 .2297 104.20
15 0.3060 .038550 .34455 156.30
20 0.4080 .051400 .45940 208.40
25 0.5100 .064250 .57425 260.50
30 0.6120 .077100 .68910 312.60
35 0.7140 .089950 .80395 364.70
40 0.8160 .10280 .91880 416.80
45 0.9180 .11565 1.03365 468.90
50 1.0200 .I2850 1.1485 521.00
55 1.1220 .A4135 1.26335 573.10
60 I .2240 .I5420 1.3782 625.20
65 1.3260 .16705 1.49305 677.30
70 1.4280 .I7990 I .6079 729.40
75 1.5300 .I9275 1.72275 781.50
80 1.6320 .20560 1.83760 833.60
85 1.7340 .218L,5 1.95245 885.70
90 1.8360 .23130 2.06730 937.90
95 1.9380 .24415 2.18215 989.90
100 2.0400 .25700 2.2970 1042.00
FOFMJLAS:
O2 = 2.04 x 10 -2 I H20 = IO.42 cc/Amp Hr
H2 = 2.57 x 1O-3 I H20 = 2.297 x 10 -2 lb/Amp Hr

A-145
3.0 CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGESYSTEM OPERATION AND PERFORMANCE

The cryogenic system operation and performance are described by

and flight environments.
nominal system performance and operational data for both ground

Nominal system performance and operational data are presented in
curve and table format to assist in rapid reference. The curves,
with the exception of those used for heat leaks and pressure change
rates, are adequately noted to allow application without written
procedures. The data include formulas, methods, and curves for
calculating cryogenic tank heat leak s and pressure change rates for
both equilibrium and non-equilibrium (stratified) conditions.
Apollo 7 and 8 flight data were used to provide a comparison of
equilibrium (calculated) tank pressure cycle time to actual flight
pressure cycle time for a variety of tank quantities.

The fuel cell operation and performance data assist the user in
evaluating cryogenic system performance, identification of flight
anomalies, and provide a basis for developing corrective actions.

The sources of the data were the original'NASA Apollo Block II Fuel
Cell, Cryogenic Gas Storage System, and Flight Batteries Flight
Support Handbook',' dated September 196S, NASA-MSC, North American
Rockwell, Pratt and Whitney, Beech Aircraft and Boeing-Houston.
These data were reviewed and found to be accurate as of December 1969.
3.1 CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY

Hydrogen Oxygen

TANK WEIGHT (PER TANK)

Empty (Approx.) 80.00 lb. 90.82 lb.
Usable Fluid 28.15 lb. 323.45 lb.
Stored Fluid (100% 29.31 lb. 330.1 lb.
indication)

Residual 4% 2%
Maximum Fill Quantity 30.03 lb. 337.9 lb.

TANK VOLUME (PER TANK) 6.80 FT3 4.75 FT3

TANK FLOW RATE (PER TANK)
Max. for 10 Minutes 1.02 lbs/hr 4.03 lbs/hr
Max. for l/2 hour 10.40 lbs/hr
Relief Valve Max Flow 6 lbs/hr @ 26 lbs/hr @
130°F 130°F

TANK PRESSURIZATION
Heaters (2 elements per tank)
Flight
Resistance 78.4 ohms per 10.12 ohms per
element element
Maximum Voltage 28 V DC 28 V DC
Power 10 watts per 77.5 watts per
element* element*
Total Heater
Heat Input Per Tank
(2 Elements) 68.2 BTU/Hr 528.6 BTU/Hr

Ground
Resistance 78.4 ohms per 10.12 ohms per
element element
Maximum Voltage 65.0 V DC 65.0 V DC

Power 54.0 watts per 417.5 watts per
element* element*
Total Heater
Heat Input Per Tank
(2 Elements) 368 BTU/Hr 2848 BTU/Hr

* Conversion Factor: 1 watt = 3.41 BTU/Hr
3.1 CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY

Hydrogen Oxygen

Pressure Switch
Open Pressure idax. 260 psia 935 psia
Close Pressure Min. 225 psia 865 psia
Deadband Min. 10 psia 30 psia
Destratification Motors (2
Motors Per Tank)
Voltage 115/200 V 115/200 V
400 cps 400 cps
Power - Average 3.5 watts per 26.4 watts per
motor* motor*
Total Average Motor 23.0 BTU/Hr 180 BTU/Hr
Heat Input Per Tank

SYSTEEl PRESSURES
Normal Operating 245 515 psia 900 +35 psia
Spec Min. Dead Band of 10 psi 30 psi
Pressure Switches

Relief Valve Note: Relief Valves are Referenced to Environ-
mental Pressure, therefore Pressure at
Sea Level (psig) will be same value in
vacuum (psia)
Crack 273 psig 983 psig
Full Flow :::: 285 psig 1010 psig
Reseat Min. 268 psig 965 psig
Outer Tank Shell
Burst Disc
+ 10
Nominal Burst Pressure 90 _ 2. psid 75 2 7.5 psid

SYSTEM TEMPERATURES
Stored Fluid -425 to 80°F -3OO'F to 80°F
Heater Thermostat (Over N.A. for 113 N.A. for 114
Temp. Protection) and Subs. and Subs.
Open Max. 80°F + 10 80°F + 10
Close t.1i n . -2OO'F -75'F

* Conversion Factor: 1 watt = 3.41 BTU/Hr
3.1 CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY

Hydrogen Oxygen

TANK HEAT LEAK (SPEC PER TANK)
Operating (dQ/dM @ 14O'F) 7.25 BTU/HR 27.7 BTU/HR
(.0725 #/hr) (.79 #/hr)
VALVE MODULE LEAKAGE RATES
External 400 see H2/HR/ 400 see 02/HR/
Valve Valve
0.736 x 1O-6 lbs 9.2 x 1O-6 lbs
H2/HR/Valve 02/HR/Valve

LIFE 600 HRS @ 600 HRS @
Cryogenic Temps Cryogenic Temps.
and operating and operating
pressure -225 pressure -865
psia psia

A-149

. .~._.~ .... _-..I._.-...-__._ ..""
,--._ I,, ..- .._-. .__., . _ ,...- __,,_.__. ....__,"__.__--.l
1._._-,._. I. _ ,, _.......-_..
_.~.-- ___.
-x
4.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CAUTION AND WARNING

The tabular data presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 list instrumentation
measurements and specify instrumentation range, accuracy and bit
value, if applicable. All of the data in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 can be
used for system monitoring during ground checkout. Table 4.1 lists
data displayed to the crew and telemetered from the vehicle to the
Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) during missions. Table 4.2 lists
data available only for system monitoring during ground checkout.
Event indications displayed to crew during flight are noted in
Table 4.2.

The instrumentation sensor location, with the exception of voltage
and current data, can be found by referring to the fuel celllcryo-
genie schematics located in Section 7.0. Voltage and current readout
and schematic locations can be obtained by referring to North
American Rockwell drawings V37-700001, Systems Instrumentation, and
V34-900101, Integrated System Schematics Apollo CSM, respectively.

The Caution and Warning System monitors the most critical fuel cell/
cryogenic measurements and alerts the flight crew to abnormal system
operation. The data presented in Table 4.1 are specification nominal
caution and warning limits for the applicable measurements. Malfunc-
tions procedures, Section 5.0, are provided for problem isolation as
a result of a caution and warning alarm.

The source of the data was North American Rockwell Measurement
Systems End-to-End Calibrated Accuracy Tolerances, TDR68-079,
dated January 10, 1969 and the original Flight Support Handbook.

A-150

.-_” -..,^ i*_,r ._“_ ,__- “.-,-.----f.ell _... _Ili”---.---L- __l_-l__l---I_LLll,-_-___.l---,.--------~. “-I.---
__.-- . _ _ . ..-.. -.. ^_ . ..---_--
TABLE 4.1
INSTRUMENTATION/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUMMARY

EAStiREMENT
NUMBER *
MEASUREMENT
NAME RANGE
T At JRACY
PERCENT ACTUAL
T TBIT
VALUE
CAUTION AND
WARNING
SET NGS
LOW HIGH
1
CCO206V DC Bus Voltage A o-45 volts 20.94 iO.42V 0.178 26.25 -
CCO207V DC Bus Voltage B

SC2113C FC 1 Current O-100 amps 11.07 11.07 a 0.395
SC2114C FC 2 Current
sc2115c FC 3 Current

SC206OP FC 1 N2 Press O-75 psia -14.30 ~3.22 psia 0.295 -
SC2061P FC 2 N2 Press
SC2062P FC 3 N2 Press

SC2066P FC 1 02 Press O-75 psia i4.30 23.22 psia 0.295 - -
SC2067P FC 2 02 Press
SC2068P FC 3 02 Press

SC2069P FC 1 H2 Press O-75 psia 14.30 k3.22 osia 0.295 - -
SC207OP FC 2 H2 Press
~~2071~ FC 3 i-12 Press

t See note, page 4-11
TABLE 4.1
INSTRUMENTATION/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUMMARY (Continued)

IEASUREMENT
NUMBER *
MEASUREMENT
NAME RANGE
T AC RACY
PERCENT ACTUAL
BIT
VALUE
CAUTION AND

im-
WAF NG
SE1 NGS
HIGH
1
SC2081T FC 1 Cond Ex Temp 145-250°F ~2.18 t2.29'F 0.417 150°F 175'F
SC2082T FC 2 Cond Ex Temp
SC2083T FC 3 Cond Ex Temp

SC2084T FC 1 Skin Temp 80-550°F 21.15 i5.40°F 1.94 360°F 5OO'F
SC2085T FC 2 Skin Temp
SC2086T FC 3 Skin Temp

SC2087T FC 1 Rad Out Temp -50 to +300°F i . 71 5.98'F 1.38 -3OOf
SC2088T FC 2 Rad Out Temp
SC2089T FC 3 Rad Out Temp

SC2090T FC 1 Rad In Temp -50 to +300°F k1.71 ?5.98'F 1.38
SC2091T FC 2 Rad In Temp
SC2092T FC 3 Rad In Temp

SC2139R FC 1 H2 Flow Rate O-O.2 lb/hr +_lO.O kO.020 lb/hr 0.00079 0.0 0.16
SC2140R FC 2 H2 Flow Rate
SC2141R FC 3 H2 Flow Rate

* See nnte, page 4-11
TP E 4.1
TRUMENTATION/CA UN AND W-SUMMARY lConti
EASUREMENT
NUMBER *
MEASUREMENT
NAME RANGE
AC RACY
PERCENT ACTUAL
l-BIT
VALUE SF
1
ION AND
WARNING

YEi-
SC2142R FC 1 O2 Flow Rate O-l.6 lb/hr dO.0 kO.160 lb/hr 0.0063 0.0 1.27
SC2143R FC 2 02 Flow Rate
SC2144R FC 3 O2 Flow Rate

SCOO3OQ H2 Tank 1 Qty o- 100% +2.68 2.68% 0.4% - -
SCOO31Q H2 Tank 2 Qty

SCOO32Q O2 Tank 1 Qty o- 100% 52.68 2.68% 0.4% - -
SCOO33Q O2 Tank 2 Qty

SCOO37P O2 Tank 1 Press 50-1050 psia 22.68 k26.8 psia 4.23 800 950
SCOO38P O2 Tank 2 Press

SCOO39P H2 Tank 1 Press O-350 psia +2.68 kg.38 psia 1.48 220 270
SCOO4OP H2 Tank 2 Press

SC0041T O2 Tank 1 Temp -320 to +~O'F k2.68 +10.85'F 1.57 - -
SC0042T 02 Tank 2 Temp

