ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
KABATAAN PARTY LIST VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
 As the country prepares to elect its next set of leaders
on May 10, 2010 on November 12, 2008, respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 85141
 which, among other things, set December 2, 2008 to
December 15, 2009 as the period of continuing voter
registration using the biometrics process in all areas
nationwide,
o except in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao.
 Subsequently, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
85852 on February 12, 2009 adjusting the deadline of
voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national and
local elections to October 31, 2009, instead of
December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution
No. 8514.
 The intense public clamor for an extension of the
October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the
COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it,
arguing mainly that it needs ample time to prepare
for the automated elections.
 Via the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
filed on October 30, 2009,3 petitioners challenge the
validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a
declaration of its nullity.
 Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino,
o a youth sectoral representative under the
Kabataan Party-list,
o sues as a member of the House of
Representatives and a concerned citizen,
 while the rest of petitioners sue as concerned
citizens.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
1. Petitioners contend that the serious questions
involved in this case and potential
disenfranchisement of millions of Filipino voters
justify resort to this Court in the first instance,
o claiming that based on National
Statistics Office (NSO) data, the
projected voting population for the
May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964
for the age group 18-19 and
o 8,756,981 for the age group 20-
24,
o or a total of 12,515,945.
2. Petitioners further contend that COMELEC
Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional
encroachment on the legislative power of Congress
o as it amends the system of continuing
voter registration under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189),
otherwise known as The Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996, reading:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The
personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be
conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during
the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
o They thus pray that COMELEC
Resolution No. 8585 be declared null
and void,
o and that the COMELEC be
accordingly required to extend the
voter registration until January 9,
2010 which is the day before the 120-
day prohibitive period starting on
January 10, 2010.
RESPONDENT’S ANSWER
 The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed on
December 7, 2009 that, among other things, the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer
upon it the power to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and
honest elections;
 that Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 (RA
6646)4 and Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (RA
8436)5 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election
acts which include voter registration;
 and that its schedule of pre-election acts shows that
the October 31, 2009 deadline of voter registration
was impelled by operational and pragmatic
considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v.
COMELEC6 wherein the Court denied a similar prayer
for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline
of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 should be
declared null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter
registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on October 31, 2009.
RULING: YES, COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 should be
declared null and void. The COMELEC is directed to proceed
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters and
holding the same until January 9, 2010.
The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our constitutional
democracy. The right of every Filipino to choose the leaders who
will lead the country and participate, to the fullest extent
possible, in every national and local election is so zealously
guarded by the fundamental law that it devoted an entire article
solely therefor:
ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system of securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and
the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons.
Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and
such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the
State derives its power from the consent of the governed. The
paramount importance of this right is also a function of the State
policy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional
declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them,7 bolstered by the
recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.8
It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated a system of
continuing voter registration in Section 8 of RA 8189 which
provides:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The
personal filing of application of REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
SHALL BE CONDUCTED DAILY in the office of the Election
Officer during regular office hours. NO REGISTRATION SHALL,
however, BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD STARTING
ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) DAYS BEFORE A REGULAR
ELECTION and ninety (90) days before a special election.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to
register daily during regular offices hours, except during the
period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days
before a special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the
period of 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before
a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL
the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections
including: (1) completion of project precincts, which is
necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots, election
returns and other election forms and paraphernalia;
(2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including
the determination of the precincts to which they shall be
assigned;
(3) finalizing the Computerized Voters List;
(4) supervision of the campaign period; and
(5) preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of Voter’s
Information Sheet.
Such determination of Congress is well within the ambit of its
legislative power, which this Court is bound to respect. And THE
COMELEC’S RULE-MAKING POWER SHOULD BE EXERCISED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PREVAILING LAW.9
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and
RA 8436 to fix other dates for pre-election acts, the same is NOT
IN CONFLICT with the mandate of continuing voter registration
under RA 8189. This Court’s primary duty is to harmonize laws
rather than consider one as repealed by the other. The
presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and,
accordingly, against implied repeal. For Congress is presumed
to know the existing laws on the subject and not to enact
inconsistent or conflicting statutes.10
Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28
grant the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for
pre-election activities only IF THE SAME CANNOT BE
REASONABLY HELD WITHIN THE PERIOD PROVIDED BY
LAW. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of
enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage – the
common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds NO GROUND TO HOLD
THAT THE MANDATE OF CONTINUING VOTER
REGISTRATION CANNOT BE REASONABLY HELD within the
period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily during office hours,
except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10,
2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the
COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines
therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v.
COMELEC.11 In said case, the Court held that the COMELEC did
not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of the
therein petitioners for an extension of the December 27, 2000
deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. For
the therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court within
the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter
registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct
of a two-day registration on February 17 and 18, 2001, clearly
within the 120-day prohibitive period.
The Court in fact suggested in Akbayan-Youth that the therein
petitioners could have, but had not, registered during the period
between the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the COMELEC
and before the start of the 120-day prohibitive period prior to
the election date or January 13, 2001, thus:
[T]here is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the
records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein
petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter
which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before
the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to
the Office of the Election Officer to register between the period
starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that
he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC
from filing his application for registration. While it may be true
that respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on
December 27, 2000, this Court is of the firm view
that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail
of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189.12(emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The clear import of the Court’s pronouncement in Akbayan-
Youth is that had the therein petitioners filed their petition – and
sought an extension date that was – before the 120-day
prohibitive period, their prayer would have been granted
pursuant to the mandate of RA 8189. In the present case, as
reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the petition (October
30, 2009) and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are
prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore,
finds no legal impediment to the extension prayed for.
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP & GORDON VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
 A petition for mandamus may be granted and a writ
issued when an agency "unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office."1
 Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New
Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.)
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed
this Petition2 for mandamus before this court to
compel respondent Commission on Elections to
implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail
security feature.
 Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. is a non-stock and non-profit
corporation.3 It operates through Bagumbayan
Volunteers for a New Philippines,4 a national political
party duly registered with the Commission on
Elections.5
o Former Senator Gordon is a registered
voter and taxpayer.6 He is an official
candidate for the Senate of the
Philippines7 and is the Chairperson of
Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.
 Gordon authored Republic Act No. 9369, the law that
amended Republic Act No. 8436, otherwise known as
the Automated Election System Law.8
 The Commission on Elections is a government
entity9 "vested by law to enforce and administer all
laws relative to the conduct of elections in the
country."10
 On December 22, 1997, Republic Act No.
843611 authorized the Commission on Elections
o to use an automated election system for
electoral exercises.12
 After almost a decade, Republic Act No.
936913 amended Republic Act No. 8436. Republic Act
No. 9369 introduced significant changes to Republic
Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, and other
election-related statutes.14
 Automation is hailed as a key "towards clean and
credible elections," reducing the long wait and
discouraging cheating.15
 In 2010 and 2013, the Commission on Elections
enforced a nationwide automated election system
using the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machines. For the 2016 National and Local Elections,
the Commission on Elections has opted to use the
Vote-Counting Machine.16
 The vote-counting machine is a "paper-based
automated election system,"17 which is reported to be
"seven times faster and more powerful than the PCOS
because of its updated processor."18 Likewise, it is
reported to have more memory and security
2

