Economic History Association

The Achievements of Economic History: The Marxist School

Author(s): Jon S. Cohen
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 38, No. 1, The Tasks of Economic History
(Mar., 1978), pp. 29-57
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2119314
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 The Achievementsof EconomicHistory:
The Marxist School
IT is impossible within the confines of a short paper to provide an
adequate survey of the main works in Marxist economic history.
The most that can be done is to introduce a limited number of issues
that best illustrate the contributions of Marxist scholars. The topics
covered in this paper include feudalism and the decline of serfdom,
the transition to capitalism, the crisis of the seventeenth century, the
English Civil War, and the rise of factories. An attempt is made to
integrate these subjects into a more or less chronological account of
European history.
The "economic history" works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and
other major figures in the development of Marxist analyses are not
treated in the paper. An attempt to condense them into a few pages
would serve no purpose.' The emphasis is instead on the works of
historians who identify themselves as Marxists, who make explicit use
of a Marxist framework, and whose writings have had, in one way or
another, a marked influence on the work of other historians.
This paper is written for a particular type of reader. There are no
books or articles that provide a systematic treatment of Marxist con-
tributions to economic history nor are there any reader's guides to
what has been written from a Marxist perspective. Most economic
historians have almost no exposure to the writings of Marxists in the
field. The purpose of this essay then is to bring together some
materials for the economic historian who is curious about Marxist
economic history, reasonably sympathetic to the general approach,
but ignorant of the literature.

Journal of Economic History, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (March 1978). Copyright ?) The Eco-
nomic History Association. All rights reserved.
I would like to thank Ian Parker and W. N. Parker for their comments and D. E. Moggridge
for many helpful discussions. Errors, omissions, and so on are, naturally, my responsibility.
1 It is worth noting that many of Marx's most important economic history insights are to be
found in his theoretical writings, The Grundrisse, The German Ideology, Capital, Vols. I-III,
Contributions to a Critique of Political Economy, and not in his socio-political pieces such as
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon or Class War in France. This is not surprising.
Marx'stheoretical constructs are historically specific; feudalism and capitalism are not describ-
able by the same laws of motion. At the same time, historical development can be treated
analytically. For Marx and Marxists, history and theory are inseparable. See P. Anderson,
Considerations on Western Marxism (London, 1976), pp. 109-12 for a discussion of theory and
history from a Marxist perspective.
29
30 Cohen
Two features of Marxist analyses, mode of production and dialecti-
cal materialism, form the core of Marxistthought, underlie the works
treated in this paper, and thus require brief consideration. Most
Marxist economic historians subscribe to the notion that every histor-
ical epoch has an identity shaped by the way in which the means of
production are owned or held, the way in which individuals relate to
one another in the process of production, and by the material forces of
production.2 That is, every period can be described in terms of a
dominant mode of production.
All historical modes of production (up to and including capitalism)
have had built-in contradictions. One class has been able through its
control over the means of production to appropriate the surplus while
another class has done the actual work and received (in good times)
enough to insure its reproduction. From this perspective the driving
force of human history has been, at a basic level, class struggles over
appropriation of the surplus.3
Dialectical materialism is both the way in which history works out
its inner logic and the only way in which this process can be com-
prehended. To paraphrase Marx, if one accepts that every historically
developed social form, as a result of internal contradictions, is in fluid
movement, then the only way to take into account simultaneously the
form's transient nature as well as its momentary existence is by means
of the dialectic.4 If history proceeds dialectically, then its dynamic is
best perceived in relational terms.
2 Bob Rowthorn, "Neo-Classicism, Neo-Ricardianism, and Marxism,"New Left Review, 86
(1974) calls these appropriation of nature and appropriation of the product. Marx observed that
"All production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through a
specific form of society." K. Marx, Grundrisse (New York, 1973), p. 87. It is the specific set of
productive forces and social relations that transforms the process from an abstraction to a
concrete historical reality.
3 As Vilar indicates, the domain of the Marxist historian is change itself but not willy-nilly
fluctuations caused by random shocks; it is systematic movement caused by class conflict; P.
Vilar, "Marxist History, a History in the Making:Towards a Dialogue with Althusser," New Left
Review, 80 (1973),84. As will be shown below, such a view of historical change holds only at a
high level of abstraction. Most Marxist historians do not attempt to reduce historical develop-
ment to the conflict between one class that owns the means of production and another that does
the work. See P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974), C. Hill, The
Century of Revolution, 1603-1714 (London, 1961), R. Hilton, Bond Men Made Free (London,
1973), among others, to gain some notion of how Marxist historians relate class conflicts to
historical change.
4 Marx, Capital, I (New York, 1947), Afterword to 2nd German ed. As an example, the

English Peasant Revolt of 1381 is much more comprehensible if viewed in terms of the
relationship of lords and peasants-the growing intransigence of the lords, the peasants'
reaction, the development of class consciousness among rich and poor peasants-in a specific
historical setting than it is if seen as the response of peasants to an increase in the poll tax. See
Hilton, Bond Men, and idem, "Peasant Movements Before 1381," EcHR, 2nd ser., 2 (1949), rpt.
in E. M. Carus-Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic History, II (London, 1962). The Marxist
 The Marxist School 31
Why the materialist base? For Marx and Marxists, conflicts asso-
ciated with production and appropriation of products are the driving
forces of history. Other considerations are important, often para-
mount, but human history and consciousness are shaped for the
most part by the material world and it is to problems of material
existence that one must look first to understand historical evolution.
For certain types of arguments abstract concepts such as the feudal
or capitalist modes of production are appropriate. In the first volume
of Capital, Marxwanted to identify the laws of motion of capitalism. It
was useful for this purpose to employ the abstraction, capitalist mode
of production. On the other hand, to treat specific historical processes
such as, for example, the paths to capitalism followed by England and
France, it is necessary to examine in detail the features that distin-
guished French from English medieval society.5
It is hoped that these observations dispel the more naive sorts of
misconceptions about Marxist economic history.6 Marx was not a
technological determinist nor are most Marxists. Marxwas explicit on
this point: "Political economy is not technology."7 Most Marxists
would contend that different historical periods have different laws of
motion but it is incorrect to infer from this, as some do, that Marxists
view history as a logical sequence of "pure" modes of production,
each one with a precise end and beginning.8 History does have a
materialist base for Marxists but this does not mean that extra-
economic or non-material forces can be ignored. In fact, the Marxist
approach compels one to analyze social forms as totalities and to
integrate economic with non-economic factors.9 Finally, Marx was a

analysis of French peasant revolts in the seventeenth century by B. Porchnev (Porshnev), Les
Soulevements populaires en France de 1623 a 1648 (Paris, 1963), while interesting, tends to
oversimplify the nature of class relationships.
5 See Vilar, "Marxist History"; Anderson, Lineages and Passages from Antiquity to
Feudalism (London, 1974); L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital (London, 1975); Marx,
of course, and many others for similar arguments and applications of these arguments.
'BSee J. Heer, "The 'Feudal' Economy and Capitalism," JEEH, 3 (1974) for a veritable
compendium of the grosser misconceptions about Marxist analyses.
7 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 81. L. White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford,

1962) comes much closer than most Marxists to being a technological determinist.
8 See Heers, "The 'Feudal' Economy."
9 Letwin ("The Contradictions of Serfdom," Times Literary Supplement, 25 March 1977)
dismisses Marxist economic history as pure ideology. His arguments are not compelling. He
seems to feel that the Marxist "model" of distribution under feudalism is inadequate but this in
no way makes it any more ideological than the contention, to which he subscribes, that factors
were paid the value of their marginal products. (Letwin indicates that a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function is a useful analytical device to discuss distribution in medieval Europe. See TLS,
p. 373). He also objects to the notion of transitions, although Marxist attempts to analyze
historical evolution are no more ideological than Letwin's implicit contention that economic
32 Cohen
good theoristwith an extensive knowledgeof history, but he made
mistakesin theory and in interpretation.1 The good Marxisteco-
nomic historiansubscribesto Marx'sgeneral approach,not to his
every statement.As Trotskyobserved, Marxismis aboveall a method
of analysisof social relations,not a defense of texts.11