SC0043T H2 Tank 1 Temp -420 to -2OO'F +2.68 t6.03'F 0.867 - -
SC0044T H, Tank 2 Temp

* See note, page 4-11
TABLE 4.1
Il~STRtiMENTATIOid/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUM?lARY (Continued)

CAUTIOH AND
WARNING
1EASUREMEHT MEASUREMENT KY BIT SE TINGS
NUMBER* NAME RANGE }7TmP ACTUAL VALUE Low HIGH

SC216OX FCl pH High Normal - High Event
SC2161X FC2 pH High Normal - High Event -
SC2162X FC3 pH High Normal - High Event -
*SC0050Q H2 Tank 3 Qty O-100%
'*SCOO51Q 02 Tank 3 Qty O-100%
,*SCOO52P H2 Tank 3 Press. O-350 psia
'*scoo53P 02 Tank 3 Press. 50-1050 psia

* See note, page A-160
** CSM 112 through 115 only

, ,I
TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRUMENTATION

MEASUREMENT BIT
NAME I RANGE VALUE

FC 1 Bus A
FC 2 Bus A
FC 3 Bus A

SC2125X ** FC 1 Bus B
SC2126X ** FC 2 Bus B
SC2127X ** FC 3 Bus B

scoo92x Pressure low Normal - Low Event
O2 tanks 1 & 2
scoo93x Motor Switch Open - Close Event
Close O2 tanks l&2
scoo94x Pressure low Normal - Low Event
H2 tanks 1 & 2
scoo95x Motor Switch Open - Close Event
Close H2 Tanks l&2

SCO36OV Fan Notor Oper
Tank 1 O2
SCO361V Fan blotor Oper
Tank 2 O2

* See note, page A-160 ** Data also displayed to crew
TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

MEASUREMENT MEASUREMENT
NUWGER* NAME RANGE VALUE

SCO362U Fan Motor Oper
Tank 1 H2
SCO363U Fan Motor Oper
Tank 2 H2

SC2075X FC H2 Inline Htr ON ON Event
SC2076X FC H2 Inline Htr OFF OFF Event

SC2116V FC 1 DC Volts Out 25-40 volts 0.059
SC2117U FC 2 DC Volts Out 25-40 volts 0.059
sc2iiau FC 3 DC Volts Out 25-40 volts 0.059

SC213OX FC 1 H2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event
Oper
SC2131X FC 2 H2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event
Oper
SC2132X FC 3 H2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event
Oper

* See note, page A-160
TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

-
MEASUREMENT MEASUREMENT BIT
NUMBER* NAME I RANGE VALUE

SC2133X FC 1 O2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event
sc2134x FC 2 O2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event
SC2135X FC 3 02 Purge Valve Close - Open Event

SC2326X ** FC 1 0 /H Shutoff Off - Hold Event
Valve ape{ Hold
SC2327X ** Off - Hold Event

sc232ax ** FC 3 0 /H Shutoff Off - Hold Event
Valve apeG Hold

GC5000V FC 1 Htr Voltage O-120 vrms 0.472
Zone 1
GC500lV FC 1 Htr Voltage
Zone 2
GC5002V FC 1 Htr Voltage
Zone 3

* See note, page A-160 ** Data also displayed to crew
TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

I~IEASUREMENT MEASUREMENT BIT
NUMBER* NAME RANGE VALUE

GC5003U FC 2 Htr Voltage O-120 vrms 0.472
Zone 1
GC5004V FC 2 Htr Voltage
Zone 2
GC5005U FC 2 Htr Voltage
Zone 3

GC5006V FC 3 Htr Voltage O-120 vrms 0.472
Zone 1
GC5007U FC 3 Htr Voltage
Zone 2
GC5008V FC 3 Htr Voltage
Zone 3

GC5009C FC 1 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 1
GC5010C FC 1 Htr Current O-50 arms 0.197
Zone 2
GC50llC FC 1 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 3

* See note, page A-160
TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRU~IENTATION (Continued)

MEASUREMENT MEASUREMENT BIT
NUMBER* NAME RANGE VALUE

GC5012C FC 2 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 1
GC5013C FC 2 Htr Current O-50 arms 0.197
Zone 2
GC5014C FC 2 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 3

GC5015C FC 3 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 1
GC5016C FC 3 Htr Current O-50 arms 0.197
Zone 2
GC5017C FC 3 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 3

GC5019E FC 1 Htr Power O-5000 watts 19.7
GC5020E FC 2 Htr Power
GC502lE FC 3 Htr Power

* See note, page A-160
TABLE 4.1 NOTE

The measurement identification used in Table 4.1 consists of seven
characters: two letters followed by four numbers and one letter as
shown below.

FUNCTIOiJAL SYSTEM CODE DISCRETE NUMBER

MODULE CODE
CLASSIFICATION

Ji F"'"""'"'"'
SC 9099P

blodule Code-

The first letter designates the measurement location by module:

C Command Module
G GSE Auxiliary and Checkout Equipment
S Service Module

Function Subsystem Code

The second letter denotes the subsystem within which the measurement
originates:

C Electrical Power

Discrete Number

Characters three through six are discrete numbers listed sequentially
within each system.

Measurement Classification

The seventh character, a letter, denotes measurement classification
or type:

C Current R Rate
E Power T Temperature
P Pressure U Voltage
Q Quantity X Discrete Event

A-160

I ^_ _---” --_...- _ -----__-- _-,llll-_-_ll._
._ ” ..,,,.,_. l.l ..ll-_-l‘._,~,-” ..-A ---_I
5.0 FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEMMALFUKTION PROCEDURES

The procedures describe the proper order and nature of emergency
steps the crew must perform to determine the source of a fuel cell
or cryogenic storage system problem/malfunction. A Caution and Warning
alarm and light or abnormal instrumentation indication is evaluated by
a malfunction procedure logic diagram. The logic diagrams enable the
crew to determine the source of the problem and corrective actions, if
required. Fuel cell shutdown and bus short isolation (not related to
Caution and Warning) procedures are also presented as part of the
malfunction procedures.

The procedures are primarily used as a guide for the flight crew to
locate a problem and are presented for the flight monitor as a guide to
the crew actions.

The source of the data was CSM 108 (Apollo 12) Flight Malfunction
Procedures.

A-161

-- ..1_---"
----- -,. --_- -~...- _ . I_ ^l-.l--_~~---.-"".--_. ~- -.- ~_.-.ll-l_~_ -.-_
REMARKS
PROCEDURE
YMPTOM 1

340 pia
220 1111 I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II I
I PROCEDURE -EMARKS

. ..I .I L- .-- . ..- -..----F ^..-“~--.l ..-ll ~_ -- -_.,. ~
-.--- .~.
SYMPTOM PROCEDURE REMARKS

~-164

~. ,.- .., .----. .- ---."-
I_....----I. _.. ."-. .._-- I -.--".^.._._... ~"_",-~ _-..___
--,...----.---
PROCEDURE I REMARKS

~-165
A-166
PROCEDURE REMARKS

~-167
PROCEDURE REMARKS
SYMPTOM PROCEDURE REMARKS
m

I
3- - a-,
A-170

_ .-_-_
j( _I__,_*_. I"e.-"--I...~--
_-__"__l__.---,_.--- -- -._.w- .._
__---_____,,-_.-__.-__ ...I -..,,. _._.
_...
E
:
7.0 FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEMHARDWAREDESCRIPTION

The fuel cell/cryogenic hardware description includes the subsystem
isometric drawings, fluid schematics, component descriptions and
filtration provisions.

Isometric drawings locate operational hardware: tubing runs, sizes
and part numbers: and system interfaces. A schematic drawing of the
Environmental Control System describes the water and oxygen system
interfaces.

Fuel cell and cryogenic storage system schematics aid understanding
of the system plumbing. These schematics are also used to reference
to specific hardware component descriptions.

Filtration data describe the component protected, its minimum
clearances and the filters rating,size, location and type.

Hardware descriptions are intended for rapid reference to the specific
physical hardware affected as a result of a malfunction. Fuel cell/
cryogenic subsystem interactions with interfacing components and sub-
systems are clarified by this background information.

The sources of the data included North American Rockwell Uperational
Checkout Procedures (OCP's), Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Fuel Cell
Electrical Power Supply-PC3A-2 Support Manual, dated February 1, 1969,
Pratt and Whitney Apollo Fuel Cell Component Descriptions, and Beech
Aircraft Corporation Project Apollo Cryogenic Gas Storage Subsystem
Flight Support Manual, dated September 6, 1968. The descriptions are
applicable through CSM-115 including identified hardware changes for
CSM 112-115 . The configurations shown were current and correct as
of December 1969.

A-172

.___... .-,-_ ._ .--. * . ..-_ -... _._-.. ..--f- ._” l--ll.-ll. “-- .___ -^-- -. ._-I. . .” --.... - .-.. ._“.--. *___“_.-^ .--. ..--.
7.1 SYSTEM HARDWAREISOMETRIC
DRAWINGSAND SCHENATIC

A-173
FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEM LOCATION IN
SERVICE MODULE
/ \
/ \
\
\

C/M-S/M?MBILICAL

FUEL CELL SHELF
\

O2 SUBSYSTEM
SHELF MODULE\

H2 TANKS-

H2 SUBSYSTEM
SHELF MODULE \

I
BEAM NO. 3

VIEW LOOKING INBOARD SECTOR IV

A-174
FUEL CELL SHELF INTERFACE

FUEL PUMP F/C SHELF
LEVEL 4

/N2 REG

I
BEAM BEAM
NO. 3 NO. 4

-7Y
/ GLY FILL (LOOP NO. 1)
ME 273-0036-0002

N; FILL ME 273-0036-0001

INTERFACES
Fl - H2 IN
F2 - O2 IN
EPS 02 VENT
ME 27%0075-0004 F3 - O2 VENT
ME 273-0041-0001
F4 - H,O OUT
F5 - N; FILL
F6 - H2 VENT
F7 - WATER GLYCOL OUT
F8 - WATER GLYCOL IN

A-175
- _.. . . . .~. ._ _ ..__ ,,

-1__-.-._ -... - ..__.. -_.. ,_“_..
OXYGEN SUBSYSTEM SHELF MODULE

y-O2 VALVE MODULE

c-\. -OS-S (ECS 2)

-.
Ll!!iiJ Y
I I
BEAM NO. 3 BEAM NO. 4

02 '

A-176
HYDROGENSUBSYSTEMSHELF MODULE

- H, TANK NO. 1

BEAM NO. 3 BEAM NO.