features,19 and is "capable of producing the Voter
Verification Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)."20 This
VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed receipt
and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-
counting machine.21
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
1. Petitioners allege that under Republic Act No. 8436,
as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, there are
several safeguards or Minimum System Capabilities
to ensure the sanctity of the ballot.
o Among these is the implementation of the
VVPAT security feature, as found in
Section 6(e), (f), and (n). The full text of
Section 6 is as follows:
SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities.
- The automated election system must
at least have the following functional
capabilities:
(e) provision for voter verified paper
audit trail;
(f) system auditability which
provides supporting documentation
for verifying the correctness of
reported election results;
(n) provide the voter a system of
verification to find out whether or not
the machine has registered his
choice; and
Petitioners claim that VVPAT "consists of
physical paper records of voter ballots as
voters have cast them on an electronic
voting system."22
o Through it, the voter can verify
if the choices on the paper
record match the choices that
he or she actually made in the
ballot.23
o The voter can confirm whether
the machine had actually read
the ballot correctly.
2. Petitioners seek to compel the Commission on
Elections to have the vote-counting machine issue
receipts once a person has voted.
According to petitioners, the VVPAT "will ensure
transparency and reduce any attempt to alter the
results of the elections."24 There will be "an electronic
tally of the votes cast" or the vote stored in the vote-
counting machine, as well as "a paper record of the
individual votes" cast or the VVPAT receipt.25 Should
there be any doubt, "the electronically generated
results . . . can then be audited and verified through a
comparison . . . with these paper records."26
In the Terms of Reference for the 2016 National and
Local Elections Automation Project, the Commission
on Elections lists the Minimum Technical
Specifications of the Optical Mark Reader or Optical
Scan System, precinct-based technologies that the
poll body shall accept.27cralawred
Component 1 (B), subparagraphs (5) and (19) states
as follows:
5. The system's hardware shall have a display panel that is capable to
display customizable messages or prompts of each stage of the process
execution, including prompts and messages for user interaction
purposes.
19. The system shall have a vote verification feature which shall
display and print the voter's choices, which can be enabled or
disabled in the configuration using the [Election Management
System]. (Emphasis supplied)
3. Petitioners claim that the Commission on Elections
refuses to implement the VVPAT function based on
fears that the security feature may aid in vote-buying,
and that the voting period may take longer.28
 On February 9, 2016, petitioners read from ABS-CBN
News Online that with a vote of 7-0, the Commission
on Elections En Banc decided not to implement the
VVPAT for the 2016 Elections.29 Petitioners attached
a copy of the article.30 Other news reports state that
the Commission on Elections ruled similarly against
the voting receipts in 2010 and 2013.31
REASONS FOR REFUSING TO ISSUE PAPER RECEIPTS
 At the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on
the Automated Election System on February 16,
2016,32 the Commission on Elections, through its
Chairperson Andres D. Bautista (Chairperson
Bautista), supposedly gave its reasons for refusing to
issue paper receipts.
o First, "politicians can use the receipts in
vote buying[;]"
o second, it may increase voting time to five
to seven hours in election precincts:33
o [T]he poll body has decided against
printing the receipt because it might be
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
used for vote buying and that it would
result in the vote-counting process being
extended from six to seven hours since it
takes about 13 seconds to print a receipt,
meaning each machine would have to run
for that long for the receipts.
o Bautista said another "big concern" is that
"there might be losing candidates who
might question the results, basically
instructing their supporters that when the
machine prints out the receipt, regardless
of what the receipt says, they will say that
it's not correct."34
 On February 11, 2016, the Commission on Elections
issued Resolution No. 1005735 providing for "rules
and general instructions on the process of testing and
sealing, [as well as] voting, counting, and
transmission of election results."36 Adopting
Resolution No. 10057 by a vote of 7-0, the
Commission on Elections En Banc made no mention
using VVPAT receipts for the 2016 national elections.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
4. Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections'
fears are "baseless and speculative."37 In assailing the
Commission on Elections' reasons, petitioners cite
the Position Paper38 of alleged automated elections
expert, Atty. Glenn Ang Chong (Atty. Chong).
o Atty. Chong recommended that the old
yellow ballot boxes be used alongside the
voting machine. The VVPAT receipts can
be immediately placed inside the old ballot
boxes.39
o After the voter casts his or her vote, he or
she gets off the queue and walks to where
the old ballot box is. There, the voter may
verify if the machine accurately recorded
the vote; if so, the voter drops the VVPAT
receipt into the old ballot box.40 Should
there be any discrepancy, the voter may
have it duly recorded with the poll
watchers for analysis and appropriate
action.41 The poll watchers must ensure
that all receipts are deposited into the old
ballot box.42 This will guarantee that no
voter can sell his or her vote using the
receipt.43
o At the end of the polling, the old ballot
boxes shall be turned over to the
accredited citizens' arm or
representatives of the public for the
manual verification count of the votes cast.
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A member of the Board of Election
Inspectors may supervise the count. The
result of the manual verification count
(using the old ballot boxes) shall be
compared with that of the automated
count (saved in the vote-counting
machine).44
 Petitioners add that during Senate
deliberations,45 the main proponent of the
amendatory law, Former Senator Gordon,
highlighted the importance of "an audit trail usually
supported by paper[.]"46
 On November 10, 2015, Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. sent
Commission on Elections Chairperson Bautista a
letter demanding the implementation of the VVPAT
feature for the May 9, 2016 Elections.47 However, the
Commission on Elections never answered the
letter.48
 According to petitioners, the inclusion of VVPAT, a
"mandatory requirement under the automated
election laws, [has been] flagrantly violated by
[COMELEC] during the 2010 and 2013 Elections."
They claim that the previous demands made on the
Commission on Elections to reactivate the VVPAT
security feature "fell on deaf ears."49 In the 2010 and
2013 Elections, all a voter received from the voting
machines were the words, "Congratulations! Your
vote has been counted," or an otherwise similar
phrase.50
 Petitioners claim that under Section 28 of Republic
Act No. 9369, amending Section 35 of Republic Act
No. 8436, anyone "interfering with and impeding . . .
the use of computer counting devices and the
processing, storage, generation and transmission of
election results, data or information" commits a
felonious act.51 The Commission on Elections
allegedly did so when it refused to implement
VVPAT.52
 In view of the foregoing, petitioners filed a Special
Civil Action for Mandamus under Rule 65, Section 3
of the Rules of Court. They ask this court to compel
the Commission on Elections to comply with the
provisions of Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended.
 Petitioners argue that mandamus is proper to
"enforce a public right" and "compel the performance
of a public duty."53 Under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of
the Constitution, this court has original jurisdiction
over petitions for mandamus. In addition, Rule 65,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court allows for a civil action
for mandamus to be directly filed before this
court.54 There is no reglementary period in a special
civil action for mandamus.55
According to petitioners, the law prescribes the
"minimum" criteria of adopting VVPAT as one of the
security features. The use of the word "must"56 makes
it mandatory to have a paper audit "separate and
distinct from the ballot."57 The Commission on
Elections allegedly has neither leeway "nor right to
claim that the ballot itself is the paper audit
trail."58 Likewise, the words, "voter verified" in
VVPAT means the voter, not the Commission on
Elections, must be the one verifying the accuracy of
the vote cast.59
Petitioners conclude that the Commission on
Elections' "baseless fear of vote buying" is no excuse
to violate the law. "There is greater risk of cheating
on a mass scale if the VVPAT were not implemented
because digital cheating" is even more "difficult to
detect . . . than cheating by isolated cases of vote
buying."60
In the Resolution dated February 23, 2016, this court
required the Commission on Elections to comment
on the petition within a non-extendible period of five
(5) days after receiving the notice.
Instead of submitting its Comment, the Commission
on Elections filed a Motion for Additional Time to File
Comment through the Office of the Solicitor
General.61 The Office of the Solicitor General alleged
that it "has not yet received a copy of the Petition and
has yet to obtain from COMELEC the documents
relevant to this case."62
It is not often that this court requires the filing of a
comment within a non-extendible period. This is
resorted to when the issues raised by a party is
fundamental and the ambient circumstances indicate
extreme urgency.
 The right of voters to verify whether vote-counting
machines properly recorded their vote is not only a
statutory right; it is one that enables their individual
participation in governance as sovereign. Among all
government bodies, the Commission on Elections is
the entity that should appreciate how important it is
to respond to cases filed by the public to enable these
rights. It perplexes this court that the Commission on
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Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
Elections failed to immediately transmit relevant
documents to the Office of the Solicitor General to
allow them to respond within the time granted.
The Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc noted that
both the Commission on Elections and the Office of
the Solicitor General were already furnished with a
copy of the Petition when this court ordered them to
file a comment.63 Due to the urgency to resolve this
case, this court denied the Commission on Elections'
Motion. This court cannot fail to act on an urgent
matter simply because of the non-compliance of the
Commission on Elections and the Office of the
Solicitor General with its orders. This court cannot
accept the lackadaisical attitude of the Commission
on Elections and its counsel in addressing this case.
This court has been firm that as a general rule,
motions for extension are not granted, and if granted,
only for good and sufficient cause.64 Counsels, even
those from government, should not assume that this
court will act favorably on a motion for extension of
time to file a pleading.65
For this court's resolution is whether the
Commission on Elections may be compelled, through
a writ of mandamus, to enable the Voter Verified
Paper Audit Trail system capability feature for the
2016 Elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections should
enable the vote verification feature of the vote-counting
machines
RULING: YES, the COMELEC is ORDERED to enable the vote
verification feature of the vote-counting machines, which prints
the voter's choices without prejudice to the issuance of
guidelines to regulate the release and disposal of the issued
receipts in order to ensure a clean, honest, and orderly elections
such as, but not limited to, ensuring that after voter verification,
receipts should be deposited in a separate ballot box and not
taken out of the precinct
 Mandamus is the relief sought "[w]hen any tribunal
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station," and "there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law."66
o Through a writ of mandamus, the courts
"compel the performance of a clear legal
duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law
upon the defendant or respondent"67 by
operation of his or her office, trust, or
4

station. The petitioner must show the legal
basis for the duty, and that the defendant
or respondent failed to perform the duty.
Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections unlawfully
neglected to perform its legal duty of fully implementing our
election laws, specifically Republic Act No. 8436, Section 6(e),
(f), and (n), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369:68
SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. — The automated
election system must at least have the following functional
capabilities:
(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;
(f) System auditability which provides supporting
documentation for verifying the correctness of reported
election results;
(n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether
or not the machine has registered his choice;
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10057 promulgated on
February 11, 2016 did not include mechanisms for VVPAT.
Under Part III of the Resolution, it merely stated:
SEC. 40. Manner of voting. - Commission on Elections decided "to err on the side of
a. The voter shall:
1. Using a ballot secrecy folder and the marking pen
provided by the Commission, fill his/her ballot by
fully shading the circle beside the names of the
candidates and the party, organization or coalition
participating in the party-list system of
representation, of his/her choice; and
2. After accomplishing his/her ballot, approach the
VCM, insert his/her ballot in the ballot entry slot;
i. The VCM will display
"PROCESSING.../PAKIHINTAY...
KASALUKUYANG PINOPROSESO";
ii. The ballot shall automatically be dropped
inside the ballot box. The VCM will then
display the message "YOUR VOTE HAS
BEEN CAST/ANG IYONG BOTO AY
NAISAMANA."
iii. The VCM will display the message
"AMBIGUOUS MARK DETECTED" if the
ovals are not properly shaded or an
unintentional mark is made. It will display
the message "AMBIGUOUS MARKS
DETECTED/MAY MALABONG MARKA SA
BALOTA." The following options shall be
provided "TO CAST BALLOT PRESS/PARA
IPASOK ANG BALOTA, PINDUTIN" or "TO
RETURN BALLOT, PRESS/PARA IBALIK
ANG BALOTA, PINDUTIN." Press the "TO
RETURN BALLOT, PRESS/PARA IBALIK
ANG BALOTA, PINDUTIN" to return the
ballot to the voter. Let the voter review the
ballot and ensure that the ovals opposite
the names of the candidate voted for are
fully shaded.
iv. In case of illiterate voters, PWD voters who
are visually-impaired, and senior citizens
(SCs) who may need the use of
headphones, the BEI shall insert the
headphones so they can follow the
instructions of the VCM.
b. The poll clerk/support staff shall:
1. Monitor, from afar, the VCM screen to ensure that the
ballot was successfully accepted;
2. Thereafter, whether or not the voter's ballot was
successfully accepted, apply indelible ink to the
voter's right forefinger nail or any other nail if there
be no forefinger nail; and
3. Instruct the voter to return the ballot secrecy folder
and marking pen, and then leave the polling place.
In a press conference last March 4, 2016, Commission on
Elections Chairperson Andres Bautista manifested that the
transparency" and resolved to allow voters to have 15-second
on-screen verification of the votes they have casted through the
vote-counting machine.69 Allowing on-screen verification is
estimated to add two (2) hours to the voting period on May 9,
2016. As reported, the meeting of the Commission on Elections
En Banc to pass this Resolution was on March 3, 2016, three (3)
days after they were required to file a comment before this
court.
Nonetheless, the inaction of the Commission on Elections in
utilizing the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting machines fails
to fulfill the duty required under Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended.
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the
Commission of Elections to "[e]nforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." One of
the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369,
which requires the automated election system to have the
capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.
Based on the technical specifications during the bidding, the
current vote-counting machines should meet the minimum
system capability of generating a VVPAT. However, the
Commission on Elections' act of rendering inoperative this
feature runs contrary to why the law required this feature in the
first place. Under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, it is
considered a policy of the state that the votes reflect the genuine
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
will of the People.70 The full text of the declaration of policy
behind the law authorizing the use of an automated election
system states:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. —It is the policy of the State
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible and informed
elections, plebiscites, referenda, recall and other similar
electoral exercises by improving on the election process and
adopting systems, which shall involve the use of an automated
election system that will ensure the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot and all election, consolidation and transmission
documents in order that the process shall be transparent and
credible and that the results shall be fast, accurate and reflective
of the genuine will of the people.
The State recognizes the mandate and authority of the
Commission to prescribe the adoption and use of the most
suitable technology of demonstrated capability taking into
account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds
available for the purpose. By setting the minimum system
capabilities of our automated election system, the law intends
to achieve the purposes set out in this declaration. A mechanism
that allows the voter to verify his or her choice of candidates will
ensure a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed
election. The voter is not left to wonder if the machine correctly
appreciated his or her ballot. The voter must know that his or
her sovereign will, with respect to the national and local
leadership, was properly recorded by the vote-counting
machines.
The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section
6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are MANDATORY. These
functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure the
transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming
elections.
The law is clear. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires the
following:
(a) individual voters can verify whether the machines
have been able to count
their votes; and
(b) that the verification at minimum should be paper
based.
There appears to be no room for further interpretation of a
"voter verified paper audit trail." The paper audit trail cannot be
considered the physical ballot, because there may be instances
where the machine may translate the ballot differently, or the
voter inadvertently spoils his or her ballot.
In Maliksi v. Commission on Elections,71 the losing mayoralty
candidate questioned the result of the elections. Upon
inspection of the physical ballots, several votes were invalidated
due to the presence of double-shading. However, when the
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digital printouts of the ballots were checked, the questioned
ballots only had single shade. The physical ballots were
tampered to invalidate several votes.
The situation in Maliksi could have been avoided if the
Commission on Elections utilized the paper audit trail feature of
the voting machines. The VVPAT ensures that the candidates
selected by the voter in his or her ballot are the candidates voted
upon and recorded by the vote-counting machine. The voter
himself or herself verifies the accuracy of the vote. In instances
of Random Manual Audit72 and election protests, the VVPAT
becomes the best source of raw data for votes.
The required system capabilities under Republic Act No. 8436,
as amended, are the MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS provided by law.
Compliance with the minimum system capabilities entails costs
on the state and its taxpayers. If minimum system capabilities
are met but not utilized, these will be a waste of resources and
an affront to the citizens who paid for these capabilities.
It is true that the Commission on Elections is given ample
discretion to administer the elections, but certainly, its
constitutional duty is to "enforce the law." The Commission is
not given the constitutional competence to amend or modify the
law it is sworn to uphold. Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended, is law. Should there be policy
objections to it, the remedy is to have Congress amend it.
The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the
requirements of the law to assuage its fears regarding the
VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper
procedures. The Commission on Elections has the power to
choose the appropriate procedure in order to enforce the
VVPAT requirement under the law, and balance it with the
constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot.73
We see no reason why voters should be denied the opportunity
to read the voter's receipt after casting his or her ballot. There
is no legal prohibition for the Commission on Elections to
require that after the voter reads and verifies the receipt, he or
she is to leave it in a separate box, not take it out of the precinct.
Definitely, the availability of all the voters' receipts will make
random manual audits more accurate.
The credibility of the results of any election depends, to a large
extent, on the confidence of each voter that his or her individual
choices have actually been counted. It is in that local precinct
after the voter casts his or her ballot that this confidence starts.
It is there where it will be possible for the voter to believe that
his or her participation as sovereign truly counts
ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMELEC and NELSON B. JULIA
FACTS:
This involves a petition filed by Nelson B. Julia (Julia),
seeking to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) as Member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur
(Sanggunian) of Angel G. Naval (Naval), who is allegedly
violating the three-term limit imposed upon elective local
officials as provided for in Article X, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution, and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code
(LGC)
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected
and had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District,
Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in
Camarines Sur.
8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to
form the present Third District. The present Second District is
composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor,
merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the
members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until
2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as
Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the
Third District in the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he
invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed
beforet he COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or
to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval.
Nelson B. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire
Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a
member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had
been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application is
more with reference to the same local elective post, and not
necessarily in connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction.
Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth
time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined
in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly
construed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THREE-TERM
LIMIT RULE, SUCH THAT NAVAL CAN NO LONGER BE ELECTED
AS SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN MEMBER.
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
RULING.
YES. The three-term limit rule would be violated, Naval can no
longer be elected.
In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the
application of the three-term limit rule upon local elective
officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts. In the
process of doing so, it is inevitable to discuss the role of elections
and the nature of public office in a democratic and republican
state like ours.
The Role of Elections in our Democratic and Republican State,
and the Restraints Imposed Upon Those Who Hold Public
Office
The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character
of a republican state and a public office, viz:
A republic is a representative government, a
government run by and for the people. It is not a pure
democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The
essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the
selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who
derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf,
serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced
or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a
republican government is a responsible government whose
officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and
shall, according to the Constitution, ‘at all times be accountable
to the people’ they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a
republican government it is almost needless to state, is the
promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the
people themselves.
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a
democratic and republican framework because it is through the
act of voting that government by consent is secured. Through
the ballot, people express their will on the defining issues of the
day and they are able to choose their leaders in accordance with
the fundamental principle of representative democracy that the
people should elect whom they please to govern them. Voting
has an important instrumental value in preserving the viability
of constitutional democracy. It has traditionally been taken as a
prime indicator of democratic participation.
The importance of elections cannot therefore be over
emphasized. Thus,
True, election is the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
6

perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may
be enlarged or restricted by law. x x x
Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration
of every democratic polity is to give effect to the expressed will
of the majority, there are limitations to being elected to a public
office. Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the
existence of term limits, the nature of public office, and the
guarantee from the State that citizens shall have equal access to
public service. Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on term
limits, is significantly reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC.
Moreover, the Court has time and again declared that a public
office is a public trust and not a vested property right.
* Significantly, this provision refers to a "TERM" as a period of
time – three years– during which an official has title to office and
can serve. x x x[.]
xxxx
The "LIMITATION" under this first branch of the provision is
expressed in the negative—"no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms." This formulation—no more than
three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule. x x x.
Reapportionment and its Basis
Reapportionment is "the realignment orchange in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated
by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation." The aim of legislative apportionment is to
equalize population and voting power among districts. The
basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a
city or a province and not the number of registered voters
therein.
R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second
District, but it merely renamed the
other four.
The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts
in Camarines Sur, the current Third District, which brought
Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less
than that of the old Second District, which elected him in 2004
and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the
intent of the lawmakers to create a single new Second District
from the merger of the towns from the old First District with
Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3(c)
of R.A. No. 9716 used the word "rename." Although the qualifier
"without a change in its composition" was not found in Section
3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive is the
clear intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second,
while merely renaming the rest.
*The application upon Naval of the three-term limit rule does
not undermine the constitutional requirement to achieve
equality of representation among districts.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the
constitutional requirement to achieve equality of
representation among the districts. It is with this mindset that
the Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new
set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of
the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal
representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or
without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a
new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by
another eligible person.
NOLASCO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Florentino P. Blanco and Eduado A. Alarilla both vied
for the mayoral position of Meycauayan, Bulacan during the
election held 8 May 1995.
Blanco garnered the highest number of votes. Edgardo Nolasco
was elected vice-mayor.
On 9 May, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to
disqualify Blanco on grounds that the latter committed acts in
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, i.e. for
giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing election functions; for committing acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; and for spending in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the
Election Code (P10 million against 97,000 registered voters).
On 15 August, the Comelec disqualified Blanco on the ground of
vote-buying and ordered the Board of Canvassers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan to reconvene and to determine the winner
out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed.
Blanco moved for reconsideration while Nolasco, as
vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. Nolasco urged
that as vice-mayor he should be declared mayor in the event
Blanco was finally disqualified. Both motions were denied.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT NOLASCO CAN REPLACE BLANCO AS
MAYOR UPON THE DISQUALIFICATION OF THE LATTER.
RULING:
YES. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 44. PERMANENT VACANCIES IN THE OFFICES
OF THE GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR, MAYOR,
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Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
AND VICE MAYOR. — (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice
governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or
vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member
or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as
the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said
office shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as
defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian
barangay member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian
member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking
sangguniang members shall be resolved by the
drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only
the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy
arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this
Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each distribution the
immediately preceding election.
In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 83. VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS. — (a) What
constitutes permanent vacancy — A permanent
vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.
(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the
governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor —
(1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor
or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall ipso
facto become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or
vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case
7

of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their ranking as
defined in this Article.
NOTE: Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty
election, the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
MARUHOM V. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Abdulmadid and private respondent Hadji Jamil
Dimaporo were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality
of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. During the counting of votes,
serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds were
committed at the instance of petitioner or his followers in that
votes actually casted for the private respondent were not
counted and credited in his favor thru the concerted acts,
conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of Election
Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the Machine Operator
who happens to be a nephew of the petitioner.
(About 115 official ballots were refused or rejected by the
counting machine which the private respondent's watchers or
representatives have requested and insisted to be re-fed to the
automated machine for the second and third times but their
requests were not heeded and instead considered the said ballots
as finally rejected; and around 56 ballots were found therein
which were not drawn from the official ballots and were included
in the counting of votes over the objection of the private
respondent's watchers or representatives.)
Petitioner was proclaimed as winner because he appeared to
have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent
garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes.
Private respondent Dimaporo, filed before this Honorable
Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner
Abdulmadid Maruhom. On the other hand, Petitioner
Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with counter-protest and
prayed to hold in abeyance further proceedings. However, the
same was denied. Thereafter, the court ordered the Revision
Committee to convene and start the revision of the ballots.
Issue: WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the petition.
Held: No, COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
Laws and statutes governing election contests especially the
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is
imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
imperative, much more so in this case considering that a mere
twenty (20) votes separates the winner from the loser of the
contested election results.
Moreover, the filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to
be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of
the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a
confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay
employed by petitioner to avert the revision ballots.
The roundabout manner within which petitioner virtually
substituted his answer by belatedly filing a motion to dismiss
three (3) months later is a frivolous resort to procedure
calculated to frustrate the will of the electorate. As pointedly
observed by the COMELEC in its challenged Resolution dated
July 6, 1999, petitioner only filed his motion to dismiss "when
the results of the trial appeared to be adverse to him" or right
after the creation of the Revision Committee had been ordered
by the trial court. If petitioner truly intended to move for the
preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses
as he claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for
the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative
defenses at the time he filed his answer.
Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of
mind by petitioner can not be countenanced much more so in
election cases where time is of the essence in the resolution
thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code states in no
uncertain terms that —
Sec. 258. Preferential disposition of
contests in courts. The RTC, in their
respective cases, shall give preference to
election contests over all other cases, except
those of habeas corpus, and shall, without
delay, hear and within thirty (30) days
from the date of their submission for
decision, but in every case within six (6)
months after filing, decide the same. . .
Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the
integrity of the ballot boxes has been violated; b.] only rejected
ballots or ballots manually counted are the proper subjects of an
election protest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-
shopping, are enough grounds to dismiss the case.
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really
the lawful choice of the electorate. In an election contest where
the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best and
most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the
ballots can not be produced or are not available, the election
returns would be the best evidence.
In this case, the counted official ballots are available and there
is no evidence, other than the bare allegation of petitioner, that
the sanctity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the protest
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
have been violated or the official ballots contained therein
impaired. The best way, therefore, to test the truthfulness of
petitioner's claim is to open the ballot boxes in the protested
precincts followed by the examination, revision, recounting and
re-appreciation of the official ballots therein contained in
accordance with law and pertinent rules on the matter. Needless
to state this can only be done through a full-blown trial on the
merits, not a peremptory resolution of the motion to dismiss on
the basis of the bare and one-sided averments made therein.
Petitioner's reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2868 to
support his restrictive claim that only rejected ballots or ballots
manually counted in case of failure of the automated counting
machines are the proper subjects of an election protest, is just
as unpersuasive.
There is admittedly a lacuna leges in R.A. No. 8436 which
prescribes the adoption of an automated election system.
However, while conceding as much, this Court ruled in Tupay
Loong v. COMELEC, that the Commission is nevertheless not
precluded from conducting a manual count when the automated
counting system fails.
Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that
—
Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in
election contest. — Where allegations in a
protest or counter-protest so warrant or
whenever in the opinion of the court the
interests of justice so require, it shall
immediately order the book of voters,
ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and
other documents used in the election be
brought before it and that the ballots be
examined and votes recounted.
PENA vs HRET
FACTS:
 Petitioner and the private respondent were
contenders for the said Congressional Office in the
May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon
canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private
respondent as the winner
 On May 22, 1995, the instant petition (petition Ad
Cautelem) was filed with the HRET, wherein the
petitioner, as protestant, averred that
8

