E. MERRITT vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS The Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act
Facts: Merrit, riding on a motorcycle, was struck by a General Hospital ambulance
when the ambulance turned suddenly and unexpectedly into the right side of Taft
Avenue, in violation of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck Merritt.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey
matter and brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in
question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so
weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live.
His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin
in such manner that it might be regarded as double and would be exposed to
infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that
the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that
made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his
head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The
patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his
mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had
to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for
mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental
and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having
received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone
a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had
constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden
buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured
for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he
could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach
the highest parts of the building.
Merritt was forced to dissolve his partnership and give up a contract he was working
on.
be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit against the
Government, in order that the one responsible for the accident and/or the amount of
damages may be settled. Thus, Act 2457 was passed authorizing Merritt to sue the
GPI.
The trial court found that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur
and held the GPI liable, awarding P14,741, together with the costs of the case.
The Attorney-General and Merritt’s counsel appealed the case.
Issues:
a. Who is negligent?
b. Is Act 2457 an admission of liability by the government?
c. May the government be made liable?
Ruling:
a. The chauffer. We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the
trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence
of the chauffeur.
b. No.
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor,
or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense (36 Cyc. 915).
As ruled in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, it simply gives authority to
commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate.
Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the
disposition of the suit shall depart from well-established principles of law, or that
the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This
of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the
Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to
declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter
to mere inference, but would have done so in express terms.
c. No.
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the (old) Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when
the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained
to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall
be applicable.
The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts
through a special agent. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is
an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and
which are regulated by law and the regulations.
Special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign
to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official.
Also, one who is duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose.
The chauffer was not a special agent. Consequently, the trial court in sentencing the
said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class
(executive agent) referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
Judgment reversed. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable
for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by
reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and