HS-3 (F/C 3)
HS-2 (F/C 2) !I
HS-1 (F/C 1) I 4,
RELIEF
H2
FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE

Ii2 VALVE MODULE/
EPS WATER GLYCOL RADIATOR TEMPERATURESENSOR LOCATION

FR( SIGNAL CONDITIONERS
TO RAumj sc2092T-
SC2091 T- -v

BEAM 4

SC20 an
F/C 1IRAU.
OUT1iET

F/C 2 KAU. INLET
\
SC2092T
F/C 3 KAU. INLET

VIEW LOOKING INBOi
(FUEL CELL SHE1 c *DE’
WATERGLYCOL SERVICE MODULE LINES
(F/C3) (TZ)
V37-458020-143 (3/S)'

(Tl) (F/C3)
V37-458056-25

(Tl) (F/Cl)
V37-458056-21

(Tl) (F/C2)
V37-458056-23

iUOIATOR RREA

RADIATOR AREA

FUEL CELL 12 /A

C No. 3

I
FUEL CELL 13 .a,-+:
'4 "37-G

EFFECTIVE
IIN S/C 098 THRU106
EFFECTIVE 01( 5/C 107 MO WRS
LINE SIZE III INCHS(OUlSIM DIMTER)
NOTE: WL TliICKJ@%.S - .OZO IMCIES MTERIM 30-L CRES
l WL THICKMSS - .035 MIXES (MTERIN N ALLOY)

A-179
CRYOGENIC HYDROGENSERVICE MODULE LINES
ME 273-O(
BEAr' T

v37-454030-39 ( l/4 Jm
F/C Shelf Area v37-454049-19 (l/4)(21

[21v37-454049-23 (l/4)
q v37-454030-45 (l/4)
&Jv37-454031-29 (l/4)
[zlv37-454049-55 (l/4)
m ~37-454031-43 (l/4)
Ql V37-454049-63 (l/4)
m ~37-454030-47 (i/4)
QV37-454049-25 (l/4)

02 Shelf Area

V37-454208-107 (l/4
v37-454208-113 (318

m EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106
q EFFECTIVE ON SjC 107 AND SUBS
( ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE DIAMETER)
NOTE: WALL THICKNESS = .020 INCHES
JRYGGENIC OXYGEN SERVICE XODULE LIIiES
V37-454207-115 (l/4)

/c-3-v37-454207-H3 (l/4)
Beam 2
c OS5

-- Beam 3
-- --
LECS 02 LINES
(CM-SM Umbilical)

F/C Shelf Area- 1 v37-454031-25(1/4)(l)
TJv17-454049-53(1/4)(2)

(?)V37-454049-49
(l)V37-454031-21
(l)V37-454031-39
(2)v37-454049-61
(21v37-454049-51
(l)V37-454031-23
(l)V37-454031-33
(2)V37-454049-57
II I F/C 3 I

02 Shelf Area- II11 V37-454207-111 (l/4)
k -v37-454207-109 (l/4)
--V37-454207-107 (l/4)
454207-105 (l/4)
-v37-454207-103(1/4)
-OS-5 (ECS-2) ' '
%OS-4 (ECS-1)
%S-3 (F/C-3)
qos-2 (F/C-Z)
H2 Shelf Area- OS-1 (F/C-l)

(1) EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106
2 EFFECTIVE ON S/C 107 AND SUBS
I ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE DIAMETER)
NOTE: WALLTHICKNESS = .020 INCHES
FUEL CELL NITROGEN SERVICE MODULE LIiJES

B

F/C Shelf Area --

N2 Supply
I -P \

El v37-454&9-33(1/4)7-
a v37-454030-57(1/4)
m v37-454030-59(1/4)
Ql v37-'!54049-35(1/4 i --
(F5)

q v37-454030-51(m)
al v37-454030-49(1/4)-
a V37-454@+2'7(1/4)-

I, EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106
EFFECTIVE ON S/C 107 AND SUBS
( ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE
DIAMETER)
NOTE: WALL THICKNESS = .020 INCHES

A-187
A-184
V37-454240-104 ME282-0047-0040
V37-454240-103
V37-454240-102

ME284-0119-0001

7-454240-101
ME284-0115-0001

1
O2 TANK 3

V37-454225-11

V37-454240-101

ME282-0046-0002

HYDROGEN/OXYGEN
TANK SHELF MODULE- SECTOR r (SIDE VIEW - BEAM 6 SIDE)
EFFECTIVE ON CStq 112-115
A-lP!iY

.-... .., ~. ._.. .-.- ---_. ._.__.. ,^-.-.“-l..~ .^._ . .“. ,.__ --.--_ _.x._...__ - _... -_-_ .- _--_lll-
HYDROGENRELIEF (HR)

r

/ ’ SECTOR VI
/- ._

V37-454240-12.5

V37-454203-119-
TO ECS'-
4

V37-454240- 15
V37-454240-l
FROM O2 TANK 2

HYDROGEN/OXYGEN
SERVICE MODULE LINES
EFFECTIVE ON CSM 112-115
k V37-454240-20

V37-454240-21
HYDROGENTANK 3
SUPPLY TO VALVE
SHELF MODULE
FROMH2 TANK 3 -
SECTOR I

FORCSM 112-115

V37-454240-24

HYDROGENTANK 3 SUPPLY
INTERFACE WITH TANKS 1 & 2 - HYDROGEN
SHELF VALVE MODULE- SECTOR IV
EFFECTIVE ON CSM 112-115
A-18cj

... - ,; .-.. ~ .-- .,_^
-_, . _~__ ...l.--.-.._..
-.---.._..-.,
__-._-._
.-_I
7.2 FUEL CELL COMPONENTDESCRIPTIONS

A-190

.,.. - _...._ ^ _
--___ __-. I_ .____,-____. -I ..” ._.._ I_.” .__. _” .--. --..-. .___._,.---1--.-1”
A-1()1
7.3 CRYOG
NIC GASSTORAGE
SYSTFN
COMPhENT DESCRIPTIONS

A-192

_. . ^... “1 . .^. -.~ .-__ _-..... l*.-l- .“_ . . . -_--. __.__ .
t -_~--..^-“-- I_._. .-. . . ” - .^ _. .ll.“l.-_^- .” -.-. . -l-._-^--_~_l__“-
CRYOGENIC STORAGE SYSTEM SCHEMATIC

A

E
El
D 1
F2
0 -
R 1 NOTE: 0 Denotes component
1 descriptions in
g5 numerical order
M (See Pages7-56 through 7-78) HzTANK
3
s
TABLE 7.3.1
CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGE SYSTEM INTERFACES

CGSS INTERFACES
ELECTRICAL INTERFACE

Valve Modules Pigtails Pigtails
Tank Connectors Hermetically Hermetically
sealed pin sealed pin
receptacle receptacle

TANK INTERFACE LINE SIZES

Fill Connections l/4" O.D. 3/8" O.D.
(0.015 wall) (0.022 wall)
Vent Connections l/4" 0.0. 3/4" O.D.
(0.015 wall) (0.028 wall)
Relief Connections 3/16" O.D. 3116" O.D.
(0.022 wall) (0.022 wall)
Feed Connections l/4" 0.b. l/4" O.D.
(0.015 wall) (0.022 wall)

CRYOGENIC VALVE MODULE

Feed Connections l/4" O.D. l/4" 0-D.
(0.015 wall) (0.022 wall)
F/C Supply Connections l/4" O.D. l/4" O.D.
(0.022 wall) (0,022 wall)
Relief Valve Outlet l/4" O.D. l/4" O.D.
(0,022 wall (0.022 wall)

FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE

Feed Connections (2) l/4" O.D. l/4" O.D.
(0.022 wall (0.022 wall)
F/C Supply Connections (3) l/4" O.D. l/4" O.D.
(0.022 wall (0.022 wall)
m&/-?-j OXYGEN AND HYDROGEN STORAGE TANK

Electrical Connector Vent Connector

Fill Connector Feed Line

Vent Connector Fill Connector

q H2 STORAGE TANK q 02 STORAGE TANK

Each storage tank consists of two concentric spherical shells. The annular
space between them is evacuated and contains the thermal insulation system,
pressure vessel support, fluid lines and the electrical conduit. The inner
shell, or pressure vessel is made from forged and machined hemispheres. The
pressure vessel support is built up on the pressure vessel from subassemblies
and provides features which transmit pressure vessel loads to the support
assembly. The fluid lines and the electrical lead line exit the pressure
vessel at its top, traverse the annular space and exit the outer shell as
follows: 02, top of tank coil cover; H2, girth ring equator.

Structural and physical parameters are listed in Tables 7.3.2 and 7.3.3,
respectively. Tank volumes, with expansion and contraction data, are
listed in Table 7.3.4. Tube sizing is listed in Table 7.3.5.

.,...- ".._. ._-- _- _.._--.._l_-..-. .~._...-.--.-..--"-.l..l"-l Lo---.------ ..,-..11..-
TABLE 7.3.2 CRYOGENIC TANK STRUCTURAL LIMITS
Hydrogen Oxygen

5 Al-2.5 Sn ELI Ti Inconel 718
Material
105,000 180,000
Ultimate Strength, psi
95,000 145,0006
Yield Strength, psi
Young's Modulus, psi 17 x lo6 30 x 10
No creep at
Creep Stress, psi 71,200
145,000
0.30 0.29
Poisson's Ratio

Safety Factors -
1.5 1.5
Ultimate
1.33 1.33
Yield
1.33 N.A.
Creep
53,000 110,000
Design Stress Level, psi
Proof Pressure, psia 400 psia 1357 psia
Burst Pressure, psia 450 psia 1537 psia

A-196

- _ ._ ,_^.___ _^ .._II________x.
.__-_- .._.I.^ _,__-_-~_. ^_..
.- ._1.'-'_------L"II__L--
.I .^.. ___- __ _. "_l_l___,
.__ _. ---...-- -...._-..
_..-___
TABLE 7.3.3 CRYOGENIC TANK PHYSICAL PARAMETERS

Parameter Hydrogen Oxygen
Pressure Vessel
Material 5Al-2.5 Sn ELI Ti Inconel 718
Inside Diameter - Inches 28.24 25.06
Wall Thickness - Inches 004 .004
.044 c:ooo .059 faooO

Outside Diameter - Inches 28.328 25.178

Outer Shell
Material 5Al-2.5 Sn ELI Ti Inconel 750
Inside Diameter - Inches 31.738 26.48
Outside Diameter - Inches 31.804 26.52
Wall Thickness - Inches .033 + .002 .020 + .002

Support
Flange Diameter - Inches 37.966 28.228
Flange Thickness - Inches .070 i .OlO .080 c .OlO
Bolt Circle Diameter - Inches 32.216 27.50
Number of Bolts 8 12

Annulus
Annular Space - Inches 1.705" .653"
Vapor-cooled and pas- Vapor-cooled shield
Insulation
sive radiation shields. with oreloaded
insulation.
Vacuum Level (TORR) - MM Hg 5 x lo-7 5 x 10-7
Average Pump Down Time 24 Days 24 Days

Burst Disc
10
Burst Pressure 90 psi r 2. 75 psi f 7.5

Weight (Empty)
Spec 75.0 lb. 93.5 lb.
Actual (Maximum) 80.0 lb. 90.8 lb.