FEUDALISM AND THE DECLINE OF SERFDOM

Feudalism
"Feudalism"and "feudalsociety"are no longer respectablecon-
cepts among many medievalists.They prefer instead more descrip-
tive terms such as seigneurialeconomy, manorialsociety, medieval
period. The terminologicalissue is trivial but the conceptual dis-
agreementis not. To borrowfrom Tawney, whether or not one is
willing to use the term feudalism,one is unlikely to make much of
those centuriesif in additionto eschewingthe word one also ignores
the fact.12 For some purposes manors, seigneuries, and freeholds
mustbe distinguished;forothers,however,it is necessaryto abstract,
to think in terms of "feudal"relations.13
The concept "feudalism"fares no better with economichistorians
who view the world as neoclassicaleconomists.They tend to project
into the past propertyand productionrelationsfound in advanced
capitalist societies. To them, markets in land, labor, and goods,
privateproperty,and individualistbehaviorhave alwaysexisted. The
task of the economic historianis to identify constraintsthat affect
utility maximizationand cost minimization. In such a system,
feudalismhas no meaning;at most it representsa particularset of
constraints.This approachhas even less to recommendit thanthat of
the medievalist.Althoughthe latter rejects generalizations,the past
at least retainsa certain integrity.
In the feudalperiodpeasantspossessedthe basic meansof produc-
tion (land and simple tools), they determined for the most part
trends in all societies throughout history can be explained in terms of a single set of behavioral
propositions.
10 See Anderson, Considerations, pp. 113-16, for a discussion of some problems in Marx's
analyses.
1 I. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed (Oxford, 1970), p. 154.
12 R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (London, 1964), Intro. to the 1937 ed.
Tawney refers to capitalism but his argument is equally applicable to feudalism.
13 See Anderson, Passages; Hilton, A Medieval Society: The West Midlands at the End of the
Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1966), and others for judicious but effective use of the concept
feudalism.
 The Marxist School 33
production techniques, and they controlled the output. A land-
owner'sincomedependedon his abilityto compelhis peasantsto turn
over to him that portion of the product that remained after the
peasants had taken care of their own reproduction.14 As Hilton points
out, there was no economic reason why the members of the peasant
community would willingly transfer the surplus to their lord.15At one
time, there may have been an element of quid pro quo; in return for
the surplus the lord provided protection, but by the eleventh century
this was no longer the case. The lords employed judicial, military, and
political power, custom, and other types of non-economic coercion to
facilitate transfer of the surplus.16
Anderson expands this traditional Marxistanalysis. It is inadequate
to treat feudalism simply in terms of lords and serfs. What distin-
guished it from other systems was not only the method of surplus
extraction but also the organization of lords and serfs into a vertically
articulated system of parcellized sovereignty and conditional prop-
erty rights. The latter made vassals subordinate to those above them,
while the former gave the vassals control over those below them.
Parcellization allowed the growth of autonomous towns, permitted a
separate universal church, and gave rise to an Estates System which
could serve as both an instrument of royal will and a device of
aristocratic resistance to royal power.17
Feudalism in its initial phase in the West (900-1300) was progres-
sive. Productivity improvements during this period were substantial,
population expanded, and in good years at least some peasants were
able to accumulate.'8 One result of this expansion and accumulation
was an increase in income differentials between prosperous and im-
poverished peasants, a feature which becomes important later in the
story. 19

14 Hilton, The English Peasantry in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1975).
15 Hilton, "Peasant Movements," p. 74; Hilton, The Decline of Serfdom (London, 1969).
16 Anderson, Passages; Hilton, Decline of Serfdom; W. Kula, An Economic Theory of the

Feudal System (London, 1976). This differs from capitalism, in which the surplus is extracted
through the purchase and sale of labor power and other commodities. Such a process was
impossible in the feudal period; labor was not yet a commodity nor were there effective markets
in land and labor. See Hilton, The Economic Development of Some Leicestershire Estates in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (London, 1947), for evidence on lack of land and labor
markets in medieval England.
17 Anderson, Passages, and also Intro. to Lineages.
18 Anderson, Passages; Hilton, "Peasant Movements," and A Medieval Society; E. A. Kos-

minsky, Studies in the Agrarian History of England in the Thirteenth Century (New York,
1956); White, Medieval Technology; G. Duby, Rural Economy and Country Life in The
Medieval West (Columbia, S.C., 1968); Hilton, The English Peasantry.
19 Kosminsky, "Services and Money Rents in the Thirteenth Century," EcHR, 5 (1935);
34 Cohen
Townsthat specializedin long distancetrade and commoditypro-
duction20expandedas commercerevived.21These townswere feudal
islands in a feudal sea; they arose under the protection, with the
support,and often throughthe effortsof the feudalaristocracy.22 As
towns expanded, as commerce and commodity production grew,
many urbansettlementsespeciallyin Western Europe became fairly
autonomouspoliticalunits.23In the fourteenthcenturythis autonomy
of towns was to be a criticalfactorin the peasants'strugglesagainst
the nobility.24
The economic expansionbegan by about 1300 to run into limits
imposed by feudal relationsof production. Populationgrowth and
risingprices exacerbatedinherent conflictsbetween lords and peas-
ants. In the feudal world, the principal means of expansion was
through conquest, colonization,or marriage.25The feudal nobility
regarded its estates more as sources of political power and social
prestige than as productiveinvestments;the nobility tended to use
the surplusforwarfareand conspicuousconsumption,not as fundsto
be used to raiseagriculturalproductivity.In this contexta landowner
increased his income through greater exaction of feudal dues, not
throughgreater investmentsin equipment or throughmore careful
estate management.26As prices and rents began to rise in the latter
part of the thirteenth century, conflictswithin the countrysidebe-
came more intense and more widespread.27
Hilton, "Peasant Movements," and elsewhere in his writings. Lenin, The Development of
Capitalism in Russia (2nd ed., rev.; Moscow, 1969), develops this analysis for Russia.
20 As opposed to peasant villages which were relatively insular communities with limited

exchange and a few part-time artisans. Hilton, The English Peasantry, also A Medieval Society;
R. Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe,"
Past and Present, 70 (1976).
21 Anderson, Passages; J. Merrington, "Town and Country in the Transition to Capitalism,"
New Left Review, 93 (1975), rpt. in R. Hilton, ed., The Transitionfrom Feudalism to Capitalism
(London, 1976); A. B. Hibbert, "The Origins of the Medieval Town Patriciate," Past and
Present, 3 (1953). Non-Marxists, such as R. Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of The Middle
Ages, 950-1350 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971) and Duby, Rural Economy, stress the revival of
commerce.
" Anderson, Passages; Kula, An Economic Theory; Merrington, "Town and Country"; and
Hibbert, "Medieval Town Patriciate," all bring out the role played by the lesser nobility in
urban affairs, especially as merchants.
23 Hilton, Bond Men; Merrington, "Town and Country"; Anderson, Passages.
2 Anderson, Passages, emphasizes this. See also, Hilton, Bond Men and M. Dobb, Studies
in the Development of Capitalism (London, 1967). Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure," denies
the importance of towns in the peasants' struggles. (See below, p. 38).
" Anderson, Passages.
26 Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure," associates this type of income maximization policy
with serf-worked estates. Battle Abbey, which had to rely more on non-serf labor, was more
progressive. This may have, in fact, been the case although there is no economic reason why it
should have been.
27 See Hilton, Bond Men, for the best documentation in English of rural conflicts in the
 The Marxist School 35
The Decline of Serfdom
In the fourteenth century the inherent contradictions within
feudalism brought expansion to a halt. Wars and famines led to sharp
increases in mortality.28The nobility was confronted with declining
prices for agricultural goods, falling rents, and the first signs of labor
shortages. On the other hand, the costs of the goods and services that
nobles purchased did not decline. The aristocracy, caught in a
squeeze, resorted to wars among itself and to an intensification of
pressures on the peasantry. The latter struggle was the crucial one: its
outcome reordered feudal relations and shaped the pattern of Euro-
pean development for the next two or three centuries.29
The nobility tried to raise feudal dues, to push up rents, to halt
mobility, to put a ceiling on wages, to reinforce feudal obligations.30
By the middle of the fourteenth century peasant resistance to these
new pressures exploded in many places into open revolt. In this
period the Peasant Revolt of 1381 occurred in England, the Grande
Jacquerie in France, and similar uprisings in Belgium, Spain, and
Western Germany. Although the major rebellions were in most
places successfully defeated, the peasants managed to make impor-
tant if modest gains. Dues were commuted from service to payments
in kind or money. Mobility increased. By 1450, an estate tilled by
servile labor was in most of Western Europe an anachronism.31

fourteenth century, especially in England. Anderson contends that the crisis was not the result
of greater surplus extraction by lords, an interpretation put forward initially by Dobb, Studies,
and Kosminsky, Studies in the Agrarian History of England. He points out that expansion in
previous centuries had been hasty and ecologically unsound; yields on the new lands were thus
low. In such a situation a given population could become excessive with the slightest misfor-
tune. This kind of ecological imperative, however, is not convincing. It presumes that had
clearances been done less hastily there would have been no crisis. A more plausible argument is
that the land brought into cultivation last was the least productive whatever the techniques
used. For output per capita to grow in this context, new techniques of production had to be
introduced which would have required the feudal nobility to spend the surplus not on warfare
and conspicuous consumption but on estate improvements. But for such a change in expendi-
ture patterns to occur, social relations of production had to alter.
28 The Black Death was a kind of diabolical bonus that abetted the crisis.
21 This focus on lord-peasant conflicts is common to all Marxist analyses of the decline of

