1. Pedro Elcano, Et Al., V. Reginal Hill Et Al.

(1977)
Laws Applicable: ART. 2177,Article 397,article 1093,Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Tort and Damages)

FACTS:

 Reginald Hill, a minor, married but living with his father, Atty. Marvin Hill with whom
he was living and getting subsistence killed Agapito Elcano
 CFI Civil Case: dismissed on the ground that he was acquitted on the ground that
his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake
 Spouses Elcano appealed
ISSUES:
1. W/N the civil action should be barred by the acquittal of criminal action - NO
2. W/N the Civil Code can be applied to Atty. Marvin Hill even though Reginald is
already married -YES
HELD: order appealed from is reversed

1. NO.
 separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime.
 If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of
the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life
 to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
 in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law
 It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.
2. YES
 While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He
 can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."

 Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible
 the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it
that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by
their minor married child without their consent
 Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

2. Rafael Reyes Trucking vs Pp. GR 145391

Facts:

In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan
bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer “Grande” bottles. Seated at
the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper. At around 4:00 o’clock that
same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at
Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the
truck’s right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road
uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged
portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and
Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade
this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming
vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the
wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca’s vehicle
rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above
said shoulder where it finally stopped. The Nissan was severely damaged and its two passengers,
namely, Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. On October 10, 1989, Provincial
Prosecutor Durian filed with the RTC an amended information charging Dunca with reckless
imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property. On November 29, 1989, the
offended parties filed with the RTC a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation,
as employer of driver Dunca, based on quasi delict. Respondents opted to pursue the criminal action
but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15,
1989, respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and
manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. However, they
did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising
from the same act or omission of the accused driver. The RTC held that the driver was guilty.
Respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold
petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private respondents in the event of
insolvency of the accused, which the lower court granted.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident may be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver
despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the truck
driver; and

(2) Whether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite
the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver.

Held:

(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the
injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice
for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.In other
words, “the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is,
civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto” either of which “may be enforced against the
culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not
recover damages under both types of liability.” In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file
a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi
delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioner, as employer of the accused
who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily
liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the
reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same
was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action
against the employer. The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether
accused Dunca is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The
action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action
filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. The policy against double
recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action
is brought against the employee or against his employer. The injured party must choose which of the
available causes of action for damages he will bring.

3. Casapunan vs Laroya GR 145391

Facts:
Respondent filed a criminal action against petitioners for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Damage to Property. While the criminal case is pending, the Petitioners filed with the
MCTC a civil case for Quasi-delict. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said civil
action against him on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the MCTC. They appeal to the RTC, with was also
denied. Hence this case.

Issue:
whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.

Held:
Yes, Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but
may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section
2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil
action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first
a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each
other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil
action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended
party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

4. Sps Santos vs Pizardo GR 151452

CRIMINAL SECTION 3, RULE 111

PROCEDURE
TITLE: G.R. No. 151452
Date: July 29, 2005
SPOUSES SANTOS vs. PIZARDO Ponente: TINGA, J.:
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA
C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, and VIRON
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,
SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners respondents
FACTS:
Case timeline:
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide
and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit
bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three
(3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans
passengers.

After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to
file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial
court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.

On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed
(4 years for action based on quasi-delict.

In this instant case, Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex
delicto and is not based on quasi delict.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the action has prescribed
RATIO:
NO.

A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioner’s claim that
the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of
negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were
pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party
has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.

At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex
quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision
convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability.

We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
 becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.

Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering
petitioners’ allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration
of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
NOTES:

5. Manliclic vs Caulanan GR 150157

FACTS:
1. The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by petitioner PRBLI and
driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza
2. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
- The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the
latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage.
- Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
3. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
4. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI
5. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
6. When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
7. The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

Respondent’s version:
- According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70
kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook
the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the
jeep on the left side.
- At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other
words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit.
- Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on
another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took
place. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Petitioner’s version:
 - The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to
overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep
in front of it.
- Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employee
8. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the TSNs from the criminal case may be admitted in evidence for the civil case.
2. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the criminal case that there was an absence of
negligence on his part.
3. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI, exercised due diligence and supervision of its employee.