Electrical/Instrumentation

Beech/NAA Interface Pigtails & Hermetically Hermetically sealed
sealed pin receptacle pin receptacle

A-197
TABLE 7.3.4 CRYOGENIC TANK VOLUMES
(With Expansion and Contraction Data1

INTERNAL VOLUME
(Less .02 ft3 for components

02 Tank H2 Tank

Ambient Pressure Max. tol. 4.7528 ft3 6.8314 ft3

Ambient Temperature Max. tel. 4.7471 ft3 6.8045 ft3

Full Ambient Pressure
-297OF 02
Max. tol. 4.7213 ft3 6.777 ft3
-423OF H2 Min. tol. 4.7156 ft.3 6.7698 ftd
Full
935 psia (02) Max. tol. 4.7532 ft3 N/A
-294'F Min. tel. 4.7497 ft3 N/A
Full
865 psia (02) Max. tel. 4.7508 ft3 N/A
-294'F Min. tol. 4.74705 ft3 N/A
Full
260 psia (H2) Max. tol. N/A 6.805 ft3
-418'F
Full
Min. tol. N/A 6.80048 ft3
--

225 psia (Hz) Max. tol. WA 6.8014 ft3
-418'F Min. tol. N/A 6.7963 ft3
Full
935 psia (02) Max. tol. 4.7848 ft3 N/A
+ 80°F Min. tol. 4.7812 ft3 N/A
Full
260 psia (H2) Max. tol. N/A 6.8597 ft3
-ZOOoF Min. tol. N/A 6.8550 ft3

Volumes Used for Tank Calculations

Average Size 4.74892 Ft3 6.7988 Ft3
Cold
835 psia O2
225 psia H,
L

Average Size 4.7830 Ft3 6.8573 Ft3
Warm
935 psia 02
260 psia H2

A-198

_I-~ .- .._- -..... ..“_ T..-I- ..---- --.- _ ,_ ______.. _. ._ . . . --I _-. ” . .._.-- .I
TABLE 7.3.5 CRYOGENIC TANK TUBE SIZING

Hydrogen Oxygen

Vent Tube l/4 O.D. x .015 l/2 O.D. x .015 wall
wall 304 L SST (Inside coil cover)
3/4 O.D. x .028 wall
(Outside coil cover)
Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Fill Tube l/4 0.0. x -015 wall 3/8 O.D. x .022 wall
304L SST Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Feed Tube* Common with vent l/4 O.D. x .015 wall
line Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Electrical Tube l/2 O.D. x .015 wall l/2 O.D. x .015 wall
304L SST Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Vapor Cooled* l/4 O.D. x .015 wall 3/16 O.D. x .015 wall
Shield Tube 304L SST Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Pressure Vessel to Vapor* l/4 O.D. x .015 wall
Cooled Shield Tube Inconel 750 AMS 5582

* Three tubes joined to provide a single feed line for the oxygen tank only.

A-199

. .._. -- . -. --. _ ,. -----... .-..-. .s _- _, ~--_--- 1_1 i-l- - ._..___._-- ___--.-- --11 _---- --*----- -.
q PRESSURIZATION AND DESTRATIFICATION UNIT

Each of the storage tanks con tains a forced convection
pressurization and destratifi cation unit.
Each unit consists of the fol lowing: FAN & MOTOR
a. A 2.0 inch diameter s upport tube approximately
3/4 the tank diameter in length.

b. Two heaters.

c. Two fan motors.

d. Two thermostats. Eliminated for H2 on CSM
113 and on and eliminated for 02 on CSM
114 and on. TUBE

FAN & MOTOR
The tube provides a large surface area for efficient ENCASED
heat transfer, and is small enough to be installed INTERNALLY
through the pressure vessel neck. The heaters are
placed along the tube's outer surface .* and brazedI . in
place. A motor-fan is mounted at the upper ana lower enas of the tube,
which draw fluid through the inlet ports located along the tube, force it
across the heat transfer surface and expel it near the top and bottom of the
vessel.
Block II tanks utilize separate sets of lead wires for each heater element
and for each motor fan through the electrical connector interface.

FAN MOTORS

The motors are three phase, four wire, 200 volts A.C. line to line, 400
cycles miniature induction type with a centrifugal flow impeller. The
minimum impeller speed of the oxygen unit in fluid is 1800 rpm with a
torque of 0.90 in. oz., and the hydrogen unit is 3800 rpm with a torque
of 0.45 in. oz.. Two fans and motors are used in each vessel.
Stator Stack ,
Yoke Ring
Bushing
Field /---
Winding

Bearings -4

Impel ler
\ Rotor
MOTOR FAN

A-200
q PRESSURIZATION AND DESTRATIFICATION UNIT(COIITINUED)

S’I’ATOR SLOT

STAMR TEZl’H -\

SPIDER

STATOR
RFTAIRER
i I-
R?XESiED SWI’

STRAIN RELIEF

A-201

. . _ ., ..).-....---. _-_-‘ -.- .."-.-____-_~ l___l___."_~-.-~_~..---- _-1__~ -_-__-_-- --11----
q PRESSURIZATION AND DESTRATIFICATION UNIT (CONTINUED)

HEATERS

The heaters are a nichrome resistance type, each contained in a
thin stainless steel tube insulated with powered magnesium oxide.
The heaters are designed for operation at 28 volts DC during
in-flight operation , or 65 volts DC for GSE operation to provide
pressurization within the specified time. The heaters are
spiralled and brazed along the outer surface of the tube. The
heaters are wired in parallel to provide heater redundancy at
half power. The heaters have small resistance variation over a
temperature range of + 80°F to -420°F.

THERMOSTATS

.GLASS SEAL
BASE ASSEMBLY
INSULATOR
THRUST PIN CAP
WAVE WASHER BI-METAL DISC

The thermostats are a bimetal type unit developed for cryogenic
service. They are in series with the heaters and mounted inside
the heater tube with a high conducting mounting bracket arranged
so that the terminals protrude through the tube wall. When the
heater tube reaches 80 *lOoF, the thermostats open cutting
power to the heaters to prevent over heating of the pressure
vessel. When the tube reaches -200°F in the hydrogen tank or -75°F in the
oxygen tank the thermostats close allowing power to
be supplied to the heaters.
q DENSITY SENSOR PROBE

The density sensor consists of two concentric tubes which
serve as capacitor plates, with the operating media acting
as the dielectric between the two. The density of the fluid
is directly proportional to the dielectric constant and
therefore probe capacitance. The gage is capable of sensing
fluid quantity from empty to full during fill and flight
operation. The accuracy of the probe is 1.5% of full scale.

TEMPERATURESEN
DENSITY PROBE
PRESSUREAND
OESTRATIFICATION UNIT fl

Hydrogen

Quantity Gaging System
Range O-100% full O-100% full
(.17-4.31 #/ft3)
Accuracy ~2.68 % full range
Output Voltage O-5 V DC O-5 V DC
Output Impedance 500 ohms 500 ohms
Power 2-l/2 watts 115 V 2-l/2 watts 115 V
400 cps 400 cps

q TEMPEKATURESENSOR

The temperaturesensoris a four-wire platinum resistance sensing element
mounted on the density sensor (see photograph of density sensor probe).
It is a single point sensor encased in a Inconel sheath which only dis-
sipates 1.5 millivolts of power per square inch to minimize self-heating
errors. The resistance of the probe is proportional to the fluid temper-
ature and is accurate to within 1.5%.

Hydrogen Oxygen
Temperature Gaging System
Range -42O'F to -ZOOoF -32O'F to +80°F
Accuracy t2.68 % full range t2.63 % full range
Output Voltage O-5 VDC o-5 v DC
Output Impedance 5000 ohms 5000 ohms
Power 1.25 watts 115 V 1.25 watts 115 V
400 cps 400 cps
@ SIGNAL CONDITIONER

The temperature and density amplifiers are separate modules, contained -
in the same electrical box. The density module functions as an infinite
feedback balancing bridge and utilizes solid state circuitry. The
temperature module also uses solid state circuits and amplifies the
voltage generated across the sensor which is linearly proportional to the
resistance of the sensor. The output in both cases is a O-5 volt DC
analog voltage which is fed into the NR interface. The voltage required
to run the signal conditioner is 115 V, 300 cycle single phase, and
draws a total of 3.75 watts of power. The accuracy of the unit is 1.0%
of full scale.

The modules are encased in Emerson-Cumings epoxy potting and the unit is
hermetically sealed.

q ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR

The electrical receptacle is a hermetically sealed device capable of
withstanding system pressures and temperature. It contains straight pins
with solder cups attached.to facilitate the soldering of lead wires from
the temperature and density probes, the destratification units and the
heaters. The pins are sealed in a ceramic materi al which has the same
coefficient of thermal expansion as the shell and pin material.

A-284
.- .-._ “__ ..” -..“-._-_“~ .-.. ~--.I __.^ 11-~ . .~. . ..----
T------ ..,-I -~ ..-1_ 1-1-1”^1.-1~ . . ..- I -..- I .” --.- 1-1 ..l--.l..
-I-.. . . ..- .*
q VAC-10~ PUMP

DESCRIPTION

The vat-ion pump is attached directly to the vacuum annulus of the oxygen
tank which maintains the insulation space at reduced pressure required for
adequate insulation. Pumping action results from bombarding the titanium
cathode with ionized gas molecules which become chemically bound to the
titanium. The impacting ions sputter titanium from the cathode. The
sputtered titanium particles also contribute pumping by gettering action.
The pump can be used as a vacuum readout device since the input
current to the pump is directly proportional to pressure. The unit is
powered by a DC-DC converter capable of putting out the required amounts
of power.
CONSTRUCTION

Vat-ion pumps have no moving parts. The pumps consist of two
titanium plates spot welded to a vacuum tight stainless steel enclosure
with an anode structure mounted between the plates connected to a copper-
gold brazed electrical feedthrough. A permanent magnet maintains a
magnetic field between the electrodes causing the ions to follow spiral
paths thus increasing transit time.

POWERSUPPLY ( CONVERTER)

The converter is a solid state device capable of supplying power to the vat-ion
pump over a large range of pressure. The unit is energized by a 28 V DC source
and is current limited to 350 ma. The unit is capable of puttinq out 4.2 ma at 10 Volts
DC and lma at 4000 volts. The unit employs a squ,are wave invert&r, a
toroid transformer and a quadrupler circuit on the output. Choke filters are supp lied
on the 28 volt DC input to keep to acceptable limits the amount of
conducted interference being fed back from the output. The metal case is well
bonded to reduce to acceptable limits radiated interference. The circuits are enc losed
in Emerson-Cumings stycast 2850 Ft.

A-205
q VAC-ION
-- PUMP (CONTINUED)

PERFORMANCE

The pumping rate of the pump is constant at 1 liter per second. Pump current
is related to pressure as shown by the graph below.

rnc>auKt VSlJJKKtNI
1 I/s VaclonPUMP

I
ma
Pump Current

LIFE SPAN

The practical life span of a vac- ion pump while pumping in the various
pressure ranges is as follows:

1 x 10e6 region - 10,000 hours
1 x 10-5 region - 1,000 hours
1 x 10-4 region - 100 hours
1 x 10-3 region - 10 hours

A-20.6
_ .._ _I . ..--.-~. __.,-_ _. .._..
‘ . "..-."-_"_ (. . _---
.---."._.-
q FILTER

.FILTBR

The filter is a multiple disc type element rated at 175 microns absolute.
The discs are stacked on a mandrel-like cartridge. The filter is used
to trap fibers and particles which could get downstream of the tank and
hinder valve module and fuel cell operation. The filter is mounted
inside the density probe adapter and is welded onto the feed and vent
line.

A-207

_~..--. .--;"-_ -~ _-,___-
I-.. ._._._- ~~__r _"-_-^ -- .-...~III_IIIIII-..-x--.--- _-_- _-~I
q SYSTEM (TANK) VALVE MODULE

TANK 2 HALF h TANK 1 HALF

CHECK

-,_m------
I OVERBOARDRELIEF

I OVERBOARDRELIEF
I____---- A
0R RELIEF VALUE 0PS PRESSURE SWITCH
0T PRESSURE TRANSDUCER m CHECK VALVE

The system (tank) valve module for the hydrogen system and oxygen system
are functionally indentical. Each module contains two relief valves, two
pressure transducers, two pressure switches: and one check valve. These
module components are each separately described on the following pages.