serfdom. See Dobb, Studies; Anderson, Passages; Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure"; Hilton,
Introduction to Hilton, ed., Transition. For Eastern Europe, where the situation was different,
see M. Malowist, "Problems of Growth of the National Economy of Central-Eastern Europe in
the Late Middle Ages," JEEH, 3 (1974); and Kula, An Economic Theory.
30 Anderson, Passages, p. 202, contends that legislation introduced during this period, the
Statute of Labourers in England, the Ordonnances in France, and so on, contained the most
explicit programs of exploitation in the history of the class struggle in Europe.
31 What might be called the first crisis of Western feudalism was not resolved in exactly the
same way in every country. It is impossible in this kind of survey to explore these differences.
See Anderson, Passages; M. Bloch, French Rural History (Berkeley, 1966); P. Vilar, "Le Temps
du Quichotte," Europe, 34 (1956), among many others for details. The constraints of the topic
36 Cohen
The failure of the feudal reaction in the West contrasts sharply with
its success in the East. By 1650 in much of Western Europe serfdom
was dead, but in the East it flourished. Why the difference? There are
essentially two standard Marxistanswers. Some have argued that the
lack of urban developments in the East compared with those in the
West accounts for the difference. Towns served as escape routes-city
air made men free-thus compelling the feudal aristocracyin the face
of population decline and labor shortages in the fourteenth and first
half of the fifteenth centuries to grant their peasants better terms,
greater freedom to prevent wholesale desertions. In the East no such
challenge to feudal control existed. Thus when difficulties arose for
the nobility, they merely tightened the screws on the peasantry.
Others contend that trade relations explain the difference. The West
exported manufactured goods to the East in return for raw materials.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, initially because of price
movements unfavorable to the aristocracy, later because of labor
shortages, large landowners in the East turned more and more to
servile tenures as a way to extract the agricultural surplus.32
Both Brenner and Anderson argue, although for different reasons,
that the traditional explanations are unsatisfactory.33 Brenner con-
tends that the strength of peasant resistance was much greater in the
West than in the East and it was this difference more than any other
that accounts for the outcome of the feudal reaction in the two areas.
In the East much land during the thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries was settled by Western immigrants or Eastern migrants.34
The aristocracy through such orders as the Teutonic knights directed
the colonization process and continued even after settlements were
established to maintain dominant political positions in peasant vil-
lages.35 The planned nature of agrarian expansion also meant that
each agricultural settlement fell under the control of a single lord, in

limit consideration to works of Marxistscholars. It goes without saying that anyone interested in
European developments during this period cannot restrict investigation to works by Marxists.
32 This explanation does not indicate why the feudal reaction in the East succeeded; it simply
provides an account Jf why it occurred. See Malowist, "Problems of Growth" and also "The
Problem of the Inequality of Economic Development in Europe in the Later Middle Ages,"
EcHR, 2nd ser., 19 (1966). E. J. Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," Past and
Present, 5 and 6 (1954), rpt. in T. Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 (London, 1965),
makes a similar argument. There is some question about timing which, however, does not affect
the essential features of the story. From the twelfth to the fourteenth century, serfdom was less
common in the East than in the West. At some point during the fifteenth or early sixteenth
centuries, lords began to impose upon the relatively free peasantry servile conditions.
33 Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure"; Anderson, Passages.
34 Malowist, "The Problem of Inequality," also makes this point.
35 Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure," pp. 57-58.
 The Marxist School 37
contrast with the West where more haphazard development over a
longer period of time often gave rise to conflicts among the nobility
over rights to peasant payments. For various reasons open field
farming as practiced in the West was rare in the East. Holdings were
in large, relatively consolidated strips, common fields were absent,
there was little need for collaborative agricultural practices among
peasants, and the peasants had no experience in the struggle for
common rights against the nobility. When the move towards serfdom
began, then, the Eastern peasants were ill-equipped to resist; they
lacked both experience in cooperative activities and the organizations
to facilitate them.
In the West open field farming, with its numerous opportunities for
communal ventures, its tradition of class actions against the nobility,
and the relative freedom of village organizations from domination by
the lords provided the peasants with the institutions and experience
for resistance. Thus, when the nobility attempted to reintroduce
servile tenures in the fourteenth century, they met with coordinated
opposition from the peasantry. This resistance, Brenner argues, com-
pelled the lords to abandon serfdom and to seek other means to
secure a labor force and maintain their incomes. Towns had nothing
to do with the outcome; neither patrician nor artisan had much
sympathy for the peasants' cause in either the East or the West.
Victory or defeat for the peasants depended for the most part on their
ability to fight as a class.
Anderson paints a somewhat different picture. He emphasizes less
the role of peasant organizations, and he attributes greater impor-
tance than does Brenner to divisions within the nobility; but the main
difference between the two lies in their interpretation of the role of
towns. According to Anderson, in the West towns actively or
passively supported the peasantry and were fundamental in the disso-
lution of serfdom. In the East towns were also strategic, but the
combination of their more recent origins, and thus a more fragile
base, and the decline of East-West trade in the fourteenth and early
fifteenth centuries made them vulnerable to suppression by the nobil-
ity. The first steps towards enserfinent were taken by the nobles
against towns, not against peasants. Anderson contends that in the
fifteenth century the number of urban settlements in the East fell
dramaticallyand the ones that remained were forced to yield most of
their political autonomy. With these bastions of resistance removed,
the nobility had with some notable exceptions (in the Ukraine, for
example) a relatively easy time of forcing the peasantry into servitude.
38 Cohen
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries peasant liberties in
the East were systematically suppressed and serfdom was imposed.36
These interpretations are not as incompatible as they may at first
appear. They can, in fact, be drawn together into a unified explana-
tion of East-West differences. As Brenner correctly emphasizes, the
degree of urban development does not explain differences in the fate
of serfdom East and West. But this does not mean that towns were
unimportant. In some cases, the urban poor were allies of the peas-
ants and compelled patricians to offer the peasants assistance. In
other instances, solid burghers for ulterior motives sided with the
peasants.37 In still other cases, artisans and craftsmen threw their lot
in with the peasants. In a time of labor scarcity, merchants, manufac-
turers, and artisans may well have welcomed new hands to keep down
the cost of services.38
On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that towns in the
East and the West were different. Malowist indicates that towns in
the East were exclusively centers of commerce with almost no com-
modity production of any importance.39 Merchants drew raw mate-
rials from the interior and sold them abroad for imported manufac-
tured goods. Merchants in the East were pure intermediaries. They
had no particular stake in a free peasantry. Viewed in this way,
merchant interests in the East appear much closer to those of the
aristocracythan they were in the West. It was, therefore, less the case
that the aristocracysuppressed the autonomy of towns than that there
was no basis of conflict. As Brenner points out, the large towns of
Brandenberg, Prussia, and Pomerania were quite prepared to legis-
late against fleeing serfs on the military's demand.40 On the other
hand, there is abundant evidence of conflicts between town and
countryside in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the West.
Thus the situation in the East was, as Anderson puts it, "over-
determined" in the sense that the weakness of peasant resistance was
compounded by the unified front of towns and lords against them. In
the West a more organized peasantry could rely as well on some
urban assistance, since towns in this area were manufacturingas well
as commercial centers. Trade relations between the East and the
3
Anderson, Passages.
37 See Hilton, Bond Men, on the experience of St. Albans and Bury St. Edmunds, and
Anderson, Passages, on Paris.
3S Hilton, Bond Men.
39 Malowist, "The Problem of Inequality." He points out that towns in Bohemia after the
Hussite revolt were exceptional.
40 Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure," p. 55.
 The Marxist School 39
West affectedboth the type of economicdevelopmentthat occurred
West,
in the two areas,a staples-producingEast and a manufacturing
and the outcome of the so-called feudal reaction.41

THE TRANSITION

The Issues and the Famous Debate

Again one encounters the perplexed "neoclassical"economist-
transitionfromwhatto what?At most, he or she wouldadmitmarkets
in the seventeenth century were more efficient allocatorsand dis-
tributorsthan they were in the thirteenth century. But the same
modelwith the sameequilibratingtendenciesand marginalequalities
is applicablein both centuries.42
Marxist scholars, on the other hand, find the transition from
feudalismto capitalismamongthe most importantand controversial
issues in European history.43 All Marxists agree that a transition
occurred in Western Europe at some time between the end of the
fourteenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries, but at this
point accord ends. There is disagreement about timing, location,
causal factors, intermediate stages, and so on.
The transition involved a shift from appropriation of the surplus in
the form of rent in money or kind and/or direct labor services to its
appropriationthrough the buying and selling of the commodity labor
power. It is for this reason, for example, that the end of serfdom in the
West did not mean the end of feudalism. It did alter social relations in
important ways but the feudal mode of production did not depend on
servile tenure. In this mode, surplus was extracted from the actual
producers through the landlords' ability to exert extra-economic
pressures on them. In the capitalist mode of production, workers are
separated from the means of production; they have nothing to sell but
their labor power." Capitalists, on the other hand, own the means of
41 Malowist, "The Problem of Inequality," and "Problems of Growth," and Hobsbawm, "The