o elections in the precincts of the Second
District of Palawan were tainted with
massive fraud, widespread vote-buying,
intimidation and terrorism and other
serious irregularities committed before,
during and after the voting, and during the
counting of votes and the preparation of
election returns and certificates of canvass
which affected the results of the election
 Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer
With Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and
Counter-Protest on June 5, 1995, to which Peña filed
a Reply on June 23, 1995. Subsequent to the filing of
his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Petition on June 22, 1995, averring that the HRET has
not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same
being insufficient in form and substance. In essence,
the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the
fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts
where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of
voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes
would be gained by the protestant as a result of the
same.
 Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss on July 10, 1995, attaching thereto a
Summary of Contested Precincts, naming 700
precincts where election irregularities allegedly
occurred.
 of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that
although it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives, the said petition, however,
fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore,
insufficient in form and substance, meriting its
dismissal. HRET dismissed the petition.
 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also
dismissed.
ISSUE:
WON the Petition Ad Caulem is sufficient in form and substance.
WON the petiton was cured when petitioner submitted a
summary of the contested precincts.
RULING:
1st issue
 A perusal of the Petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that
Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts
where widespread election, fraud and irregularities
occured. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the
very substance of the protest. Under Section 21 of the
Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in
form and substance of the petition constitutes a
ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.
 Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a
more serious inadequacy than a mere failure to
specify the number of votes which would inure to the
protestant, as was the case in Gallares vs. Casenas, or
the failure to impugn the validity of some of the
ballots cast, as in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of
which cases were decided in the 1920s. The defect in
the instant case arises from the failure to allege the
contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of
"massive fraud, widespread intimidation and
terrorism and other serious irregularities", without
specification, and substantiation, of where and how
these occurrences took place, appears in the petition.
We cannot allow an election protest based on such
flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole
election process will deteriorate into an endless
stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to
disembank from the water.
2nd issue
 The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs.
HRET, that substantial amendments to the protest
may be allowed only within the same period for filing
the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the
HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
 While it is conceded that statutes providing for
election contests are to be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officers may not be defeated by mere technical
questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election
protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the
issues he had raised in his original or amended
pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory
period for filing of the protest.
 Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the
power to annul an election should be exercised with
the greatest care as it involves the free and fair
expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme
cases of fraud and under circumstances which
demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and
wanton disregard of the law that elections are
annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible
to take any other step.9 . . . This is as it should be, for
the democratic system is good for the many although
abhorred by a few.
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
BINCE, JR. V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Bince and Macu were Sangguniang Panlalawigan candidates in
Pangasinan during the 1992 elections. During the canvassing of
the COCs for the 10 municipalities of the 6th District, Micu
objected to the inclusion of the COC of San Quintin, claiming that
it contained false statements. Micu later secured a resolution
from the COMELEC directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers
the correct number of votes from the municipality of San
Quintin.
Meanwhile, Micu filed several petitions for correction of the
Statements of Votes (SOVs) for alleged errors in other
municipalities of the 6th district (Tayug and San Miguel). Note
that the errors were committed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBCs). However, after canvassing the COCs for the
10 municipalities, it turns out Bince garnered 27,370 votes
against Micu’s 27,369 or a margin of 1 vote. Bince was not yet
proclaimed at this time because of the absence of authority from
the COMELEC.
On June 29, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution
directing the PBC to continue with the provincial canvass and
proclaim the winning candidates. On June 24, the PBC acted on
Micu’s petitions for correction of the SOVs for Tayug and San
Miguel. Bince appealed, claiming that the PBC had no
jurisdiction.
Subsequently the PBC filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking
a definitive ruling as to who should be proclaimed. Apparently,
if the corrections for the SOVs of Tayug and SM were to be
included, Emiliano Micu would gain plurality by 72 votes. The
COMELEC resolved the PBC to proclaim the winning candidate
on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass. However on July 21, Bince was proclaimed winner.
Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul
Proclamation, and Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt and
Annul Proclamation, alleging that the PBC defied the directive of
the COMELEC. The COMELEC held the officers who proclaimed
Bince in contempt, and directed the PBC to proclaim the true
winner.
 The case later turned to the legality of the PBC’s
granting of the petition for the correction of the
Tayug and SM SOVs. Micu claims that his petitions for
correction were valid under Section 6, Rule 27 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Eventually, Bince’s
proclamation was affirmed, but on Micu’s MFR to the
en banc, was set aside and declared null and void.
9

Bince appealed to the SC in a special civil action for
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed GAOD in nullifying
Bince’s proclamation.
HELD: NO
Nullification was justified as the basis was a mathematical error
committed by the MBCs in the computation of votes. The
COMELEC cannot be faulted for subsequently annulling the
proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical
error in addition, committed by the MBCs.
As to timeliness of Micu’s petitions for correction:
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that
is, before the petitioner’s proclamation on July 21, 1992. The
petition of the MBC of San Miguel was filed on June 4, 1992,
while that of the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still,
private respondent’s petition was filed with the MBC of Tayug
and San Miguel on June 10 and 11, 1992, respectively. It is
definitely well within the period required by Section 6, Rule 27
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Sec. 6 clearly provides that
the petition for correction may be filed at any time before
proclamation of a winner.
What if the petitions for correction were filed out of time? No
effect.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed
out of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial
grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of
validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable
result of frustrating the people’s will cannot be countenanced.
Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on
technicalities has been consistently observed by the Court.
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public
interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not
be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. And also settled is the rule that laws
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.
Was allowing the correction of mathematical errors proper?
YES
It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it
involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The
correction sought by respondents is correction of manifest
mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for
a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes
received by the candidates. In this case, the manifest errors only
sought proper and diligent addition of the votes in Tayug and
San Miguel. Consequently, by a margin of 72 votes, Micu
indisputably won. Bince’s proclamation and assumption into
public office was therefore flawed from the beginning, the same
having been based in a faulty tabulation.
TRINIDAD v SUNGA
FACTS: Sunga run for mayorship in Iguig, Cagayan in 1995
elections. Trinidad is the incumbent mayor. Sunga filed with the
COMELEC a letter-complaint for disqualification against
Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) localgovernment
vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Section 261, par. (o), Art.
XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). Later,
another complaint in viola589; of Sec 261 par (e) refers to
threats,intimidation and other forms of coercion. The 2 charges
were consolidated.
In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, the COMELEC 2nd
Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for
investigation. Hearingswere held wherein Sunga adduced
evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad did not to submit
any evidence at all.
Trinidad won the election, while Sunga ranked 2nd. Sunga moved
for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However,
Trinidad was proclaimedthe elected mayor, prompting Sunga to
file another motion to suspend.
Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke
the proclamation of Trinidad as the duly; proclaim Sunga as the
duly elected Mayor, and, direct Sunga to take his oath and
assume the duties andfunctions of the office.The COMELEC En
Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed
the filing of the corresponding informations in the Regional
TrialCourt against Trinidad.
On October 13, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioners
MFR and also annulled his proclamation as duly electedMayoR
in the May 11, 1998. Private respondents motion to be declared
Mayor was, however, denied.
Petitioner alleges that the questioned Resolutions were
promulgated without any hearing conducted and without his
evidence having beenconsidered by the COMELEC, in violation
of his right to due process. Also contends that the portion of the
October 13, 1998 Resolution annullinghis proclamation as
Mayor in the1998 elections was rendered without prior notice
and hearing and that he was once more effectively denieddue
process.
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
ISSUES:
1. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings
before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the
May 8, 1995 elections wasconcerned?
2. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings
before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the
May 11, 1998 electionswas concerned?
3. May petitioners proclamation as Mayor under the May 11,
1998 elections be cancelled on account of the disqualification
case filed against himduring the May 8, 1995 elections?
4. May private respondent, as the candidate receiving the
second highest number of votes, be proclaimed as Mayor in the
event of petitionersdisqualification?
HELD:
1. No, The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side or anopportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is
not at all times and in all instancesessential. The
requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. In
the case at bar, petitioner was able to file an Answer
with Counter Petition and Motion to Dismiss. He was
also able to submit his counter-affidavit and sworn
statements of forty-eight (48) witnesses.
2. And 3 discussed as one: We note that petitioners
term as Mayor under the May 8, 1995 elections
expired on June 30, 1998. Thus, when the first
questioned Resolutionwas issued by COMELEC on
June 22, 1998, petitioner was still serving his term.
However, by the time the Motion for Reconsideration
of petitionerwas filed on July 3, 1998, the case had
already become moot and academic as his term had
already expired. So, too, the second questioned
Resolutionwhich was issued on October 13, 1998,
came at a time when the issue of the case had already
been rendered moot and academic by the expiration
ofpetitioners challenged term of office. When the
appeal from a decision in an election case has
already become moot, the case being an election
protest involving the office of the mayor theterm
of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on
that ground, unless the rendering of a decision on
the merits would be of practical value(Yorac v.
10

Magalona, supra). This rule we established in the case
of Yorac v. Magalona which was dismissed because it
had been mooted
With the complaint for disqualification of private
respondent rendered moot and academic by the
expiration of petitioners term of office
thereincontested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner
from his reelected term of office in its
secondquestioned Resolution on the ground that it
comes as a matter of course after his disqualification
in SPA No. 95-213 promulgated after the
1998election. While it is true that the first questioned
Resolution was issued eight (8) days before the term
of petitioner as Mayor expired, said Resolutionhad
not yet attained finality and could not effectively be
held to have removed petitioner from his office.[20]
Indeed, removal cannot extend beyondthe term
during which the alleged misconduct was committed.
If a public official is not removed before his term of
office expires, he can no longer beremoved if he is
thereafter reelected for another term.
CONSTRUCTION: liberally and equitably
construed the electoral laws of our country to
give fullest effect to the manifest will of
ourpeople, for in case of doubt, political laws
must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the
popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot.Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will
4. no error in the COMELECs rejection of private
respondents move to be declared as Mayor on
account of petitionersdisqualification. To begin with,
the issue had been rendered moot and academic by
the expiration of petitioners challenged term of
office. Second,even in law and jurisprudence, private
respondent cannot claim any right to the office. As
held by the COMELEC, the succession to the office
of themayor shall be in accordance with the
provisions of the Local Government Code which,
in turn, provides that the vice mayor concerned
shall becomethe mayor.
Contention: respondent claims that there are compelling
reasons to depart from this doctrine. He argues that since the
disqualification case filedagainst the petitioner for the 1995
elections has been rendered moot and academic, it is with the
1998 elections that its impact must be felt. He alsoclaims that
justice should be given him as victim of petitioners dilatory
tactics.
The court said: despite the disqualification cases, trinidad still
garnered the highest votes. To allow private respondent, a
defeated and repudiated candidate, to take over the
mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is
todisenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their
part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracy and the peoples right to electofficials of their
choice.
PUNZALAN V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto
Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995
elections.
On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC)
proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor,
having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo
Manalastas 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalan’s 8,612 votes.
On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest
docketed as Election Case No. E-005-95 before the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results
of the elections in the municipality’s forty-seven (47) precincts.
In due time, Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with counter
protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21) precincts of
the 47 protested by Manalastas.
On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest
docketed as Election Case No. E-006-95, also before the RTC in
San Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of the
elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts.
Meneses, on his part, filed an answer with counter-protest with
respect to ninety-six (96) precincts of the 157 protested by
Punzalan.
Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties
and subject matter, they were ordered consolidated and were
jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44.
Succinctly, the election contests sought the nullification of the
election of Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud,
irregularities and other illegal electoral practices during the
registration and the voting as well as during the counting of
votes.
After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered
judgment on September 23, 1996 with the following findings,
viz: that massive fraud, illegal electoral practices and serious
anomalies marred the May 8, 1995 elections; that ballots,
election returns and tally sheets pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8,
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
20, 41, 53, 68, 68-A and 70 disappeared under mysterious
circumstances; and that filled-up ballots with undetached lower
stubs and groups of ballots with stubs cut out with scissors were
found inside ballot boxes. Because of these irregularities, the
trial court was constrained to examine the contested ballots and
the handwritings appearing thereon and came up with the
declaration that Punzalan was the winner in the elections.
On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution
in EAC No. 48-96 setting aside the trial courts decision and
affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly
elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga
ISSUE:
1. WON absence of signature of the BEI Chairman render the
ballot void
2. WON the trial court’s findings prevail over the COMELEC’s
RULING:
1. While Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known
as An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local
Elections and For Electoral Reforms, requires the BEI chairman
to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to
do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an
election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in
said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall
be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI
chairman or any of the members of the board to comply with
their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing,
authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not
penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating
the will of the people.
In the recent case of Marcelino C. Libanan v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jose T. Ramirez, this
Court affirmed the ruling of the Tribunal in Libanan v. Ramirez
to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the
back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of
these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC
watermark; and (b) in those cases where the COMELEC
watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of
red and blue fibers in the ballots. The Court explained in this
wise:
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid
down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine
for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to
wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials,
or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases
where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily
apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in
the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant
11