A-208
la RELIEF VALVES

ATMOSPHERIC
SENSING
PORT-

NEGATIVE
RATE SPRING IL I
ASSEMBLY

BELLOWS
POPPET PRESSURIZED
VOLUME
POSITIVE RATE
SPRING ASSEMBLY

VENTA L TANK PRESSURE

The relief valve, part of the system valve module, is differential type
designed to be unaffected by back pressure in the downstream plumbing.
The valve has temperature compensation and a self-aligning valve seat.
The valve consists of an ambient pressure sensing bellows preloaded with
a belleville spring, which operates a poppet valve. Virtually zero
pressure increase between crack and full flow is obtained by cancelling
out the positive spring rate of the pressure sensing element with a
negative-rate belleville spring (see above right). The large sensing
element and small valve produces large seat forces with a small crack-
to-reseat pressure differential assuring low leakage at the reseat
pressure. The Belleville springs are made of 17-4 PH and 17-7 PH
stainless steels. The bellows is a three-ply device designed to prevent
fractures due to resonant vibrations.

The relief crack pressure is 273 psig minimum for hydrogen tanks and
983 psig minimum for oxygen tanks. The valve is atmospheric sensing;
therefore, relief crack pressure in space is 273 psia minimum for hydrogen
and 983 psia minimum for oxygen.

Oxygen Hydrogen

Full Flow Pressure 1010 psig (max.) 285 psig (max.)

Reseat Pressure 965 psig (min.) 268 psig (min.)

A-209
. i. .I- -... . .L-i-““_l.l”~-.._-l_- .,.,. _ -..-- . --. ~__ -“,“111111 .“lll”----.,l--- _x__-_-
q PRESSURESWITCH

TTANK PRESSURE

H rSENSING DIAPHRAM

PIVOTED
TOGGLE LEVER
REFE HORSESHOESPRING
PRES
INSULATOR '

.ELECTRICAL
A CONTACT ARM

The pressure switch, part of the system valve module, is a double pole,
single throw absolute device. A positive reference pressure (less than
atmospheric) is used to trim the mechanical trip mechanism to obtain the
required absolute switch actuation settings. The reference pressure is
typically between 4 to 10 psia. A circular convoluted diaphragm senses
tank pressure and actuates a toggle mechanism which provides switching
to drive motor switch (Cryogenic Electrical Control Box Assembly). The
motor driven switch controls power to both the tank heaters and
destratification motors. The pressure switch body is 302 stainless steel and
the diaphragm is 17-7 stainless steel. This unit is capable
of carrying the current required by the motor driven switch without any
degradation. The convoluted diaphragm actuates the switch mechanism in
a positive fast manner which eliminates bounce and the resultant voltage
transients.
11 CRYOGENIC PRESSURETRANSDUCER

TANK

The pressure transducer, part of the system valve module, is an absolute
(vacuum reference) device. 'The transducer consists of a silicon pickup
comprised of four sensors mounted on a damped edge diaphragm and an
integral signal conditioner. The unit senses tank pressure through the
discharge line from the tank. The signal conditioner output is a O-5
VDC analog output which is linearly proportioned to tank pressure.

Hydrogen Oxygen

Range 0 to 350 psia 50 to 1050 psia
Accuracy' + 2.68 % full range * 2.63 %full range
Output Voltage O-5 V DC O-5 V DC
Output Impedance 500 ohms 500 ohms
Power 1.5 watts 1.5 watts
Voltage 23 V DC 23 V DC

A-211

,. , ._..~_..- .._ .-...._.- -. I ,_..i _-... -.--.-L ,_.,__-.^ ..I_.. --,.. _...-*....^..
- _ .. ..- _..I,._L.‘ _ _~--l_l-__-__--.., -_.~~.._-l_-,.l
~I-.
•l CHECK VALVE (SYSTEM MODULE)

From Tank 2
t
G?7
Spring

Seat Assv -

Seal

The check valve, part of the system valve module, is designed to open at
a differential pressure of approximately 1 psia. The single poppet IS
spring loaded and has a large area to prevent chattering during flow in
the normal direction. This large area also helps in obtaining a positive
seal if pressurized in the reverse direction.

A- 2.12
El FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE

VALVE MODULE ENVELOPE

TO FUEL CELLS

-FROM TANK
FLOWSCHEMATIC

The fuel cell valve module consists of two check valves and three solenoid
shutoff valves contained in a cast body. The separate hydrogen and oxygen
modules are functionally identical. Individual valve module components
are described on succeeding pages.

A-213

. __ . _“-.* .-- *.-._--... ,.. .._. ____-“-^ ‘_--.” -.-.. --- -.....
.‘_“..,...I -...- --
q SOLENOID VALVES

POSITION SWITC
SOLENOID NO. 1

OUTLET
SIMPLIFIED

The solenoid valves, part of the fuel cell valve module, employ a poppet-
seat arrangement. This poppet is actuated by a magnetic armature which is
suspended on a Belleville spring. The upper solenoid is used to open the
valve; the lower to close it. The snap-over-center belleville spring both
guides the armatures and latches the valve open or closed. A switch to
indicate valve closed position is incorporated. The valve opens against
pressure and pressure helps seal the valve against leakage in the normal flow
direction. The valve body is 321 stainless steel. The maximum in-rush
current is 10 amps with steady state current at 2 amps. The solenoid coil
circuit has diode noise suppression.

A- 214
q CHECK VALVE (FUEL CELL MODULE)

FROM SYSTEM
f VALVE MODULE

MAIN S
AUXI
SEAT

Seated - both main and Cracked - at low flows Full flow - both main
auxiliary seats are closed. the auxiliary seat is and secondary seats are
barely open and catches wide open; the high flow
contaminant particles, velocities carry par-
the main seat is wide ticles through the valve
open and protected from without fouling the seat.
contaminants.

The check valve, part of the fuel cell module, is designed to open at a
differential pressure of approximately 1 psia. The valve consists of a
main seat and 'auxiliary seat operating as shown pictorially above. A
large seat area provides a positive low leakage seal if pressurized in
the reverse direction.
Ezl
8 ti2-02 INLINE FILTER

.-+qfq!p-&
- FLOW DIRECTION

The hydrogen and oxygen reactant filter consists of a multiple of chemically
etched discs. The discs are stacked on a mandrel-like cartridge. The filter
is used to trap contamination which could get downstream of the reactant tank
valve modules. The filter is rated at 5~ nominal and 12~ absolute with a
dirt holding capacity of .25 grams. The filter design does not allow it to
generate system contamination and provides closer adherence to specified
filter rating.

A-216

--_ ".,_.l._-~-.l----l--_--.l-,-~-_ .-"---. ,._--- -,.,
--__.-_ -..--ll.l".lll .._
_,._-4__
-,"-..--.-.,--
---.--w--e.-.-- I_._.
q FILL AND VENT DISCONNECTS - AIRBORNE

Each vent and fill disconnect utilizes a spring loaded poppet and a pressure
cap that can be locked into place. The ground unit is connected by aligning
grooves on the ground sleeve with keys on the airborne body, pushing until a
stop is reached (about 40 lbs. force is required), and turning the ground
sleeve until engagement is complete. The spring loaded poppets can be self
opening on installation of mating ground disconnects, or can be opened sub-
sequent to installation of the ground disconnect, depending on the type of
ground unit that is used, The poppet is self closing on removal of the
ground unit regardless of the type used.

A- 21’7

. ..- . , _. .._ ^.” ,.“__-___ . __*_*_.
_l^--~.-l_---.“~---~-~ ------ -il_-. _“-ll-“l_-~- --.- __L.-_-_ -___ _- ._-_-_
7.4 FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC
SYSTEM FILTRATION

A-218

_ I .--. _,..- _ . ,_____..
. .-_- I .--_--~_-. ,__-,..____-..
.-.^_( ,I__..-I- _--.~--__ ". ^..^--..---"-
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION

CRITICAL MINIMUM FILTER PROTECTION OTHER
COMPONENT CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS

acondary Bypass Valve 0 to 0.006 in. annulus No filter
tapered pintle depending
on travel

ater/Glycol Pump 75~ nom. Internal to Non Bypassing
100~ absolute2 Pump Inlet Type
Area = 6.6 in I

ater Separator Hole Size = 0.030 in.dia 40~ absolute Internal to Water Made from
heck Valve Stem Clearance = 0.013 in. Area2= 0.076 Separator Pump Sinter Cd
Max. Stroke = 0.048 in. in. Powder

2 Pump 5~ nom. Between H -0 Valve Chem Milled
12~ absolute Module & fi -a2 Fuel Stacked Disc
Holding capa- Cell Moduli Filter Element
city =
.25 grams
1D
rimary Bypass Valve Bi-Metalic Flapper
1
D
5p nom. Between H -0 Valve Chem Milled
Stroke = 0.040 in. 12~ absolute Module & 6 -a2 Fuel Stacked Disc
Clearance (min) at full Holding capa- Cell Modulz Filter Element
regeneration = 0.013 in. city =
.25 grams D
1

2 Regulator
1
D Internal to Made from
Valve seat clearance open = 1Op nom.
0.008 in. Min. radial slid- 25~ absolute2 Regulator Inlet Sinter Powder
ing clearance exposed to Area 0.076 in
gas = 0.006 inches
I9

D Filtration also provided by filter at the H2 Regulator Inlet (see H2 Regulator)

D2 Valve
for
open seat
Apollo
clearance
8 regulator.
is based on regulator flow conditions at 2200 watts plus purge
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued)

CRITICAL MINIMUM 1 FILTERt PROTECTION OTHER
COMPONENT CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTIC!

H2 Purge Valve Ball travel from seat = 611 nom. Internal to Cylindrical-
0.020 in. to 0.025 in. 18~ absolute2 Valve Inlet Shaped Screen,
Min diametric clearance = Area 0.35 in. Bypassing Type
0.005 in.

1. H2 Purge Valve 0.0305 in. dia. Protective Internal and Lee Jet Size
Orifice (Valve screen (per- Upstream of Orifice 0.0305 in.
exit) forated cap) @ Valve Exit orifice, 750
hole size = LOHM
0.008 in.

02 Regulator Valve Seat clearance open 10~ nom. Internal to lade from
= 0.005 in. Min. radial 25~ absolute ?egulator Inlet jinter Powder
sliding clearance exposed Area = 0.076 in 21
to gas = 0.0035 in. b

02 Purge Valve Ball Travel from Seat = 6~ nom. Internal to Iylindrical-
0.020 in. to 0.025 in. 18~ absolute \Jalve Inlet Shaped Screen,
Min. diametr c clearance = Area = 0.35 in2 3ypassing Type
0.005 in.

1. O2 Purge Valve 0.0120 in. d a. Protective Internal and Lee Jet Size =
Orifice (Valve screen (per- llpstream of Orifice 3.0120 in.
exit) forated cap) P Valve Exit orifice, 4500
hole size = LOHM
0.008 in.

I% Valve open
for Apollo
seat clearance
8 regulator.
is based on regulator flow conditions at 2200 watts plus purge
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued)

CRITICAL MINIMUM FILTER PROTECTIO!i OTHER
COMPONENT CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS
2 Vent Valve Ball seal .020 to .025 inches 6~ nom. Internal to Cylindrical-
from seat. Valve pintle travel 18~ absolute Valve Inlet Shaped Screen,
from sealing seat is .OlO-.012 Area = 0.35 in? Bypassing Type
in. Maximum diametric
clearance .006 inches.

1. N Vent Valve 0.0186 in. dia. Protective Internal and Lee Jet Size =
Okfice screen (per- Upstream of Orifice 0.0186 in.
forated cap) 0 Valve Exit orifice, 2000
hole size = LOHM
0.008 in.