Crisis," show how trade between the two areas influenced economic development. The argu-
ment presented in this section needs to be tested. One possible approach is to do a comparative
study of towns in Europe to find out first if more manufacturing-oriented urban areas gave more
support to peasants, and second, if urban areas in the West were actually more centers of
production than in the East.
42 As Merrington points out, there is a tendency in this approach to see history as no more
than the evolution of efficient markets. Merrington, "Town and Country," p. 74.
4 This is not only because of its historical importance. It is presumed that an understanding
of the earlier transition will provide insights into current trends, in advanced capitalist countries
as well as in less-developed areas.
i Hilton in "Capitalism-What's in a Name?" (Pastand Present, 1 [1952]; rpt. in Hilton, ed.,
Transition) gives a rough sketch of the transition, discusses the nature of capitalist production,
40 Cohen
production,purchaselaborpowerin exchangeforits value, and make
what they can from the sale of the finishedproducts. In this case,
workersand capitalistscome together of their own free will and, for
the most part, extra-economiccoercionis not necessaryto realizethe
surplus.This does not mean that classantagonismsvanishnor does it
imply that the state, the judiciary,and the military,have no role to
play in facilitatingsurplus extraction.But it does suggest that the
problem is no longer that of forcing one class which controls the
surplus to turn it over to another. Instead the state has to provide
suitableconditionsfor capitalaccumulation;amongother things this
necessitatesideologicallegitimationof the system ratherthanrepres-
sion, expansionthroughtrade, investment, technologicalchange not
warfare,creationof a compliant, trained, mobile, prosperouswork
force, not an impoverished,ignorantpeasantry.45
The best known Marxistcontroversyis the Dobb-Sweezy-etal.
debate over the transition. Dobb in Studies took issue with the
conventional notion that feudalism declined because of external
forces,particularlythe growthof commerce,and arguedinsteadthat
its dissolution resulted from internal contradictions.Towns were
indeed importantfactorsin the peasants'strugglefor freedombut, as
Dobb states ". . . it was the growinginefficiencyof feudalismas a
system of production,coupled with the growingneeds of the ruling
class for revenue, that was primarilyresponsiblefor its decline."46
Sweezy, on the other hand, argued that feudalismwas inherently
stable;no evidence exists to supportthe contentionthat lordswanted
more revenue and thus over-exploitedthe peasantry,while the flight
of the serfsfromthe landwas not due to expulsionbut to the magnetic
forceof towns. Thus, to Sweezy, it was the growthof commerceand
towns that broughtabout the end of feudalism.47

and lays out an agenda for research. The paper is a masterpiece of synthesis and many of the
research topics he indicates still remain.
45 There is no possible way to review or even list all the Marxist materials old and recent. On

the role of the state in capitalist societies, Engels, Anti-Duhring (New York, 1972), contains the
orthodox Marx-Engels position. For an extension and adaptation of this, see Lenin, "The State
and Revolution," in R. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology (New York, 1975). Economic analyses
have been presented by P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York, 1966) and J.
O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973). For more political and
sociological emphases, see N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London, 1974) and
R. Miliband, The State in an Advanced Capitalist Society (London, 1969), who, it should be
noted, disagree about the role of the state. See N. Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to
Miliband and Laclau," New Left Review, 95 (1976), for the latest entry in the debate and for
references to previous statements.
4 Dobb, Studies, p. 42.
47 P. Sweezy, "A Critique," in Hilton, ed., Transition.
 The Marxist School 41
There are problems with Sweezy's analysis.48 He identifies
feudalism with production for use which leads him to argue that
production for exchange, tied up with the growth of towns, brought
about the decline of feudalism.49 But the general consensus among
Marxists is that production for exchange and towns were compatible
with the feudal mode of production. The essence of the system lay in
the use of extra-economic force to extract the surplus, in parcellized
sovereignty and conditional property, and not in production for use.
It is felt that Sweezy's analysis distorts the nature of feudalism and
leads to a misinterpretation of the economies of Renaissance Europe.
Sweezy regards the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as transi-
tional, neither feudal nor capitalist, but most Marxists contend that
while the decline of serfdom did affect traditional relations, the period
of absolutism must be regarded as feudal.
If the nature of the transition between these two modes of produc-
tion is to be understood, the following questions must be answered.
What were the forces that led to the development of markets in land
and labor? How, in particular, was a "free" wage labor force created?
What was the method by which capital penetrated and gained control
over the production process? What forces led to the dissolution of
feudal relations of production, to loss of control by the landowning
aristocracy of political and juridical power, and to the break-up in
towns of monopoly and guild controls of trade and production? These
are the kinds of questions that the works considered in the remainder
of the paper try to answer.
The Absolutist State
With the decline of serfdom landlords could no longer rely on
servile labor to work their estates.50 They either leased out their lands
or they hired workers. Both expedients tended to transform the
landscape. In the first case, a cash nexus replaced the reciprocal flow
of services, and in the second, the ground was prepared for the

48 On the current state of opinion, see Hilton, Intro. to Hilton, ed., Transition. Most of the
articles in the collection, including the ones added since the original debate in the early 1950s,
are worth reading.
49 Baran and Sweezy in Monopoly Capital present an analysis of capitalism that in many
respects parallels Sweezy's interpretation of feudalism. That is, they contend that advanced
capitalist economies are inherently stable; the source of revolution is not from internal conflicts
but from the periphery. In both analyses, the authors focus on the process of circulation, not on
the way in which surplus value is created and appropriated.
50 Discussion of absolutism in this section is based largely on the analysis of Anderson,

Lineages. The book is a brilliant piece of Marxist history that hardly receives adequate treat-
ment in this paper. Readers are urged to work through this book.
42 Cohen
growthof wealthy peasantswho used the surplusnot for warfareor
extravagancebut forinvestment.5'It is quite possibleas well that the
monetizationof payments forced peasants into the marketand en-
couragedpetty commodityproduction.Under favorableconditions,
these petty commodityproducerscould expandoperations,begin to
employ wage labor, accumulate,and become in effect capitalistem-
ployers.52These developments in agricultureand manufacturing
formthe basisof what Dobb andTakahashi,followingMarx,consider
the truly revolutionizingpath to capitalism.53
Towns in the late middle ages survivedand in many cases pros-
pered. From the mid-fifteenthcentury on they became important
sourcesof new technology(bronzecannons,movabletype, new navi-
gational equipment) that revolutionizedwarfare, commerce, and
communications.In most of Western Europe, trade revived around
this time and with it mercantilefortunesgrew.
The aristocracywas thus threatenedon two fronts. In agriculture
the nobles were in danger of losing control over the surplus; in
politicstheirhegemonywas in jeopardy.The aristocracy,with misgiv-
ings, as the ReligiousWarsand the Frondein France,the Pilgrimage
of Gracein England, and other aristocraticrebellionsdemonstrate,
threw its lot in with the absolute rulers. Sovereigntywas displaced
upwardfromthe locallevel, while conditionson propertywere eased.
The former step was necessaryto maintainpolitical and economic
control;the latterwas inevitableonce the need for homageand fealty
was gone.54The Renaissancemonarchieswith their mercenaryar-
mies, theirimmensebureaucracies,and theircomplexjuridicalstruc-
turesrepressedin one way or anotherthe peasantand plebianmasses
and co-optedthe mercantilebourgeoisie.The formertaskwas largely
accomplishedthroughthe veiled threatof force;the latterwas man-
aged throughthe sale of offices,tariffprotection,grantsof monopoly,
colonialexpansion,andotherpoliciesthatfavoredboth the crownand
the merchantaristocracies.55
51 Dobb, Studies, pp. 125-26; H. Takahashi, "A Contribution to the Discussion," in Hilton,
ed., Transition; Hilton, "Capitalism." This pushes the discussion towards the rising-declining
gentry and the causes of the English Civil War. These issues are touched on below.
52 Dobb, Studies; Takahashi, "A Contribution."
53 Sweezy, "A Critique," contends that Marx had in mind not rising from the ranks, but,
whatever the origin, the producer set up as a full-blown capitalist. In fact, Marxwas contrasting
merchants who were well adapted to the feudal mode with those newcomers who were excluded
from all the benefits dispensed by the ancien regime. They therefore were revolutionaries in the
sense that they had to overthrow the old order to prosper. They revolutionized not only social
relations of production but the entire social and political system.
54 See Anderson, Lineages, for the whole story.
55 On the role of mercenary armies, see the excellent piece by V.G. Kiernan, "Foreign
Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy," Past and Present, 11 (1957).
 The Marxist School 43
The absolutist state, however, had inherent contradictions. The
monarchs remained attached to the idea that the best way to add to
one's wealth was to take from someone else. Although this is probably
an oversimplification, it does help explain why war, marriage, and
colonial plunder were considered by the Renaissance monarchs as the
principal ways to a nation's expansion. Such policies required stand-
ing armies, fleets, frequent wars, lavish courts, and high expenditures.
Finance was the major problem for every absolutist monarch. It is
worth considering three consequences of this situation. First, through
heavy taxes on the peasantry, as in France and Spain, the monarchy
frequently drained funds away from possible investment in agricul-
ture and thus inhibited productivity growth. This may have acted as a
severe constraint on economic expansion.56 Second, the crown was in
perpetual conflict with the Estates over division of the surplus.57
Although the contradictions of the late feudal period cannot be
viewed exclusively in terms of struggles at the level of the state, these
were obviously important in shaping development in France, En-
gland, Spain, and other Western countries. Third, the absolutist state
encouraged the growth of trade, commerce, and manufacture. This is
especially evident in France and England. Although the kinds of
activities sponsored by the crown were not in themselves incompati-
ble with feudal relations-for example, monopoly trading and man-
ufacturing companies, guild-controlled production with strict appren-
ticeship laws, government policies-they did create a setting in which
revolutionary changes in social relations and in productive forces
could occur.
The Seventeenth Century Crisis
Hobsbawm, in the first of his two articles on the crisis of the
seventeenth century, constructed an interesting model of capitalist
development.58 He argued that sustained growth in an economy, such
as that of seventeenth-century England, required a shift of resources
(labor and means of production) from low to high productivity sectors,
56 This is part of Brenner's argument in "AgrarianClass Structure."
57 This was the struggle Trevor-Roper had in mind when he argued that the seventeenth-