that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to
rejection.
Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides
that in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall
be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason
to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election
officer in failing to affix his signature at the back of the ballot
does not constitute as a good and clear reason to justify the
rejection of a ballot.
2. The appreciation of the contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked
with the supervision of elections all over the country. It is the
constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original
jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial
and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election
protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials.
Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings,
conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said
Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not
be interfered with by this Court.
Anent Punzalans assertion that the trial courts finding which
was arrived at after an adversarial proceeding wherein an
expert witness testified and was cross-examined, should not be
interfered with by the COMELEC whose finding was arrived at
without the benefit of a hearing or the aid of an expert, it is
axiomatic that the COMELEC need not conduct an adversarial
proceeding or a hearing to determine the authenticity of ballots
or the handwriting found thereon. Neither does it need to solicit
the help of handwriting experts in examining or comparing the
handwriting. In fact, even evidence aliunde is not necessary to
enable the Commission to determine the authenticity of the
ballots and the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots as
an examination of the ballots themselves is already sufficient.
In Bocobo v. COMELEC, we likewise ruled that:
x x x. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting; this can
be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence
aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an
inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v.
Parungao, 52 Phil. 718). x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No.
132435 is hereby DISMISSED. The status quo order issued by
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
this Court on February 24, 1998 is LIFTED. The petitions in G.R. relying on its own findings on whether or not these contested
Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot and ballots were prepared by one person. The ballots are the best
academic by the foregoing disquisition. evidence of the objections raised. Resort to handwriting experts
is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful,
are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting,
this can be done by the COMELEC (in this case, the court taking
BAUTISTA V. CASTRO
cognizance of the appeal in this election protest) itself.
FACTS:
The law (Sec. 14 of B.P. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec.
Petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent
36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation.
Roberto Miguel were candidates for the office above mentioned.
The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of
After canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by
Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law
the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982 with a
and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.
plurality of two (2) votes.
This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.
On May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City
2. As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent court
Court of Quezon City, (docketed as Election Case No. 82-408) on
reversed the decision of the trial court which ruled that these
the ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices allegedly
were not marked ballots and hence, were valid votes for
committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no
petitioner BAUTISTA. In reversing the trial court, respondent
counter protest.
court ruled that the presence of an arrow with the words "and
party," was meant for no other purpose than to Identify the
It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting
voter.
centers in Brgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City were
contested. A revision and recounting of the ballots was
We agree. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental.
conducted which resulted in a tie.
As a general rule, a voter must write on the ballot only the names
of candidates voted for the offices appearing thereon. Certain
From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel
exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149 of the Revised
filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. * On July
Election Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and the
29, 1982, judgment was rendered on the appeal which, as stated
like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the
in the first portion of this decision, declared protestant Roberto
ballot (par. 5). Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or appellation
Miguel the duly elected Barangay Captain of Bgy. Teachers
of affection and friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if
Village East, Quezon City and setting aside as null and void the
accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, and
proclamation of protestee Sergio Bautista.
above all, if they were not used as a means to identify the voter.
Even under a liberal view, the words written on the ballots
ISSUE:
under consideration cannot be considered as falling within the
1. WON a ballot which does not contain the signature of
exception to the rule. Consequently, they are irrelevant
the poll chairman be considered a valid ballot
expressions that nullified the ballots.
2. WON respondent Judge acted correctly in its
appreciation of the contested ballots
While the name written was "BLBIOY", there was no doubt that
the voter intended to vote for "BIBOY", the nickname of which
RULING:
petitioner was popularly known and which nickname was duly
1. The contention of petitioner that respondent court
registered in his certificate of candidacy. Hence, the respondent
relied on the report of an alleged handwriting expert is
court's decision as regards Exhibit "5" is reversed and the vote
misplaced. It should be noted that while respondent court
is counted for petitioner.
considered the report of Atty. Pagui, it did not rely solely on the
Exhibit "6" was invalidated by both respondent court and the
said report. In the words of respondent court, "(I)t has taken
city court as stray vote on the ground that petitioner's name,
pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the
written as "Bo. Barangay Bautista" was placed on the first line
questioned ballots and handwritings and compare the same
intended for councilmen. In the case of Farin v. Gonzales and CA,
with each other . . ." In fact, in its effort to determine the true
G.R. No. L-36893, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 237, cited by
value of the contested ballots and in order not to disenfranchise
petitioner, it was ruled that where the name of a candidate is not
bona fide voters, it counted certain ballots in favor of petitioner
written in the proper space in the ballot but is preceded by the
which the alleged handwriting expert found as written by only
name of the office forwhich he is a candidate, the vote should be
one person. It contradicted said report as regards Exhibits "I",
counted as valid for such candidate. Such rule stems from the
"J", "V" and "V-1". The respondent court was circumspect in
fact that in the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to
12

ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it
could be determined with reasonable certainty. In this case,
while the name of petitioner was written in the space for
barangay councilman, his name was preceded by the name of
the office for which he is being elected, that as Punong Barangay
or Barangay Captain (See Exh. "6"). The respondent court ruled
that what was placed before the name BAUTISTA was Bo.
Barangay and not Po. Barangay for Punong Barangay (or
Barangay Captain). We believe however that the voter's
intention to vote for BAUTISTA as Barangay Captain was
present and said vote should be counted in favor of petitioner.
Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit "7". This ballot
cannot be considered as a vote for petitioner whose name was
written seven (7) times in the ballot. The writing of a name more
than twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and
serves no other purpose than to identify the ballot.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent court is MODIFIED
as regards Exhibits "5" and "6". Private respondent Roberto
Miguel in declared the duly elected Barangay Captain of
Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, with a plurality of
twenty-two (22) votes. The temporary restraining order issued
Court on December 2, 1982 is hereby LIFTED.
CARLOS VS ANGELES
Petition: Original special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order seeking to annul the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 125 finding Protestant,
ANTONIO SERAPIO, as the DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF
VALENZUELA CITY.
Decision: GRANTED. The Court ANNULS and DECLARES VOID
the decision dated April 24, 2000 of the trial court
FACTS:
 Petitioner Jose Emmanuel L. Carlos and respondent
Antonio M. Serapio were candidates for the position
of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila during the May 11, 1998 elections.
 On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor
obtaining the highest number of votes in the election
returns.
 Serapio, garnering the second highest number of
votes, filed an election protest.
 A recount was conducted resulting to a 17,007 vote
margin in favor of Carlos.
 The lower court set aside the proclamation of
petitioner and declared respondent Serapio as the
duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City despite the
result of the recount.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion when the court set aside the
proclamation of petitioner and declared respondent
Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City
RULING:
Yes, the trial court committed GAOD amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming
respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela on the
basis of its perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela,
even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his favor.
An election means the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the
elected officials of which are determined through the will of the
electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will,
the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
Specifically, the term election, in the context of the Constitution,
may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of votes.
The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or
plurality of valid votes cast in the election. xxx In case of
protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the
candidates decides the election protest case. The candidate
receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be
proclaimed the winner. Even if the candidate receiving the
majority votes is ineligible or disqualified, the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer,
cannot be declared elected. The wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser
because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of
election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. In other words, a
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
ADDITIONAL READING
ISSUE (1):
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, by
petition for certiorari as a special civil action, the decision
of the regional trial court in an election protest case
involving an elective municipal official considering that it
has no appellate jurisdiction over such decision
RULING:
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
YES.
The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
decision of the regional trial court in the election protest case
before it. Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution provides
that the SC shall exercise original jurisdiction over xxx and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
The COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction over election protest
cases involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of
general jurisdiction. Article IX (C), Section 2 of the Constitution
provides that the COMELEC shall xercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction xxx.
Further, the COMELEC has original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and COMELEC have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in election cases involving
elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction
first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE (2):
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure
of election
RULING:
No, it has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.
It is the COMELEC sitting en banc that is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.
To declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must occur:
first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the
date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes
not cast would affect the result of the election. Neither of these
conditions was present in the case at bar.
The Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances
where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
13

voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the
preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes.
SUNGA VS COMELEC
Petition: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside, for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the
COMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213,[1]
dismissing the petition for disqualification against private
respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad.
Decision: PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July
1996 Resolutions of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213,
"Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad, for disqualification,
and ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein
expressed.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga ran for the position of Mayor in
the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May
1995 elections against then incumbent mayor private
respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad.
 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint for
disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of vote
buying, terrorism and violation of the election gun ban, and
use of vehicles owned by the government in his campaign.
 Trinidad got the highest number of votes in the election while
Sunga trailed second.
 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of
Trinidad to no avail. He then filed for the suspension of the
effects of the proclamation.
 The COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report to the
COMELEC En Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged
in court for the above-mentioned violations.
 COMELEC dismissed the disqualification case.
ISSUE:
WON Sunga should be proclaimed as mayor in the event
that Trinidad is disqualified
RULING:
No.
Sunga’s contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the
duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig, Province of
Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no
support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified
for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a
disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into
office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy
on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray,
void or meaningless.
Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic
electoral process as well as the sociological and psychological
elements behind voters preferences. Election is the process of
complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its
ultimate purpose is to give effect to the will of the electorate by
giving them direct participation in choosing the men and
women who will run their government. Thus, it would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired
the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
whom have positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him.
While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of
votes, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the people
of Iguig, Cagayan. The wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the
law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in
favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and
does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number
of votes to be declared elected.
ADDITIONAL READING
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC was correct in dismissing Sunga’s
petition for disqualification
RULING:
No.
Resolution No. 2050 issued by the COMELEC infringes Sec. 6 of
RA No. 6646.
The COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a
disqualification case was warranted under any of the following
circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the
election but was still pending (unresolved) after the election;
(b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
before the proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the
disqualification case was filed after the election and after the
proclamation of the winner.
In contrast, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. This
amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which
cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued
beyond the scope of its authority.
MITMUG V. COMELEC
Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private
respondent DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT were among the
candidates for the mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao during
the 11 May 1992 election. There were sixty-seven (67) precincts
in the municipality.
Voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-nine (49)
precincts where the average voter turnout was 22.26%, i.e., only
2,330 out of 9,830 registered voters therein cast their votes.
Five (5) of these precincts did not conduct actual voting at all.
Consequently, COMELEC ordered the holding of a special
election on 30 May 1992 in the five (5) precincts which failed to
function during election day. On 30 July 1992 another special
election was held for a sixth precinct.
Petitioner Mitmug filed a petition seeking the annulment of the
special election conducted on 30 May 1992 alleging various
irregularities such as the alteration, tampering and substitution
of ballots. But on 13 July 1992, COMELEC considered the
petition moot since the votes in the subject precincts were
already counted.
14

Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in
some or all precincts of Lumba-Bayabao were also filed with
COMELEC by other mayoralty candidates
Thereafter, new board of Election Inspectors was formed to
conduct the special election, which later on proclaimed private
respondent Dagalangit as the duly elected Mayor.
Issue: WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying motu
proprio and without due notice and hearing the petitions
seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the
precincts.
Held: No. COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the petitions.
A closer examination of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
particularly Sec. 2, Rule 26, thereof which was lifted from Sec. 6,
B.P. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, provides:
Sec. 2. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election
in any precinct has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody of canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result
of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing,
call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty (30)
days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur:
first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the
date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not
cast would affect the result of the election.
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes not cast will
definitely affect the outcome of the election. But, the first
requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or
even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a
failure to elect. Since actual voting and election by the
registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place,
the results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded.
COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion,
much less grave, in denying the petitions outright. There
was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did
not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought.
For, the language of the law expressly requires the concurrence
of these conditions to justify the calling of a special election.
Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2)
conditions in the petitions seeking to declare failure of election
in forty-three (43) more, precincts, there is no more need to
receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.
There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the
will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be
ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded
respect. After all, there is no pArovision in our election laws
which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast
their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate
must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of
the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25%
of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the
same must still be respected. There is prima facie showing that
private respondent was elected through a plurality of valid
votes of a valid constituency.
RULLODA VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Petronilla Rulloda sought the permission
of the COMELEC to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband. During the canvassing of
votes on July 15, 2002 elections, Rulloda garnered 516 votes
while respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes. Despite
this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the
Barangay Chairman.
After the elections, Rulloda knew that the COMELEC on July 13,
2002 issued Resolution 5217 which denied the Certificate of
Candidacy of Rulloda, which resulted to the deletion of her name
as a candidate for the Barangay Elections. The said resolution
cited as authority the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 4801 dated
May 23, 2002, which provided in Section 9 that there shall be no
substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials.
Issue: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy and
in proclaiming Placido considering that he was the only
candidate for Barangay Chairman.
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
Held: Yes, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay
election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because
there is no political party from which to designate the substitute.
Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores
the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold
the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-
settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed
as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot.
Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific
provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay
elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into
the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more
reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political
parties are involved than when political considerations or party
affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
It was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the
contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in
election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true
will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation
of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results.
PACANAN VS. COMELEC
 Before the Court is a petition for certiorari which
seeks to set aside
o the Order1 dated March 17, 2008 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) First
Division and
o 2) the Resolution2 dated January 21, 2009
of the Comelec En Banc dismissing
petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr.’s
appeal from the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Catbalogan,
Samar, in Election Case No. 07-1, which
declared private respondent Francisco M.
15