2. N Vent Valve 6~ nom. Internal to Cylindrical
V&t Port Plug 18~ absolute Valve Exit Screen
Area = 0.15 in?

I2 Fill Valve Ball seal .020 to .025 inches
from seat. Valve pintle travel
from sealing seat is .OlO-.012
in. Minimum diametric
clearance .005 inches.
1. Inlet Port 6~ nom. Internal to Disc-shaped
18~ absolute Valve Inlet Screen
Area = 0.034 in?
(Min)
2. Interstage 6~ nom. Internal to Cylindrical
18~ absolute Valve at Inter- Screen
3. Exit Port Area = 0.074 in?stage and Exit
(Min) Port
I2 Regulator Valve Seat Clearance Open, 10~ nom. Internal to Made from
0.0015 in. Min. radial 25~ absolute Regulator Inlet Sinter Powder
sliding clearance exposed Area 0.076 in.'
to gas = 0.0035 in. I9

I3 Valve open seat clearance is based on regulator flow conditions at 2200 watts plus purge
for Apollo 8 regulator.
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued)

CRITICAL MINIMUM FILTER PROTECTION OTHER
COMPONENT CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS

1 Regulator Overboard 200 MESH screen Internal to Screen Twill or
J&t Port Plug 0.001%0.0026in Regulator Exit Plain
dia.wire

rletering Orifice 0.0215 in. dia. Protective Between N2 None
screen (per- Regulator and 02 &
forated cap) H2 Regulators
hole size =
0.008 in.

Radiator Bypass Valve
Main Valve 0.0015 to 0.003 in. None at Valve Filtrati'on Filter
Bypass Valve 0.002 to 0.004 in. Provided by at Coolant Pump
Orifice/Stroke Pump Inlet Inlet
Main Valve 0.156 in/O.060 in. Filter
Bypass Valve 0.420 in/O.018 in.

Valve Module, H2 175~ absolute Internal to H2 Chem Milled
(Consists of 2 relief Area = 0.97 in? Cryogenic Tanks Stacked Disc
lalves, 2 press. Outlet Filter Element
iwitches, 2 press.
transducers, and one
:heck valve)

Jalve Module, O2 175~ absolute Internal to 02 Chem Milled
(Consists of 2 relief Area = 0.97 in? Cryogenic Tanks Stacked Disc
valves, 2 press. Outlet Filter Element
switches, 2 press.
transducers, and one
check valve)

< I
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued)
CRITICAL
COMPONENT
MINIMUM -T FILl PROTECTION OTHER
CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTIC
12-0 Fuel Cell Valve
lodu?e (Consist of 2 5~ nom. 3etween H -0 Valve Chem Milled
:heck valves and 3 12~ absolute 'lodule ani H2-0 Stacked Disc
iolding capa- -uel Cell Mo&l$ Filter Element
solenoid valves each)
city =
.25 grams
}

/

/

REPORT OF
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

APPENDIX B - REPORT OF MISSION
EVENTS PANEL

APPENDIX C - REPORT OF MANUFACTURING
AND TEST PANEL

APPENDIX D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL

APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT
MANAGEMENT PANEL
NTO-
(_.CCE-SSUO--N
7n4_9
NUMBS) _ '_

_ (P (CODE)

(N._SA Cl_6R_TMX OR A'DdUMBER) (CATEGORY)

NATIONAL ........ INISTRATION
..2
AI_PENDIX.
., B
REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL
CONTENTS

Page
Part

APPENDIX B - REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL

B-I
BI TASK ASSIGNMENT ................

B-3
B2 PANEL ORGANIZATION ................

B-5
B3 SUMMARY OF EVENTS .................

B4 PRELAUNCH AND MISSION EVENTS PRIOR TO THE
B-II
ACCIDENT ....................

B-II
LAUNCH COUNTDOWN ................

B-II
Mechanical Build-up and Gas Servicing .....

B-13
Cryogenic Servicing ..............

B-25
Spacecraft Closeout and Terminal Count ....

LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR COAST PHASE PRIOR
B-26
TO THE ACCIDENT ................

B-26
Launch and Flight Summary ...........

B-27
Spacecraft Systems Operation ........

B-30
Hydrogen Low Pressure Master Alarm ......

B-31
Cryogenic Tank Destratification .......

B-37
B5 INCIDENT EVENTS ................

INTRODUCTION ................ B-37

STATUS OF THE SPACECRAFT PRIOR TO THE
ACCIDENT ................. B-45

FAN TURNON AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
B-45
ANOMALIES ...................

OXYGEN TANK PARAMETERS FROM 55:53:30 UNTIL
LOSS OF TELEMETRY ............... B-51

B-54
LOSS OF TELEMETRY ...............

iii
Part Page

SPACECRAFT EVENTS AT THE TIME OF TELEMETRY
LOSS .................... B-56

CHANGES IN SPACECRAFT DYNAMICS ........ B-62

TEMPERATURE CHANGES OBSERVED IN SERVICE
MODULE ................... B-67

FAILURE OF CRYOGENIC OXYGEN SYSTEM ...... B-67

OPERATION OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM B-80

B6 POSTINCIDENT EVENTS ............... B-83

IMMEDIATE RECOVERY .............. B-8_

Chronology of Spacecraft Reconfiguration
Actions .................. B-84

Evaluation of Electrical and Cryogenic
Oxygen Problem .............. B-88

Maintenance of Attitude Control ....... B-92

Lunar Module Activation ........... B-97

PLANS AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO RETURN THE CREW
TO EARTH .................. B-IO0

Consumables and Systems Management
Actions .................. B-I02

Return to Earth Trajectory Control ..... B-111

Entry Procedures and Checklist
Definition ................ B-120

B-7 INSTRUMENT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS ........ B-127

OXYGEN TANK TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT ...... B-127

OXYGEN TANK QUANTITY INSTRUMENTATION ..... B-130

OXYGEN TANK 2 PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION .... B-i34

iv
Part Page

PULSE CODE MODULATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION B-l_7

MISSION CONTROL ............... B-152

REFERENCES ................... B-158

v
This page left blank intentionally.

vi
PART BI

TASK ASSIGNMENT

Panel i was assigned the task to develop a detailed and accurate
chronology of mission events directly related to the flight of Apollo 13.
This event sequence would then form a baseline of data for analytical
use by Panel i, other Panels, and the Review Board.

To provide such a chronology, Panel i worked to produce a consoli-
dated sequence of all data whether derived from telemetry records, crew
observations, inflight photographs, air-to-ground communications, or
other sources of information. Of special significance to Panel i was
the requirement to correlate data taken from different sources, such
as crew observations and telemetry, in order to provide greater assur-
ance of the validity of data wherever possible.

In order to provide meaningful boundary conditions for its work,
Panel i divided its effort into three areas:

i. Preincident events, which covered the flight from countdown
to the time of the inflight accident.

2. Incident events, which covered the flight from approximately
55 hours and 52 minutes to the conclusion of immediately related data
events.

3. Postincident events, which covered the subsequent mission
period to splashdown.

In each of the three areas the main purpose of the Panel was to
provide the most efficient presentation of events for the Board's use
in reviewing, evaluating, and interpreting the significance of mission
events. Consequently, Panel I devoted a considerable portion of its
time to the task of data interpretation and verification. As was
intended from the Charter of the Board, the primary focus of the Panel's
work was the period of time during which the service module encountered
serious inflight difficulties, and its presentation of data reflects
this particular emphasis.

B-I
This page left blank intentionally.

B-2
PART B2

PANEL ORGANIZATION

Panel i was chaired by Mr. Francis B. Smith, Assistant Adminis-
trator for University Affairs, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The Board Monitor was Mr. Neil Armstrong from the Manned Spacecraft
Center. Additional Panel Members were:

Mr. John J. Williams, Kennedy Space Center, for preincident events

Dr. Thomas B. Ballard, Langley Research Center, for incident events

Mr. M. P. Frank, Manned Spacecraft Center, for postincident events

Although each of the above specialized in one phase of the Panel's
total assignment, the Panel acted as one unit in the review and assess-
ment of data and in the analysis and interpretation of those events
identified with the accident.

B-3
This page left blank intentionally.

B-4
PART B3

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

Apollo 13 was launched on schedule from Kennedy Space Center at
2:13:00 e.s.t, on April ii, 1970. The crew consisted of James E. Lovell,
Commander (CDR); John L. Swigert, Command Module Pilot (CMP); and Fred W.
Haise, Lunar Module Pilot (LMP). The preflight countdown was routine and
although some malfunctions and anomalies occurred during boost and earlier
portions of the flight, none except the premature cutoff of one of the S-II
engines was considered at the time to be of a serious nature.

At about 55:54, the crew had just completed a television broadcast;
CMP Swigert was in the left seat of the command module, LMP Haise was in
the lunar module, and CDR Lovell was in the CM lower equipment bay, when
all three heard a loud bang. At about the same time in Mission Control
in Houston, the Guidance Officer (GUIDO) noted on his console display that
there had been a momentary interruption of the spacecraft computer. He
told the Flight Director, "We've had a hardware restart. I don't know
what it was." At almost the same time, CDR Lovell, talking to Mission
Control, said, "I believe we've had a problem here." Also at about the
same time, the Electrical, Environmental, and Communications Engineer
(EECOM) in Mission Control noticed on his console display the sudden
appearance of limit sensing lights indicating that a few of the telem-
etered quantities relating to the spacecraft's cryogenic, fuel cell, and
electrical system had suddenly gone beyond pre-set limits. Astronaut
Swigert in the command module, noting a master alarm about 2 seconds
after the bang, moved from the left seat to the right seat where he could
see the instruments indicating conditions of the electrical system, and
noticed a caution light indicating low voltage on main bus B, one of the
two busses supplying electrical power for the command module. At that
time, he reported to Mission Control, "We've had a problem. We've had
a main B bus undervolt." At the same time, however, he reported the
voltage on fuel cell 3, which supplied power to main bus B, looked good
and assumed that the main bus B undervolt condition had been a transient
one. However, 2 or 3 minutes later, when another master alarm sounded,
LMP Haise moved into the right-hand seat to recheck the fuel cells and
noted that two of the three fuel cells (no. i and no. 3) were showing no
hydrogen or oxygen flow and no electrical output and that fuel cell 2 was
carrying the command module's total electrical load through bus A. Bus B
was dead. In addition, several other electrical and cryogenic system ab-
normalities were evident.

Detailed studies and analyses of telemetry records made since the
flight indicated that during the 90 seconds before the "bang", several ab-
normal events occurred. At about 55:53:23, within a few seconds after the
crew had turned on two fan motors which stir the supercritical cryogenic

B-5
oxygen in oxygen tank no. 2, electrical "glitches" (transient high-
amplitude current and voltage fluctuations) occurred which could be in-
dicative of momentary electrical short circuits. Analyses of telemetry
data also indicate that first one fan motor and then the other probably
became disconnected from the electrical bus concurrently with the glitches.
Thirteen seconds after the first glitch (16 seconds after the fans were
turned on) the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2 started to rise; during the
next 24 seconds it increased from a normal value of 891 psia to 954 psia;
it remained at that pressure for approximately 21 seconds and then again
increased to a maximum value of 1008 psia (approximately the pressure at
which the relief valve was set to open), at which point the relief valve
apparently opened and pressure began decreasing. During the last 23 sec-
onds of this period, during the second oxygen pressure increase, telem-
etry indicated that oxygen tank no. 2 temperature also began to increase
sharply; and concurrently with the sudden temperature rise, the oxygen
tank no. 2 quantity gage, which had been inoperative for the previous
9 hours, began to show fluctuating readings. At about 90 seconds after
the start of the pressure rise, telemetry transmission from the space-
craft was suddently interrupted for a period of 1.8 seconds.

Putting all of this and other information together with the service
module photographs taken later by the crew and with subsequent changes in
the condition of the spacecraft system leads to a determination that
immediately before and during this 1.8-second interval the following
things happened:

i. The oxygen tank no. 2 system failed, leading to loss of all
oxygen pressure.