century crisis was caused by the state's enormous appetite for funds and society's growing
reluctance to satisfy it; see H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth
Century," Past and Present, 16 (1959); rpt. in Aston, ed., The Crisis. Most critics contend that
Trevor-Roper undervalued the importance of military expenditures and overestimated the
consequence of court extravagances. See J.H. Elliott, "Trevor-Roper's 'General Crisis' Sym-
posium," Past and Present, 18 (1960), rpt. in Aston, ed., Crisis; and R. Mousnier, "Trevor-
Roper's 'General Crisis' Symposium," Past and Present, 18 (1960), rpt. ibid. Everyone agrees
that problems of finance existed.
5 Hobsbawm, "Crisis," pt. 1.
44 Cohen
that is, a transferof capitaland men fromagricultureto manufactur-
ing. At the same time, the marketfor manufacturedgoods had to
expand. In the seventeenth century this could be accomplishedin
two ways. One was throughcreationof colonial marketsfor home-
producedcommodities;the other was throughthe transformation of
the self-sufficientagrarianpopulationinto a mass of consumers.The
firstrequiredan appropriatecolonialpolicy, plantationsand produc-
tion, not robbery. The second would accompanythe transfer of
people out of agriculture.An immobile peasantryhad to become a
"free"wage laborforce and techniquesof productionhad to alter to
raise output per workerand per acre. This would permit people to
move out of agriculturewithoutreducingoutputor raisingproduction
costs.59Relationsof productionin manufacturinghad to change as
well. Monopolycontrol over long-distancetrade and guild control
over labor, quality, and productiontechniques had to be broken.
This model for the most part describes the path to capitalism
followedby England.It does not, of course, excludealternatives;in a
sense, Hobsbawmpresents a set of sufficientconditionsfor capitalist
development.In the second articlehe attemptsto presentthe actual
process by which these conditions were met or frustrated. The
seventeenth-centurycrisis, he contends, resulted in a considerable
concentrationof economic power. It was this concentration.that
sealed the fate of feudalismand provided the basic organizational
formsforfutureindustrialization.It strengthened"putting-out"at the
expense of craftproduction,it favored"advanced"over "backward"
economies, it speeded up accumulation,and it helped provide a
surplusof agriculturalproducts.
There are a number of problems with this part of Hobsbawm's
analysis,but one is particularlydisturbing.60Whatwas the "general"

59 Ibid. Hobsbawm does not pay adequate attention to these changes. See Brenner, "Agra-
rian Class Structure," and J. Cohen and M. Weitzman, "A Marxian Model of Enclosure,"
Journal of Development Economics, 1 (1975). The latter show that enclosure alone raised
economic efficiency in agriculture and led to an expulsion of workers from the agrarian sector.
60 Hobsbawm uses the term concentration to describe phenomena that are for the most part
unrelated. Concentration of land-holdings has nothing to do with the growth of towns at the
expense of the countryside. In addition, concentration in its various guises does not necessarily
lead to the kind of results he seems to think it does. More concentrated holdings of land,
especially in the period before modem farm machinery, did not guarantee that productivity
would rise-witness the experience of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it is not at all obvious that
the break up of monopoly control over trade resulted in an increase in concentration, nor that
the expansion of putting-out activities when it occurred represented greater concentration than
did royal manufactories. Finally, did the crisis lead to concentration or was it the tendency
towards "concentration," more consolidated land-holdings, more putting-out, more aggressive
policies of foreign trade and colonial expansion, that gave rise to the crisis?
 The Marxist School 45
crisis of the seventeenth century? Was it an economic one that began
with a depression in one country and spread to others? If so, then
Holland, England, and France as well before 1640, underwent no
crisis. If, on the other hand, the crisis lay in the confrontation of
barriers to capitalist development, then England and perhaps Hol-
land experienced a crisis but Eastern Europe did not. Economic
difficulties in Spain and Eastern Europe had an impact through trade
and capital flows on economic developments in England, France, and
the Netherlands. But the social, political, and economic problems
within the Spanish monarchy were very different from those, for
example, within England. For this reason, it is more reasonable to
view the revolts, wars, and so on, of the seventeenth century as
related but fundamentally different phenomena.6'
Similarities existed among the Renaissance states, of course, espe-
cially in the West. A common feature, noted above, was large expen-
ditures on armies, warfare, and bureaucracies. These expenditures
had to be funded and as Trevor-Roper, Anderson, and others point
out, it was conflict over funds that led to many of the uprisings during
the seventeenth century. Trevor-Roper argues that in the economic
boom of the sixteenth century these expenditures could be sustained
without much strain on the economy; but in the seventeenth-century
recession these heavy expenditures put burdens on the economy that
eventually became intolerable.62 As was pointed out above, the ten-
dency of the state to draw funds away from the economy slowed the
rate of domestic investment and probably contributed to the eco-
nomic difficulties that countries experienced in the seventeenth cen-
tury. But it is worth noting that military expenditures under some
conditions contribute to economic expansion. Among the questions
that remain to be answered are the following. Why did these expendi-
tures not stimulate economic activity in the seventeenth century,
assuming, of course, that they did not? Why, in general, did govern-
ment spending in the seventeenth century inhibit accumulation and
capitalist development?63