Langi, Sr. as the winning Mayor of Motiong,
Samar.
 In the Order of March 17, 2008, the Comelec First
Division dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the
correct appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules
of Procedure within the five-day reglementary
period.
 In the assailed Resolution dated January 21, 2009, the
Comelec En Banc denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, declaring that the Comelec did not
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the
non-payment of the appeal fee on time, and that the
Comelec First Division was correct in dismissing the
said appeal.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr. and private
respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr. were candidates
for mayor in the municipality of Motiong, Samar
during the May 14, 2007 elections.
 After the canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) of Motiong, Samar proclaimed
Pacanan as the duly elected mayor, having garnered
a total of 3,069 votes against private respondent’s
3,066 votes.
 Thereafter, private respondent filed with the RTC a
Protest dated May 25, 2007 which was docketed as
Election Case No. 07-1,
o contesting the results of the elections in
ten (10) of the forty-nine (49) precincts in
Motiong, Samar, and
o alleging acts of violence and intimidation
and
o other election irregularities in the
appreciation of the votes by the MBC.
 Thereafter, petitioner filed his Verified Answer with
Counter-Protest dated June 4, 2007,
o asserting that private respondent’s
allegations of threat and intimidation,
fraud and other irregularities in the
conduct of elections were mere allegations
unsupported by any documentary
evidence.
o Petitioner also disputed the election
results with respect to seven (7) precincts.
RTC’S RULING:
 On January 7, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision in
Election Case 07-1, which declared Langi as the
winner in the May 14, 2007 mayoralty race for
Motiong, Samar with a plurality of six (6) votes, viz:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing Protestant
Francisco M. Langi, Sr. having obtained the over all
total votes of 3,074 and the Protestee’s 3,068 total
and final votes is declared the winner in the
Mayoralty contest in Motiong, Samar with a plurality
of (6) votes. Therefore the proclamation on May 17,
2007 is hereby annulled and declared Francisco
Langi, Sr. y Maceren as the duly elected Mayor of
Motiong, Samar. The winner is awarded the amount
of P 32,510 as actual damages and no evidence
aliunde for damages for the court to award. xxx
 On January 10, 2008, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal and paid ₱3,000.00 appeal fee per Official
Receipt No. 6822663 before the RTC, Branch 27,
Catbalogan, Samar.
 He also appealed the RTC decision dated January 7,
2008 to the Comelec which docketed the case as EAC
No. A-13-2008.
o Out of the ₱3,000.00 appeal fee required
by Section 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure, petitioner only paid the
amount of ₱1,000.00 (plus ₱200.00 to
cover the legal research/bailiff fees) to the
Cash Division of the Comelec, per Official
Receipt No. 0510287. The said payment
was made on February 14, 2008.7
COMELEC’S RULING:
 On March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division issued
an Order dismissing the appeal, viz.:
Pursuant to Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure which provide for the payment of
appeal fee in the amount of P3,000.00 within the
period to file the notice of appeal, and Section 9 (a),
Rule 22 of the same Rules which provides that failure
to pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for the
dismissal of the appeal, the Commission (First
Division) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to
DISMISS the instant case for Protestee-Appellant’s
failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by
the Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-(5)-
day reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.
 On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
 which the Comelec En Banc denied in the Resolution
dated January 21, 2009,
o declaring that the appeal was not
perfected on time for non-payment of the
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Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
complete amount of appeal fee and for late
payment as well.
o The Comelec En Banc held that the
Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over
the appeal because of the non-payment of
the appeal fee on time.
o Thus, the Comelec First Division correctly
dismissed the appeal.
Petitioner further claims that he paid a total of ₱4,215.00 for his
appeal, as follows:
a. To RTC on January 10, 2008 ------ ₱3,000.00
10.00
5.00
TOTAL
₱3,015.00
b. To Comelec on February 14, 2008 -- ₱1,000.00
50.00
150.00
TOTAL
₱1,200.0
0
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
 Petitioner submits that it is incumbent upon the RTC
to transmit to the Comelec the entire ₱3,000.00
appeal fee that he paid on January 10, 2008.
 Petitioner also advances another interpretation of
the Comelec Rules that the RTC is under obligation to
remit to the Comelec the ₱2,000.00 representing the
excess amount of the ₱1,000.00 appeal fee.
 Thus, petitioner claims that he must be deemed to
have complied, in full or at least substantially, with
the Comelec Rules on the payment of appeal fees.
 Petitioner maintains that the alleged non-payment of
the correct appeal fee is not due to his own fault or
negligence.
o He claims that the laws on appeals in
election protest cases are not yet well-
established, thus, he must not be made to
suffer for an oversight made in good faith.
o The Resolution No. 8486 of July 15, 2008
adopted by the Comelec to clarify the rules
on compliance with the required appeal
fees in election cases should not be applied
retroactively to the subject election
protest.
 Lastly, petitioner invokes liberality in the application
of the election law.
o He asserts that the popular will of the
people expressed in the election of public
16

officers should not be defeated by reason
of sheer technicalities.
o Petitioner argues that the true will of the
people of Motiong in the May 14, 2007
elections should be determined by
ordering the Comelec to give due course to
his appeal and to resolve the same on the
merits.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
 In his Comment, respondent Langi, Sr. states that the
petition was just a mere rehash of the Motion for
Reconsideration that petitioner filed with the
Comelec En Banc.
 Respondent maintains that for the Comelec to
exercise its authority to administer proceedings,
grant leniency, issue orders, and pass judgment on
issues presented, it must first be shown that it has
acquired the requisite jurisdiction over the subject
matter pursuant to the initiatory acts and procedural
compliance set as conditions precedent.
 Respondent also argues that the negligence and
mistakes of petitioner’s counsel bind petitioner. He
then reiterates the cases where this Court held that
the non-payment or insufficiency of payment of filing
fees is a valid ground for the dismissal of the appeal
and that the subsequent full payment thereof does
not cure the jurisdictional defect.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding
that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time whether there
are highly justifiable and compelling reasons to resolve the
subject case on the merits in the interest of justice and public
interest.
RULING:
 Section 3, Rule 22 (Appeals from Decisions of Courts
in Election Protest Cases) of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure mandates that the notice of appeal must
be filed within five (5) days after promulgation of the
decision, thus:
SEC. 3. Notice of Appeal. – Within five (5)
days after promulgation of the decision of the court,
the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice
of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney
of record of the adverse party.
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
 Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec
rules require the payment of appeal fees in appealed
election protest cases, the amended amount of which
was set at ₱3,200.00 in Comelec Minute Resolution
No. 02-0130,11 to wit:
SEC. 3. Appeal Fees. – The appellant in
election cases shall pay an appeal fee as follows:
(a) For election cases appealed from Regional Trial
Courts……….₱3,000.00 (per appellant)
(b) For election cases appealed from courts of limited
jurisdiction…..₱3,000.00 (per appellant)
SEC. 4. Where and When to Pay. – The fees
prescribed in Sections 1, 2 and 3 hereof shall be paid
to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the
Commission within a period to file the notice of
appeal.
 Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC12
also provide the procedure for instituting an appeal
and the required appeal fees to be paid for the appeal
to be given due course, to wit:
SEC. 8. Appeal. – An aggrieved party may appeal the
decision to the Commission on Elections, within five
days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal
with the court that rendered the decision, with copy
served on the adverse counsel or party if not
represented by counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. – The appellant in an election
contest shall pay to the court that rendered the
decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos
(₱1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the
notice of appeal.
 A reading of the foregoing provisions reveals that two
different tribunals
o (the trial court that rendered the decision
o and the Comelec)
require the payment of two different appeal fees for
the perfection of appeals of election cases.
 This requirement in the payment of appeal fees had
caused much confusion, which the Comelec
addressed through the issuance of Comelec
Resolution No. 8486.13
o Thus, to provide clarity and to erase any
ambiguity in the implementation of the
procedural rules on the payment of appeal
fees for the perfection of appeals of
election cases, the resolution provides:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections is
vested with appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, and those involving elective
barangay officials, decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 07-4-15 (Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests Before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials) promulgated on May 15, 2007
provides in Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14
thereof the procedure in instituting the
appeal and the required appeal fees to be
paid for the appeal to be given due course,
to wit:
Section 8. Appeal. – An aggrieved party
may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections, within five days
after promulgation, by filing a notice of
appeal with the court that rendered the
decision, with copy served on the adverse
counsel or party if not represented by
counsel.
Section 9. Appeal Fee. – The appellant in an
election contest shall pay to the court that
rendered the decision an appeal fee of One
Thousand Pesos (₱1,000.00),
simultaneously with the filing of the notice
of appeal.
WHEREAS, payment of appeal fees in
appealed election protest cases is also
required in Section 3, Rule 40 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure the
amended amount of which was set at
₱3,200.00 in COMELEC Minute Resolution
No. 02-0130 made effective on September
18, 2002.
WHEREAS, the requirement of these two
appeal fees by two different jurisdictions
had caused confusion in the
implementation by the Commission on
Elections of its procedural rules on
payment of appeal fees for the perfection
of appeals of cases brought before it from
the Courts of General and Limited
Jurisdictions.
17

WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the
rules on compliance with the required
appeal fees for the proper and judicious
exercise of the Commission’s appellate
jurisdiction over election protest cases.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby
RESOLVES to DIRECT as follows:
1. That if the appellant had already paid the amount of ₱1,000.00
before the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court or lower courts within the five-day period,
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in
Election Cases Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
and Barangay Officials (Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 07-4-15) and his Appeal was given due course by the Court,
said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee of
₱3,200.00 at the Commission’s Cash Division through the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by
postal money order payable to the Commission on Elections
through ECAD, within a period of fifteen days (15) from the time
of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the lower court. If no
payment is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall
be dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. The appeal may be
dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the
Commission on any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx
2. That if the appellant failed to pay the ₱1,000.00 – appeal fee
with the lower court within the five (5) day period as prescribed
by the Supreme Court New Rules of Procedure but the case was
nonetheless elevated to the Commission, the appeal shall be
dismissed outright by the Commission, in accordance with the
aforestated Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
The Education and Information Department is directed to cause
the publication of this resolution in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
This resolution shall take effect on the seventh day following its
publication.
SO ORDERED.
Our ruling in the very recent case of Aguilar v. Comelec, quoted
hereunder, squarely applies to the instant case:
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the
following procedure in the appeal to the COMELEC of trial court
decisions in election protests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials:
SEC. 8. Appeal. – An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to
the Commission on Elections, within five days after
promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel
or party if not represented by counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. – The appellant in an election contest shall
pay to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of
the notice of appeal.
Section 8 was derived from Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution and Rule 40, Section 3, par. 1 and Rule 41, Section
2(a) of the Rules of Court. Section 9 was taken from Rule 141,
Sections 7(1) and 8(f) of the Rules of Court.
It should be noted from the afore-quoted sections of the Rule
that the appeal fee of ₱1,000.00 is paid not to the COMELEC but
to the trial court that rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of
the notice of appeal and the payment of the ₱1,000.00 appeal fee
perfect the appeal, consonant with Sections 10 and 11 of the
same Rule. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the records have
to be transmitted to the Electoral Contests Adjudication
Department of the COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may
only exercise its residual jurisdiction to resolve pending
incidents if the records have not yet been transmitted and
before the expiration of the period to appeal.
With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the previous rule
that the appeal is perfected only upon the full payment of the
appeal fee, now pegged at ₱3,200.00, to the COMELEC Cash
Division within the period to appeal, as stated in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended, no longer applies.
It thus became necessary for the COMELEC to clarify the
procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees. For this
purpose, the COMELEC issued on July 15, 2008, Resolution No.
8486, which the Court takes judicial notice of. The resolution
pertinently reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing resolution is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. The appeal
to the COMELEC of the trial court’s decision in election contests
involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the
filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the ₱1,000.00
appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the
five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of ₱3,200.00 to
the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section
3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not
affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright
or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule 22, Section
9 (a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And
pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are
not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until
they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. In
such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to
dismiss the appeal or not.
Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division,
may dismiss petitioner’s appeal, as it in fact did, for petitioner’s
failure to pay the ₱3,200.00 appeal fee.
Be that as it may, the Court finds that the COMELEC First
Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The Court notes that the notice
of appeal and the ₱1,000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed
and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April
21, 2008. On that date, the petitioner’s appeal was deemed
perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the
rule on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or
almost three months after the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July
31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution
No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed petitioner’s
appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the
additional ₱3,200.00 appeal fee.1avvphi1
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the
clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioner’s appeal
should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No.
8486. Fairness and prudence dictate that the COMELEC First
Division should have first directed petitioner to pay the
additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory
resolution, and if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and
only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead, the COMELEC First
Division hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the
recently promulgated clarificatory resolution – which had taken
effect only a few days earlier. This unseemly haste is an
invitation to outrage.
The COMELEC First Division should have been more cautious in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the mere technicality of non-
payment of the additional ₱3,200.00 appeal fee given the public
interest involved in election cases. This is especially true in this
case where only one vote separates the contending parties. The
Court stresses once more that election law and rules are to be
interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect,
not to frustrate, the will of the electorate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The July 31, September 4 and October 6, 2008 Orders
18