HELD: The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly liable for the damages for his negligence or reckless imprudence
based on quasi-delict. The PRBLI is held solidarily liable for the damages caused by the petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.

1. Admissibility of the TSNs

Petitioner’s contention:
- The TSNs should not be admitted to evidence for failure to comply with the requisites of Sec.
47, Rule 130 of the ROC
- The petitioner, PRBLI, had no opportunity to cross examine the witnesses because the criminal
case was filed exclusively against Manliclic.
- Admission of the TSNs will deprive the petitioner of due process.
Court:
- The testimonies are still admissible on the ground that the petitioner failed to object on their
admissibility.
- Failure to object to the inclusion of the evidence is a waiver on the provision of the law.
- In addition, the petitioner even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Ganiban.
- The court disagrees that it would deprive the petitioner of due process. For the failure of the
petitioner to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object for the non compliance with
the ROC.

2. Civil liability arising from crime v. Quasi-delict/Culpa Acquiliana

Petitioner:
- The version of the petitioner deserves more credit as the petitioner was already acquitted by
the CA of the charge of Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical
injuries.
Court:
- From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from or
based on quasi-delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in
causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of
a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees
- it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground
that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.

- In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action
arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
- The extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
 act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused.

In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that arising from quasi-delict:

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

(a) if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from
the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
(b) if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or
ex delicto.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT

- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime.
- The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code. The acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
- civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of
the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist).
- An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

- The petitioners urge the court to give more credence to their version of the story however, as
they constitute a question of fact, it may not be raised as a subject for a petition for review.
Findings of the trial court and appellate court are binding on the Supreme Court.
- The testimony of the petitioner about the jeep of the respondent overtaking another vehicle in
the criminal case was not consistent with what he gave to the investigator which is evidently a
product of an after-thought
- If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision
took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof
rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than
having been forced off the road.

3. PRBLI’s liability
- Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both.
- The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of
such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.

Petitioner’s contention:
- PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees
- In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent
before he became a regular driver.
 - As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence
of ready investigators is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the
supervision of its employees
Court:
- In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof.
- As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of
the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the
selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work.
- The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees
- it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver
as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in
the supervision of its personnel.
o no evidence introduced that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the
safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles
o no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver
should behave while operating their vehicles
o The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough. Same
does not comply with the guidelines set forth with regard to the supervision.
o Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown
and established.
o the lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual
containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers
- For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

6. Franco vs IAC GR 71137

FACTS:
The instant petition deals mainly with the nature of an employer's liability for his
employee's negligent act.
At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the
northbound Franco Bus with Plate No. XY320-PUB he was driving to the left to avoid
hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented pavement of the
MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an
incoming Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate No. YL-735 being driven by one Magdaleno Lugue
and making a collision between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous
eventuality.
Dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway the length of the
parked truck with trailer), the mini bus landed right side down facing south in the canal
of the highway, a total wreck. The Franco Bus was also damaged but not as severely.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the two (2) drivers, Macario Yuro and Magdaleno
Lugue, and two (2) passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.

Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs.
Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of
driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for damages through reckless
imprudence against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and operators of the Franco
Transportation Company

ISSUE:

Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents
was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict.
yes under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code

RULING:

Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under
the Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which
is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles
102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provide as follows:
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keepers and
proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons criminally
liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special
police regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods

taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein,
or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposits of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also
apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties;
while the second kind is governed by the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry,
xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a
delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose
primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the
employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there
should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and
corresponding liability therefor are proved.

In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who
should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the
damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap
died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that
their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability.
On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability
is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious
acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.

Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose the
primary liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its alleged reckless
driver, we confront ourselves with the plausibility of defendants-petitioners' defense that
they observed due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employees. On this point, the appellate court has unequivocally spoken in
affirmation of the lower court's findings, to wit:

“Anyway, a perusal of the record shows that the appellants were not able
to establish the defense of a good father of a family in the supervision of
their bus driver. “
Consequently, therefore, we find petitioners liable for the damages claimed pursuant
to their primary liability under the Civil Code.
7.