61 This seems to be the message of Anderson in Lineages. He treats the countries of Europe

in detail and describes the nature of absolutism in each. He pinpoints the similarities and
differences of the various crises that were so widespread in seventeenth-century Europe.
62 Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis."
6 Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure," explicitly, and Hobsbawm, "Crisis," pt. 1, by
inference contend that capitalist development presupposed a transformation of the agrarian
sector which heavy government expenditures, by draining the surplus away from agriculture,
would slow rather than speed up. This may be true but it seems that gains could be made
through enclosure, consolidation, and careful management, which did not require extraordinary
46 Cohen
The English Civil War
The misconception that Marxist analyses rely on strict economic
causality is especially prevalent among those concerned with the
English Civil War. Lawrence Stone, for example, observes that since
the breakdown of opponents during the struggle did not correspond
with economic and social divisions, Marxistinterpretations are unten-
able." Such a judgment is too harsh. First of all, the precise composi-
tion of warring sides is hardly an adequate test of the influence that
social and economic factors had on behavior. Choice among alterna-
tive courses of action depends not only on preferences but also on
immediate pressures, uncertainty, and other considerations that may
cause behavior to diverge from narrowly defined preferences.65 Sec-
ond, although it is true that Christopher Hill in 1940 took a fairly rigid
class warfare view of the Civil War, his analysis has become much
more complex and subtle since then.66 In fact, Hill's work demon-
strates the need to include in any study of the English Civil War not
only social and economic forces, but also religious and intellectual
ones.67 As Hill has shown, religious convictions and political ideas
modified economic considerations; only by fully exploring the interac-
tion of these factors and the way in which they shaped men's at-
titudes, objectives, and perceptions, can the historian hope to under-
stand the Civil War.68
It is commonly agreed that by 1600 the English crown was sorely
strapped for funds.69 Expenses were rising and revenues were not.
Problems of finance were nothing new to the monarchy, and in fact
expenditures. See Cohen and Weitzman, "A Marxian Model," and L. Stone, The Crisis of the
Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 294-323.
" L. Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642 (London, 1972).
" Richard Johnston, a colleague, noted that no social psychologist would expect actions and
preferences to have a one-to-one correspondence in all cases.
" Compare C. Hill, "The English Revolution," in C. Hill, ed., The English Revolution, 1640
(London, 1940) and Puritanism and Revolution (London, 1958), pp. 153-98, with his later
works, such as The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714 (London, 1961) and Intellectual Origins of
the English Revolution (Oxford, 1965). In 1946, Dobb argued that, ". . . the division of the
country between the parties of the King and the parliament followed closely along economic and
social lines" (Studies, p. 170). One suspects that Dobb's analysis would have evolved as did
Hill's if he had pursued historical research.
67 Hill, Century, p. 15, and Puritanism, pp. 3-31.
68 Trevor-Roper's interpretation of the origins of the Civil War as presented in EcHR
supplement on the decline of the gentry ("The Gentry, 1540-1640," EcHR, Supplement 1
[London, 1953]) is more narrowly economic than any put forward by Hill, and certainly less
sensitive to the true nature of religious convictions. As Hill observes, "To Trevor-Roper the
spiritual wrestlings of a Milton, a Vane, a Roger Williams are nothing but epiphenomena of
economic decline" (Hill, Puritanism, p. 12).
69 See Hill, Century; Stone, Causes; Anderson, Lineages; Trevor-Roper, "Crisis," among
others.
 The Marxist School 47
Tudor monarchs had sold off crown lands to raise money for current
expenditures, which exacerbated the problems of the Stuarts. They
had fewer income yielding assets to meet their rising requirements.
The monarchy in England, furthermore, lacked the right possessed
by the French crown to raise funds through direct taxation of the
peasantry; there was in England no equivalent of the gabelle. The
Stuarts did possess some sources of income independent of par-
liamentary control: wardship and tenures, rents on crown land, and
they even had connections with a small but strategic circle of London
citizens through whom they could tap the financial resources of the
city.70 Nonetheless, the monarchy was still compelled to haggle with
Parliament over duties, taxes, levies, and the like, a struggle that
became over time one of sovereignty. Who was to rule: the king and
his court, or the "men of property" whose interests lay with Parlia-
ment?71 It is necessary to interpret actions and composition of these
two groups with care. As mentioned above, the sides did not break
down neatly according to some simple notion of class division. Many
merchants were royalists, and many members of the aristocracy and
higher gentry sided with Parliament. But the merchants who har-
bored royalist sentiments were for the most part those, such as the
East India and Levant magnates, whose associations with the crown
were intimate and whose political and economic well-being were, to
some extent, tied up with that of the king.72 The new colonial mer-
chant and colonizing aristocrats, on the other hand, were overwhelm-
ingly anti-royalist. As Brenner observes, it would be wrong to attrib-
ute this opposition to strictly economic motives, for issues of power
and ideology were at stake. But their economic interests brought
them together, made them aware of common political and ideological
views, and thus formed them into a unified revolutionary force.73
There were divisions as well within religious groupings, between
Presbyterians, Independents, and so on. But they all stood, at least in
the beginning, in opposition to the established church and to the
crown. The course and outcome of the Civil War was largely deter-
mined by which of these groups came to dominate politically, but the
critical revolutionary upheaval relied on their united efforts against
the crown.

70
Brenner, "The Civil War Politics of London's Merchant Community," Past and Present,
58 (1973), 74.
71 Hill, Century, p. 63; Stone, Causes, p. 39.
72 Brenner, "Civil War Politics."
73 Ibid.
 48 Cohen
The interests of the crown and Parliament, of the established
church and the puritans were, as it turned out, irreconcilable. In the
economic sphere, the crown wanted higher taxes, higher duties,
more sale of offices, more monopolies, while the opposition wanted
abolition of monopolies, support for commerce and colonization, no
sale of office (at least no abuse of offices once sold), and no arbitrary
duties nor excessive taxation. A growing number of parliamentarians
were also opposed to guild restrictions, apprenticeship laws, and
limitations on freedom to consolidate, engross, and enclose land. It is
true that some economic conflicts were resolvable. The crown, for
example, did not in principle oppose enclosure; it merely objected to
changes that led to depopulation and reduction of arable land.74 The
basic conflict, however, could not be worked out. Men of Parliament
wanted to make that institution, not the king, sovereign, an objective
that the monarchy could not accept and retain its absolute right to
rule.
Religious differences were no more susceptible to compromise. On
almost every fundamental issue of religion, the established church
and dissidents disagreed: pluralism vs. equality, preaching vs. prayer,
sabbath observance vs. holidays for saints' birthdays, salvation
through faith vs. salvation through works, local control vs. central
authority of the clergy.75 There is no question that the religious
conflicts fueled the revolution and were perhaps a necessary condi-
tion for its occurrence. There is, however, a question about the
relationship between religious differences and socio-economic back-
grounds of combatants. Clearly, it would be a mistake to assume that
all businessmen, improving landlords, the new colonial merchants,
that is, the so-called men of property who supported parliamentary
opposition to the crown, were puritans. But it would be equally
wrong not to recognize that many puritans were men of property. The
religious struggle paralleled, sustained, and shaped the political and
economic ones. Puritan beliefs of individual salvation, predestination,
and good works were quite compatible with the ideology of
capitalism.76 It is also worth noting that the puritan ethic was essen-
tially radical; it discouraged acceptance of authority simply on the
basis of tradition.77Thus, ideologically and in strict religious terms,
puritanism nourished the conflict between king and Parliament.
74 See Cohen and Weitzman, "A Marxian Model."
75 Hill, Century.
76 See Hill, Continuity and Change in Seventeenth Century England (London, 1974), pp.
81-102, for a restatement of Tawney's analysis of religious conviction and capitalistic attitudes.
77 Hill, "Puritanism, Capitalism, and the Scientific Revolution," Past and Present, 29 (1964).
 The Marxist School 49
The economic consequences of the war tend to confirm the nature
of the conflicts emphasized by Marxists. Attempts by the crown to
block enclosures and consolidation ceased.78 Wardship and feudal
tenures were abolished. The crown dropped support of copyholders
and small freeholders. An aggressive foreign policy in support of trade
was pursued, a course of action which the Stuarts had been reluctant
to follow. Regulation of manufacture ended, the power of the guilds
was broken, and restrictive apprentice legislation was no longer en-
forced. Growth of a wage-labor force was encouraged in various ways,
in particular through the introduction of harsh poor laws.
In religious and intellectual terms as well, the outcome of the war
ran along lines that a Marxist historian would expect. Parliament
gained control over the church; political power of the bishops was
gone for good. Church courts were abolished, and the clergy lost its
position as a separate estate. During the Civil War the doctrine of a
sovereign Parliament was established, a major intellectual achieve-
ment, which marked the end of absolutism in England.79 The way
was clear for the emergence of capitalism.

THE RISE OF CAPITALISM

Agriculture
The agrarian landscape in England was transformed during the
following century or so (1660-1750). Estates were enclosed and con-
solidated, new crops, new crop rotations, and improved farming
techniques spread rapidly through the English countryside.80 Many
copyholders and small freeholders either lost claims to their land or

As Hill observes, even in Protestant countries such as England the logic of Protestantism, the
dissidence of dissent, was an ever present threat to established authority.
78 See H.J. Habbakuk, "English Landownership, 1680-1740," EcHR, 10 (1940), and J. D.
Chambers, Nottinghamshire in the Eighteenth Century (2nd ed.; London, 1966). Neither
author is a Marxist but their analyses are quite compatible with those of Marxists. Chambers in
this work provides a portrait of rural changes that ranks among the best available. This work
receives almost no attention while Chambers' article, "Enclosure and the Labour Supply in the
Industrial Revolution," EcHR, 2nd ser., 5 (1953), which in many respects is untenable, gets all
the notice. See Cohen and Weitzman, "A Marxian Model"; W. Lazonick, "Karl Marx and
Enclosures in England," Review of Radical Political Economy, 6 (1974); and J. Saville, "Primi-
tive Accumulation and Early Industrialization in Britain," Socialist Register (1969), for critiques
of Chambers.
79 Hill, Century, p. 175.