and the October 16 2008 Entry of Judgment issued by the
COMELEC First Division in EAC (BRGY) No. 211-2008 are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
COMELEC First Division for disposition in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the appeal from
the trial court decision to the Comelec is perfected upon the
filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the ₱1,000.00
appeal fee to the trial court that rendered the decision. With the
promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the perfection of the
appeal no longer depends solely on the full payment of the
appeal fee to the Comelec.
In the instant case, when petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal
and paid the appeal fee of ₱3,015.00 to the RTC on January 10,
2008, his appeal was deemed perfected. However, Comelec
Resolution No. 8486 also provides that if the appellant had
already paid the amount of ₱1,000.00 before the trial court that
rendered the decision, and his appeal was given due course by
the court, said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal
fee of ₱3,200.00 to the Comelec’s Cash Division through the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by
postal money order payable to the Comelec, within a period of
fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the Notice of
Appeal with the lower court. However, if no payment is made
within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed
pursuant to Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, which provides:
SEC. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. – The appeal may be
dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the
Commission on any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx
Thus, when petitioner’s appeal was perfected on January 10,
2008, within five (5) days from promulgation, his non-payment
or insufficient payment of the appeal fee to the Comelec Cash
Division should not have resulted in the outright dismissal of his
appeal. The Comelec Rules provide in Section 9 (a), Rule 22, that
for failure to pay the correct appeal fee, the appeal may be
dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the
Comelec. Likewise, Section 18, Rule 4015 thereof also
prescribes that if the fees are not paid, the Comelec may refuse
to take action on the appeal until the said fees are paid and may
dismiss the action or the proceeding.
Here, petitioner paid ₱1,200.00 to the Comelec on February 14,
2008. Unfortunately, the Comelec First Division dismissed the
appeal on March 17, 2008 due to petitioner’s failure to pay the
correct appeal fee within the five-day reglementary period. In
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the Comelec En
Banc, in the Resolution dated January 21, 2009, declared that
the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal
because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time.
However, during the pendency of petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 27, 2008, the Comelec
promulgated Resolution No. 8486 to clarify the implementation
of the Comelec Rules regarding the payment of filing fees. Thus,
applying the mandated liberal construction of election laws,16
the Comelec should have initially directed the petitioner to pay
the correct appeal fee with the Comelec Cash Division, and
should not have dismissed outright petitioner’s appeal. This
would have been more in consonance with the intent of the said
resolution which sought to clarify the rules on compliance with
the required appeal fees.
In Barroso v. Ampig, Jr.,we ruled, thus:
xxx An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed
with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is to
ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of
canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is
the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of
proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest
therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and
pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their
claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of
dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate.
And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all
means within its command who is the real candidate elected by
the people.
Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a
liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec. Thus
we have declared:
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general
rule recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an
ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves
not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate
with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office
within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in
office for an uncertain period one whose right to it is under
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared
not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public
interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of
an ordinary action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Order dated March
17, 2008 of the Comelec First Division and the Resolution dated
January 21, 2009 of the Comelec En Banc in EAC No. A-13-2008
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the case be
REMANDED to the Comelec First Division for further
proceedings, in accordance with the rules and with this
disposition. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of Catbalogan,
Samar is DIRECTED to refund to petitioner Constancio D.
Pacanan, Jr., the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) as
the excess of the appeal fee per Official Receipt No. 6822663
paid on January 10, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
TAGUIAM vs. COMELEC
 This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of
a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction1assails the December 20,
2007 Resolution2 of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPC No. 07-
171 which granted private respondent Anthony C.
Tuddao’s Petition for Correction of Manifest Error
and Annulment of Proclamation of petitioner Jonas
Taguiam as the 12th winning candidate for
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan. Also assailed is the October 9, 2008
Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4
 Petitioner and private respondent were candidates
for the position of Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Tuguegarao City in Cagayan
o during the 2007 National and Local
Elections.
 On May 19, 2007, Jonas Taguiam was proclaimed by
the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) as the 12th
ranking and winning candidate for the said position
with 10,981 votes.5Private respondent obtained
10,971 votes6 and was ranked no. 13.
 On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed with the
COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest errors
in the Election Returns and Statement of Votes for 27
clustered precincts7 and for the annulment of the
19
 ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia

proclamation of the affected winning candidate in Tuguegarao, petitioner. Thus, the total number of votes obtained
Tuguegarao City. Cagayan. by private respondent was 10,980, while the total
Let the City Board of Canvassers of Tuguegarao, Cagayan number of votes received by petitioner was 10,957.
 He alleged that he was credited with less votes in implement this Resolution with dispatch. As such, private respondent was rightfully the 12th
several Statements of Votes by Precincts (SOVP) as SO ORDERED.10 winning candidate for the Sangguniang
compared with the tally of his votes in the election Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
returns ERs), whereas petitioner was credited with  The COMELEC held that the belated filing of private
more votes. Private respondent offered evidence in respondent’s petition cannot deter its authority to  Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
the following nine precincts: 0035A/0036A, ascertain the true will of the electorate and thereafter was denied by the COMELEC En Banc on October 9,
0061A/0063A, 69A/69B, 87A/87B, 192A/192B, affirm such will. 2008.
264A/265A, 324A/325B, 326A, and 328B.  Thus, after due proceedings, the COMELEC found
private respondent’s allegations duly substantiated  Hence, this Petition for Certiorari11 raising the
 Petitioner denied the allegations of private with material evidence and confirmed the following:
respondent and argued that the petition should be ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
dismissed for having been filed late or six days after A. With regard to the votes of private respondent: discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
the proclamation of the winning candidates.8 took cognizance of private respondent’s petition for correction
Precinct SOV ER No. Vote Vote Votes Affected
of manifest errors in the Election Returns and Statement of
No. P No. s in s in
 Meanwhile, the members of the CBOC of Tuguegarao Votes despite its late filing.
SOV ER
City denied private respondent’s allegations of
P
manifest errors in the SOVP; maintained that  Petitioner avers that private respondent’s petition
petitioner garnered more votes than those obtained for correction of manifest errors should have been
1 69A/69 1532 96026 27 27 0
by private respondent; and that they have properly dismissed outright for failure to show any
B 7 79
performed their duties and functions.9 justification for its late filing; that, if the petition had
2 87A/87 1054 96026 13 13 0 been properly dismissed, private respondent had
 On December 20, 2007, the Second Division of the B 3 99 other remedies available, such as an election protest.
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, to wit:
3 192A/1 1053 96028 20 19 -1 Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant 92B 1 01 Procedure expressly states that:
Petition filed by Anthony Tuddao for Correction of
Manifest Error and Annulment of Proclamation of 4 326A 1053 96029 43 53 +10 Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed
Jonas Taguiam is hereby GRANTED. 2 21 Directly with the Commission –
(a) The following pre-proclamation controversies
ACCORDINGLY, the City Board of TOTAL +9 may be filed directly with the Commission:x x x x
Canvassers of Tuguegarao, Cagayan is hereby
DIRECTED to 2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest
(i) RECONVENE B. With regard to the votes of petitioner: errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results
after giving due Precinct No. SOVP ER No. during the canvassing as where
Votes in Votes in ER Votes Affected
notice to the No. SOVP
concerned (1) a copy of the election returns or
parties, 1 35A/36A 10543 9602647 40 33 -7 certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once,
(ii) CORRECT the (2) two or more copies of the election
errors in the 2 61A/63A 10539 9602672 55 50 -5 returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of
Statement of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately,
Votes by 3 264A/265A 10528 9602871 39 29 -10 (3) there has been a mistake in the copying
Precinct of the figures into the statement of votes or into the
4 324A/325A 10533 9602920 62 61 -1
(SOVP), and certificate of canvass, or
thereafter 5 328B 10527 9602924 33 32 -1 (4) so-called returns from non-existent
proclaim the precincts were included in the canvass, and such
12th winning TOTAL -24 errors could not have been discovered during the
candidate for canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and
 The COMELEC concluded that nine votes should be
the proclamation of the winning candidates had already
added to the total number of votes garnered by
Sangguniang been made.x x x x
private respondent; while 24 votes should be
Panlungsod of
deducted from the total number of votes obtained by