2. The service module panel covering bay 4 blew off, possibly
producing the "bang" heard by the crew.

3. The spacecraft's velocity changed by 0.5 fps.

4. Transmission of telemetry from the spacecraft was interrupted
(possibly caused by the panel striking and damaging the high-gain antenna
through which data were being telemetered).

5. Various valves in the reaction control systems (RCS) were shocked
closed (contributing to some difficulties in maintaining automatic atti-
tude control).

6. Valves controlling oxygen flow to fuel cells _ and 3 were shocked
closed (leading to failure of both fuel cells 2-1/2 minutes later for lack
of oxygen).

7. Oxygen tank no. i started leaking oxygen.

B-6
8. Venting of oxygen produced forces on the spacecraft which the
automatic stabilization system counteracted by firing opposing spacecraft
reaction control thrusters.

9. Various sensors or their wiring were damaged to cause subsequent
erroneous readings.

These changes occurred so rapidly, of course, that neither the crew
nor the mission controllers could have had a clear picture of specifi-

cally what had happened.

In the Mission Control Center, after the 1.8-second data loss, the
EECOM first suspected an instrumentation failure since earlier in the
flight (46:40) the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage had failed and since
other pressures, temperatures, voltages, and current readings were so
abnormal (e.g., more than i00 percent or less than 0 percent of fu_
scale) as to appear unrealistic. They appeared more indicative of an
instrumentation failure than of real quantities. The Flight Director
also initially believed, from the information available to him in the
Control Center, that the difficulty was electrical or electronic in
nature. Consequently, Mission Control Center's initial efforts during
the first 3 or 4 minutes after the malfunction were to validate instru-
ment readings and to identify a possible instrumentation failure. Dur-
ing the next several minutes, both the flightcrew and the ground con-
trollers worked at switching fuel cell bus power configurations in an

attempt to understand what had happened and to get fuel cells I and 3
back on line. They determined that fuel cell i had no output and dis-
connected it from the bus. Later they also disconnected fuel cell 3
for the same reason. For several minutes they connected the command
module's entry battery to bus A to aid fuel cell 2 in supplying elec-
trical power and to insure against further failures due to low voltage.

Shortly after the malfunction, while the Apollo 13 crew and the
EECOM were trying unsuccessfully to restore electrical power output from
fuel cells i and 3, the Guidance and Navigation Officer (GNC) reported

an unusually high level of attitude control thruster activity on the
spacecraft. This added to their problems, since it indicated other
abnormal conditions aboard the spacecraft and used excessive thruster
fuel. Consequently, during the next hour the ground control and the
crew were required to pay a great deal of attention to maintaining
attitude control of the spacecraft and to identifying and eliminating
the cause of the instability. At the same 'time, the Flight Director
began to suspect that the genesis of the problem might lie in the RCS,
rather than in the high-gain antenna or instrumentation.

B-7
During this period (about 14 minutes after the accident) CDR Lovell
reported, "...it looks to me, looking out the hatch, that we are venting
something. We are venting something out into space ...... it's a gas of
some sort." He subsequently described this venting as extremely heavy
and unlike anything he had seen in his three previous space flights.

For about i hour 45 minutes after the accident, the crew and ground
controllers wrestled with electrical problems caused by oxygen supply
and fuel cell failures and with attitude stability problems caused by
the venting of oxygen, the shock closing of thruster system valves, and
electrical system failures. During this period they went through a
series of control system reconfigurations until automatic control
was finally established at 57:32. In the meantime, as it became more
apparent that the loss of oxygen from oxygen tank no. i could not be
stopped and that fuel cell 2 would soon expire, the LM was powered up
(57:40), LM telemetry was turned on (57:57) and attitude control was
transferred from the CM to the LM (58:34). At 58:40, 2 hours 45 minutes
after the accident, the CM was completely powered down.

One of the main concerns then was to make the trajectory changes
that would return the spacecraft safely to Earth within the lifetime
of the onboard consumables--water, oxygen, thruster fuel, and electric
power. At the time of the accident the spacecraft was on a trajectory
which would have swung it around the Moon (about 21 hours after the ac-
cident) and returned it to Earth where it would have been left in a
highly elliptical orbit about the Earth with a perigee (nearest approach
to Earth) of about 2400 miles. Four trajectory correction burns were
made during the remainder of the flight as illustrated in figure B6-9.

61:30 - A 38 fps incremental velocity (delta V) burn using the
descent propulsion system (DPS) engine and the LM primary guidance and
navigation system (PGNS). This burn was performed 16 hours before they
swung around the Moon, and was targeted to place the spacecraft on a
trajectory which would return it to the atmospheric Earth reentry corri-
dor rather than the 2400-mile perigee.

79:28 - A 861 fps delta V burn using the DPS 2 hours after swinging
around the Moon to speed up return to Earth by about 9 hours (143 versus
152 g.e.t.) and to move the landing point from the Indian Ocean to the
Pacific Ocean where the primary recovery forces were located.

105:18 - A 7.8 fps delta V burn using DPS to lower perigee altitude
from _-7 miles to about 21 miles.

137:40 - A 3.2 fps delta V final burn using LM RCS thruster to cor-
rect for small dispersions in previous burns and assure that the space-
craft would reenter in the center of its entry corridor.

B-8
During the remainder of the flight there were several other unusual
situations which the crew and Mission Control successfully contended with.
The use of electrical power aboard the LM had to be managedvery carefully
to conserve not only the LMbatteries but also the water supply, since
water was used to dissipate heat generated by the electrical equipment.
The LM LiOH was not adequate to remove carbon dioxide for three men for
the duration of the return trip, so a method was devised to circulate
the LM cabin oxygen through the CM's Li0H filters. Since the CMhad to
be used for reentry, its main bus B had to be checked out very carefully
to assure that there were no electrical shorts and the CMentry battery
which had been used earlier to supply power for the ailing CMhad to be
recharged from the LMbatteries.
Several actions essential to reentry and landing were undertaken
during the last 9 hours of the flight as illustrated in figure B6-10.
The SMwas jettisoned a few minutes after the last midcourse correction,
about 4-1/2 hours before reentry. In viewing and photographing the SM,
the crew realized for the first time the extensiveness of the physical
damage(panel blown off, Mylar strips hanging from antenna, etc.). At
about 2-1/2 hours before reentry, the CM's inertial platform was powered
up and aligned and the LMwas jettisoned about 1/2 hour later. Reentry
was at 142:40 and splashdown at 142:54 g.e.t.

B-9
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B-IO
PART B4

PRELAUNCH AND MISSION EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

This section of the report contains significant events prior to
the accident with emphasis placed on the spacecraft and particularly
on the cryogenic system. It starts with the launch count (T - 98:00:00)
and ends prior to the significant events of the accident (55:52:00).

LAUNCH COUNTDOWN

Countdown operations for both the command service module (CSM)
and lunar module (LM) were started at approximately i0:00 a.m.e.s.t.
on Monday, April 6, 1970. The start of the countdown was delayed
approximately 8 hours because of a pad clear operation involving a
special test of the LM supercritical helium (SHe) system. A timeline
of significant countdown milestones is shown in figure B4-1.

Mechanical Build-up and Gas Servicing

Following completion of CSM powerup, water servicing, and securing
of the LM SHe operation, installation of the CSM heavy ordnance initi-
ators was started at approximately 3:00 p.m.e.s.t. The ordnance
operation and remote resistance checks of the launch escape rocket
initiators were completed by 9:30 p.m.e.s.t., April 6, after being
slightly delayed to correct a mechanical interference problem (incorrect
thread depth) with the initiator in the launch escape rocket motor.
Combined CSM and LM helium and gaseous oxygen (GOX) servicing was
started at 2:00 a.m.e.s.t, on April 7, and was successfully completed
by noon that day. At this time, both the CSM and LM were functional
at T - 66:00:00, at which point a built-in hold of 12 hours had been
originally planned. As a result of the late countdown start, both the
LM and CSM spacecrafts experienced only a 6-hour built-in hold.

From noon Tuesday, April 7, through ii:00 a.m. Thursday, April 9,
mechanical build-up operations (panel closure, LM thermal blanket in-
stallation, etc.) were conducted on the CSM and LM. The CSM fuel cells
were activated and preparations were completed for CSM cryo loading,
that is, filling the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tanks. Details of
this operation are covered below. During this time the LM SHe tank was
initially loaded and a 24-hour cold soak period started. All of these
operations were completed without a significant problem, with the

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B-12
spacecraft progressing functionally from T - 66:00:00 to T - 41:00:00;
including completion of the built-in hold at T - 66:00:00 and another
planned 16-hour built-in hold at T - 48:00:00.

Cryogenic Servicing

CSM cryo loading or flowing liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen was
scheduled to be performed from ii:OO a.m.e.s.t, through 7:00 p.m.e.s.t.
Thursday, April 9, 1970. A timeline of significant milestones, including
preliminary preparations, is shown in figure B4-2. (See Appendix A,
Part A5 for a description of the fuel cell and cryogenic systems.) The
configuration of the cryogenic and fuel cell systems was as follows:

i. The fuel cell gaseous oxygen and hydrogen systems were at a
pressure of 28 psia with oxygen and hydrogen gases. The fuel cells had
been operated in the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) and were left
pressurized with reactant gases (gaseous oxygen and hydrogen) to main-
tain system integrity between CDDT and countdown.

2. The oxygen and hydrogen tanks were at a pressure of 80 psia
with oxygen and hydrogen gases. The tanks had been evacuated (less than
5mm Hg for 2 hours minimum) and serviced during CDDT, with reactant gas
left in the system after detanking to maintain system integrity between
CDDT and countdown.

3. The ground support equipment (GSE) lines were connected to the
spacecraft and had been previously evacuated, pulse purged, and then
pressurized with reactant gas to 80 psia. Purity samples taken of the
gases from the GSE were within specification. The pressure-operated
disconnects (POD's) that connect the GSE to the spacecraft had been leak
checked at 80 psia with reactant gas and indicated no leakage.

4. The portable oxygen dewar used to service the spacecraft oxygen
tanks was serviced on April 7, 1970. Liquid samples taken from the vent
line of the dewar during servicing were within specification. All of the
preceding activities were accomplished without undue delay or difficulty.

The first activity for the fuel cell and cryogenic system in the
countdown started at approximately 3:00 p.m.e.s.t, on April 8, 1970.
The move of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen dewars from the cryo-
genic buildings to the pad had been completed. The primary oxygen_
backup oxygen, and backup hydrogen dewars were located on the pad at the
base of the mobile service structure (MSS) while the primary hydrogen
dewar was moved to level 4A of the MSS. The hydrogen and oxygen GSE
configuration is shown in figures B4-3 and B4-4, respectively.

B-13
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B-16
Pictures of the servicing dewars, valve boxes, and pressurizing equipment
are shown in figures B4-5 through B4-10.

Dewpoint samples of the oxygen and hydrogen spacecraft tanks were
obtained. This was accomplished by pressurizing the tanks with reactant
gas to 80 psia through the vent line and then venting the tank back
through the vent line and obtaining a moisture sample at the vent line
sample valve. Both the oxygen and hydrogen tanks met the requirements
that the moisture content be less than 25 parts per million (ppm).
Oxygen tanks no. i and no. 2 read less than 2 ppm.

After the dev_oint samples of the tanks were obtained, sample bot-
tles were installed on the tank vent lines. The sample bottles were
flow purged with reactant gases at 80 psia for 5 minutes, followed by
i0 pulse purges ranging in pressure from 80 psia to 20 psia.