80 E. Kerridge, The Agricultural Revolution (London, 1967), contends that the revolution in
agriculture was a sixteenth-century phenomenon. This is probably an exaggeration although
important changes in agriculture did take place before 1600. There is no question of the rapid
transformation after 1660. See among others, E.L. Jones, ed., Agriculture and Economic
Growth in England, 1650-1815 (London, 1967), Intro.; Chambers, Nottinghamshire; Hab-
bakuk, "English Landownership."
50 Cohen
sold out. This was the period during which large landowners,
capitalist tenants, and agricultural laborers became the dominant
figures in agriculture and the small, independent farmers shrank in
importance.81
Some would argue that the changes in agriculture were necessary
for sustained industrial growth to take place.82 France's inability to
bring about similar agrarian changes may explain why, even with
governmental policies favoring industrialization, the country kept
running up against productivity limits in agriculture. The conse-
quences were subsistence crises, rising wages and food prices, and
thus a reduced rate of accumulation in industry.83Whether or not the
same process had to be followed in every country, there are two
features of these analyses that must be stressed. First, the develop-
ment of a wage labor force is seen as the result of changes in so-
cial relations and productive forces-enclosure, new farming tech-
niques-and not as the consequence of an exogenous change in
the rate of population growth." Demographic expansion is itself a
result of these changes. The decline of services, the growth of wage
employment in agriculture and manufacturing, the shift of the popu-
lation out of strictly agricultural areas, all products of changing rela-
tions of production, led to population growth.85
Second, technological change does not drop from the rafters as a
deus ex machina at an appropriate moment to propel the system
forward. Rather, technological change is viewed as part of the trans-
formation process. New techniques cannot be introduced without
changes in social relations; it is at the same time the possibility and
wish to introduce new techniques that encourages changes in social
relations.86 Farming techniques did improve after 1650 and these
81 See Habbakuk, "English Landownership"; also G.E. Mingay, Enclosure and the Disap-
pearance of the Small Farmer in the Industrial Revolution (London, 1968).
82 Hobsbawm, "Crisis," implies this; Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure," states it explicitly.

Most Marxistanalyses, that of Marx included, emphasize the importance of changes in agricul-
ture. See Marx, Capital, Vol. I, pt. VIII; Dobb, Studies, chap. 6; Saville, "Primitive Accumula-
tion"; Lazonick, "Karl Marx";Cohen and Weitzman, "A Marxian Model."
83 Brenner, "AgrarianClass Structure." There may be a problem with this argument. Aside
from the period between 1650 and 1714, France may have done as well as England. See the
recent article by R. Roehl, "French Industrialization: A Reconsideration," Explorations in
Economic History, 13 (1976), which in spite of its peculiar framework is a provocative piece.
8' Cohen and Weitzman, "A Marxian Model," and Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure."
Chambers, "Enclosure," does not explain why population grows. It just does and it is this
expansion that provides the wage labor force for industry and agriculture.
85 Habbakuk,"English Populationin the Eighteenth Century,"EcHR, 2nd ser., 6 (1953), and
"The Economic History of Modem Britain," this JOURNAL, 18 (1958).
86 Anderson, Passages, contends that social relations must alter before new techniques can
be introduced once a mode of production has pushed to the limits of expansion within the old
 The Marxist School 51
new methodswere importantfactorsin the transformation of agricul-
ture. But it is misleadingto awardto technologicalchangethe status
of prime moverwhen, in fact, changesin techniquesthemselvesare
productsof changes in "organizational" arrangements.87

Trade
Between 1640 and 1660 English foreign policy was transformed.
From that time on, business interests dominatedpolicy decisions,
andfromabout1660to 1720Englandunderwenta veritablecommer-
cial revolution.There is no need to repeat here the details of these
changes.88 But it is useful to point out one aspect of policy that tends
to be overlooked in conventional histories. The Navigation Acts, the
keystone of England's new commercial policy, were not intended
simply to wrest the carrying trade from Holland or to build up
English shipping. They were designed as well to reshape trade rela-
tions between the mother country and the colonies very much along
the lines of Hobsbawm's "new colonialism." That is, the objective was
to turn the colonies into consumers of English manufactured goods
and suppliers of raw materials for English industries and for re-export
markets. For the most part, the policies were successful.89
Hill attempts to add a further dimension to this story. He suggests
that the chance to export manufactured goods to captive colonial
markets gave English producers an opportunity to develop to the
point at which they could compete in the eighteenth-century Euro-
pean markets.90Presumably Hill means that English producers were
able to develop their business techniques, perhaps expand enough to
experience economies of scale, and to train their work force. The
expansion of trade was indeed a critical factor in England's growth in
the eighteenth century and the metropolis-hinterland relationship
that developed was important. But there is a shortage of quantitative

framework. It should be noted that this discussion does not provide a theory of technological
change. See below for Marxist contributions on technological change.
87 Jones, ed., Agriculture, Intro., makes this kind of technological argument. Saville, "Primi-
tive Accumulation," calls Jones' discussion technical history, not economic history.
as See W. Minchinton, ed., The Growth of English Overseas Trade (London, 1969), Intro.,
and the articles by Ralph Davis in the collection. R. Grassby, "The Personal Wealth of the
Business Community in Seventeenth Century England," EcHR, 2nd ser., 23 (1970), is only
partly successful in his attempt to estimate the wealth in the business community. This is an
important subject that deserves more work. It would be useful in particular to know how the
mercantile wealth which was accumulated in liquid form was used.
89 The slave trade was a bonus. It offered an outlet for manufactured goods, it provided a
colonial work force, and it made many Englishmen very rich.
'I Hill, Century, p. 213.
 52 Cohen
studies that measure the impact of the commercial changes on
capitalist development.91
Industrial Development and Factory Production
It was in industrial production that capitalism achieved its potential
for expansion. In pre-capitalist manufacturingprocesses, the means of
production were often owned or controlled by the individual pro-
ducer, scale was usually small, and even when it was not, there was
very little division of labor; each operator produced a finished prod-
uct. With the separation of workers from the means of production,
greater division of labor, and routinization of the work process, mi-
nute specialization was possible and capital was able to extend its
control over the production process.92
The first step in this evolution was putting-out. The merchant-
manuficturer organized distribution and provided materials but he
still lacked control over production; the means of production were
held by the operators, work was carried out under the worker's own
supervision, and the final product was turned over to the putter-out
upon completionY3 Putting-out had advantages over urban craft pro-
duction; part-time laborers, usually agricultural workers, could be
used and guild regulations could be circumvented.94 Putting-out also
had drawbacks:it was difficult to control quality, to prevent stealing
by workers, and to increase output because of workers' preferences
for leisure over more income past a certain income level. Division of
labor and technological innovation were discouraged, the power to
speed up operations and to stretch out working days was restricted.
These are well-known features of putting-out. In effect, they all
stemmed from the putter-out's inability to regulate the actual process
of production. This restricted capital's ability to increase profits.95
91 Minchinton, ed., Growth of English Overseas Trade, Intro., suggests some areas to
investigate, but the actual work is yet to be done.
92 Dobb, Studies, chap. 7, brings this out. H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital

(New York, 1974), is concerned exclusively with this process. Braverman'sbook is a masterpiece
of economic analysis.
9' Dobb, Studies; Braverman, Labor; S. Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management
(London, 1965); G. Unwin, Samuel Oldknow and the Arkwrights (Manchester, 1924); S.
Marglin, "What Do Bosses Do?" Review of Radical Political Economy, 6 (1974).
" Margin contends that putting-out also allowed the merchant to interpose himself between
the market and the producer, thus guaranteeing himself a piece of the action ("What Do Bosses
Do?"). This argument runs the risk of divorcing the putting-out system from its historical
setting. Putters-out had skills, access to capital, and knowledge of markets which it would be a
mistake to overlook. See Dobb, Studies; also Dobb, "Reply I," and Takahashi, "A Contribu-
tion," in Hilton, ed., Transition. G. Unwin, Industrial Organization in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries (Oxford, 1904), provides one of the best descriptions of the origins of
putting-out.
95 Braverman, Labor; Pollard, Genesis; Marx, Capital, I; Dobb, Studies. Marglin, "What Do
 The M-arxistSchool 53
The factory facilitated greater exploitation, more rapid accumula-
tion, and constant technological innovations. In the first phase of
factory production, strict discipline and tight regulation of the work
force were of paramount importance to the factory owner. As factory
production evolved, as workers became conditioned to factory labor
and also more organized, as the state for various reasons introduced
legislation to mitigate the worst aspects of factory labor, technological
change became the driving force of capitalist expansion. Much work
by Marxists has focused on factory discipline and technological
change. In what remains of this section contributions in these areas
will be considered. First, however, it would be useful to consider one
result of the debate over the conditions of the English working class
during the initial phase of the industrial revolution.
The Conditions of the Working Class
It would be impossible to provide in this essay a summary of one of
the longest running and least conclusive debates in the economic
history literature. The effort would in any case be redundant since A.
J. Taylor, in his introduction to collected articles on the debate, has
written an admirable overview.96 In spite of the enormous quantity of
literature on this issue, E. P. Thompson's book on the making of the
English working class continues to tower over other contributions and
not because of noble sentiments or proper passions.97 Hobsbawm
captures part of Thompson's achievement with the observation that,
"The question as formulated by Thompson is important because it
raises the whole nature of society and industrialization under
capitalist conditions and changes produced by one on the other.
"98 But there is more. Thompson documents the making of the