20

If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not
later than five (5) days following the date of
proclamation and must implead all candidates who
may be adversely affected thereby.
 While the petition was indeed filed beyond the 5-day
reglementary period, the COMELEC however has the
discretion to suspend its rules of procedure or any
portion thereof. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure state, to wit:
Sec. 3. Construction. – These rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring
the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. – In the interest of
justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all
matters pending before the Commission, these rules
or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.
 Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance
with the spirit of Section 6, Article IX-A of the
Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the
power to "promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices" to attain justice and the noble purpose of
determining the true will of the electorate.12
 In Jaramilla v. Commission on Elections13 and Dela
Llana v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court affirmed
the COMELEC’s suspension of its rules of procedure
regarding the late filing of a petition for correction of
manifest error and annulment of proclamation in
view of its paramount duty to determine the real will
of the electorate. We have consistently employed
liberal construction of procedural rules in election
cases to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.15
 In the instant case, records show that petitioner was
declared the 12th winning candidate based on SOVPs
containing mathematical and clerical errors. The
total number of votes in the SOVPs of the identified
precincts are markedly different from the votes
tabulated in their respective ERs, i.e., petitioner was
given additional votes, while private respondent’s
votes were reduced, which altered the outcome of the
election. Petitioner was declared the last winning
candidate for the position of Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, instead of private
respondent.
 In Torres v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court
reiterated that while the remedy of the losing party is
an election protest after his opponent has already
been proclaimed as winning candidate, such recourse
is on the assumption, however, that there has been a
valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and
void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and
the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office
cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare
such nullity and annul the proclamation.17
 It is significant to note that petitioner did not assail
the factual findings of the COMELEC of manifest error
in the tabulation of votes but only raised issues on the
foregoing technicalities. Hence, the COMELEC’s
unrebutted findings of fact are therefore sustained.
 Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court
or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. Grave abuse of discretion
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it
contemplates a situation where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to
act at all in contemplation of law. In
a certiorari proceeding, as in the instant case, it is
imperative for petitioner to show caprice and
arbitrariness on the part of the court or agency whose
exercise of discretion is being assailed.18
For acting pursuant to its Constitutional mandate of
determining the true will of the electorate with substantiated
evidence, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC in annulling the proclamation of petitioner.
Said proclamation is flawed from the beginning because it did
not reflect the true and legitimate will of the electorate. Having
been based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no valid
proclamation to speak of.
SULIGUIN vs. COMELEC
 This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse the
Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) En Banc in SPC No. 04-209 dated
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
November 18, 2004 which denied petitioner
Margarito Suliguin’s motion for reconsideration of
the July 21, 2004 Resolution2 of the Comelec’s First
Division. The Comelec nullified his proclamation as
the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan,
Laguna.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the
candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna during the May 10, 2004 elections.
 At around 6:00 p.m. on said date, respondent
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) convened to
canvass the votes for all the candidates.
 Petitioner received 6,605 votes while respondent
Ecelson Sumague received 6,647 votes.
 However, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering
Precincts 1A to 19A, Sumague appears to have
received only 644 votes when, in fact, he received
844 votes. The MBOC failed to notice the discrepancy
and proclaimed the winning candidates at around
7:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed
as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan,
Laguna, garnering a total of 6,605 votes.3
 Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation
of the votes received by him and Suliguin in a
Letter4 dated May 15, 2004, it appearing that there
was a mistake in adding the figures in the Certificate
of Canvass of votes. He pointed out that he officially
garnered 6,647 votes, as against petitioner’s 6,605
votes.
 The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent
Sumague to a conference. Upon review, the MBOC
discovered that it had, indeed, failed to credit
respondent Sumague his 200 votes from Precincts 1A
to 19A, and that with his 6,647 votes, he should have
been proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan
member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of petitioner
Suliguin.
 On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec
a "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement
of Votes" for Councilor. The error was attributed to
extreme physical and mental fatigue which the
members of the board experienced during the
election and the canvassing of votes.
 In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his
oath of office before Judge Renato B. Bercades.5
 On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued
a Resolution6 granting the petition of the MBOC. The
Commission nullified the proclamation of petitioner
21

Suliguin as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 National
and Local Elections "for being based on an erroneous
computation of votes." It then ordered the MBOC of
Nagcarlan, Laguna to reconvene and effect the
necessary corrections in the SOV, and forthwith
proclaim Sumague as the 8th duly elected
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna.7
 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution but the Comelec En Banc denied the
motion on November 18, 2004; hence, this petition.
Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling against him. In
support of his petition, he alleges that:
 4.1 THE "PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN
THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR COUNCILOR,
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS UNDISPUTEDLY FILED
OUT OF TIME, and
 4.2 "THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN
THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR COUNCILOR,
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS FILED BY THE
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN DEFIANCE
OF EXISTING COMELEC RULES AND REGULATIONS
AND WAS OBVIOUSLY BIAS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CANDICATE ECELSON C. SUMAGUE.8
 Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35,9 36(c)
and (f)10 of Comelec Resolution No. 6669 (General
Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and
District Boards of Canvassers in Connection with the
May 10, 2004 Elections), the MBOC should not have
entertained the letter-request of respondent
Sumague as it was filed only on May 17, 2004, or four
(4) days after the canvassing of votes was terminated
and after he (petitioner) was proclaimed winner as
the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan,
Laguna.
 Furthermore, respondent Sumague never entered
any objection during the proceedings of the
canvassing of votes. The MBOC itself filed the
"Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of
Votes" before the Comelec only on May 26, 2004, 13
days after the canvassing of votes was terminated.
Petitioner maintains that the Comelec should have
denied the petition, since according to the Revised
Comelec Rules, it should have been filed not later
than five (5) days following the date of the
proclamation.
 Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the
MBOC itself to file the petition before the Comelec. He
further argues that upon the proclamation of the
winning candidates in the election, the MBOC
adjourns sine die and becomes functus officio.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec erred in granting
the petition of the MBOC to nullify petitioner’s proclamation as
the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan in Nagcarlan, Laguna.
RULING:
 In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to
ascertain by all means within its command who the
real candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the
rules that would hinder in any way not only the free
and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but
also the correct ascertainment of the results.11
 In the case at bar, the simple mathematical procedure
of adding the total number of votes garnered by
respondent Sumague as appearing in the Statement
of Votes submitted to the Comelec would readily
reveal the result that he has forty-two (42) votes
more than petitioner. Such result would, in effect,
dislodge petitioner from said post, and entitle
respondent Sumague to occupy the eighth and last
seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
Petitioner himself never disputed the discrepancy in
the total number of votes garnered by respondent
Sumague, and instead questioned the personality of
the MBOC to file the petition and insisted that such
petition was not filed on time.
 Sections 312 and 413 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure explicitly provide that such rules may be
"liberally construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed,
the Comelec has the discretion to liberally construe
its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or
any portion thereof in the interest of
justice.14 Disputes in the outcome of elections involve
public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand if they
constitute an obstacle to the determination of the
true will of the electorate in the choice of their
elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.15
 What is involved in the present petition is the
correction of a manifest error in reflecting the actual
total number of votes for a particular candidate.
Section 32, subparagraph 5 of Comelec Resolution
No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votes
of any candidate as a manifest error.16 As correctly
cited by the Comelec,17 a manifest clerical error is
"one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding and is apparent from the papers to the
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COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not
include an error which may, by evidence dehors the
record be shown to have been committed."
 The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect
the true winner elected by the voting public, to
occupy the eighth position as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. In Carlos v.
Angeles,18 the Court had the occasion to declare:
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the
choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote" through the use of
the ballot, and the elected officials of which
are determined through the will of the
electorate. "An election is the embodiment
of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people."
"Specifically, the term ‘election,’ in the
context of the Constitution, may refer to
the conduct of the polls, including the
listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of votes." The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or
plurality of valid votes cast in the election.
"Sound policy dictates that public elective
offices are filled by those who receive the
highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office. For, in all
republican forms of government the basic
idea is that no one can be declared elected
and no measure can de declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election."19
 We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec
(First Division) granting the petition of the MBOC:
A careful perusal of the records show that
there was, indeed, an honest error committed by
petitioner MBOC in the computation of votes for
candidate Ecelson Sumague which resulted in the
erroneous proclamation of respondent as one of the
winners for the said office.
 "A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the
eye or obvious to the understanding and is apparent
from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and
collector, and does not include an error which may,
by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been
committed."
 The contention of respondent that the instant
petition should be dismissed for being filed out of
time cannot be given merit because his proclamation
22

was flawed. It must be stressed that "a proclamation
based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a
petition to correct errors in tabulation under Section
7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, even
if filed out of time, may be considered, so as not to
thwart the proper determination and resolution of
the case on substantial grounds and to prevent a
stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation
based on an erroneous tabulation of votes."
 Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed
because it was based on a clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not
through the legitimate will of the electorate, there can
be no valid proclamation to speak of and the same can
be challenged even after the candidate has assumed
office."
 There is no showing that petitioner MBOC acted with
manifest bias and committed a grave abuse of
discretion. "Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility which must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."
Petitioner MBOC is merely doing its function that is
mandated by law – to canvass votes in the election
returns submitted to it in due form, adding or
compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown
in the face of such returns and eventually proclaim
the winning candidates. Respondent miserably failed
to prove that petitioner exhibited manifest bias
thereby thwarting his chances of winning the last slot
for Sangguniang Bayan Member. "Absent a strong
showing to the contrary, the court must accept the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and strong evidence is necessary to rebut
this presumption."
 Likewise, it cannot be said that petitioner MBOC
violated the sanctity of the ballots. Unlike the Board
of Election Inspectors which counts the votes from
the precinct levels, the MBOC computes the votes as
appeared in the election returns.
 Finally, a subsequent annulment of the proclamation
of the respondent does not constitute a clear
violation of his right. In the first place, there is no
valid proclamation to speak of. He was not elected by
a majority or plurality of voters. His alleged right was
based on an erroneous proclamation. By any
mathematical formulation, the respondent cannot be
construed to have obtained such plurality of votes;
otherwise, it would be sheer absurdity to proclaim a
repudiated candidate as the choice of the voters.
"Where a proclamation is null and void, the
proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot
deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such
declaration a nullity." Respondent also cannot claim
that he was denied of his right to due process of law
since he was given the opportunity to be heard. He
was duly notified by petitioner MBOC of the
erroneous computation which resulted in his
proclamation and was afforded the opportunity to be
heard by this Commission.
 "The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and
control over the members of the Boards of Election
Inspectors and Canvassers. Its statutory power of
supervision and control includes the power to revise,
reverse or set aside the action of the boards, as well
as to do what boards should have done, even if
questions relative thereto have not been elevated to
it by an aggrieved party, for such power includes the
authority to initiate motu proprio or by itself steps or
actions that may be required pursuant to law."20
 Petitioner posits that the Comelec’s reliance in the
ruling of this Court in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections21 is misplaced since, unlike the present
petition, petitioner therein was an affected candidate
who filed his petition on time.
 The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The
Court, in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,22 declared that:
Assuming for the sake of argument that
the petition was filed out of time, this
incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the
instant case on substantial grounds.
Adherence to a technicality that would put
a stamp of validity on a palpably void
proclamation, with the inevitable result of
frustrating the people’s will cannot be
countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, we
categorically declared that:
x x x Adjudication of cases on substantive
merits and not on technicalities has been
consistently observed by this Court. In the
case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20
SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes v.
Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746),
this Court had the occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election
contests involve public interest, and
technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they
constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the
ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia
electorate in the choice of their elective
officials. And also settled is the rule that
laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will
of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo,
26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil.
269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496,
January 27, 1962; Macasunding v.
Macalañang, G.R. No. L-22779, March 31,
1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In an
election case, the court has an imperative
duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate
elected by the electorate. (Ibasco v. Ilao,
G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). x x
x (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp.
818-819). (Italics ours)
In the later case of Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections (119
SCRA 465), this doctrine was reiterated and the Court went on
to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this
Court has made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of
the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the
free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also
the correct ascertainment of the results. This bent or disposition
continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the
legal rules enunciated in the election laws should not frustrate
the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved
is the allowance of the correction of what are purely
mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the
votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the
opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination
and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private
respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is
correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition.
Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the
true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs
involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected
involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.23
The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v.
Commission on Elections,24 to wit:
The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate
that respondent’s assumption of office was effected by a clerical
error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes
23
 ELECTION LAWS
COMPILED CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Jocelyn Valencia

and not through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus,
respondent’s proclamation was flawed right from the very
beginning. Having been based on a faulty tabulation, there can
be no valid proclamation to speak of insofar as respondent
Castillo is concerned. As this Court once said:
To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made a
mistake in computing the total number of votes for respondent
Sumague, it took swift action and called the attention of the
Comelec by filing the Petition to Correct Entries Made in the
Statement of Votes for Councilor.

"x x x Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the
principle that Comelec is with authority to annul any canvass Commission on Elections in SPC No. 04-209 dated July 21, 2004
and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Order
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar issued by the Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.
to the exercise of such power. It, of course, may not be availed of SO ORDERED.
where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondent’s petition before the Comelec is precisely directed
at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive
that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to Comelec.

xxx
"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a
proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly
proclaimed candidate has assumed office.
xxx
"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy of
any party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election
protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has
been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the
proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in
any way affect the basic issues." (Aguam v. Commission on
Elections, 23 SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani v. Commission
on Elections, 186 SCRA 484 [1990]).25

Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of

petitioner for being based on an erroneous computation of
votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on
Elections,26 where the proclamation is null and void, the
proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot deprive the
Commission the power to declare such proclamation a nullity.
We emphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.27

In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in

annulling the proclamation of petitioner. In a special civil action
for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to prove not
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondent issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse of
discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.28
24