The hydrogen dewar was then connected to the servicing GSE. The
fill line between the dewar and the spacecraft was flow purged with
55 psia of helium gas for 15 minutes, and a moisture sample taken from
the fill line. A sample result of 2 ppm was obtained. An additional
flow purge using gaseous hydrogen at 55 psia was then performed for
i0 minutes, followed by 13 pulse purges ranging in pressure from 55 psia
to 20 psia (Note: This cleans the dead-end areas at the manifold).

The fuel cells were then pressurized to their operating pressure
(62 psia oxygen and hydrogen). Heat was applied electrically to the
fuel cells from external GSE to melt the potassium hydroxide. Fuel
cell 3 heater current, supplied from GSE for heatup, was slightly low
(1.2 amps vs. 1.4 amps). This heater current was adjusted after the
heatup and calibration of the fuel cells was completed.

With the fuel cells at operating temperature (420 ° F) and pressures,
a calibration test on each fuel cell was performed. Fuel cells were
calibrated by applying loads in approximately lO-amp increments until a
maximum current of 60 amps was reached while monitoring the output volt-
age. The fuel cell loads were supplied by GSE load banks. After cali-
bration_ the fuel cells were connected to the spacecraft busses and
40-amp GSE load applied to each cell for fuel cell water conditioning
(approximately 4 hours). After these loads were removed from each fuel
cell, 6-amp in-line heater loads with a 50-percent duty cycle were ap-
plied. With the fuel cells in this configuration a visual engineering
inspection of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen loading systems was
performed with the exception of the liquid oxygen dewar_ not yet con-
nected.

Immediately prior to flowing liquid hydrogen, the spacecraft hy-
drogen and oxygen tank fans and quantity probe circuit breakers were

B-17
Figure B4-5.- Liqnid hydrogen dewar.

B-18
Figure B4-6.- Liquid oxygen dewar.

B-19
Figure B4-7.- Hydrogen valve box at Launch Complex 39.

B-20
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Figure B4-8.- Oxygen valve box at Launch Complex 39.

B-21
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B-22
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B-23
closed. (See Appendix A, Part A5, for description of the oxygen and
hydrogen tanks.) The hydrogen dewar was pressurized to approximately
30 psia prior to servicing. Hydrogen was flowed through both tanks for
i0 minutes (normal) prior to obtaining an increase in tank quantity.
This period is required to chill the system. The flow rate during
servicing was approximately 2.1 pounds per minute for 22 minutes (both
tanks). The flow was stopped for 30 minutes when the tank quantity
reached 85-percent and the dewar and spacecraft tanks vented to ambient
pressure. The fans were turned off during this period. This time
period is required to chill the hydrogen tank. The dewar was again
pressurized to approximately 30 psia, and flow (at normal rates) began
through the fill manifold detank line for 2 minutes to chill the GSE
prior to then opening the spacecraft fill POD's. Whenthe quantity gage
stabilized (about 98-percent) the dewar pressure was increased to approx-
imately 35 psia and the vent POD's closed, followed closely by the
closure of the fill POD's. The GSEvent valve was closed simultaneously
with the closing of the spacecraft vent POD's. This operation traps
cold gas between the spacecraft vent POD's and the GSEvent valve. As
the cold gas warmsand expands, it is vented into the two sample con-
tainers connected to the vent line sample valve. The samples were
analyzed for helium, nitrogen, and total hydrocarbons. Both samples
were within specifications.

The hydrogen dewar was removed and the prime oxygen dewar was
brought up to level 4A of the MSS. The oxygen dewar was connected to
the servicing GSE. The fill line between the dewar and the spacecraft
was flow purged with 55 psia of oxygen gas for 15 minutes, and a mois-
ture sample taken from the fill line. A sample result of less than 2 ppm
was obtained. After sampling, 13 pulse purges from a pressure of 55 psia
to a slight positive pressure to maintain flow were performed. The
spacecraft oxygen tank fans were turned on prior to oxygen flow. The
oxygen dewar was pressurized to approximately 45 psia. Oxygenwas flowed
through both tanks for approximately 2 minutes (normal) before an indica-
tion was noted on the quantity probe. The flow rate during servicing was
25 pounds per minute for approximately 25 minutes (both tanks). After
the tank quantity reached i00 percent, flow was continued for an ad-
ditional i0 minutes, to further chill the tanks. The spacecraft vent
POD's and the GSEvent were then closed, followed immediately by the
closure of the fill POD's. The spacecraft tank fans were turned off at
this time. The cold gas trapped in the vent line was sampled. The
oxygen is sampled for helium, nitrogen, and total hydrocarbons. Both
samples were within specification. The service module supply valve was
opened to allow the CMsurge tank to pressurize for flight.

While pressurizing the surge tank, fuel cell i was connected
to dc bus A to minimize the usage of liquid hydrogen. A constant

B-24
flow from the liquid hydrogen tanks equal to the heat gained by the tank
results in minimumliquid hydrogen usage. The load on the fuel cell was
approximately 20 amps. This configuration was maintained until 4 hours
before launch, at which time fuel cells 2 and 3 were connected to the
busses. Fuel cells i and 2 were connected to bus A with fuel cell 3
supplying power to bus B. The fuel cells supplied power to the space-
craft from this time through launch.

Ground electrical power was supplied to the tank heaters to bring
the tanks to flight pressure. The liquid oxygen system pressurization
to approximately 935 psia and the liquid hydrogen system to approximately
235 psia was completed by 6:40 p.m. on April 9, 1970. The fuel cells
were supplied by onboard reactants from this period through launch. Fan
motor checks were performed, and the GSEand airborne systems closed out
for flight.

The entire CSMcryo loading operation was normal except that liquid
hydrogen tank no. i was loaded to 98.7 percent instead of the desired
minimum99 percent (reason for this is still under study by both the
MannedSpacecraft Center and the KennedySpace Center) and a slight leak
developed through the liquid oxygen tank no. 2 vent quick disconnect.
The leak was stopped by the installation of the flight cap prior to tank
pressurization. These conditions were determined to be acceptable for
flight.

Spacecraft Closeout and Terminal Count

Following completion of the cryo loading operation the countdown
proceeded normally from T - 32:00:00 through such milestones as: LM crew
provision stowage and final closeout; LM SHe servicing; launch vehicle
battery installation and electrical systems checks; CSMcrew provision
stowage; backup astronaut crew checks; and ALSEPfuel cask installation.
At 7:00 p.m.e.s.t, on April i0, 1970, the countdown clock was held
at T - 9:00:00 for a planned built-in hold of 9 hours and 13 minutes.
Following resumption of the countdown at 4:13 a.m.e.s.t, on April ii,
1970, final launch vehicle cryogenic loading preparations were completed
and launch vehicle cryogenic loading was successfully conducted through
9:30 a.m.e.s.t.
The remainder of the countdown activities, including flightcrew
ingress_ final CSMcabin closeout, and the space vehicle terminal count,
progressed normally with the exception of a minor problem with a broken
key in the CSMpyro guard, and a stuck open no. 2 liquid oxygen vent
valve in the S-IC stage. Both problems were satisfactorily resolved with-
in the planned countdo_¢ntime, v_hich included a final built-in hold of
i hour at T - 3:30:00 minutes.

B-25
LAUNCH
ANDTRANSLUNAR
COASTPHASEPRIORTO THEACCIDENT

Launch and Flight Summary

The space vehicle was launched at 2:13:00 e.s.t., April ii, 1970.
The only unexpected occurrence during the boost phase was an early
shutdown of the S-II inboard engine. Low frequency oscillations
(approximately 16 hertz) occurred on the S-II stage, resulting in a
132-second premature center engine cutoff. Preliminary analysis indi-
cates that an engine pressure sensor detected a varying engine thrust
chamber pressure resulting from a large pressure oscillation in the
liquid oxygen system and turned the engine off. The four remaining
engines burned approximately 34 seconds longer than normal, and the
S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approximately 9 seconds longer to
achieve the required velocity. The cause of the liquid oxygen system
oscillation is presently being studied by the Marshall Space Flight
Center. A parking orbit with an apogeeof 100.2 nautical miles and a
perigee of 98.0 nautical miles was obtained.

After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems
were verified and preparations were madefor translunar injection. The
second S-IVB burn was initiated on schedule for translunar injection.
All major systems operated satisfactorily and conditions were
nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory. With the spacecraft
in a free-return trajectory, and with no further major propulsion
burns, the spacecraft would pass around the Moonand reenter the
Earth's atmosphere.

The commandservice module (CSM)separated from the service module
LM adapter (SLA) at 3:06:39. The spacecraft was maneuveredand docked
with the lunar module (LM) at 3:19:09 and the LM separated from the
SLA at 04:01:00. The S-IVB was then maneuveredusing residual pro-
pellants to impact the lunar surface. The first midcourse correction
(23.1 fps), performed at 30:40:50 using the service propulsion system,
inserted the spacecraft into a non-free-return trajectory with a peri-
cynthian altitude close to the planned value of about 60 miles. Under
these conditions, with no further propulsion engine burns, the spacecraft
would orbit the Earth in a highly elliptical orbit. These trajectories
are discussed in more detail in Part B6 of this Appendix.

The mission was routine and generally proceeded according to the
timeline. Because the crew was ahead of schedule and midcourse cor-
rection number 3 was cancelled, an early entry into the lunar module
was madeat 55:00:00. A scheduled television broadcast to the Earth
was madebetween 55:15 and 55:46, and at the time of the accident,

B-26
both the Commanderand Command Module Pilot were in the commandmodule
while the Lunar Module Pilot was just entering the commandmodule from
the lunar module.

Spacecraft Systems Operation

This section of the report will deal only with problems and events
in the various systems encountered with the CSMduring the powered
phase, parking orbit, and translunar coast phase of the mission up to
the time of the accident. The systems will be treated separately
except that electrical current and voltage fluctuations associated with
the operation of the fans to stir the supercritical oxygen and hydrogen
will be covered under the cryogenic section.

CSM structural-mechanical.- Structural loads during boost phases
of the flight were within acceptable limits. Command module structural
oscillations of less than 0.1g at 16 hertz in all directions were
measured during the period of S-II longitudinal oscillations (POG0)
prior to the center engine cutoff. The levels of these oscillations
were comparable to those measured during ground test and on previous
Apollo missions.

At approximately 00:25:00 minutes, a computer program was entered
into the computer to align the inertial measuring unit. During this
alignment, the sextant is rotated, which in turn releases the external
ablative optics covers. The optics covers are spring loaded, and held
in place by clips. When the sextant is rotated, an arm located on the
sextant engages a cam that releases the clips and jettisons both covers.
Minor difficulty was experienced in jettisoning the two covers. The
optics were rotated twice manually to 90 degrees according to the
checklist, but the covers did not jettison. The optics were then
rotated in the automatic mode (past 90 degrees) and the covers Jetti-
soned. The cause of the covers not jettisoning was that the sextant
was not rotated far enough in the manual mode to completely engage the
cam.

After CSM/LM docking, the crew reported that two docking latches
were not fully engaged. Both latches were opened and reset. There
are 12 docking latches on the command module. Each latch has a trigger
that is engaged when the lunar module docking ring comes in contact
with the CSM docking ring. The handle has a red indicator that indi-
cates when the latch is engaged. On several spacecraft during ground
checkout one or two of the latches had to be reset manually, as in the
case of Apollo 13. The prime cause is not having the two docking rings
perfectly parallel at the time of engagement. The manual resetting of
one or two of the latches is consid