Bosses Do?" argues that factory production, at least initially, may not have increased economic
efficiency as most economic historians believe. In factories, workers were compelled to labor
more hours per day at speeds set not by themselves but by bosses. Thus, factory output may
have been greater per worker but the workers were working more. Marglin dismisses the
freedom of choice argument-workers chose factory labor, therefore, they were better off-
with evidence that suggests that many early factory workers were there not out of choice but
through compulsion.
9
A. J. Taylor, ed., The Standard of Living in Britain in the Industrial Revolution (London,
1975), Intro. See also, B. Inglis, "The Poor Who Were with Us," Encounter, 37 (1971). F.
Engels, The Condition of the English Working Class in 1844 (Oxford, 1958), still remains an
important source of information on the working class during the period. The edition referred to
above of Engels' classic was translated by W. 0. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner who, in their
introduction, attempted to discredit the work. Inglis and Hobsbawm have since discredited the
introduction of Henderson and Chaloner. Taylor has brought together many of the most
interesting articles in the debate and has provided a good bibliography.
7 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York, 1963).
9 Hobsbawm, "The Standard of Living Debate," in Taylor, ed., The Standard of Living, p.
187.
54 Cohen
working class according to those who made it, the workers. To ac-
complish this, he explores all those aspects of contemporary society
that shaped individuals' perceptions of themselves and moulded them
into a conscious class; changes in relations of production, in location of
work, in religion, education, material conditions, and political
pressures.99 He tries to delineate on the basis of the experiences of
those who lived it what went into developing class consciousness and
the will to act as a class.100These are, of course, fundamental issues
for Marxists. Even those who do not agree with Thompson's defini-
tions of class consciousness, and his methods of analyzing them, must
acknowledge the importance of the questions raised by the book and
the need to raise them for other periods and places.101
Work and Work Discipline
Whether or not material conditions improved, as Thompson points
out, the workers experienced the changes as catastrophes.102What
was it about the nature of factory work, at least in the beginning, that
caused workers to resist it? There are two related explanations for this
reaction by workers. Some have argued that the factories changed the
nature of exploitation. Labor power itself became a commodity and
capital instead of purchasing labor embodied in goods bought labor
power directly. Once purchased, the rate of surplus value and profits
depended on the factory owner's ability to manage his work force.
The personnel problems encountered by the early factory masters,
irregularity, absenteeism, and poor discipline, were, of course, not
problems in cottage production or farming where patterns of work
and leisure were associated with the nature of the tasks that had to be
accomplished.'03 But in factories the patterns of work were funda-
mentally altered and the imperatives were different. Division of
" Thompson, The Making, esp. pt. III.
100 See ibid., Intro., for an eloquent statement of his intentions and why.
101 Brenner's attempt in "Agrarian Class Structure" to show how class consciousness was
shaped among Eastern and Western peasants is a step in the right direction. Braverman,Labor,
explores the impact of technological change and scientific management on the nature of work
and work conditions. His findings have implications for class consciousness. Dobb, Studies,
chap. 7, analyzes the relationship between social relations and class consciousness. A new
journal, History Workshop, promises to deliver more studies of this sort. J. Foster, Class
Struggle and the Industrial Revolution (London, 1974), attempts to analyze the development of
working class consciousness in three provincial towns in England in the nineteenth century.
The book does not receive in this essay the attention it deserves. The book as well as the review
by G. Stedman-Jones, "Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution," New Left Review, 90
(1975), are well worth reading.
1a0 Thompson, The Making, p. 212.
106 Thompson, "Time, Work Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present, 38

(1967).
 The Marxist School 55
labor required coordinationof activities; traditional work habits
which did not necessitate such coordinationwere now considered
unacceptable.Specializationand fragmentationbrokethe connection
between effortand finalproduct,the basisof taskorientationof work.
Finally, the pace of work and regularityof work came to be set by
masters,not men.04 Time was money;the employerknew this and
his workershad to learn it.105
The job of the factorymasterthen was to teachworkersthe rules of
the new system. But, and this is the secondpoint, productivityin the
factorieswas not much higher than in cottages. To make factories
profitable,workershad to be compelled to laborlong hours for low
pay under poor work conditions.In fact, informationon discipline,
work regulations,and other controlsin the early factoriesindicates
that measureswere harshand that workerswere naturallyreluctant
participantsin the system.06 As Usherobserves,it was only through
technologicaldevelopmentsespeciallyadaptedto factoryproduction
that these new work places were able to establish their economic
superiorityover cottages.107
TechnologicalChange
In the long run, therefore,the key to the successof factoryproduc-
tion lay not in the ability of employersto squeeze more effortout of
their employees but in the apparentcompatibilityof factorieswith
technologicalinnovation.
As Marxindicated,putting-outand manufactories(in his sense) led
to a greater division of labor than was used in guild, artisan, or
handicraftprocesses.108There were, however, limits to growth of
productivitywithin manufacturingbecause this system rested exclu-
sively on the divisionof laborand continuedto retainthe characterof
handicraft.Productionwas dependent on the skill, strength, quick-
ness, and surenessof the individualworkperson.109But manufacture

104 Braverman, Labor; Marx, Capital, I, chap. 15.

105 Thompson, "Time," gives a graphic account of how the workers' concept of time changed
and the efforts involved in changing it.
108 Pollard, "Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution," EcHR, 2nd ser., 16 (1963);
Thompson, "Time"; Hobsbawm, "Custom, Wages, and Work-Load in Nineteenth Century
Industry," in A. Briggs and J. Saville, eds., Essays in Labour History (London, 1960); D. A.
Reid, "The Decline of Saint Monday, 1766-1876," Past and Present, 71 (1976).
107 A. P. Usher, An Introduction to the Industrial History of England (New York, 1920), p.
350.
108 See Unwin, Samuel Oldknow, for a detailed description of the division of labor associated
with certain putting-out operations.
"09N. Rosenberg, "Marx as a Student of Technology," Monthly Review, 38 (1976).
 56 Cohen
did provide a breakdownof the productiveprocess into a series of
analyzablesteps which was essentialfor the next step, the incorpora-
tion of these individualactivitiesinto machineprocesses. As Rosen-
berg points out, once this was accomplishedit became possible to
apply scientific knowledgeand principlesto the productionprocess
itself in a routineway and thus to revolutionizeconstantlythe means.
of production.
In all of this one changewas crucial,the productionof machinesby
means of machines. To Marx this was one of the most significant
aspectsof capitalistdevelopment.It was for this reason,for example,
thathe laid so much stresson the historicalimportanceof Maudslay's
slide rest.110The importanceof this changecan easilybe seen. Divide
an economy into two sectors, one which produces the means of
production,the other consumptiongoods. In such an economy the
ability to apply scientific knowledgeto the productionof machines
facilitatesthe development of capital-savingtechnology. In other
words, technologicalchangein the sector that producesthe meansof
productiontends to reduce the cost of machinesused in the produc-
tion of machinesand consumergoods. Thus, the productionof ma-
chines by machinesmeant that growthwith technologicalchangedid
not necessarilyimply a rising organiccompositionof capital nor a
tendency for the rate of profit to fall.111
This is for the most part unexploredterrain;Marxlooked it over
briefly and left it. Much remainsto be done along these lines.

CONCLUSIONS

Anyonefamiliarwith Marxistcontributionsto economichistorywill

realize the extent to which this paper falls short of a comprehensive
surveyof the literature.For the mostpart, articlesin Englishand the
historicaldevelopmentof Englandtend to dominatethe discussion.
This does not in any way constitutea judgmentabout the qualityof
workdone in other languagesnor does it impute a particularimpor-
tance to the case of England.It merelyseemed to me most appropri-
ate to concentrateon Englishlanguagematerialsand on the historyof
110 Marx, Capital, I, chap. 15.
"ll Neoclassical economics caught up with notions of homogeneous, malleable capital is
incapable of dealing with such notions. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology (Cambridge,
1976), presents some interesting critiques of neoclassical theories of technological change. J.
Robinson, "The Organic Composition of Capital" (MS.) makes a similar point to the one
developed in the text. Dobb, Studies, pp. 280-90 misses this point. He contends that improve-
ments must come in the sectors that produce the means of subsistence if capital accumulation is
not to lead to a decline in the rate of profit.
 The Marxist School 57
a country with which most readers have some familiarity. The essay
also stresses recent contributions to the literature. The purpose of this
emphasis was to bring the reader up to date on Marxist scholarship
and to indicate current directions of research and techniques of
analysis. Since these works build on past research they also provide
an avenue into older literature. I hope that this essay serves as an
adequate introduction to Marxist economic history; readers are en-
couraged to sample some of it and draw their own conclusions about
its achievements and prospects.
JON S. COHEN, University of Toronto